Liang v.

People GR 125865, January 28, 2000

Facts:
Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with oral cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed defamation. Liang was arrested
by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered
the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

Ruling:
NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

Calub vs. CA
Facts:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two motor vehicles;
both vehicles are loaded with illegally sourced lumber driven by Pio Gabon and
Constancio Abuganda which both failed to present the legal documents. Felipe Calub,
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer filed before a criminal
complaint against Abuganda but were dismissed. But the impounded vehicles were
forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda. However, one of the vehicles was again

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apprehended the second time with illegally sourced lumber without the legal
documents. The respondents filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two
(2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners.
Issue:
WON the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles is a suit
against the State.
Ruling:
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And
a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its
purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to
public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of
their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the
present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit
against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State’s consent.

LANSANG v. CA GR 102667 February 23, 2000

FACTS:
General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However,
this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or
instrument involved. Chairman Lansang of NPDC sought to clean up Rizal Park and
terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the
area.

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction
in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was
actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a
government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such
official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as
Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its
consent.

RULING:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state. The doctrine of state immunity
from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the

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performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against
the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will
require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount
necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. Lansang was sued not in his
capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from the
complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.

MANCENIDO V. CA, GR 118605, APRIL 12, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial
officials to compel them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition
for review on certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the
council of the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official
capacities

HELD:
Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
provides for the appointment of a legal officer, whose function is:

"(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component
city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse
party;"

Shell v. Jalos – 630 SCRA 399(2010)

FACTS:
This is a case against a petroleum contractor , Shell Philippines,
whose pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from
coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen. Petitioner Shell
Philippines exploration and the republic of the Philippines entered into
service contract for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in
northwestern Palawan. This is the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. The pipeline
spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea. Respondents (Jalos,
et al) filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC .
Respondents claimed that they were all fishermen along that coastal
area in Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was affected by the

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construction and operation of Shell‘s natural gas pipeline. Shell moved for dismissal of
the complaint and alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction, as it
is a pollution case under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, or the pollution control law.
Pollution adjudication board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution
cases and actions for related damages. Shell also claimed that it could not be
sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the state‘s consent. Shell
said that under the service contract, it served merely as an agent of
the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves.

Issue:
Whether or not the suit is actually against the state and is
barred under the doctrine of state immunity.

Ruling:
The court ruled that Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a
provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya natural gas project.
It is not immune from suit and may be sued for claims even without
the state‘s consent. The respondent‘s however can file the complaint with the PAB.

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) vs. Hon.

Santamaria
Facts:
China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation
(Northrail) for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila
to San Fernando, La Union. The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the
Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese Ambassador to
the Philippines wrote a letter to DOF Secretary informing him of CNMEG’s designation
as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project. Thus, the Philippine government and
EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan
Agreement.
Respondents filed a complaint and alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan
Agreement were void for being contrary to the constitution. However, petitioners argue
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the
Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the
Northrail Project was a product of an executive agreement.
Issue:
WON the petitioners is an agent of the Chinese government making it immune from
suit.
Ruling:
The Contract Agreement does not partake of the nature of an executive agreement. It is

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merely an ordinary commercial contract that can be questioned before the local courts.
Thus, Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled
to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement.

SANTAMARIA , GR 185572, 07 February 2012, 665 SCRA 189 (2012)

(Revisits and reiterates several

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) – CNMEG

North Luzon Railways Corporation – Northrail

FACTS:
CNMEG entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Northrail to conduct a
feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).

3 The Chinese government designated Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) as
the lender, while the Philippine government named DOF as the borrower, because
Memorandum of Understanding wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s
Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.

Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I,
Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey
basis. Furthermore, Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart
financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement. In the Loan Agreement, EXIM
Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in favor of the Philippine government
in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.

The respondents later filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with
Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing. In the Complaint, respondents alleged that the
Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the
Constitution; (b) RA 9184, Procurement Reform Act; (c) PD 1445, the Government
Auditing Code; and (d) EO 292 the Administrative Code.

Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail
because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any
motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions
that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement
between two sovereign states.

RULING:
The instant Petition is DENIED. CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit, and

Page 5
the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. The Court explained the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit: There are two conflicting
concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to
the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot
be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts. Since the Philippines adheres
to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved –
whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions.

The Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine
government, while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG.
Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of the
transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable
part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the
Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character. Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, and
the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon
Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of
its business.

Santos v. Santos - 92 PHIL. 281 (1952 – 1953)

Facts:
An undivided parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Province of
Rizal with an area of 21,577 square meters was owned by the petitioners and the
respondent in the proportion of 1/7 undivided share for Teodora Santos and 1/14
undivided share each for Josefina Santos and Emiliana Santos and 5/7 undivided share
for Leoncio Santos. Petitioners complained that from 1945 to 1949 Leoncio Santos
collected from the Army of the United States of America rentals for the use and
occupation of a parcel of land and later sold the lot the Administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration on or about 13 May 1949. Petitioners demand for the
accounting of the payments for the rentals of the lot and to give to the portion of the
fruits of the rentals according to their portion of the said lot. They also prayed to
restore to their ownership the portions of the said land that belongs to them
contending that the said contract of sale is null and void because it is performed
without their consent and to pay the petitioners for damages and cost. The
Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of the complaint against him. This motion was

Page 6
granted on the ground that the Civil Aeronautics Administration not being a juridical
person has no capacity to sue and be sued and for that reason it cannot come under the
jurisdiction of the court.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners can sue the Civil Aeronautics Administration who is not a
juridical entity.

Ruling:
The Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot
legally prevent a party or parties from enforcing their propriety rights under the cloak
or shield of lack of juridical personality, because it took over all the powers and
assumed all the obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the
contract in question. In National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, the court held that
the Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued and that the principle of state
immunity from suit does not apply to it. The order appealed from dismissing the
complaint as to the Civil Aeronautics Administration is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v. VINZONS

FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent, which
includes maintenance of the following specific equipments: air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The
agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The
respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was
unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have
waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance
Agreement.

RULING:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis.

