12 Chapter 3

CHAPTER-III
FIR AND DELAY
A. INTRODUCTION
Prompt lodging of information of commission of cognizable offence at the first
available opportunity is supposed to be true version without any addition, embellishment
and concoction. The chances of missing links outside influence after thought and
additions are removed, where the memory is fresh and information is given without any
loss of time. In past their was many hardships in registering a case, as distance of Police
Station and Place of occurrence, transport and communication mediums, but some of
these factors have been extinguished by the lapse of time.
In Bathula Nagamalleswara Rao & Ors. V. State Rep. By Public Prosecutor1
the Apex court held that Delay in lodging of FIR, if justifiably explained, will not fatal.
An undue delay in lodging a First Information Report is always looked with a certain
amount of suspicion and should as far as possible be avoided.
Delay in lodging FIR can be of three types:
(1) Delay in lodging First Information Report by informant;
(2) Delay in recording First Information Report by the officer-in-charge of the police
station;
(3) Delay in dispatching the First Information Report to the Magistrate.
First Information Report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable
piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial.
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The importance of the report can hardly be over estimated from the stand point of
accused. In State of Rajasthan V. Om Prakash2 the honorable Supreme Court decided
that there was delay of nearly 26 hours in lodging the FIR. The offence is alleged to
have taken place at about 9 a.m. The FIR was registered at about 11.30 a.m. on the next
day. It was contended by Mr. Bachawat, Learned Counsel for the respondent that this
delay had assumed importance and was fatal particularly when the brother of the
prosecutrix, namely, Mam Raj (PW-6) was admittedly at the house. The delay, according
1 2008(2) CRIMES 188 (SC) at page 189.

2 AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 2235 para 9.
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to the counsel, has resulted in embellishments. Reliance has been placed on the decision
in the case of Thulia Kali V. the State of Tamil Nadu3 holding that the first information
report in a criminal case is extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose
of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial (Advantage of Prompt FIR &
Disadvantage of delay has also discussed in this case). The object of insisting upon
prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to
obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed,
the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye
witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information
report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On
account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger
s
creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story

as a result of deliberation and consultation. There can be no dispute about these
t
principles relied upon by Mr. Bachawat but the real question in the present case is about
the explanation for the delay. It is not at all unnatural for the family members to await the
arrival of the elders in the family when the offence of this nature is committed before
taking a decision to lodge a report with the police. The reputation and prestige of the
family and the career and life of a young child is involved in such cases. Therefore, the
presence of the brother of the prosecutrix at home is not a much consequence. It has been
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established that the farther of the girl along with his brother came back to their house at 7
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O’clock in the evening. The girl was unconscious during the day. PW-2 told her husband
as to what had happened to their daughter. The police station was at the distance of
15Kms. According to the testimony of PW-1 no mode of conveyance was available. The
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police was report the next day morning and FIR was recorded at 11.30 a.m. The delay in
reporting the matter to the police has thus been fully explained.
The object of insisting upon prompt lodging to the police in respect of
commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in
which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by
them as well as the names of eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in
lodging the F.I.R. quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought
3
AIR 1973 SC 501.
101
on account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity danger
creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account on concocted story
as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is therefore, essential that the delay in
lodging of the F.I.R. report should be satisfactorily explained.4 When as occurrence was
not reported for more than 20 hours after the occurrence it was unsafe to base conviction
upon the evidence. It is therefore necessary that delay in lodging F.I.R. should be
satisfactorily explained.5
B. Delay
In State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan,6 it was held that murder of five persons at
night time, complaint lodged with police at dawn, Complainant did not leave the house
out of fear. Explanation for delay was held reasonable.
Reasonable delay is always to be excused as has been decided by the Apex Court
in many cases, and in codified laws no where time have been mentioned, but it is to be
written within reasonable time period, as have been explained under;
In Munna @ Pooran Yadav V. State of Madhya Pradesh7 the Apex Court held
that The prosecution story is based on the First Information Report (Ex. P-11) lodged by
Gariba (P.W. 4), the father of the deceased Chhota on 01.02.1997 to the effect that in the
morning, three accused persons came to his house when his son Chhota was sleeping.
The appellant then entered the house and took away Chhota to a nearby place Chamrola
(the platform used by the villagers for chit-chatting etc.). It was further alleged that while
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the two acquitted accused caught hold of Chhota by his hands, the appellant Munna fired
at Chhota due to which he fell down and died on the spot. On that basis the investigation
started and after the completion of the investigation, all the accused were tried before the
1st Additional Sessions Judge, Chattarpur. On their conviction, all the accused filed
Nathoo v. State, (2000) Cri LJ 3850,3852 para 13 (All) (DB).

Thulia Kali v. State of T.N., 1972 Cri. L.J. 1296: 1972 S.C.C. (Cri.) 543 A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 501;
Bishnu Dev v. State. 1982 Cri. L.J. 493 (Cri.) Kishan Pd. Raj Guru Mohapatra v. State of Orissa,
1985 W.(Cri.) 486. Abhimanu v. State of Orissa, (1984) 57 Cut. LJ 27; Annu Poojary v. State of
Karnataka. (1984) 1 Kar. L.J. 242; State of Rajashtan v. Gokal Chand, 1984(1) Crimes 22.
2000(2) RCR (Criminal) 1 (P&H) (DB).
AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT i344.
102
appeals before the High Court which resulted in the conviction of the appellant being
confirmed.
Shri S.K. Gambir, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
firstly contended that the High Court was not justified in relying upon the evidence of
sole eye witness Gariba (P.W. 4) on account of his interest and secondly as his evidence
was disbelieved insofar as it related to the original accused No. 2 Barra and accused NO.
3-Brijlal. He further pointed out that the First Information Report in this case was
obviously incorrect as the timings of the First Information Report could not match with
the oral testimony of Gariba (P.W. 4) in that, he submitted that had the incident taken
place at about 7 O’clock in the morning and the police station at Jujhamagar being six
kilometers away, the First Information Report could not have been lodged at 8.05
O’clock as in fact much time was spent in contacting the other person who, admittedly,
attended the Police station along with P.W. 4- Gariba. The learned senior counsel,
therefore, says that the whole prosecution story itself becomes suspect.
As against this, Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State supported the conviction and pointed out that there was no reason for Gariba (P.W.
4) to falsely implicate the accused. He pointed out that it was quite possible for Gariba to
reach the police station at about 8 O’clock in the morning and to lodge the First
Information Report. He also pointed out that the medical evidence as well as the post
mortem report itself showed that the death had taken place at the time as indicated in post
mortem report and thus supports the evidence of the doctor. Lastly, the learned counsel
pointed out that the other witnesses were rightly believed by the Sessions Court as well as
the High Court as corroborative evidence of Gariba (P.W. 4).
The first and the foremost thing is that the homicidal death of Chhota by firing is
not disputed. There is practically no challenge to the evidence of the Dr. S.S. Chaurasia
T.W. 2) who asserted that the deceased had died due to the bullet wound which was
slightly below the back side of the neck and the bullet turned towards the right rupturing
ntemal organs and breaking bones of right side ribs stopped below the skin. In para 9 of
lis examination in chief, he opined that the death of the deceased was caused due to
shock suffered due to firearm injury to him. There is hardly any cross examination of the
vitness except a feeble suggestion that the injury could not be sustained if the bullet is
103
fired from the sides. One other suggestion was regarding the timing of injury in which the
doctor affirmed that there could be difference of 2-3 hours in the period of injury. The
learned counsel for defence argueid that in the post mortem report, it was indicated that
the timing of injury and death could be about 24 hours to 36 hours earlier from the time
of post mortem. The post mortem was conducted on 02.02.1997, i.e. the next day at 9.00
a.m. From this, the learned counsel argued that if 36 hours have to be counted backwards
from 9.00 a.m. on 2.2.1997, then the death of Chhota could not have occurred in the
morning but it must be somewhere at night between 01.02.1997 and 02.02.1997. It was
on this basis that the learned counsel tried to develop his theory of false implication as
also the wrong timing of filing of F.I.R.
Much was tried to be suggested about the time of F.I.R. We have seen the original
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Hindi First Information Report as also the original Hindi evidence of the witness. The
witness has specifically stated that the time was the day-break time, sun was about to rise
(Din Nikalne me thaa). Considering that the witness was not a literate witness and did not
know how to read the watch, the mention of 7 O’clock as the time of incident in the First
information Report appears to be the handiwork of the person who recorded the First
Information Report. Much importance cannot be given to such insignificant factors.
I
Much was tried to be suggested from the evidence of Gariba (P.W. 4) that immediately
after the incident, he went to the neighbours, like Ambika Prasad (P.W.l) and Sunderlal
Vishwakarma (P.W.3) and substantial time was spent and, therefore, he could not have
reached along with all those person to Jujhamagar police station at about 8 O’clock
which was six kilometers away. In our considered opinion, such criticism has no merits.
Nothing has come in the evidence as to how these persons reached the police station.
There is no cross examination to any of these witnesses regarding the time taken from the
village to the police station. If that is so, it would not be possible to reject the First
|
Information Report on that flimsy ground alone. Again the distance between the village
and the police station which is given in First Information Report is six kilometers
approximately. That in our opinion is not such a distance which would not be covered
within an hour or so. Giving overall consideration to this aspect, we are of the opinion
that the First Information Report was a genuine document and was correctly recorded at
104
the time when it was given and there is nothing unusual in the timings of First
Information Report. We, therefore, reject the argument of the defence on that ground.
In State Of U.P. V. Manoj Kumar Pandey8 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that the approach of the trial court and the High Court is clearly unsustainable.
Merely because the victim was more than 16 years of age as held by the trial court that
cannot be a ground to hold that she was consenting party. No evidence was led to show
such consent. Apart from that normal rule regarding the duty of the prosecution to
explain the delay in lodging FIR and the lack of prejudice and/or prejudice caused
because of such delayed lodging of FIR does not perse apply to cases of rape. This has
been the consistent view of this court. The High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in
disposing of the appeal in such cryptic manner. In the circumstances of the case, we set
aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh hearing so that it can
consider the matter and hear in detail and dispose of the same by a reasoned judgement.
Whatever has been expressed by us supra is only for the purpose of coming to the
conclusion that the manner of disposal of the appeal is not proper. Delay as regards
timing of lodging of First Information Report is fatal to prosecution case.9
In Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana,10 it was held that rushing of victim to
hospital to save his life instead of first going to Police Station was a satisfactory
l
explanation for delay.

In Ramdas & Ors V. State of Maharashtra11 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that mere delay in lodging FIR not by itself necessary fatal to prosecution case.
Counsel for the State submitted that the delay in lodging the first information report in
>uch cases is immaterial. The proposition is too broadly stated to merit acceptance. It is
10 doubt true that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not necessarily
'atal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact that the report was lodged belatedly
s a relevant fact of which the court must take notice. This fact has to be considered in the
ight of other facts and circumstances of the case, and in a given case the court may be
atisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been sufficiently explained. In the light
AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 711 para 3.

Om Prakash v. State of U.P., 2009(1) Crimes 183(SC).
1 2000(2) RCR(Criminal) 717(SC).
105
of the totality of the evidence, the court of fact has to consider whether the delay in
lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution. That is a matter of
appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where there is direct evidence to explain
the delay. Even in the absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances
appearing on record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. There are
cases where much time is consumed in taking the injured to the hospital for medical aid
and, therefore, the witnesses find no time to lodge the report promptly. There may also be
cases where on account of fear and threats, witnesses may avoid going to the police
station immediately. The time of occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of
conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in
lodging of the report. It is also possible to conceive of cases where the victim and the
members of his or her family belong to such a strata of society that they may not even be
aware of their right to report the matter to the police and seek legal action, nor was any
such advice available to them. In the case of sexual offences there is another
consideration which may weigh in the mind of the court i.e. the initial hesitation of the
victim to report the matter to the police which may affect her family life and family’s
reputation. Very often in such cases only after considerable persuasion the prosecutrix
may be persuaded to disclose the true facts. There are also cases where the victim may
choose to suffer the ignominy rather than to disclose the true facts which may cast a
stigma on her for the rest of her life. These are case where the initial hesitation of the
prosecutrix to disclose the true facts may provide a good explanation for the delay in
j
lodging the report. In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect of delay in lodging the
report with the police is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and the court must consider
the delay in the background of the facts and circumstances of each case. Different cases
have different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind
of the court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and
each must rest on its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the circumstances,
facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in
another. Thus mere delay in lodging of the report may not by itself be fatal to the case
of the prosecution, but he delay has to be considered in the background of the facts and
12 Pandurang and others v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 216.

106
circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by the court of

fact.
In Mahtab Singh & Anr. V. State of U.P.13 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that delay one of the main reasons given by the High Court in upsetting the
Judgment of acquittal is that FIR was lodged barely 45 minutes after the incident; the
distance ofpolice station being hardly one furlong from the place of occurrence. High
Court, however, failed to consider a very material aspect that despite the fact; that police
station was situated close and visible from the place of incident, yet PW-1 did not go
immediately to police station to report but he first went to Charan singh to have a written
report prepared and then went to the police station with written report. The first version
of the incident could have been reported at the police station within five minutes of its
occurrence. The fact that PW1 took 45 minutes in reporting the incident at the police
station rather creates doubt about the truth fullness of the prosecution case and does not
rule out false implication of the accused against which PW1 had grudge due to some civil
dispute between them.
In Satypal V. State of Haryana14 the honorable Supreme Court decided that This
Court can take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily the family of the victim would not
intend to get a stigma attached to the victim. Delay in lodging the First Information
Report in a case of this nature is a normal phenomenon. Both the courts below apart
from relying on a part of the testimony of the prosecutrix found the evidence of PW-5 to
be absolutely reliable. The medical evidence itself being a part of the evidence is required
to be appreciated in the context of ocular evidence and other circumstances surrounding
thereto.
In State of Himachal Pradesh V. Gian Chand15 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for
doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in
lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court in its guard
to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is
13
14
AIR 2009 SURPEME COURT 2190 para 20.
15
AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 2075.
107
satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is
possibility of embellishment in prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay
would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction or
the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire
prosecution case. In the instant rape case P.W. 1 the mother of the prosecutrix is a widow.
The accused is a close relation of brother of late husband of P.W. 1 P.W. 1 obviously
needed her family members consisting of her-in-laws to accompany her or at least help
her in lodging the First Information Report at the police station. The incident having
occurred in a village, the approach of the in-laws of P.W. 1 displayed rusticity in first
calling upon the father of the accused and complaining to him of what his son had done.
It remained an unpleasant family affair on the next day of the incident which was tried to
be settled, if it could be within the walls of family. That failed. It is thereafter only that
the complainant, the widow woman, left all by her and having no male family member
willing to. accompany her, proceeded alone to police station. She was lent moral support
by the village Panch, whereupon the report of the incident was lodged. The sequence of
I
events soon following the crime and as described by the prosecution witnesses sounds
quite natural and provides a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Thus the delay in
making the FIR can be said to be satisfactorily explained and, therefore, would not cause
any dent in the prosecution case.16
In Ponnusamy V. State of Tamil Nandu17 the Apex Court held that The
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contention of the learned counsel that the statement to the said effect, purported to have
been made, by PW-1 should not be relied upon as no officer from the police station had
been examined to establish the said fact, cannot be accepted for more than one reason.
PW1 is a rustic villager. She is an illiterate lady. According to her, she had been turned
away from the police station on the premise that no dead body was recovered or there
being no other evidence relating to her death. No exception to such a statement can be
taken. The courts cannot be oblivious of such conduct on the part of the police officers.
Apathy on the part of the police officers to accept complaints promptly is well known
phenomena.
1996 (2) Crimes 213 (Him Pra).

108
They were searching for the deceased earlier but without success. Only on the
disclosure statement made by the appellant before PW-10 and the police officer at
Sathyamangalam police station having refused to record the First Information Report,
they started searching for the body on the bank of the canal The Investigating Officer,
Village Administrative Officer as also other prosecution witnesses, clearly proved the
discovery of a dead-body. Identification of the dead-body on the basis of the manglastura,
saree as also the silver ring on the toe of the deceased is not in dispute. Significantly, a
key was also recovered. PW-22, a responsible officer, with a view to satisfy himself as
regards the identity of the dead-body, with reference to the key tied at the end of the
saree, asked PW-2 to bring the trunk and found it to be of the lock put on the said trunk.
In Dilawar Singh V. State of Delhi the Apex Court held that in criminal trial
one of the cardinal principles for the court is to look for plausible explanation for the
delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to the complainant to
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make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make
fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case
to be presented before the Court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in
either coming before the police or before the court, the courts always view the allegations
with suspicion and lookfor satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the
delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case.
In Thuiia Kali v. The State of Tamil Nadu19, it was held that the delay in
lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment as a result of
afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, but also danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version,
exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. In
lam Jag and Others v. The State of U.P.20 the position was explained that whether the
lelay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must
lepend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay
an be condoned if the witnesses have no motive for implicating the accused and for
vhen plausible explanation is offered for the same. On the other hand, prompt filling of
! AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 3234; 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) 115 (SC).
’ (AIR) 1973 SC 501.
1 AIR 1974 SC 606.
109
the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness or authenticity of the

version of the prosecution.
The complainant has attempted to explain the delay by stating that the matter was
reported to the police but the police did not take any action. Such statement can hardly be
taken to have explained the delay. It is the simplest of things to contend that the police,
though report had been lodged with it, had not taken any steps. But it has to be
established by calling for the necessary records from the police to substantiate that in fact
a report with the police had been lodged and that the police failed to take up the case. The
principle has been statutorily recognized in section 210 of the Cr.P.C. which enjoins upon
the Magistrate, when it is made to appear before him either during the inquiry or the trial
of a complaint, that a complaint before the police is pending investigation in the same
matter, he is to stop the proceeding in the complaint case and is to call for a report from
the police. After the report is received from the police, he is to take up the matter together
and if cognizance has been taken on the police report, he is to try the complaint case
along with the G.R. case as if both the cases are instituted upon police report. The aim of
the provision is to safeguard the interest of the accused from unnecessary harassment.
The provisions of section 210, Cr.P.C. are mandatory in nature. It may be true that non-
compliance of the provisions of Section 210, Cr.P.C., is not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution because of the provision of Section 465, Cr.P.C. unless error, omission or
irregularity has also caused the failure ofjustice and in determining the fact whether there
is a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could
not should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. But even applying the
very same principles it is seen that in fact the appellant was in fact prejudiced because of
the non-production of the records from the police. Delay in filing the complaint because
of police inaction has to be explained by calling for the records from the police was
explained by this Court in Khedu Mohton and Others v/s. State of Bihar (AIR 1971 SC
66). Where the Court took exception to the fact that the complaint lodged with the police
had not been summoned or proved, no satisfactory proof of any such complaint had been
adduced before the Court, and none of the documents as would have become available
under sec. 173 Cr.P.C. had also been brought on record.
110
In the incidents like rape, mores when the perpetrator of the crime happens to be a
member of the family or related therewith, involve the honour of the family and
therefore, there is reluctance on the part of the family of the victim to report the matter of
the police and carry the same to the Court. A cool thought may precede lodging of the
FIR.21
In Ramdas & Ors. V. State of Maharashtra22 the Apex Court held that on the
question of delay in lodging the first information report, the evidence is equally
unconvincing. The occurrence took place in the night intervening 9th and 10th January,
1996. The first information report Ex. 22 was recorded on the 18th of January 1996. There
is apparently a delay of about 8 days in lodging the first information report In the first
information report a somewhat difference version has been given with a view to explain
1 th
the delay. It was stated that when on the 11 of January, 1996 the police did not register a
case, and the father-in-law of the prosecutrix came to know about the fact, he
accompanied the prosecutrix and went to the police station and lodged a report. However,
since she was not sent for medical examination and the police did not take any action to
arrest the accused, she went to her father, who . was working in the Jagdamba Sugar
Factory on 17th January, 1996. On the next day i.e. on 18th January, 1996 they came to
Beed and lodged the complaint with the Superintendent of Police and thereafter, on the
information given by her, a case was registered against the appellants. This story has been
given a go bye by the proxecutrix in the course of her deposition. Her evidence before the
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court was to the effect that she went to her sister Sindhubai in the morning and reported
the matter to her. This happened on 11th January, 1996. She along with Sindhubai, PW3,
went to police station Kaij but the police did not register a case on the basis of the
nformation given by her. On the next day she went to her father, who was then at the
tagdamba Sugar Factory in Ahmadnagar District. She narrated the entire incident to him
>n that day. On the next day they went to Beed and complained to the Superintendent of
5olice whereafter they were directed to go to the police station and lodge the report
vhich they did on 18th January, 1996. If her evidence is carefully analysed the following
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 AIR SCW 998 and Harpal Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 1981
SC 361, Foil.
AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 155 at p. 161.
Ill
facts would emerge. The first attempt to lodge the report was made on the 11th January,
1996. Thereafter the prosecutrix went to her father-in-law on the 12th of January, 1996.
On the next day i.e. on 13 January, 1996 they went to the Superintendent of Police at
Beed and made a complaint. Thereafter they came to police station Kaij on the same day
and lodged the report. If we accept the statement of PW-2, the report should have been
lodged on 13th or 14th January, 1996. There is no explanation as to how it was lodged 4
days later.
It would thus appear that there is no reasonable explanation forthcoming from the
prosecution explaining the delay in lodging the report with the police, which was in fact
lodged 8 days later. Though in her first information report, the prosecutrix mentioned
about her earlier report being recorded, she did not say so in her deposition, but that fact
has come in the deposition of PW-6 PSI Laxman Borade.
In the instant case there are two eye-witnesses who have been examined to prove
the case of the prosecution. We have rejected outright the evidence of PW-5. We have
also critically scrutinized the evidence of the prosecutrix, PW-2. She does not appear to
us to be a witness of sterling quality on whose sole testimony a conviction can be
l
sustained. She has tried to conceal facts from the court which were relevant by not
deposing about the earlier first information report lodged by her, which is proved to have
been recorded at the police station. She has deviated from the case narrated in the first
information report solely with a view to avoid the burden of explaining for the earlier
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report made by her relating to a non-cognizable offence. Her evidence on the question of
delay in lodging the report is unsatisfactory and if her deposition is taken as it is, the
inordinate delay in lodging the report remains unexplained. Considered in the light of an
earlier report made by her in relation to a non-cognizable offence, the second report
lodged by her after a few days raises suspicion as its truthfulness.
Delay in filing FIR is not fatal to the prosecution if it is properly explained. Delay
of 3 hours was due to distance of 3 miles between place of occurrence and Police
Station. It is no doubt true that mere delay in lodging the First Information Report is not
necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact that the report was
lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of which the Court must take notice. This fact has to be
23
Nathoo v. State, (2000) Cri LJ 3850, 3852 para 13 (A11)(DB).
112
considered in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case and in a given case the
Court may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been sufficiently
explained. In the light of the totality of the evidence, the Court of fact has to consider
whether the delay in lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution. That
is a matter of appreciation of the absence of direct explanation there may be
circumstances appearing on record which provide reasonable explanation for the delay.
The time of occurrence, the distance of the police station, mode of conveyance available,
are all factors which have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging the report.24
Supreme Court decided that in case of Murder and Robbery, Delay in lodging FIR not
fatal to prosecution. It is not the case of accused that after occurrence of the incident
some deliberations took place in order to falsely implicate the appellant in the case.25
The inordinate delay in registration of the F.I.R. casts a casts a cloud of suspicion
on the credibility of the entire warp and woof of prosecution case.26
M. Chockalingam and S. Palanivelu, JJ. in Velraj V. State Rep. by the
Inspector of Police27 the held that
1. Once the police had taken up investigation of case after its registration, extra
judicial confession made to a witness thereafter would not be admissible.
2. Unexplained delay in FIR reaching the court would create doubt in prosecution
case.
oft og on ot oo oo
Delay of two, three, four, eight, ten days, thirteen days is fatal or not to
the prosecution depends on case to case that delay has been properly explained or not.
Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra. (2007) 2 SCC 170.

Subhash v. State of Haryana, 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) 81 (SC).
Ganesh Bhawan Patel v. State, of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 115; 1979 Cri. LJ 51: 1979
S.C.C. (Cri.) 1; Anne Nageshwara Rao v. P.P., 1975 Cri. L.J. 1119: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1387: 1975
r. S.C.C. (Cri.) 357; Ramjas Suriya v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 810 : 1983 Cri. LJ.
1105: 1983 S.C. C. (Cri.) 748: 1983(2) Crimes 237: 1983 All. C.C. 276, Puran Singh v. State of
Haryana, 1985 (1) Crimes 137; Anant Ram v. State, 1985 All. C.C. 168(H.C.); Achhar Singh v.
State of Punjab, 1984(2) Crimes 843; Girdhari v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Raj. L.W. 445.
2008(4) CRIMES 759 (MAD) at page 761.
Shankar Lai v. State of M.P, 1982 Cri. L.J. 254.
Satbir v. State of U.P., 1982 Cri. LJ. 1743(2): A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1216.
Wala v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cri. L.R. (Raj). 26.
Shankaraya Naik & Ors. V. State of Karnataka AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 818 para 7.;
Phinder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 R.L.W. 687.
Nand Kisore v. State of Haryana, 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 170 (P&H); Sushil Kumar Pati@ China
v. The State, 1993(2) Crimes 800(Cal.); Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 1999(2) RCR(Criminal)
343(P&H).
Sadhu Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998(2) RCR (Criminal) 61 (P&H).
113
In Shankaraya Naik & Ors. V. State of Karnataka34 the honorable Supreme

Court decided that We are also of the opinion that there is absolutely no delay in the
lodging of the FIR in the facts of the case. The incident had happened at 6.30 p.m. on
25th August, 1995, the injured had reached the hospital by 8 p.m. and the FIR had been
lodged at the police station by an injured., eye witness eight hours later. Taking into
account normal human conduct and the fact that many persons had sustained injuries, one
of whom had subsequently died, a delay of eight hours can, by no stretch of imagination,
be dubbed as inordinate. Thus the delay in this case was reasonable.
Factum of unexplained delay in lodging F.I.R. becomes material when the
informant is an educated person and conversant with.legal matters.35
In a murder case an FIR can not be lodged in a murder case after the inquest has
been held.36 When information of the offence has been lodged after considerable
unexplained delay then such delay introduces serious infirmity in the prosecution case
•37
against the accused. The time factor is vital in lodging a meticulously documented FIR
and any inordinate delay may prove detrimental both for effective investigation and
prosecution. 38
•
In Anoop Singh v. State of Haryana39 honorable court decided that in dowry

death delay of 12 hours in lodging is not fatal. Where the families are involved, it may
not be unusual for relations and other members of the society to delay the matter by a few
i
hours or so.
When the FIR was lodged after 2-12 hours since occurrence at Police Station
which is just 3 km. then irresistible conclusion will be that witness lodging FIR never
witnessed the occurrence and accused was rightly given the benefit of doubt.40
Delay of twelve hours in lodging the FIR is undoubtedly an important
circumstance, but when it has been reasonably explained, then delay is of no

State of Bihar v. Ram Bachan Singh. 1982 Cr. L.C. 18 (Pat.).
Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra, 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) 671(SC).
Puran v. State of U.P., 1983 All Cri. LR. 390: 1953(1) Crimes 973 (S.C.): A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 454;
State of Rajasthan v. Pooran, 1986 Raj. LW 434.
Bias or Hate Crimes- Need to Reform the Police System by Alvine Ethan Lyngwa & Sedenla
Bhutia, west Bengal Nation University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata indlaw.com
2006(2) RCR(Criminal) 824(P&H)(DB).
Sardara v. State of Haryana, 1985(1) Crimes 107.
114
consequence.41Now on the basis of long line (almanac) of authoritative decisions of the

Supreme Court and various High Courts, it is an established legal position that delay in
lodging FIR is undoubtedly an important circumstance to cast a cloud of suspicion on the
credibility of the entire warp and woof of the prosecution version, but this legal point is
also no longer res integra that if the alleged delays has been reasonably and satisfactorily
explained then delay shall be of no consequence and will not make the FIR doubtful.42
Delay in lodging F.I.R. is not fatal to prosecution case by itself as there should be
some indication in the report that the delay was due to utilized for consultations. In this
case the police station was seven km. and the members of the deceased could not go to
P.S. throwing their life in danger due to night and impending fear of accused persons.43
Delay in lodging not ipso facto fatal to prosecution. It is fatal when prosecution
introduces a false witness, who has not witnessed occurrence and involves innocent
person as an accused 44In case relating to alleged natural offence the F.I.R. was lodged
after 20 days, and the victims evidence was also found to be suffering from
inconsistencies, the acquittal was up-held.45
In Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana46 the honorable court decided that Delay of
6 days in lodging FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case. In this case injuries were
inflicted on the deceased and death occurred after six days, deceased remained in hospital
for treatment, matter was not reported to Police by doctors.
Lalai Alias Din Deo v. State of U.P., 1974 Cri.L.J. 1393; AIR 1974 SC 2118.
Ram Jag v. State of U.P., 1974 S.C. 606; 1974 Cri. L.J. 479: 1974 S.C.C. (Cri.) 152; Amrik Singh
v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1171: 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.)252: 1981 Cri. L.J. 634; Harpal Singh
v. State of H.P., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 361: 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.) 208: 1981 Cri. L.J. 1; Appren Joseph v.
State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C.I; Jhallu v. State, 1983(1) Crimes 1144: 1984 All. C.C. 28 ;
Gabib Singh v. State, 1972 S.C. C. (Cri.) 568: 1972 Cri. LJ. 1286; Krishna Pillai v. State of
Kerala, 1981 Cri. L.J. 1743 A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1237: 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.) 669: Bhag Singh v. State of
Haryana, WW. Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 100, Bishnu Dev v. State, 1982 Cri. L.J. 493; Lalji Singh v. State
of U.P., 1985 Cri. L.J. 1488: A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1266: Lalai alias Dinoo v. State of U.P., 1974 Cri.
LJ. 1393: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2118: Dharma alias dharma Singh', 1982 Ch. Cr. Cases (H.C.)163;
Hanuman v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cri. LR. (Raj.) 415: 1982 Raj. Cri. C. 294; Magar Singh v.
State of Rajasthan, 1982 LAV 513; Mihal Singh v. State of Haryana, 1982 Cri. L.T 16; Bharat v.
State, 1983 All. Cri. R. 160; Bhagirath v. State Bank of Inida, 1983 Raj. Cr. C. 258; Atmuddi v.
State of U.P., 1973 S.C.C.(Cri.) 676; 1973 Cri. A.R. (S.C.) 67, Rammurthi v. State of Haryana.
1976 Cri. L.J. 1888: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2455: 1976 S:C.C. (Cri.) 602.
Sangana Basappa Bheemappu Kaligonnavar v. State of Karnataka, 1994(1) Crimes 33 (S.C.).
2005 Cri L.J. 5124 (P&H)(DB)(A).
State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra Mishra, (2000) Cri LJ 4717(A11)(DB).
2006(2) RCR(Criminal) 744(P&H).
115
Delay in F.I.R, casts doubt on prosecution case.47 Delay in lodging FIR must be
satisfactorily explained.48 In case of unreasonable delay in recording FIR without any
satisfactory explanation of such delay, prosecution case must fail.49
Though the recording of the F.I.R. is expected to be at the earliest yet if the delay
is satisfactorily explained then it has no effect.50
Unexplained delay in lodging FIR would be fatal to prosecution.51When delay in
filing F.I.R. was not explained in statement under Sec. 161 Cr. P.C. and when names of
actual assailants were not known and further when extreme delay in lodging F.I.R. was
caused due to informant obtaining legal advice, then the prosecution case ought to be
rejected.52
When there is inordinate delay in lodging F.I.R. and when reasons for the said
delay were not mentioned either in F.I.R. or specified in statement of the complainant
under Section 161, Cr.P.C. then explanation for the said delay submitted during trial
cannot be believed.
In Dilawar Singh V. State of Delhi54 the honorable Supreme Court decided that
Mere statement that, the matter was reported to the police but the police did not take any
action. Such statement can hardly be taken to have explained the delay in making
complaint. It is the simplest of things to contend that the police, though report had been
lodged with it, had not taken any steps. It has to be established by calling for the
necessary records from the police to substantiate that in fact a report with the police had
been lodged and that the police failed to take up the case. The principle has been
statutorily recognized in Section 210 of the Cr.P.C. which enjoins upon the Magistrate,
when it is made to appear before him either during the inquiry or the trial of a complaint,
that a complaint before the police is pending investigation in the same matter, he is to
stop the proceeding in the complaint case and is to call for a report from the police.
47 Balwan v. State. 1989 Cri. L.J. 2475 (D.B.).

48 Ram Dithe v. State of H.P., 1990(1) Crimes 149.
49 Bhagat Ram v. state of H.P., 1989 Cri. LJ. 2520 (H.P.)
50 Dhobi Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1990(1) Crimes 28: 1989 Cri. LJ. N.O.C. 193 (Patna).
31 R. Kulandavelu v. State. 1993 Cri. LJ. 2574.
52 State of U.P. v. Raj Bahadur, 1993 U.P. Cri. R. 52: 1993 Cri. L.J. 86 (AH) D.B. 1992 All. Cri. R.
433: 1993 All. C.C. 73: 1992(3) Crimes 982.
53 State of U.P. v. Raj Bahadur, 1993 U.P. Cr. R. 52 : 1993 A.C.C. 73.
54 AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 3234.
116
In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the Court is to look for plausible
explanation for the delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to
the complainant to make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or
even make fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version
of the case to be presented before the Court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is
delay in the either coming before the police or before the Court, the court always views
the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. If no such
satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case.
Where the filing of FIR is understandable by circumstances of the case and there
is no reason to suspect its correctness the conviction will stand.55 Where the informant
has not been examined on the reasons for the FIR being lodged late, the explanation
stands proved.56
While computing the time taken by the informant in lodging the report the court
must give consideration to human factors and other circumstances. Witnesses would take
some time to compose themselves and decide the course of action.57 When FIR was
t
lodged after delay of three days although injured was conscious throughout, then it casts
doubt on prosecution version.58
There would be no delay in lodging F.I.R. if the father of the deceased married
girl has rushed to the hospital to save the life of her daughter.59
When there was delay in F.I.R. and when it was reasonably explained and when
the investigating officer was not specifically asked about delay and reasons for delay,
:hen delay cannot be held as fatal to the prosecution.60
When there was considerable delay in lodging F.I.R. which remained unexplained
)y the prosecution by no stretch of acceptable evidence, then prosecution case would
ail.61
Lalai v. State. (1975) 3 S.C.C. 373.

Babu Krishna Kamble v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1269: 1980 Cri. LJ. 628.
State of U.P. v. Manohar Lai, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2073: 1981 Cri. L.J. 1701: 1981 S.C.C.(Cri.) 672.
Satbir v. State ofU.P., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1216: 1982 Cri. L.J. 1734(2): 1982 S.C.C. (Cri.) 132.
Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, 1990 Cri. L.J. 562. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 209.
Aidan v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cri. L.J. 2413 (Raj.) (D.B.).
A. Ramu v. Ramaswamy. 1993 Cri. L.J. 2544 (2546) Mad.
117
The explanation of delay must be convincing, reasonable and satisfactory.62 It is settled

law that if the FIR is not lodged without any undue delay, it loses its efficacy and has to
be looked upon with suspicion. It is also a settled law that delay in lodging the FIR has to
explain satisfactorily in order to make FIR believable, if the delay has not been
satisfactorily explained, no reliance would be placed on the FIR.63
When the FIR was lodged with delay then the explanation that none of villagers
agreed to accompany complainant to police station was not found satisfactory particularly
when it was not very late in the night.64
Delay in lodging F.I.R. by itself is not fatal to prosecution case if it is duly
explained.65 Delay in F.I.R. by itself can never be a ground for acquittal. It will only call
for a greater scrutiny of the prosecution evidence.66
Effect of delay in lodging F.I.R. is ,to scrutinize the prosecution evidence more
t
thoroughly so as to shift truth from falsehood or grain from the chaff.67

What shall be the effect of delay in lodging F.I.R., explaining it the Apex Court of
India has held that it is will settled that the delay in giving the F.I.R. by itself cannot be a
ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, we
cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the
occurrence. Human nature as it is. The kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence
cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to
the police. At times being-grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately
occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these
circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report.
Of course the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts have pointed out that in cases
arising out of acute factions there is a tendency to implicate persons belonging to the
opposite faction falsely. In order to avert the danger of convicting such innocent persons
the courts are cautioned to scrutinize the evidence of such interested witnesses with
Hardwari v. State of U.P., 1986 All Cri. R. 311.

Rustam Khan v. State of M.P., 1984(1) Crimes 812; Vishnu v. State of M.P., 1983(2) Crimes 914
(M.P.).
Sukh Lai v. State of U.P., 1985 All CJ 1175.
Jasbir v. State of Punjab 1992(3) Crimes 483 (P&H) (p. 484).
Periyakanippan v. State , 1992(1) Crimes (Mad.).
Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, 1992(2) Crimes 2 (P & H).
118
greater care and caution and separate grain from the chaff after subjecting the evidence to
a close scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the F.I.R. also will have to be scrutinized
carefully. However, unless there is indication of fabrication, the court cannot reject the
prosecution version as given in the F.I.R. and later substantiated by the evidence merely
on the ground of delay. These are all matters for appreciation and much depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case.68
Delay in F.I.R. casts doubt on prosecution case.69Though the recording of the
F.I.R. is expected to be at the earliest yet if the delay is satisfactorily explained then it has
no effect.70 Delay in lodging F.I.R. must be satisfactorily explained.71
In case of unreasonable delay in recording F.I.R. without any satisfactory
explanation of such delay, prosecution case must fail.72
Unless there are indications of fabrication, the court cannot reject the prosecution
version as given in the F.I.R. and later substantiated by the evidence merely on the
ground of delay in giving the F.I.R. Undue delay in filing F.I.R. makes the prosecution
case doubtful.74
Delay in lodging F.I.R. may not be fatal to the prosecution case but where
circumstances indicate that there was likelihood of exaggeration being introduced or false
accusation being thought of, then onus lies on the prosecution to explain the delay
satisfactorily.75 An ordinate delay in lodging F.I.R. must be explained to the satisfaction
of the Court.76
Every delay in making of FIR cannot theoretically be considered to be fatal
without reference to relevant facts and circumstances.77 Delay in lodging FIR would not
Tara Singh v. State of Punjab. 1990 Cri. LJ. 2681 (2683) S.C.: AIR 1991 S.C. 63.
Bahvan v. State. 1989 Cri. LJ 2475 (D.B.).
Dhobi Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1990(1) Crimes 28: 1989 Cri. LJ. N.O.C. 193 (Patna).
Ram Dithe v. State of H.P., 1990(1) Crimes 149.
Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P., 1989 Cri. LJ. 2520 (H.P.).
Tara Singh v. State of Punjab. 1990(3) Crimes 565 (568); 1991 All. C.C. 93 (S.C.).
Charan Singh v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri. LJ. N.O.C. 15 (All) 1990 All. C.C. 566(2).
SadaNand v. State of Orissa, 1991(2) Crimes 343: Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2000(2)
Crimes 209 : 2000 Cr. L.J. 2463 (SC).
Bholaram v. State of U.P., 1991(3) Crimes 377 (All.) at page 379.
Abdul Razzaq v. State, 2000(2) Crimes 278 (All.) D.B.
119
be fatal when assurance can be obtained from other evidence regarding truth of his
version. 78
•
When two eyewitnesses have explained that they remained busy in attending to
the injured and arranging for blood and medicines and when it is well known fact that the
blood is not easily available and it can only he obtained after making serious efforts then
the explanation of witnesses regarding their non-lodging the report would be
acceptable.79
In State of Punjab V. Mohinder Singh & Ors.80 The Apex Court held that as
submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, three factors weighed with the High Court
for acquitting the respondents. Firstly, the alleged non-explanation of delay in
presentation of the FIR. The High Court has wrongly recorded that there was no
explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR. There was no requirement for offering any
such explanation. Even otherwise, in the FIR it has been categorically stated that nobody
came forward to accompany the complaint to the police station in the dark night.
Therefore, she had to wait till the morning to come to the police station. In the cross-
examination to this witness, no question regarding the reason for the alleged delay in
!
lodging the FIR was asked, though the witness was cross-examined at length. There was
not even a suggestion that she had wrongly stated about the reason as to why she was
lodging the FIR on the next morning. The conclusion of the High Court is, therefore,
i
clearly unsustainable.
When the occurrence was at the night time and the police station was about 9
kilometres away and when there were three deaths and the killers had deadly weapon and
i
when the villagers would not have dared to go out in the night time. Then in the said
circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that there was undue delay on the part of the
complainant to inform the police, particularly when accused persons were named in
FIR.81
Periasami v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996(2) Supreme (Cri.). 402: 1996(6) SCC 457 1996(7)
Supreme 240 : 1996(4) Crimes 39 (SC) 1997 Cri. L.J. 219.
Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1997 Cr. L.J. 3178 (3180) SC : 1997 (35) ACC 188 (SC).
AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 92
State of M.P. v. Udai Singh, 1998 Cri. L.J. 365 (368) (S.C.) 1997 (4) Crimes 308 (S.C.).
120
In State of Karanataka v. Diwakara Bhat,82 it was held that: “The High Court
also took the view that the incident had occurred at about 2-15 p.m. while the report of
the occurrence was made at about 5-10 p.m. and that this delay raised a very serious
suspicion about the manner in which the incident had occurred. But the fact cannot be
lost sight of that injured Kini had sustained head injury and was unconscious. The first
and foremost concern of PW-1 and her son would be to see that the victim is provided
with immediate medical aid without any further risk to his life. They, therefore, took him
immediately to a nearby private clinic. But the private doctor declined to attend to the
victim and directed them to go to the Government Hospital as it was the case of assault.
The wife and son of the victim, therefore, had to take the victim to the Government
Hospital where he was admitted and given medical aid. In such a situation the report was
slightly delayed for which there is plausible reason. In these facts and circumstances the
i
question of any suspicion or doubt as to the manner in which the occurrence took place
does not arise. The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse interference on
this account”.
When the incident had occurred at about 2.15 p.m. while the report of the
occurrence was made by the widow of the victim at about 5 p.m. and when the injured
had sustained head injury and was unconscious and the first and foremost concern of the
said widow and person was to provide medical aid to the said injured, then in view of
these facts and circumstances, the question of suspicion or doubt as to the manner in
no
which the occurrence took place does not arise.

It cannot be said that the prosecution which is otherwise duly proved has to fail
merely on the ground that as there was no explanation for a little delay or the explanation
!
3f such delay is found to be unsatisfactory. All that can be said is that in such an
eventuality Court have to be at guard in evaluating the entire evidence on record.
Otherwise stated, the evidence of the witnesses has to be weighed with greater
urcumspection.84
1997 Crl. L.J. 226 SC.

State of Karnataka v. Diwakara Bhat, 1997 Cri. L.J. 226 (228) S.CJ: 1996 AIR SCW 4132:
1996(16) SCC 467: 1996(11) SCC 148: 1997 SCC (Cri.) 144: 1996 SCC (CR)1383.
Gadhadhar Pati v. Banshidhar Pati, 1991(3) Crimes 812 (814).
121
When the specific overt acts attributed' to the accused have been consistently
mentioned right from the stage of giving the earliest report and the doctor has also
corroborated that version indicating no chance of fabrication, mere delay by itself is not
enough to reject the prosecution.85;
o/
Delay in lodging F.I.R. must be explained and proceed by the prosecution. Delay
of 6 hours when the distance between place of occurrence and police station is only 5
0*7
kms. No reliance can be placed oh such FIR.

on
The prosecution should explain the reasons for delay in recording the FIR. The
entire fabric of the prosecution case would collapse if the FIR is held to be fabricated or
80
brought into existence long after the occurrence.
When there was delay in FIR and when it was reasonably explained and when the
investigating officer was not specifically asked about delay and reasons for delay, then
delay cannot be held as fatal to the prosecution.90
When there was considerable delay in lodging F.I.R. which remained unexplained
by the prosecution no stretch of acceptable evidence, then prosecution case would fail.91
When amicable settlement of incident of rape was sought and complaint to police
was held, up for 10 days. Then said delay in F.I.R. was of no consequence.92-
C. Delay in lodging the FIR by Informant

FIR is the contemporaneous record containing a spontaneous narration of the
crime by the maker thereof before his memory fades or before he has time and
opportunity to embellish or to introduce facts as a result of confabulation (gossip) and
reflection.93
Zahoor v. The State of U.P., 1990 (3) Crimes 556 S.C. (559): 1990 All. C.C. 644: 1991 Cri. L.J.
56. (S.C.). ;
Meghaji Godadji Thakore v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Cri. L.J. 730.
State v. GangaPd., 1986 All C.R. 383.
Thulia Kali v. State of T.N., 1972 Cri. L.J. 1296 (SC); Bhag Singh v. State of Haryana, 1979 Cri.
L.J. N.O.C. 100, Bihsnu Dev v. State, 1982 Cri. L.J. 493 (D.B.).
Bijendra v. State of U.P., 1993(2) crimes 735 (All.) (D.B.) 1993 A.C.C. 470.
Aldan v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cri. L.J. 241 (Raj.).(D.B.).
A. Ramu v. Ramaswamy, 1993 Cri. LJ. 2544 (2546) Mad.
Sushil Kumar Pati @ China v. The State, 1993(2) Crimes 800 (Cal.).
The Delhi Law Times, 2003, Vol. CII, Journal Section(JS) 8.
122
In Malempati Pattabi Nairender v. Ghattamaneni Maruti Prasad94 it was held

that FIR prepared on strength of written complaint, scribe not examined, He lived 13
kilometers away from place of occurrence. In this case it was not explained how that
scribe was brought to place from such a distance and at what time. Held, ther would have
been confabulation and deliberations before preparing the written complaint.
If delay has occurred in lodging the information by the informant or victim, the
officer investigating the case should obtain explanation from the informant in regard to
such delay and incorporate the same in the statement of the witnesses. If this is done, no
adverse presumption would arise against the prosecution case.
In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab,95 it was held that the delay in lodging the first
information quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On
i
account of delay the report not only gets bereft of the advantage or spontaneity, danger
creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated or concocted story as a
result of deliberation and consultation. It is therefore, essential that delay in lodging of
the first information report should be satisfactorily explained.96
Sone Lai and others v. The State of U.P.,97 it was held that the occurrence took
place sometime after midnight on 15/16th Nov. 1966. The informant had lost his two sons
in the prime of their lives and he must have been shocked and stupefied particularly when
even the corpses of the two deceased persons were not spared but were taken away by the
accused. A third person was also abducted. All the accused persons were armed with
deadly weapons and one of them had a gun. The FIR was lodged at 9-10 a.m. on 16-11-
1966.
Held that the Sessions Judge was not justified in holding that the FIR was belated
or that no reasonable explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR given by the
prosecution. As the accused were so desperate as to take away the bodies in order to
obliterate all traces of their crime, they would not have spared the life of any persons who
|
may have been sent to the Police Station at that ghastly hour. In fact, the common sense
view of the matter would be that in these circumstances not even the informant or his
2000(2) RCR(Criminal) 777(SC).

1953 Cr. L.J. 1465 (SC).
First Information Report (F.I.R.) by Rajender Mangari, Asia Law House, Hyderabad, 2nd Edition
2005-2006, Page-37.
77
1978 Cr.L.J. 1122; AIR 1978 SC 1142.
123
relations would have ventured to stir out of the village for going to the Police station
unless they were supplied with adequate police help. It was true that some villagers had
arrived at the scene of occurrence with some arms but it was doubtful if they could have
agreed to go to the police station knowing the defiant attitude of the accused. The only
sensible course in these circumstances for the informant would have been to persuade the
villagers to go in the direction of the bullock cart so as to find out the dead bodies and the
person who was abducted.
In Lalai alias Dindoo and another v. State of U.P.,98 it was held that: “The only
other ground on which Radhey Shyam’s evidence was challenged is that though the
incident took place at about 10-30 p.m. on the 25th that Radhey Shyam lodged the First
Information Report. This undoubtedly is an important circumstance but the Sessions
Court and the High Court have given a reasonable explanation of the delay. The night
was dark, the road was rough and the assault so fierce that Radhey Shyam could not have
collected his wits to proceed straightway to the police station. There is no indication in
the evidence that the names of the appellants were incorporated in the First Information
Report as a result of any confabulation.”
In Atmaduddin v. State of U.P.," it was held that: “There has been no delay in
the matter of either furnishing the first information report by PW-2 or in the police
forwarding the body for post-mortem. It has been brought out in evidence which has been
accepted both by the trial Judge and High Court that in connection with the report lodged
in respect of the murder of Afsar Ahmed earlier in the day, the investigation officer
attached to Pura-mufti, within whose jurisdiction the offence had been committed, had
come to the village Hadwa for investigation. PW-2 and other witnesses on finding that
Mohd. Ilyas was dead, carried the body to his house across the river Ganges and reached
the house at about 6.00 p.m. After reaching the house PW-2 prepared the report to be
given to the police. But at that time the investigating officer of Puramufti on knowing
!
about the second incident, namely, the death of Mohd. Ilyas had come to the house of the
deceased. When PW-2 gave the report to him, the police officer found that the offence
had been committed within the jurisdiction of the police station Nawabganj. Therefore,
98
1974 Cr. L.J. 1393; AIR 1974 SC 2118.
99
1974 CrL L.J. 1300; AIR 1974 SC 1901.
124
he instructed PW-2 to take the report and give it in the first instance to the police station
at Puramufti who will be forwarding the same to the police station at Nawabganj. He also
deputed a constable to accompany PW-2. The report was accordingly lodged at police
station Puramufti at about 6-30 p.m. The said report was immediately dispatched to the
police station at Nawabganj. But as the constable, who had to take the said report, could
not get any conveyance that night from Allahabad where he had reached by truck, he had
to wait till the following morning to go to Nawabgunj. Accordingly on the morning of
February 15, 1969, at about 10-10 a.m. the papers were lodged at Nawabgunj police
station. The police officer thereafter immediately took up the investigation. From the
facts mentioned above it will be seen that there has been no delay in the first information
report being furnished by PW-2. In the first instance, immediately after reaching his
|
house with the body of his father, he had given the report to the police officer of
[
Puramufti and under his instructions it was sent to the police station and was recorded at
6-30 p.m. In view of the fact that it had to be properly lodged at another police station,
namely, at Nawabgunj, there has been some inevitable delay. But the point to be noted is
that PW-2’s version of incident as well as the names of the persons who had witnessed
the same was in the hands of the police on the same day by 6-30 p.m.”
In Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Punjab,100 it was held that. “Mr. Jethamalani
i
contended that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, in that,
though according to the prosecution the incident took place at 6-30 a.m. it was lodged at
the police station at 6:15 p.m. which, admittedly, was at a distance of two furlong from
the spot. In repelling this contention when raised before it, the High Court observed as
under:-
“Om Prakash accused is closely related to Sukhdev Raj. He is married to the
latter’s father’s sister. Dr. Naja and Dr. Parmar have graphically described the condition
of injured Yudhvir. General condition of the patient was critical. He was in peripheral
circulatory failure. He was being transfused blood. Kidney function was very poor.
: !
Seriousness of the condition was explained to his relatives. The operation of the patient
was started at 9.00 a.m. Because of stab wound in the chest there was a root in the pleura
through which air and blood were coming out. After the operation the patient was kept in
100 1997 Crl.L.J. 3178 SC.

