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The Intersection between Structural Foundations and Cultural

Identities of Islamist Parties in Consolidating States

Adam Throne
June 1, 2018
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Introduction

December, 2010 Mohamad Bouazizi self-immolated himself in response to years of

repression and police corruption under the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. With the assistance of

social media, this sparked peaceful protests throughout Tunisia. Soon later, other Middle East

populations with similar grievances also took to the streets in what is now referred to as the Arab

Spring. Many of these peaceful revolts are still in progress, or their outcomes are yet to be

determined. For example, civil war continues to divide Syria. Despite its longevity and failures

though, this period marked a key turning point in the understanding of authoritarianism and

political structure in the Middle East.

Tunisia and Egypt are comparable cases, because they are two of the prominent nations

in which the coercive apparatus failed the regime. January 14, 2011 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of

Tunisia stepped down from his 24-year presidency after it became clear that his police force

could no longer protect him. Ben Ali relied primarily on counterbalancing to prevent a military

coup during his rule. By favoring the police force and marginalizing the military, Ben Ali lost the

support of military leaders and operatives (Nassif 2015, 270). Additionally, the cross-culture

critical mass involved in the protests included family-members and close friends of the military.

Ben Ali’s top officers elected to defect by defending protestors from the police rather than

protecting the regime (Nassif 2015, 245). February 11, 2011 Hosni Mubarak of Egypt resigned

as president and transferred his power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Mubarak

focused his coup-proofing strategy on appeasing upper echelon officers in the military. His

tactics included supporting a military economy, placing officers in positions of power and wealth

after retirement, and providing officers with advanced technology (Nassif 2015, 262). This

proved successful, because Mubarak was able to maintain power for 30 years before the Arab
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Spring. However, Mubarak’s tactics failed to protect him from a critical mass, because lower-

level officers and individual soldiers did not receive the same luxuries (Nassif 2015, 266).

Recognizing that their power would be delegitimized if they ordered the army to fire on

protestors, the generals were forced to remain barracked. As a result, by the end of 2011, the

people of both Tunisia and Egypt had toppled their respective regimes and started the process of

consolidating democracy.

Nearly a decade later, it is clear that Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating democracy

and that Egypt failed in consolidating democracy. Tunisia has a ratified constitution, runs fair

elections, has experienced a transition of power across party lines, and has made progress in

human rights. The Supreme Judicial Council is a newly established independent body for

checking the power of the government (Human Rights Watch 2017). A robust investment code

attracts Foreign Direct Investment from other established democracies (US Department of State

2015). A proposed gender parity law aims to ensure greater female representation in local

politics (Human Rights Watch 2017). Only continued economic corruption and the emergency

response to terrorism threaten the success of democracy (Masmoudi 2018, 150). In 2017,

Freedom House, known as the global watchdog of democracy, gave Tunisia an aggregate

freedom score of 78/100. This is fairly close to America’s 89/100 or Brazil’s 79/100 (Freedom

House 2017).

In contrast, following a 2014 coup by Commander Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt has

returned to authoritarianism. Liberal, foreign, and Islamist activists each face criminal

restrictions (Freedom House 2017). Terrorism rates have grown substantially as Islamists have

been pressured to radicalize (IEP 2017). The government uses aggressive and abusive

intelligence tactics to combat this radicalism (Dworkin 2017). On the same aggregate freedom
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scale, Egypt received a score of 26/100 (Freedom House 2017). Despite experiencing similar

success in critical mass protests in 2011, each of these nations diverged significantly during the

process of democratic consolidation. What political factors contributed to this outcome, and how

might this case study be applicable to future cases of consolidation in the Middle East?

I argue that cultural differences between the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and Muslim

Brotherhood Party in Egypt significantly impact relationships with other key political actors

including voting citizens, other political parties, and the military. Ultimately, when applied in

context with key structural characteristics of each nation, these differences severely impacted the

ability of each nation to consolidate democracy following transition from authoritarianism. The

outcomes of this study can be used to evaluate the culture of Islamic groups in Middle Eastern

nations currently undergoing transition and predict whether democracies will consolidate.

