FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198225, September 27, 2017

TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.), INC., AND MST MARINE SERVICES PHILS., INC., Petitioners, v.
SHIRLEY G. DE CHAVEZ,1 Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the January 31, 2011 Decision3 and the August 8, 2011
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 112898. The CA granted the Petition for
Certiorari filed therewith and reversed and set aside the December 16, 2009 Decision5 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC OFW (M) 09-000540-09, which affirmed the
July 18, 2009 Decision6 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissing the complaint for payment of death
benefits in NLRC-NCR OFW (M) 12-17395-08 for lack of merit.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioners hired Ryan Pableo De Chavez7 (Ryan) as chief cook on board the oil
tanker vessel Haruna Express for period of nine months.8 However, on February 26, 2006, Ryan was
found dead inside his cabin bathroom hanging by the shower cord and covered with blood.9 Thus,
Ryan's surviving spouse, Shirley De Chavez (Shirley), filed complaint10 for death benefits.

In her Position Paper,11 Reply,12 and Rejoinder,13 Shirley alleged that Ryan did not commit suicide
considering that Ryan even submitted himself to medical check up at hospital in Ulsan, Korea day prior
to his death; that during their telephone conversation two days before his alleged suicide, Ryan
informed her that the vessel would be discharging crude oil in Batangas and that they might see each
other; that no suicide note was found; that Ryan died during the effectivity of his contract and while on
board the vessel, hence, his heirs are entitled to death benefits; that petitioners did not clarify how Ryan
could have committed suicide; that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties is not
accorded to foreign nationals, such as the Ulsan police authorities; that no evidence was adduced that
the Ulsan Maritime Police indeed conducted an investigation into Ryan's death; that the imputation that
Ryan took his own life because he was pressured by his mother to obtain a loan for new house flies in
the face of the fact that Ryan was recently married and about to start family, that he had acquired new
house and that he wag recently promoted as chief cook; and, that the pictures taken when Ryan was
found dead which tended to show that he was murdered was not at all explained in the Medical
Certificate of Death issued by the Ulsan City Hospital of Korea.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed in their Position Paper,14 Reply,15 and Rejoinder16 that Shirley
is not entitled to death benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) because the Medical Certif1cate of Death the written statements of
the Chief Mate, the Ship Master, and Messman Benjamin Melendres (Messman Melendres), and the
investigation report prepared by International Inspection and Testing Corporation (INTECO),
uniformly found Ryan's cause of death as suicide; that the Personnel Manager of Thome Ship
Management Pte. Ltd. (Thome Ltd.) submitted an Investigation Report indicating that the possible
reason for the suicide was Ryan's loss of direction or overwhelming despair after his mother virtually
pushed him to take huge loan to purchase house; that the Ulsan Maritime police who investigated the
incident did not notice any foul play; that Messman Melendres, who was the first person to break into
Ryan's locked room, likewise observed that there was nothing in Ryan's cabin to suggest that there had
been fight or struggle; that the examination of Ryan's corpse revealed no signs of trauma; and, that
Shirley could not testify on how Ryan died because she was not on board the vessel when the incident
transpired.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In Decision dated July 18, 2009,17 the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the evidence
convincingly showed that Ryan's death was authored by Ryan himself, viz.:
A careful perusal of [INTECO's Investigation Report] and [the] medical certificate reveals that the
direct cause of [Ryan's death,] based on the autopsy findings of the Ulsan City Hospital, showed that
the cause of death x x x was 'excessive bleeding from [Ryan's] cut wrist apparently by scissors', [even]
the Medical Certificate of Death issued by the Ulsan City Hospital certified that the cause of death of
the deceased was by 'Hanging, strangulation and suffocation'.18
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

In its Resolution dated September 30, 2009,19 the NLRC initially dismissed Shirley's appeal for failure
to submit certificate of non-forum shopping. However, on reconsideration the NLRC granted and
reinstated her appeal.

On December 16, 2009,20 the NLRC rendered its Decision denying Shirley's appeal and affirming the
LA's ruling that petitioners succeeded in proving that Ryan died at his own hands, thus:
A careful and thorough reading of the appeal would show that the same is based more on assumptions
and speculations rather than on facts. The fact that [Ryan] has x x x a new wife, [a] new home and
recently was promoted as Chief Cook does not mean that he could not have committed suicide
anymore [sic]. The fact that the medical certificate and the result of the autopsy appears to be
contradictory to each other on the causes of death as detailed by [Shirley] does not mean that [Ryan]
was murdered and did not commit suicide. And the fact that the comfort room has not been built for
possible self suspension does not mean that [Ryan] was murdered.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Shirley instituted before the appellate court Petition for Certiorari,22 contending that petitioners had
not presented substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Ryan indeed committed suicide and
insisting that his death was compensable.

In its assailed January 31, 2011 Decision,23 the CA reversed the NLRC and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated
December 16, 2009, and Resolution, dated September 30, 2009, in NLRC LAC OFW (M) 09 000540-
09 (NLRC-NCR OFW (M) 12-17395-08) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The records of
this case are remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission tor the computation of the death
benefits to be awarded to [respondent] Shirley De Chavez in behalf of [her] deceased husband Ryan
Pableo De Chavez.

SO ORDERED.24
The CA found no sufficient evidence that Ryan took his own life, hence it declared Shirley entitled to
death benefits. The CA held that the cause of Ryan's death as stated in the Medical Certificate of Death
issued by the Ulsan City Hospital was different from that set forth in the INTECO Report. It stressed
that there was nothing in the records to show that INTECO had the authority to investigate into Ryan's
death and to issue official findings at the conclusion of its investigation. We quote pertinent portions
from the CA's disquisition:
A perusal of the record of this case shows that the basis of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and [the]
NLRC was Medical Certificate of Death, prepared by certain Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City
Hospital, and an Investigation Report of the International Inspections and Testing Corp. However, an
examination x x x of the aforesaid evidence fails to conclusively convince the Court that the death of
the [Shirley's] husband was due to his own hand.

First, the findings under the said Medical Certificate and the said Investigation Report appear to be
contradictory with one another. Under the Medical Certificate the cause of death [was] hanging by
strangulation, thus:
'Cause of death

1. Direct Cause of Death.

INTENTIONAL SELF-HARM BY [HANGING], STRANGULATION AND SUFFOCATION

2. Intermedicate Predisposing Cause of Death.

3. Predisposing Cause of Death.

BLOOD LOSS' (emphasis supplied)
However, Under the Investigation Report the cause of death was found to be due to excessive bleeding
from the cuts from the seafarer's wrist, thus:
'Autopsy on the Corpse of [Ryan] Investigation by Ulsan Maritime Police:

The autopsy on the corpse of [Ryan] was performed at the Ulsan City Hospital x x x [witnessed by] all
parties concerned including us Mr. Leow Ai Hin, Senior Shipping Executive of Thome Ship
Management Pte. Ltd., Singapore x x x and x x x the cause of death of [Ryan] was excessive bleeding
from the cut wrist of [Ryan] apparently by scissors. The Ulsan Maritime Police requested handwritten
statements of all remaining crews of "HARUNA EXPRESS" in the evening hours of Feb. 27th which
were prepared submitted to the Police in the morning hours of Feb. 28 and then "HARUNA
EXPRESS" sailed off Ulsan Port at 12:30 hrs. of Feb. 28th. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, who is this 'International Inspection and Testing Corporation' that performed the autopsy and
prepared the Investigation Report? Is this corporation trained to perform an autopsy? More importantly,
are its findings officially recognized? The Court has scoured the record and it cou1d not see one iota of
description, aside [from the fact] that it is 'foreign corporation', that would tend to lend credence to
itself as an investigtive body and to its findings. As it is, the said investigation report woefully pales in
comparison as to what real autopsy report should look like. An autopsy report should give an accurate
account of the various marks found on the body such as ligature marks, cuts, the precise locations
thereof, and other tell-tale signs that would lead an investigator to conclusively conclude as to the
cause of death but the so[-]called investigation report only gives vague account at best.

Third, why was there no official autopsy done on the body of the deceased seafarer by the Ulsan
Maritime Police? And if there ever was an autopsy done by the Ulsan Maritime Police, where is the
autopsy report of the police? The Court would think that the shipping company, understandably
interested in avoiding paying any compensation, would prefer an autopsy done by the police rather than
private corporation. After all, the findings of the police are accorded respect and regularity by the
courts but, curiously enough in this case, the shipping company decided to have the body examined
instead by private corporation whose credentials to perform an autopsy have not even been verified.25
In its August 8, 2011 Resolution,26 the CA likewise denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issue:

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in awarding [to Shirley] death
compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the POEA contract despite undisputed evidence which
clearly show that the seafarer died by his own hand. The award is not unjustified [sic] under the facts
and evidence of the case, the same is likewise plainly contrary to Section 20 (D) of the governing
POEA contract.27
Petitioners'Arguments

In their Petition,28 Reply,29 and Memorandum,30 petitioners contend that under the governing POEA-
SEC, seafarer's death during the term of his contract is not automatically compensable particularly if
the same was due to his willful act; that the LA's findings of fact, which were upheld by the NLRC,
should not have been disregarded by the CA because Shirley herself, whose duty was to establish her
entitlement to the death benefits, has utterly failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate her bare
allegation that Ryan was not responsible for his own death; that apart from her absolutely empty and
hollow claim, Shirley presented no proof that Ryan was victim of foul play; that the purported
contradictory information about the cause of Ryan's death, whether he chose to hang himself or slash
his wrist with scissors, did not negate the fact that his death was self-inflicted; that the Medical
Certificate of Death31 prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital, which listed
"Intentional Self Harm by [Hanging], Strangulation and Suffocation" as the direct cause of death, and
the INTECO's Report32 which declared Ryan's death as "suicide," effectively meant the same thing;
that although no official autopsy report was issued by the Ulsan Maritime Police, the latter allowed the
vessel to sail on February 28, 2006 only after they had verified and were satisfied that there was no foul
play in Ryan's death; that Lapid v. National Labor Relations Commission33 is not applicable because
the coroner's report therein was incomplete, whereas the Medical Certificate of Death of the Ulsan City
Hospital and INTECO Report, gave detailed account that Ryan was found hanging by rope or cord
while sitting on the toilet bowl with his wrist slashed and pair of scissors nearby; that incumbent upon
the Supreme Court to resolve this case because the CA's findings are not only diametrically opposed to
the findings of both the LA and the. NLRC, but the CA's findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; that it was Shirley's duty to prove by substantial evidence her entitlement to
death benefits; that the CA erred ill not giving credence to INTECO's. Report as well as the
Medical.Certificate of Death issued by the Ulsan City Hospital; and that they have proven by
substantial evidence that Ryan's death was self-inflicted, thus Shirley is not entitled to death
compensation benefits pursuant Section 20(D) of the governing POEA-SEC.

Respondent Arguments

Shirley counters that re-assessment of the propriety of the award of death compensation benefits
involves an examination of the evidence, which is not proper in Rule 45 petition; that petitioners failed
to prove that Ryan committed suicide; that INTECO's Report has no credence at all; that Ryan's death
should not be presumed to be self-inflicted and that compensability attaches by the mere fact that Ryan
died in the course of his employment; that there was no indication that Ryan contemplated to commit
suicide; that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter;"34 and, that the burden of proof that an employee's
death is non-compensable always lies with his employer.

Issue

Is the CA correct in ruling that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Shirley's
claim for death benefits?

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

In general, the Court is not trier of facts; however, an exception lies when the findings of the CA and
the NLRC conflict with each other, as in this case, in which event this Court must go over the records
to determine whether the CA had sufficient basis for overturning the NLRC.35 More specifically, the
Court must adjudge in this Rule 45 petition whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the
seafarer committed suicide.36 The unbending precept that must guide this Court in resolving petition
of the character elevated before this Court is: "As claimant for death benefits, [the seafarer's heir] has
the burden to prove by substantial evidence that [the seafarer's] death is work-related and that it
transpired during the term of his employment contract."37

Section 20(A) and (D) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provide that:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the employer shall pay
his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) x x x at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

xxxx

D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or
death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties,
provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is
directly attributable to the seafarer.
Given the evidence on record, we hold that Ryan's death was due to his own deliberate act and deed.
Indeed the Medical Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital,
who, it is presumed, must have examined Ryan's cadaver, and the INTECO's Report which contained
information involving the self-same death, must be deemed as substantial evidence of that fact. We are
satisfied that the material facts set forth in the Decisions of both the LA and the NLRC constitute
substantial evidence that Ryan took his own life, that he died by his own hands. "That [the seafarer's]
death was result of his willful act is matter of defense. Thus, petitioners [as employers] have the burden
to prove this circumstance by substantial evidence"38 which is the quantum of proof in labor cases.
In Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Pedrajas,39 this Court held that the seafarer's heirs were not
entitled to any benefits since the employers were able to substantially prove that the seafarer who was
found hanging on the vessel's upper deck with rope tied to his neck had committed suicide. The
employers therein presented the forensic report of the Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian Court
from the Public Prosecutor's Office of Livomo, Italy which pointed out in detail that there were no
other injuries in the seafarer's body and confirmed the deceased himself "tied the rope to the metal
pipe"40 based on the evaluation of "the crime scene, the rope used for hanging, type of knot,
temperature and position of the body when found."41 Furthermore, two suicide notes written by the
seafarer addressed to his wife and to the vessel's crew were also offered as evidence. Similarly, in
Unicol Management Services, Inc. v. Malipot,42 this Court found substantial evidence that the true
cause of the seafarer's death was suicidal asphyxia due to hanging in the vessel's store room. These
findings were based on the employers' submission of the Medico Legal Report issued by the Ministry
of Justice of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Death Certificate issued by the UAE Ministry of
Health together with the Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Master's Report. The conclusion
in said Medico Legal Report that the seafarer committed suicide drew support from an external
examination of the cadaver which showed that the deep lacerated groove around the deceased's neck
was vital, recent, and result of hanging with rope and that there were no other recent injuries.

To belabor point, the resolution of whether herein petitioners have shown that Ryan committed suicide
is based essentially on the examination of two pertinent documents.

The first document is the Ulsan City Hospital's Medical Certificate of Death43 which was signed by
one Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung with License No. 25028. It reads:
xxxx

• Date and Time of Death: Date 26th FEB. 2006

Time 03:00-4:00 at the break of the day

• Place of Death: B-DECK, HIS BATHROOM, THE BOARD, HARUNA EXPRESS

ON THE SEA 15km FROM ULSAN

• Cause of death

1. Direct Cause of Death.

INTENTIONAL SELF-HARM BY [HANGING], STRANGULATION AND SUFFOCATION

2. Intermedicate Predisposing Cause of Death.

3. Predisposing Cause of Death.

BLOOD LOSS

THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE44

The second document is the INTECO Report45 signed by one "S.M. Han, Rep. Director." It pertinently
stated:
I) General Information:

xxxx

b) Upon completion of the load in work, "HARUNA EXPRESS" sailed off Onsan Port at 06:35 hrs. of
Feb. 26th bound for Nagoya. However, "HARUNA EXPRESS" deviated returned to Ulsan Port due to
the death of Chief Cook, [Ryan], x x x and sailed off Ulsan Port at 12:30 hrs. of Feb. 28th after
completion of the investigation by Ulsan Maritime Police.

xxxx

IV) Circumstance/Cause of Accident:

Upon interviewing the Master, Chief Engineer, Third Officer Mess Boy and also upon reviewing the
statements of crews, our finding were as follows:

17:30 hrs. of Feb. 25th: Chief Cook instructed the mess boy x x x to bring provisions from the reefer
for the breakfast of the next day and to cook the breakfast of Feb. 26th for the crew.

xxxx

08:45 hrs. of Feb. 26th:

x x x [T]he mess boy went up the Chief Cook's cabin to inform that he would leave the galley x x x he
called the Chief Cook before opening the cabin door, but no response, and therefore, he opened the
cabin door, but there was no Chief Cook in his cabin, and the bathroom door was closed and very quiet.
The mess boy knocked [at] the bathroom door calling the Chief Cook's name, but no response, and the
mess boy tried to open the bathroom door, but it was locked, and so, the mess boy opened the bathroom
door using his (messboy's) key. Upon opening the bathroom door, considerable blood was found on the
floor, and part of the Chief Cook's feet was seen with the shower curtain partly closed.

09:00 hrs. of Feb. 26th:

The mess boy immediately notified x x x the Chief Officer [what he saw], and both mess boy Chief
Officer rushed to the Chief Cook's cabin and upon opening the shower curtain, they found the shower
hose around the neck of the Chief Cook, and the Chief Officer instructed the mess boy not to touch
anyt[h]ing.

09:01 hrs. of Feb. 26th:

Alerted all crews including the Master Chief Engineer x x x after removing the shower hose from the
Chief Cook's neck, first aid care was performed on him, and his left wrist was found cut about 5cm
long about 1cm max. deep, and pair of sharp scissors was found in the bathroom x x x oxygen
resuscitation heart pressuring were performed x x x. However, the Chief Cook was almost in dead
condition with his tongue hung out and the breathing stopped.

09:05 hrs. of Feb. 26th: x x x the ship's course altered back to Ulsan.

xxxx

11:35 hrs. of Feb. 26th: Transferred the Chief Cook to Coast Guard Vessel "POLICE 307".

xxxx

12:10 hrs. of Feb. 26th: Chief Cook was taken to City Hospital in Ulsan.

13:25 hrs. 13:50 hrs of Feb. 26th.

The Chief Cook was examined under the witness of the ships' agent the Ulsan Maritime Police, and the
result was that the Chief Cook x x x was dead x x x 03:00 hrs. of Feb. 26th.

V) Autopsy on the Corpse of [Ryan] Investigation by Ulsan Maritime Police:

The autopsy on the corpse of [Ryan] was performed at the Ulsan City Hospital under the witness of all
parties concerned including us Mr. Leow Ai Hin, Senior Shipping Executive of Thome Ship
Management Pte Ltd., Singapore from 18:00 hrs. to 19:00 hrs. of Feb. 27th, and as result of the
autopsy, the cause of death of [Ryan] was excessive bleeding from the cut "Wrist of [Ryan] apparently
by scissors. The Ulsan Maritime Police requested the hand-written statements of all remaining crews of
"HARUNA EXPRESS" in the evening hours of Feb. 27th, which were prepared submitted to the Police
in the morning hours of Feb. 28th, and then "HARUNA EXPRESS" sailed off Ulsan Port at 12:30 hrs.
of Feb. 28th.

VI) Cause of Death of Mr. Dechavez:

Based on x x x all [information] available as reported herein, the cause of death of [Ryan] was
concluded to be suicide.46
Indeed, it is settled that:
In labor cases, [this Court's review power] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court involves the
determination of the legal correctness of the CA Decision. This means that [this] Court must ascertain
whether the CA [had] properly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC Decision. Simply put, 'in testing for legal correctness, [this] Court views the CA Decision in the
same context that the [Rule 65] petition for certiorari it [adjudicated] was presented' to [that court]. It
entails limited review of the acts of the NLRC, [viz.,] whether [the NLRC] committed errors of
jurisdiction. It does not cover the issue of whether the NLRC committed any error of judgment, unless
there is showing that its findings and conclusions were arbitrarily arrived at or were not based on
substantial evidence;47
In the present case, both the LA and the NLRC ruled that Shirley's claim for death benefits was without
basis since. Ryan committed suicide as principally established by the Medical Certificate of Death
issued by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital, who attested that the direct cause of Ryan's
death was "Intentional Self-Harm by [Hanging], Strangulation and Suffocation."48 Both the LA and
the NLRC also adverted to the Report prepared by the INTECO which stated that .
The autopsy on the corpse of [Ryan] was performed at the Ulsan City Hospital under the witness of all
parties concerned including us Mr. Leow Ai Hin, Senior Shipping Executive of Thome Ship
Management Pte Ltd., Singapore from 18:00 hours to 19:00 hours of February 27th, and as result of the
autopsy, the cause of death of [Ryan] was excessive bleeding from the cut wrist of [Ryan], apparently
by scissors. The Ulsan Maritime Police requested the handwritten statements of all remaining crews of
'Haruna Express' in the evening of February 27, which were prepared submitted to the police in the
morning hours of February 28th, and then 'Haruna Express' sailed off Ulsan Port at 12:30 of February
28.

xxxx

Based on x x x all [information] available as reported herein, the cause of death of [Ryan] was
concluded to be suicide.49
Elaborating on the foregoing, Leow Ai Hin, Marine Personnel Manager of the Thome Ltd., stated in
Attachment No. 4:
xxxx

LATE C/COOK DECHAVEZ'S FAMILY HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AND INFORMED OF HIS
DEATH. ON INVESTIGATION WITH THE FAMILY FOR POSSIBLE REASON OF HIS
INTENDED SUICIDE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MOTHER HAD ACTUALLY WANTED
HIM TO TAKE LOAN FOR HOUSE INVESTMENT. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY HIS WIFE, WE
BELIEVE THAT X X X THIS BIG INVESTMENT AMOUNT HAS PUT VERY HEAVY
[RESPONSIBILITY] ON HIM THAT HE MAY HAVE LOST HIS DIRECTION AND PURSUE
THE DEATH SOLUTION. BESIDES HE WAS JUST PROMOTED TO CHIEF COOK [IN] THIS
CONTRACT AFTER SERVING CONTRACTS BEFORE WITH US AS MESSMAN.

WE DO NOT SUSPECT ANY FOUL PLAY ON BOARD AS HE IS VERY WELL LIKED BY ALL
CREWMEMBERS AND HAS NO DISPUTE OR ENEMIES WITH ANYONE ON BOARD. THE
CREW STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE POLICE YESTERDAY CAN TESTIFY TO HIS STATUS
[ON BOARD].50
We believe that the above-mentioned pieces of documentary evidence upon which both the LA and the
NLRC erected their conclusions that Ryan's death was directly attributable to his own deliberate act
and will, in other words, suicide, constitute substantial evidence that Ryan was the author of his own
death. In the absence, as in this case, of incontrovertible proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that
the persons who prepared these documents acted in good faith to attest to the facts they saw or had
personal knowledge of, even as it should also be presumed that these documents likewise spoke the
truth. Indeed the facts and circumstances mentioned in said documents pointing to the fact that Ryan's
death was suicide, are spread all over the entire records of the case, indicating purposeful and
deliberate intent to bring out the core reality that Ryan was the author of his own death. What is more,
the sum of such facts and circumstances had been recognized, appreciated and adopted by both the LA
and the NLRC and was made the underpinning of the most critical and crucial basis of their Decisions
which they rendered in the regular performance of their duties.

By contrast, the question may be asked: What was the basis of the CA in granting the petition for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari instituted before it by Shirley? According to the CA, the findings of the
Medical Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital which
mentioned the direct cause of Ryan's death as Intentional Self-Harm by Hanging, Strangulation and
Suffocation, are at war with the cause of death mentioned in the INTECO Report, which described "the
cause of death of [Ryan as] excessive bleeding from the cut wrist of [Ryan] apparently by scissors".51
If there is any difference between the two documents with respect to Ryan's suicidal death, it is
difference with hardly any distinction. In point of fact, however, the CA appeared to have overlooked
that the INTECO Report stressed the cause of death of Ryan thus: "Based on [all the foregoing
information] available as reported herein, the cause of death of [Ryan] was concluded to be suicide."52
It is evident that the appellate tribunal had engaged in petty nitpicking in pitting the findings made in
the two documents. This is so because death by intentional self-harm as stated in the Medical
Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital is the necessary
equivalent of suicide mentioned in the INTECO Report.

The CA also asked the rhetorical question:

[W]ho is this 'International Inspection and Testing Corporation' that performed the autopsy and
prepared the Investigation Report? Is this corporation trained to perform an autopsy? More importantly,
are its findings officially recognized? The Court has scoured the record and it could not see one iota of
description, aside [from the fact] that [it] is 'foreign corporation' that would tend to lend credence to
itself as an investigative body and to its findings.53
Such rhetorical question by the CA need not merit clear-cut answer if only because it is rhetorical
question. It suffices to say, however, that both the LA and the NLRC took notice of the INTECO
Report and both agencies were well in their right and power to do so. It is horn-book law that quasi-
judicial agencies like the LA and the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of evidence that are
observed by the regular courts of justice.54 Thus, in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Pedrajas,55 this
Court had occasion to observe:
Apparent from the foregoing, the report of the Italian Medical Examiner, which stated that Hernani
committed suicide is more categorical and definite than the uncertain findings of the PNP Crime
Laboratory and the NBI that homicide cannot be totally ruled out. Excerpts from the PNP and NBI
reports would disclose that both agencies were unsure if homicide or suicide was the underlying cause
of Hernani's death. Hence, the Court agrees with the findings of the LA and his judgment to give
weight and credence to the evidence submitted by the petitioners proving that Hernani committed
suicide.56
The CA also asked another rhetorical question:
Third, why was there no official autopsy done on the body of the deceased seafarer by the Ulsan
Maritime Police? And if there ever was an autopsy done by the Ulsan Maritime Police, where is the
autopsy report of the police? The Court would think the shipping company, understandably interested
in avoiding paying any compensation, would prefer an autopsy done by the police rather than private
corporation. After all, the findings of the police are accorded respect and regularity by the courts, but
curiously enough in this case, the shipping company decided to have the body examined by private
corporation whose credentials to perform an autopsy have not even been verified.57
This observation is of no consequence in this matter. For in point of fact, the INTECO's Report
categorically stated that the Ulsan Maritime Police were present when the cadaver of Ryan was being
autopsied at the Ulsan Hospital. Moreover, it noted that the Ulsan Maritime Police had requested
handwritten statements of all remaining crews of the Haruna Express in the evening February 27, 2006
which were prepared and submitted to the police in the morning of February 28, 2006 after which the
Haruna Express sailed off Ulsan Port at 12:30 of February 28, 2006.

What is more, it is not for the CA to substitute its own discretion for the discretion of the LA and the
NLRC relative to labor relations cases that are within these agencies' peculiar expertise and
jurisdiction. The CA apparently overlooked that the case instituted before it is petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which addresses nothing more than the question of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. And, to repeat, we find nothing in the Decisions
of both the LA and the NLRC that approximates grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The reason is that the Decisions of both the LA and the NLRC are grounded on
substantial evidence which stemmed from the aforestated documentary evidence that were presented by
the petitioners before the LA and the NLRC.

Almost on all fours with this case is our holding in Unicol Management Services, Inc. v. Malipot:58
Normally, the Supreme Court is not trier of facts. However, since the findings of the CA and the NLRC
were conflicting, it is incumbent upon this Court to wade through the records to find out if there was
enough basis for the CA's reversal of the NLRC decision.
In this case, the CA ruled out the commission by seaman Glicerio of suicide on the ground that the
evidence presented by petitioners, such as the Medico-Legal Report and Death Certificate, did not state
the circumstances regarding the cause of seaman Glicerio's death. Also, the CA held that the
Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Master's Report were submitted for the first time on appeal
to the NLRC, and thus, should not have been admitted by the NLRC.

First, this Court would like to underline the fact that the NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the
first time on appeal on the ground that it may ascertain facts objectively and speedily without regard to
technicalities of law in the interest of substantial justice.

In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission 4th Division, We held that our jurisprudence is
replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and
submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence before the
NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with
this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits,
submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.

Moreover, among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that
the Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others. In
addition, the Commission may, among other things, conduct investigation for the determination of a
question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the
absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its
proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer
technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the
parties upon due notice. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence on
cases appealed before the Commission, otherwise, its factual conclusions would not have been given
great respect, much weight, and relevance when an adverse party assails the decision of the NLRC via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to this Court via
petition for review under Rule 45.

Accordingly, if we take into consideration the Investigation Report, log book extracts and Master's
Report submitted by petitioners, the same all strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he
committed suicide.

Contrary to the findings of the CA, it appears that the Investigation Report submitted by Inchcape
Shipping Services completely detailed the events that happened prior to seaman Glicerio's death, i.e.,
from the last person who corresponded with him when he was still alive, the circumstances leading to
the day he was discovered dead, to the person who discovered him dead. Based on the investigation, it
appears that seaman Glicerio was cheerful during the first two months. However, he, thereafter, kept to
himself after telling people that his family is facing problems in the Philippines and that he .already
informed petitioners to look for his replacement.

The result of the above investigations is even bolstered by the Medical Report issued by Dr. Sajeed
Aboobaker who diagnosed sean1an Glicerio with musculoskeletal pain and emotional trauma due to
family problems, when the latter complained of chest pains and palpitations on December 10, 2008.

Second, both the Medico-Legal Report and Death certificate indicate that the actual cause of death of
seaman Glicerio is 'suicidal asphyxia due to hanging.'

The Medico-Legal Report issued by the United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Justice states:
Medico-Legal Report on Case No. 2/2009/Casualties

In accordance with the letter of the Director of Fujairah Public Prosecution dated 09.07.2006 to carry
out the external examination on the remains of Mr. Glicerio Ramirez [M]alipot, Filipino national, to
show the reason of death and how death occurred, I, Prof. Dr. Osman Abdul Hameed Awad. medico-
legal senior consultant in Fujairah, hereby certify that I carried out the external examination on the
aforementioned body on 15.01.2009 at Fujairah Hospital Postmortem. also reviewed the minutes of
investigations. Moreover, I hereby decide the following:

A) External Examination:

The body is for man aging about 56 years, in saprophytic state because of being in the refrigerator
along with blood precipitation in the upper and lower limbs. I noticed deep lacerated groove transverse
in the front of the neck and [the upper] level of the thyroid gristle with em width, going up and to the
two sides of the neck and disappears beneath the ear along with the emergence of the tongue outside
the.mouth. did not notice any recent injuries in the body.

B) Opinion:

Based on the above, I decide the following:

1)
Based on the external examination of the body of the aforementioned deceased deep lacerated groove
round the neck. It (sic) vital and recent. It occurs as result of pressure and hanging with an elastic body
such as rope x x x
2)
The death is due to suicidal Asphyxia due to hanging.
3)
The time of death synchronizes with the given date.
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that there was no foul play regarding seaman Glicerio's suicide
considering that an external examination of his body shows no violence or resistance or any external
injuries. In fact, the post-mortem examination conclusively established that the true cause of death was
suicidal asphyxia due to hanging.

All told, taking the Medico-Legal Report and the Death Certificate, together with the Investigation
Report, log book extracts, and Master's Report, we find that petitioners were able to substantially prove
that seaman Glicerio's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing
suicide.

With that settled, we now resolve the issue of whether respondent is entitled to death compensation
benefits under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract.

Section 20 of the POEA "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships," provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

xxxx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under
the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during
the time of payment
xxxx

D
No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided,
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly
attributable to the seafarer.
Clearly, the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is
established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may
be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury
directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. Thus, since petitioners were able to substantially
prove that seaman Glicerio's death is directly attributable to his deliberate act of hanging himself, his
death, therefore, is not compensable and his heirs not entitled to any compensation or benefits.

Finally, although this Court commiserates with the respondent, absent substantial evidence from which
reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, we are left with no choice but to
deny her petition, lest an injustice be caused to the employer. While it is true that labor contracts are
impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA Employment Contract must be
construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment
onboard ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged January 31, 2011 Decision and August 8,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112898 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the December 16, 2009 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
LAC OFW (M) 09-000540-09 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, and Tijam JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-21953 March 28, 1969

ENCARNACION GATIOAN, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
SIXTO GAFFUD ET AL., defendants,


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.

Felix Fernandez for plaintiff-appellee. 
Tomas Besa and Jose B. Galang for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the Court of First Instance of Isabela.

The facts as found by the said court are as follows:

The land in question was originally registered in the name of Rufina Permison under Original
Certificate of Title No. L-3432, dated December 18, 1935 on the basis of a free patent. In the year
1948, Permison sold it to Sibreno Novesteras, who in turn, conveyed it to appellee Encarnacion
Gatioan on April 1, 1949. Through the initiative of appellee, the said Original Certificate of Title No.
L-3432 in the name of Rufina Permison was cancelled on June 3, 1949 and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1212 was issued in favor of appellee.

On June 12, 1950, appellee obtained a loan in the amount of P900.00 from the appellant, Philippine
National, Bank, and as security therefor, mortgaged the land described in TCT No. T-1212. Said
mortgage was duly inscribed at the back of the title but was cancelled when it was fully paid on June 3,
1953. Using the same land and title as collateral, appellee acquired another loan in the sum of
P1,100.00 from the same bank on May 3, 1954. The annotated incumbrance covering this second loan
was upon its being paid released on June 28, 1956. On July 18, 1957, appellee secured, a third loan
from the same bank, this time for a bigger amount — P2,800,00. Again, she remortgaged the same land
and title. This third loan appears as Entry No. 8511 at the back of TCT No. T-1212. The third loan not
yet paid, she secured an additional loan of P3,170.00 from the same bank on July 30, 1957, for which
she, however, gave as collateral, another parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-4807. The deed of
mortgage covering the last amount was jointly and severally execution by appellee and the other
registered co-owners appearing in the last mentioned title.

On August 12, 1960, appellee paid P2,800.00, plus interest, in full payment of the last loan secured by
mortgage on the land covered by TCT No. T-1212, as per receipt No. 402272-B. Partial payment was
also given for the other joint obligation secured with the joint deed of mortgage on the other land.
Despite these payments, appellant executed no instrument releasing or discharging the incumbrance on
TCT No. T-1212.

In the meantime, on January 23, 1956, the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan
procured a free patent covering the identical parcel of land described in TCT No. T-1212 of appellee,
on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-6038 was issued in their favor. On May 15,
1956 and January 8, 1957, they also obtained two loans from appellant Bank in the sum of P1,400.00
and P300.00, respectively, and as collateral for both, they mortgaged the said land covered by OCT No.
P-6038. Without paying these two obligations, a consolidated mortgage in the sum of P2,300.00 was
executed by them on June 17, 1957, for which they gave as security in addition to the land described in
OCT No. P-6038, another parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title No. 3137, also in
their names.

Subsequently, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources compared the technical
descriptions, areas, lot numbers and cadastral numbers of the land described in TCT No. T-1212 with
that covered by OCT No. P-6088, and convinced that both titles covered the same identical land, he
recommended the cancellation of the latter.lâwphi1.ñet

On May 16, 1962, because of the existence of OCT No. P-6038 in the name of the defendant spouses
Gaffud and Logan, containing an annotation of the aforementioned consolidated mortgage in favor of
the appellant Bank, and the annotation on TCT No. T-1212 of the mortgage incumbrance covering the
already paid loan of P2,800.00 to the appellee, which appellant Bank refused to have cancelled,
appellee filed the complaint for quieting of title in this case.

The above facts were found by the lower court from the stipulations submitted by the parties, except
defendant spouses Gaffud and Logan who were declared in default. No oral evidence was presented by
any of the parties.

From a judgment favorable to the plaintiff thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

(a) Declaring null and void ab initio the patent and certificate of title No. P-6038 issued in the name of
the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan;

(b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Isabela to cancel, upon payment of the fees, original certificate of
title No. P-6038 in the name of said spouses and ordering the Philippine National Bank to surrender to
the Register of Deeds of Isabela the owner's duplicate certificate of said title for its cancellation;

(c) Declaring the real estate mortgage executed by the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora
Logan in favor of the Bank, recorded on OCT P-6038 null and void and unenforceable as against the
herein plaintiff, and ordering its cancellation, without prejudice of the Bank's right to collect from the
said spouses;

(d) Dismissing the complaint and its prayer, to order the defendant bank to immediately cancel or
release the mortgage recorded on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1212 in the name of the plaintiff,
unless the other joint obligation secured with the joint deed of mortgage executed by the herein
plaintiff together with her co-debtors has been full paid; and

(e) The court hereby sentences the defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan to pay to the
plaintiff as actual or compensatory and exemplary or corrective damages, and attorney's fees, the total
amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00), and to pay the costs.

only the appellant Bank has come to Us on appeal on a sole question of law related to paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) thereof. (See Notice of Appeal, p. 90, Record on Appeal.)