Page 7
Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a
diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with
private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy.
The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered
into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by
the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

MENTRAN V. PAREDES – 79 PHIL. 819 (1947 – 1948 )

FACTS:
Prior to the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V
entitled "National Labor Union, versus Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran),"
wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose
affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent; that the
respondent "is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known as `Metran,
having nine demands at length set forth in said petition be granted.
Wherefore, Metran filed a petition for the dismissal of the case "on the ground that it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it cannot be sued". It is an office
"under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications," under Executive Order No. 59.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Metran can be able to invoke the Doctrine of State Immunity.

HELD:
Yes, the court held that Metran was a mere office or agency of the government,
unincorporated and possessing no juridical personality under the law, incapable of
suing or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit against the
Government, which suit may not prosper without the Government's consent.

NAC v. Teodoro – 91 PHIL. 203 (1952)

Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act no. 224,
which expressly made the provisions of the corporation law applicable
to the said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports
Corporation was abolished and the Civil Aeronautics Administration was
created to take its place. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, inc. Paid to the
National Airports Corporation Php 65, 245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod
airport no. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to
have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used
by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the
Philippine Airlines, inc., to recover the above amount.

Page 8
 The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint
against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been
dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National
Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on
the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands
subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in
interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod airport no. 2 and, further,
that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."

Issue:
Whether the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and,
as an agency of the republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not
possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued.

Held:
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which
the entity was organized. These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue
and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the
power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute
and defend suits for and against the national airports corporation,
having acquired all the properties, funds and chooses in action and
assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the national airports
corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair
the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting
them into unincorporated agencies.

Mobil Philippines vs. Customs Arrestre

Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S."Leoville", consigned
to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the customs arrastre service, the unit of the bureau of customs then handling
arrastre operations therein. The customs arrastre service later delivered to the broker
of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.,
filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the customs arrastre service
and the bureau of customs to recover the value of the undelivered case. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the
law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities
are immune from suit; that defendant bureau of customs as operator of the arrastre

Page 9
service at the port of manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be
sued by private individuals.
Issue:
WON the defendants can invoke state immunity.
Held:
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The
bureau of customs, to repeat, is part of the department of finance, with no personality
of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles
and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. Clearly, therefore, although said
arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary
and governmental function of the bureau of customs, so that engaging in the same does
not necessarily render said bureau liable to suit. It could not perform its governmental
function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to
the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

DEL MAR v. PVA, 51 SCRA 340 (1973)

FACTS:
Del Mar was relieved with honorable discharge with permanent total physical
disability. Philippine Veterans Administration granted him pension but was soon
discontinued because he received the same pension under the United States Veterans
Administration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is a suit against the state.

RULING:
As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the
immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions
resulting in “adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property.”

It is not a suit against the state, when a claimant institutes an action against a
functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed
from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said
claimant.

Also, the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand
partakes of a money claim against the PVA — a mere agency of the Philippine

Page 10
Government — and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable
without its consent.

CAA V. CA – 167 SCRA 28 (1988)

FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of
Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport to meet his future
son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck
to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches
high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a
3-hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the
airport.

ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Aeronautics Administration can claim state immunity?

HELD:
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation,
not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a
business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel
and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns.

Farolan v. CTA – 217 SCRA 340 (1993)

Facts:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying
among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging Buhay Trading . Bagong
Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00.

The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment

upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of
nylon. Upon re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in
quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the
shipment in favor of the government.

Private respondent filed a petition for the release of the questioned goods which the
Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong
Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent
claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition

Page 11
and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands that the Bureau of
Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.

Issue:
Whether the Bureau of Customs may enjoy immunity from suit

Ruling:
On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,”
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate
judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary
function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of
Customs must fails.

Also, Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private
respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since
it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it
sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that
this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.

PNR vs IAC
Facts:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of Defendant Philippine
National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La union and bound for Manila
and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Bulacan, from
Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Calumpit, Bulacan got stalled and
was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to Plaintiff's bus and its
passengers, eighteen of whom died and fifty-three others suffered physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would
pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for damages against defendants. The
defendants, in their answer traversed the material allegation of the complaint and as
affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence
and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
Issue:
WON PNR being a governmental agency has immunity from suit.

Held:
No, the Manila Railroad Company, the PNR‘s predecessor, as a common carrier, was

Page 12
not immune from suit. The state divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it
organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. Thus,
suits against state agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act
in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the state. Suits against
state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or
non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by
the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are
not regarded as suits against the state.

REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO, 457 SCRA 460 (2005)

FACTS:
The funding for the Agno Rover Flood Control Project was to be derived primarily
through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). DPWH
constituted a Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) for the purpose of conducting
international competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract. Among the 6
pre-qualified bidders are present Daewoo and China International.
Nolasco, invoking his right as a taxpayer, prayed that the DPWH and BAC be
restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and have Daewoo disqualified as a
bidder.
He alleged that Daewoo obtained copies of "Confidential Reports from an Unnamed
DPWH Consultant” and that based on the reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and
the putative award to Daewoo illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government. Thus,
DPWH and BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and have Daewoo
disqualified as a bidder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was a suit against the State without its consent.

RULING:
Yes. An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any
separate juridical personality of its own and hence enjoys immunity from suit. It cannot
be said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by entering
into a contract, for at the time the petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not yet
entered into a contract with respect to the project.
The presumption is that the State and its elements act correctly unless otherwise
proven.

REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX – 518 SCRA 20 (2007)

FACTS:

Page 13
 The Bureau of Customs (BOC) seized and forfeited the shipment owned by
UNIMEX Micro-Electronics. When the latter filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), the forfeiture decree was reversed and the court ordered the release
of the goods. However, respondent’s counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to
enforce the CTA decision. When respondent asked for release of its shipment, BOC
could no longer find subject shipment in its warehouses. The CTA ordered the BOC to
pay UNIMEX the commercial value of the goods with interest. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the decision of the CTA in
the SC. One of its grounds was that the government funds cannot be charged with
respondent’s claim without a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by
mere judicial order.

ISSUE:
Can the government be held for actual damages?

HELD:
Although the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the
government, and that under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be
held liable for governmental acts (jusimperil), the court still holds that petitioner
cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of the case warrant its exclusion from the
purview of the state immunity doctrine. The court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC s
ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. The situation
does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of
state immunity. The doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail
itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate
claims against it.

