GENERAL PROVISIONS - Article 774 to 782

1.

G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO
NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants..

2.

G.R. No. 201787 September 25, 2013

ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased), Petitioner, vs.

HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, Respondent.

3.

G.R. No. 171035 August 24, 2009

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BAYHON, MELANIE BAYHON, BENJAMIN BAYHON, JR., BRENDA BAYHON, ALINA BAYHON-
CAMPOS, IRENE BAYHON-TOLOSA, and the minor GINO BAYHON, as represented herein by his natural mother as
guardian-ad-litem, JESUSITA M. BAYHON, Respondents.

4.

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-55000 July 23, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B.
PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO,
JR., heirs-appellants, vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-62895 July 23, 1987

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding Judge of the (now) Regional
Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No.
916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-63818 July 23, 1987

DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO,
Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as
Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA,
GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO,
respondents.
 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

No. L-65995 July 23, 1987

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and JOSE CUENCO

BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES,
Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu.

G.R. No. 41171

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88
years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document
as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the
presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses.

Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court held that the document
presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery.

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of
Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing claims or
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.

The following petitions or claims were filed:

1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of
heirs and determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed against said petition.

2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma.
Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition.

3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena
Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition
for declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.

4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario
Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and
the heirs of Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.

When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following facts were established:

1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having predeceased the former), were survived by
their eight (8) children, namely,

Jose Ma. Borromeo

Cosme Borromeo
Pantaleon Borromeo
Vito Borromeo
Paulo Borromeo
Anecita Borromeo
Quirino Borromeo and
Julian Borromeo

2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his brothers and sisters predeceased him.

3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:

 a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939

b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios
Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the
petitioners herein.

c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.

4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan.
30, 1950 leaving the following children:

a. Anecita Ocampo Castro

b. Ramon Ocampo
c. Lourdes Ocampo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.

5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following children: a. Marcial Borromeo

b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife, Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda
Borromeo Talam c. Asuncion Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.

The last three died leaving no issue.

6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following children:

a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949

b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following children:

aa. Federico Borromeo bb.

Marisol Borromeo (Maria B.
Putong, Rec. p. 85) cc. Canuto
Borromeo, Jr. dd. Jose Borromeo
ee. Consuelo Borromeo ff. Pilar
Borromeo gg. Salud Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948

d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:

aa. Maria Borromeo Atega

bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda
Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd.Rosario Borromeo ee. Fe
Borromeo Queroz

On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the following, to the exclusion of
all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo 6. Asuncion Borromeo
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo 7. Marcial Borromeo
3. Vitaliana Borromeo 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
5. Salud Borromeo

The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.

On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the
properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this same
order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and
manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value
of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated portion.

On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion
before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the
law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he
stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.

Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the
persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.

Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support his motion for
reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V.
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver
agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having
been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
inexistent for lack of subject matter.

On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement
assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo.

A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.

In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring
respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion
for reconsideration.

The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo
because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the
shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private
respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is
improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time allowed
for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement
of partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to partition the
estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.

It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside
from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo,
is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance
of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of
inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance.
Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights
were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which
directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a
person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be
certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points
out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain
that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent
Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over
the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court
because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the
estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the same.

The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be
considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former.
Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment
of the death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to
which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of
the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the
moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs,
therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.

In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist,
three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to
relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must
be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).

The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention
to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to
concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of
money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In
this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document,
is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was
never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to
them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement
on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15,
1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer
and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the
same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed
this document on March 24, 1969.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and
declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498.
Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers
in handling the settlement of the estate.

In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 55000

This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified this
case to this Court as the questions raised are all of law.

The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also question the jurisdiction of the lower court to
hear and decide the action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.

The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children
did not yet possess or own any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary
right was only acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.

They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of waiver of hereditary right in the present case
because there was no object, which is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver
of hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio but was inexistent.

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any formal pleading filed by the lawyers of
Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two things which
are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said
waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite
pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the validity of the waiver
agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.

The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories
to the waiver document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights
because the rights from that moment on became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be declared as heir first
before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of the death of the person from whom he
is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories
to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their right to the
inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.

On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of
a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an
order specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and
setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance
involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the question.

The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of
the late Vito Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be validated. The essential elements of a waiver,
especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case.

The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in
consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was
filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the
respondent.

The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the
subsequent cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of
hereditary rights.

Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.

The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 62895

A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for
the immediate closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora.
Both motions were grounded on the fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the
estate since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.

Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco
Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate and close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R.

Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to compel the petitioner, as coadministrator, to
submit an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's
fees, and that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the
petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the
administration proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and accounting because the latter motion
was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or
resolve a case or matter within three months from the date of its submission.

The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already been resolved when the respondent judge
cancelled all settings of all incidents previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and
restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an
agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order dated
August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties
of the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered
that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.

According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not
finally distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following circumstances:

1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's
fees;
 2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the
waiver agreement signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R.
No. 4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of notices of lis pendens on the different titles
of the properties of the estate.

Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9
group of heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the
judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and
ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to render an
accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of several properties.

The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.

Considering the pronouncements stated in:

1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974;

2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito
Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-
raffling; and

3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R.
No. 63818.

the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as coadministrator of the estate, if he
has not vet done so, as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate
speed.

G.R. No. 63818

On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among others, the following:

xxx xxx xxx

6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the production of the certificates of title
and to deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said
motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various
motions for reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as owners they cannot be deprived of their
titles for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua
ultimately withdraw his motions for production of titles.

7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno
who was then the counsel of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident,
Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among others, Atty.
Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire
property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in contempt of court with the dim prospect
of suspension from the practice of his profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and
suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together,
continued to harass administrator

xxx xxx xxx

9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a
sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.

10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the sale of the entire estate
or to buy out the individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell
their distributive shares under the terms and conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment
has become apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed
by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena
duces tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
and the other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected until the herein
 movants shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely independent
and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents.

11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of this proceeding, including the incidents
above-mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against
the herein movants. Incidents which may create this impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)

The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the following:

xxx xxx xxx

16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state herein that respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al.
Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.

17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot be legally done without the conformity of
the heirs-distributees because the certificates of title are already registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the
agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based
on the rationale that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present income of the
so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to say their piece. Only the 4/9
group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly
favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.

xxx xxx xxx

20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well
as other incidents now pending in the court below which smack of harassment against the herein petitioners. For,
regardless of the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following circumstances:

(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua
whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.

(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees, and
petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great disappointment of respondent.

(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly intended to harass and
embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.

(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by failing to resolve the claim for
attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other
lawyers were resolved by respondent after petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43,
Rollo)

On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and
disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered
the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.

A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for
review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco
P. Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.

The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its
merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others concerned.

The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn
shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They
claim that this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00.
They add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the
lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders against the failure
of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate
court. They claim that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of this Court directing the
said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is
conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.

Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes
as co-administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what t he was
supposed to have received as rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to February
1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to
sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26
to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to
cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.

On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose
Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for cash, a report on which the
administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt
was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,
bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-
distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the
motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of
Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another
subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.

On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds
for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.

On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common
cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the administrator.

On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco
Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order by Judge Burgos.

Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
produce the titles in court.

All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos
issued an order denying the private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the subpoena.1avvphi1

It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp.
Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had not done anything towards
the closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L.
Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.

The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell
the entire estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the
part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:

... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach
and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has
no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation,
but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor or of either partly
or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such circumstances
is to disqualify himself "That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve
ed. what is more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.

In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition
for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself
has become moot and academic.

G.R. No. 65995

The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R
during the pendency of this petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents related to the said special
proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void
and without force and effect whatsoever.

The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the
reversion from the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their names as early as 1970,
notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's
fees of the lawyers-claimants who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be
legally charged against their respective clients and not against the estate.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one and barred by res judicata because this Court on
July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate.
They claim that this resolution, which was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate
Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it granted the petition for certiorari and or prohibition and
disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the
transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March
1, 1983, which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).

We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who
individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly
excessive amount of 40% of the market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.

Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, —

(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled
to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;

(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;

(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No.
916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos
shall immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that the successor-
judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be implemented:

(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:

(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank
deposits by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983;
and

(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market value of the estate from which
attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the
heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but
in amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired from
the estate as beneficiaries. SO ORDERED.

5.

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998

HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO,
HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO CARLOS A.
SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO,
DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as
Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30 March 1994. Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.

Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado, were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a
539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with a house
erected thereon.1 On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue. 2 Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private
respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A.
SAMPAYO, Carlos A. Sampayo, Gelleroso C. Sampayo, Myrna
C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia. A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A.
Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in
her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City. 3

The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private respondents failed to produce
any document to produce that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. 4 On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was
substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed
Conti. 5

At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral
heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the
original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,
6 Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the

only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948,
and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina,
Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth
certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes
Sampayo, were Antonio Sampavo and Brigida Jaraza.

The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero
who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the church records, hence, the lower left portion of the
documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to where the documents were logged in particular. 7 The baptismal
certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire On two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil
registration records were totally burned. 8 On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25 October 1919
(Exh. "I") 9 showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).

Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and
with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina. 10

To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosal
Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband
Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since 1937. 11 In fact,
she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes 12 and spent for the necessary repairs and
improvements thereon 13 because by agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them. 14

However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim. 15 Rosario also disclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her-relatives from their
house. 16 When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that the only one she remembered was Josefina since
there were many relatives who came. When asked who Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, when
asked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied having ever known them. 17

Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since both
of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord, 18 although she admitted that she did
not know whether Lourdes had other relatives. 19

According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the tombstones of Gabriel Cord and
Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred beside
her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario during her direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred there
because her relatives took her remains. 20

On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respodents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court. 21

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in finding that private respondents
were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon. 22

On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and held 23

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by preponderance of
evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not
err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a
project of partition of the residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court . . . . Considering our earlier finding that the lower court
did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore
 entitled to inherit her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now
private respondents] are not entitled, to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in 11 supplied).

Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua 24 and Marabilles v. Quito, 25 that a prior and separate judicial declaration
of heirship was not necessary 26 and that private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and
registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and
all other incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law, including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil
Code, 27and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa 28 holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent,
as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative value of the documentary and
testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she
was a vital witness in the case. 29 Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed
share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal
requirements especially publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship
with the deceased. 30

There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action
originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud 31 —

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it
is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any
proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison; and that without such
settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by
the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his
heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may
be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a
judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the;
plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 32 of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes
Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-
ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right
originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for the partition of the
estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary
settlement of estates of small value. 33 But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half
share which they inherited; from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners.
The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rules 69 of the Rules of Court
—

Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the
other persons interested in the property.

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously maintained by petitioners. There
are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought
to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should
go to which co-owner. 34 Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence,
have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they
claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before
respondent Court of Appeals.

Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not
prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not
prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of
Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to
testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her. 35

We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted that private respondents are competent
and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are
co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession.

Succession is a mode of acquisition by vietue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. 36 Legal
or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity. 37 If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spuoses, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 38 It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issues.
Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.

Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, 39 the filiation of ligitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or
private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 40 By analogy, this method
of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.

Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official act of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. 41 The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by
private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are
authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein. 42

The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official
recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil.105 [1914], 43 thus.

. . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under
Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are
one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during this
course of its business.

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were
four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the
same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise
of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal
certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.

Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the court a quo
and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the original has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the
original certificate of birth of Manuel T. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983,
respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.

Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners' contention that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove
filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the
declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute
her testimony in open court when she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by
the trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary and testimonial evidence not were not disputed by defendants" (now
petitioners). 44 Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the identities
of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs, counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she professed she had
enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Contil, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who
regarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly
preponderate to the right of private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

WILLS IN GENERAL – Article 783 to 795

1.

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ
and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition
for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This
opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita
Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her
own legally adopted children.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was
appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding
the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition
alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact
been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners'
intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition
filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced
and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents,
but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary
questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria,
et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners
likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written
depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.

On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved
the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the
late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez who entered an
appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by
way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will
of the decedent.

On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently submitted their respective
memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the
properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.

The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On
October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on
April 21, 1964.

Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April
21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary
dispositions.

The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on
one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and
nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers
and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of
the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy
is Basilia's last will — immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.

The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his
brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the
validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption
in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of
this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess
that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to
properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question
of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by
reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue
of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same
heirs by the decedent is false.

The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears
from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the
following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:

III
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay
(Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz.

xxx xxx xxx

Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa
kaparaanang sumusunod:

A.—Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na
pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales),
bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati (½) ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang
gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang
Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati (½) ng mga lagay
na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa
Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati (½) ng ilang
lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.

The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing
that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime.
The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the
respondents at all — the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the
falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the
lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece
from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First,
the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang
mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under
the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not
make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent
of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her
express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But
even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed
her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause
for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely
because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was
valid, still such institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written
in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the
will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the
late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs
as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases,
"mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were
used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute
indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound
by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored
the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare
this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate
by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of
a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of
the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should
be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of
giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for
that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. 5

To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that,
as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first — an act which the court could
legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justices.6 That the court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as
articulated by the Rules of Court.7 ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

2.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of
Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory
heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in
her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small
parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten
shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the
decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the
testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.

After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner
to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the
lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and
the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the
legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real
properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80

 2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01

The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas
(appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while
the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;

(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash
and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and
Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary
to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the

grandchildren remain untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964,
wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the entire
estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants
should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by
the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs
are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et
al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole
estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective
heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78

while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrixappellee and
oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of
the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that
the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully
restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy,
which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her
will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With
reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be
paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled
that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes
which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the
testatrix."

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the
free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;

2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the
real properties left by the Testatrix; which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In
consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule
123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's
decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law
of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise." 8

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose
mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither
these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these
fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her
estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property
in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the
same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is
subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him
may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-
appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina,
and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their respective legitimes.

2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has
been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080
"now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to
repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with
all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does
not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full
validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half
and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion,
and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil
Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two
large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a
partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance
with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned
in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion
Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject
to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of
the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by
herself and her co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of
real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties
to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the
compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the
remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the
nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting
the free portion." 16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific
heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix
of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear
intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half
disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of
adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following
her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I
named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my
death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of
compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of
Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory
of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly
was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may
retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of
Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and
testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator
has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given
by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against
the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have
a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during
her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the
heirs is here determined and undisputed.

5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily
resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion
of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being
paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and
give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the
estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and
hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the
legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine
peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the
wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties
of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the
sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the
adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should
receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the
requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably
been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the
currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the
project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

4.

G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918

In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.

MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,

MALCOLM, J.:

The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will,
or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.

Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at
more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation
state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without
the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused
it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested
and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as follows:

SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real
or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and
signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the date Act No. 2645 went
into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not
published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death
took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil.,
276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and
the death occurred after the enactment of this law.

There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a change in the statutes prescribing
the formalities necessary to be observed in the execution of a will, when such change is made intermediate to the execution of a
will and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889],
57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are
controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the
time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the following: "As until the death of the testator the
paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the law in
force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept
the foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be
held invalid.

The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force
at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be
supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord
Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's
death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from
which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs.
Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)

Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs.Mitchell [1868], 57
Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:

Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of
the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law
existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule
subsequently enacted, though before his death.

While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he would
have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest satisfied in security on that
presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it
does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and
he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when
the will is executed, though to go into effect at a future time.

A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of Alabama and New York, is
that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to
impair the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price
vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)

This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection, under such circumstances,
should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has
provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful
pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.

The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or
devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and
attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future time.lawphil.net

It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only
a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112
U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article
3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No.
2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil.,
558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña
[1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which,
in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as
in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is
admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to
observe that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute
announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the
execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645,
but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.

To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as established by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.

The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is
reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
 4.

G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants..

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last
Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of
Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins
and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence
and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke
and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which
the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing
at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said
three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other.
The oppositors did not submit any evidence.

The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and
that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law
still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according
to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952,
admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the
time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted,
and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not
folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements
which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one,
not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the
failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:

. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity
should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should
be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.

And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:

From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the document are
signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted
to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura
Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.

What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows
holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But
article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the
affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed
will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court
in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.

Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate
remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees
and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

5.

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA

GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines
for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices as ancillary administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and
Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh
Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed
an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at
28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s
name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court
of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William
Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9
Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account;
and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial
court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of
Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼
undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey
and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for
distribution to the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three
children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial
court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent contended that
petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the
project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws
on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the
"best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also
alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April
7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one
is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title
in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not
holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA,
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER
EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF
AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC,
WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be
annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment
or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters
therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that
at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the
partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard
to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how
the estate will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to
extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial
of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his
duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party
thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta
filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24
Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of
judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, 28 and
must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s
will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil
Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in
accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already
well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her
lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special
Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing
her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from
the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case
since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore,
the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the
trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32Respondent cannot be
faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came
to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but
to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his
ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party
from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not
pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts
of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which
show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence,
and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is
not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care
and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the
standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in
Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines
but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the
Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore
City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September
7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her
national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the
testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed
of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided
by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37
however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely
relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was
no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will
before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland.
As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39
He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary
administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it
issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and
distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent
and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds
the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed
to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. The CA
likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed
should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle
which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence
adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator
was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established
under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the
proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the
Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination,
to wit: x x x
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant
Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties and
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered
extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum,
resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s
abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made
applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati
property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the
same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial
aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts,
"all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal
representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that
"unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal
representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is
reasonable under the circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the Makati
property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these
properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard
subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the
proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in
the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court
may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law
of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October
4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905,
Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by
the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of
First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905
of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s
estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity
of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to
the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if
the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the
special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they
were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s
wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property
in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or
controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation
of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973
Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the
transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections
7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49
In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that
attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT – Article 796 to 803

1.

G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO

UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.

CARSON, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to probate a document purporting to
be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the
sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and
who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no
heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.

Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and
form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed,
Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.

The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the
presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.

Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño, testified in support of the will, the latter being the justice
of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the
testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the third
subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes no comment upon his absence, we think it may
safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that,
when because of death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the
subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear
of record, and this especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.

The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that the testator, at the time of
its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament,
and that in his presence and in the presence of each other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching
and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony
save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a
contradiction, however, which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed
and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was
assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that
his wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument, and that he was given
nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately before or after, or both before
and after he attached his signature to the will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in
conflict with the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that nourishment might
have been given to him both before and after signing the will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and
the other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both. But, however this may have been, we do not
think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant incident,
to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses,
or as to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of
contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed,
or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person
who was present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit
as to negative the possibility or probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the witnesses could
not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions
in the testimony of the witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity, and on the other hand their
testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that occurred, and is so convincing and altogether
satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of
entire confidence and belief.

The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time and on the occasion when the
subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the
alleged testator was at that time in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two
of these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six in
the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the witnesses in support of
the will testified that it was executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the
testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased,
where he was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that time the alleged
subscribing witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or
to make himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our
opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a
fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear
to any fact which he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased
was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny the
genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was
not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a somewhat suggestive question by his
attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-
examination, he was forced to admit that because his brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were
Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as
to which testified; and he admitted further, that, although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other
members of his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness
could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should
have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness
happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive
evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and place or in the
manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the other
witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as
to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed.

In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence, and upon a
comparison of this signature with the signature attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial
judge, who held in this connection as follows:

No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the presiding judge of this court does
not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared
these two signatures, and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that the
signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber
was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and
the other fact, that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was not in
the habit of signing his name every day.

These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two signatures, but the court finds
that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical.

That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing
witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their
testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself
to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence
of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of
the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the
boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able
to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property,
is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.

Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow, and wholly
fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because
of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly
corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased
at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him
from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of
the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in
the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave
and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown
men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his
wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.

It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the degree of mental capacity of a
particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity,
or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has
ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid
will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs.Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity,
and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body,
or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided
he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property" (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has
not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest
degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity,
would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the
derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680); and, that
"Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree" (Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3
P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a
person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from
disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of making a valid
will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the
act she is engaged in" (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).

But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity which
will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator
was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the
following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the
United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these
elements, there can be no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all
these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the
time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon
the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of
his bounty.

(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)

In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the instrument
propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed
by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his
own free will and accord.

The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance against the appellants.

2.

G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO

PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting to probate a document which
was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo
of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five
months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the
decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a
deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed according to the formalities and
requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.

The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered
from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the
power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained
the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his
wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.

At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio,
and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and
consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three testamentary
witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was executed. According to the
uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following manner:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these
notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces
of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator
asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head;
that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator
and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the
presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.

These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the
lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.

This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity at
the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting
witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was
not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that
he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for
the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his
statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that
the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.

Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his testimony
was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will.
This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed
offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this
witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents
were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five
years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The
following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:

Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his
right mind?

A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I spoke to
him he did not answer me.

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he
had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the
will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in
what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one
occasion when he visited him.

Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what
be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed
to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at
some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his
statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he
would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.

We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their
testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in
consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the
mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities
were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his
life. However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.

The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority
is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental
incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag
(14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous citations there given from
the decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction
the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to
prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of
Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never
having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are
many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and
body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were
the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many
gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated
as insanity and idiocy.

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person may exercise and
this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the
question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —

Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A
testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of
executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)

The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell
vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:

To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.

In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:

The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory?
Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his
bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the business
in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)

In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of
nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered
a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and
obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:

Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his
immediate family or property. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and mental weakness
and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf,
but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated
questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular
that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his
reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational
expression.

In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the
case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have
led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that
the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate
that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it
does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of
the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period
several hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will
in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.

For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance
against the appellants. .

3.

C.A. No. 4 March 21, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD NEYRA, petitioner-appellee, vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.

TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. BLANCO, petitioners-appellants, vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.

DE JOYA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on
December 3, 1943, admitting to probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the deceased Encarnacion Neyra; at the
same time denying the probate of a previous will dated September 14, 1939, alleged to have been executed by the said testatrix.

Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942, filed, on November 10, 1942, a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, for the probate of said will.

On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, who had not been named as
beneficiaries in said will, filed on opposition to the probate of the said will dated November 3, 1942, alleging (1) that at the time
of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed testamentary capacity; (2) that her
thumb marks on said instrument had been procured by means of fraud by petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion Neyra
never intended to consider said document as will; (3) that the alleged will, dated November 3, 1942, had not been executed in
the manner and form prescribed by law; and(4) that Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had executed a will, naming
as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and that said will had never been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.

On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the allegations in the opposition.

Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate of the first will executed by Encarnacion Neyra, on
September 14, 1939, marked as Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza filed their
opposition to the probate on said will marked as Exhibit 16, and amended said opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which
Teodora Neyra and the others filed a reply, on September 20, 1943.

On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and the counter petition mentioned above, said petitioner
as well as the oppositors, presented evidence, testimonial and documentary. The witnesses presented by the petitioner Trinidad
Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez, Rev. Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr.
Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio A. Aldecoa, Atty. Ricardo Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who
had acted as scrivener in the preparation of said will dated November 3, 1942.

Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses, the principal among whom were Presentacion Blanco,
Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical expert, and the oppositors Teodora Neyra and Pilar
de Guzman themselves.

After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting to probate the will dated November 3, 1942; at the
same time denying the probate of the will dated September 14, 1939.

From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, assigning
several errors, which may be reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court erred (1) in finding that Encarnacion Neyra
wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was reconciliation between Encarnacion Neyra and her sister Trinidad;
(3) in accepting as satisfactory the evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in ignoring the evidence submitted by the
oppositors; and (5) in not admitting to probate the will dated September 14, 1939.

The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the case in the court below, has satisfactorily and
sufficiently established the following facts:

That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and two children, by his first
marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other relatives; that after the death of Severo Neyra, the
two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious quarrels, in connection with the properties left by their deceased
father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, concerning said properties (Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others
demanded from Encarnacion Neyra et al. the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, and
it was finally decided in favor of the defendants in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943
(G.R. No. 8162, Exhibit 9).

In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded from Encarnacion Neyra, one-half (½) of the property
described therein, and one-half (½) of the rents, and the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the plaintiff, but at the same
time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77, under her counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra again elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals for Manila (G.R. No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided, pursuant to the document of compromise marked as
Exhibit D; and the petition for reconsideration filed therein still remains undecided.

That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will on September 14,
1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her
other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in
said will in favor of her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will was brought to
the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious organization
declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in
order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion
Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat,
an attorney working in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that
Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely
prepared a draft in the form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said
religious organization, among others, as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said
religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance.

In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she
sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, after which she
expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy
communion, in view of her condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra, Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary
arrangements to be made for the celebration of holy mass in the house of Encarnacion Neyra, and, as a matter of fact, on
November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, officiating in said
ceremony, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took holy communion; that after said religious
ceremony had been terminated, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters,
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion Neyra accepted said advice and at about noon of the same day (November
1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad Neyra, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that on seeing
one another, the two greeted each other in a most affectionate manner, and became reconciled; that the two had a long and
cordial conversation, in the course of which the two sisters also talked about the properties left by their deceased father and
their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed,
on the condition that the property involved therein, consisting of a small house and lot, should be given exclusively to Trinidad
Neyra, on the condition that the latter should waive her claim for her share in the rents of said property, while under the
administration of Encarnacion Neyra, and that the two should renounce their mutual claims against one another. It was also
agreed between the two sisters to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said
agreement, but Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave
him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions relative to the
disposition she wanted to make of her properties in her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of
compromise or agreement marked as Exhibit D, as well as the new will and testament marked as Exhibit C, naming Trinidad
Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, and said
instruments were ready for signature on November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942; Attorney Panis
read said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to Encarnacion Neyra slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro
Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, herein petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if its terms
were in accordance with her wishes, if she had anything else to add, or anything to be changed in said will; and as Encarnacion
Neyra stated that the terms of said will were in accordance with her wishes and express instructions, she asked for the pad and
the will Exhibit C and, with the help of a son of herein petitioner, placed her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the presence
of the three attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which the attesting
witnesses signed at the foot of the document, in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, and of each and everyone of
the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro Garcia and petitioner Trinidad Neyra and several others were also present.

On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart attack, unexpectedly died.

Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again decided not to accept the provision made in its favor by
the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty. Ricardo Sikat, said decision could not be
communicated to the testatrix, before her death.

Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request made on October 31, 1942, by Encarnacion Neyra for
the celebration of holy mass in her house, on November 1, 1942; that said mass was in fact solemnized in her house, on that date,
in the course of which the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra took holy communion; that on the same day, after the mass, Encarnacion
held a long conversation with Father Garcia, in the course of which, said priest advised her to have reconciliation with her sister
Trinidad; and that said advise was accepted by Encarnacion.

But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her, and that in fact
she came to the house of Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon that same day, November 1, 1942, with said
Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra greeted each other most affectionately,
forgiving one another, after which they talked about the property left by their deceased father and the litigation pending between
them; and the two sisters agreed to settle their case, which had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila,
concerning a certain house and lot, on the understanding that said property should be given exclusively to Trinidad, and that
the latter should renounce her claim against Encarnacion, for her share in the rents collected on said property, and, at the same
time, Encarnacion renounced her claim for P727.77 against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed between the two sisters that
Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to prepare the necessary papers for the settlement of said case. Presentacion Blanco, a
witness for the oppositors, also testified substantially to the foregoing facts.

By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the other attesting witnesses, it has also been shown that
Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, and received instructions from
Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said agreement, but also for the preparation of a new will, and consequently
Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise and the will, dated November 3, 1942, which were both thumb marked,
in duplicate, in the afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who was then of sound mind, as shown by her appearance and
conversation, aided by a son of Trinidad Neyra, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B.
Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.

Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra, and so was Trinidad
Neyra.

On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's disease, perhaps, Encarnacion Neyra expired, at about
3 o'clock in the morning.

Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of oppositor Maria Jacobo
Vda. de Blanco, practically corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the petitioner, with reference to the signing of
documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942.

Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for the oppositors, testified, however, that when the
thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed, as stated above, to the document of compromise in question, dated November 3,
1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the documents thumb marked
by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.

Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's thumb mark
was affixed to the will, only in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del Barrio, when Encarnacion
was already dead.

The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature and effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely
unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.

According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping sickness, known as Addison's disease, are not yet fully
known: that persons attacked by said decease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first attack, while others die after a
few weeks only, and that as the disease, progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop
tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250, 1252, 1253;
MaCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V. pp. 272-279).

And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942,
due to a heart attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.

In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known
and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time,
to recollect the property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator,
and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao
vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)

Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, who stated that it
tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties deemed necessary and
sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of
the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis.
(Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony testimony of the attending physician that the deceased
was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to
understand what said to him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind
of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in
order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly
conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of
property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of
executing the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in
the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood each other clearly, thus showing
that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.

It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix
in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit
of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental
faculties until the moments of their death.

Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was of sound
mind and possessed testamentary capacity, at the time of the execution of the will, cannot be properly disturbed.

The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time that the testatrix thumbed marked the will
in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida. But it has been fully shown that the attesting
witnesses were present at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the
testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the will, but
whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it in this case.
(Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the will is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua
vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca
Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)

The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties, as said oppositors had been named legatees in the
will dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will dated November 3, 1942.

On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men, who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome
of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable
character, who had known and seen and talked to the testatrix.

Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the effect that there could have been no reconciliation
between the two sisters, and that the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the document embodying the agreement,
while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question,
when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view is preposterous, to say the least. Said
testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. The oppositors and their witnesses could not have
told the truth; they have testified to brazen falsehoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the
evidence of the oppositors is completely applicable the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728,
735.)

In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to show the alleged improbability of the reconciliation
of the two sisters and the execution of the will, dated November 3, 1942, they have erroneously placed great reliance on the facts
that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently
on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Dreadful indeed are the feuds of relatives, and difficult the
reconciliation. But they had forgotten the fact that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious and pious woman instructed in the ancient
virtues of Christian faith and hope and charity, and that it was godly to forgive and better still to forget.

It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the
latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must have evoked
in her the tenderest recollections of childhood. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always been fair to her
sister who in fact, had had successively instituted two suits against her, to recover what was her due, and for which Encarnacion
believed she must atone, she finally decided upon reconciliation, so that she might depart in peace.

The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence, and that Trinidad had been demanding tenaciously
her share; and as a Christian woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one has any right to enrich himself unjustly, at the
expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that Encarnacion should desire reconciliation with her sister Trinidad, and
provide for her in her last will and testament.

As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served Encarnacion Neyra for so many years and so well, it was
also natural that she should make some provision for him, as gratitude is the noblest sentiment that springs from the human
heart.

The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with new beneficiaries named therein, including principally
her bitterest enemy of late, which is completely incompatible with the will, dated September 14, 1939, may really seem strange
and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above the logic of the head is the feeling in the heart, and the heart has reasons of its
own which the head cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge of eternal verity.

As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted to follow "the path of the just, which is as the shining
light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may be blessed. As a Christian woman, she must
have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow the law, for this is the whole duty of man.
In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter the conclusions set forth in the decree appealed
from. This court will not reverse any findings of fact by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony and depending largely
upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the presence of the trial judge, unless the court below failed to take into
consideration some material facts or circumstances, or to weigh accurately all of the material facts and circumstances presented
to it for consideration. (Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336; Melliza vs.Towle, 34 Phil., 345; Caragay vs. Urquiza, 53 Phil., 72, 79;
Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil., 419.)

After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it legally impossible to sustain any of the errors
assigned by the appellants. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

4.

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.

PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners, vs. LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator
to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable. 1

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in
Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G1186 dated
30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA
REGALA. SO ORDERED.5

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial
will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge
Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the
said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo)
and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses
LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses
Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga
and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who
would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses; x x x x

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament,
I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also
command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their
spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda
Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x 12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her
own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. 13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in
Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or
on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA).
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition 14 with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 2000 15allowing Lorenzo
to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge
Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the
Will and her signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.19
Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke
in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this,
Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.21

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition 22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio
averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala,
Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed
the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s
Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress
or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her
Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation 29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of
Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator
since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will
has not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for crossexamination by
the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified
on his father’s condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical
certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. 32

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with
his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January
1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth
and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was
in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing
in the USA when the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents
and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her transactions.34
Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the
Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed. 35 On crossexamination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. 37 She claimed to have helped in the household
chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of
her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said
household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie
admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September
16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however,
the envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful"
because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. 45 On cross examination, it
was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based
on her personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. 48 He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the
said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another
document on September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he
who explained that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties
upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52
Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?"
Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die
already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter
purportedly replied,
"I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them." 54 After which,
Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents and

eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated
September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.57

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she
was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. 58

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree
with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the
oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further,
no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the
Will.60

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF
PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED 63

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings. 64 This is expressly
provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved
and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three
or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures
of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the
attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in
the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question
her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the
petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped
her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration 66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was
not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so
as to render him unfit to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the
New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical
or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand,
we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." 69 More importantly, a testator is presumed
to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800
of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will.
Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as
earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested
that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her
parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was
born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot
be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on
September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for
old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent
and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition
of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from
her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad,
even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’
allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from
being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that
bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to
uphold said allegations.71Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the
very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact,
whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with. It provides:

RULE 76

Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the subscribing
witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and
not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to
the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed,
their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having
attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required
by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent
witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness,
Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during
the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk
and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her
part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time,
Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither
interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that
for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing
witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of
Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an
established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must
testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that]
ought to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
[testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby." 75 This, coupled with
Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to
the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in
favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

5.

G.R. Nos. L-3272-73 November 29, 1951

MANUEL GONZALES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MANOLITA GONZALES DE CARUNGCONG, petitioner-appellee; ALEJANDRO
GONZALES, JR., and JUAN GONZALES, oppositors-appellants.

PARAS, C.J.:

On November 27, 1948, Manuel Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be referred to as testatrix) died at the age of about seventy-
eight years, leaving five children, namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan
Gonzales. The estate left by her is estimated at P150,000.

On December 22, 1948, Manuel Gonzales filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition (Special Proceeding
No. 837) for the probate of an alleged will executed by the testatrix on November 16, 1942 (Exhibit B—Manuel Gonzales),
devising to Manuel Gonzales the greater portion of the estate, without impairing the legitimes of the other children.

On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de Carungcong filed in the same court a petition (Special Proceeding No. 838) for the probate
of another alleged will executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1—Manolita G. Carungcong), leaving to Manolita G. de
Carungcong the greater bulk of the estate, without impairing the legitimes of the other children.

In his opposition filed on February 16, 1949, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the disallowance of the wills executed on November
16, 1942, and May 5, 1945, on the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by the testatrix in an instrument
executed by her on November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2—Alejandro and Juan Gonzales), with the result that her estate should be
distributed as if she died intestate.

With the exception of Leopoldo Gonzales, the children of the testatrix filed mutual oppositions to one or the other instruments
tending to negative their respective positions.

After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision with the following dispositive pronouncements:

All facts considered in the light of the evidence presented and in the manner in which the witnesses testified the court
concludes and holds:

First: That Exhibit B — Manuel Gonzales, though validly executed on November 16, 1942, was revoked by Exhibit
1—Manolita G. Carungcong in accordance with the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Second: That Exhibit 2 — Alejandro and Juan Gonzales being executed without the knowledge and testamentary
capacity of the testatrix and being contrary to the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said
document is hereby declared null and void.

Third: That Exhibit 1 — Manolita G. Carungcong having been executed in accordance with law the same is hereby
declared as the true and last will and testament of the deceased Manuela Ibarra Viuda de Gonzales, and said will is
hereby admitted probate.

From this judgment petitioner Manuel Gonzales and oppositors Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. and Juan Gonzales have appealed. The
appeal as to Juan Gonzales was dismissed in view of his failure to pay the proportionate share of the printing cost of the record
on appeal.

In the parts material to the present appeal, the will executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945, is of the following form and tenor:

IKALABING-DALAWA. Na ang aking HULING BILIN AT TESTAMENTONG ito ay binubuo ng PITONG (7) dahon o pagina
na may bilang na sunud-sunod at ang bawa't dahon o pagina ay mayroong tunay kong lagda o firma, gayon din ang lahat
ng aking saksi o testigos.

SA KATUNAYAN ng lahat ng isinasaysay ko dito ay aking nilagdaan ito dito sa Imus, Kavite, Filipinas ngayong ika-5 ng
Mayo ng taong 1945, na nakaharap dito sa ating paglagda o pagfirma ang tatlong saksi o testigos. At aking ding nilagdaan
o pinirmahan ang tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawa't dahon o pagina nitong testamento kong ito sa harap ng lahat at
bawa't isang saksi o testigos at ang lahat at bawa't isa naman sa kanila ay nangagsilagda o nagsifirma din dito bilang
saksi ko sa harap ko at sa harap ng lahat at bawa't isa sa kanila, at ganoon din silang mga saksi ko ay nangag-lagda o
nagsi-firma sa tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawa't isa sa mga dahon o pagina nitong aking testamento.

(Sgd.) MANUELA Y. VDA. DE GONZALES

MANUELA IBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES

Mga Saksi o Testigos:

(Sgd.) BIENVENIDO DE LOS REYES

(Sgd.) TAHIMIK T. SAYOC
(Sgd.) LUIS GAERLAN

It is contended for the appellants that this will does not contain any attestation clause; that, assuming the concluding paragraph
to be the attestation clause, it is not valid because it is the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses, and because it does not
state the number of sheets or pages of the will.

In the very recent case of Valentina Cuevas vs. Pilar Achacoso, G.R. No. L-3497, decided May, 1951 * we sustained, finding a
precedent in Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378, an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the body of the will.
Through Mr. Justice Bautista, we held:

The clause above quoted is the attestation clause referred to in the law which, in our opinion, substantially complies
with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion serious nor
substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear
the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses.

Instrumental witnesses, as defined by Escriche in his Diccionario Razobada de Legislacion, y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p.
1115, is on who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing" (in re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809). An
instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper execution
of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the will immediately under the signature of the
testator, shows that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
 The attestation clause in question bears also similarity with the attestation clause in the will involved in Aldaba vs.
Roque, (43 Phil., 378). In that case, the attestation clause formed part of the body of the will and its recital was made by
the testatrix herself and was signed by her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding the validity of the will,
the court said:

In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will;
however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so
hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No.
2465.

Of course three of the Justices of this Court concurred in the result, "in the possibility that the testator in the present case, or the
person or persons who prepared the will had relied upon the ruling laid down in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, and that it
would now be unfair to reject the present will when in its preparation a ruling of this Court has been followed." But the case at
bar still falls within this view, the will (Exhibit 1—Manolita G. Carongcong) having been executed on May 5, 1945.

The attestation clause contained in the body of the will being thus valid, the statement in the penultimate paragraph of the will
hereinabove quoted as to the number of sheets or pages used, is sufficient attestation which may be considered in conjunction
with the last paragraph. It is significant that the law does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause. While
perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially
when the authenticity of the will is not assailed, as in this case.

The result reached in respect of the sufficiency of the will (Exhibit 1—Manolita G. Carongcong) necessarily disposes of the
contention of the appellant Manuel Gonzales that the trial court erred in not admitting to probate the will (Exhibit B—Manuel
Gonzales), since the latter will must be considered revoked by the subsequent will (Exhibit 1— Manolita G. Carongcong).

What remains to be discussed is the claim of appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. that the will (Exhibit 1—Manolita G. Carongcong)
has been revoked by the testatrix in the instrument of November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2—Alejandro and Juan Gonzales) which
provides as follows:

Ako, MANUEL YBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES, may sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa ciudad ng Rizal, may mahusay at
wastong pag-iisip at mabuting pagtatanda, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito at bilang huling kapasiyahan ay
sinasaysay ko ito at ipinahahayag sa ngayon sa alin mang testamento o huling habilin na napirmahan kong una sa
kasulatang ito ay pinawawalan ko ng saysay at kabuluhang lahat pagkat hindi iyong tunay kong kalooban ngayon.

Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito at sa pagkat hindi ako makalagda ngayon ang pina-kiusapan si Constancio Padilla na ilagda
ako sa kasulatang ito ngayon ika-17 ng Noviembre ng taong ito 1948, dito sa ciudad ng Pasay.

Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee), contends that the testatrix lacked the testamentary
capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation, and their contention was sustained by the trial court. We
have examined the record and found no valid reason for reversing the finding of said court which had the benefit of observing
and hearing the witnesses testify. Upon the other hand, the following considerations amply support the appealed decision:.

1. For more than ten years prior to her death, the testatrix had suffered from hypertension. On November 14, 1948, she had
aphasia and on November 15, 1948, she was taken to the hospital upon advice of the family physician, Dr. Jose C. Leveriza. In the
letter introducing her to the hospital authorities (Exhibit E—Manuel Gonzales), Dr. Leveriza stated that the testatrix was
suffering from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. Particularly on November 18, 1948, when the alleged instrument of
revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in a comatose and unconscious state and could not talk or understand. The
following is the testimony of Dr. Leveriza portraying the physical condition of the testatrix up to November 18, 1948:

P. Y que hizo usted cuando Doña Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales ya estaba en el hospital?—R. Me fui alla para examinarla.

P. Cual era el resultado de su examen?—R. Cuando fue al hospital a examinarla en el primer dia via que la aphasia se
agravo, o sea que ha perdido el poder de hablar inteligentemente; tambien encontre que estaba inconsciente,
durmiendo constantemente y no se le podia, despertar, tenia la respiracion fatigosa, lenta y con estertores, y no podia
levantarse, asi que yo perscribi que diera el alimento por medio de hypodermoclysis, o sea por medio de inyecciones.

Sr. PAMINTUAN.—Quisieramos saber, Su Señoria, si se presenta al testigo como experto?

Sr. SERRANO.—Tambien quisiera saber si se presenta como madico de la familia o como medico experto?.

Sr. ARCEGA.—Presento al testigo como medico de cabecere y como medico experto al mismo tiempo. P. Y que

hicieron en el hospital en vista de sus instrucciones?—R. Cumplieron la prescripcion mia.

P. Que sucedio con respecto al estado de la paciente?—R. La paciente a medida que pasaban los dias se quedaba
grave cada vez y mas graves los sintomas aun que al primer dia en que fue ella llevada al hospital.

P. Volviendome a la condicion de la paciente, en que estado se encontraba Doña Manuela I. Vda. de gonzales el 14 de
noviembre de 1948 antes de ingresarla en el hospital?—R. La encontre con aphasia, no podia hablar inteligentemente.
"P. Puede usted explicar al Juzgado el curso de la enfermedad de Doña Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales?—R. Estuvo
agravandose desde el segundo dia en que fue ingresada al hospital, y desde ese dia orinaba y deponia en la cama
inconscientemente.

xxx xxx xxx

(t.s.n., Laquindanum, March 21, 1949, pp. 24-26.)

P. Explique usted al Juzgado el curso de la enfermedad de la paciente haciendo referencia de las fechas que aparecen
en los Exhibitos 3 y 3-4?—R. El noviembre 14, ordene el ingreso de la paciente al Mercy Hospital, porque tuvo paralisis
parcial en la lengua, probablemente de origen embalismo o thrombosis cerebral, y como ya era de noche no se llevo al
hospital, sino el dia 15 de noviembre en donde le he hecho dos visitas; la condicion de la paciente continuo empeorando
hasta el dia 25 de noviembre en que sobrevino la complicacion de pneumonia hypostatica hasta que fallecio el noviembre
27, 1948, a las 2:30 p.m.

xxx xxx xxx

(t.s.n., Laquindanum, March 21, 1948, pp. 28-29.)

JUZGADO.—P. Como llego usted a esa conclusion de que desde el 14 de noviembre de 1948 en que usted ordeno la entrega
de la paciente al hospital empeoro su salud hasta que murio el dia 27 de noviembre de 1948?-R. Porque cada vez mas se
acentua su estado comatoso, y demas su respiracion se hacia mas fatigosa cada vez que pasaban los dias, y con estertores.

P. Y como estaba su estado mental?—R. Estaba completamente inconsciente desde el dia en que entro en el hospital.

Sr. ARCEGA. — P. Podia hablar la paciente en la fecha en que fue ingresada al hospital?-R. No, señor.

P. Despues del 15 de noviembre de 1948 en que segun usted fue ingresada la paciente en el hospital podia hablar
ella y hacer entender sus palabras?—R. No, señor.

P. Y que hacia la paciente?—R. Estaba durmiendo continuamente, no podia abrir sus ojos por si sola, sino que yo
abria para ver la pupila.

P. Trato usted de tener conversacion con la paciente?—R. Naturalmente trataba, pero contestaba, y ni creo que me
entendia.

P. Podia levantarse la paciente?—R. No, señor, porque estaba en estado comtosos, y para prevenir la pneumonia
hypostatica dos o tres hombres tenian que levantaria y ponerla algo de costado o algo asi reclinada.

P. Y que resultado tuvo esa precaucion que usted tomo?—R. Se ha retrasado o retardado le pneumonia, pero
sobrevino, al fin, que siempre es fatal.

P. Usted dijo que al fin sobrevino la pneumonia, que efecto tuvo esa pneumonia a la paciente?—R. Precipito la muerte
de la paciente.

P. El 18 de noviembre de 1948, segun testimonio de los testigos, otorgaron el documento Exhibit 2Alejandro y Juan
Gonzales, puede usted decir al Juzgado en que estado se encontraba Doña Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales?—R. Estaba en
estado comatoso.

P. Por que sabe usted eso?—R. Porque en esa fecha yo la visite dos veces: una por la mañana y otra por la tarde.
P. Y estando en el estado comatoso, como usted, dice, puede usted decir al Juzgado si podia ella hablar o entender
sus palabras o su deseo?—R. No, señor.
P. Hizo usted esfuerzos para hacerie comprender sus palabras?—R. Siempre examinaba a ella para ver si reaccionaba
favorablemente la paciente, pero cada vez era peor.
P. Puede usted decir si en aquella fecha la paciente podia siquiera hacer movimiento de cabeza?—R. No, señor, porque
la parte derecha del cuerpo tenia hemiflejia o paralisis.
P. Cual es la causa de oso que usted dice hemiflejia o paralisis?—R. Generalmente se debe a una hemorragia cerebral
o trombosis del cerebro.
P. Teniendo hemorragia cerebral o trombosis del cerebro, segun usted, cual es la parte del cuerpo humano que queda
afectada?—R. La cabeza y tambien los brazos, como los miembros del cuerpo. P. Que quiere usted decir como los
miembros del cuerpo?—R. Las manos y los pies.
P. Podia mover la paciente sus manos y su cuerpo?—R. La parte izquierda si.
P. Y la parte derecha?-R. No, señor.
JUZGADO.—Pero una persona en ese estado de salud, como estaba la paciente Doña Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales, el 18
de noviembre de 1948, podia comprender palabras dichas a ella o indicaciones hechas por alguna persona a ella?—R.
No, señor.(t.s.n. Laquindanum, March 21, 1948, pp. 30-33.).
While appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. has attempted to show that Dr. Leveriza was not an expert, the latters's testimony
remains uncontradicted. The fact that the testimony of the attesting witnesses tends to imply that the testatrix was of sound
mind at the time the alleged instrument of revocation was executed, cannot prevail over the findings of the attending physician,
Dr. Leveriza, because even Dr. Ramon C. Talavera (an attesting witness) testified that although he had not examined the testatrix,
her case appeared serious; that he had a hunch that "they were taking advantage of the last moment of the deceased and they
were trying to make me an instrument in the accomplishment of their aims," and that he had the idea that the testatrix was in
doubtful condition because he "could only judge from the people going there.".

It is also argued that if the testatrix was in a comatose condition, Dr. Leveriza would not have ordered to "let her sit on bed or
on chair and let her turn on her side sometime." However, Dr. Leveriza has given the reason for this prescription, namely, to
avoid hypostatic pneumonia.

In support of the contention that the testimony of the attesting witnesses should be given more credence than the opinion of an
expert witness, reliance is placed on the case of Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227; Galvez vs.
Galvez, 26 Phil., 243; Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573; Amata vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485, and Neyra vs. Neyra, 42, Off.
Gaz., 2790 ** These cases are notably distinguishable from the case at bar. The former refer to situations in which the doctors
were not in a position to certify definitely as the testamentary capacity of the testators at the time the wills therein involved
were executed, because they had not observed the testators on said dates or never saw them; whereas the case now before us
involves a family physician who attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her on the day when the alleged instrument
of revocation was executed.

2. We cannot help expressing our surprise at the fact that the instrument of revocation was allegedly executed on
November 18, 1948, when, according to the testimony of Jose Padilla, the latter was asked by the testatrix to prepare the
necessary document as early as in the month of May, 1948, and reminded about it for the second time weeks before November
1, 1948, and for the third time several days before the latter date (November 1, 1948). The first excuse given by Jose Padilla for
the delay is that he was busy and the children of the testatrix had certain disputes which he tried to settle. The second excuse is
that he was not able to secure soon enough from Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. some documents of transfer which he wanted to examine
in connection with the preparation of the desired instrument of revocation. We are inclined to state that these excuses are rather
poor. If Jose Padilla was too busy to give attention to the matter, he could have very easily informed the testatrix and the latter,
if really desirous of revoking her former wills, would have employed another to prepare the requisite document. The fact that
there were disputes between the children of the testatrix certainly was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the wish of the
testatrix. Neither was it necessary to examine the documents relating to the properties of the testatrix, since the instrument of
revocation could be prepared without any reference to the details of her estate. Indeed, the instrument (Exhibit 2—Alejandro
and Juan Gonzales) is couched in general terms.

3. Even under the theory of the appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. it is hard to rule that the testatrix had sufficient
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the alleged instrument of revocation. In the first place, Constancio Padilla
(brother of Jose Padilla) merely asked the testatrix, first, if she was agreeable to the instrument of revocation prepared by Jose
Padilla, and secondly, if she was agreeable to the signing of said document by Constancio Padilla, to which two questions the
testatrix allegedly answered "Yes". It is not pretended that the testatrix said more about the matter or gave any further
instruction. The attesting witnesses were not introduced to the testatrix, and their presence was not even mentioned to her. it
is obviously doubtful whether the testatrix understood the meaning and extent of the ceremony. Assuming that the testatrix
answered in the affirmative the two questions of Constancio Padilla, without more, we cannot fairly attribute to her
manifestation of her desire to proceed, right then and there, with the signing of the questioned instrument. In other words,
contrary to the recital of the attestation clause, the testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the attesting
witnesses.