Appellant does not, however, impugn the lower court's ruling in declaring null and void and
cancelling OCT No. P-6038 in favor of the defendant spouses Gaffud and Logan; it only insists that the
lower court should have declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith and for value as regards the
mortgages executed in its favor by said defendant spouses and duly annotated on their abovementioned
OCT P-6038 and that consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be carried over to and
considered as incumbrances on the land covered by TCT No. T-1212 of appellee which, as already
stated, is the identical land covered by OCT P-6038 of the Gaffuds. We find no merit, whatsoever, in
this contention, because the point raised was already passed upon by this Court in no uncertain terms in
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, way back on October 2, 1915 and in subsequent cases of similar
nature. 1 We unhesitatingly affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Indeed, upon the facts found by the trial court as above stated, there can be no question that the
decision of this Court in Legarda v. Saleeby, supra, is controlling herein. Therein this Court held:

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 56, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that
the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against the defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser". That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser", by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land,
including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to appellee an "innocent
purchaser", as the phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by
reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall,
to an "innocent purchaser", would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser", as
the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, if said sections are to be applied. Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to
be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These
questions indicate to difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase
"innocent purchaser", in said sections.

May the purchaser of the land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser", as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It
is never issued until it is recorded. The record is notice to all the world. All persons are charged with
the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded or any portion of it,
must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses. This rule is so
well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710-[a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin v. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis v. Newell 17 Conn. 97; Buchanan v. International Bank, 78 111. 500; Youngs v. Wilson, 27 N.Y.
351; McCabe v. Grey, 20 Cal. 509; Montefiore v. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take
notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property, be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art. 1875.) In the face of that
statute, would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance
have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be
relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains is
just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law: that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the plea of ignorance of the law of
affecting a contract as to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public
record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser" when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55,
and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser" should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in no sense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land
included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes
the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land
included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In
order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safer rule to establish. We believe the phrase
"innocent purchaser", used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has
been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under
the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to
all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even be regarded as the holder in good faith of that part
of the land included in his certificate which had theretofore been included in the original certificate of
the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under
the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and included in his deed of transfer the
very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said
strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility.
Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his
vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question
must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that the rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from
the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for
damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate
who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors
should be permitted to secure in their title against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and
who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which
he is charged and by reason of his negligence should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such
purchaser case rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence. (31 Phil. 590, 599-603)

Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank grants a loan on the security of land, it
first undertakes a careful examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physical and on-the-spot
investigation of the land itself offered as security. Undoubtedly, had herein appellant Bank taken such a
step which is demanded by the most ordinary prudence, it would have easily discovered the flaw in the
title of the defendant spouses; and if it did not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be
held to be guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in question. In either case, appellant
Bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law. 2

A more factual approach would lead to the same result. From the stipulated facts, it can be seen that
prior to the execution of the mortgage between appellant and the defendant spouses, the appellee had
been mortgaging the land described in TCT No. T-1212 to it. She did this first in the year 1950 for a
loan of P900.00, and again in 1954 for a loan of P1,100.00. In both instances, the appellant Bank had
possession of, or at least, must have examined appellee's title, TCT No. T-1212, wherein appear clearly
the technical description, exact area, lot number and cadastral number of the land covered by said title.
In other words, by the time the defendant spouses offered OCT P-6038, in their names, for scrutiny in
connection with their own application for loan with appellant, the latter was charged with the notice of
the identity of the technical descriptions, areas, lot numbers and cadastral numbers of the lands
purportedly covered by the two titles and was in a position to know, if it did not have such knowledge
actually, that they referred to one and the same lot. Under the circumstances, appellant had absolutely
no excuse for approving the application of the defendant spouses and giving the loans in question. To
appellant, therefore, fittingly applies the following pronouncement of this Court:

One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of, title in his vendor cannot claim
that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put
him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the
title of his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon
his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title will not make him an innocent purchaser for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice
of the defect as would have led to its discovery had be acted with that measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation..... (Dayao v. Diez, supra; citing the
case of Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery. Co., 37 Phil; 644.)
 Anyway, appellant Bank is not without any remedy. It appears that, defendant spouses have another
land covered by OCT 3137 which is also mortgaged to it and which perhaps may yet be sufficient to
cover the loans in question. In any event, again, the following ruling of this Court in the recent case of
De Villa v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968, applies to appellant:

We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title around issued to different persons covering
the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in case
of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding
under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second certificate.
The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort to his vendor for
redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who should be
permitted to resort secure in their title. (Citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590) [Emphasis supplied]

The recourse to the cases of Blanco, et al. v. Esquierdo, G.R. No. L-15182, December 28, 1960 and
Director of Lands v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606, made by appellant in its brief is obviously unavailing. The
factual settings of those cases are entirely different from the one before Us now. In the case of Abache,
what happened was that the land which one Santiago Imperial and his mother claimed during the
cadastral proceedings was adjudicated by the cadastral court in its decision to other parties, the
Adornados, who had never made any claim thereto, and when the Imperials asked later on, after the
decree and title had been issued, for the annulment of such title in the name of said non-claimants, it
appeared that the latter had already mortgaged the land to one Luis Meneses. This Court decreed that
although the title of the Adornados was void and the Imperials were entitled to the issuance of the title
in their favor, the mortgage in favor of Meneses constituted a valid lien over the land; the remedy of
the Imperials was to go against the Assurance Fund. Thus, in that case, there was nothing in the title
itself which could indicate to Meneses that there was a flaw in the title of the Adornados, because the
error was committed by the court in the proceedings and not in the issuance of the title, hence it
contained on its face no circumstances of suspicion at all, from any point of view, unlike in the present
case wherein an examination of the title of the defendant spouses was sufficient to put appellant on
notice that the land described therein was identical with the land it had previously dealt with under
another title in the name of somebody else.

The same is true with the other cited case of Blanco, et al. v. Esquierdo, supra. The pertinent portions
of said decision are as follows:

That the certificate of title issued in the name of Fructuosa Esquierdo is a nullity, the same having
been secured thru fraud, is not here in question. The only question for determine nation is whether the
defendant bank is entitled to the protection accorded to "innocent purchasers for value", which phrase,
according to sec. 38 of the Land Registration Law, includes an innocent mortgagee for value. The
question, in our opinion, must be answered in the affirmative.

The trial court, in the decision complained of, made no finding that the defendant mortgagee bank was
a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Fructuosa Esquierdo. Indeed, there is nothing alleged in
the complaint which may implicate said defendant mortgagee in the fraud, or justify a finding that it
acted in bad faith. On the other hand, the certificate of title was in the name of the mortgagor Fructuosa
Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to the defendant bank. Such being the case, the said
defendant bank, as mortgagee, had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and, in the
absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. (De Lara, et al., vs.
Ayroso, 50 Off. Gaz. 4838; Joaquin vs. Madrid, et al., G.R. No. L-13551, January 30, 1960.) Being
thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and
protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto thru fraud. The remedy of the persons
prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those causing the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for the recovery of damages
against the Assurance Fund. (De la Cruz vs. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144; Blondeau vs. Nena, 61 Phil. 625;
Sumira, et al. vs. Vistan, et al., 74 Phil. 138; Raymundo et al., vs. Mayon Realty Corp., et al., 54 Off.
Gaz. 4954; Avecilla vs. Yatco, et al., 54 Off. Gaz. 6415.)

In this connection, it will be noted that the deceased Maximiano Blanco died way back in 1930 and
the certificate of title pursuant to his homestead application was issued in the name of his heirs
sometime in 1934. Plaintiffs, however, took no steps for the settlement of their late brother's estate and
instead merely took possession of the land in question jointly with Fructuosa Esquierdo. They also
appear to have entrusted the owner's certificate to said Fructuosa Esquierdo thus making it possible for
her to fraudulently secure a transfer certificate of title in her name. This should be emphasized, for in
several cases it is what impelled this Court to apply the principle of equity that "as between two
innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who. made it
possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss". (De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso supra.)

Again, it is clear that in that case, the title examined by the bank had no indication, whatsoever, of
any, defect in it, unlike, as already stated, in this case.

By no means of reasoning, therefore, can anyone ever say that the case cited and relied upon by
appellant could have modified the doctrine in Legarda v. Saleeby, supra, and the other cases wherein it
was reiterated. In fact, no mention at all is made by appellant of the Legarda v. Saleeby case in its brief
by way of explaining way said appellant had to bring this case on appeal to Us in the face of the said
decision which explained clearly and in detail the law on the point appellant now urges before Us. We
are thus persuaded that appellant paid little heed to the merit or lack of merit of this appeal which We
find to be frivolous.

WHEREFORE, as appellant has not appealed from the judgment of the lower court insofar as
paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof are concerned, said paragraphs stand, and the rest of said judgment is
hereby affirmed. Double costs against appellant in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes

1
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644; La Urbana v. Bernardo. 62 Phil. 790; Dayao v.
Diez, G.R. No. L-4106, May 29, 1952.

2
Although the case of Legarda v. Saleeby, supra, refers specifically to purchasers, Section 38 of Act
496 as amended, provides that "Whenever the phrase 'innocent purchaser for value' or any equivalent
phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value."
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 211111, September 25, 2017

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., ITS PRESIDENT, AND GULF ENERGY
MARITIME, Petitioners, v. NOEL N. ORBETA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the October 18, 2013 Decision2 and January 28,
2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
125046 and affirming in toto the December 29, 2011 Decision4 and April 30, 2012 Resolution5 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC (OFW-M) No. 05-000371-
11.

Factual Antecedents

On June 11, 2009, respondent Noel N. Orbeta was hired by
petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (CF Sharp), on behalf of its foreign principal and co-
petitioner herein, Gulf Energy Maritime (GEM), as Able Seaman on board the vessel "M/T Gulf
Coral". He boarded on September 9, 2009 and thereupon commenced his work.

It appears that
on January 3, 2010, while on duty, respondent, as he was closing the vessel's air valve, slipped and
fell on his back, and landed on the vessel's metal floor.6

On February 8, 2010, while the vessel
was docked in the United Arab Emirates, respondent was referred for medical examination after
complaining of pain in his lower right abdomen, difficulty in passing urine, and slight irritation in
the urinal area. After examination by a physician, he was diagnosed with acute lumbago and
recommended for immediate repatriation.7

On February 10, 2010, respondent was repatriated
and, upon arrival, he immediately reported for post-employment examination and treatment to the
company-designated physician, to whom he disclosed the January 3, 2010 accident. He was placed
under the care of an orthopedic surgeon, who found him to be suffering from "compression
fracture, L1, minimal."8 As a result, respondent underwent physical therapy to rehabilitate his back,
and was advised to wear a lumbar corset and undergo magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the
lumbosacral spine. For medication, he was given neuron enhancers and pain relievers. 9

On
June 16, 2010, after the MRI results came out, respondent was temporarily diagnosed with
"lumbosacral muscular spasm with mild spondylosis L3-L4;"10 the company-designated physician
also concluded that there was no compression fracture, contrary to what was initially suspected.
Respondent was thus given a Grade 10 partial disability rating pertaining to moderate rigidity of the
truncal area.11 He was scheduled to undergo a bone scan on July 16, 2010.