Structural Foundations of Tunisia and Egypt

For any comparative study of Tunisia and Egypt, it is important to consider underlying

structural differences. Many of the following structural theories are intertwined or associated.

Any number of these explanations can be used to better understand the dynamics involved in the

process of consolidating democracy. These structural elements play an essential role in

developing the framework that political interactions took place in following the Arab Spring.

Some scholars argue that historical factors establish the potential for democracy to

consolidate in a nation long before transition from a regime. In Northeast Africa, colonial

independence movements served as differing precedents for post-Arab Spring power transitions

in Tunisia and Egypt (Hamid 2014, 192). Tunisia’s relatively short-lived independence from

France served as a model of political cooperation for future leaders. In 1954, soon after Tunisian

resistance began attacking French colonial outposts, France instituted a complete withdrawal
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policy in order to move 400,000 additional soldiers to a more violent revolution in Algeria.

Through diplomatic relationships and fair elections, Habib Bourguiba was able to defeat his

Islamist rival Ben Youssef, ensure complete independence from France, and lead a peaceful

transition to a republic (Clayton 2014, 93). He then proceeded to work tirelessly to westernize

Tunisia and its culture (Hamid 2014, 193). Today, France and Tunisia maintain significant

economic and cultural relations. Negotiation, political resolution, and incorporation proved to be

more successful than violence and political isolation experienced in other revolutions. In 2011,

political actors unsure of how to govern a new democratic system may have looked to the

decisions of their founding figures for guidance on political transition. In Tunisia, there was

hence a tradition of cross-party cooperation and political communication.

On the other hand, the extended and violent revolution between Egypt and Great Britain

contributed to a culture of military intervention in politics. In 1919, Egyptian protestors initiated

a violent uprising against the British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan (Botman 1991, 55).

Recognizing their dwindling position at the hands of a new liberal society developing its own

national identity, the British removed their protectorate but continued to control key elements of

society. Egypt was able to rule itself under a parliamentary monarchy, but the British maintained

strategic and commercial dominance. In 1952 though, a new movement led by Nasser used

military strength and Soviet backing to overthrow King Farouk and end British occupation

(Birmingham 2008, 8). The prominence of coups and assassinations throughout the latter half of

the 20th century shows that this standard of violence continued to influence politics. It is likely

that el-Sisi also considered his military predecessors when deciding whether or not to overthrow

President Morsi. Therefore, it is unsurprising that el-Sisi decided to initiate a coup. Critics of this

argument would claim that global politics have shifted significantly over the past 50 years and
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that more modern political movements have greater impacts on current interactions (Houssi et al.

2016 and others). This may be the case, but this early divergence cannot be overlooked in its

entirety. At a minimum, each society looks at its patriots from decolonization as role-models for

modern leadership.

The geography of each nation also plays a significant role in determining the potential for

democracy to consolidate. Tunisia’s isolation from conflict and close proximity to European

nations promotes civil development and the spread of democratic ideals. Beyond deployment

through United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Tunisian Military has only been directly

involved in the 2011 Battle of Wazzin and ongoing counter-terror operations (United Nations

Peacekeeping). According to World Bank, the Tunisian military had only 47,800 active

personnel in 2016 (International Institute for Strategic Studies). As a result, Tunisia is able to

focus development more on domestic aspects that make it suited for harboring democracy than

on national defense. Additionally, Tunisia is close to many European tourism destinations.

Tunisia’s beaches are once again becoming popular European tourist destinations after recent

terror attacks (Monk 2017). It is common for Tunisian scholars to live or work in Europe. These

relationships encourage the circulation of non-Muslim and Western ideology. Given the urban

population distribution of Tunisia, the benefits and particularities of democracy are accordingly

well-known by the general populous.

In contrast, Egypt’s possession of the Suez Canal, border with Israel, and vast size in

comparison to Tunisia encourage an environment of conflict and increase cultural diversity

throughout the nation. Since gaining independence, Egypt’s military has been involved in over

15 international conflicts. The nation in 2016 had 835,500 active military personnel

(International Institute for Security Studies). Due to its strategic position, the United States has
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offered the nation’s military 1.6 billion dollars each year since 1979 to maintain order in the

Middle East (Najjar 2017). Unlike in Tunisia where much of the nation is urban, a vast amount

of Egypt is classified as rural. It is difficult for a regime or any political actor to monitor

ideologies when individuals are not confined to densely populated areas. This naturally promotes

polarization and enables radical movements. Without access to foreign ideology, many

individuals facing oppression tend to radicalize rather than democratize. This structural

polarization and elevated military status may be reasons why the fate of democracy in Egypt was

determined by the military.

Varying education systems also impact the potential for consolidation to occur. A

prominent theory of democracy is that education is essential for consolidation, because voters

must be able to make their own self-guided decisions on candidate viewpoints. Overall, Tunisia

has a much stronger education system than Egypt does. In 2015, 74.2% of Tunisian women and

89.6% of Tunisian men over the age of 15 could read and write. In Egypt, only 65.4% of women

and 82.2% of men over the age of 15 could read and write. The school life expectancy in Tunisia

is 15 years compared to 13 years in Egypt. In 2012, Tunisia spent 6.3% of its GDP on public

education while Egypt only spent 3.8% of its GDP on public education (CIA World Factbook).

According to Human Development Reports, Tunisia had an education index of .621 in 2011. In

the same year, Egypt only had an index of .573 (United Nations). These structural education

differences suggest that individual voters in Tunisia are better equipped to interpret and

understand political doctrine related to elections than Egyptian voters are. Additionally, although

Tunisia also has a larger and more developed university system than Egypt does, the diversity of

religion in higher education within Egypt also contributes to polarization (Ranking Web of

Universities 2017). Western universities, including the American University in Cairo, promote
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liberal ideology. Public Universities, many of which have roots with the Muslim Brotherhood,

promote conservative Islam. If education is polarized within a nation, then political identities

will also be polarized. This is a challenge to a young democracy.

Finally, more specific to this case study, the timeline of the 2011 revolutions themselves

played a significant role in determining the potential for democratization in each nation.

Although party-leaders and NGOs in Tunisia had prepared for democratization years before the

Arab Spring began, they did have the element of surprise on their side. For decades, it had

seemed that there was an undeniable Middle East exception to the global trends in

democratization. The ideological, self-interest, and security elements of regimes had prevented

major uprisings from occurring. When the Tunisian uprising occurred, Ben Ali did not have a

well-developed exit strategy in place. He fled via plane without a destination in mind, attempted

to land in France before being turned away, and finally found asylum in Saudi Arabia (Middle

East Eye 2017). He was forced to turn power over directly to a council of citizens. Consequently,

the Mubarak regime was able to see what had happened in Tunisia and plan accordingly. The

president’s relationship with el-Sisi and the decision to pass power to SCAF rather than a

citizen’s coalition are signs of a larger grand strategy. Gadaffi was able to make calculated

moves to guarantee the continuation of power by his close friends in the military, ensure his

eventual return to Cairo, and ultimately prevent democracy from consolidating. By not being

caught off guard, Egypt was able to prepare a long-term strategy for limiting democracy and

ensure the continuation of benefits for original regime supporters.

In sum, there was a clear structural divergence between Egypt and Tunisia by the time the

Arab Spring succeeded in overthrowing regimes in 2011. Tunisia’s political structure was

already conducive to democratization by 2011. Strong foreign relationships provided oversight

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and expertise on consolidating democracy. NGOs earned Nobel Peace Prizes for working

directly with populations to promote the liberal ideals of democracy among all classifications of

the nation. Strong education ensured that people were well aware of social issues and dynamics

(Stepan 2018, 43). Egypt presented a greater challenge. Socioeconomic and ideological

polarization divided the population. Rising extremism challenged the nation’s security and

political interests. An entitled military with a history of involvement in politics was assigned to

oversee the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, although these explanations differentiate the

nations, they do not provide a causal mechanism for the success or failure of democratic

consolidation. I believe that these structural differences are important but serve only as the

foundation for the interactions between governing parties and other political actors following

successful Arab Spring revolutions. Influenced by these structural factors, Islamist Parties in

Egypt and Tunisia diverged significantly despite having similar initial goals. This ultimately

caused them to take very different approaches to consolidation which proved to be successful in

Tunisia and fail in Egypt.

Islamist Rise to Power

Prior to studying specific Islamist political parties in Egypt and Tunisia, it is essential to

understand how these fairly radical groups have so much influence in Middle Eastern politics.

Whether American policymakers like it or not, Islamist groups are permanent actors of Middle

East politics. Limiting their development as political parties will only encourage radicalization

and isolation. The following explanation is derived from Tunisia and Egypt, but similar patterns

can be seen elsewhere throughout the authoritarian Arab world.

To start, as the ideological promises made by regimes dissolve, individuals are left

searching for an alternative source of inspiration. The first element of coup-proofing is

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ideological subordination (Quinlivan 2000). Arab-socialism used the promise of future economic

gains to convince citizens that their lifestyles would eventually improve if they supported the

regime (Khadduri 1970). Pan-Arabism used the historic legacy of the Ottoman Empire to

convince individuals that the regime would work towards creating a great cross-national Arabic

society (Ajami 1978). Rally around the flag tactics and religious war tactics garner temporary

support and excuse poor economic output. However, in each of these strategies, promises lose

support over time if there are not significant results to credit them. In addition to hurting support

for the regime, the failure of these ideological promises caused individuals to search for a

different means to the same end.

However, in order to prevent uprisings and quell the spread of revolutionary ideas,

another key part of the Middle East regime’s strategy is counter-intelligence and policing of all

social environments. The severity of this strategy differs by nation, but for the most part

organized ideas impartial to the regime are limited. Mosques become the only places in which

open communication is allowed under authoritarian repression, because presidents are either

Muslim themselves or recognize that limiting religious freedom could prompt more direct

uprisings (Ismail 2012, 435). As a result, leaders of Muslim communities gain significant social

and political clout. The parallel development of the internet and social media allow these leaders

to communicate and organize their power structure in a broader setting.

Furthermore, through a culture of isolation, Islamist organizations learn to run smoothly

without the support of the regime. The Ennahda Party, Muslim Brotherhood, and more radical

groups such as the Taliban have each faced severe scrutiny and punishment in their early stages.

This has prevented them from being accepted as valid political parties, but it has also allowed

them to grow independent of the existing political structure. When regimes fall, Islamist groups
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already have strong organization, the pre-existing support necessary to dominate initial

campaigns, and the determination to gain retribution through politics (Hamid 2014, 11). The

consistent outcome is domination by Islamist Parties in foundational elections. Varying cultures

of elected Islamist majorities determine how these religion-oriented parties respond once in

positions of power.

Cultural Development of Islamist Majority Parties

Cultural developments caused the Ennahda Party to emerge as a moderate political party

and the Muslim Brotherhood to remain a conservative protectorate of the Koran. It is important

to not essentialize either of these parties or their origins, so the following analysis focuses on

specific policies of each group and the actions of their leadership over time. There is significant

variation among individual party supporters, and this is illustrated in the recent transition by

many to more radical Jihadi and Salafi movements.

The original beliefs of each Islamist group are essential for understanding the emergence

of their modern stances. From its start, the Ennahda party’s commitment to citizens gained it

widespread popular support. Originally known as the Movement of the Islamic Tendency, the

Ennahda Party was founded in 1981 by its current president Rached Ghannouchi (Hamid 2014,

190 – 191). It attributed its emergence to the Iranian Revolution and, more notably, to the

Muslim Brotherhood (Lewis 2011). However, it also quickly established itself as a moderate and

accepting Islamist party. Its heavy reference to moral and cultural renewal, lack of desire for an

Islamic state, and decision to ignore Sharia Law were particularly attractive to progressive

college students who were the product of Tunisia’s evolving structure. In 1989 14% of the nation

voted for the Ennahda in parliamentary elections, and in some regions up to 60% of the nation
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voted for the Party (Hamid 2014, 191 – 193). From the start, Ghannouchi’s party was successful

in politics and appealed to the masses by producing tangible social benefits.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood also gained quick national support, its message was

one of hate and retribution. Hassan al-Banna and six other workers from the Suez Canal

Company founded the brotherhood with the goal of combatting Western influence on traditional

Islam (Mura 2012). They believed that practicing Islam in itself should ensure a splendid

lifestyle, and the intervention of the West had prevented correct teaching of the religion (Hamid

2014, 9). Over its first twenty years of existence, al-Banna’s hateful interpretation of the Koran

fit well with the existing Anti-British sentiment of the nation. This established a standard for

extremism to expand from.

Due to their widespread support and active social participation, both parties were widely

punished and isolated by regimes looking to consolidate power for themselves. Each party’s

experience with marginalization significantly shaped its modern viewpoints. Following the

Ennahda Party’s success in the 1989 election, Ben Ali quickly reversed his tolerant policies

toward the Ennahda Party, disbanded its meetings, and arrested close to 15,000 supporters.

However, he also made the momentous choice to exile the party’s key leaders after imprisoning

them (Hamid 2014, 191). Over the next 40 years, these leaders, including Ghannouchi, were able

to experience Western culture firsthand and monitor the political scene of Tunisia from afar.

They experienced the development of the internet, changing societal structures, and the rise of

progressive trends. It became clear to them that people still supported the essential teachings of

Islam, but younger generations were also interested in commercialism, western education, and

world travel. Citizens could think on their own, develop their own opinions, and challenge

radical claims. Building off of its roots, the party recognized that it needed to set aside its
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outdated radical agenda in favor of more accepting and dynamic policies if it hoped to achieve its

goal of encouraging Muslims to choose a Muslim lifestyle (Hamid 2014, 193). While exiled in

the United Kingdom from 1991 – 2011, Ghannouchi wrote hundreds of articles advancing

arguments against violence and the forced implementation of Sharia Law (Stepan 2018, 49). By

being adaptable to change, the Ennahda Party managed to develop in a similarly progressive

fashion as Tunisia itself.

The decisions by Egyptian regimes to keep leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in solitude

caused the Islamist group to radicalize, overlook progressive development, and misunderstand

political relationships within Egypt. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood today are similar to

what they were when Egypt achieved independence from Great Britain. Although not to the

same extent, the torture and inhumane conditions of Egyptian prisons had similar psychological

effects as Syrian prisons did (Human Rights Watch 1991). Trapped in their own minds and

driven to psychological extremes, key leaders of the brotherhood became increasingly committed

to ensuring the future implementation of their own interpretation of the Koran on society. The

goals of this movement became less about fixing society from Western Corruption than about

gaining retribution for imprisonment (Wickham 2015). The decisions of Elder Members were

not to be questioned by less-experienced members. This is why, when young members started

ignoring the advice of their superiors to not attend anti-regime protests, the members were forced

to intervene by dominating the protests and changing their messages (Wickham 2018, 36). The

Muslim Brotherhood commitment to conservative Islam and inability to mediate with other

opinions did not align with existing social or political trends in Egypt. When the Brotherhood

was elected to power, this conservative stubbornness caused democracy to fail.

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Relationships with Other Political Actors

The outcome of diverging cultural development paths for the Ennahda and Muslim

Brotherhood parties can be qualified by the varying decisions each party made with other major

political actors when elected into power following the Arab Spring. It is clear that the Ennahda

party was open to compromise and valued the long-term benefits of democracy over its own

political agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood was hungry for power and prioritized using its

political advantage to benefit its own interests against widespread opposition. When applied to

the geopolitical structures described above, these varying Islamist cultures allowed democracy to

consolidate in Tunisia and fail in Egypt.

