G.R. No.

114337 NITTO ENTERPRISES

vs.
NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILIFIRST DIVISION / KAPUNAN,
J.
: Daylo, Jerome Dela CruzSeptember 29, 1995 Series: 6FACTS:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired RobertoCapili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and coremaker
as evidenced by anapprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990
to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rateof P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable
minimum wage. On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a pieceof glass which he
was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a
nearbyhospital. Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his
work station.There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the
process injured his left thumb.The following day he was asked to resign. Three days after, ,
private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.The Labor Arbiter
rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid anddismissing the
money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the decision of
theLabor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto Enterprises
and not an apprentice.Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution ordering for the
reinstatement of Capili and to collecthis back wages. Petitioner, Nitto Enterprises filed a case to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of Nitto
Enterprises?
LAW:
Article 280 of the Labor Code
RULING: Yes.
The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executedon May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
maker/molder.However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7,
1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by theDepartment of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. The act of filing theproposed
apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step
towardsits final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.Nitto Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated
that apprenticeshipagreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeshipprogram duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force andeffect; and Capili is
considered to be a regular employee of the company
Atlanta Industries vs. Sebolino Digest
G.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, petitioners, vs. APRILITO R.

SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMONTE, and JOSEPH H. SAGUN,
respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Sebolino et al. filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment,
nonpayment of wages and other money claims as well as damages. They alleged that they had
attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months
from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to
their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event
vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They
also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List) prior to their
engagement as apprentices.

The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal to be illegal with respect to nine out of the twelve
complainants. Atlanta appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the illegal dismissal
decision with respect to Sebolino and three others. They moved for reconsideration but this was
denied. They then brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which held that Sebolino and
the three others were illegally dismiised.

The CA ruled that Sebolino and the three others were already employees of the company
before they entered into the first and second apprenticeship agreements. For example, Sebolino
was employed by Atlanta on March 3, 2004 then he entered into his first apprenticeship
agreement with the company on March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004. The second
apprenticeship agreement was from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004. However, the CA found
the apprenticeship agreements to be void because they were executed in violation of the law
and the rules. Therefore, in the first place, there were no apprenticeship agreements.
Also, the positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator and
scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic building materials,
the companys main business. Sebolino and the three others were, therefore, regular employees
whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Sebolino and three others were illegally
dismissed.

HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.

LABOR LAW - Illegal dismissals

The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the NLRC decision and in affirming the labor
arbiters ruling, as it applies toCostales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA
correctly ruled that the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees
when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were
invalid.

The following considerations support the CA ruling.

FBased on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino
and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees before they were
made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the respondents status through
relevant operational records in the case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for
December 2003 which the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and
work schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 cited by the CA.

The CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational documents, for the failure of
Atlanta to raise a challenge against these documents before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the said documents sufficientto establish the
employment of the respondents before their engagement as apprentices.

The fact that Sebolino and the three others were already rendering service to the company
when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the
apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted
by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman
and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual
business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building materials. These tasks and their nature
characterized the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.Thus, when
they were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the
opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 152894

August 17, 2007

This is a petition for review of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The Facts

On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as “fish
cleaner” at petitioner’s tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an
apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75
daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship
program.
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where
petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or “needs improvement” since she scored only 27.75%
based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation,
Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a
termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective
at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.
Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-
payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay
Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification
the Labor Arbiter’s decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is
hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant’s
backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All
other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decision are
AFFIRMED.
Upon denial of Palad’s motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered, to wit:

(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;

(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;
(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld from her up to the time of her reinstatement;
(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) per cent
of the monetary award herein; and
(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not
valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA
approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required
standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded
due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS AN APPRENTICE; and
2. WHETHER THERE WAS A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before
Hiring of Apprentices

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
“care maker/molder.” On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner
and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship
agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can
be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
(“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x.
Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferredthe authority
over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the
TESDA. RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program as a pre-
requisite for the hiring of apprentices.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced before the TESDA’s approval of petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed
a regular employee performing the job of a “fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of a “fish cleaner” is
necessary in petitioner’s business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 28021 of the
Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer.
Illegal Termination of Palad

To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal
must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself.
When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this
case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor
performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and
of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of
termination because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of
evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend
herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Bernardo vs NLRC DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:

Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993
by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly
worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they
are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as
money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article
280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special
workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate
the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the
employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to
opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular,
but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed
these tasks for more than six months.
Petition granted

G.R. No. 74246 January 26, 1989

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners,
vs. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor
and Employment judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.

FACTS:
Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a
general utility worker on January 10, 1979. After 6 months, he was informed that his work was
unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards. To give him another chance, and
with Dequila’s written consent, Mariwasa extended Dequila’s probationary period for another
three months: from July 10 to October 9, 1979. Dequila’s performance, however, did not
improve and Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period.
Dequila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Mariwasa and its VP for Administration,
Angel T. Dazo, and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389. DIRECTOR OF
MINISTRY OF LABOR: Complaint is dismissed. Termination is justified. Thus, Dequila appeals
to the Minister of Labor.
MINISTER OF LABOR: Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a
regular employee at the time of his dismissal, thus, he was illegally dismissed. (Initial order:
Reinstatement with full backwages. Later amended to direct payment of Dequila’s backwages
from the date of his dismissal to December 20, 1982 only.)
ISSUE: WON employer and employee may, by agreement, extend the probationary period of
employment beyond the six months prescribed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code?
RULING: YES, agreements stipulating longer probationary periods may constitute lawful
exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months.
The SC in its decision in Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. (1984) said that “Generally, the probationary
period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the
parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established
by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the
employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in
requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the
probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October, 1981
inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or
when the job requires certain qualifications, skills experience or training.”
In this case, the extension given to Dequila could not have been pre-arranged to avoid the legal
consequences of a probationary period satisfactorily completed. In fact, it was ex gratia, an act
of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after
having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be
turned against said employer’s account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not
perform according to its work standards.
By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any
benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the
period of extension. By reasonably extending the period of probation, the questioned agreement
actually improved the probationary employee’s prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular
employment.

Petition granted. Order of Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed.