ARTICLES 147-148: PROPERTY REGIME OF
UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE read consistently with Article 129.
1. VALDEZ VS. RTC
Case Doctrine:
● In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court
granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage
null and void. It also directed the parties to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following
clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147
of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in
common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions
on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which
was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article
147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles
50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of
the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3)
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who
has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit
a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,
13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void.
2. AGAPAY VS. PALANG
Facts:
Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left
to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their
only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with
Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a
subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay.
Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A
house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation
as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a
case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels
of land to their only child, Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for
recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issues:
Who owns the riceland?
Who owns the house and lot?
Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise
agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of
the separation of property between Miguel and Carlina
and the termination of their conjugal partnership?
Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son
and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession?
Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-
defendant in the case?
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made
in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15,
1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and
unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22
years of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness,
it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, there being no proof of the same.
In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the
riceland was bought 2 months before she and Miguel
actually cohabited to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the
precise date when they commenced their adulterous
cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state
definitively that the riceland was purchased even before
they started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of
actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money
to the purchase price of the riceland, there is no basis to
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal
partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s
name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of
the Civil Code because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
3. No. Separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order
or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment
which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not
specifically and expressly for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent,
proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims
thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court
or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a
party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be
called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in
the case at bar.
3. TUMLOS VS. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an
action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and
Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building that through their tolerance they allowed the
Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years
without payment of any rent. It was agreed that
Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other
defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was
not complied with. Demand was made several times for
the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need
of the property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma
had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was likewise
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals
from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said
apartment under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-
owners of the subject property. The claim was not
satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no
other evidence presented to validate it except for the said
affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited
with Mario and that she bore him two children were true,
the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted.
Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The
property relation governing their supposed cohabitation
is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual
contribution is required by the said provision in contrast
to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by
one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such
is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not
proven then there can be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
4. SAGUID VS. CA
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but
separated de facto from her husband, when she met and
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the
parties
HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution
is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code,
article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00
for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed
in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal.
5. ACRE VS. YUTTIKKI
FACTS:
Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his
prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting.
Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one
parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline
Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of
land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki,
married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married
to Jose del Mar. Sofronio died after more than 24 years
of union with Evangeline.
The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of properties and/or partition with damages.
They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject
properties with his fund.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested
properties.
RULING:
Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested
properties.
The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls
under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering
that their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148,
properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both
of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.
The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that
Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the
contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not
exist here.
The certificate of title on its face show that the one
property was exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the
other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is
well-settled that the words "married to" preceding
Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Evangeline.
ARTICLES 150-151: FAMILY RELATIONS
1. GAYON VS. GAYON
FACTS:
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro
Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially
that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed
— copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for
the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein
described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan,
municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including
the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within
five(5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre
Gayon, Genoveva d eGayon, or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor;
that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had,
by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was
attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March
21, 1961, sold theafore mentioned land to plaintiff Pedro
Gayon for the sum of P614.00;that plaintiff had, since
1961, introduced thereon improvements worthP1,000;
that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said
property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of
our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the
consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired
through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that
an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the
consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned
property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon
alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case;
that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's
favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had
embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of
Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel
for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least
P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the
amicable settlement of the case" before filing his
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be
dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an
earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of
the suit is tenable.
HELD:
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case,
Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
thesame have failed, subject to the limitations in article
2035.”
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising
from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained
between members of the same family." This phrase,
"members of the same family," should, however, be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas
her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in
said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it
being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre
Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case
at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
same.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby
set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre
Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence
of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings,
not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
2. ESQUIVIAS VS. CA
Facts:
Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of
land with an area of 1,260 square meters and the two-
storey house standing thereon. In 1950 she
extrajudicially constituted this property into a family
home. Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon
and Jose G. Domalaon, among other children, were
named beneficiaries thereof.
On March 11, 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by Julia Galpo de Domalaon in favor of her
son-in-law, Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia
Domalaon.
On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by
Julia Galpo de Domalaon with the conformity of all her
children. Afterwards, another deed of sale was executed
by her dated 12 April 1977 transferring to Jose G.
Domalaon the house and lot which once constituted the
family home.
Prior to the sale of the property to him, or on 21 October
1976, Jose already filed two (2) applications for Free
Patent in his name covering the entire property. When
his first application was approved, a certificate of
title was issued on 11 February 1981. His rights over the
other application covering the rest of the property were
relinquished by him in favor of his sister Elena. It turned
out later that Elena G. Domalaon also succeeded in her
application for Free Patent and a certificate of title was
issued in her name on 18 March 1985.
Alleging that it was only in 1981 that she came to know
that the document she signed in favor of Atty. Salvador
S. Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed of sale, Julia
Galpo de Domalaon filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law and
lawyer of the Domalaons, Atty. Esquivias took
advantage of her trust and confidence and poor eyesight
by representing that the document was a sale of her land
in favor of all her children.
RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed the case on the basis of its finding that there
was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of
Art. 222 of the New Civil Code; hence, the instant
petition.
Issue: W/N the complaint was rightfully dismissed
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-
in-law of Jose and Elena Domalaon. Atty. Esquivias is
not a member of the family of his wife and is outside the
scope and coverage of the law requiring that the same
members of a family should exert efforts to bring about a
compromise before the commencement of a litigation.
We agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code
provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made but the same have failed. The reason for the
law is that a lawsuit between family members generates
deeper bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it is
necessary that every effort should be made towards a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
and passion in the family.
But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code
applies only to suits between or among members of the
same family. The phrase "between members of the same
family" should be construed in the light of Art. 217 of
the Civil Code under which "family relations" include
only those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between
parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their
descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S.
Esquivias is not included in the enumeration of who are
members of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-
law of respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his
marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with
respondents is based on affinity and not on
consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is concerned,
he is a stranger with respect to the family of his wife
and, as such, the mandatory requirement of "earnest
effort toward a compromise" does not apply to him. In
Magbaleta v. Gonong we ruled that "efforts to
compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the
family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or
indispensable one. An alien to the family may not be
willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish,
the delay and the complications that wranglings between
and among relatives more often than not entail. Besides,
it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family
be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to
have innocently acquired some interest in a property by
virtue of his affinity to the parties. Contrary to the ruling
of the Court of Appeals, we find no reason to give Art.
222 a broader scope than its literal import.
3. SANDEJAS VS. IGNACIO, JR.
Facts:
Arturo drew up a check, UCPB Check No. GRH-560239
and wrote on it the name of the payee, Dr. Manuel Borja,
but left blank the date and amount. He signed the check.
The check was left with Arturo's sister-in-law, who was
instructed to deliver or give it to Benjamin. The check
later came to the possession of Alice who felt that Arturo
cheated their sister Rosita in the amount of three million
pesos (P3,000,000.00). She believed that Arturo and
Rosita had a joint and/or money market placement in the
amount of P3 million with the UCPB branch at Ortigas
Ave., San Juan and that Ignacio preterminated the
placement and ran away with it, which rightfully
belonged to Rosita. She together with Rosita drew up a
scheme to recover the P3 million from Arturo. Alice got
her driver, Kudera, to stand as the payee of the check,
Dr. Borja.
Alice and Rosita came to SBC Greenhills
Branch together with a man (Kudera) who[m] they
introduced as Dr. Borja to the then Assistant Cashier
Luis. They opened a Joint Savings Account. As initial
deposit for the Joint Savings Account, Alice, Rosita and
Kudera deposited the check. Thereafter, they
successfully widraw the amount. Arturo Ignacio, Jr. and
Evelyn Ignacio (respondents) filed a verified complaint
for recovery of a sum of money and damages. Judgment
is rendered in favor of plaintiffs as against defendants
Security Bank and Trust Co., Rene Colin Gray, Sonia
Ortiz Luis, Alice A.I. Sandejas and Rosita A.I. Cusi.
The counterclaims of Patricia A.I. Sandejas are
dismissed. Both parties appealed the RTC Decision to
the CA. The defendants-appellants Security Bank and
Trust Company, Rene Colin D. Gray, Sonia Ortiz-Luis,
Alice A.I. Sandejas, and Rosita A.I. Cusi, are ordered to
jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs. Petitioners and
SBTC, together with Gray and Ortiz-Luis, filed their
respective petitions for review before this Court.
Issue:
1.Whether or not Alice and Rosita are justified in
encashing the subject check given the factual
circumstances established in the present case.
2.Whether or not the petitioners can hold respondent
liable for moral damages as effect of his complaint.
Ruling:
Petitioners' posture is not sanctioned by law. If they truly
believe that Arturo took advantage of and violated the
rights of Rosita, petitioners should have sought redress
from the courts and should not have simply taken the
law into their own hands. Our laws are replete with
specific remedies designed to provide relief for the
violation of one's rights. It is true that Article 151 of the
Family Code requires that earnest efforts towards a
compromise be made before family members can
institute suits against each other.
However, nothing in the law sanctions or allows the
commission of or resort to any extra-legal or illegal
measure or remedy in order for family members to avoid
the filing of suits against another family member for the
enforcement or protection of their respective rights. As
to Patricia's entitlement to damages, this Court has held
that while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
nevertheless essential that the claimant should
satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages and its causal connection to defendants acts.
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA were not
convinced that Patricia is entitled to damages. In
addition, and with respect to Benjamin, the Court agrees
with the CA that in the absence of a wrongful act or
omission, or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot
be awarded.
4. LEE VS. CA
ARTICLES 153-154: FAMILY HOME
1. MANACOP VS. CA
FACTS:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost
pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein,
the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of
money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against
the former. As a consequence of the order on July 28,
1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy
was issued on August11, 1989 which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by
Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop,
herein petitioner. The petitioner insists that the attached
property is a family home, having been occupied by him
and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
attachment.
ISSUE:
That the parcel of land is a Family Home and cannot be
subject for attachment.
HELD:
Petitioner belief that his abode at Quezon City since
1972 is a family home within the purview of the Family
Code and therefore should not have been subjected to
the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that
respondent court properly applied the discussion
conveyed by Justice Gancayco in this regard when he
spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo
vs. Breva (185 SCRA 766[1990]) that:
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered
service for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from
the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered
a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in1969 is not well-taken. Under
Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution
of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or
liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or
was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988.Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).
Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in
1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This
fact alone will militate heavily against the so-called
exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under
paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in
Modequillo.
2. CABANG VS. BASAY
Facts:
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot
No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied
nor took possession of the lot.
On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real
property from the heirs of Felix Odong for
P8,000.00. The latter also did not occupy the said
property.
Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the
same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They
were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot
No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the
said cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed
Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were
actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out,
however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the
townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot
No. 7778 was used by the government as a public road
and as there were many discrepancies in the areas
occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-
appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees.
RTC ruled in favor of the defendants. CA reversed the
said decision. Petitioners insist that the property subject
of the controversy is a duly constituted family home
which is not subject to execution, thus, they argue that
the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of
the trial court.
Issue: W/N the improvements introduced by petitioners
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate
them from their predicament.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
As defined, [T]he family home is a sacred symbol of
family love and is the repository of cherished memories
that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house
where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a
family reside, including the land on which it is
situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family. Article 153 of
the Family Code provides that
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in
urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the
afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.
There can be no question that a family home is generally
exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted
as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must
be constituted on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Indeed, as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v.
Planters Products, Inc. [T]he family home must be part
of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property
of the unmarried head of the family. In other words:
The family home must be established on the properties
of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal
partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either
spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on
community property, or conjugal property and partly on
the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent
of the latter.
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where
there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it
can be constituted only on his or her own property.
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of
petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the
stark and immutable fact is that the property on which
their alleged family home stands
is owned by respondents and the question of ownership
had been long laid to rest with the finality of the
appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.
55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject
land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
3. SPS. DE MESA VS. ACERO
FACTS:
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero
which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. When Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan,
the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses Acero
was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate
of sale was issued to them. Thereafter, they leased the
subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then defaulted
in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals
due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment
against Spouses De Mesa. In their defense, Spouses De
Mesa claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the
subject property. They deny that they are mere lessors,
alleging that they are the lawful owners of the subject
property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom. The
MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. Spouses De Mesa
appealed the Decision.
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify
the title of Spouses Acero on the basis that the subject
property is a family home which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have
not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying
their unpaid loan. The RTC dismissed their complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is exempt from execution
HELD:
It is without dispute that the family home, from the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment. However, this right
can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set
up and prove the status of the property as a family home
at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
himself before the sale of the property at public auction.
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This
claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence
or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right,
it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove
the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject
property as a family home.
ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 &171: LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN; GROUNDS TO IMPUGN
LEGITIMACY
1. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria
Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig,
herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation
propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was
suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His
brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house
and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly
move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September
1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house
of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1,
1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the
deceased
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943
and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is
presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he
was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously
sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
absence during the initial period of conception,
impotence which is patent, and incurable; and
imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation
took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other
than the husband during the initial period does not
preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son
of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel
land.
2. BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had
various properties. They both died intestate. The special
proceedings for administration of the properties were
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio
filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of
the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that
she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is
capable of administering his estate. She submitted the
pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives
of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence,
that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa
was not the biological child of the spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family
Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA
reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa
Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late
spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate
child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child
is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain
couple.
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file
an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by
Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born
to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses.
Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-
law are the sole heirs of the estate.
3. DE JESUS VS. ESTATE OF DIZON
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage
that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992.
Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a complaint on 01 July 1993
for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the
Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status
of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.
The trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of
petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship
could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as
petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
ISSUE: WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate
children of the late Juan Dizon
HELD:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners
were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes
the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the
deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This
issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted
to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in
lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
4. PEOPLE VS. UMANITO
FACTS:
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused
Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA,
had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child
hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as
well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court
deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father
of BBB.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to
the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not
to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe
the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or
other information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time
as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the
biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the
alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above
findings, there is a99.9999% probability of paternity that
Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense
admitted that if the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of
[BBB].
