Codthic June 12, 18

CODTHIC June 12 Readings
Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services
Rule 2.01 - Not to Reject or Oppressed Defenseless or Oppressed Services

IBP Handbook, Guideliness Governing the Establishment and operation of Legal Aid
Office, Art. 1 sec. 1 (Reserve Section)
Rep. Act No. 9999 (2006), Legal Aid Law
Rep. Act No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012
- Ledesma v. Climaco, G. R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
Rule 2.02 - Not to refuse to give Legal Advice
Rule 2.03 - No Solicitation

Rule 138 sec. 27, Rules of Court
- In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)
- Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B. M. No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)
- Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 133 (2009)
- Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37 (2012)
Rule 2.04 No Rates Lower than Customarily Charged
Canon 3 Information on Legal Services that is True, Honest, Fair, Dignified and Objective
Rule 3.01 - No False or Unfair Claim re: Qualifications

- Khan v. Simbillo, A. C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003 & G. R. No. 157053, 409 SCRA 299
(2003)
Rule 3.02 - No False or Misleading Firm Name

- Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie, A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136 SCRA 349 (1985)
- In re Petition of Sycip, G. R. No. X92-1, July, 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
- Nebreja v. Reonel, A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 385 (2014)
Rule 3.03 - Partners Assuming Public Office

Constitution Art 6, sec. 14; Art. 7, sec 13; Art. 9, sec. 2
- Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292, Febrary 20 1999, 303 SCRA 756 (1999)
Rule 3.04 - Not Use Media to attract Legal Business

- Cruz v. Salva 105 Phil 1151 (1959)
Source for the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

http://www.chanrobles.com/codeofprofessionalresponsibility.html#.Wx-oYFOFOAw
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known
Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN
EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
I. Rule 2.01 - Not to Reject or Oppressed Defenseless or Oppressed Services

IBP Handbook, Guidelines Governing the Establishment and operation of Legal Aid
Office, Art. 1 sec. 1 (Reserve Section)
Rep. Act No. 9999 (2006), Legal Aid Law
Rep. Act No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed.
1. GUIDELINES ON LEGAL AID GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE

ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF LEGAL AID OFFICES IN ALL
CHAPTERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE I PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
SECTION. 1. Public service. – Legal Aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means

for the correction of social imbalances that may and often do lead to injustice, for
which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service
should, therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be so
administered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and deserving
members of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid
may be necessary to forestall an injustice.
2. Rep. Act No. 9999 (2006), Legal Aid Law

Aka the "Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010".
In a Nutshell:
What - (Section 3) Any legal services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any
activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experiences
Why - (Section 2) (1) value the right of everyone for a legal counsel (2) policy of state
to promote a just and dynamic social order (3) to secure the ends of justice
How - (Section 4) (1) Lawyer/Professional partnership shall certification from the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited

association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be
provided are within the services defined by the
To determine the number of hours given by the lawyer, the association accredited by
the SC shall issue the necessary certification
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited
association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act
and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
WHy would lawyers do this? Ans Incentive. Section 5 - entitled to an allowable tax
deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the
actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%)
3. Rep. Act No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012

“Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense
of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an
election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is
not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert
himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal,
if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners
that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.”
Nutshell: The petitioner wants to withdraw as counsel de oficio and he asks the counsel to accept his petition.
Due to his new posisition as a Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full
time to the defense of the two accused.
Judges: There was an obvious reluctance of the petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de officio
Reiterates how lawyers have a duty for the public, and being lawyers, which is a profession, entails following
rules set by the board.
II. Rule 2.02 - Not to refuse to give Legal Advice
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a
case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
III. Rule 2.03 - No Solicitation

Rule 138 sec. 27, Rules of Court

- In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)
- Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B. M. No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)
- Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 133 (2009)
- Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37 (2012)
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act

designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 138 sec 27, Rules of Court
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
1. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)

The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
He used his lawyer profession and his notary public capacities as a bargain tool
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of
cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards
of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That
should be distinctly understood.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
2. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B. M. No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jun1993/ac_553_1993.html (too long lol)
Bar Matter # 553 07/17/93 MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.,
respondent.
Main issue: The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines"
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am—
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
1
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Representative Decision
Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Restrain respondent
Philippine Bar Association: Restrain respondent
Philippine Lawyers' Association: Restrain respondent
U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle Restrain respondent
Federacion Internacional de ?
Abogados:
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members
of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
3. Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 133 (2009)
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed
to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.[14]
4. Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37 (2012)
Complainant Villatuya complaint regarding Tabalingcos (1) undue payments for him, (2)
solicitation of money from another firm (3) Bigamy.
Complainants Accusation
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients
signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
Respondent’s Defense
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19
IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
47
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
48
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

49
Annex "C" of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
50
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
51
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. In this case, it is confusing for the client
if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules
2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
IV. Rule 2.04 No Rates Lower than Customarily Charged

Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
Canon 3 Information on Legal Services that is True, Honest, Fair, Dignified and Objective
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
I. Rule 3.01 - No False or Unfair Claim re: Qualifications

(2003)
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
(2003)
Main Issue: Simbillo advertised his services as an expert in annulment cases and he can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months (Answered by Mrs. Simbillo). He published
the add Philippine Daily Inquirer(july 5 2000), Manila Bulletin (Aug 2 6 2000) and Philippine Star
Respondent’s Answer
Admits. He wants lawyers to change it.
IBP Commission on Bar

…passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business
Respondent begs, but still advertised his legal services. . Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the
October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
RESULT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
II. Rule 3.02 - No False or Misleading Firm Name

- Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie, A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136 SCRA 349 (1985)
- In re Petition of Sycip, G. R. No. X92-1, July, 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
- Nebreja v. Reonel, A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 385 (2014)
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or

assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of
a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.
Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie, A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136 SCRA 349 (1985)
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago,
Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from
being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment"
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
In re Petition of Sycip, G. R. No. X92-1, July, 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue
using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the
Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of
the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that
old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included
in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Nebreja v. Reonel, A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 385 (2014)
July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES.
JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K.
TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE
LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner. According to article 1840 of the Civil Code
explicitly sanctions the practice… (Passage summary: Deceased partner shall not be liable for
any debts)
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. Other regulating professions, (accountancy and engineering, etc) has legislature authorising
them.
3. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics said that the continued use of the name of a
deceased/former partner when permissible by local custom, is not ethical but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use…
4. No use of deception. Death was publicised in newspapers. Letterheads were changed including
the years of service.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a DP Name in a professional firm name.
6. Consistently allowed by the US courts and is accepted practice in the legal profession
LOL Resolution of April 15, 1957 “Perkins and Ponce Enrile” had the similar arguments and was advised
to drop the name.
LOL The court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down
Courts’ Reasoning
1. Petitioners counter Article 1815 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of
one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject
to the liability, of a partner.
NOTE: THIS REFERS TO LIVING COUNTRIES.
Prescinding (leave out of consideration) there could be practical objections. Able lawyers without
connection starts from scratch, meanwhile another able lawyer can join an old firm and ride on that old
firm.
2. The article 1840 of the Civil Code is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the cicil code aka “Dissolution
and Winding up” - The law contemplates a hold-over situation in preparatory to formal
reorganisation.
Also it thats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a profesional
partnership. In Professional partnership, the reputation of which depends on the individual skills of the
members.
3. partnership for the practice of law cant be likened to partnerships of other business or
professionals.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in
holding property." 11
law practice is improper.
4. It is true that Cannon 33 tells that the continued name is not unethical and the practice is
permissible by local custom but the canon warns that care should be taken that no deception is
practiced through its use.
5. There is no local custom that sanctions the practice
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal
and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP"
and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
III. Rule 3.03 - Partners Assuming Public Office

Constitution Art 6, sec. 14; Art. 7, sec 13; Art. 9, sec. 2
- Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292, Febrary 20 1999, 303 SCRA 756 (1999)
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall

withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the
firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Constitution Art 6 (THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT) sec 14

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Constitution Art 7 (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)sec 13

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Constitution Art 9 (CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION)sec 2

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the
active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292, Febrary 20 1999, 303 SCRA 756 (1999)
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R.
GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon
City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in
conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
RESOLUTION
However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex
"B" of complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was indeed included in the
BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent
denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is included
therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he
may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the
calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give
the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, that
complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that respondent actually offered to her
the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his name
included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he
must also be administratively sanctioned."
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name
which appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services.[1] Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge
or consent and the calling card[2] carries his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with
the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act
of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk.
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must
not only be characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above
suspicion.[3]
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.
IV. Rule 3.04 - Not Use Media to attract Legal Business

- Cruz v. Salva 105 Phil 1151 (1959)
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business.
Cruz v. Salva 105 Phil 1151 (1959)
G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of
People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before
us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing
the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case
wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent
authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with
his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein
presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary,
Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he
(Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the
witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to
understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the
offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and
is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end
to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a
penalty to the one liable.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in
part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby
publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and
find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would
meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur.
REFERENCES:
I. RA 9999 2006 Legal Aid Law

Republic of the Philippines
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila
Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999
AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the dignity of every
human person and guarantee the rights of every individual, particularly those who cannot afford the
services of legal counsel.
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies and
programs that provide adequate social services and improve the quality of life for all.
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure that every person
who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a competent and independent counsel
preferably of his/her own choice, if upon determination it appears that the party cannot afford the
services of a counsel, and that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and
protect of the party.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to be performed
by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and
quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may
be defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as
envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme
Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the
Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the
private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional
firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the
Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were actually
undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited association by the
Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing
the tax deductions as provided for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships
rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an
allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual
free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual
performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services
herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services
rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for
Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court.
Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ, in cooperation
with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby mandated to conduct an annual IEC
campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures and guidelines in availing tax deductions
and inform the general public that a free legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is
being provided by the State. 1avvph!1
Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the effectiveness and social
impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall submit an annual report to both Houses of
Congress indicating therewith the number of parties who benefited from this Act.
The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location, demographic characteristics
and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of this Act.
Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days from the date
effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the necessary revenue regulations for the proper
implementation of the tax component as envisioned in this Act.
The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations with respect
to the legal services covered under this Act and the process of accreditation of organizations and/or
associations which will provide free legal assistance.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the
other provisions not affected by such declaration shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative circular not consistent
with any provision of this Act is hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House of Representatives President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2361 and House Bill No. 4301 was finally passed
by the Senate and the House of the Representatives on January 27, 2010 and January 26, 2010,
respectively.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives
Approved: FEB 23, 2010

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
II. REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand twelve.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE RELEASE
OF AN INDIGENT PERSON IN CUSTODY AS AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Recognizance Act of 2012″.
Section 2. Statement of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to promote social justice in all
phases of national development, including the promotion of restorative justice as a means to
address the problems confronting the criminal justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged
resolution of cases, lack of legal representation, lack of judges, inability to post bail bond, congestion
in jails, and lack of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate offenders. In consonance with the principle
of presumption of innocence, the 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to
bail or to be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In furtherance of this policy, the
right of persons, except those charged with crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, to be released on recognizance before conviction by the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Recognizance Defined. – Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any person
in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject
poverty. The court where the case of such person has been filed shall allow the release of the
accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay,
city or municipality where the accused resides.
Section 4. Duty of the Courts. – For purposes of stability and uniformity, the courts shall use their
discretion, in determining whether an accused should be deemed an indigent even if the salary and
property requirements are not met. The courts may also consider the capacity of the accused to
support not just himself/herself but also his/her family or other people who are dependent on him/her
for support and subsistence.
Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of the accused at the
time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be considered by the courts for the purpose of
covering as many individuals belonging to the marginalized and poor sectors of society.
Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the Constitution. – The
release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense is a
matter of right when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment:
Provided, That the accused or any person on behalf of the accused files the application for such:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person in custody for a
period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance,
shall be released on the person’s recognizance.
Section 6. Requirements. – The competent court where a criminal case has been filed against a
person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release of the detained person on
recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of the following requirements are complied
with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or incapacity either to post a
cash bail or proffer any personal or real property acceptable as sufficient sureties for a bail bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of the municipality
or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused resides of the
application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall include in its agenda the notice from the court
upon receipt and act on the request for comments or opposition to the application within ten (10)
days from receipt of the notice. The action of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a resolution, and
shall be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the purpose of this Act duly made before the
sanggunian shall he considered as an urgent matter and shall take precedence over any other
business thereof: Provided, That a special session shall be called to consider such proposed
resolution if necessary;
The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a list of recommended organizations
from whose members the court may appoint a custodian.
(2) The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its secretary shall submit any resolution
adopted under this Act within twenty-four (24) hours from its passage to the mayor who shall act on
it within the same period of time from receipt thereof;
(3) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, fails to act on the said resolution
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been acted
upon favorably by the mayor;
(4) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, disapproves the resolution, the
resolution shall be returned within twenty-four (24) hours from disapproval thereof to the sanggunian
presiding officer or secretary who shall be responsible in informing every member thereof that the
sanggunian shall meet in special session within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the veto for
the sole purpose of considering to override the veto made by the mayor.
For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of the municipality or city shall be
considered final and not subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a copy of which
shall be forwarded to the trial court within three (3) days from date of resolution.
(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes as, but not limited to,
photographic image reproduction of all sides of the face and fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs
involved for the purpose of this subsection shall be shouldered by the municipality or city that sought
the release of the accused as provided herein, chargeable to the mandatory five percent (5%)
calamity fund in its budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and
(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing therefor within twenty-four (24)
hours from the filing of the application for release on recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided,
That such hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor later than forty-eight (48)
hours from the receipt of notice by the prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said hearing, the
prosecutor shall be ready to submit the recommendations regarding the application made under this
Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall be entertained.
Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. – Any of the following circumstances
shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from availing of the benefits provided
herein:
(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed under Section
5(a);
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under conditional
pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding his/her case
indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the case;
and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to the new crime
he/she is being accused of.1âwphi1
Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. – Except in

cases of children in conflict with the law as provided under Republic Act No. 9344, the custodian of
the person released on recognizance must have the following qualifications:
(a) A person of good repute and probity;
(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;
(c) Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; and
(d) Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church, academe, social welfare,
health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable organizations or organizations engaged in the
rehabilitation of offenders duly accredited by the local social welfare and development officer.
If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the sectors and
institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the person released on recognizance
may be from the qualified residents of the city or municipality where the applicant resides.
Section 9. Duty of the Custodian. – The custodian shall undertake to guarantee the appearance of
the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian shall be required to execute an
undertaking before the court to produce the accused whenever required. The said undertaking shall
be part of the application for recognizance. The court shall duly notify, within a reasonable period of
time, the custodian whenever the presence of the accussed is required. A penalty of six (6) months
to two (2) years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the custodian who failed to deliver or produce
the accused before the court, upon due notice, without justifiable reason.
Section 10. Role of the Probation Officer. – Upon release of the person on recognizance to the
custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the Probation Office concerned to monitor and
evaluate the activities of such person. The Probation Office concerned shall submit a written report
containing its findings and recommendations on the activities of the person released on
recognizance on a monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for his/her release have
been complied with. The prosecution including the private complainant, if any, shall be given a copy
of such report.
Section 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. – The court shall order the arrest of the
accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention, due to any of the following circumstances:
(a) If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person after a summary healing,
giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;
(b) If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the abovementioned court or
any other competent court without justification, despite due notice;
(c) If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of another offense involving moral
turpitude and the public prosecutor or the mayor in the area where the offense is committed
recommends the arrest to the court; or
(d) If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such as, but not limited to,
stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the case
pending against the accused: Provided, That upon the issuance by the court of such order, the
accused shall likewise become the proper subject of a citizen’s arrest pursuant to the Rules of Court.
Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement of Sentence;
Exception. – The benefits provided under this Act shall not be allowed in favor of an accused after
the judgment has become final or when the accused has started serving the sentence: Provided,
That this prohibition shall not apply to an accused who is entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law
if the application for probation is made before the convict starts serving the sentence imposed, in
which case, the court shall allow the release on recognizance of the convict to the custody of a
qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused actually resides.
Section 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 14. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith
are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same are more beneficial to the accused.
Section 15. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which originated in the House of Representatives was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December 19, 2012 and December 10, 2012, respectively.
(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives
Approved: MAR 14 2013
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines
III. Ledesma v. Climaco, G. R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to
1
withdraw as counsel de oficio. One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused.
The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect
2
[being] to delay this case." It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel
de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that
must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too,
even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not
now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill.
The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala
of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
3
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as
counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on
February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,
1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of
the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964,
he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June
14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964
4
July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." Reference was then made to another order of February
11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the
trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the
5
government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." After which, it was noted in such
order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court
and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the
ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de
6
oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being
appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a
surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
7
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services
are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he
has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is
8
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."
9
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, where respondent was de oficio
counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its
officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially
when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the
10 11
prosecution of criminal cases ...." Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia reiterated such a
view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such
counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective
assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have
12
a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of
the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its
importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to
be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it
is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
13 14
own." So it was under the previous Organic Acts. The present Constitution is even more
emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
15
and counsel," there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
16
evidence."
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put
matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good
faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate
future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been
set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel
with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
IV. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into
office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in
Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as
member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In
case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there
on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents
of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that
my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it
clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you
in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted
the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing
to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act
No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28
of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must
be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se
improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied
real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to
do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.
VI.
FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3]
and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently
called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9]
found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover,
he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by
an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos
referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer
lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This
crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is
not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
VII. Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37 (2012)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
1
marriage was subsisting.
2
In a Resolution dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to
3
file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
4
receipt of the record.
5
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice
setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference,
complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution
three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to
complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
6
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
7
filed his verified Position Paper, on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
8
2005.
Complainant’s Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial
consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his
9
work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
10
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, letter-proposals to clients
11
signed by respondent on various dates and proofs of payment made to the latter by their
12
clients.
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts
of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted
a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the
13
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not
14
an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office – but of Jesi and Jane
15
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder. Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
16
latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. Respondent
also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and
the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary
17
of complainant had been paid.
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
18
Management, Inc.; and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
19
the said company.
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
20
been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
21
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
22
Certification issued by the NSO. The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places
and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
23
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at
24
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
25
submitted during the hearing of the case. Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
26
opportunity to controvert those documents. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
27
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270. He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
28
B-3271. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory
29
hearing on 20 November 2007. While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would
30
not attend the hearing, respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the
suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two
Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
31
discovered to be bearing his name.
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines
32
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his
33
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No.
07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary
34
Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the
35
criminal cases.
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
36
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
37
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
38
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
39
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence
that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first
40
marriage was subsisting. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
41
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
42
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
43
annulment of Marriage Contracts.
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
44
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the
45
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.
46
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
47
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
48
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
49
Annex "C" of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
50
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
51
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. In this case, it is confusing for the client
if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate
this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into
by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
52
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. We are not persuaded by his
argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
53
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
1âwphi1
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
54
and satisfactory proof. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare
55
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance
of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
56
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
57
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
58
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

(On leave) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

* Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
(On leave) MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

* Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
VIII.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs.ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON
BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public
is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10]
Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting
any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on
the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and
after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are
a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a
self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and
to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
(emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
IX.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,
respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel.
He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he
filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois
with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or
associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

Codthic June 12, 18

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CODTHIC June 12 Readings

Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services

Rule 2.01 - Not to Reject or Oppressed Defenseless or Oppressed Services

Rule 2.02 - Not to refuse to give Legal Advice

Rule 2.03 - No Solicitation

Rule 2.04 No Rates Lower than Customarily Charged

Rule 3.01 - No False or Unfair Claim re: Qualifications

Rule 3.02 - No False or Misleading Firm Name

Rule 3.03 - Partners Assuming Public Office

Rule 3.04 - Not Use Media to attract Legal Business

Source for the ​CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services

I. Rule 2.01 - Not to Reject or Oppressed Defenseless or Oppressed Services

1. GUIDELINES ON LEGAL AID GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE

ARTICLE I PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

SECTION. 1. Public service. – Legal Aid is ​not a matter of charity.​ It is a means

2. Rep. Act No. 9999 (2006), Legal Aid Law

Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited

3. Rep. Act No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012

II. Rule 2.02 - Not to refuse to give Legal Advice

III. Rule 2.03 - No Solicitation

Rule 138 sec. 27, Rules of Court

Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act

1. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)

modern computers and electronic machines"

Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Restrain respondent

Philippine Bar Association: Restrain respondent

Philippine Lawyers' Association: Restrain respondent

U.​P.​ Women Lawyers' Circle Restrain respondent

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

IV. Rule 2.04 No Rates Lower than Customarily Charged

I. Rule 3.01 - No False or Unfair Claim re: Qualifications

qualifications or legal services.

IBP Commission on Bar

II. Rule 3.02 - No False or Misleading Firm Name

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

In re Petition of Sycip, G. R. No. X92-1, July, 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)

J​uly 30, 1979

Petitioners base their petitions on:

III. Rule 3.03 - Partners Assuming Public Office

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall

Constitution Art 6 (​THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT​) sec 14

Constitution Art 7 (​EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT​)sec 13

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

Constitution Art 9 (​CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION​)sec 2

IV. Rule 3.04 - Not Use Media to attract Legal Business

Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

Cruz v. Salva 105 Phil 1151 (1959)

G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

I. RA 9999 2006 Legal Aid Law

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Approved: FEB 23, 2010

II. REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389

Section 8. ​Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. – Except in

(Sgd.) ​JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) ​FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

(Sgd.) ​EMMA LIRIO-REYES (Sgd.) ​MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

IV. In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)

Source for the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

SECTION. 1. Public service. – Legal Aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means

U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle Restrain respondent

July 30, 1979

Constitution Art 6 (THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT) sec 14

Constitution Art 7 (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)sec 13

Constitution Art 9 (CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION)sec 2

Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on Recognizance. – Except in

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]