Professional Video v. TESDA – 591 SCRA 83 (2009)

Facts:
To fulfill TESDA’s mandate to "develop and establish a national system of skills
standardization, testing, and certification in the country.", it sought to issue
security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees
who have passed the certification process. TESDA’s Pre-Qualification Bids Award
Committee (PBAC) conducted two public biddings for the printing and encoding of
PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both instances since only two bidders –
Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) and Sirex Phils. Corp. – submitted proposals.

Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated
contract with PROVI. TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their Contract
Agreement for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC
cards. Under this Contract Agreement, PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system
and equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the Technical Proposal.

Page 14
PROVI alleged that out of TESDA’s full liability, the outstanding balance remained
unpaid.

Issue:
Whether TESDA is immune from suit in the performance of this governmental
function

Ruling:
Yes, since TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.
TESDA is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government operating under its
own charter. While PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively
waived its immunity since the purpose of its contract with TESDA is to provide
identification which TESDA will thereafter sell to TESDA trainees, TESDA thereby
engages in commercial transactions not incidental to its governmental functions.

The Court agreed with TESDA’s response that while it will charge the trainees with a
fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only to recover their costs and is not
intended for profit. The action of TESDA in the case at bar does not characterize the
transaction as industrial or business.

Ministerio vs CFI
Facts:
Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot; alleging that
in 1927 the National government took physical and material possession of it and used it
for the widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any
agreement. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or
return of its possession, but defendant public highway commissioner and the auditor
general refused to restore its possession.
Issue:
WON the defendants are immune from suit.
Ruling:
Yes. If the property can no longer be restored and is in fact being enjoyed by the state,
then the state must be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for
purposes of fixing the just compensation.

SYQUIA v. ALMEDA-LOPEZ, 84 SCRA 312 [1978]

FACTS:
Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment
buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South
Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. About the middle of the year 1945,
plaintiffs executed three lease contracts. The term or period was to be "for the duration
of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the USA." The
apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US armed

Page 15
forces stationed in the Manila area.

The said leases terminated six months after when Japan surrendered. The predecessors
approached Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to
them, but were advised that the US Army wanted to continue occupying the premises.
Hence, the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate the lease and
execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher
than those payable under the old contracts. Later, the predecessors refused to execute
new leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States Army will vacate
subject properties prior to 1 February 1947."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was a suit against the State without its consent.

RULING:
Courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue to recover possession
of property being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government
even though no suit can be brought against the Government itself, but inasmuch as the
plaintiffs in the present case are bringing this action against officers and agents of the
US Government not only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses
supposedly being held illegally by them in the name of their government, but also to
collect back rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into
by the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing of the damages
claimed, as a result of which, the present suit must be regarded as one against the
United States Government itself, which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by
citizens of another country.

FESTEJO V. FERNANDO – 94 SCRA 54

FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a
right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her
express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land
and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of
land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not this is a suit against the state?

RULING:
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's
land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went
outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or

Page 16
destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly
departed from the duties imposed on him by law. Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any other citizen
and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act. It is a
general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or
otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of
law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he
exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he
is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of
the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR V. CA – 229 SCRA 557 [1994]

Aberca v. Ver – 160 SCRA 590 [1988]

Facts:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General
Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances
in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order,
elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs
were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known
to and sanctioned by defendants.

Issue:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.

Ruling:
No. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an

Page 17
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.

Even if the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all
times.

Shauf vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently
qualified where private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian personnel officer, while
private respondent Anthony Persi was education director. By reason of her
non-selection to the position, petitioner filed an equal employment opportunity
complaint against private respondents, for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex.
Petitioner was promised to be appointed to the overhire position as soon as it became
vacant however, it never happened.
Issue:
WON the respondents are immune from suit.
Ruling:
No. Private respondents’ defense is based purely on outright denials which are
insufficient to discharge the onus probandi imposed upon them. They equally rely on
the assertion that they are immune from suit by reason of their official functions. As
correctly pointed out by petitioners in their Memorandum, the mere invocation by
private respondents of the official character of their duties cannot shield them from
liability especially when the same were clearly done beyond the scope of their authority.

VIDAD v. RTC, [1993]

FACTS:
A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held a strike from their
school classes, to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. The
teachers also assailed alleged corruption in DECS.

Page 18
 A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo
Gomez with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their
classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges will be filed. The order not
having been heeded, teachers were each given five days from receipt of said complaints
within which to submit their respective answers and supporting documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the public officials were covered by the State’s immunity on suit.

RULING:
The various complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the
part of the DECS officials. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be
impossible of proof. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are able to establish their
allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages can be warranted. Public officials are
certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from the acts
done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not be said to have
acted within the scope of their official authority, and no longer are they protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR V. CA – 229 SCRA 557 [1994]

Africa v. PCGG/Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan – [January 1992]

Facts:
Victor Africa, who claims to be an employee of ETPI holding the positions of
vice-president, general counsel, corporate secretary and special assistant to the
chairman (and president), filed directly with this Court a petition, seeking to enjoin the
PCGG and its nominees/designees to the board of directors and the newly-installed
officers of ETPI from implementing their alleged illegal, invalid and immoral act of
ousting him from his offices and positions at the ETPI pending the determination of
whether they have validly, legally and morally assumed their supposed positions and
offices as "directors" and/or "officers" of ETPI.

He contends that the reasons advanced by the PCGG-sponsored board of directors for
ousting him from his offices has clear intent to harass him into refraining from
questioning before several tribunals all the invalid, illegal and immoral acts of said
PCGG-sponsored board which have caused and are still causing ETPI damages because
they constitute dissipation of assets.

Issue:
Whether the case at bar in effect is a suit against the State and, since there is no
waiver of immunity by the State, Sandiganbayan cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
same.

Page 19
Ruling:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies only in actions resulting in adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of
property.

Plaintiffs sought the intervention of the Sandiganbayan to obtain redress for what they
perceived to be an arbitrary and illegal deprivation of their proprietary rights in the
ETPI by the individual defendants resulting from the latter being installed as directors
or officers of ETPI by virtue of the questioned acts or orders of the PCGG. Plaintiffs do
not seek to impose pecuniary liabilities against the PCGG as a government entity. Verily,
the PCGG cannot hide behind the aforestated doctrine of immunity of the State from
suit to bar plaintiffs from going to the courts to seek affirmative reliefs in these actions.