Low voter turnout and misinformation in young democracies elevates the importance of

the relationship between political parties and individual voters. If unity is not cultivated among

the population, then democracy is not possible. The culture of the Ennahda Party and Muslim

Brotherhood distinguished the abilities of each party to sustain legitimate popular support in

2011. The Ennahda Party made sure to demonstrate itself as an actor of the population as a whole

rather than a protectorate of its own base. It achieved this by striving for a civil state and

ensuring fundamental rights. In contrast to a religious state, a civil state is controlled by citizens

under the protection of laws and guidance of administrators. Ghannouchi decided to not pursue

the incorporation of Sharia Law into the constitution or even make Islam the official state

religion. His reasoning for this decision is founded on the structure of society: “There is an

ongoing debate in our country between secular currents which may be described as extremist,

and Islamist ones which may be described in a like manner” (Stepan 2018, 4). Recognizing this

intrinsic religious polarization, Ghannouchi aimed to tie the nation together through the

implementation of liberal ideals including equality, freedom, and independence. These attributes
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can be seen in the constitution ratified under the Ennahda Party’s leadership. The second chapter

of the Tunisian constitution contains 29 articles that each guarantees a personal right or freedom.

The state is mandated to pursue moderation and tolerance as well as include all races and

nationalities. Essential human rights, such as access to water, free education, freedom of belief,

and gender equality, are also protected (Ghannouchi 2018, 22). These inclusions support my

point that the culture of the Ennahda Party was largely shaped by the study of Tunisian structure

itself. By not including any religious attributes, this constitution is supportive of the entire

nation. This has allowed the formation of a shared Tunisian identity that is essential for

democracy to succeed.

Following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the critical mass that had been successful

in Egyptian national protests failed to stay united under democracy. This was evident soon after

the military forced individuals to clear Tahrir Square following Mubarak’s resignation. If the

Muslim Brotherhood had taken the advice of Ghannouchi and recognized the religious

polarization within its society, it could have similarly worked to incorporate the viewpoints of

diverse backgrounds into its governance. At first, it seemed that regime repression in fact have

caused the Muslim Brotherhood to moderate as Hamid suggests is a traditional pattern in the

Middle East (Hamid 2014, 38). Through its organized campaign, the organization claimed that it

was committed to democracy and a civil state. This somewhat surprising perspective earned the

vote of many central voters. However, more on pace with what its cultural development in

isolation would predict, the Muslim Brotherhood turned against its moderate election promises

and forced a conservative social agenda once in power. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that it

had single-handedly been responsible for mobilizing the protestors responsible for Mubarak’s

collapse. This misunderstanding of a critical mass proved to be a severe blunder in the polarized
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structure of Egypt. Rather than creating a civil state like Tunisia had, the Muslim Brotherhood

worked to incorporate Sharia Law into its constitution. Proposed policies included incorporating

Muslim Brotherhood teachings into public education, opening government daycares, and

monitoring public spaces. Women were required to cover their heads, going out was permitted,

and casual western ideology was illegal (Kandil 2014). This caused significant protest from

liberal, secular, and center-right members of society. Despite practicing Islam, many young

individuals did not appreciate a conservative reading of the Koran due to their educations,

Western influences, and use of social media (Brown 2018, 78) Differentiations in socioeconomic

class also caused varying degrees of interest in the continuation of political reform (Lynch et al.

2017). By attempting to conform a highly divided population to its radical ideology, the Muslim

Brotherhood lost support of its allies. Without a cooperative society, the military remained the

strongest individual actor in Egypt.

Similar relationship trends can be seen in the organized politics of Tunisia and Egypt.