RULING:
Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
(DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary
conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito
had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990,
nine months after the day she said she was raped by
Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3). The disputable
presumption that was established as a result of the DNA
testing was not contradicted and overcome by other
evidence considering that the accused did not object to
the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits
"A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is
deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime
of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private
complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and
that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the
penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
deny Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The instant
case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED
ARTICLES 172 &175: PROOF OF FILIATION
1. FERNANDEZ VS. CA
2. JISON VS. CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint
against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as
illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20
years after her mother’s death and when she was already
39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940
and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his
acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
petitioner supported her and spent for her education such
that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate
child of Francisco Jison.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the
same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established.
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.
The following facts was established based on the
testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was
conceived at the time when her mother was employed by
the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child
through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates
and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of
age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in
the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to
have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the
“high standard of proof required for the success of an
action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying
upon the provision on “open and continuous
possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation,
even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within
the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
3. TIJING VS. CA
Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife,
they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo
Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched
Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she
usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was
doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to
get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and
despite her and her husband‘s efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their child‘s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of
Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita,
whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and
allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John
Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita
as her own son, sired by her common-law husband
Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita
and Tomas for it was the latter‘s own brother who
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an
accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal
marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita.
Tomas‘ brother even testified that Tomas himself
admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the
subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce
the competent evidences to establish the child‘s filiation
with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim
with sufficient
clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child‘s birth.
Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone
ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and
the admission of Tomas‘ own brother that Tomas was
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could
have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married which is false because
even private respondent had admitted she is a common-
law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in
said birth certificate.
4. GOTARDO VS. BULING
FACTS:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
complaint with the RTC of Maasin,Southern Leyte, for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
claiming that the CharlesGotardo is the father of her
child Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied the paternity.
Parties’ failed to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC
terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trialon the merits
ensued.
Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed that she
met Charles (accounting supervisor) onDecember 1,
1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leytebranch.
Charles courted Divina in the third week of December
1992 and they became sweethearts in thelast week of
January 1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting
cards on special occasions, (Valentine’s Day and her
birthday); she reciprocated his love and took care of him
when he was ill.
In September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual
relations with the respondent in the former’s rented room
in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo (Divina’s
uncle). Rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August
30, 1994.
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and
became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on
August 8, 1994, she got pregnant. Charles was happy
and made plans to marryDivina. BUT, Charles backed
out of the wedding plan. (Divina filed for damages for
breach of promise to marry but was amicably settled).
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. (When
Charles did not show up and failed toprovide support to
Gliffze, Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24,
1995 for recognition andsupport of their son)
Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in
Court.
Charles denied being Gliffze’s father in Court.
RTC
– approved monthly child support. RTC (appeal)
– reversed former decision
CA
– ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and give
monthly child support
ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child
support and to be recognized as Charles’ son.
HELD: YES.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private hand written instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation
may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his]pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible]under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.”
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman
declares
—supported by corroborative proof
—that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father. We explained further that the two affirmative
defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to
either physical absence or impotency, or(2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception. In this case, the respondent established a
prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of
her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that
the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not
deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent,
only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3)
months pregnant already in September 1994 when he
was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack
of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may
be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
5. SALAS VS. MATUSALEM
ARTICLE 176: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
PARENTAL AUTHORITY; RA NO. 9255 (2004)
1. TONOG VS. CA
Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and
sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as
a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
father and grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over
Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the
court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the
court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for
custody over Gardin.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who
modified their previous decision and granted Edgar
custody over Gardin.
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother
of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to
be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child
who is below seven years of age for “compelling
reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If
older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state
his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.
The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of
child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered
be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the as a recognition of paternity
other parent, or even to a third person.
RULING: YES.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the
controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did
private handwritten instrument must be signed by
not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art.
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
175 and 172. It is therefore implied.
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people Special circumstances to the case:
and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.  Died 2 months prior to child’s birth

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child  Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the  Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment
special proceedings before the trial court. by father and brother who stand to be affected
2. DELA CRUZ VS. GRACIA by their hereditary rights

FACTS: The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

 Dominique and Jenie were living together 1. Where the private handwritten instrument is
without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 filiation, there should be strict compliance with
months before Jenie gave birth. the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent
 Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s
birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino. 2. Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and
 When Jenie applied for registration of child’s competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
birth, Jenie attached the ff.: filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as
 Certificate of Live Birth
it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
 AUSF, together with Dominique’s
3. GRANDE VS. ANTONIO
handwritten autobiography
 Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by
Dominique’s father and brother
 Respondent denied the registration because the
child was born out of wedlock.
 Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition
because the document (autobiography) was
unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father) which states that:
 “Private handwritten instrument must be
duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity”
 Furthermore, petition was denied because the
document did not contain any express
recognition of paternity.