Published in Bellona Quarterly 2/2008 (653) p 81-89

SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (SCO):
SECURITY OR INSECURITY FOR CENTRAL ASIA?

COL ZDZISŁAW ŚLIWA AND COL YULIN ONG

INTRODUCTION

In December 1991, a global superpower, the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen
separate countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant turning point in history.
A highly authoritarian political regime with sufficient military means to destroy mankind
several times over was dismantled peacefully with so little bloodshed, and the disintegration
brought the established international order of a bipolar world to an end and sent the
international system into a state of flux.

As new and existing states grappled with new threats and security needs in a new
international system, some states took the opportunity to impose a new international order
while others sought to restore a semblance of the old order. Examples are the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) 1 and the Collective Security Treaty (CST) 2 which could be seen
to be a successor to the Soviet Union and perceived to be a geopolitical tool for Russia to
maintain its influence over the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, the expansion of
the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include former
Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics 3 has been perceived as expanding American
imperialism, and a means to secure US energy interests in the continent’s major oil and gas
supplies and a supply line of communications from the Baltic coast to the Caspian basin. The
inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet republics is also perceived to be as an
attempt to encircle and contain Russia. In response to the eastwards expansion of NATO, the
former Collective Security Treaty (CST) was reorganized into the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) in 2002, comprising the remaining member states of Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. In the economic arena, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a treaty to create the Eurasian Economic
Community (EEC) in 2000.

The geopolitical competition between the major powers continues eastwards and is
fast encroaching into Central Asia which is geopolitically significant for being the crossroads
of Europe and Asia and its rich energy resources. Central Asia consists of Uzbekistan,

1
The Commonwealth of Independent States consists of eleven former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan discontinued
permanent membership as of August 26 2005 and is now an associate member. The Soviet government had already
recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on September 6 1991, and the three Baltic nations refused to
join the CIS.
2
The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992 by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1993 Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine joined the Treaty as observers. In 1999 Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty. Ukraine and Moldova have also lost their interest in
military integration.
3
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in 1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia were admitted to NATO in 2004. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro have expressed a wish to join the alliance. In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia accede to the EU. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007.

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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and is also considered the last bastion
of the former Soviet Union. Bringing these Central Asian states under Western influence
either through the EU or NATO would be deemed to be a final and complete ideological
victory. Unlike the other breakaway states, these Central Asian states did not seize
independence but found independence by default. 4 None of them have ever existed before as
a distinct entity, are deeply dependent on one another and have been always been reliant on a
collective security arrangement. 5

Common security interests and concerns drove China and Russia to found the
‘Shanghai Five’ alliance 6 in 1996 to focus on battling the terrorist threats emanating from
Afghanistan and ensuring regional stability in Central Asia, which later became the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. This paper examines the purpose of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and how it promotes regional security in Central
Asia. It will examine how the organization serves the security needs of the region and its
neighbouring countries, in particular, Russia and China, and how the US presence and
interests in the region can impact the security of the region. The paper will also explore
implications of the expansion of the SCO.

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The SCO members include China, Russia, and four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) with India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan holding
observer status. The remaining Central Asian state, Turkmenistan is not a SCO member as it
has declared neutrality but had participated in the recent Bishkek summit in 2007. The
proclaimed goals of the SCO are ‘strengthening mutual confidence and good neighbourly
relations among member countries; promoting their effective cooperation in politics, trade
and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation,
tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and
ensure peace, security and stability in the region, to move towards the establishment of a new,
democratic, just and rational political and economic international order’. 7