Differences in cultural development caused the Ennahda Party to incorporate minority parties

into its governance and pushed the the Muslim Brotherhood, running as the Freedom and Justice

Party, to isolate itself from political rivals. Ghannouchi’s cultured leadership, learned from years

in exile, emphasized unity through proportional representation. Beginning in 2003, the Ennahda

Party and two Tunisian secular left parties started holding annual meetings in France to discuss

the potential for cooperation (Stepan 2018, 50). October 18, 2005 the Ennahda party was a

participant in the World Summit on the Information Society that later developed into the October

18 Committee. This committee incorporated the viewpoints of political parties, activists, and

journalists with the goal of envisioning a post-Ben Ali democratic Tunisia (Ghannouchi 2018,

16). These preemptive meetings show that the party was genuinely invested in sharing its power
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with other representatives. When elected into the majority position of Tunisia’s first constituent

assembly, the Ennahda chose to incorporate rather than target its recognized political opposition.

This constituent assembly was responsible for drafting the constitution that would be used to

guide future governance. With 51.97% voter turnout, the Ennahda Party won 89 seats compared

to 29 from the CPR and 26 from the Aridha. Although this is a dominant advantage, the low

turnout is fairly concerning for such an important election. Rather than abusing his advantage as

an Islamist Majority power, Ghannouchi established a consensus democracy and placed on his

cabinet members from leading opposition parties (Gobe and Salaymeh 2016). A democracy is

only a complete democracy if all members of society are equally represented. Through an early

commitment to gender equality in politics, the Ennahda Party set the stage for nearly one third of

Tunisia’s 2017 Parliament to be represented by women (Eltahawy 2018). In 2014, the Ennahda

Party lost control of its advantage in parliament and intentionally withdrew from the presidential

election (Ghannouchi 2018, 19). The coinciding decision to peacefully pass power to the next

leader is a final illustration of the Islamist party’s commitment to democratic ideology. A culture

of respect and greater interest in the societal benefits of democracy created strong relations

between the Ennahda Party and its opposition. When applied to the progressive structure of

Tunisia that encouraged the balance of ideas, this allowed democracy to consolidate in its natural

form.

An underlying interest in promoting its personal religious goals through politics caused

the Muslim Brotherhood to isolate itself from political enemies when elected to power. Unlike

the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood did not run away with the election in

2011. Led by Morsi, the party only earned 37.5% of the national popular vote. As a result, Morsi

felt immense pressure from all sides. The secular left, composed of nearly 10% of the population,
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directly targeted the sovereignty of the Muslim Brotherhood on a religious basis (CIA World

Factbook). After all, the underlying purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood was to protect

interpretation of the Koran from Westerners and Christians. On the right, other rising Islamist

groups including Jihadis and Saladis looked to recruit from the Muslim Brotherhood’s

supporting base. The Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate election promises and involvement in

peaceful protests were not radical enough for hardline Muslims. Having risen to power in a

culture of isolation and self-endowment, the Muslim Brotherhood chose to follow a strategy of

political domination rather than choose an ally. Despite only possessing a little over one third of

the popular vote, Morsi constructed a majoritarian government in which other political opinions

had no significance. The Muslim Brotherhood consistently presented a rude and commandeering

attitude to the secular left (Kandil 2014). The polite and mannerly interactions typical of Western

democracies were nowhere to be found. This exemplifies both the desire for retribution

developed by Muslim Brotherhood leadership in prison and the long-term development of the

Brotherhood in political isolation. As the Muslim Brotherhood started to turn on its election

promises and institute radical policy changes on Egyptian society, the secular left felt threatened

and turned to the military for assistance. By failing to pursue a democratic strategy of cross-party

collaboration in a nation whose politics were structurally divided, the Muslim Brotherhood

became a target of political aversion. Without the support of individual voters or political allies,

the hopes for democracy to consolidate under the Muslim Brotherhood’s conservative policies

were bleak.

A crucial obstacle in the process of consolidating a democracy is ensuring the

subordination of the former military by the majority party. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Party

recognized the limited role of the military and made few changes to the existing security
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structure. Both Tunisia and the Ennahda Party have limited histories of violence. The military in

Tunisia follows a tradition of Patriotic Excellence. Commanding officers believe that it is their

duty to protect the interests of the nation rather than the interests of the government (Nassif

2015, 270). This is the same attitude shared by militaries in other democratic nations including

the United States and England. This un-political agenda is in fact more conducive to democracy

than to authoritarianism, because in a democracy the goals of the state coincide with the goals of

the people. The Ennahda Party continued to utilize the police force to counteract terrorism and

marginalize the military as a peacekeeping force. The constitution, new system of law, and

political freedom ensured individual rights and government security; the military’s focus was to

protect the border and ensure peace. The rise in terrorism, the continuation of police corruption,

and an ongoing state of emergency challenge the party’s decision to not initiate widespread

security reform (Masmoudi 2018). However, regarding the consolidating democracy, the

Ennahda Party’s decision to focus its attention on political relations with other actors besides the

military proved to be faultless.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to appreciate the power of the military

ultimately triggered the failure of consolidation. As the popularly elected party, the Muslim

Brotherhood could have used its position to unify the nation against the military. Quick security-

sector reform could have eliminated key regime figures. Unable to oppose the entire nation, the

military would have been forced to comply and rescale its role to efficiently counter rapidly

increasing terrorism rates. However, due to its own entitlement, the Muslim Brotherhood instead

turned to the military for support against the Secular left (Kandil 2014). Its core religious beliefs

and culture of isolation caused the Muslim Brotherhood to believe it had far more power than it

actually did following 2011. It thought that by continuing to allow military corruption, it would
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garner the same support from the military that Mubarak had upheld (Wickham 2018, 34). With

the support of the military, the radical Islamist group could assumedly oppress the religious

opposition and successfully institute its widespread political agenda. This move backfired

severely though when the secular left also requested the military’s support.

As he resigned, Mubarak’s last act was to hand national power to the military with the

intention of ensuring a smooth transition. Already, structural factors contributed to the propensity

for the military to intervene in Egyptian political affairs. Additionally, the military disliked the

radical ideology and interventionist approaches of the Muslim Brotherhood. They found the

military economy to be unstable under its new leadership. The thought of Muslim Brothers

fighting alongside well-established officers was disturbing (Nassif 2018, 138). Only the

knowledge that a cross-party coalition had taken down Mubarak kept el-Sisi and other generals

in compliance. With both sides of the political spectrum asking for assistance, the blessing of

Mubarak, and radical jihadists attacking civilians across the country, the military felt as though it

needed to intervene in order to protect the safety of its civilians and preserve personal interests.

This resulted in the failure of democracy when el-Sisi removed President Morsi from power and

dismissed the Egyptian Constitution in 2013.

Conclusion

In conclusion, both the structure of Tunisia and Egypt and culture of the Ennahda

Movement and Muslim Brotherhood diverged significantly over the course of Authoritarian rule.

When these elements intersected following successful peaceful protests against respective

regimes during the Arab Spring, the potential for democracy to consolidate was very different in

each nation. The Ennahda Party leadership was able to recognize the progressive trends of
 21

society from exile and use its understanding of structural dynamics to unite the nation. Its

associated decisions to construct a civil society and draft a non-religious constitution allowed

democracy to flourish even after the Ennahda Party handed over power three years later.

Through imprisonment, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership became obsessed with promoting its

own conservative interpretation of Islam and used its position of authority to push its radical

objectives onto a society ripe with polarization. The outcome was the division of voters, the

empowerment of the military, and a coup d’etat. It is clear that the Islamist majority in Middle

Eastern nations must be capable of adapting to societal trends, particularly among young

generations, in order to consolidate democracy. Knowledge of this pattern can be used to predict

the outcome of consolidation in existing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and regimes

currently undergoing transitions from authoritarianism. It can also be used to strategize potential

strategies for foreign intervention in these environments.

 22

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