I
125
the recovery room of the operation theatre and was shifted to the Ward. General
condition of the patient was serious in the ward also. Patient was having respiratory
distress. The inter-costal tube in the sixth inter-costal space (sic) was blocked and it was
changed. Three incisions were given over the chest wall to relieve the respiratory distress.
During the post operative period the condition of the patient remained stormy.
Two eye-witnesses have explained that they remained busy in attending to the
injured and arranging for blood and medicines. It is a well known fact that the blood is
not easily available in the Muffasil towns and it can be obtained after making serious
efforts. The operation on the injured lasted about five hours. It can be safely inferred that
fairly large amount of blood must have been needed during and after the operation. So the
explanation of the witnesses regarding their not lodging the report is acceptable
especially as, when the accused to be named were closely related. Sukhdev Raj was
already under stress because of the precarious condition of his son. He did not also weigh
in his mind the pros and cons of getting a case registered against his near relations. This
is more go when there was no previous enmity between the two families. For all these
reasons the report was not lodged till 6-15 p.m. The close relationship of the complainant
with the accused is a sufficient safeguard against the false implication of any of the
i
accused. If Sanjeev Kumar had not actually caused injuries to Yudhvir, Sukhdev Raj
would have been the last person to falsely name him. As the above quoted observations,
we do not find any merit in the contention of Mr. Jethamalani.”
In Sheelam Rarnesh and another v. State of A.P.,101 it was held that:
“It was natural human conduct for the informant PW-1 (who was on the hit list) to
run towards the police station as the deceased was hit by guns and suffered injuries. His
first duty , in addition to his safety, was to bring police to the place of occurrence and to
ensure that medical help be given to the deceased. He came back to the place of
occurrence with police and the deceased was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to
the injuries at 7-55 p.m. Immediately thereafter, PW-1 returned to the police station and
lodged the formal FIR. The doctor PW-6 has deposed that the deceased died at 7-55 p.m.
From the above evidence, we hold that there was no delay in filing the FIR.
2000 Crl. L.J. 51 SC.

126
In State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh,102 it was held that “Witness has clarified the
position by stating that it was rainy season, that at several places water had collected on
the road, that major part of the road was kachha road and because of that he reached Orai
late in the evening and that he first went to his son’s house, dictated a report to his son
Lallu and signing the same he carried it to the Police Station where he lodged it at 7-15
P.M. with the Diwanji on duty there. Having regard to the explanation given by the
witness, it is impossible to agree with the criticism made that there was delay in lodging
the first information report.
FIR was lodged at 7:15 P.M. when the occurrence took place at 2:30 P.M. and the
Police Station was at the distance of 7 miles only.
In Murari Thakur & Anr. V. State of Bihar103 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that delay because father of victim was informed only after he came back at
i
night. Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that there was delay in filling the
FIR. We are of the opinion that there is no such delay which can be said to be fatal to the
prosecution case. The occurrence took place on 26.8.1998 at 4 p.m. The first informant
the father of the deceased, Bhuneshwar Mishra (PW8), was at Sitamarhi and returned
home on 8 p.m., when they came to know from his brother Dhaneshwar Mishra that his
minor son Bal Krishna Mishra aged about 14 years had been murdered. After
Bhuneshwar Mishra learnt about this form his brother Dhaneshwar Mishra (PW4), then
he went and lodged the FIR R.K Tiwari (PW11), the investigating officer, has stated in
his evidence that it was rainy season and there was flood in the area and he reached the
vlace of the occurrence on the night of 26.8.1998/27.8.1998 at about 1.30 a.m. and
I
recorded the Fard-e-bayan of the informant. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion
hat there was no such fatal delay in lodging the FIR.
In Balwinder Singh v. Union of India,104 it was held that complaint disclosed
:ommission of cognizable offence, case not registered by Police on the ground that
ncident was 15 years old and stale. There was no ground to refuse the registration of
ase; delay per se has never been considered as fatal in criminal proceedings. What is the
ffect of delay that will be seen by the trial court. However in view of considerable delay,
!
12 AIR 1978 SC 191; 1978 Cr.L.J. 141.

14 1997(3) RCR(Criminal)755(P&H).
127
direction issued to S.P. to enquire into allegations and register a case of if cognizable
offence was made out.
In Tama @ Tamal Mai V. State of West Bengal105 the Apex Court held that the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the First Information Report was
lodged after some delay is not of much, substance. It has been stated by PW-1 first
informant in his deposition before the Court that as there was torrential (heavy) rains; he
could not go to the police station that day. We may also place on record that the police
station is situating at a distance ofabout 21 kilometers from the place occurrence.
D. No cross-examination on delay
Each reason has to be looked with great care and caution when court decides a
case, relating to the delay of registration of a case. In Bobu Krishna Kamble v. State of
Maharashtra,106 held that “The assault took place about mid-day. Yeshwant on being
informed of what has transpired detailed Balu to go to the Police Station and lodged a
report. In the absence of any mode of transport, Balu covered six miles distance on foot.
According to his testimony it was raining that day. It may be pointed that Balu was not
cross examined on the reasons for the first information report being lodged late and that
the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained.
E. Delay in rape cases

In these cases it is not only related with the victim but also related with the person
of the family of the victim. Many times due to shame and family honor they do not
contact to the police immediately and delay causes weaken the prosecution case.
In State of Himachal Pradesh V. Prem Singh the honorable Supreme Court
decided that the delay in a case of sexual assault can not be equated with the case
involving other offences. There are several factors which weigh in the mind of the
prosecutrix and her family members before coming to the police station to lodge a
complaint. In a tradition bound society prevalent in India, more particularly, rural areas, it
105
106
AIR 1980 SC 1269; 1980 Crl. LJ 928.
107
128
would be quite unsafe to throw out the prosecution case merely on the ground that
there is some delay in lodging the FIR.
In Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh,108 it was held that “Delay of 10
days in lodging the first information report stands reasonably explained when the
prosecutrix stated that as honour of the family was involved, its members had to decide
whether to take the matter to the Court or no.”
It is not uncommon that such consideration delays action on the part of the near
relation of a young girl who has been raped.
F. Prosecution explains - no delay

In some cases court have decided that fact of the case justifies the delay and
there is no delay. In Shivappa & Ors. V. State of Karnataka109 the honorable Supreme
Court decided that Delay in lodging the First Information Report, in our opinion, has
i
sufficiently been explained. If the accused persons were to be falsely implicated, PW-9,
I
Shivappa, and PW-10, Bassappa, would have rushed to the Police Station on the same
night. In any event, they would have themselves gone for lodging the First Information
Report on the next date. They had fled away because of the threats given to them. They
stayed out throughout the night. PW-9 shivappa, came back only on the next day. One
can very well visualize his mental condition. If the married sisters of the deceased,
therefore, in the aforementioned situation started from their village round about 8
i
O’clock on the next day to reach the Police Station at about 10.00 am, no exception can
ie taken thereto. Delay in lodging the First Information Report in case of this nature is
tot such, which would impel us to infer that there, existed a possibility of false
mplication.
There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that lodging of the First Information
teport within a short time after the occurrence would ordinarily lead to a conclusion that
tie statements made therein are correct but when the delay in lodging a First Information
teport is sufficiently explained, the same would receive the evidentiary value it deserved.
AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981 Cr.L.J.P. 1.

AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 1860 at page 1865.
The very fact that two married sisters gathered the courage at the earliest possible
opportunity to go to the Police Station itself eliminates false implication. They are
married. They came to spend some time with their family on the occasion of some
festival. It is difficult to believe that they would have some independent motive to falsely
implicate so many persons. If that be so, it might not have been possible for them to give
a detailed description of the manner in which the occurrence took place. Furthermore, the
Police came to the place of occurrence soon after the lodging of the First Information
Report. The dead body was immediately sent for post-mortem examination. From the
evidence of the doctor, as noticed hereinbefore, the post-mortem examination started at
12.30 pm. The approach of the High Court, therefore, cannot be said to be incorrect.
Furthermore, in the First Information Report itself, three motives have been attributed,
one of them being the involvement of the deceased in the murder of the younger brother
of Accused NO. 1, Ningondeppa.
In Ratna Partap v. State of Haryana,110 held that, “The first information report
was given at 7:00 P.M. The special report which was prepared thereafter was dispatched
to the Magistrate at Karnal, 13 miles away, by special messenger. It reached the
Magistrate at 3:00 A.M.
One most make some allowance for delays arising in the course of the ordinary
conduct of human business. After the first information report is given, some time must
l
have been taken to prepare the special report. A special messenger must have been sent
for. Instructions must have been given. He must have made some preparations to go upon
the journey, perhaps have a meal and a change of dress. If he was traveling by some
I
vehicle, there must have been some further delay to arrange for a vehicle. After reaching
Karnal, the messenger must have made some other arrangements to go from the place
whether the vehicle must have stopped at the residence of the Magistrate. There was no
delay.
In Om Prakash V. State of U.P.*111 the honorable Supreme Court decided that
Delay in lodging the First Information Report has a great importance in a case of this
nature. Enmity between the parties stands admitted. The prosecution case proceeded on
110 AIR 1983 SC 680 ; 1983 Cr. LJ 1272.

130
the basis that immediately after occurrence and after shifting the dead body under a shed,
the informant got the First Information Report scribed by Ganga Sahai and immediately
thereafter proceeded on foot to this Police Station. If this part of the story is correct, the
prosecution’s case would not to subject to much doubt. But if the scribe of the First
Information Report was residing in a separate village which is it? Kms. Away from the
place of occurrence, and it was at that place the FIR was scribed whereafter PW-1
arrived at the Police Station, it would impossible for him to reach by 4.30 in the morning.
The prosecution did not examine the scribe of the First Information Report although his
son has been examined as an eye-witness. If he was residing at the relevant time in the
village where the incident had taken place, it was expected that either he had witnessed
the occurrence or had reached the place of occurrence immediately after the accused fled
away. The prosecution, therefore, should have made attempts to clarify this anomaly.
Indisputably, there exists a discrepancy as regards timing of the lodging of
the First Information Report P.W.3, Head Constable Hriday Narain Shukla, testified that
it was lodged at 4.45 a.m. Records, however, show otherwise. In the FIR, it is shown to
have been lodged at 4.45 p.m. As noticed hereinbefore, there are some interpolations but
according to the Investigating Officer, he recorded the First Information Report at 9.30
p.m. on 16.8.1979.
In Dinesh Borthakur V. State of Assam the honorable Supreme Court
decided that First Information Report might have been lodged by the appellant only when
he police arrived at the scene of occurrence. The Investigating Officer came to the place
if occurrence at about 4.45 pm. PW1 categorically stated that he had asked someone to
nform the police. When he did not comply therewith, then only he did so. If, in the
iforementioned situation, the appellant had not informed the officer-in-charge of the
>olice station, no presumption of adverse inference could be raised against him. There
vas no delay on the part of the appellant in informing the police, particularly, when he
iad informed PW1 who, in turn, informed the police.
In State of Haryana v. Manoj Kumar,113 it was held that: “A young boy of 19
ears, who escaped death even after several attempts on the road and ultimately found his
AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2205 page 2212.

AIR 1994 SC 147; 1993 Crl. L.J. 3839.
131
brother becoming victim of the said attack, must have been completely broken. It was too
much to expect from him that before his father arrived, he would have taken legal steps
for prosecuting the respondent.
No adverse inference can be drawn in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, because Rohan (PW-14) or anyone did not lodge the first information report during
the night itself. PW-13 father of the victim, who is a military officer has stated on oath,
that he got the information from Rohtak at about 2:00 a.m. or 2:15 a.m. in the night and
he immediately proceeded for Rohtak and reached there at about 4:00 a.m. or 4:15 a.m. in
the morning. He found Rohan (PW-14) in his house at Rohtak, but he was “besudh” (not
in his senses) and was lying on a ‘Charpai’. At about 9-00 A.M. in the morning he tried
to know the full details from his son Rohan and then he lodged the first information
report on the basis of the facts narrated by his son Rohan.
It is true that time factor has an important role in context with lodging of a first
information report. But, if the prosecution explains the delay satisfactorily, the Court is
not expected to reject the whole prosecution case merely on that ground. The present case
is one such case where taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, the
prosecution case cannot be rejected on the ground that the first information report was not
lodged during the night.”
In Ashok Kumar Chaudhary & Ors. V. State of Bihar114 the Apex Court held
i
that it is trite that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not by itselffatal to
the case of the prosecution. Nevertheless, it is a relevant factor of which the Court is
obliged to take notice and examine whether any explanation for the delay has been
offered and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If no satisfactory explanation is
forthcoming, an adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution. However, in the
event, the delay is properly and satisfactorily explained; the prosecution case cannot be
thrown out merely on the ground of delay in lodging the F.I.R. Obviously, the
explanation has to be considered in the light of the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the case.
AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2436 at p. 2439, para 14.

132
G. Delay in lodging the FIR

Only reasonable delay is excused and when court finds that delay is not
reasonable on court rejects the contention and plea taken for the same. In State of
Rajasthan v. N.K,115 it was held that: “A mere delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a
ground by itself for throwing the entire prosecution case overboard. The Court has to
seek an explanation for delay and test the truthfulness and plausibility of the reason
assigned. If the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court it cannot be counted
against the prosecution.
In the present case it is true that the incident dated 1-10-1993 was reported to the
police on 5-10-1993. The prosecutrix was a married woman. Her muklana ceremony had
not taken place. Muklana ceremony is a rural custom prevalent in Rajasthan,
wehereunder the bride is left with the parents after marriage having been performed and
is taken away by the husband and/or in the in-laws to live with them only after a lapse of
time. The origin of the custom owes its existence to performance of child marriages
which are widely prevalent there. The Muklana was yet to take place. The prosecutrix
was a virgin prior to the commission of the crime and this fact finds support from the
medical evidence. The parents of such a prosecutrix would obviously be chary of such an
incident gaining publicity because it would have serious implications for the reputation of
the family and also on the married life of the victim. The husband and the in-laws having
i
become aware of the incident may even refuse to carry the girl to reside with them. The
i
incident if publicized may have been an end to the marriage of the prosecutrix. Added to
:his is the communal tinge which was sought to be given by the community of the
recused. (The accused and the prosecutrix belonged to different communities). The father
)f the prosecutrix and other witnesses have stated that while they were about to move to
he police station they were prevented from doing so by the community fellows of the
iccused who persuaded them not to lodge a report with the police and instead to have the
natter settled by convening a panchayat of the village people. After all the family of the
dctim had to live in the village inspite of the incident having taken place. The
:xplanation is not an afterthought. An indication thereof is to be found in the FIR itself
15
2000 (5) SCC 30.
133
where the complainant stated that “the delay in lodging the report is due to village
panchayat, insult and social disrepute”. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-
examination of the witnesses to doubt the truthfulness of the explanation so offered.”
H. Delay in recording of FIR by Officer Incharge of Police Station

FIR is to be written as soon as possible, some times officer-in-charge of the police
station escape from this essential job because after registration of the case they have to
further inquire the case and by this reason they can not escape from their duty. Sec. 154
Cr.P.C. mandates the officer-in-charge of police station to record first information report
as and when he receives information to a commission of cognizable offence. There
should not be any delay on the part of the officer-in-charge of police station in recording
first information and registering the case upon it. Delay in registration of FIR renders
case to the prosecution suspicious. Any explanation given by the police officer is not
unbelievable.
In State of Maharashtra V. Prakash Sakha Vasave & Ors.116 the honorable
Supreme Court decided that So far as the delay in lodging the First Information Report
is concerned, it has been accepted that the informant went to the wrong police station and
when he was directed to go to Navapur Police Station, he went there and lodged the FIR.
That clearly explains the delay. Delay in filing F.I.R. is, therefore, not fatal. In the
I
ultimate analysis, High Court was not justified in directing acquittal of A-l and A-2.
However, so far as A-3 is concerned, the High Court has indicated sufficient reasons for
I
holding him not guilty. Same needs no interference. But the reasons indicated for
directing acquittal of A-l and A-2 are not justified. We, therefore, set aside the judgment
of High Court so far as their acquittal is concerning. But considering the facts of the case,
it is apparent that the accused persons were annoyed with the deceased because of his
having illicit relationship with another lady while his wife was alive. The case does not
fall to the rarest of rare category. The appropriate sentence would be life imprisonment.
The State’s appeal is allowed the extent indicated above. Respondents 1 and 2 and
directed to surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence. It is the

i
134
established principal that if a cognizable offence occurs and the police station is different
from the having jurisdiction, report is to be written and must be sent to the concerned
police station.
In Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra,117 “The most
important of these circumstances is the conduct of S.I. Patil in not recording that “first
information” allegedly given by Shinde and Ravji on that occasion. S.I. Patil admitted
that he did not record the information given to him by Shinde and Ravji about the
occurrence, on that occasion. The information, which he then received, was about the
commission of a cognizable offence. It was, therefore, the duty of S.I. Patil (who was
incharge of the police station) to record it in accordance with provisions of S. 154 Cr.P.C.
but he did not do so. The explanation given by him was that it was the practice of this
Police Station not to record such information until a message was received from.the
hospital with regard to the condition of the injured person. This explanation of Patil’s
failure to do what was his statutory duty, was mere moonshine and was rightly repelled
by the learned trial Judge.”
It will bear repetition that the learned Judges of the High Court have disbelieved
Ravji and accepted S.I. Patil’s bare word of mouth, both with regard to the time of
recording Ravji’s statement and Ravji’s having informed Patil in the police station at 7.30
p.m. about the accused being the assailants of the deceased, when Ravji and Shinde took
:he injured there in a taxi. As noticed already, one of the reasons given by the High Court
?or rejecting Ravji’s testimony on this point, is that he was a mere labour boy having no
sense of time. With respect, this reason appears to us manifestly unsound. Labourers,
nasons and artisans who work on daily wages for fixed hours have an acute sense of
:ime. There was nothing indefinite or unbelievable in Ravji’s version to the effect that his
statement was recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector between 12 mid night and 1 a.m.
vhile his signature was obtained on that statement probably at 3 a.m. No question was
mt to him to test his sense of time. Nor was any attempt made in re-examination to elicit
i clarification, if one was needed, with a view to reconcile this version of the witness
vith that of the prosecution case, as laid by S.I. Patil, about the time of recording Ravji’s
tatement, treated as the FIR.
7
1979 Cr.L.J. 51; AIR 1979 SC 135.
135
Thus, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances, this inordinate

delay in registration of the FIR and further delay in recording the statements of the
material witnesses, cast a cloud of suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and
woof of the prosecution story.”
In Gopaiah v. State of A.P.,118 it was held that mere delay in recording the FIR
was caused by the absence of the Sub-Inspector from the police station and as the
constable present were illiterate.
I. Delay in Despatching the FIR to the Magistrate

FIR is to be sent to the Illaqua Magistrate immediately as has been decided in
many recent cases by apex court. In Bathula Nagamalleswar Rao & Ors. V. State,
Rep. by Public Prosecutor119 the Apex Court held that “we have given our anxious
consideration to the rival contentions of the Learned Counsel for the parties. The
arguments put forward by Mr. Patwalia although are extremely attractive, yet we find
ourselves unable to agree with the same. It is no doubt true that FIR (Ex.P5) came to be
recorded at 11:00 p.m. on 18.07.1996 in the Police Station by Head Constable P.
i ■
Mallikajunarao (PW-8), who was posted at the relevant time at Police Station, Thulium.
The incident of murder of deceased No. 1 and deceased No. 2 took place at 7:30 p.m. on
18.7.1996 as per Complaint (Ex. PI) made by PW-1 to. Sub-Inspector Maqbool Khan
(PW-11), which was sent to Police Station, Thulium, through PC No. 2896 for
registration of the FIR. It has come in the,cross-examination of PW-8 that the distance
between Police Station, Thulium, and Mangalagiri where the Magistrate holds court is
i ■ ■
about 20 kms. PW-8 categorically stated that FIR (Ex. P5) was registered by him at 11:00
p.m. on 18.7.1996 and even if the copy of the FIR was to be sent to the Magistrate during
the mid-night, it was not possible for the Police Constable to take the FIR and deliver the
same to the Magistrate at Mangalagiri on the intervening night of 18/19.07.1996 as there
was no bus service available during the night time between the two places. The trial court
in its judgment observed that the FIR was received by the Magistrate at 4.00 p.m. on
19.07.1996. The trial court has noticed but not accepted the contention of the learned
118
1978 Cr.L.J. P. 798.
119
136
counsel for the accused persons that in these circumstances the statement of PW-1 (Ex.
PI) might have been recorded at 3.00 p.m. on 19.07.1996 at village Uddandayunipalem
and from the village itself the statement might have been sent to Mangalagiri in a police
vehicle and, therefore, the same was received by the Magistrate at 4.00 p.m. on
19.07.1996. We have independently scrutinized the evidence of PW-1 and PW-11, the
Investigating Officer. It is their clear and consistent testimony that statement (Ex. PI)
was recorded at 9.00 p.m. on the: night of 18.07.1996 after the incident of murder had
occurred at 7.30 p.m. It is undisputed fact that one Ramamohanarao, son of A-6, was
murdered on the same evening at about 6.00 or 6.30 p.m. at the outskirts of village
Uddandayunipalem. It is the evidence of PW-11, Sub-Inspector of Police, that about 7.15
pm. M. Venkatarao informed him that his rival group of men armed with deadly weapons
was moving towards their village and on receiving the information he along with other
police personnel had immediately proceeded to village Uddanadayunipalem in a private
I
jeep for maintaining law and order. PW, Head Constable, in cross-examination,
corroborated the version of PW, Sub-Inspector of Police, that on 18.07.1996 around 7.15
p.m. on receipt of the information in regard to some incident of violence in the village,
P.W. 11 along with five staff members left the Police Station for maintaining law and
order in the village. PW-8 sent FIR (Ex. P5) to the Magistrate through PC No. 2896 who
brought statement of PW-1 (Ex. P-1) at 11:00 p.m to the Police Station. PW-13, Circle
1
Inspector of Police, stated that on the midnight of 18/19.07.1996 at about 00.15 hours he
received a copy of express FIR through PC No. 2896 disclosing the incidents of murder
of three persons in village Uddandayunipalem. The endorsement made on FIR (Ex. P5)
by the Magistrate on its bare perusal would reveal that he received a copy of the FJ.R.
through PC No. 1293 and not through PC No. 2896 as deposed by P.W. 8. It appears
from the record that PC No. 2896 handed over a copy of express FIR to PW-13, Circle
Inspector of Police, at village Udandayunipalem at 00.15 hours on the intervening night
of 18/19.07.1996 and the constable PC No. 1293 might have been deputed to deliver the
FIR (Ex. P5) to the Magistrate at Mangalagiri. The trial court in its judgment observed
that keeping in view the serious and tense situation in the village because of the murder
of three persons on the same evening, the entire staff of Police Station was deputed to
maintain law and order problem there. Out of the victims, one was the son of A-6, ex-
137
Sarpanch of the village, whereas deceased No. 1 was the sitting Sarpanch of the same
village. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the trial court held that there was
no delay in lodging the FIR the police and delay in sending a copy of the FIR to the
Magistrate was a result of shortage of police personnel who could not be deputed to
deliver the same to the Magistrate during the night of18.07.1996 or in the early hours of
19.07.1996. The High Court has re-examined the evidence on record and held that the
delay in sending FIR to the Magistrate was not deliberate or intentional, but because of
some technical errors committed by the Investigating Officer during the course of
investigation of the case which could not be found fatal to the case of the prosecution,
especially when the Investigation Officer was not cross-examined on this point.
We have earlier pointed out that in the present case there was a delay of about 16
hours in sending the FIR (Ex. P5) to the Magistrate, but the explanation as recorded by
the. trial court that the majority of the police personnel were deputed in village
Uddandarayunipalem for maintaining the law and order situation which was too tense in
view of the murder of three men of the village on the same evening, we do not find any
cogent and convincing reason for doubting the correctness and truthfulness of the FIR
which was promptly lodged in the Police Station at 9:00 p.m. in relation to the murder of
deceased No. 1 and deceased No. 2 at about 7:30 p.m. The Investigation Officer in cross-
examination denied the suggestion of the defence that Ex. PI was brought into existence
around 2:35 p.m. or 3:00 p.m. on the next day, i.e. 19.07.1996, after a good deal of
consultations and confabulations with the leaders of rival group of the accused and
i
particularly after observing the injuries on the dead body of deceased No. 1. He
categorically stated that he recorded the statement (Ex. PI) made by PW-1 between 9:00
p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on 18.07.1996 and on completion thereof, the same was sent through
P.C. No. 2896 to the Police Station for registration of the FIR and after registration of the
same constable brought the copy of the FIR. to the scene of occurrence at about 12:00
mid-night and thereafter PW-11 took up further investigation of the case. A suggestion of
the defence of Ex. PI and under their instructions he had not only ante-timed but also
ante-dated the FIR and planted witnesses and having done so he deposed falsely against
the accused persons, has categorically been denied by him.
138
Sec. 157 Cr.P.C. mandates that if, from information received or otherwise, an
officer-in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence
which he is empowered to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report. In other
words Sec. 167 of the Code, directs sending of report forthwith i.e. without any delay
immediately.
Therefore, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of a police station to send the FIR
immediately without any delay to the Magistrate concerned. If there is any delay in
sending the FIR to the Magistrate, FIR will become doubtful. If report is received by a
Magistrate lately, it can give rise to an inference that FIR was not lodged at that time.
But, prosecution can offer satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt
of FIR by the concerned Magistrate. The prosecution has to lead evidence in this regard.
To avoid all these things, it is better for the officer in-charge of a police station to send
FIR forthwith after registering.” In Indra Pal Singh V.State of U.P.I20the honorable
Supreme Court decided that The occurrence took place at about 8.30 p.m. near village in
which the accused allegedly, fired gun shots at deceased and FIR of occurrence was
lodged at about 6.15 a.m. on the following morning at Police Station which is situated at
a distance of about 15 Km. from place of occurrence. The father of deceased has given
explanation that due to fear from the accused and non-availability of conveyance, he
could not promptly go to the police station to lodge FIR of the occurrence. He stated that
after the murder of deceased, he with the help of his co-villagers took the dead body of
his son from the place of occurrence to his house and since they were all waiting and
grief stricken he got the report of the occurrence scribed by his second son at about 3.00
a.m. on the following morning and then at about 4.00 a.m. he proceeded to the police
station, and handed over the written report to the police official present there. In these
circumstances, the explanation offered by the information for not lodging the FIR soon
after the occurrence, was quite satisfactory and convincing and there was no deliberate
I
delay on his part in reporting the crime to police. Therefore, FIR would not be liable to
be rejected on ground of delay in lodging 8 a.m.
120
139
In Badi Guravaiah v. State of A.P.,121 it was held that “Generally the FIRs
registered under sections other than grave crimes like Section 302 IPC will be sent in
regular course and the FIRs registered under sec. 302 IPC will be sent by express
messengers. In this case the FIR was originally registered under Section 324 IPC on 21-
3-1989 and subsequently on receipt of death intimation on 25-3-1989 the section of law
was altered to Section 302 IPC and altered FIR was sent on 25-3-1989 which reached the
Court on the same day.
Mere delay in receipt of the FIR by the Magistrate by itself is not fatal to the
prosecution provided it was lodged with the police without any delay and investigation
commenced on that basis, unless it is proved that the delay has been given room to
concoction. However, the delay has to be considered in the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. In this case, immediately after the incident PW 1 went to the
hospital taking her injured daughter on the very same night at 4-30 a.m. After examining
the injured PW-9 sent Ex. P7 intimation to the police of Gudur Town PS. PW-14
proceeded to the hospital at 5-30 a.m. on the same night and recorded the statement Ex.
P-1 from PW-1. So practically tiere is no delay in giving the FIR. Immediately after
receipt of Ex. P-1 and P-7, PW-17 registered the case and started investigation. The very
fact that the injured was sent to the hospital immediately and the statement Ex. P-1 was
recorded at 5-30 a.m. itself shows that prompt action was taken in the matter. In these
circumstances, the mere delay in dispatch of the FIR is not a circumstance which can
throw the case of the prosecution in its entirety.
J. Delay in lodging the FIR favorable decision to the accused

In Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P.,122 it was held that “Delay in dispatching the
FIR to the Magistrate is a circumstance which provides a legitimate basis for suspecting
that the first information report was recorded much later than the stated date and hour
affording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and
embellishments and set up a distorted version of the occurrence. In this case, the
121
1994(2) ALT (Crl.) 125, Div. A.P.
122
AIR 1976 SC 2443; 1976 Crl. L.J. 1883.
140
suspicion hardens into a definite possibility when one finds that the case made in Court
differs at least in two very important particulars from that narrated in the FIR.
In this case, the prosecution offered no explanation for the delay of two days in
sending the FIR to the Magistrate. The appeal was accepted.
In Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra,123 it was held “The
inordinate delay in registration of the FIR and further delay in recording the statements of
the material witnesses, casts a cloud of suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and
woof of the prosecution story.
In Babboo v. State of Madhya Pradesh,124 it was held that the FIR was lodged
12 hours after the occurrence and it does not contain the name of the assailants.
It would be reasonable inference that for a period of 12 hours after the occurrence
the names of the assailants were not disclosed and this would wholly belie the
prosecution case that Phoola Bai, Lachhman and Kanhaiya Lai were witnesses to the
occurrence.
| •js
In B. Subba Rao v. Public Prosecutor, it was held that there was no
I
unavoidable delay; On the contrary report was lodged at earliest possible opportunity. In
i
this case there was ghastly murder due to political rivalry in the village and report was
lodged after 14 hours. Eyewitnesses took shelter in the fields in the night due to
apprehension to their lives and lodged report in the morning.
Delay in Dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate

In Sushil and others v. State of U.P.,[26 it was held that “Sec. 157 Cr.P.C. requires
:he sending of report forthwith to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
jffence, but every delay in sending the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case unless
;ome prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused by such delay.
In State of UP. v. Gokaran,121 in the present case there is no material to indicate
hat there was any deliberate delay on the part of the investigating officer in dispatching
he report. This apart, no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused persons
23 AIR 1979 SC 135; 1979 Cr.LJ 51.

24 AIR 1979 SC 1042 ; 1979 Cr.L.J. 908.
25 1997(4) RCR(Criminal) 673(SC).
26 1994 (IV) CCR 816 ; 1995 (1) ALT (Crl.) 64 (SC).
11 AIR 1985 SC 131.
141
by the said delay. On the contrary it is abundantly clear from the evidence on record that
after the FIR Ex. Ka 4 was recorded the Police Inspector Bhim Singh PW6 immediately
recorded the statement of the informant in the police station itself and at 8-30 A.M.
proceeded to the place of occurrence alongwith the ASI Om Dutt Tyagi who prepared the
Panchanama of the dead body at the spot, recorded the statement of the witnesses,
prepared the site plan Ext Ka 9 and seized the blood stained and sample earth from the
place of occurrence as well as paijama and shoes of the deceased. He than made a search
of the accused persons but they could not be traced out. These facts are not disputed and
the same have been corroborated by the evidence of witnesses. It is thus clear that on 15-
8-1980 the Police Inspector Bhim Singh and his ASI Om Dutt Tyagi both remained busy
in the investigation at the place of occurrence and thereafter in sending the dead body to
the District Hospital for post-mortem. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above
and after going through the prosecution evidence which we shall discuss here-in-after we
are satisfied that the report was lodged on the date and time mentioned in the FIR Ext.
Ka-4 and sending of report by the prosecution was not delayed in order to introduce some
improvement, embellishment or distorted version of the occurrence.
In State of M.P. v. Ramesh,128 it was held that: “The entire basis for the
aforesaid argument is that in letter dated 3-10-1985 to the Superintendent of Police to
which the informant himself was a signatory, it had not been indicated that an FIR had
already been lodged earlier. This argument made by Mr. Naik, learned Senior Counsel is
wholly misconceived inasmuch as the said document indicates that several persons had
already been arrested by them and persons can be arrested only after lodging of FIR and
not before that. PW-1 is himself the informant and has categorically stated that he had
given the report to the police on 1-10-1985 itself and there is no reason why his statement
should be discarded. Learned counsel, Mr. Naik in this context had urged that the fact
that the FIR reached the Magistrate only on 3-10-1985 substantiates his allegation that
there was no FIR on 1-10-1985, as alleged by the prosecution. But the investigating
officer has indicated the reason that 2nd of October being a holiday on account of Gandhi
Jayanti, he has sent the documents on 3rd October and this explanation has been accepted
128
(2000)1 SCC 243.
142
by the learned Sessions Judge as well as by the High Court. We do not think that a
separate view could be taken by this Court on this score”.
K. Time of dispatch
In Omprakash v. State of U.P.,129 it was held that “The Sec. 157 of the Cr.P.C.
only states that the First Information Report, should be dispatched forthwith and does not
say that the time of dispatch must be noted thereon.” Thus time is immaterial and has not
been specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure but it must be dispatched within
reasonable timeperiod.
L. The delay in dispatching a copy of FIR is not sufficient to put the case of
prosecution out of court
In P. Venkaiah v. State of A.P.,130 it was held that, the mere fact that there was
some delay in dispatching a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is not sufficient to put the
case of the prosecution out of Court. The FIR reached the Magistrate at about 5-15 P.M.,
i.e. only about 4-5 hours after it was lodged. It is also well known that a Magistrate is a
very busy person and the mere fact that there is some delay before necessary entries are
made would not be fatal to the prosecution case.
ML Object of Sending of FIR to the Magistrate

To avoid the possibility of improvements in the prosecution story and
introduction of any distorted version by deliberations and consultation and to enable the
Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the investigation is the main
abject of sending of FIR to the Magistrate.
In Arjun Mark and others v. State of Bihar,131 the Apex Court held that, there
s yet another serious infirmity which further deepens the suspicion and casts cloud on the
credibility of the entire prosecution story and which has also upon last sight by the trial
court as well as High Court and it was with regard to the sending of occurrence report
FIR) to the Magistrate concerned on 22-7-1985, i.e. on the date of the occurrence.
29
AIR 1983 SC 431; 1983 Cr. L.J. 831.
30
AIR 1985 SC 1715.
31
1994 SCC Cr. L.J. 155.
143
Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that if from information
received otherwise an officer-in-charge of a Police Station has reason to suspect the
commission of an offence which1 he was empowered U/S. 156 to investigate, he shall
forthwith send a report of the same to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
such offence upon a police report. Section 157 Cr.P.C. thus, in other words directs the
sending of the report forthwith i.e., without any delay.
Further, the Section 159 Cr.P.C. envisages that on receiving such report, the
Magistrate may direct an investigation or if he thinks fit to proceed to once or depute any
other Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed at hold a preliminary enquiry into the case
in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure is implicit with the use of the
word ‘forthwith’, occurring in Section 157 which means promptly without any undue
i
delay: The purpose and object is so obvious. This spelt out from the combined reading of
Sections 157 and 159 Cr.P.C. It has the dual performance.
Firstly, to avoid the possibility of improvements in the prosecution story and
introduction of any distorted version by deliberations and consultation and secondly, to
enable the Magistrate concerned to have a watch on the progress of the investigation. But
in the present case, admittedly, the report as alleged is said to have been dispatched to the
Magistrate concerned on 22-7-1985 by a special messenger vide Ex. P-2. It is, thus clear
that the report, was not sent forthwith, in other words immediately and without delay. As
the incident has occurred in the intervening night of 19/20-7-1985 and according to
domain PW 10 the officer-in-charge of a Police Station, the FIR was already recorded in
the morning of 20-7-1985. If, in fact, the FIR was already recorded in the morning of 20-
7-1985, there was no reason not to dispatch the same to the Magistrate concerned till 22-
7-1985. That there is no material on record to show as to why delayed report was sent to
the magistrate on 22-7-1985 but the learned counsel for the respondent submitted at the
bar that the Investigating Office remained busy in the investigation on 20-7-1985 which
was Saturday and since 21-7-1985 was Sunday, the report was sent on Monday, 22-7-
1985. He submitted that in Bihar State even in murder cases, FIR is never sent to the
residence of Magistrate on Sundays and on Holidays. If that be so, we are afraid of such
practice can never said to be an healthy practice which renders mandatory provisions
nugatory. If such a practice is prevalent it must be deprecated and it is high time that the
144
authorities concerned should wake-up and see that the provisions of Sec. 157 are
complied with in letter and spirit'. Undue delay in lodging First Information Report, is
looked with a certain amount of suspicion and should as far as possible be avoided.
Delay in recording FIR can be of three types:
(1) Delay in lodging FIR by informant;
(2) Delay in recording FIR by the Officer-in-charge of the police station.
(3) Delay in dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate.
Delay either in lodging or in recording or in sending the copies of FIR to the
concerned Magistrate generate suspicion about the truthfulness of the contents given in
the FIR. The significance of the delay depends upon the facts and circumstances in each
and every case; there is no hard and fast rule to decide about the impact of delay. In all
possibilities the prosecution must be able to explain the delay. The informant must give
the reason for the delay in the information itself.
N. Some reasonable explanations of delay

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh132 honorable Supreme Court
decided that so far delay in lodging the FIR question is concerned, the delay in a case of
I
sexual assault cannot be equated with the case involving other offences. There are several
factors which weigh in the mind of the prosecutrix and her family members before
coming to the police station to lodge a complaint. In a traditional bound society prevalent
in India, more particularly, rural areas, it would be quite unsafe to throw out the
prosecution case merely on the ground that there is some delay in lodging the FIR. In that
score, learned counsel for the appellant is right that the High Court has lost sight of this
vital distinction. Additionally, we find that the prosecution has clearly established
commission of offence punishable under Sections 354 and 506 IPC. So far as the offence
punishable under Section 375 IPC. On a reading of the evidence of the prosecutrix, we
find that a case of rape has not been established so far as the respondent is concerned. It
would be quite unsafe to throw out the prosecution case merely on the ground that
there is some delay in lodging in FIR.
32
2009(1) LAW HERALD (SC) 714 para 6.
145
It is the duty of the prosecution to explain the delay in lodging of FIR or sending
it to the court or registering the same. Physical condition of the informant, Geographical
condition of the place, Seasonal conditions, Psychological condition of the informant and
circumstantial conditions may be one of the reasons for delay. On the basis of various
decisions of Supreme Court and High Court, the following are some of the circumstances
which are to be considered as reasonable explanations of delay in FIR.
1. Fear of accused persons.I33- Psychological cause of delay.

2. Fear of damage of family honor in rape cases.134 - Psychological cause of delay.
3. Delay due to shock of murder.135- Psychological cause of delay.
1
4. Delay in FIR due to infliction of grievous injuries, to the injured person.
Physical cause of delay.
1 "XI
5. Options of motive to falsely implicate the accused.
1
6. When Husband himself bums his wife.
Haji Lai Deen v. State, 1977 Cri. L.J. 538; Karam Singh v. Charan Singh. 1984 Cri. L.T. 37.
Harpal Singh v. State of H.P., 1981 Cri. L.J. 1: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 361: 1981 S.C.C.(Cri.) 208;
Anwar Hussain v. State of Rajasthan , 1987(1) Crimes 103(para-6); State of Rajasthan v, Dhania,
1986 Cri. L.J. 956; Puran Singh v. State of Rajasthan. 1985 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 54 (Raj.): Ganesh v.
State of M.P., 1985(3) J.L.J. 778: Puran Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Raj L.W. 357: 1984
Raj. C.J. 83: Mohan v. State of M.P., 1982 Cri. L.R. (M.P.) 44: State of Rajasthan v. Savita. 1983
Raj. L.W. 364; State of Karnataka v. Manjanama, 2000(2) Crimes 302 (SC): 2000 Cri. L.J. 3471
(SC): AIR 2000 SC 2231: 2000 SCC (Cri.) 1031: 2000(28) All Cri. R. 1638; C. Chandrakant v.
State of Karanataka, 2002 Cri. L.J.NOC 341 (Kant.)
State of Punjab v. Jagbir Singh, 1973 S.C.C. (Cri.) 886; Sone Lai v. State of U.P., 1978 Cri. L.J.
1122 : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1142; Babu Lodhi v. State of U.P., 1987(2) crimes 205; Dalip Singh v.
State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 364: 1953 Cri. L.J. 1465: Nabbi v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cri.
L.R. (Raj.) 135; Krishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1237: 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.) 669:
1981 Cri. L.J. 743.
Bankey Lai v. State of U.P., 1971 Cri. L.J. 1540 (para 13): 1971 S.C.C. (Cri.) 253: A.I.R. 1971
S.C. 2233: Gumam Singh v. State of Haryana, 1981 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 83; Ram Chandra v. State of
Rajasthan. 1982 Cri. L.J. 36; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, A.I.R, 1973 S.C. 2407 : 1973 S.C.C.
(Cri.) 886; Krishna Pillai S. Kumar v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1237 : 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.)
669 : 1981 Cri. L.J. 743; Pattipati Venkalah v. State of A.P., 1985 Cr. LJ. 2012: A.I.R. 1985 S.C.
1715 : 1985 S.C.C. (Cri.) 464 : 1985(2) Crimes 746; Babu Lai v. State of Rajasthan, 1984(1)
Crimes 442; Swaran Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Raj. L.W. 210; Gurbaehan Singh v. Satpal
Singh, 1990 Cri. L.J. 562 : A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 209; Rashbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2002(2)
Crimes 209 (SC); 2000(40) All Cri. C 950; 2000 SCC (Cri.) 1169; State of Karnataka v. Diwakara
Bhat, 1997 SCC (Cri.). 144; 1997 Cri. LJ.226 (228); Garib Singh v. State, 1972 S.C.C. (Cri.) 568:
1972 Cri. L.J. 1286 (para 9). '
Ram Jag v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 606: 1974 S.C.C. (Cri.) 370; Saktu v. State of M.P.,
A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 760 : 1973 S.C.C. (Cri.) 307.
Bharat v. State, 1983 All. Dand Nimaya, 323(324).
i
146
7. When facts mentioned in the FIR cannot be changed by mere delay.139-

Circumstantial cause of delay.
8. Long distance of police from the place of occurrence. 14°- Geographical cause of
delay.
9. Because of night and the Police station is situated at very far distance.141 -
Seasonal cause of delay.
10. Rough Road.142 -Geographical cause of delay.
11. Bad weather.143 - Seasonal cause of delay.
12. Non-availability of transport.144 -Geographical cause of delay.
13. When facts of occurrence are admitted by both the parties.145- Circumstantial
cause of delay.
14. When the informants did not know the FIR was necessary to lodge.146
i
15. Rainy Season.147- Seasonal cause of delay.

16. When amicable settlement was started.- Circumstantial cause of delay.
17. Delay in recording the FIR was caused by the absence of Sub-Inspector from the
police station and the constable present was illiterate.148 -Circumstantial cause
of delay.
18. Delay must be explained by examining the constable who has dispatched such
report to the Magistrate. - Circumstantial cause of delay.
Neelam Kumar Sood v. State, 1983(2). Crimes 493; Ratna Ram v. State of Haryana, 1982 Cri. LJ.
N.O.C. 8; Jai Prakash v. State, 1982 Cri. LT. 190:1981 Cri. L.J. 1340.
Nabbi v. State of Rajasthan, 198,2 Cri. L.R. (Raj.) 135; Dull Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1986 Cri.
L.R. (Raj.) 615; Babu Krishna Kamley v. State of Maharashtra, 1980 Supp. S.C.C. (Cri.) 912:
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 364:1953 Cri. LJ. 1465; Bujjha v. State of U.P.,
1985 Cri. L.J. 1829; Chatara v. state of Rajasthan, 1982 Raj. Cri. C. 385: State of Rajasthan v.
Nathu Ram, 1993 Cri. L.J. 533 (Raj.); State of M.P. v. Udai Singh 1998 Cri. LJ 365 (368) SC:
1997 (4) Crimes 308 (SC); Hari Ram v. State of M.P., 2002 (3) Crimes 405 (M.P.); Jugroo v. State
of MP., 2002 Cri. L.J. 1055 (M.P.); State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash. 2002 Cri. LJ 2951 (SC).
Lalai v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2118: 1978 Cri. L.J. 1393: Duli Chand v. State of
Rajasthan, 1986 Cri. LR. (Raj.) 615.
Lalai v. State of U.P., (Supra); State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 191 : 1978 Cri. LJ.
141: 1978 S.C.C. (Cri.) 83.
Babu Krishna Kamble v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1269 : 1980 Cri. LJ. 928 (S.C.); State of
U.P. v. Sughar Singh, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 191 : 1978 Cri. L.J. 141 : 1978 S.C.C. (Cri.) 83.
Babu Krishna Kamble v. State of M.P., (Supra).
State of Rajasthan v. Gur Bachan Singh, 1982 Raj. Cri. C. 338 (D.B.).
Manager Yadav v. State, 1984 (2) Crimes 747; 1984 All. L.J. 1146.
Fekan Bind v. State of Bihar, 1988(1) Crimes 740.
Amrik Singh v. State ofPunjab,1983 Cri. L.J. 1405.
147
i) Fear of damage to family honour in rape cases.- Psychological cause of delay. In a

rape case delay of 24 hours is not fatal to prosecution.149 In a case of rape the delay in
lodging F.I.R. has to be considered by the Court in the context of psychological reaction
of the incident upon the prosecutrix.150
When amicable settlement of incident of rape was sought and complaint to police was
held up for 10 days, then said delay in F.I.R. was of no consequence.151
Where in a rape case victim was a village girl aged 10 years who after the occurrence
of the incident in a shock narrated the incident to her relative and then to her parents and
immediately on next day on identifying the accused as culprit they lodged F.I.R. with the
police, the delay occurred in the case would not be fatal because her relative and parents
might have consulted the elders and other people in the village and that will naturally
result in some delay. Especially in eases like rape or outraging the modesty of a woman,
the aggrieved , or the injured person or her relations will naturally think twice before
giving a complaint to the police. This will be much more so in the villages because it
involves the prestige and reputation of the family of the victim. The delay will be fatal in
1 ^9
cases of murder and such sort of cases but it will not be so in cases of this nature.
In Ram Chet Rajbhar v. State of W.R.153, a Division Bench has held that when
a prosecutrix aged about 9-10 years has disclosed the name of accused in F.I.R. lodged by
her and to her parents, and when medical evidence proving sexual act then non-disclosure
of name of accused before doctors is not fatal to prosecution.
Where in a rape case victim was a village girl aged 10 years who after the
occurrence of the incident in a shock narrated the incident to her relative and then to her
i
parents and immediately on next day on identifying the accused as culprit they lodged
F.I.R. with the police, the delay occurred in the case would not be fatal because her
relative and parents might have consulted the elders and other people in the village and
that will naturally result in some delay. Especially in cases like rape or outraging the
modesty of a woman, the aggrieved or the injured person or her relations will naturally
think twice before giving a complaint to the police. This will be much more so in the
149 Dhru Kumar v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Cri. LJ. N.O.C. 83 (Guj.).
150 Rehmat v. State of M.P., 1994(1) Crimes. 533 (S.N.) M.P.
151 Sushil Kumar Pati @ China v. The State . 1993(2) Crimes 800(Cal.).
152 Nalla Ram Babu v. State of A.P., 1992 Cri. L.J. 324.
153 1992 Cri. LJ. 372 (376) Cal.
148
villages because it involves the prestige and reputation of the family of the victim. The
delay will be fatal in cases of murder and such sort of cases but it will not be so in cases
of this nature.154
Mere delay in lodging the FIR can not be a ground by itself for throwing the
entire prosecution case over board. The Court has to seek an explanation for delay and
test the truthfulness and plausibility of the reason assigned. If the delay is explained to the
satisfaction of the court it cannot be counted against the prosecution.155
ii) Informant did not know that F.I.R. was necessary to lodge. - Circumstantial
cause of delay.
A victim of any injury may be informed by the doctor that his case is to be dealt
as medico legal case. It is possible that informant might not be knowing that FIR is
I
necessary and he would have been asked by the doctor while examining his injuries in a
1
medico legal case, and lodging of FIR is necessary,
lii) Rainy Season. - Seasonal cause of delay.

Rainy season and flood may be one of the reasons for delay in the registration of a case.
In Silak Ram & Anr. V. State of Haryana158 the Apex Court held that Coming
to the stand that there was delay in lodging the FIR and in dispatch of the report to the
Illaqua Magistrate, this also has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court. Delay in
lodging FIR by itself would not be sufficient to discard the prosecution version unless it
is unexplained and such delay coupled with the likelihood of concoction of evidence.
There is no hard andfast rule that delay in filing FIR in each and every case is fatal and
on account of such delay prosecution
i
version should be discarded. The factum of delay
I
requires the court to scrutinize the evidence adduced with greater degree of care and
caution. In this case the eye witnesses have given a vivid description of the events. The
I
evidence of PW11 as noted above is cogent and consistent and the version given by this
Nalla Ram Babu v. State of A.P:, 1992 Cri. LJ. 324.

State of Rajasthan. V. Noore Khan, 2000(2) Crimes 84 (SC); 2000 Cri. LJ 2205: AIR 2000 SC
1812: 2000 SCC (Cri.) 898. i
Manager Yadav v. State, 1984 (2) Crimes 747; 1984 All. LJ. 1146.
Fekan Bind v. State of Bihar, 1988(1) Crimes 740.
149
witness fits with medical evidence. It has come on record in the evidence of the
Investigating Officer (in short ‘10’) that the distance between Bawani Khera and Bhiwani
is about 20 k.m. and from Dhanana to Bhiwani is about 18 K.m. and from Dhanana to
Mundhal is about 12 k.m. Investigating Officer has categorically stated that there was
flood in the areas. In the FIR it was specifically stated that the occurrence took place
around mid night of 24/25.8.1995. The statement was recorded at Mundhal Khurd
Chowk on 25.9.1995 at 9.40 A.M. and the same was dispatched to the police station of
Bhiwani Khera. The formal FIR indicates that it was recorded at 11 AM and had reached
the magistrate at 7 p.m. It has been stated that the late delivery was ‘due to flood’ in the
area and this has been specifically noted by the Judicial Magistrate who was reported as
follows:
“Received from constable Devender; Kumar at 7 p.m. on 25.9.1995. Stated that
due to the flood, he reached late.” In Silak Ram & Anr. V. State of Haryana159 the
Apex Court held that Coming to the stand that there was delay in lodging the FIR and in
i
dispatch of the report to the Illaqua Magistrate, this also has been elaborately dealt with
by the High Court. Delay in lodging FIR by itself would not be sufficient to discard the
prosecution version unless it is unexplained and such delay coupled with the likelihood of
concoction of evidence. There is no hard and fast rule that delay in filing FIR in each
and every case is fatal and on account of such delay prosecution version should be
discarded. The factum of delay requires the court to scrutinize the evidence adduced with
greater degree of care and caution. In this case the eye witnesses have given a vivid
description of the events. The evidence of PW11 as noted above is cogent and consistent
and the version given by this witness fits with medical evidence. It has come on record in
the evidence of the Investigation Officer (in short TO’) that he distance between Bawani
Khera and Bhiwani is about 20 k.m. and from Dhanana to Bhiwani is about 18 k.m. and
from Dhanana to Mundhal is about 12 k.m. Investigating Officer has categorically stated
that there was flood in the areas. In the FIR it was specifically stated that the occurrence
took place around mid night of 24/25.8.1995. The statement was recorded at Mundhal
Khurd Chowk on 25.9.1995 at 9.40 A.M. And the same was dispatched to the police

Q>
150
station of Bawani Khera. The formal FIR indicates that it was recorded at 11 AM and had
reached the magistrate at 7 p.m. It has been stated that he late delivery was due to flood
in the area and this has been specifically noted by the Judicial Magistrate who has
reported as follows”
“Received from constable Devender Kumar at 7 p.m. on 25.9.1995. Stated that
due to theflood, he reached late.”
In Murari Thakur & Anr. V. State of Bihar160 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that there was delay in
filing the FIR. We are of the opinion that there is no such delay which can be said to be
fatal to the prosecution case. The occurrence took place on 26.8.1998 at 4 p.m. The first
informant, the father of the deceased, Bhuneshwar Mishra (PW8), was at Sitamarhi and
returned home on 8 p.m. when he came to know from his brother Dhaneshwar Mishra
that his minor son Bal Krishna Mishra aged about 14 years had been murdered. After
Bhuneshwar Mishra learnt about this from his brother Dhaneshwar Mishra (PW4), the he
went and lodged the FIR R.K .Tiwari (PW11), the Investigating Officer, has stated in his
evidence that it was rainy season and there was flood in the area and he reached the
place of the occurrence on the night of 26.8.1998/ 27.8.1998 at about 1.30 a.m. and
recorded the Fard-e-bayan of the informant. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion
that there was no such fatal delay in lodging the FIR.
iv) When amicable settlement was sought. - Circumstantial cause of delay.