The SCO has brought the Central Asia region under the influence of Russia and China
and it is inevitable that the organization is viewed with apprehension and suspicions,
especially from the US. The Central Asia region is part of Eurasia 8 which Brzezinski
describes as the centre of world power and the key to controlling Eurasia is controlling the
Central Asian republics. 9 The key to controlling the Central Asian republics is Uzbekistan. 10
The region (See Figure 1) stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Chinese Xinjiang
autonomous region in the east, from Kazakhstan in the north to northern Iran and Afghanistan
in the south, and borders on Russia, Iran and China. Brzezinski also views Russia and China
as the two most important states whose competing interests might threaten the US in Central
Asia, and that the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Iran and Kazakhstan must be ‘managed’ by the US as
4
Martha Brill Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia”, New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, (eds.)
Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 556.
5
These five Central Asian states joined the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1992 after
gaining independence.
6
The Shanghai Five consists of China, Russia, and three Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
7
SCO Website: http://www.sectsco.org
8
Brzezinski described Eurasia is all of the territory east of Germany and Poland, stretching all the way through Russia and
China to the Pacific Ocean. It includes the Middle East and most of the Indian subcontinent.
9
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books,
1997, p xiii
10
Zbigniew Brzezinski, pp 124-132.

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buffers or counterweights to Russian and Chinese moves to control the oil, gas and minerals
of the Central Asian republics. 11 He also notes that any nation that become predominant in
Central Asia would threaten the current US control of oil resources in the Persian Gulf. 12

Given its geostrategic nature and energy supplies, it is not surprising that the SCO has
been described to be an enigma, a security organization, a regional forum, an anti-terrorism
coalition, a Russian and Chinese-led alliance to counter US hegemony. 13 The organization
can also be a potential energy alliance/club that brings energy suppliers and consumers
together in a unique energy-security arrangement.

Figure 1: The Caucasus and Central Asia

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol_2003.jpg (With Refinement)

Security Organization or an Anti-US Alliance. The competition in the Central Asia region
heightened as the US, after consolidating its influences in former Soviet republics of Ukraine
and Georgia which border Russia, is deemed to be completing the containment of Russia, and
countering Chinese influence in the region, with the establishment of military bases (or
forward operating sites) in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2001 after the events of 9/11. The
setting up of the SCO in 2001, was therefore, seen to be an alliance to counter US hegemony,
even though the SCO declared that the alliance is not directed against any states or alliances
but focused on Central Asian regional security, in particular, the ‘three evil forces of
terrorism, separatism and extremism’. 14 However, at the inauguration of the SCO in October
2001, the leaders of member states said that the organization will foster ‘world multi-
polarization’ and contribute to the ‘establishment of a fair and reasonable international

11
Zbigniew Brzezinski, p 121.
12
Zbigniew Brzezinski, p 53.
13
Jefferson Turner, “What is Driving India’s and Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?”,
Strategic Insight, Volume 4, Issue 8, August 2005, Centre for Contemporary Conflicts. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California.
14
SCO Joint Statement, Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Oct 2001

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order’, 15 in a thinly veiled but clear statement that SCO seeks to counterbalance the US
dominance in the international system and reduce US influence in the energy-rich Central
Asia. This has fostered the view that the SCO is a Russian and Chinese-led alliance to
counter US hegemony, and that it was the genesis of a Warsaw Pact-type organization to
counter the NATO eastwards expansion. This view was further strengthened when the US
request for membership was rejected in 2005, and the SCO call for US withdrawal of forces
from Central Asia. This was followed up quickly with the closure of the US Karshi-
Khanabad air base located in Uzbekistan in July 2005, and Kyrgyzstan’s demand for a fee
increase from US$2 million to US$200 million a year for the use of its Manas air base.

Anti-Terrorism Coalition or Regional Security Organization. The ambiguous nature of

the SCO as to whether it is an anti-terrorism (broadly defined) coalition or a regional security
organization arises from its stated aims to fight terrorism and the nature of the large scale
joint military exercises such as Exercises Cooperation 2003 and Peace Mission 2005 and
2007. These exercises involved large numbers of conventional units conducting operations
that bore with some semblances of the US ‘anti-terrorism war’ in Iraq and Afghanistan rather
than typical smaller scale anti-terrorism drills. The type of forces and equipment involved in
the exercise go beyond its goals of fighting transnational threats such as drug trafficking,
organized crime and ethnic separatism, to suggest that the purpose of the exercise was for
multinational cooperation and coordination of common military activities against larger scale
military threats. 16 This was reinforced by PLA Senior Col. Lu Chuangang, the chief of the
command group of the Chinese exercise directorate, who listed the exercise objectives as:
long-distance mobility of forces by rail and aircraft, joint operations with six nations;
precision engagement using high-technology attack capabilities; and long-distance integrated
military support operations. 17 From a strategic perspective, the recent exercise was a
proclamation to the international community that there is no ‘power vacuum’ in Central
Asia's strategic space that needs to be filled by security organizations from outside the
region. 18 The exercise also underscores the improving Sino-Russian relationship and the
security cooperation among the SCO member states. At the same time, Russia and China
repeatedly made statements that the SCO is not a military bloc, and that the SCO was not
targeting the interest of or posing a threat to any third country. 19

Energy Alliance/Club or Energy Geopolitics. The SCO has played an increasingly

significant role in strengthening the security and stability in a potentially unstable central
Asian region through security and economic cooperation. At the recent SCO meeting,
Russian president, Putin suggested the formation of an energy alliance/club where energy-
rich member states will meet the energy demands of energy-deficient member states. It is
only natural that the cooperation expands into the energy field given the large supplies of
natural gas in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, potential member Turkmenistan and current
observer Iran, which would account for about 50% of the world gas supply. There are also
significant oil resources in the Caspian Sea and hydroelectric energy resources in Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan. The existing pipeline network for oil and gas could be extended to all

15
Associated Press, 15 Jun 2001. To strengthen the fight against ‘the three evils’, in 2004, SCO established the Regional
Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and in 2006, it announced plans to fight cross-border drug crime
as part of its wider counter-terrorism efforts
16
Jane's Intelligence Review, Fissures in the Force: Multilateral Co-Operation Can Only Go So Far, 1 June 2007, p. 4.
17
Peoples Daily online July 31, 2007
18
M. K. Bhadrakumar, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Primed and Ready to Fire: Toward a Regional and Global
Realignment?, Asia Times, 04 August 2007.
19
Statements by the Chiefs of the General Staff of PLA Gen Liang Guanglie and Russia Gen Yuri Baluyevsky at the
conclusion of Peace Mission 2007.

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member states (See Figure 2). The formation of such energy alliance of existing members and
potential members such as Iran, India, and Pakistan, could potentially make it the most
powerful energy alliance that can rival OPEC, and provide energy security for its member
states and an assured market for supplier states.

Such a SCO energy alliance has the potential to further alter the geopolitics and
security in Eurasia. Russia has already employed energy as a geopolitical weapon against the
encroaching western influence. It has managed to draw Austria into a key energy partnership,
making it a base for Gazprom's future expansion into EU territory. Austria's ‘defection’ to the
Russian camp virtually dealt a coup de grace to Washington's strategy to cut Russia's share of
Europe's growing need for gas. Russia could potentially leverage on Europe’s dependency to
promote its largely anti-American foreign policy agenda. A SCO energy alliance that
monopolies 50% of the world gas supply could allow Russia or the SCO to become the
predominant force and seriously threaten Western interest in Central Asia

Figure 2: Existing and Proposed Pipelines in Central Asia

Source: Pipelines Politics, http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm

The competition in the energy arena extends to pipeline network in Eurasia. Russia is
keen on the possibility of an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, which would constitute a
challenge to US intentions to utilize Afghan and/or Turkmen gas to supply Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India through a new pipeline that bypasses both Russia and Iran. The US has
also been pressing for the development of new energy pipelines from the Caspian and Central
Asia that bypass Russia. The US is aggressively advancing its proposals for the construction
of oil and gas pipelines linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe across the Caspian
Sea; new pipelines that would connect the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline with the
Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline (making Turkey an energy hub for Europe); and the so-called
Nabucco pipeline to link Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries with southern European
markets (See Figure 3). In response, Russia has frustrated the US attempts to bypass Russia’s
role as the key energy supplier for Europe. Russia’s tripartite agreement with Turkmenistan

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and Kazakhstan to upgrade and expand gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
along the Caspian Sea coast directly to Russia, has scuttled the prospects of the US-supported
proposals for a trans-Caspian pipeline and the Nabucco pipeline, as these proposals depended
significantly on the availability of Turkmen and Kazakh gas. 20 Iran is also an important factor
in this competition, both as a natural gas potential supplier and a conduit for Turkmen gas for
the US proposed Nabucco pipeline. Bringing Iran into the SCO fold will completely
undermine the US energy and geopolitical interests in Central and South Asia.

