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Overview
Fire
Passive fire protection. No sprinklers.
Resistance:
Building
106 m (32 storeys). Commercial.
Type:
The Building
The Windsor Tower or Torre Windsor (officially known as Edificio Windsor) was a 32-
storey concrete building with a reinforced concrete central core. A typical floor was two-
way spanning 280mm deep waffle slab supported by the concrete core, internal RC
columns with additional 360mm deep steel I-beams and steel perimeter columns.
Originally, the perimeter columns and internal steel beams were left unprotected in
accordance with the Spanish building code at the time of construction
The building featured two heavily reinforced concrete transfer structures (technical
floors) between the 2nd and 3rd Floors, and between the 16th and 17th Floors
respectively. The original cladding system was fixed to the steel perimeter columns and
the floor slabs. The perimeter columns were supported by the transfer structures at the
17th and 3rd Floor levels.
The building was subjected to a three year refurbishment programme of works when
the fire broke out. The major works included the installations of:
A sprinkler system
The refurbishment was carried out floor-by-floor from the lower floors upwards. By the time the fire broke out, the
The Windsor Tower's original structural design complied with the Spanish building codes in 1970s. At the time of
the construction, the Spanish codes did not require fire protection to steelwork and sprinkler fire protection for the
building.
As a result, the original existing steelwork was left unprotected and no sprinkler system was installed in the
building. The gap between the original cladding and floor slabs was not firestopped as well. In fact, these weak
links in the fire protection of the building was being rectified in the refurbishment project at the time of the fire.
Since the building adopted the "open plan" floor concept, effectively, the fire compartmentation could only be
floor-by-floor (about 40 x 25m). However, the vertical compartmentation might not be fully achieved due to the
lack of firestop system in floor openings and between the original cladding and the floor slabs.
The original fire protection system and the upgrading works being carried out at the time of the fire are compared
as follows (NILIM 2005):
The Fire
It was reported that the fire started at 23:00 at the 21st Floor.
Within one hour, all floors above the 21stFloor were on fire. In the
following hours, the fire gradually spread downwards to the lower
technical floor at the 3rd Floor. The total fire duration was
estimated to be 18 ~ 20 hours.
The Damage
Analysis
The main factors leading to the rapid fire growth and the fire spread to almost all floors included:
the failure of vertical compartmentation measures, in the façade system and the floor openings
It was believed that the multiple floor fire, along with the simultaneous buckling of the unprotected steel perimeter
columns at several floors, triggered the collapse of the floor slabs above the 17 th floor. The reduced damage below
the 17th floor might provide a clue.
The fire protection on the existing steelworks below the 17th floor had been completed at the time of fire except
for the 9th and 15th floors. When the fire spread below the 17th floor, those protected perimeter columns survived,
except for the unprotected columns at the 9th and 15th floors which all buckled in the multiple floor fire (see Figure
2). However, they did not cause any structural collapse. Obviously, the applied loads supported by these buckled
columns had been redistributed to the remaining reinforced concrete shear walls. Nevertheless, structural fire
analysis should be carried out before such a conclusion can be drawn.
Figure 2 Buckling of unprotected steel perimeter columns at the 9th floor (Photo: Colin Bailey)
On the other hand, the reinforced concrete central core, columns, waffle slabs and transfer structures performed
very well in such a severe fire. It is clear that the structural integrity and redundancy of the remaining parts of the
building provided the overall stability of the building.
Dave, P. (2005). “Madrid tower designer blames missing fire protection for collapse”. New Civil Engineer, 2
June 2005.
[NILIM 2005] National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management (NILIM). (1 Jul 2005). “Report on