There would be no delay in lodging FIR if the father of the deceased married girl
has rushed to the hospital to save the life of her daughter.161
Complaint was lodged two days later but as stated earlier Indian society being
what it is the victims of such a crime ordinarily consult relatives and are hesitant to
approach the police since it involves the question of morality and chastity of a married
woman. A woman and her relatives have to struggle with several situations before
deciding to approach the police, more so when the culprit happens to be related. In such
160
161
Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh., 1990 Cri. LJ. 562: A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 209.
151
cases, therefore, the delay is understandable and hence merely on that account the
1
prosecution version cannot be doubted.
N. Prompt FIR
In Manilal Hiraman Chaudhri V. State of Maharashtra163the
honorable Supreme Court decided that failure to examine motorcyclist who had taken
informant to police station on his motorcycle would not lead to conclusion that no FIR
was lodged by informant. We, therefore, do not see any infirmity in the deposition of
PWs 4 and 5. We may also notice that according to Mr. Naphade, the motorcyclist who
had been the PW-4 to be police station had not been examined. The said person has again
nothing to do in the matter. He was not a witness to the occurrence. The fact that the First
t
Information Report was lodged promptly and the deceased was removed to the hospital
i
for treatment in a tractor is not the subject-matter of any controversy. How PW-4 reached
the police station may be relevant for judging this conduct. Failure to examine the owner
of the motorcycle itself, in our opinion, would not lead to the conclusion that no first
Information Report was lodged by PW-4.
Prompt filing of FIR is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness of the
version of the prosecution. It was held by Supreme Court held in Ram Jag and others v.
UP. State.164 that “According to the prosecution the occurrence took place at about 4
p.m. and since the First Information Report was lodged at about 12-30 at night at the
Tarabgani police station which is at a distance of about 4 miles from the scene of
occurrence, the learned Sessions Judge held that there was undue delay in lodging the
report and that the delay was not satisfactorily explained. It is true that witnesses cannot
be called upon to explain every hour’s delay and a common sense view has to be taken in
ascertaining whether the First Information Report was lodged after an undue delay so as
to afford enough scope for manipulating evidence. Whether the delay is so long as to
throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a
I
variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay in filing report
State of Rajasthan v. Sri Narayan, 1992(2) Crimes 1154 (SC): 1992 Cri. LJ 365 (SC).
AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 161, para 12.
AIR 1974 SC 606 ; 1974 Cr.L.J., P. 479.
152
of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution

relies have no motive for implicating the accused.”
On the other hand, the prompt filing of report is not an unmistakable guarantee of
the truthfulness of the version of the prosecution.
In the instant case, the importance of the question whether there was delay in
filing the First Information Report is of a different order. The case of the appellants is
that the occurrence must have taken place under the cover of darkness, that is, long after
the time at which it is alleged to have taken place and that is why the First Information
Report could not be lodged earlier than at 12-30 a.m. This defence is well founded and
the High Court was clearly in error in discarding it.
O. Prompt lodging of FIR by itself would not necessarily lead to inference that it is
true. Other attending circumstances must be taken into account.165 Delay/non delay
(promptness) in lodging of the FIR is a relative term and the depends upon facts of each
case. Delayed FIR where place of incident 3 kms. away from village. Village itself
situated in remote area of taluka. Explanation that no one who was present at the time of
occurrence could dare to leave the place in the dead of night to inform others or go to the
Police Station. Sufficiently explains the delay. It is a settled principle of law that delay
per se in lodging the FIR cannot be held fatal to the prosecution. F.I.R. in a criminal
case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the
purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial.
FIR filed immediately after occurrence rules out any possibility of deliberation to
falsely implicate any person. In this case Krishna v. State, Rep by Inspector of Police.
A prompt F.I.R. leaves no possibility for any concoction of a false case against an
accused.169
Ram Singh v. State of M.P., 1989 Cr.LJ. NOC. 206.

2003 Cri L J 3542: AIR 2003 SC 3578 : 2003 AIR SCW 3447.
Alla Chinna Appa Rao v. State of A.P., 2003 Cri. L.J. 17 (SC): 2003 (1) Crimes 23 (S.C.);
Narender Singh v. State, 2003 Cri. L.J. 222 (P & H).
2003 Cri L J 3705 : AIR 2003 SC 2978 : 2003 AIR SCW 3688.
Sat Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1974 Cri. L.J. 345 (349); A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 294: 1974 S.C.C. (Cri.)
173; Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 911: 1981 S.C.C. (Cri.) 379: 1981 Cri.
L.J. 618.
153
Their Lordships of Supreme Court in Kahan Singh v. State,170 observed that “It
must be remembered that when the information is given very soon after the occurrence,
then the possibility ofputting up a false version becomes very remote. ”
The same view was followed in other decisions.171 If the F.I.R. is made very soon
after the occurrence that is undoubtedly a circumstance in favour of the prosecutor.172
Prompt F.I.R. when there is practically no time to spin out a false story is one
towering circumstance which goes a long way to lend assurance to the claim of the
• 173
prosecution. .
Prompt lodging of the F.I.R. followed by prompt dispatch of its copy to the
Magistrate eliminates the chances of fabricating false story and introduction of false eye
witnesses.174 When the F.I.R. was made within six and half an hours of the occurrence at
12 miles from the Police Station and when the victim did not die at once then the F.I.R.
was prompt.175
The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to police is to obtain
1
early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime is committed.
When F.I.R. was lodged at the earliest possible opportunity on the day of
occurrence and reached the court the same day, and it contained name of the accused and
the detailed manner in which the crime was committed, then such F.I.R. is a very
important piece of corroborative evidence against the accused.177
The promptness of F.I.R. affords a valuable corroboration to the prosecution story
and to the evidence of eye-witnesses.178 When there is extraordinary delay in lodging
1971 Cri. L.J. 806 (809); A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 983.

Nanhey v. State of U.P., 1973 Cri. L.J. 273; A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 224: Bhag Shah v. The State of
Punjab, 1971 Cri. L.J. 903 (P &.H): Pragahi v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2659 : 1973 S.C.C.
(Cri.) 928 : 1973 Cri. L.J. 1828; Balaka Singh v. State ofPunjab, 1975 Cri. L.J. 1734 : A.I.R. 1975
S. C. 1962: State ofPunjab v. Ramji Das. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1085 : 1977 Cri. L.J. 705: 1977 S.C.C.
(Cri.) 368; Mehar Chand v. State of Rajasthan. 1983 S.C.C. (Cri.) 57 (ii): Veelu Swaray v. State of
T. N., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 832 : 1983 Cri. L.J. 1087 : 1982(2) Crimes 327 : 1983 S.C.C. (Cri.) 704.
Asa Ram Vithal Singh v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1315 : 1974 Cri. L.J. 1093:
Vijai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Cri. LJ. (R.A.) 728.
State ofPunjab v. Wasan Singh,A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 697: 1981 Cri. L.J. 410.
Bhag Singh v. The State ofPunjab. 1971 Cri. L.J. 903: Lakhmi v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 Raj.
L.W. 594.
Dalip Singh v. State ofPunjab. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 364 : 1953 Cri. L.J. 1465.
Bishnu De. v. State, 1982 Cri. L.J. 493.
Bhag Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Cri. L.R. 697 (Raj.).
Bhanwariya v. State of Rajasthan. 1984 Cri. L.J. 425 (Raj.)
154
F.I.R. and there is failure of prosecution to explain the delay, then F.I.R. should be
viewed with suspicion.179
When the F.I.R. was lodged soon after incident, then there is no justification for
argument that it discredited statement of its maker.180
Thus, the object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report is to obtain earliest
information regarding the commission of the crime, when there is delay in lodging the
report, if often results in embellishment, which is a creature of afterthought. Some people
may try to foist crime upon person known or unknown having inimical relations after
consultation with other people. So, a coloured version comes out on account of
imagination and influence of opinion of others which is not for a just decision of the case
which creates doubt about the prosecution version. Especially, when means of
communications are there, when opportunity to go to police station is there, where there
is no fear or atmosphere of terror, when the parties have calmed down from the effect of
horror of the occurrence and when there is no attempt whatsoever to approach the police
for any information and when, admittedly, there are inimical relations with the accused,
1
then delay in lodging the first information report and that too, in our opinion, inordinate
delay, assumes importance going to the extent of being fatal to the prosecution cases,
I
which in this case appears to be as seen above.181

In absence of any explanation for delay in F.I.R. the version of the prosecution is
weakened. Delayed F.I.R. does not help the prosecution. Delay mere is not fatal in every
case, delay has to be explained. The F.I.R. in a criminal case is an extremely vital and
valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at
i
the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect
of commission of offences is to obtain prior information regarding the circumstances in
which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by
them as well as the names of eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in
lodging the F.I.R. often results in embellishment which is the creature of an afterthought.
On account of delay the report only gets bereft and advantage of spontaneity danger
Ramji Suriya v. State of Maharashtra. 1983 Cri. L.J. 1105 : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 810: 1983 S.C.C.
(Cri.) 748: 1983(2) Crimes 237.
180
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1977 Cri. L.J. 214: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 349: 1976 S.C.C. (Cri.) 436.
181
JagarNath Girl v. State of Bihar 1991(3) Crimes 95 (Para 16).
155
creeps in and the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated accost or concocted story
as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is therefore, essential that delay in the
lodging of the F.I.R. should be satisfactorily accounted for.182
When F.I.R. was lodged within a short period of less than 3 hours then it is a
prompt F.I.R.183
F.I.R. cannot encroach upon the periphery of the evidence tendered by other
witnesses regarding incident.184 First Information Report is not a substantive piece of
evidence and it has value only for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the
maker.185 Prompt filing of F.I.R. is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness of
the version of the prosecution.186
In Chandrappa & Ors. V. State of Karanataka187 the Apex Court held that It is
true that prima facie there appears to be some delay in the lodging of the FIR at 10.45
p.m. in the light of the fact that incident had happened at 4.30 p.m. on 1st August 1993.
However, as three of the accused have put up a counter version, the effect of the delay in
the FIR is somewhat reduced. We are also of the opinion that the delay in the lodging of
the FIR has been substantially explained as the incident had happened in a remote village
some distance from the Police Station and as PW3 had also sustained a serious injury, the
first anxiety of the family would have been to look after him the more so as all the
brothers of the deceased and PW3 were themselves the assailants and there was nobody
else in the family to have taken the injured PW3 to the hospital. It is also significant that
the FIR could not have been recorded earlier as the entire family was involved either on
one side or the other and it had ultimately been left to a hapless widow, completely
isolated from the rest of the family, to lodge the FIR. It is in this background we find
that a delay of a couple of hours cannot be said to be unreasonable.
Meghaji Goddaji Thakoore v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Cri. L.J. 730.

Ayer Maya Visa v. State of Gujarat, 1992(3) Crimes 819.
Sahadeven Rajan v. State of Kerala. 1992(2) Crimes 256.
Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1992(2) Crimes 282 (S.C.)
Ramjog v. The State of U.P. 1974 S.C.C. (Cri.) 370: 1974 Cri. LJ. 479: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 606; Tara
Chand v. State of Haryana. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1891 : 1971 Cri. L.J. 1411.
156
Delay offour hours is not too long when in occurrence one died at the spot and
two out of six injured were hospitalized.188
Though the importance of F.I.R. made promptly cannot be minimized the mere
fact that it was immediately made:after the incident cannot rule out any embellishment in
the version about the incident given by the prosecution. In this case complainant was the
clerk of an advocate so they could certainly have quickly thought out what version to
give. So much importance to the prompt F.I.R. cannot be attached.189
Sometimes it becomes difficult to accept that a neatly written and detailed F.I.R.
court have been written up so soon190A mere small gap between time of occurrence and
making of first information report1 alone cannot make prosecution case plausible, when
otherwise is not so. In case where prosecution story is otherwise believable or inspires
confidence, this promptness does not assume importance, but it cannot be accepted as a
principle of universal application that where the F.I.R. is made without any loss of time
the prosecution story is necessarily truthful.191
An F.I.R. though not substantive evidence is an important document. Its prompt
lodging lends credence to prosecution and diminishes the possibility of a coloured
version being put up by the complaint. The recording of time and date of lodging of
|
F.I.R. in the register is an internal check about the promptness of lodging F.I.R.192
Unexplained delay of about ten hours in lodging First Information Report is fetal
to the prosecution. Mere delay of 14 hours in filling FIR in a case of murder because
of family disputes not fatal where there are reliable eye-witness and also the conduct of
accused in fleeing away for 3 weeks. 194The entire case of the prosecution cannot be
rejected merely on the ground that there was delay in giving F.I.R.195 In Rampat & Ors.
V. State of Haryana196 the honorable Supreme Court decided that delay in writing
would not render the entire prosecution case suspicious when occurrence of incident
188 State of Punjab v. Hagir Singhi, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2407 : 1973 S.C. C. (Cri.) 886.
189 Tara Chand v. State of Haryana, 1971 Cri. L.J. 1411: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1891.
190 Datar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1193 : 1974 Cri. L.J. 908.
191 Swaranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1985(1) Crimes 1084.
192 State v. Nidhan Singh. 1984 Cri! L.J. 1362.
193 Murugan v. State, 1994(1) Crimes 137 (Mad.).
194 Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2000) Cri LJ 4280 (Pun) (DB).
195 State of U.P. v. Jamshed, 1994(1) Crimes 571 (574) S.C.
157
stands admitted. It has been contended that the FIR was ante dated and ante timed. Such
a contention was raised inter alia on the premise that the first informant got his father
admitted in the General Hospital, Namaul at about 1.35 p.m. whereas the FIR was lodged
at about 1.50 p.m. at Ateli having regard to the fact that one has to take at least half an
hour to reach Ateli from the General Hospital, Namaul in his own conveyance and also
having regard to the fact that Head Constable Kailash Chand (P.W.13) reached the
hospital at about 5.00 pm.
The High Court, on the other hand, opined that by the time of examination of the
deceased had ended which may be at about 2.30 p.m.; the first informant (P.W.8) must
have reached the hospital as, according to the High Court, it takes about 15-20 minutes to
cover the distance from Ateli to Namaul.
The said contention cannot be sustained having regard to the fact that by 1.30
p.m. or 1.40 p.m. even accused persons were arrested; they had been produced before Dr.
Goel and they had been examined; even P.W. 12 and other witnesses were also
examined.
The FIR might have been recorded at a later stage. But the information about the
occurrence must have been given by P.W. 8 to the Office-in-charge of Ateli Police
Station prior thereto. Even a copy of the FIR was received by the Magistrate concerned at
about 10.30 p.m. on the same day. Furthermore, the Investigating Officers were not cross
examined on that point. In any event, it is wholly unlikely that the FIR was ante timed
and. ante-dated. Even assuming that the same was ante-timed or ante-dated, the fact that
an incident had occurred was not disputed. AT least two of the accused persons accepted
their presence. The defence story is that two accused persons had sustained injuries at the
hands of the prosecution witness Lai Singh. (P.W. 12).
If occurrence of the incident stands admitted, in our opinion, even if some delay
has been caused in writing of the FIR, the same would not render the entire prosecution
I
case suspicious. When the delay in F.I.R. is duly explained then such delay would not be
1 q*7 '
fatal to the prosecution.

When a district malaria officer committed rape on lady supervisor then delay in
lodging F.I.R. would not be fatal. She was highly educated lady, being on M.A. in Arts
197
State of Haryana v. Manoj. Kumar, 1994(1) Crimes 102 (S.C.).
158
and Architecture from Banaras University and was employed under the Government. She
had a status and prestige in the society. In a tradition-bound society like ours, it very
often happens that ladies subjected to sexual assault do not come out in the open and try
to conceal the fact because of social disapproval with its accompanying humiliation. P.W.
6 must have been more conscious of such fact and there was nothing unusual for her to
go on thinking over the matter for a complete day before she decided to come out in the
open. There was as such no unnatural conduct in her for such reason.198
An F.I.R. recorded without any loss of time is likely to be free from embroideries,
exaggerations and without anybody intermeddling with it and polluting and adulterating,
the same with lies. The purpose of F.I.R. is to obtain the earliest account of a cognizable
offence, before there is an opportunity for the circumstance to be forgotten and
embellished. Though the F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence and can be used to
corroborate or contradict the statement of the maker thereof, it can also be used to test
and measure the trustworthiness of the prosecution story as a whole.199
The importance of the report, which has been lodged promptly can hardly be over
estimated from the stand point of the accused. The object of insisting upon lodging of the
report to the police promptly in respect of commission of an offence like murder is to
obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the offence was
committed, the names of the accused culprits and the parts played by them as well as the
names of the witnesses. The delay in lodging of the F.I.R. quite often results in
1
embellishment which is quite often creature of afterthoughts.200When the F.I.R. was
lodged promptly with all details then prosecution case can be believed.201
P. Advantages of Prompt FIR
In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu,202 their Lordships of Supreme Court has
explained in detail value and advantages of the prompt FIR. It was held therein that FIR
in a Criminal case is an extremely wit and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of
198 Dr. Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v. State of Orissa, 1994(1) Crimes 47.
199 Gulshan Kumar v. State, 1993 Cri. LJ. 1525 (Delhi).
200 State of U.P. v. Gauri Shankar, 1993 S.C.C. 41.
201 Sardul Singh v. State of Punjab,. 1993(2) Crimes 1174(1176) S.C.
202 1972 Cr.L.J. 1296; AIR 1973 SC 501.
159
corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the report can
hardly be over-estimated from the.stand point of occurrence. The object of insisting upon
prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to:
1. Obtain early infomiation regarding the circumstances in which the offence/ crime
has been committed:
2. Obtain the names of the actual culprits and part played by them as the names of
the witnesses present at the scene of occurrence (eye witness, details of weapon
used in the crime).
Q. Disadvantages of delayed FIR
In the case of Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu,203 the following

disadvantages of delayed FIR has also been pointed out:-
1. Delay in lodging the FIR quite often results in embellishment which is a creative
of after thought.
2. On account of delay the report not only gets benefit of the advantage of
spontaneity, danger, creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated
account of connected story as a result of deliberation and consultation.
It is therefore, essential that delay in lodging of FIR should be satisfactorily,
explained.
i
R. Meaning of forthwith
It was held by the Supreme Court in Alla China Apparao and others v. State of
Andhra Pradesh,204 that within the meaning of Sec. 157(1) Obviously cannot mean that
the prosecution is required to explain every hour’s delay in sending the first information
report to the Magistrate, of course, the same has to be sent with reasonable dispatch,
which could obviously mean within a reasonable possible time in the circumstances
prevailing. Therefore, in our view, the first information report was sent to the Magistrate
with reasonable promptitude and no delay at all was caused in forwarding the same to the
203
1972 Cr.LJ. 1296; AIR 1973 SC 50L.
204
2002 (2) ALD (Criminal) 789 (SC).
160
Magistrate. In any view of the matter, even if Magistrate’s Court was closed by and the
first information report reached him within six hours from the time of its lodgment, in
view of the increase in work load, we have no hesitation in saying that even in such a
case it cannot be said that there was any delay at all in forwarding the first information
report to the Magistrate. Thus, we do not find any substance in this submission as,
according to us, the first information report was promptly dispatched to the Magistrate
and received by him without any delay whatsoever. A question now arises is that where
first information report is shown to have actually been recorded without delay and
investigation started on its basis, if any delay is caused in sending the same to the
Magistrate which the prosecution fails to explain by furnishing reasonable explanation,
what would be its effect upon the prosecution case. In our view, ipso facto the same
i
cannot be taken to be a ground for throwing out the prosecution case if the same is
otherwise, trustworthy upon appreciation of evidence which is found to be credible.
However, if it is otherwise, an adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution
and the same may affect veracity of the prosecution case, more so when there are
circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of
i
manipulation in the first information report by falsely roping in the accused persons after
due deliberations. Reference in this connection may be made to decisions of this court in
the cases of Pala Singh v. State ofPunjab.
5. Delay in Lodging FIR is not necessarily fatal in every case - Court has to see
vhether there are any genuine reasons for the delay
Apex Court in Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab,206 observed that “When
here is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed, the Court has to look at
he reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR
odgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the
iolice of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too
!
ncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the
1972 (2) SCC 640, Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1976 (4) SCC 369, State of Karnataka v.
Moin Patel, 1996 (8) SCC 167, Harpal Singh v. Devender Singh and another, 1997 (6) SCC 660,
Siv Ram v. State of U.P. 1998 (1) SCC 149, Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, 2001 (7) SCC 318, and
Munshi Prasad and another v. State of Bihar, 2002(1) SCC 351.
6
2002 (1) ALD (Criminal) 259 (SC).
161
Police Station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the
informers to reach the Police Station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that
the Kith and Kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain
level of tranquility of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the Police Station for
the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another case is, the persons who
are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that
the Police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident.
In Zahoor v. State of U.P. honourable Supreme Court held that We are not
providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which would cause delay in lodging the
FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to
treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved
as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the court is to
look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a
version no consequences shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR.
In Tara Singh V. State of Punjab,208 the Apex court observed, “It is well settled
that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution
case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush
to the Police Station immediately after the occurrence.
Human nature as it is, the Kith and Kin who have witnessed the occurrence
cannot be expected to act mechanically with the entire promptitude in giving the report to
the Police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately
occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these
circumstances for them to take some time to go to the Police Station for giving the
report”.
In the present case, no doubt, there is apparently a long delay on two days to give
information to the police but the bereaved widows was not absolutely certain that she lost
her husband once and for all until her brother-in-law confirmed to her, after identifying
the dead body, that the same was that of her husband. The initial tension and suspense,
undergone by her would have billowed up into a massive wave of grief. It is only
207
1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 372, Tara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 536, Jamna v. State
of U.P. 1994(1) SCC 185.
208
1991 Suppl. (1) see 536.
162
understandable how much time a woman, placed in such a situation, would take to reach
some level of placidity for communication to the strangers of what she knew about the
last journey of her husband. We therefore find no merit in the contention based on the
delay of lodging the FIR.
T. Duration or time fixed schedule can not be laid down for giving information of an
offence to the police.
No duration of time or a fixed time schedule can be laid down for giving
information of a crime to the police. It is a question of fact to be determined by the Court
in each case having due regard to the circumstances of the case in hand. Thus, where the
witnesses were no relations of the deceased and also did not have the courage to go to the
police station over a rough road at night or early morning or go to the place of occurrence
to offer aid to the deceased during the said point of time, it was held that on these facts
alone their evidence in Court could not be brushed aside nor could the prosecution story
dubbed as false and imaginary only to implicate the accused due to enmity. This was held
in the case of Arpen Joseph v. State of Kerala.209
In Apren Joseph alias Current Kunjukunju v. State of Kerala,210 it was held
that: “Statute does not provide that the first information report can only be made by an
eye-witness. This information when recorded is the basis of the case set up by the
informant.
No duration of time in the abstract can be fixed as reasonable for giving
nformation of crime to the Police. The question of reasonable time is a matter for
letermination by the Court in each case. Mere delay in lodging the first information
eport with the Police is, therefore, not necessarily, as a matter of law, fatal to the
jrosecution.
The mere fact that the eye witnesses did not gather up enough courage to go to the
tolice station to lodge the first information report or to go to the place of the occurrence
j
iuring the night or early in the following morning to give some aid to the deceased, who
ndoubtedly was no blood relation of any one of the witnesses does not show that they
1973 Crl. L.J. 185 SC.

Ibid.
163
had not witnessed the occurrence and the whole story is imaginary and made up only for
falsely implicating the accused is due to enmity.
The occurrence took place at 10-30 P.M. but the report was lodged by one
member of the panchayat at 8 A.M. although he had come to know about the incident at 5
A.M. The appeal was dismissed.
In Gudise Venkappa and others v. State rep. by P.P. H.C. of A.P.,211 “Section
154 or any provision of Cr.P.C. does not prescribe the limit within which the FIR should
reach the police station. Whether there is delay in lodging the FIR and whether there is
satisfactory explanation for delay depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
What is delay in urban area may not be applicable to a rural area nor the delay by literate
person or well informed person or persons who have advantages to approach the police
immediately may not be delay in regard to .other persons who are not placed in such
advantageous positions. It may be easy to explain the delay with positive evidence, but
the production of positive evidence may not be possible always. Therefore, the delay can
be explained in any manner including the totality of the circumstances in the case so as to
convince the Court that under the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no delay
or that such a delay was unavoidable. At any rate, the accepted principle that an FIR
should reach the police station at the earliest opportunity should not be stretched to
logical ends, thereby ignoring the true intent of law and human limitations. To doubt the
case of the prosecution or throw the FIR as a suspicious document merely on the time
factor mechanically, would be the ultimate end of all fundamental justice in the criminal
investigation system.”
U. Measures to check the ante-timed FIR

Apex court time to time decides whether FIR is ante-timed or not. In Maharaj
Singh v. State of U.P.,212 held that the Apex Court had to consider the grievance
regarding the alleged ante timing of FIR. The following is the observation made by the
apex court.
211
1994 (2) ALT 220 (DB) A.P.
212
1994 (5) SCC 188; 1994 SCC Cr. L.J. 1391.
164
“The FIR in criminal case and particularly in murder case as vital and valuable
piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating evidence led to the trial. The object of
insisting upon prompt lodging of FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the
circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual
culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, finger used and also the names of the
eye witness if any. The delay in lodging FIR often results in embellishment which is a
creature of after thought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of
advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of colour version or
exaggerated story.
With a view to determine whether FIR was lodged at the time, it is alleged to have
been recorded the court generally looks for a certain external checks. One of the checks is
that, the receipt of the copy of the FIR called a special report in murder case by a local
Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference
that FIR was not lodged at the time, it is alleged to have been recorded unless of course,
the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt
of the copy of. the FIR by the local Magistrate. Prosecution had led no evidence at all in
this behalf.
The second external check equally important is the sending copy of the FIR along
with the date and its occurrence in the enclosed report even though the enclosed report
prepared under Section 174 Cr.P.C. is aimed at serving a statutory function to lend
credibility to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and different statements
•eeorded during the inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of these
letails is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo stage and
lad not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due
leliberations and consultation and then they ante timed to give a colour of promptly
edged FIR.
In Girish Yadav v. State of M.P.,213 it was held that now it is no doubt true that
xtemal checks indicated in the said decision would lend credibility to the prosecution
ase that the FIR was prompt as it is enumerated in the said decision is not exhaustive list
f external checks. There may be other external checks also which may get well
! AIR 1996 SC 552; 1996 Cr.L.J. 2159 SC.

165
established on record and may lend credibility to the prosecution about the prompt
recording of FIR. In the present case two such external checks were established. One
such check consists of the site map Ex. PI5 which was prepared on the spot after
recording of the FIR. Witness PW-13 TC. Kusry stated in his evidence that on visiting
the scene of offence after recording the FIR the panchanama of the dead body was
prepared on the spot which is Ex. P-11 and at the same time he prepared a map of the
spot of the occurrence which is Ex. P15 when we turned to Ex. PI5 we find that the site
map of the crime was prepared in the presence of the panchas in Cr. Case No. 429/1982
under Sections 148/149 and 302 and it was prepared while Sri Hindu Tiwari was present.
Thus, in the presence of the first informant, the site was prepared on spot after the case
was already registered as Crime No. 42/1982. We have already noted the evidence of Sri
S.R. Tandon PW11, who had stated that he has written down the report Ex. P-1 as
dictated to him by PW 2. Hindu Tiwari and had given a Crime No. 420/82. This clearly
shows that Tiwari was almost on the heels of the incident promptly and thereafter the site
map was prepared on the spot. When the site map mentioned the crime case No.
420/1982 it lent credibility to the prosecution that the FIR was already recorded as S.
No.......in the police station before the police machinery was put into action. The other
external check is found from the KAIMISANHA Ex. P27.
(a) Which is the copy of the original SANHAA. The entry maintained by the
I
police in the Police Station. That entry shows that immediately after the FIR was
recorded all the relevant contents were thereafter also recorded in this book. It furnishes a
contemporaneous record was mentioned in the FIR in the last of this clinching evidence.
Thereafter, it is not possible for us to agree with the contention of learned counsel for
appellant that the FIR was ante-timed. We entirely agree with the finding reached by the
trial as well as by the High Court that the FIR was promptly recorded at police station
almost hard on the heels of the incident in the afternoon of 4-9-1982 and it reflects
prompt and timely action of what had taken place on the spot on the fateful afternoon and
who were the assailants of the deceased Gudda Tiwari. In this section, the learned
counsel for complainant also submitted that the investigation on the spot was done after
recording of the FIR. There was no reason why in the requisition of post mortem Ex. PI 1,
the names of the 7 accused were mentioned and it was recited on 4-9-1982 G. Tiwari died
166
due to old enmity and his enemies inflicted injuries on his body. It is difficult to
appreciate how in the requisition application for post mortem as addressed by witness.
S.R. Kumar, Station Officer to the Medical Officer was any information for him to
mention the names of the accused. The information which was to be sent to the Doctor
was regarding the homicidal death of the person concerned whose body was sent for post
mortem. Non-mentioning of the names of the accused in that requisition would not by
itself be a circumstance to rule out prompt filing of the first information report which has
stood well established on record of the case as seen earlier. Consequently, even this
aspect cannot advance the case of the appellants for showing that FIR would not have
been recorded prior to the preparation of inquest panchanama and application for post
mortem Ex. PI2.
In Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana,214 it was held that- “Kamla left the village
Dhand for the Primary Health Centre, Adampur about 8-30 a.m. and by that time it was
known to all the villagers including Kamla that Om and Mahinder had succumbered to
their bullet injuries. There was therefore, nothing unusual in the report in which Kamla
stated that Om and Mahinder both had died in the occurrence having received bullet
injuries. The FIR was not ante-timed.
In Mohanlal Ganga Ram Grehani v. State of Maharashtra,215 it was held that:
“The First Information Report is ante-timed if the station house diary which contains the
contents of the First Information Report does not mention that Ishrat had visited the
Police Station and lodged the complaint and investigatory officer left the Police Station
for the Hospital accompanied by the complainant.”
V. REVIEW
i ■
In this Chapter, delay relating to the FIR has been discussed elaborately. Delay in
rape cases, reasonable delay has been discussed in many cases decided by the Apex
Court. Advantage of the prompt FIR and disadvantages of the delayed FIR is also
sxplained. Cases where delay of few hours, days, and years has been decided fatal to the
:i4
AIR 1995 SC 280; 1995 SCC (CrI.) 355.
;15
AIR 1982 SC 839; 1982 SCC (9) 334.
167
prosecution case, and these are specifically have been marked in bold and italic. As the
phrase FIR (First Information Report) is to be written first in time that is why invariably
main stress is on Prompt FIR.
— o —

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CHAPTER-III

FIR AND DELAY

1 2008(2) CRIMES 188 (SC) at page 189.

creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story

Nathoo v. State, (2000) Cri LJ 3850,3852 para 13 (All) (DB).

explanation for delay.

AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 711 para 3.

12 Pandurang and others v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 216.

circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by the court of

1996 (2) Crimes 213 (Him Pra).

the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness or authenticity of the

Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra. (2007) 2 SCC 170.

In Shankaraya Naik & Ors. V. State of Karnataka34 the honorable Supreme

In Anoop Singh v. State of Haryana39 honorable court decided that in dowry

AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 818 para 7.

consequence.41Now on the basis of long line (almanac) of authoritative decisions of the

47 Balwan v. State. 1989 Cri. L.J. 2475 (D.B.).

Lalai v. State. (1975) 3 S.C.C. 373.

The explanation of delay must be convincing, reasonable and satisfactory.62 It is settled

thoroughly so as to shift truth from falsehood or grain from the chaff.67

Hardwari v. State of U.P., 1986 All Cri. R. 311.

which the occurrence took place does not arise.

1997 Crl. L.J. 226 SC.

kms. No reliance can be placed oh such FIR.

C. Delay in lodging the FIR by Informant

In Malempati Pattabi Nairender v. Ghattamaneni Maruti Prasad94 it was held

2000(2) RCR(Criminal) 777(SC).

100 1997 Crl.L.J. 3178 SC.

2000 Crl. L.J. 51 SC.

12 AIR 1978 SC 191; 1978 Cr.L.J. 141.

E. Delay in rape cases

F. Prosecution explains - no delay

AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981 Cr.L.J.P. 1.

110 AIR 1983 SC 680 ; 1983 Cr. LJ 1272.

AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2205 page 2212.

AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 2436 at p. 2439, para 14.

G. Delay in lodging the FIR

H. Delay in recording of FIR by Officer Incharge of Police Station

AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 1636 para 6.

Thus, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances, this inordinate

I. Delay in Despatching the FIR to the Magistrate

J. Delay in lodging the FIR favorable decision to the accused

Delay in Dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate

23 AIR 1979 SC 135; 1979 Cr.LJ 51.

ML Object of Sending of FIR to the Magistrate

N. Some reasonable explanations of delay

1. Fear of accused persons.I33- Psychological cause of delay.

7. When facts mentioned in the FIR cannot be changed by mere delay.139-

15. Rainy Season.147- Seasonal cause of delay.

i) Fear of damage to family honour in rape cases.- Psychological cause of delay. In a

lii) Rainy Season. - Seasonal cause of delay.

Nalla Ram Babu v. State of A.P:, 1992 Cri. LJ. 324.

AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 2739.

iv) When amicable settlement was sought. - Circumstantial cause of delay.

of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution

Ram Singh v. State of M.P., 1989 Cr.LJ. NOC. 206.

1971 Cri. L.J. 806 (809); A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 983.

which in this case appears to be as seen above.181

Meghaji Goddaji Thakoore v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Cri. L.J. 730.

fatal to the prosecution.

P. Advantages of Prompt FIR

Q. Disadvantages of delayed FIR

In the case of Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu,203 the following

1973 Crl. L.J. 185 SC.