Figure 3: Pipelines – From Russia to Europe; Proposed Iranian Pipelines

along the Caspian Sea and the Proposed Nabucco Pipeline

The Proposed Nabucco Pipeline

Pipelines in the Caspian Region

Sources: CIA; http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/black_sea_pipelines_giwa and

http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com

SECURITY OF THE SCO REGION

The SCO region is a region of economic opportunities with its large energy resources
but regional security is an imperative to provide confidence and to attract foreign investors to
invest in the long term energy projects. The SCO seeks a major role in the development,
including production, transit and export of the region’s energy resources, 21 and in doing so,
seek to further improve cooperation with the mainly western energy consumers, improve
their GDP, quality of life, enhance the acceptance of current leadership in each regime and to

20
M. K. Bhadrakumar, Russia, Iran Tighten the Energy Noose, Asia Times, 22 Dec 2007
21
B. A. Gelb, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, CRS Report RS21190, CRS Issue Brief for Congress,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Updated 8 September 2006, p. 2.
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Oct/RS21190.pdf

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eradicate socially motivated unrest such as those that occurred in Uzbekistan in May 2005 or
Kyrgyzstan in 2006. 22

There are destabilizing factors both inside and outside each of the Central Asian
republic that can spill over to Russia and China. The Central Asian states faced ethno-
political, economic conflict, social and ecological issues that need to be collectively resolved.
Additionally, international terrorism and religious extremism, drug trafficking is also on the
raise. The SCO has provided the regional architecture to collectively secure peace, stability
and security against mainly non-traditional threats for its member states as well as facilitated
close cooperation between Russia and China.

• The Central Asian Republics. The SCO has provided stability especially in reducing
multi-ethnical tensions in the Central Asian region as its people associate themselves
strongly to regions, tribal connections and ethnicity than to citizenship in the independent
states. 23 The SCO has contained threats arising from cross-boundary flow of people,
equipment and in particular, drug trafficking which has seriously impacted the terrorists’
finances. 24 Its anti-terror stance is contributing to the global war on terrorism although the
SCO has no direct cooperation with NATO or the US. However, any ethnic tension in the
region runs the risk of escalation to become bilateral conflicts between states of the
Central Asia republics and destabilizing the region in a short time. Such a situation could
force the SCO to become involved in a civil war or mount a peacekeeping force, creating
tension, suspicions and distrust within the organization. Internal disturbances in any of the
Central Asian republics could threaten the existing regime and the lack of strong
successors, and a developed pluralistic party system could rapidly breed national
instability which could necessitate intervention by the other SCO members to
preemptively eradicate any budding extremist, terrorist or separatist movement.
Destabilization in the Central Asian region could also rapidly escalate into separatism and
directly threaten Russia and in particular China who is dealing with potential separatist
movement in Xinjiang.

• Russia. The region is its traditional area of influence arising from historical ties,
transportation links, pipelines and trade. The Central Asian republics have also relied in
Russia to provide security, in particular, the Russian minorities in Kazakhstan (about
25%). Regional security and stability are important for the continued economic
development of the Russian economy as well as having a buffer zone against Islamic
extremism. Russia sees its influence in Central Asia as key to its national security and
articulated in a new ‘national security concept’ in 2001 that any effort to weaken Russia’s
positions in Central Asia is a significant security threat. 25 Bringing its neighbouring
countries into some sort of security arrangement would create the strategic buffer it seeks
and thwart the US encirclement and containment efforts. Russia is closely observing the
US and NATO anti-terror war in Afghanistan and their efforts to set up bases in the
region, as such actions might pose future challenges to its influences in the region.

22
F. Hill, K. Jones, Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2006,
p. 111.
23
J. K. Davies, and M. J. Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning: Where do we go from here?
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington February 2004, p. 22.
24
Luan Shanglin, SCO to intensify fight against cross-border drug crimes, China View from 22 April 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/22/content_4459199.htm
25
J. Nichol, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Updated 7 January 2005, p. 42.

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• China. China has minorities in Xinjiang who are ethnically linked to the region. With the
SCO umbrella, China has addressed its main concerns of separatism as the Central Asian
republics can no longer provide support for any separatist movement. This is supported
by bilateral agreements and exercises focused on combating the three evils, with
separatism as a common threat. The SCO has also created a strategic buffer for China and
blunt the US continental encirclement and containment efforts. The SCO can also
provided China an alternative source of oil and gas in its bid to achieve energy security
for its sustained economic development. For long-term Chinese security, energy is crucial
for its economic growth which, in turn, is essential for both political stability and
geopolitical power. This pursuit of energy security is actually a pursuit of economic and,
hence, political security. 26 Oil and gas from the Central Asia region through the less
vulnerable, land-based pipelines would address its maritime vulnerability to potential
disruptions of supplies through the Straits of Malacca. 27 A stable Central Asian region
would also foster economic development and energize China’s remote and impoverished
western region. It has the potential to become the second wing of Chinese economic
development and close the economic gap that exists between the coastal cities and its
western regions. Economic development of the region would also address the concerns
over socially motivated unrest fuelling any separatist movement. The SCO has also
provided China a stage to enhance its role beyond an East Asian power and pursue its
stance of a multi-polar world.

FUTURE EXPANSION OF THE SCO

The strength of the Sino-Russian relationship and their common interests are the
pivots of the SCO. China and Russia have increasingly improving ties and share a common
concern of the US global dominance. However, historic mistrust, competing interests in the
region and differences over the future roles of the SCO may also affect regional security.
China is focused on leveraging on the political and economic weight of the SCO as a forum
to build security for the region and to promote SCO as a model promoting multilateralism
from which the US is conspicuously absent. On the other hand, Russia desires to develop the
SCO into a hard security and military alliance that pursue a Moscow-centric agenda, to
counter what it perceives as increasing military-political and strategic threats all along its
frontiers. This has been met by opposition from all other SCO members, as they prefer the
organization to remain focus on anti-terrorism, economic cooperation and one that is not
openly anti-American.

The enlargement of SCO to include India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran and Turkmenistan
seems inevitable as they share common geostrategic interests, the promise of economic
opportunities and a marriage of convenience between energy suppliers and consumers.
However, the SCO Secretariat has stressed that the Organization's current charter does not
provide for the inclusion of new members. More importantly, it is the other geopolitical
dynamics that will determine the rate of expansion of the SCO. In the near future, its
expansion is likely to be a gradual process.

Legal aspects of the Charter aside, differences exist as Russia wants India in the SCO
but has to compromise by accepting China’s insistence to admit Pakistan too, which raise a
spectre of a lingering proxy war between two key members of the same security arrangement.

26
R. Giragosian, The Strategic Central Asian Arena, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1 (2006) p. 133-
153.
27
More than 80 percent of China oil imports come through the Straits of Malacca.

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Granting India or Pakistan full membership to the Organization could exacerbate the
differences in the long-term engagement of the US and NATO in Central Asia. These two
governments rely on the western military presence in Afghanistan to prevent the resurgence
of the Taliban and its regional terrorist allies. 28 Inducting India and Pakistan as full members
might require the SCO to address Jammu and Kashmir and other contentious issues.

Turkmenistan has not indicated whether it has plans to join the SCO in any capacity
but the attendance of the Bishkek Summit in 2007 by the Turkmen leader as an ‘honoured
guest’ was a significant event. Both Moscow and Beijing have been urging Turkmenistan to
forsake its neutrality and join the organization but Turkmenistan also wants to retain a tie to
Washington. However, its new leadership may well seize the opportunity to strengthen its
regional affiliations as well as its ties to Moscow and Beijing by joining the SCO. The
inclusion of Turkmenistan could push the SCO closer towards becoming an energy club and
completely remove the possibility of Turkmenistan coming under the US influence. However,
the other members of the Organization might not agree to grant Turkmenistan immediate
membership, as they expect Turkmenistan to be first granted an observer status and to
increase its cooperation with the SCO on energy and other common interest issues.

Unlike Mongolia which has not indicated any strong interest recently in becoming a
full SCO member, Iran is most keen to become a full member. The inclusion of Iran into the
SCO is politically more problematic as it would appear that the SCO supports Iran’s nuclear
program and might be called upon to defend it, and put the alliance into direct confrontation
against the US. Russia is keen to include Iran in order to fulfill its vision as an energy club
with its large gas supplies and extensive pipeline system. Besides being a conduit for
Turkmen gas and a key factor that can undermine the US-sponsored Nabucco project,
pipelines through Iran would provide the most direct and cheapest route to the Persian Gulf
and access to the Asian market. China is unwilling to strain relations with the US over the
admission of Iran. Despite their shared fears of US containment, their bilateral ties with the
US remains the most important strategic relationship. The US views Iran as a terrorist nation
and its inclusion would affect the SCO’s credibility as an anti-terrorism organization as
reflected by the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld’s comments at the Shangrila
Dialogue when he said that it was ‘strange that one would want to bring into an organization
that says it is against terrorism one of the leading terrorist nations in the world: Iran.’ 29 From
Iran’s perspective, the threat of more international sanctions over its nuclear program has
further heightened the strategic importance of its neighbours and the SCO as a potential
guarantor of its future security, and a shelter provider from international pressure to end its
uranium enrichment program. Tehran’s optimism stems from the protection the SCO
provided to Uzbekistan after the Andijon massacre in May 2005.

CONCLUSION

The SCO is set to grow in terms of membership and influence regionally in Asia and
internationally. Within the SCO, security will remain its focus, but increased economic and
political cooperation are also gaining momentum. The oil and gas-rich region is keen to
leverage on its strategic resources to increase ties in the energy sector within the organization.
The ambiguous nature of the organization may become its own undoing as in the military

28
R. Weitz, SCO Fails to Solve Its Expansion Dilemma, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 Sep 2007.
29
The Shangrila Dialogue, Central Asia: Does The Road To Shanghai Go Through Tehran?, The International Institute For
Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/june-2006/

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sphere, the SCO is competing with the CSTO and it has to compete with the Eurasian
Economic Community (EEC) in the economic arena. Although Russia is keen on closer ties
between the CSTO and SCO, and to evolve the SCO into a hard security and military alliance,
China is keen to pursue the other path of building security through political and economic
cooperation. Future cooperation and even mergers of the organizations are possible, given the
common interests and members.

The SCO has been a forum to discuss issues of common concern and for Russia and
China to use it, each in their own ways, as an alternative form of international organization.
The SCO has provided the regional architecture to collectively secure peace, stability and
security against traditional and non-traditional threats. Common interests and mutual benefits
have been the unifying factors for the young Organization that its stature as an international
organization in the future is likely to grow with each passing Summit. Its future status as an
international organization, however, continue to depend on the convergence of interests of its
most powerful members such as Russia, China and India (if and when it joins), the vision and
the paths that these powerful members steer the Organization towards to and on, and the
dynamics amongst these three major powers.

In the event that membership expands to include Turkmenistan, Iran, India and
Pakistan, the nature of the SCO would undergo a serious qualitative change and induce new
geopolitical dynamics. Despite its waning influence, the US is likely to continue to seek
inroads to the region. The reduced US presence in the Central Asian region may trigger an
increased presence in Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia to encircle and contain Russia, and in
Afghanistan and even India to counter the Chinese influence. The blunting of its continental
approach to encircle and contain China will force the US to strengthen its maritime approach
and even enhance its presence in South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan. In the end, while the
SCO has created security in the Central Asian region, the organization may become the new
Cold War opponent that the US is seeking and stimulate insecurity on continental Eurasia.

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