DOH vs Pharmawealth
Facts:
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government
hospitals in the Philippines. The Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the
accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. The respondent
submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited drug products, including the antibiotic “Penicillin G Benzathine”.
Petitioner through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications,
bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of
Penicillin G Benzathine which the petitioner applied for the bidding however, it was
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS).
Thus, the respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. However, Petitioners
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the outright dismissal of the
complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity.
Issue:
WON the petitioners are immune from suit.
Ruling:
No. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for
damages in connection with their alleged act of “illegally abusing their official positions
to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine
contract which act was done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and
breadth of their powers given by law” is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing
principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide
behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
BAER v. TIZON, 57 SCRA 1 [1974]

FACTS:

Edgardo filed a complaint for injunction against Baer. He alleged that he was engaged

Page 20
in the business of and that the Amarican Naval Base authorities stopped his logging
operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from
interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was issued by respondent
Judge. Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the
Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign
without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not yhr doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent is applicable.

RULING:
The action against Baer being against the US Government and therefore, covered by
the principle of immunity of suit.

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is evident. What was sought by private
respondent amounted to interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner
in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the
Philippine-American Military Base Agreement.

The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary
charge against the sovereignor would require the doing of an affirmative act by it.
Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and
immediately to the most important public function of any government – the defense of
the state - is equally as untenable as requiring it to do n affirmative act. Also, foreign
state may not be brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts
without its consent.

US V. RUIZ – 136 SCRA 487 [1985]

FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the
construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:
WON the US is immune from suit having dealt with a private corporation.

HELD:
YES.A State may be said to have descended the the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its

Page 21
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Sanders v. Veridiano – 162 SCRA 88 [1988]

Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station.
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.

Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants
in the special services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). On October 3,
1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The
hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends
to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have
proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to
supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case
with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the
case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent
to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's
employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters
contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings
was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners argued
that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that
the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our own
government but also to foreign states

RULING:
Yes. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper
unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be

Page 22
sued. So the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government
but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.

The practical justification for the doctrine is that "there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which
wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude
would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally
expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.

THE HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, 238 SCRA 524 [1994]

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with
two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the
squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations
of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity.

RULING:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have
adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of
the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of
nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of real estate business, surely the saidtransaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is
immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in
nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.
It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it

Page 23
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

JUSMAG V. NLRC – 239 SCRA 224 [1994]

FACTS:
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance
support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. When dismissed, he held
the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG
PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His
services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Private
respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the
ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He
asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its
immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged lack
of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued. Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint "for want of
jurisdiction." Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(public respondent), assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune from suit for alleged
violation of our labor laws.
NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost its right
not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle
of estoppels that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee
relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to
immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether JUSMAG can claim State Immunity?

HELD: In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
“Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles.” In
international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state
and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is anchored on the
principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium
(an equal has no power over an equal).

Larkins v. NLRC – 241 SCRA 598 [1995]

On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
underpayment of wages. Charges were against petitioner T/Sgt Aldolra Larkins who
was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the
dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base,
Pampanga, Lt. Col. Frankhauster, and Joselito Cunanan, the new contractor (JAC

Page 24
Maintenance Services) employed for 3 AGS.

Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the
hearings. They failed to submit their position paper , which the Labor Arbiter deemed a
waiver on their part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for decision on the basis
of private respondents' position paper and supporting documents which therefore on
November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all the claims of
private respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of
illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full
backwages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired
jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both
original and amended, were ever served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum of
Appeal," petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were
not in accordance with the provisions of the Philippines.
U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

Issue:
Whether the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent Labor
Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case

Ruling:
Summonses and other processes issued by the Philippine Courts and administrative
agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any US base in the
Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander.
If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to
serve the process, and obtain the server’s affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead addressed the
summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander.

CARABAO, INC. v. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT COMMISSION

35 SCRA 224 [1970]

ARCEGA V. CA – 66 SCRA 230 [1975]

FACTS:
The petitioner, doing business under the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream
Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of
the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly
unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange.
The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others,
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the
judgment sought will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and

Page 25
therefore the suit is one against the Government, which cannot prosper without its
consent, and in this case no such consent has been given. The petitioner appealed, but
the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion
to dismiss.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution to which an
opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a
certification that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign
exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines
which cannot be sued without its consent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Central Bank of the Philippines can sue and be sued?

HELD:
Yes, this suit is brought against the Central Bank of the Philippines, an entity
authorized by its charter to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued,
therefore, has been given.

Rayo v. CFI – 110 SCRA 456 [1981]

FACTS:
At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", Napocor, the respondent, opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden,
precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were
inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation.
Napocorc invoked in each answer a special and affirmative defense that "in the
operation of the Angat Dam," it is "performing a purely governmental function", hence
it "can not be sued without the express consent of the State."

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents for dismissal of the case and
contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions
and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE:
Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued
under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

RULING:
The charter provision that the Napocor can "sue and be sued in any court" is
without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim
such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

Page 26
 It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether the Napocor
performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of
the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under
its charter. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter
provision that the Napocor can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification
on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one
instituted by the petitioners.

Municipality of San Fernando vs Firme

Facts:
A collision occurred between a passenger jeep and dump truck of the municipality of
San Fernando, while it was on its way to get sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando‘s municipal street. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney,
including Laureano Banina Sr. died, as a result of the injuries they sustained and four
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. The private respondents instituted
a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney. The
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney filed a third party complaint against the
municipality of San Fernando and the dump truck driver. Petitioner raised as of its
defenses the non-suitability of the state , thus it cannot be held liable.
Issue:
WON petitioner is immune from suit.
Ruling:
Yes. The test of liability of the municipality depends on won the driver, acting in behalf
of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. The
construction or maintenance of roads are governmental activities, therefore, the
municipality of San Fernando cannot be held liable.

REPUBLIC v. NLRC, 263 SCRA 290 [1996]

FACTS:
The full ownership of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI) was transferred to its
creditor, the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC), following the
latter’s foreclosure of PNEI assets. Then, the sequestration order was lifted to give
way to the sale of PNEI by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in the meanwhile,
had taken over the management of the company.

The continuing deterioration of its financial condition prompted PNEI to lodge, a

Petition for Suspension of Payments with the SEC, a move calculated to prevent further
dissipation of PNEI’s assets and to make PNEI a viable source of income for the
government. The management committee, which was created to handle the business
operations of PNEI, presented a report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best

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serve the interest of all parties concerned, the sale of the company through
privatization in accordance with the rules of the APT. As a cost saving measure, the
management committee also recommended to the SEC the retrenchment of some 500
employees of PNEI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent is applicable.

RULING:
APT which has been mandated to “take title to and possession of, conserve,
provisionally manage and dispose of assets” that have been identified for privatization
or disposition clearly provides that said instrumentality, among other things, can “sue
and be sued.” This provision indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court.
Nonetheless, we have likewise since explained that suability does not necessarily mean
liability on the part of the particular instrumentality or agency of the government. The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either
by general law or special law, it may limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’ and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

DOH V. CANCHELA – 475 SCRA 218 [2005]

United States v. Guinto – 182 SCRA 644 [ 1990]

PRC v. CA, 256 SCRA 667 [1996]

FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which disallowed
petitioner’s claim for deduction as bad debts of several accounts in the total sum of
P395,324.27, and imposing a 25% surcharge and 20% annual delinquency interest on
the alleged deficiency income tax liability of petitioner.

Petitioner Philippine Refining Company (PRC) was assessed by respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to pay a deficiency tax for the year
1985 in the amount of P1,892,584.00.
One of the accounts that did not classify as bad debts but were written off is in the
account of AFPCES, unpaid supplies amounting to P13,833.62.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AFPCES as government agency enjoys immunity from suit.

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RULING:
With regard to the account of AFPCES for unpaid supplies in the amount of
P13,833.62, petitioner asserts that since the debtor is an agency of the government,
PRC did not file a collection suit therefor. Yet, the mere fact that AFPCES is a
government agency does not preclude PRC from filing suit since said agency, while
discharging proprietary functions, does not enjoy immunity from suit. Such pretension
of petitioner cannot pass judicial muster.

REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA – 78 SCRA 470 [1977]

FACTS:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection
of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil
Philippines Exploration Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service , where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any
office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless
consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P.
Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated
October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent’s decision is valid

HELD:
No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation
found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without
its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to
the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of
law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against
the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is
this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the
general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls
for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could
still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy
of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for
final adjudication.

Santiago v. Republic – 87 SCRA 294 [1978]

Facts:
In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the

Page 29
Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should
construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by
December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot.
However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted
Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation. The trial
court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and
should not prosper without the consent of the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.

Ruling:
No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue
of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the
terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau of Plant Industry has
breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor
Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the
donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so
advances.

Traders Royal Bank vs. IAC

Facts:
Traders Royal Bank entered into a loan agreement with the NMPC represented by Dir.
Cendaña and the PSI represented by its president Jalosjos, for the purposes of
broadcasting the 1981 season of the PBA amounting to 2.5 million pesos. NMPC-PSI
failed to pay its obligations with Traders, hence, Traders filed with the CFI a complaint
against NMPC-PSI for the collection of the said amount. CFI issued a writ compelling
the NMPC-PSI to pay the obligations incurred in the loan, PSI, through Jalosjos, paid
1.8 million as partial payment of the obligation. NMPC filed a motion to dismiss the
case contending that as a government instrumentality it has immunity from suit, CFI
denied the motion. NMPC now filed before the IAC contending that the CFI acted with
grave abuse of discretion for not recognizing NMPC’s immunity from suit. IAC granted
NMPC’s petition. Traders assailed IAC’s decision contending that by entering into a
contract NMPC waived its right from immunity of suit.
Issue:
WON the NMPC, by entering into a contract waived its rights from immunity of suit
Ruling:
The court ruled that as a general rule, government instrumentalities are immune from
suit even though it enters a contract so long as it is still in the scope of its governmental
functions, in the case at bar broadcasting the PBA season is not an act of disseminating
governmental information hence it impliedly waived its immunity from suit.

REPUBLIC v. SANDOVAL, 220 SCRA 124 [1993]

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FACTS:
Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program.
There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists
and scores were wounded. As a result, then President Aquino issued AO 11 creating the
Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The
most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased
and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against
the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity.

RULING:
The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the
State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action
in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable
because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and
injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a
settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police
officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for
damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

DELOS SANTOS V. IAC – 223 SCRA 11 [1993]

FACTS:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal.
Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo
Cadiente, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9
meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land Aside
from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also
constructed, occupying an area of 2,906 sq m of their property Constructed in a zigzag
manner, the creak meandered through their property. Petitioners files two cases which
were later consolidated, Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several
grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could
not be maintained without the State's consent. The lower court dismissed the petition;
petitioners elevated the case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the cases back to
the IAC.
IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the
State without consent. Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari

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ISSUES:
Whether the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained

HELD:
YES. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the
State against an action for payment by the owner. The respondent government officials
executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use; no
expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the construction of the
projects.
DA v. NLRC – 227 SCRA 693 [1993]

Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into
a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night
shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the
DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable
with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision
became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue:
Whether the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Ruling:
The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character
of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued
under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be
given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a

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contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its
non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be
deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it
could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money
claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

EPG vs. DPWH

Facts:
The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH, constructed 145
housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the said contracts was
only for 2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request and assurance of then
DPWH undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructions for the
completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not issued payment
by DPWH. With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for legal
affairs, the petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH secretary. The DPWH auditor
did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt. Through the
request of then DPWH secretary de Jesus, the DBM released the amount for payment
but respondent DPWH Secretary Vigilar denied the money claims prompting
petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC which said trial court denied.
Hence, this petition among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not
be sued invoking the constitutional doctrine of non-suability of the state also known as
the royal prerogative of dishonesty.
Issue:
WON the principle of state immunity is applicable in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The principle of state immunity finds no application in this case. Under the
circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the royal prerogative of dishonesty
and hide under the state‘s cloak of invincibility against suit. Considering that this
principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The rule is not absolute for it does not say

Page 33
that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen.

PHILROCK v. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, 180 SCRA 171 [1989]

LIANG V. PEOPLE – GR 125865 [JANUARY 28, 2000] ADB IMMUNITY)

FACTS:
Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a
Chinese national who was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The MeTC,
acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal
processes, dismissed the criminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig City
annulled and set aside the MeTC’s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for review
before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of
the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence,
the present MR.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

HELD:
NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

Republic v. Hidalgo – 477 SCRA 12 [2005] (writ execution)

Facts:
On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale of a property against the Republic of
the Philippines (in whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered)
in the RTC of Manila.
The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC on the
ground of state immunity. A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals

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which reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Upon the inhibition of the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35), the case
was re-raffled Branch 37, with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge.

In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic in default for failure of Solicitor
Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for
in his motion for extension dated 21 May 2003. On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. On 10 December 2003, respondent
issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. On 22 December 2003, a
writ of execution was issued.

Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule
that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the
issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic

Ruling:
Yes, the respondent judge violated the constitution since no costs shall be allowed
against the government of the Philippines where the government is the unsuccessful
party.

In declaring the government answerable to the attorney’s fees of the plaintiff and other
costs of the suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well-established rule that costs
of suit are not recoverable against the government. Also, the Court ruled that court
costs are not recoverable from a government agency.

CURATO v. PPA, 590 SCRA 215 [2009]

U.P. V. DIZON – 679 SCRA 54 [2012]

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public of character which coulld
not be validly made subject of a writ of execution or garnishment.

FACTS:
The University of the Philippines (UP) entered in a General Construction
Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the construction of the
extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Science Building in the
campus of the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB). In the course of the
implementation of the contract, Stern submitted three progress billings corresponding
to the work accomplished, but UP paid only the two of the billings. The third billing,
prompting stern builders to sue UP, an officials to collect the unpaid billing and to
recover various damages.

Page 35
Meanwhile, the sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository banks,
namely; Land Bank of the Philippines and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
The UP assailed said garnishment of funds. Stern builders, meanwhile, again sought
the release of the garnished funds.

ISSUE:
Whether the Funds of UP are subject to garnishment

HELD:
The Funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be
spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of
this action could not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or garnishment.
The adverse judgement rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforcable by execution against UP, because suability
of the state did not necessarily mean its liability.

Quilonia v. The General Court Martial – GR No. 9660, March 4, 1992

Facts:
The petitioner, a policeman, was charged before respondent general
court martial with the crime of murder. The petitioner filed a motion expressing his
desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of a military
jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the enactment of the
Philippine National Police law creates his honest belief that he should now
be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court. The general court martial
denied the motion and insisted on arraigning the petitioner and scheduling the
hearing. Thus, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order filed by petitioner.

Issue:
Whether a policeman charged with a criminal case can seek for
trial in a civilian court instead of in a military court
Ruling:
He can do so. R6975 creating the PNP, which took effect on January 1, 1991,
provides that ―criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been
arraigned upon the effectivity of this act shall be transferred to the proper city or
provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. Although RA.
6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on December
28, 1990, nevertheless, respondent court martial knew or should have known that
the said act had already been signed or approved by the president on December 13,
1990 and that the same was published in 2 national newspaper of general circulation
on December 17, 1990 and that it would take effect on January 1, 1991. The court

Page 36
martial thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it insisted on arraigning the
petitioner and scheduling the hearing, just so the trial will begin
before January 1, 1991. The civilian character with which the PNP is
expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line
therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to
civilian courts.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary

Facts:
In 1990, R.A 6975 entitled ―an act establishing the Philippine National Police under a
reorganized department of the interior and local government, and for other purposes
was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar, assailed the constitutionality of the said
law on the ground that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He
advances the view that R.A. 6975 weakened the national police commission by limiting
its power ―to administrative control‖ over the PNP, thus control‖ remained with
the department secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed.
Issue:
WON the President abdicated control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of R.A
6975
Ruling:
There is no abdication. The president has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
president, is the ―doctrine of qualified political agency. The president‘s power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the cabinet who, in turn, and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department. The circumstance that the NSAPOLCOM and
the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed act, the funding of the PNP being in large
part subsidized by the national government.

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET v. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES

ASSOCIATION, INC.
GR No. 169466, May 9, 2007

FACTS:
PD 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the nucleus and the integrated police forces as
components thereof. RA. 6975, entitled “An Act Establishing The Philippine National
Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And
For Other Purposes,” hereinafter referred to as PNP Law, was enacted.

Page 37
The petition alleged in gist that INP retirees were equally situated as the PNP retirees
but whose retirement benefits prior to the enactment of RA 6975, as amended by RA
8551, were unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from the higher rates and adjusted
benefits accorded to the PNP retirees.

ISSUE:
Did RA 6975 abolish the Integrater National Police (INP)?

RULING:
No. what the law provided was for the “absorption”, :transfer”, and/or “merger” of
the INP, as well as the other offices comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. Hence, they
are not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP
retirees under Section 74 and 75 of RA 6975.

MENDOZA V. PNP, GR NO. 139658, JUNE 21, 2005

FACTS:
Po3 William m. Mendoza, together with po2angelita ramos, were dismissed from
duty by the regional appellate board after forcibly arresting one teodoro conti y
viceranand maltreating him. The petitioner filed with the regional trial court (rtc),
branch 61 alleging that he was denied due process and prayed that the rab decision
dated 23 august 1993 and resolution dated 17 december 1993 be annulled.rab, through
the office of the solicitor general (osg), rebuffed the argument stating that the
administrative remedies were not exhausted after failing to appeal to the department of
interior and local government and then to the civil service commission before
proceeding to the courts.

ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the PNP

HELD:
Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that the State shall establish and
maintain one police force which shall be civilian in character. Consequently, the PNP
falls under the civil service pursuant to section 2(1), Article IX-B.

Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 (1970)

Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales are questioning the
validity of RA 6132 claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.
The said republic act expressly repealed RA 4914 which implemented
Resolution No 2 issued by congress, sitting as a constituent assembly, in 1967. The
resolution called for a constitutional convention to be composed of two delegates

Page 38
from each representative district having the same qualifications as a
congressman. In 1969, congress amended resolution no. 2 with resolution 4 limiting
the delegates to only 320 with legislative districts entitled to at least two each.
Furthermore, it gives authority to the constitutional convention to fill any other
details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, embodied in an implementing legislation. on 24
august 1970, congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted republic act
no. 6132 repealing RA 4914 and implementing the two resolutions.

Issue:
Whether the congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact
implementing legislation to fill the gaps created by the constituent
assembly

Ruling:
While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by
the present constitution solely and exclusively in congress acting as a constituent
assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now
contained in resolution nos. 2 and 4 as well as in RA no. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to congress acting as a constituent assembly. Such implementing
details are matters within the competence of congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such
statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they
are valid.

Lambino vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for initiative and referendum with the COMLEC to amend
the 1987 Philippine constitution, particularly articles VI and VII to replace the present
presidential-bicameral system of government to parliamentary-unicameral system
using section 2, Article XVII of the constitution. Petitioners’ claim that their petition
was signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes
over 12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3% of the
registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in accordance with section
2, Article XVII of the constitution. The petition to change the constitution involves
sections 1-7 of Article VI; sections 1-4 of article vii and an article XVII
entitled ―transitory provisions. The COMELEC dismissed the petition where it was
held that RA 6735 intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution, but is, unfortunately, inadequate to cover that system under section 2,
Article XVII of the constitution. However, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court on Certiorari and Mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion and to
set aside the COMELEC decision and to compel the latter to give due course to their

Page 39
initiative petition.
Issue:
WON the Lambino group‘s petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
constitution on amendments to the constitution through people‘s initiative.
Ruling:
Section 2, Article XVII of the constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people‘s initiative to propose amendments to the constitution. There must be 2
essential elements present: 1.the people must author and must sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign for and on their behalf; 2. The proposal must be
embodied in the petition.
The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
constitution for conducting a people‘s initiative. There is likewise no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); MR (1997)

FACTS:
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon
its approval:
(a)set the time and dates forsignature gathering all over the country
(b) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers
ofgeneral circulation, and
(c) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations

Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. She
argues among others that the People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of
those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond
the power of people’s initiative.

ISSUE:
Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or
does it constitute a revision.

RULING:
Delfin’s proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change
from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited
tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political

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dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against
reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance.

LAMBINO V. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 (2006)

FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 constitution; they filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group
alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided
by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying
sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative.

HELD:
Section 2, Article XVII of the constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people‘s initiative to propose amendments to the constitution. There
must be 2 essential elements present: 1.the people must author and must sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign for and on their behalf; 2. The
proposal must be embodied in the petition. The lambino group miserably failed to
comply with the basic requirements of the constitution for conducting a people‘s
initiative. There is likewise no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the comelec.

Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (resolution of both houses) no. 1, proposing that section

5, article vi, of the constitution of the Philippines, be amended
so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120 to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be

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 according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although
each province shall have at least 1 member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments

to said constitution, the convention to be composed of 2
elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected
in the general elections " and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution be

amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the Constitutional Convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in congress.
Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President,
became republic act no. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned resolutions no. 1 and 3 be submitted
at the general elections

Issue:
Whether a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,
violates the constitution.

Ruling:
Article XV of the Constitution provides that the congress in joint session assembled,
by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification. The provisions of article XV of the constitution
are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that r. B. H. No. 3 permits congressmen to
retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume
the functions of delegates to the convention

MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, GR 135962, March 27, 2000

FACTS:
Respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
Respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

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ISSUE:
Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA?

RULING:
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of
this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities
and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and
their own local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the
power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority.

Also, our Congress delegated police power to the LGU’s. It empowers the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Panlungsod and Bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province, city or municipality and its
inhabitants.
DARIO V. MISON – 176 SCRA 84 [1989] (REORGANIZATION)

FACTS:
March 25, 1986, Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3

“Declaring a national policy to implement the reforms mandated by the people,

protecting their basic rights, adopting a provisional constitution, and providing for an
orderly transition to a government under new constitution”

EO 127, Reorganization Program, was also issued. Several acts and rules were issued to
comply with the proclamation. January 6, 1988, Mison issued a memorandum for
employees where the latter shall be: Informed of their reappointment, or
Offered another position in the same department or agency
Informed of their termination

As a result, Dario was one of the many whose services were terminated subject to
normal clearances and possible receipt of retirement benefits under existing laws, rules,
and regulations. Hereafter, the Civil Service Commission reinstated hundreds of
employees who were separated by Mison.
Mison charged the CSC with grave abuse of discretion, a case that could be subject to
judicial review without prejudice to the powers of CSC to have the final say to cases
involving its employees and officers. Dario invoked security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Is it constitutional to separate career civil service employees not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation 3 dated March 25 1986?

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HELD:
Yes. Under Section 16 of Article 18: Transitory Provisions, which explicitly authorize
the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said
provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127
may continue even after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization.

Mendoza v. Quisumbing – 186 SCRA 108 [1990]

Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City who,
on June 4, 1986, was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as such with a
"PERMANENT" status. He has served the Department of Education for forty-two (42)
years, moving up the ranks in the public schools system. In a letter, petitioner
received the letter-order informing him that pursuant to EO No. 117 which provides for
a reorganization of the DECS and the implementing guidelines thereof he would be
considered separated from the service effective April 15,1987 without prejudice to
availment of benefits. The letter particularly stated that consistent with the mandate of
reorganization to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness, all incumbent
officials/personnel are on 'holdover' status unless advised otherwise. In his place,
Secretary Quisumbing appointed Dr. Socorro L. Sering, on a permanent status on
March 2, 1988. In the meantime, the petitioner, in a letter dated April 2, 1987, wrote
Secretary Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letter-order. The letter was
forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The motion for reconsideration
remained unacted upon, hence on June 24, 1987, the petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction. In a
resolution dated September 19, 1988, the RAB recommended that action on the
petitioner's letter- reconsideration be deferred pending resolution of the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether the letter-order form Sec Quisumbing is valid and should be executed

Ruling:
No. There was a grave abuse of discretion when services were terminated by mere
letter-order.

The petitioner was appointed in a "PERMANENT STATUS" besides having a rating

of 79% for the rating period of May 1986 to April 1987, which is considered "Very
Satisfactory" under the "Rating Sheet for Key MEC Officials." There was grave abuse of
discretion when the petitioner's services were terminated by a mere letter-order on the
justification that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was

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only in a hold-over capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy
matter to issue charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over
status in order to run after him.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA, GR 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed the possible
elements of VFA. This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
President Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a)it must be a treaty
(b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
(c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?

RULING:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent
and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find

nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

JOYA V. PCGG – 225 SCRA 568 [1993]

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FACTS:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then
Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to
auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be
part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf
of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule.
Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with
the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and that the paintings
and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the people in
general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have been deprived of
their right to public property without due process of law, they have the legal personality
to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA
4846.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exerciseits
power of judicial review over this case.

HELD:
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not
the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote
non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their
silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the
petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed
not because they are after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of the respondent
public officials which is the only ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued. The
taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from
private sources and not with public money.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 221 SCRA 189 [1993] (powers of PCGG)

On March 17, 1986, PCGG, on the basis of prima facie evidence, issued an order
sequestering Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation (PIMECO). On July 29, 1987, the
Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, end pursuant to E.O. No. 14 and the
Constitution, filed with respondent Sandiganbayan a Complaint against Ferdinand E.
Marcos, et al., for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,

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involving PIMECO together with their assets and shares of stock which, based on
documents in PCGG possession, were illegally acquired by said defendants in unlawful
concert with one another and with gross abuse of power and authority.
On May 6, 1988, respondent Sabido filed his Answer to the above complaint
denying that he was a close business associate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and that he has
not participated in the plunder of the National Treasury and the other acts stated in the
complaint.

Defendant learned from newspaper reports that the plaintiff through the PCGG
intends to turnover the management, control and possession of PIMECO to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through its subsidiary Meat Packing
Corporation of the Philippines (MPCP)

Issue:
Whether the turnover made by the PCGG is equivalent to the performance of an act
of ownership and if PCGG may exercise ownership

Ruling:
The powers of PCGG do not include performance of acts of ownership. The court
found that the projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is unwarranted
and was effected or done by petitioner beyond the scope of powers vested to it upon by
law. Such turnover made by the PCGG is equivalent to the performance of an act of
ownership which PCGG cannot exercise. We have invariably ruled that the PCGG is
merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only powers of administration
over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. In the exercise of its
functions, it must consistently bear in mind that it can only do acts and things
necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve and preserve sequestered assets.

Tolentino vs COMELEC
Facts:
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent commission on elections
"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on november 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in section 1 of article V of the
constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to organic resolution no. 1 of the constitutional convention of 1971,
and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the constitution of the
Philippines. The constitutional convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the constitution namely, resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of congress held on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing

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legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.
Issue:
Is it within the powers of the constitutional convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s.
Ruling:
The court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in
a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of article XV of the constitution; hence all acts of the
convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null and void. lt says
distinctly that either congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called
for the purpose "may propose amendments to this constitution,". The same provision
also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room
for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of congress
or convention, and the provision unequivocally says "an election" which means only
one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the constitutional
convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as
the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are hereby declared
null and void. The respondents COMELEC, disbursing officer, chief accountant and
auditor of the constitutional convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution.

ARANETA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 242 SCRA 482 [1995]

(investigate/prosecutory powers)

FACTS:
Upon receipt of a complaint by the PNB, the NIDC and the PNEI, the PCGG
conducted a preliminary investigation on the supposed transfer of a major portion of
the assets of PNEI to NETI, a newly organized corporation principally owned and
controlled by Araneta III, a son-in-law of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
under certain terms and conditions that made it possible to permit PNEI assets,
including those which were not included in a projected sale to NETI, to be prematurely
delivered to the latter enabling it to operate said assets even before the execution of the
purchase agreement. During the investigation, Araneta III, who was on "forced" exile
abroad, appeared through counsel and moved for an extension of time to file his
counter-affidavit and other evidence conditioned on his return. This motion was denied
by the PCGG.

ISSUE:

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 whether or not respondent PCGG has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation specifically over the acts complained of by the PNB, the NIDC and the
PNEI.

RULING:
The investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship.

RUMUALDEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN – 244 SCRA 152 [1995] (AUTHORITY

OVER ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH)

Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 240 SCRA 376 [1995] judicial action)

Facts:
One of the very first undertakings of the Revolutionary Government swept into
power by the so-called EDSA Revolution in February, 1986 was the recovery of
"ill-gotten wealth" reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos,
their relatives, friends and business associates. At the time that the government of
former President Marcos was driven from power, the country's debt was over
twenty-six billion US dollars; and the indications were that "illegally acquired wealth"
of the deposed president alone, not counting that of his relatives and cronies, was in the
aggregate amount of from five, to ten billion US dollars, the bulk of it being deposited
and hidden abroad.
These special remedies were prescribed and defined in Executive Orders Numbered
1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino in March, 1986.
The PCGG was created by Executive Order No. 1 to assist the President in the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated, "whether located in the Philippines
or abroad."

Ruling:
The evident purpose of the constitutional requirement that the corresponding
judicial action or proceeding be filed within six months was to preclude the possibility
that the PCGG would indefinitely maintain its orders of sequestration, etc. and to
compel it, within a reasonable time, to bring them into the realm of judicial oversight.

The issue in all the cases at bar chiefly concerns the fourth limitation pursuant to which

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the PCGG had to file "the corresponding judicial action or proceeding" within a fixed
period of six months. The evident purpose was to preclude the possibility that the
PCGG indefinitely maintain its orders of sequestration, etc. and to compel it, within a
reasonable time, to bring them into the realm of judicial oversight, evaluation and
control, to the end that excesses of the officials and agents enforcing and implementing
said orders might be prevented and avoided and private rights duly protected and
vindicated, while the main business of determining the character of the property as
"ill-gotten wealth" or not was being attended to.

DE LEON V. ESQUERRA, 152 SCRA 602 (1987)

FACTS:
alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen
of barangay dolores, taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, de Leon received memo
antedated December 1, 1986 signed by oic gov. Benhamin esguerra, February 8, 1987,
designating florentino magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local
government and similar memo signed February 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

ISSUE:
whether or not designation of successors is valid.

HELD:
No, memoranda has no legal effect. 1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on
the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986. 2.
February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no
longer in effect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory
provision, article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended. 3.
Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect.
Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay
officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

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