Custodial Investigation – shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who is

investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without

prejudice to the “inviting” officer for any violation of the law.

Miranda Rights History

Miranda vs Arizona
Ernesto Miranda was arrested for a crime. However, when he was arrested, the arresting
officer failed to tell him his rights and such were to remain silent because anything that he may
say may be taken against him and his right to seek counsel of his preference, and if he cannot
afford to hire one, the government shall provide him with one.

In such case, he was not told of his rights, therefore, everything that he said or did was not
admitted as evidence to the court, therefor, he was acquitted. Subsequently, he was, again,
caught for another violation of a crime, this time, the arresting officer made sure to remind him
of his rights.

Requisites of Miranda Rights:

a. Any person in custodial investigation has the right to remain silent;

b. Anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
c. He has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel
present when being questioned; and
d. If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him before any questioning if
he so desires.

When to invoke? – from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he was singled out as a suspect in
the commission of the crime although not yet in custody.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He
had beendetained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistentlymaintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigatingofficers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted
on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued
tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet
bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer
endurethe pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken.
Headmitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confessionthey prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators,purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silentand to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Insteadthere should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in adialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and thereis no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused wasnot permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters andother relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation
and it wasonly about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visithim. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and
yet during theinvestigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was notassisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

Physical and Psychological torture are prohibited

Coerced Confessions are not admissible --- people vs Olivares

There are two kinds of coerced confessions

a. Those which are the product of third degree methods (par2. Sec.12, Art 3)
b. Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings. (par1. Sec.12, Art 3)

RIGHT TO BAIL
General Rule: All persons charged with an offense shall be bailable by surieties or to be released
on recognizance as may be provided by the law.

Exceptions:

a. When the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua

b. When the evidence of guilt is strong

Note: In the case of enrile vs sandiganbayan, The SC added another exception which was
applied in the case thereof, that is, for humanitarian reasons, where appellant, Sen. Enrile was
permitted to post bail for humanitarian reasons in consideration of his age and health
condition.

BAIL IN EXTRADITION CASES

As suggested by the use of the word _conviction,_ the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs Olalia

Juan Muñoz was charged before a Hong Kong Court with several counts of offenses in
violation of Hong Kong laws. If convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge.
After Juan Muñoz was arrested in the Philippines, the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Juan Muñoz. On
December 20, 2001, Judge X of RTC-Manila allowed Juan Muñoz to post bail. However, the
government of Hong Kong alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting him to bail because “there is nothing
in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.” May Juan Muñoz, a potential extradite, be
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court?

Yes. In a unanimous decision the SC remanded to the Manila RTC, to determine whether Juan
Muñoz is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.” If Muñoz is not
entitled to such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

“If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceeding where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue,” the Court said.

Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the
Court saw the need to reexamine its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge
Purganan which limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)

It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the
Constitution.

It further said that even if a potential extradite is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It added that “extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. (GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge
Olalia, Jr. and Muñoz, April 19, 2007)

Note: In Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan, September 24, 2002,
The SC ruled that Mark Jimenez is not entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending except upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

Q: State the reasons whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion in the following
cases:

1. The imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua and the accused is
a minor.
A: A minor charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is a matter of
right under Art. 68 of the RPC also in accordance with RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice
welfare Act of 2006.
2. The accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to
suffer an interdeterminate penalty of 8 years to twelve years of reclusion temporal.
 A: Bail is a matter of discretion. The ROC provides that upon conviction of the RTC of an
offense NOT punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, admission to bail is
discretionary.
Rule 114, Sec.5

PLUNDER(RA 7080)

The Plunder Law

The most discussed law these days is Republic Act 7080 otherwise known as the law on
plunder. Seen as a deterrent to prevent public officials from stealing money from the
government, the plunder law was passed in 1991 with the most significant signatory being one
Senator Joseph Estrada. In this edition of the Law Professor, we shall now examine the
intricacies of the Plunder Law.

What is plunder and how is it committed? According to Section 2 of RA 7080, plunder is

committed when a public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) of RA 7080 in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00). In addition, any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished.

The criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) are as follows:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on

the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or

any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or,
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

In the original version of RA 7080, the offender was liable only if the aggregate amount
amassed is at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) with the corresponding penalty
of life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public
office. However, RA 7659 (The Death Penalty Law) amended Section 2 of RA 7080, and lowered
the amount to Fifty million pesos and increased the imposable penalty to death, to wit:

Sec. 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder) is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.

The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State.”

Section 4 of RA 7080 also prescribes the method for proving that the crime of plunder was
committed. It states that for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus, Latin for “you have the body”, is the name given to a variety of writs for the
purpose of bringing a party before a court or judge. It’s purpose is not to determine the
prisoner’s guilt or innocence but whether he is restrained of his liberty by due process[1]

Our present rules of court procedure only provides for the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum (we all know it simply as the writ of habeas corpus) which is the common remedy
against an alleged illegal detention. Thus, the writ ordinarily extends only to cases of “illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto”.[2] It is more
commonly associated with activists being allegedly picked up by military agents but it can have
equal application to, say, a child taken by one spouse without the consent of the other or a
spouse being placed in a drug rehab center without the consent of the other (the Mark Jimenez
case should come to mind).

Amparo

At present, there is a proposed amendment to the rules to allow the use of the writ of amparo.
It is unclear if the proposed amendments would cover all aspects of the amparo doctrine. It
may be better eventually if our laws do so. The doctrine has a broad scope encompassing not
just illegal detention nor actual violations, but also the prevention of possible violations, of
human rights and other constitutional guarantees. “The “amparo” suit is an original Mexican
institution with no exact equivalent in the common law tradition.

The word “amparo” literally means favor, aid, protection, or shelter. Legally the word
encompasses elements of several legal actions of the common law tradition: writ of habeas
corpus, injunction, error, mandamus, and certiorari.

There are five types of “amparo” suits: 1) “amparo” as a defense of individual rights such as life,
liberty, and personal dignity; 2) “amparo” against laws (defending the individual against un-
constitutional laws); 3) “amparo” in judicial matters (examine the legality of judicial decisions);
4) administrative “amparo” (providing jurisdiction against administrative enactments affecting
the individual); 5) “amparo” in agrarian matters (protecting the communal [property] rights of
peasants).”[3]

The amparo procedure for the protection of human rights has 2 parts: The 1st part aims to
prevent the consummation of the alleged violation/s of human rights; and so, without yet
deciding on the merits of the case, the court suspends the alleged illegal act/s. The 2nd part of
the procedure involves proving the facts alleged and determining whether or not they do
violate human rights. The acts subject of the amparo suit include all kinds of actions by any
authority, even laws or judicial decisions.[4]

Applying the foregoing to the present reality of our country’s record-breaking killings and
abductions of activists, labor leaders, journalists, and even priests, the alleged violators will
then be promptly investigated and will not be left to merely deny they have custody of the
prisoner (and render useless any procedure to produce the prisoner and make them
accountable). The court can order an investigation to determine the truth of the facts alleged.
This radically changes the present habeas corpus procedure where the alleged violators can
simply deny they have custody and that is that, and everybody should look elsewhere.
As it is more likely that the victims of human rights violations are those who cannot afford
costly, complex, inaccessible, burdensome and prolonged procedures, the proposed
amendments to our rules must avoid the same. To defend against possible dictatorial leanings
of leaders, the right to amparo must not be allowed to be suspended under any circumstance.
And owing to the repeated allegations against military personnel, civilian courts must be given
jurisdiction over them to avoid further loopholes.

Habeas Data

A companion to the habeas corpus and amparo remedies is the writ of “habeas data’ based on
a person’s right to information about himself/herself, whether the information is in the
possession of the government or a private entity.[5] The right includes the right to modify (even
correct) or remove such information due to its sensitive, erroneous, biased, or discriminatory
nature.

In recent years, recourse to the action of habeas data has become a fundamental instrument
for investigation into human rights violations committed during past military dictatorships in
some South American countries. Families of disappeared persons have used habeas data
actions to obtain information concerning government conduct, to learn the fate of disappeared
persons, and to exact accountability.[6]

In the end, of course, a writ by any other name is only as strong as the powers of enforcement.
It is significant to note that the 2 farmers who last month escaped an alleged 18-month illegal
and brutal detention by military soldiers went straight to the Supreme Court to seek protection
and not to the lower courts, the police, their local government nor even Malacañang, and at the
same time, refused protection under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. This act
speaks volumes on their faith in the institutions which, by theory and by law, are supposed to
protect them.

Writ if Amparo Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Habeas Data

Writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or
is threatened with violation
by any unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ
covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
Wirt of Habeas corpus is an
order by a competent court
directing a person detaining
another and requiring the
former to produce the body
of the detainee at a
designated time and place
and show cause and explain
the reason for such detention.
Writ of Habeas Data is a
remedy to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty,
or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information
regarding the person, family,
home, and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
Right to Speedy trial
CASE: Lumanlaw vs Hon. Peralta
Yes. Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally
informed of the charges against them. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not
a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. Particularly, it implements the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them and their right to speedy trial.

Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within
which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should “reflect the
fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.”

Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:

“x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.”

RIGHT TO SELF INCRIMINATION

CASE: Beltran vs Samson
When the accused was ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence
against him. It is a clear violation of his right against self-incrimination. As held in Beltran vs
Samason, writing is something more than noving the body, or the hands or fingers; writing is
not purely mechanical act bevause it requires application of intelligence and attention.

NON-DETENTION BY REASON OF POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS

Art. III, Sec. 18

(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefsand aspirations
(2) No involuntary servitutde in any form shall exist exept as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
 (Paragraph 1, Sec. 18, Art. III)

R.A. 1700 – Anti Subversion Act

Punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein.

R.A. 1700 was now repealed by R.A. 7636. (People vs Pimentel) where the SC ruled that any
persons charged with subversion should be dismissed for it has no more basis.

(Paragraph 2, Sec. 18, Art. III)

Involuntary servitude is a condition where a person is person is compelled by force,

coercion, imprisonment, and against his will to labor for another, whether paid or not.

Right against voluntary servitude is NOT absolute.

Exceptions:

a. As punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted

b. Service in defense of state
c. Naval enlistment
d. Posse comitatus
e. Return to work order in industries affected with public interest
f. Patria potestas

POSSE COMITATUS

- power or force of the county, in English use from the late 16th century, shortened
to posse from the mid 17th century. While the original meaning refers to a group of
citizens assembled by the authorities to deal with an emergency (such as suppressing a
riot or pursuing felons), the term posse is also used for any force or band, especially with
hostile intent, often also figuratively or humorously.In 19th-century usage, posse
comitatus also acquires the generalized or figurative meaning.
- Based on police power of the state

PATRIA POTESTAS

- power that the male head of a family exercised over his children and his more remote
descendants in the male line, whatever their age, as well as over those brought into the
family by adoption.

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS

Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner
or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law.

Doctrine of Incorporation

Legal principle that, in general, the provisions of international law are enforceable in a
jurisdiction so far as they are consistent with the provisions of its domestic law.

Capital Punishment not cruel

In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a per curiam Decision held that Republic Act
No. 8177,77 even if it does not provide in particular the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or inhuman, and is thus constitutional. Any infliction of
pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.78

The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice
and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.79

RA 7659

AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR
THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

RA 9364 – An act prohibiting the imposition of Death penalty

Double Jeopardy. A second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction or
multiple punishments for same offense. The evil sought to be avoided by prohibiting double
jeopardy is double trial and double conviction, not necessarily double punishment.

People vs Dela Torre

G.R. No. 137953-58
April 11, 2002
Facts:

Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with his common-law wife Melinda
Torre, namely: M1, M2 and M3. Melinda left her family when M1 was about seven (7) years old
bringing with her M3. The victim lived with her father and brother M2 in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, teacher of M1, noticed sudden changes in her behavior
and when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her head
teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case to
the DSWD who took her under its custody.

M1 testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: September
30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and
December 23, 1996.

A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the
3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine o’clock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.

Issues:

(a) Whether appellee should be penalized with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
No. 7659?

(b) Whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.

Held:

The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of
lasciviousness against M1 on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal
knowledge [of] M1 on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23
December 1996." Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the
victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated
and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.

However, the court refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained
that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses.

The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of
death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the
accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11
of RA 7659.

Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from
a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.

In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v.
Leones, it unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort,
there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to
uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to
increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused
against double jeopardy."

The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater
penalty.

"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other
hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the
findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated.
Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to
the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on
double jeopardy."

EXCEPTION TO THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE Jeopardy (DENNIS T. VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs. CONSUELO C. ALIGA)
 1. Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of
midtrial as ruled in Peopl vs Tria-Tirona
2. Where the has been grave abuse of discretion under exceptional cisrcumstances as
ruled in People vs Court of Appeals

PEOPLE VS TRIA-TIRONA

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the decision of
respondent Judge Tria-Tirona acquitting accused-private respondent Chief Inspector Renato A.
Muyot and in lieu thereof a judgment be issued convicting the latter of the crime charged.

Armed with two search warrants, members of the NBI and the Presidential Task Force Hammer
Head serving as security, conducted a search on the house of accused MUYOT located in
Banawe, Quezon City. The alleged finding of 498.1094 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) which led to the filing of an information charging private respondent
with Violation of Section 16, Article III of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.

The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent judge PERLITA J. TRIA-TIRONA

Private respondent, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. After trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision acquitting private
respondent on ground of reasonable doubt. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed grave
abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered,
would lead to accused’s conviction.

ISSUE: Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the
merits without violating the constitutional precept against double jeopardy?
I
RULING: To settle the issue of whether or not an acquittal can still be appealed, this Court
pronounced in People v. Velasco that as mandated by the Constitution, statutes and
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule
is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court
on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double
jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied
due process.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the
merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a
finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
We have categorically ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a finding of
mistrial, no appeal will lie in case of an acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us,
we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal
to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the accused’s right against
double jeopardy.

EX POST FACTO LAW

A law that makes illegal an act that was legal when committed, increases the penalties for
an infraction after it has been committed, or changes the rules of evidence to make
conviction easier. The Constitution prohibits the making of ex post facto law.

An Ex post facto law is one which:

1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to it
when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of
amnesty.

BILL OF ATTAINDER - Is a legislative act which inflicts punishment wihout trial.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, May 26 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared
the winning candidate; however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he
was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under
US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:

The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is
considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San
Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause under Article
IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship