RULE 4-VENUE

EL HOGAR FILIPINO V SEVA

Facts:

This is an appeal taken by A.P. Seva, as judicial administrator of the estate of Leonor G. de Seva, from
the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated August 3, 1931, confirming the sale made by the
sheriff of said court, of a parcel of residential property with the improvements thereon situate in the
City of Manila, and mortgaged to the plaintiff, El Hogar Filipino, the highest bidder being Victor
Buencamino for P12,550, and ordering the issuance of another writ of execution for the rest of the
sentence under execution.

Issue:

1.) whether or not the property herein litigated was sold extra judicially by the sheriff of Manila
2.) Whether or not there is insufficiency of the price at which the property was sold at public
auction
3.) whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila that took cognizance of the foreclosure
proceedings here mentioned, has jurisdiction to order the public auction sale of the mortgaged
property situate in Occidental Negros.

HELD:

1.) No. The appellant himself answers this question in his brief recital of the facts, wherein he states
that by virtue of a writ of execution dated June 29, 1931, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in the foreclosure proceedings instituted by El Hogar Filipino against A. P, Seva, as
administrator of the estate of the late Leonor G. de Seva, the sheriff of Manila sold the property
at public auction. Inasmuch as a competent court has ordered the public auction sale of the real
property, and this order has been carried out, the sale cannot be called extra judicial.

2.) No. this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Green (52 Phil., 491) :

"MORTGAGE; SALE OF REALTY UNDER EXECUTION. Inasmuch as the opposition to the confirmation of the
sale made by the sheriff pursuant to the execution only alleged as a ground that the price for which the
mortgaged property was sold was absolutely inadequate and unreasonable, and whereas it has
heretofore been held by this court that a smaller price, for which the same property was sold at the first
auction, notwithstanding that it was inadequate, was not sufficient by itself alone to,annul the order
confirming the sale (which was annulled for a different reason); therefore, the fact that the opponent was
not given an opportunity to present evidence in support of the allegations of his opposition does not
constitute a prejudicial error which would nullify the order confirming the sale made by the sheriff."
In the present case the appellant has not shown, either in the lower court or in this court, that there was
anybody who offered, or was willing to offer, a higher price for the property in question, if the sale made
by the sheriff to Victor Buencamino would be set aside, and another auction sale held.

3.) Affirmed. The court laid down the following case doctrines:

In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, EFFECT OF SECTION 377, CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real property
shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located,
does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relates simply to the
personal rights of the parties as to the place of trial.

VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION ; WAIVER BY PARTIES. Venue is not connected with
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the defendants rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred
by section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication. Act No. 136 before
referred to having conferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First
Instance relative to the real estate of the Islands, section 377 referred to will not be held or construed to
restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not containing express provisions to that end."

"PROPERTY IN SEVERAL COUNTIES. Although there is contrary authority, where tracts of land situated in
different counties are embraced in one mortgage, the proper court of either county has jurisdiction to
foreclose the mortgage and order the sale of all the land. Several mortgages securing an entire debt are
in effect one and may be foreclosed in any county in which part of the land lies.

It has already been held, therefore, that when various parcels of land or real property situate in different
provinces, are included in one mortgage contract, the Court of First Instance of the province wherein
they are situated or a part thereof is situated, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for the
foreclosure of said mortgage, and the judgment therein rendered may be executed in all the other
provinces wherever the mortgaged real property may be found.
MIJARES VS PICCIO

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition and eertiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin respondent
Judge from enforcing his order requiring petitioners to answer the complaint and proceed with the trial
in Civil Case No. R-3822 and asking at the same time that said order be set aside and the case be
dismissed as regards said petitioners.

On December 24, 1954, Pastora Alvarez Guanzon filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against her husband Jose M. Guanzon containing two causes of action: one for the annulment of a deed
of sale in favor of Sulpicia Guanzon of certain, real properties situated in the province of Negros
Occidental, and the annulment of a deed of donation inter-vivos in favor of Joven Salvador Guanzon of
another set of real properties situated in the province of Cebu; and another for the separation of their
conjugal properties, which include both real and personal acquired during marriage (Civil Case No. R-
3823).

On October 19, 1955, plaintiff filed a motion to bring into the case Sulpicia Guanzon and her husband
Vicente Mijares as parties defendants alleging that their presence therein is indispensable. This motion
was granted and said defendants were duly summoned in accordance with law.

On January 17, 1956, the new defendants Sulpicia Guanzon and Vicente Mijares, instead of filing their
answer, filed a motion to dismiss based on three grounds, to wit: (1) that venue is improperly laid, (2)
that there is a misjoinder of causes of action and of parties defendants, and (3) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of said defendants. After hearing the parties on this motion, the court
denied the same on February 7, 1956, holding that the action is in personam as it does not affect title to
real property, that there is no misjoinder of causes of action, and that it has jurisdiction over the persons
of the movants. The movants filed a motion for reconsideration, and when this was denied, they
interposed the present petition for prohibition and certiorari seeking to set aside the two orders
adverted to.

Issue: Whether or not there is a misjoinder of the cause of action

Held:

YES. The present case involves the rule which allows the joinder of several causes of action, the
pertinent provision of "which is embodied in Rule 2, section 5, which provides that "Subject to. rules
regarding venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party claim state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many different causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party."

While this rule appears simple, however, difficulties may arise in its application, for it does not state
specifically the cases where several causes of action, may be joined, each case apparently depending
upon the nature of the transactions involved. But one thing is clear: That the joining of causes of action
must be subject to the rules regarding venue and joinder of parties. If these rules are violated, then a
misjoinder of causes of action may arise.

Former Chief Justice Moran gives several illustrations of how this rule may be applied which are
interesting. On this point he makes the following comment:

"This rule, which is now expressly extended to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims, is
subject to the limitation regarding venue, whereby several causes of action with no common venue
cannot be joined. For instance, if A, a resident of Manila, has against E, a resident of Baguio, two causes
of action, one for money, and another for title to real property located in Zamboanga, he cannot join them
in a single complaint, for the venue of the first action, which is either Manila or Bagnio, is different from
the venue of the second, which is Zamboanga.

The rule is likewise subject to the limitation regarding joinder of parties. For instance, if plaintiff A has a
cause of action against B, another cause of action against C, and another cause of action against T), the
three causes of action cannot be joined, because there would be a misjoinder of parties defendant, each
of them being interested in the cause of action alleged against him but not in the other causes of action
pleaded against the others.1 A claim on a promissory note against three defendants may not be joined
with a claim on another promissory note against two of the defendants, for again there is a misjoinder of
parties, the third defendant in the first cause of action not having an interest in the second cause of
action."2 (Moran, Comments on the Ilules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 Ed., p. 24).

In the light of the instances cited by former Chief Justice Moran, it may be stated that there is a
misjoinder of causes of action in the present case not only as regards venue but also as regards the
defendants. With regard to the first, it should be noted that the first cause of action stated in the
complaint refers to the annulment of a deed of sale of certain real properties situated in the province of
Negros Occidental, and of a deed of donation inter vivos of another set of real properties situated in the
province of Cebu. They therefore refer to two different transactions which affect properties situated in
two different provinces. The venue has therefore been improperly laid as regards the properties in
Negros Occidental. With regard to the second, it also appears that the deed of sale which is sought to be
annulled was made in favor of Sulpicia Guanzon whereas the deed of donation was made in favor of
Joven Salvador Guanzon, and there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the two defendants
have a common interest that may be joined in one cause of action. On the contrary, their interest
is distinct and separate. They cannot therefore be joined in one cause of action.

In the light of the above considerations, it may therefore be stated that the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioners in so far as the cause of action involving the annulment of the deed of sale covering the
properties in Negros Occidental is well taken and should have been sustained by the lower court.
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS
UNION BANK OF THE PHIL. ET. AL

Facts:

Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that restructuring agreement is null and
void because the borrower has not complied with the condition precedent of the bank. It is also
unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union bank. Paglaum was a party only to
the real estate mortgages and not in the restructuring agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu
City, and the assumption of the RTC's jurisdiction was without basis.

Held:

We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed
waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.7 Nevertheless, there
is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of our 18 June 2012 Decision.

Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual determination that is not within the
province of this Court.8 These questions can be brought to and resolved by the RTC as it is the
proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present evidence in support of these claims.

Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit the issue,
being a mere rehash of what we have already resolved in our Decision.
NOCUM AND PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER VS TAN

FACTS:

Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and
Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. INQUIRER and
NOCUM alleged that the venue was improperly laid, among many others. It appeared that the
complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.

RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved,
Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the
amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was
printed and first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was
printed and first published in the City of Makati"

RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal
stating that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured
in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in the
Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.

Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed,
one filed by petitioners and the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners. Petitioners argue
that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the
latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed
and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed
to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.

ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

HELD:

YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising
from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that it is the RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated
jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case;
venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner
and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties;
venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

AHere, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature
were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and
not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor
would respondent’s failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court
of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower
court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was
not properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to
the place where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely to
establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to
do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the
court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment.

The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint,
indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where
the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the
dismissal, the same may still be amended. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any
grave abuse of discretion.