On July 16, 2010,
respondent failed to appear before the company physician for the scheduled bone scan;12 instead, it
appears that he consulted with an independent orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Nicanor Escutin (Dr.
Escutin), who prepared and signed a "Disability Report"13 dated September 8, 2010 stating as
follows:

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

> COMPRESSION FRACTURE, L1

> LUMBAR SPONDYLOSIS

DISABILITY RATING:

Based on the physical examination and supported by laboratory examination, he had his injury on
his LOW BACK while working. He fell on the deck when their ship swayed. The fall was strong
enough which resulted in some injury on his lumbar spine. He had several months of physical
therapy but his back pain persisted, so he had MRI studies. His MRI showed that there is a [sic]
some defect on his L3 vertebra. He was advised to have Bone scanning test to determine what is
causing the abnormality at L3. The spondylosis at L3/L4 showed that there is some structural defect
at L3 which is maybe due to the fall he sustained last Jan '10. He should undergo Bone Scan and
EMG-NCV to determine the exact problem on his lumbar spine. If nothing is done, his condition
might worsen which can incapacitate him. He will [sic] is not capable of returning to his former job
as a seaman since he has still on and off back pain.

He is given a PERMANENT DISABILITY. He is UNFIT FOR SEA-DUTY in whatever capacity as

a SEAMAN.14
Notably, Dr. Escutin's findings included a recommendation for respondent to undergo Bone Scan
and EMG-NCV15 to determine the exact problem on his lumbar spine, which is consistent with the
recommendations of the company-designated physician.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Instead of following the respective medical opinions of his and the company-designated physician,
as well as subjecting himself to the required bone scan and other tests to fully determine and treat
his condition, respondent filed on July 20, 2010 a complaint for payment of permanent and total
disability benefits, medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees against petitioners before the
NLRC NCR, Quezon City, docketed as NLRC--NCR Case No. (M) 07-09911-10.

In his Position Paper16 and other pleadings,17 respondent claimed that his work-related spinal injury
entitles him to permanent and total disability and other benefits afforded him under his Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract, as well as damages
for the anxiety and stress he suffered as a result of petitioners' refusal to pay his claims. Thus, he
prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him a) permanent total disability benefits in the amount of
US$89,000.00 or its peso equivalent; b) sickness benefit allowance of US$3,070.00; c) moral and
exemplary damages at P500,000.00 each; and d) 10% attorney's fees.

In their joint Position Paper18 and other pleadings,19 petitioners sought dismissal of the complaint,
arguing that respondent is not entitled to his claim of permanent total disability benefits, in view of
the company- designated physician's final and binding Grade 10 assessment; that respondent
abandoned his treatment, which was still ongoing when he filed the labor case; that respondent is
entitled only to US$17,954.00 as compensation for his Grade 10 disability rating; yet by abandoning
his treatment and violating the POEA contract, respondent should be held responsible and is not
entitled to disability and other benefits, damages, and all other claims, and for this reason,
respondent's case should be dismissed; that respondent's resort to an independent physician who
arrived at a contrary finding entitled petitioners to secure the opinion of a third doctor, pursuant to
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA contract,20 which could no longer be done in view of the filing of the
labor case, and for this reason, the opinion of the company-designated physician should instead
prevail; that respondent's back pain does not deserve a Grade 1 rating under Section 32 of the
POEA contract,21 as it is not severe and did not render him completely immobile or paralyzed; and,
that respondent's other claims are thereby rendered unfounded and baseless. Petitioners prayed that
they be held liable only for the total amount of US$17,954.00 which is equivalent to the Grade 10
disability rating given by the company-designated physician.

On February 23, 2011, a Decision22 was rendered by Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas granting
disability benefits and attorney's fees in favor of respondent. The Decision decrees as follows:
It appears from the foregoing facts, circumstances and arguments advanced by the opposing parties,
the only issue is that of disability rating.

After [a] careful evaluation of the positions of complainant and [respondents,] this Office finds the
disability gradings issued by the company designated doctor and the independent Physician to be
inappropriate.

It was established that the complainant suffered injury of [the] lumbar spine due to [an] accident
while on board [the] MV Gulf Coral on January 3, 2010. He was subjected to [a] series of Medical
examination and treatment for almost five (5) months by the company doctor and later on by an
independent physician for having suffered intermiheat [sic] pains at the back.

On June 16, 2010 the [sic] Dra. Susannah Ong-Salvador, [respondents'] Medical Coordinator
prematurely issued a disability assessment of Grade 10 to the complainant x x x though the
complainant has yet to undergo Bone Scan xx x. This to our mind is [an] inappropriate assessment
of the disability grade of [the] complainant because he has not fully recovered. While it may be true
that the assessment of the company designated physician has great probative value, it could not be
said as [binding] and conclusive as the assessment issued to complainant was done prior to the
termination of Medical examinations.
Independent Doctor assessment of complainant's disability grading is likewise inappropriate as it
was merely based on presumption. It was noted that from the disability rating issued by Dr. Nicanor
F. Escutin x x x is not yet certain to warrant issuance of disability rating. x x x

xxxx

Considering therefore the degree of the injury suffered and the duration of complainant's Medical
treatment this Office finds the disability rating stated in paragraph 4, Chest-Trunk-Spine, Section 32
of Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going Vessel applicable which states:

'CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE

xxxx

4. Fracture of the dorsal or lumbar spines resulting to [severe] or total rigidity of the trunk or total
loss of lifting power of heavy objects ------- GR. 6

xxxx

The [claim] for payment of Medical expenses and damages has no legal and factual bases hence the
same must fail.

The claim for payment of attorney's fees is warranted in the light of the legal services rendered by
the counsel for the complainant in protecting the rights and interest of his client by way of recovery
of the disability benefits of the latter.

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

the respondents
To pay complainant his disability benefits equivalent to Disability Grade 6 in the amount of
US$44,550 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.

To pay attorney's fee of ten (10%) percent of complainant's monetary award.

Other claims dismissed.

SO ORDERED.23
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioners took the matter before the NLRC, via appeal docketed as NLRC LAC (OFW-M) No. 05-
000371-11.

On December 29, 2011, the NLRC issued its Decision, declaring as follows:
The appeal has no merit.

It is an undisputed fact that complainant-appellee's work-related injury has not been resolved
despite the extensive medical management undertaken by the company-designated physician for a
period of more than 120 days or from February 11 to June 16, 2010. By reason thereof, both the
company-designated physician and Dr. Escutin found it imperative for the complainant-appellee to
undergo a Bone Scan for the purpose of determining the cause of the abnormality in his lumbar
spine. As it remains unresolved, complainant-appellee continues to suffer intermittent pain on his
back. Undeniably, this unstable condition of the complainant-appellee gave rise to the varying
assessments on the extent of his disability by the two (2) doctors based on their own medical
perspectives. It is worthy to underscore that both doctors are Orthopedic Surgeons, whose
competence and expertise to address the medical condition of the complainant-appellee are definitely
beyond question.

We analyzed the disability ratings of the company-designated physician and Dr. Escutin for the
purpose of resolving the issue pertaining to the extent of disability compensation and We are
persuaded that the former had thoroughly examined complainant-appellee. Dr. Escutin however
only saw him once and the basis of his disability report was not revealed, thus making his finding
inconclusive. However, We cannot ignore the fact that the company doctor merely gave a provisional
rating. Additionally, complainant-appellee was advised to undergo bone scan. We are convinced that
these facts are articulate indicators that complainant-appellee's illness has not been resolved even
after the lapse of 120 days.

It bears to stress that it is not the medical significance of the illness that solely determines whether a
seafarer is permanently or totally disabled. The nature of his job vis-a-vis his illness should also
considered. Complainant-Appellee worked as an Able Seaman. As such he is expected to be
physically fit because agility and [strength] are requirements of his job. Complainant-Appellee has
been found to be suffering from spondylosis, which has been described as the degeneration of the
spine caused by wear and tear on the joints. According to medical literature, deterioration involves
the cartilages and bones in either the cervical spine (joints of the neck) sometimes referred to as
cervical spondylosis or the lumbar spine sometimes referred to as lumbar degenerative disc disease x
x x. With this kind of ailment, it is plain to see that complainant-appellee's seafaring career as an
able seaman has come to an untimely end. It is for this reason that We resolve to grant him total and
permanent disability benefit.

The concept of total and permanent disability has been expounded by the Supreme Court in this
wise:
'To be entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits, the employee 's disability must not only be total but also
permanent.

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any of his body.

Total disability, on the other hand, does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation,
it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one's earning capacity. Total disability does not require that the employee be
absolutely disabled, or totally [paralyzed] What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the
employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom.' x x x
With regard to the amount of total and permanent disability benefit due complainant-appellee, the
sum of US$89,100.00 is hereby awarded to him based on the benevolent provisions of the CBA and
not on the POEA Standard Employment Contract x x x.

Finally, the award of attorney's fees to the complainant-appellee is hereby deleted considering the
apparent lack of bad faith on the part of the respondents-appellants in dealing with the predicament
of the complainant-appellee. Respondents-Appellants' disclaimer of liability for total and permanent
disability benefits to the complainant-appellee is primarily anchored on their honest reliance on the
assessment rendered by the company-designated physician. It is a well-settled principle that even if a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights,
attorney's fees may still not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected
in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his
cause x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of Labor Arbiter
Catalino R. Laderas dated February 23, 2011 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1) Complainant-Appellee is hereby awarded the sum of US$89,100.00 or its equivalent in Philippine

Peso at the time of payment, representing his total and permanent disability benefits under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA); and

2) The award of attorney's fees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.24 (Citations omitted)

Respondent moved to reconsider, but in its April 30, 2012 Resolution, the NLRC held its ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners thus filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 125046, questioning the
NLRC's pronouncements and arguing that the award of permanent and total disability benefits was
unwarranted; that the NLRC should have limited itself to determining which of the two medical
opinions, that of the company-designated physician or the independent doctor, should prevail; and
that mere incapacity to return to work after 120 days does not automatically entitle respondent to a
Grade 1 disability rating, as his injury is specifically governed by the provisions of the POEA
contract.

On October 18, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision which contains the following
pronouncement:
In the case of floreta vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., the Supreme Court has applied the
Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to Filipino seafarers in keeping with the avowed
policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor, it holding that the notion of
disability is intimately related to the worker's capacity to earn, what is compensated being not his
injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity, hence,
disability should be understood less on its medical significance but more on the loss of earning
capacity.

Expounding on the matter, the Supreme Court has pronounced that permanent total disability
means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar
nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perforn1, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. Verily, permanent
disability has been defined as the inability of a worker to perforn1 his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

To be sure, in the case of Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation, the Supreme Court minced no
words in ruling that the inability of a seafarer to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days renders his disability total and permanent. x x x

xxxx

In the case at bench, private respondent was medically repatriated on 10 February 2010 and yet, at
the time of the filing of the present complaint on 20 July 2010, he has yet to obtain employment as a
seafarer in any capacity. Evidently, more than 120 days had already lapsed form the time of his
repatriation and the filing of the complaint. He was subjected to continued medical treatment and
rehabilitation without any development.

Suffering from such illness as a result of his accident on-board, which illness has yet to be cured or
medically resolved, private respondent is rendered unfit to work and resume his duties as an able
seaman, a job that requires heavy lifting and involves strenuous tasks. Rightly so, the NLRC
modified the Labor Arbiter Decision, considering that private respondent deserves a Grade 1
disability rating having failed to obtain employment for more than 120 days from his repatriation.

Emphatically, under the [POEA-SEC], two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be
compensable: First, that the injury or illness must be work-related; and Second, that the work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
Both elements are availing in the present case as the injury sustained by private respondent had
been a direct result of his work-related accident on-board and while on-duty as a seafarer.

So viewed, private respondent's impediment is deemed total and permanent and thus warrants the
award of disability benefits amounting to US$89,100.00 in accordance with the prevailing CBA
between the parties. Petitioners' arguments being devoid of factual and legal basis, there is no
cogent reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari and to deviate from the settled rule that
findings of facts of the NLRC are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Court, when supported
by substantial evidence, as in the case at bench.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED md the assailed
Decision dated 29 December 2011 and Resolution dated 30 April2012 [are] AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.25 (Citations omitted)

Petitioners moved to consider, but the CA was unmoved. Hence, the present Petition
Issues

Petitioners submit that -

x x x THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS,
CONSIDERING THAT:
RESPONDENT IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO TOTAL PERMANENT
DISABILITY BENEFITS SIMPLY BECAUSE, THRU HIS OWN FAULT, HIS BACK
CONDITION WAS NOT RESOLVED AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY (120) DAYS.

RESPONDENT VIOLATED HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE POEA-SEC BECAUSE HE

INEXPLICABLY ABANDONED HIS TREATMENT WITH THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED
DOCTORS.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEDICAL FINDING BY A THIRD DOCTOR, THE ASSESSMENT OF

THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED ORTHOPEDIC SURGEON IS CONTROLLING.26
Petitioners' Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and respondent's labor complaint be
dismissed, petitioners maintain in their Petition and Reply27 that the respondent's inability to work
for more than 120 days is not tantamount to permanent total disability; that in fact, there was as yet
no declaration with respect to his fitness to work or permanent total disability, as he required further
medical treatment and yet he abandoned the same; that instead of undergoing the required
treatment, respondent discontinued his medical visits to the company physician and thus prevented
petitioners from resolving his condition; that by his own actions, respondent intentionally prevented
his condition from being cured and caused the aggravation thereof, if any, in express violation of his
POEA contract which requires him to submit himself to treatment by the company physician; that
respondent was finally diagnosed by the company-designated physician with a Grade 10 disability
rating, which diagnosis should prevail over that of respondent's appointed physician, especially in
the absence of the required opinion from a third doctor chosen mutually by the parties; and, that
respondent's claim for disability benefits is thus limited to the Schedule of Disability Allowances
under Section 32 of the POEA standard contract.

Respondent's Arguments

In his Comment,28 respondent counters that as between the diagnosis of the company physician and
that of his appointed physician, Dr. Escutin, the latter prevails; that the evidence does not indicate
that further medication or additional treatment was required for his condition, and as a matter of
fact, no further medical treatment was advised for his case after June 16, 2010; that there was no
declaration of fitness for work by the company physician after more than 120 days of treatment, his
illness was not cured, and he could not return to work as a seaman on account of his injury; that
petitioners' claim that he abandoned his ongoing treatment deserves no consideration, as in fact he
was never told of such further treatment after his last consultation on June 16, 2010; that
petitioners' claim of further required treatment is a ploy to discredit him by precisely making it
appear that he refused to undergo treatment with the company physician; that petitioners' claim that
he called to inform them that he could not appear on July 16, 2010 for his scheduled bone scan is a
lie; and that the opinion of a third physician is not mandatory, the labor tribunals may simply
determine which of the conflicting medical opinions (company physician and independent
physician) should prevail based on the evidence and circumstances.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition in part.

'An employee's disability becomes permanent and total [only 1)] when so declared by the company-
designated physician, or, [2)] in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent
total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment periods, while the employee's disability
continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-
designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability.' The
'mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the payment of permanent total
disability benefits.' 'If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.' 29
For a little over 120 days, or from February 10, 2010 to June 16, 2010, 126 days to be exact,
respondent underwent treatment by the company-designated physician. On June 16, 2010, he was
partially diagnosed with "lumbosacral muscular spasm with mild spondylosis L3-L4;"30 the company
physician also concluded that there was no compression fracture, and respondent was told to return for
a scheduled bone scan. However, instead of returning for further diagnosis and treatment, respondent
opted to secure the opinion of an independent physician of his own choosing who, although arriving at
a finding of permanent total disability, nonetheless required respondent to subject himself to further
Bone Scan and Electromyography and Nerve Conduction Velocity tests "to determine the exact
problem on his lumbar spine."31

Instead of heeding the recommendations of his own doctor, respondent went on to file the subject labor
complaint. In point of law, respondent's filing of the case was premature.

The company-designated physician and Dr. Escutin are one in recommending that respondent undergo
at least a bone scan to determine his current condition while undergoing treatment, thus indicating that
respondent's condition needed further attention. In this regard, petitioners are correct in arguing that
respondent abandoned treatment, as under the law and the POEA contract of the parties, the company
physician is given up to 240 days to treat him. On the other hand, the fact that Dr. Escutin required the
conduct of further tests on respondent is an admission that his diagnosis of permanent total disability is
incomplete and inconclusive, and thus unreliable. It can only corroborate the company-designated
physician's finding that further tests and treatment are required.

In New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. Despabeladeras,32 this Court held that a seafarer is guilty of
medical abandonment for his failure to complete his treatment before the lapse of the 240-day period,
which prevents the company physician from declaring him fit to work or assessing his disability. Thus:
As recited earlier, upon Michael's return to the country, he underwent medical treatment in accordance
with the terms of the [POEA- SEC]. Upon his repatriation x x x, he was given medical attention
supervised by x x x the company-designated physician. He was later on endorsed to an orthopedic
surgeon. The company-designated specialist recommended that he continue with his physical therapy
sessions. During his visit on February 10, 2010, he was required to return for a follow up checkup x x
x. For unknown reasons, he failed to return on the said date.

It should be noted that on February 10, 2010 when Michael last visited the company-designated
orthopedic surgeon, it had been 166 days since he was referred to the company-designated physician
upon his repatriation x x x. During this time, Michael was under temporary total disability inasmuch as
the 240-day period provided under the aforecited Rules had not yet lapsed. The CA, therefore, erred
when it ruled that Michael's disability was permanent and total.

xxxx

On the issue of abandonment, the Court agrees with petitioners' stance that Michael was indeed guilty
of medical abandonment for his failure to complete his treatment even before the lapse of the 240 days
period. Due to his willful discontinuance of medical treatment with Dr. Cruz, the latter could not
declare him fit to work or assess his disability.

Michael's claim that requiring him to await the medical assessment of Dr. Cruz would mean that his
fate would unduly rest in the hands of the company doctor does not persuade. Worthy of note is that the
company- designated physician is mandated under the law to issue a medical assessment within 240
days from the seafarer's repatriation. It is, therefore, incorrect to conclude that a seafarer is at the mercy
of the company doctor.

Thus, without any disability assessment from Dr. Cruz, Michael's claim for disability compensation
cannot prosper. Section 20(D) of the POEA-SEC instructs that no compensation and benefits shall be
payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful
or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties. Michael was duty-bound to complete his medical
treatment until declared fit to work or assessed with a permanent disability grading. It is undisputed
that Michael did not undergo further treatment. x x x [S]uch a refusal negated the payment of disability
benefits.

Michael's breach of his duties under the POEA-SEC was aggravated by the fact [that] he filed his
complaint for permanent total disability benefits while he was under the care of the company-
designated specialist and without waiting for the latter's assessment of his condition. x x x 33 (Citations
omitted)
Identical rulings were arrived at in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission34 and, more recently, in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Quillao35 where this ponente
made the following pronouncement:
We agree with petitioners' contention that at the time of filing of the Complaint, respondent has no
cause of action because the company-designated physician has not yet issued an assessment on
respondent's medical condition; moreover, the 240-day maximum period for treatment has not yet
lapsed. x x x

The records clearly show that respondent was still undergoing treatment when he filed the complaint.
On November 12, 2009, the physiatrist even advised respondent to seek the opinion of an orthopedic
specialist. Respondent, however, did not heed the advice[;] instead, he proceeded to file a Complaint
on November 23, 2009 for disability benefits. And, it was only a day after its filing x x x that
respondent requested from the company-designated doctor the latter's assessment on his medical
condition.

Stated differently, respondent filed the Complaint within the 240-day period while he was still under
the care of the company-designated doctor. x x x

Clearly, the Complaint was premature. Respondent has no cause of action yet at the time of its filing as
the company-designated doctor has no opportunity to definitely assess his condition because he was
still undergoing treatment; and the 240-day period had not lapsed. x x x36
Nevertheless, respondent might have treated the company-designated physician's June 16, 2010
temporary diagnosis as the final assessment of his condition, which prompted him to secure the opinion
of Dr. Escutin and thereafter file the case prematurely. For this he cannot be completely blamed;
indeed, he might have proceeded under the impression that he was being shortchanged. Given his
position in the employment relation, his distrust for the petitioners is not completely unwarranted.

Consequently, respondent is entitled only to compensation equivalent to or commensurate with his

injury. In this regard, the Court finds the Labor Arbiter's findings to be correct and in point, even with
respect to his ruling on respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees. As far as respondent is concerned,
his work-related condition was serious enough to require further medical care, yet it could have been
resolved if he had undergone the procedure prescribed by the company-designated physician and his
own appointed doctor. For his omissions, he is only entitled to disability benefits consistent with his
injury suffered.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The assailed October 18, 2013 Decision and
January 28, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125046 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The February 23, 2011 Decision of Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 201271

ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES, and

JUSTO TORRES, .JR., Petitioners
vs.
ANTONIA F. ARUEGO, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rules 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set
aside the September 12, 2011 Resolution2 and March 26, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 which dismissed petitioners' Roberto A. Torres, Immaculada Torres-
Alanon, Agustin Torres and Justo Torres, Jr. (petitioners) Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and
denied their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 7, 1983, Antonia F. Aruego (Antonia) and Evelyn F. Aruego (Evelyn), represented by their
mother and guardian ad litem Luz M. Fabian, filed a Complaint4 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila for '"Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights" against Jose E.
Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and guardian ad
litem Justo M. Torres, Jr. (collectively dependants). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-
16093.

In their Complaint, Antonia and Evelyn alleged that they are the illegitimate children of the
deceasedJose M. Aruego (Aruego) who had and maintained an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian,
their mother, up to the demise of Aruego on March 30, 1982.

Alleging further that they are in continuous possession of the status of children of the deceased Aruego
and not being aware of any intestate proceeding having been filed in court for the settlement of the
estate of Aruego, they have thus filed this complex action for compulsory acknowledgment and
participation in said inheritance. In paragraph 10 of their Complaint, they enumerated the following
properties left by the deceased Aruego, so far as known to them:

10. The deceased Jose M. Aruego left, among other things, so far as known to the plaintiffs, the
following properties:

(a) Undivided one-third (%) share to a parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 30770 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City, Metro Manila, with an area of797 square meters, more or less.

(b) Undivided one-half(~;) share to the parcels of land covered by:

T.C.T. No. 48618 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 68,365
square meters, more or less.

T.C. T. No. 18683 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of23,13 l
square meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 21319 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 12,956
square meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 21317 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 7, 776
square meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 21315 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 34,889
square meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 21316 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 6,083
square meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 127154 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 757 square
meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 9598 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 1, 167 square
meters, more or less.

T.C.T. No. 1060 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, with an area of 44,602
square meters, more or less.

(c) Undivided one-half share of whatever rights, interests and participation the deceased Jose M.
Amego has on the University Stock Supply, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under Philippine
laws.5

In their Answer,6 defendants denied the allegations of the Complaint and set forth affirmative defenses

to dispute the claim of Antonia and Evelyn that they are the illegitimate children of the deceased
Aruego.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered a Decision7 on June 15, 1992, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -

1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;

2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;

3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:

1. Real [Estate] Properties covered by

TCT No. 48680, exh "K";

2. TCTNo. 18683, exh "K-1";

3. TCTNo. 12150, exh "K-2";

4. TCTNo. 21316, exh "K-3";

5. TCT No. 21317, exh "K-4";

6. TCTNo. 21318, exh "K-5'';

7. TCT No. 127154, exh "K-6";

8. TCT No. 9598, exh "K-7";

9. TCT No. 1060, exh "K-8";

10. TCT No. 30730, exh ''K-9";

11. share in the University Book S

4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to Yi portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego;

5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose
Aruego;

6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego's share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;

7. Defendants to pay plaintiff (Antonia Aruego) counsel the Sum of ₱10,000.00 as Atty's. fee.

8. Cost against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.8

Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration9 but it was denied by the lower court in its
Order10 dated January 14, 1983. They filed a Notice of Appeal11 on February 12, 1993 but it was
denied due course by the lower court in its Order 12 dated February 26, 1993 on the ground that it was
filed out of time.

Subsequently, defendants (now petitioners) filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.13 On August 31, 1993, the CA dismissed the Petition
for lack of merit,14 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a Minute Resolution dated
October 13, 1993.15

On December 3, 1993, petitioners appealed the CA's Decision dated August 31, 1993 to this Court
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari.16 In a Decision17 dated March 13, 1996, this Court denied
the Petition and affirmed the CA's Decision dated August 31, 1993 and Resolution dated October 13,
1993.

On December 4, 1996, the court a quo issued a Writ of Execution18 to execute its Decision dated June
15, 1992.1âwphi1

On August 15, 1997, plaintiff Antonia (now respondent) filed a Motion for Partition 19 with the court a
quo alleging that its June 15, 1992 Decision became final and executory in view of the denial of the
notice of appeal filed by petitioners and the dismissal of their Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari by
the CA and the subsequent denial of their appeal to the Supreme Court on March 13, 1996.

On November 6, 1997, respondent filed a Motion to Implement Decision 20 dated June 15, 1992 which
was granted by the court a quo in its Order21 dated December 5, 1997.

On December 12, 1998, petitioners filed a Verified Complaint 22 with the RTC of Quezon City
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36300, seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale 23 dated May 14,
1998 and the corresponding titles (TCT No. 188200 24 and TCT. No. 19125725 ) issued in relation
thereto, which was executed by respondent in favor of Sharon Cuneta, Inc. covering the Yi portion of
the lot covered by TCT No. 30730, one of the enumerated properties comprising the estate of the
deceased Aruego as declared in the June 15, 1992 Decision of the lower court.

On July 1, 1999, respondent filed anew a Motion for Partition26 dated June 28, 1999 praying for the
implementation of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo.

In view of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-36300, the court a quo in its Order27 dated November
8, 1999 resolved to defer the resolution of respondent's Motion for Partition dated June 28, 1999 on the
ground that the controversy involved in the Quezon City RTC case would constitute a prejudicial
question to the issue involved in the Motion for Partition. Respondent's motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the court a quo in its Order28 dated March 21, 2000, she filed a Petition for
Certiorar29 in the CA. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58587.

Finding that no prejudicial question existed between the two cases involved, the CA granted the
Petition for Certiorari on March 23, 2004.30 The CAs' Decision became final and executory for failure
of petitioners to appeal therefrom. Thereupon, respondent moved that her Motion for Partition be given
due course.

Petitioners opposed the motion arguing in the main that the partition of the estate of Aruego could not
take place by virtue of respondent's mere motion considering that there was no conclusive adjudication
of the ownership of the properties declared as constituting the estate of Jose M. Aruego and that all the
identities of his heirs had yet to be determined.31

Unconvinced, the lower court rejected the arguments of petitioner and granted respondent's motion in
its Order32 dated July 23, 2009 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The court orders:

1. The Defendants to submit, within 30 days from notice of this order, an accounting of all the fruits,
rents, profits, and income from the properties belonging to the estate of Jose M. Aruego from the time
of his death until the actual division thereof among his heirs;

2. Each [party] to nominate three (3) competent and disinterested persons and submit, within 15 days
from notice of this Order, the names of said persons from which this court shall choose three (3)
commissioners who will be tasked to perform the following:

a) To make an updated project of partition specifying the metes and bounds of the particular portion of
the property assigned to plaintiff; and,

b) Upon approval by the court of the project of partition, to effect the same and deliver to plaintiff her
share thereon.

SO ORDERED.33

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but it was denied by the court a quo.35

Unsatisfied, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari36 with the CA. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 113405. In a Resolution37 promulgated on September 12, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition for
lack of merit38 and later denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution 39 dated March
26, 2012. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 4540 filed by petitioners anchored
on the following grounds:

THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERSAPPELLANTS'

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF

IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO.

B. IN LIGHT OF HEIRS OF JUAN D. FRANCISCO v. MUNOZ-PALMA, THE ASSAILED

RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND NO COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT
WARRANTS A REVIEW AND/OR MODIFICATION OF THE [15] JUNE 1992 DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THE [15] JUNE [1992] DECISION (OF THE COURT A QUO) IS NOT CONCLUSIVE WITH
RESPECT TO THE PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE ESTATE OF MR. JOSE M. ARGUEGO, SR.
AS THE SAME IS NOT AN ISSUE IN RESPONDENT-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS.

b. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUD/CATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR DUE TO
THE ABSENCE OF SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS.

c. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ISSUE REGARDING THE PROPERTIES

COMPRISING THE ESTATE OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR. HAS ATTAINED FINALITY, THE
SAME MAY STILL BE MODIFIED AS THE TERMS THEREOF ARE PATENTLY UNCLEAR AT
LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARE OF MS. SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARGUEGO, AS WELL
AS THE SHARES OF THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS AND/OR THIRD PARTIES THAT
EXIST PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF MR. JOSE M. ARUEGO, SR.41

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners assail the September 12, 2011 and March 26, 2012 Resolutions of the CA on the principal
ground that the Court erred in applying the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the
exceptions thereto. Citing the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Munoz-Palma,42 petitioners contend
"that the doctrine of immutability of judgments admits of exceptions, x x x [as] when the terms of the
judgment are not clear enough that there remains room for interpretation thereof, [in which case,] the
judgment may still be appealed even when the same has already attained finality." 43 Petitioners cited
and quoted the following portion from the Decision in the aforementioned case of Heirs of Francisco v.
Hon. Muñoz-Palma44 to prove their point:

It may be well to remember, that the fact that the decision in the case has long become final and
executory, and that the order in dispute was issued merely in execution thereof, does not necessarily
imply the non-existence of an appeal therefrom. For while it is true that, as a general rule, an order of
execution of a final judgment is not appealable, it also recognized that the rule is subject to two
exceptions, viz., (1) when the order of execution varies or tends to vary the tenor of the judgment, and
(2) when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough that there remains room for interpretation
thereof by the trial court.45

Petitioners assert that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo "are obviously unclear
as it admits of different interpretations" 46 which, in fact, account for the remaining conflict between the
parties herein. Respondent believes that the "1/2 portion" should be taken from the "whole estate,"
contrary to their interpretation that the "1/2 portion" refers to "1/2 of the share of each legitimate
descendant of Aruego."47 Acting on her erroneous belief, she had, in fact, caused the subdivision of the
property covered by TCT No. 30730, now the subject of the pending annulment case before the RTC of
Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36300.

Likewise relying on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Muñoz-Palma,48 petitioners fault the CA in
failing to find no compelling circumstance that warrants a review and/or modification of the June 15,
1992 Decision of the court a quo. According to them, the June 15, 1992 Decision is not conclusive
with respect to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego as the same is not an issue in
respondent's complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights.

Petitioners also dispute the ruling of the court a quo in its February 26, 2010 Order49 (one of the
assailed Orders in their petition for certiorari before the CA) that it was forced to grant respondent's
motion because the June 15, 1992 Decision had already attained finality and the necessity of giving
finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. According to petitioners, the court a quo in effect
is saying that they are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. They do not agree, as the elements of
res judicata are absent in this case. They insist, first, that the June 15, 1992 Decision is not a judgment
on the merits regarding the extent of the estate of Aruego. It "was rendered without any presentation of
evidence during trial, much less argued by the respective parties;" 50 second, that it is not a final
judgment, but a mere interlocutory order, as it leaves something more to be done which is the partition
of Aruego's estate; and third, there is no identity of subject matters, parties and causes of action
between the case adjudicated in the June 15, 1992 Decision and the present controversy.
Even assuming that the June 15, 1992 Decision has attained finality, petitioners still maintain that it
may still be modified because its terms are patently unclear. There is ambiguity in the manner the
estate of Aruego should be divided as it admits of various interpretations.

All said, petitioners pray that the instant Petition be given due course -

a) by declaring that the June 15, 1992 Decision is erroneous at least with respect to the properties
comprising the estate of Aruego;

b) by declaring that the terms thereof, with respect to the estate of x x x Aruego, are unclear and
ambiguous;

c) by allowing the parties to present evidence to determine the properties and/or property interests of
Aruego which are to be properly included in his estate; and

d) to issue an Order annulling and setting aside the assailed Resolutions of the CA. 51

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent's arguments are anchored principally on the finality of the June 12, 1992 Decision of the
court a quo. She points out that the said Decision has attained finality more than 20 years ago for
failure of petitioners to timely appeal therefrom. Their subsequent actions before the CA and the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the said Decision all proved futile as the appellate courts
sustained its validity and denied their petitions.

Respondent contends that there is no ambiguity in the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision. Its
dispositive portion clearly identified the properties of the estate and the share of respondent therein.
Moreover, petitioners could have raised their objections on these matters in their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration or on appeal, or certiorari in said case, but did not.

According to respondent, the Order52 dated July 23, 2009 of the court a quo giving due course to the
Motion for Partition53 dated July 28, 1999 merely implements the final and executory Decision dated
June 15, 1992 giving respondent "1/2 share of the share of legitimate child in the estate of Jose Aruego,
Sr. enumerated therein."54 The CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 did not err in dismissing the petition to
set aside the said Order.55

The Principal Issue

The principal issue to be resolved in this Petition is whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the
court a quo, which attained finality more than 20 years ago, may still be subject to review and
modification by the Court.

Our Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

The first assailed Resolution dated September 12. 2011 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405
dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit. The CA ruled that it cam10t issue a writ
of certiorari to allow parties to present evidence in a case that has long attained finality. It held:

Asking this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to enable a party, in this instance the Petitioners, to
present evidence after a decision has longattained finality is no different from praying that an already
executory decision be reviewed. More certainly, such strat[e]gem cannot be allowed as it will
contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments. Instructive on this point is the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Milan, viz[.]:

A judgment becomes 'final and executory' by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence,
no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
decision that has became final.

When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time. x x x

x x x Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. x x x

True, the doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of exceptions such as the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to
any party, and where the judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench.
Hence, there is no ground to justify the modification of the Respondent RTC's June 15, 1992 Decision.

To stress, the Court finds, after a thorough review of the records, no compelling circumstance extant in
this case that would warrant a departure from the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Most
certainly, We cannot issue a writ so as to allow the Petitioners to present evidence as the same should
have been raised by them during trial. x x x56 (Emphasis in the original)

Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the CA ruled in its second assailed Resolution dated
March 26, 2012, viz.:

At the risk of being repetitious, it bears reiterating, therefore, that this Court cannot and will not issue a
writ of certiorari to enable the Petitioners to present evidence in a case where a decision has been
rendered as far back as June 15, 1992, for doing so will contravene the doctrine of finality of
judgments.57

We affirm the assailed Resolutions of the CA.

Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land.58 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of
clerical errors, the socalled nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.59

In arguing that the assailed Resolutions erroneously applied the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments and the exceptions thereto, petitioners relied heavily on the case of Heirs of Francisco v.
Hon. Munoz-Palma.60 Petitioners insist that the terms of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo
are not clear enough, as there remains room for interpretation thereot: hence, the judgment may still be
appealed even when the same has already attained finality.

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Heirs of Francisco v. Hon. Munoz-Palma61 is misplaced. It should
be stressed that in the Heirs of Francisco case, on appeal was an order of execution, which although
generally not appealable, was allowed because the Court found that the Project of Partition submitted
to implement the decision was not in accordance with the final decision in the case. The Order
approving the Project of Partition becomes subject to review and whatever error may have been
committed in arriving thereat is correctible by appeal. In the earlier case of Castro v. Surtida,62 it was
held that an appeal from an order of execution would be allowed as an exception to the general rule so
that the appellate tribunal might pass upon the legality and the correctness of the said order.63 In
contrast, what petitioners in the present case seek is an order from the court to allow them to present
evidence with regard to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego and the heirs who are to share in
the inheritance. This is, in effect an appeal from the June 15, 1992 Decision which has long become
final and executory, and not from an order of execution which is yet to be carried out, thru a Project of
Partition still to be submitted to and approved by the court.

As correctly held by the court a quo in its Order dated July 23, 2009, "[t]he question as to what
properties have been deemed included in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr. has already been settled when
the court finally resolved the main controversy on June 15, 1992 and declared, inter alia, that plaintiff,
Antonia Aruego, is entitled to one-half of the share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr. x x
x."64 The court directed the parties to submit the names of their nominees from among whom the court
shall choose three commissioners to submit an updated Project of Partition for the approval of the
court.

Worthy to note also is the ruling of the CA in its assailed Resolution dated September 12, 2011 that
said court "cannot issue a writ so as to allow the [p]etitioners to present evidence as the same should
have been raised by them during trial." 65

We have perused the records and found that respondent offered in evidence the certificates of title to
the properties allegedly comprising the estate of Aruego.66 There is nothing in the records to show that
petitioners opposed the said offer of evidence. They also lost the chance to dispute the evidence
presented by respondent when they failed to raise the issue in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the June 15, 1992 Decision and more so when they failed to appeal therefrom.

The records also disclose that petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case. They presented
and formally offered their own evidence67 but nothing was presented to rebut respondent's evidence on
the properties comprising the estate of Aruego. In short, petitioners had ample opportunity to present
their countervailing evidence during trial and it is now much too late in the day to present the evidence
that they should have presented way back then. It is settled that the active participation of a party
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the
court's resolution of the case. 68

Petitioners pass the blame to their counsels of record in the court below for their lost appeal. This is
unacceptable. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are
binding on the client.69 We explained in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People70 that "[t]he rationale for the rule is
that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental
to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by
counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of
the client himself."

Petitioners next contend that the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo is not conclusive with
respect to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego, as the same is not an issue in respondent's
Complaint71 for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights.

This contention is specious.

Although the Complaint of respondent is captioned "For: Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights", a close reading of the averments therein would indubitably show that the
determination of the estate of Aruego and the participation of respondent in the inheritance are among
the issues raised in her Complaint. Paragraph 9 of her complaint stated:

9. To the best knowledge of the plaintiffs, no intestate proceeding has been filed in court for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, thus this complex action for compulsory
acknowledgement and participation in said inheritance.72

On the other hand, in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, respondent enumerated the properties left by
Aruego, so far as known to her.73 Consistent with her averments in paragraphs 9 and 10, respondent
prayed that:

4. The share and participation of the plaintiffs in the estate of their deceased father be determined, and
the defendants ordered to deliver such share unto the plaintiffs. 74
It has been consistently held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are
controlling.75 In Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,76 the Court said: "it is not the caption of the pleading
but the allegations that determine the nature of the action. The court should grant the relief warranted
by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for."

Petitioners assail the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 Decision insofar as it declares the
properties enumerated therein as comprising the estate of Aruego. . They point out that such
declaration in the dispositive portion is bereft pf any discussion in the body of the decision.

They are mistaken. "To understand the dispositive portion of a decision, one has only to ascertain the
issues of the action."77 As shown above, the determination of the estate of Aruego is one of the issues
raised in the Complaint of respondent. In support thereof, respondent submitted in evidence the
certificates of title covering the properties claimed to be part of the state of Aruego, as well as the By-
Laws of the University Bookstore.78 No countervailing evidence having been presented by petitioners,
the court a quo declared these properties as comprising the estate of Aruego in the dispositive portion
of this Decision.

Jurisprudence holds that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes of
execution.79 If petitioners believed that the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 Decision is
questionable, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the said Decision
became final and executory. But as pointed out earlier, while petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, they did not raise therein the supposed error of the court in declaring the properties
enumerated in the dispositive portion of the Decision as comprising the estate of An1ego. They also
failed to appeal the Decision and thereby lost the chance to question the Decision and seek a
modification or amendment thereof. The inevitable result of their failure to timely question the
Decision is for them to be botmd by the pronouncements therein. To reiterate, once a decision has
attained finality, '"not even this Court could have changed the trial court's disposition absent any
showing that the case fell under one of the recognized exceptions." 80 As amp1y discussed above, this
case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for review on Certiorari is DENIED and the assailed September 12,
2011 and March 26, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113405 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

 September 14, 2017

G.R. No. 218830

JESUS V. COSON, Petitioner 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 30, 2015 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35837 which affirmed in toto the February 27, 2013
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2005-
0498- D finding Jesus V. Coson (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa.
Also assailed is the June 4, 2015 CA ResoJution1 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Factual, Antecedents

Petitioner is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Good God Development Corporation
(GGDC), a corporation engaged in the business of developing subdivision and building
houses/condominiums therein for sale to the general public.4

On December 21, 2001, GGDC, through its President Jack Christian Coson, borrowed ₱2,522,000.00
from private complainant Atty. Nolan Evangelista (hereinafter "private complainant"). The purpose of
the loan was to buy the land owned by the First eBank Corporation ("First eBank") and covered by
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 250201, which is adjacent to GGDC's property situated in Barrio
Maningding, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 252245.
A Deed of Real Estate Mortgage5 was executed by the parties whereby the property owned by GGDC
was put up as collateral for the loan.

After the sale of First eBank's property was consummated, title thereto was transferred in the name
ofGGDC under TCTNo. 261204.6

On May 29, 2003, another Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 7 was executed by GGDC through petitioner
by virtue of Board Resolution No. 0093, series of 2002, 8 in favor of private complainant for a loan of
P4,784,000.00. The land covered by TCT No. 261204 was given as security for the said loan. On the
same date, petitioner executed a Promissory Note9 acknowledging his indebtedness of ₱4,784,000.00
and promising to pay the said amount in accordance with the schedule mentioned in the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage dated May 29, 2003.

On July 29, 2003, petitioner and private complainant executed a Memorandum of Agreement 10 (MOA)
stipulating, inter alia, that petitioner was desirous of borrowing the mortgaged TCT No. 261204 to be
surrendered to the Home Development Mutual Fund or PAG-IBIG Fund11 to obtain a loan the proceeds
of which shall be paid to private complainant in satisfaction of petitioner's obligation; that the parties
shall open a joint account with a reputable banking institution where the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG
Fund loan shall be deposited; and that petitioner shall make 11 installment payments as per schedule
set forth in the said MOA. Pursuant to the MOA, petitioner issued 11 postdated Banco de Oro checks,
the first check for ₱3,000,000.00 and the other 10 checks, a uniform amount of ₱185,000.00 for each
check.

On September 8, 2003, GGDC, through petitioner and PAG-IBIG Fund, executed a Loan Agreement12
whereby GGDC, as borrower, was granted a developmental loan by PAG-IBIG Fund in an amount not
exceeding ₱30,000,000.00 to finance the development of Carolina Homes subject of the MOA 13 of the
same date (September 8, 2003) executed by the parties.

On October 7, 2003, the first tranche of the ₱30,000,000.00 loan in the amount of ₱9,000,000.00 was
released by P AG-IBIG Fund to GGDC. 14 In view of the failure of petitioner to pay the loan of
₱4,784,000.00 to private complainant despite repeated demands therefor, or to return TCT No. 261204
as agreed upon in the MOA dated July 29, 2003, private complainant filed a complaint against
petitioner for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Subsequently, on August 5, 2005, an Information15 dated July 19, 2005 was filed by the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City with the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2005-
0498-D charging petitioner with the crime of Estafa allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of July 2003, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JESUS V. COSON, received in trust
and confidence from one NOLAN R. EVANGELISTA the title of the land, TCT No. 261204 which he
had given as a security to the ₱4,784,000.00 mortgage secured from the latter, alleging that he would
use it in obtaining a loan from the [Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)] and promising the
latter that he would pay him the mortgage consideration upon release of the proceeds of the loan by the
said agency, but upon receipt of the proceeds, with intent to gain, by means of unfaithfulness or grave
abuse of confidence, the herein accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, renege
on his promise and refuse to perform his obligation to pay NOLAN [R.] EVANGELISTA despite
demands made on him to do so, thereby misappropriating and converting the said amount for his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of NOLAN R. EVANGELISTA, in the aforesaid
amount of ₱4,784,000.00 and for other consequential damages sustained.

Contrary to Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. 16

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 27, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision17 in Criminal Case No. 2005-0498-D finding
petitioner (accused therein) guilty as charged, ratiocinating as follows:

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether accused Coson is guilty of the crime
charged. As earlier stated, Coson is being charged and tried with the crime of Estafa defined and
penalized under second element of Estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph (b), subdivision
No. 1, Article 315. The elements of Estafa under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code are:

(1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same;

(2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or
property;

(3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or property.

The essence of this kind of Estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words 'convert' and 'misappropriate'
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

In the case at bench, from the testimony and evidence on record, the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged as shown by the following
circumstances.

First, a loan in the amount of [₱4,750,000.00] secured by a real estate mortgage was constituted over a
piece of land registered in the name of herein accused Coson covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 261204 was entered between him and Atty. Nolan Evangelista. Coson was not able to pay the loan
but Evangelista did not foreclose the real estate mortgage.

Records of this case further show that Coson sought Evangelista thru a common-friend, Atty.
Alejandro Fernandez, and made representation if Evangelista could lend the title to him as he was
trying to find source of money to pay his loan from Evangelista and the title shall be used to secure a
loan from the [Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)] from where [the] accused could realize loan
releases sufficient to pay his obligation to Evangelista.

Evangelista agreed to the proposal of accused Coson and delivered to the former TCT No. 261204 to
secure [the] loan from the [HDMF]. The proposal and the mechanics of their agreement are contained
in a document designated as Memorandum of Agreement. Accused issued various checks in favor of
Evangelista, to wit: Check No. 492550 for P3 million pesos; Check No. 492551 for Pl 85,000.00 pesos;
Check No. 492552 for ₱185,000.00 pesos; Check No. 492553 forP185,000.00 pesos; Check Nos.
492554 to 492560. These checks are supposed to be funded from the loan which Coson will be
obtaining from the [HDMF].

It has been further established by the evidence on record that after sufficient time had lapsed,
Evangelista asked Atty. Fernandez to deposit in the latter's account check No. 492551 in the amount of
₱185,000.00 but it was dishonored by the drawee bank. Evangelista and Atty. Fernandez tried to
inform accused of the dishonor of his check but both could not locate his whereabouts until one time
Atty. Fernandez chanced upon him somewhere in Quezon City where the former informed the latter of
the dishonor ofhis check.

In the meantime, Evangelista was able to discover that Coson had obtained [a] loan from the [HDMF],
La Union Branch, but accused used the loan [proceeds] to pay some of his obligations but did not fund
the checks he issued in accordance with their memorandum of agreement or the purpose for which
Evangelista entrusted TCTNo. 261204.

In fact, a certain Mary Jane Laron, Officer-in-Charge, Loan and Contribution, Management Loan and
Recovery Division, [HDMF], La Union Branch, testified that Coson was able to realize initial loan
release in the amount of P9 million.

Nonetheless, as admitted by Jill Catherine Coson, witness for the defense, x x x the joint account of
[the] accused and Evangelista was not funded contrary to the memorandum of agreement between the
two despite the initial release of the nine (9) million pesos. Thus, two (2) demand letters were sent to
the accused either to return the title or pay the amount of ₱4, 784,000.00 pesos. However, Coson
can no longer return the title of the property as Arthur David, record custodian of the Register of
Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan, testified that TCT No. 261204 has already been cancelled and a new title
has already been issued covering the land described in said title.

[The a]ccused averred in his defense that Evangelista did not entrust the title to him to be used as
collateral for a loan he filed with the [HDMF] but he asked Evangelista for the title to be submitted to
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for cancellation and re-distribution to the various lot
purchasers.

He further averred that he was not able to settle his original obligation to Evangelista because he
suffered business reverses and encountered personal problems.

Accused's defense of the need to submit the title to the Land Registration Authority for cancellation
and distribution to the lot purchasers could not be taken seriously for the simple reason that accused did
not present any document that would show that indeed the title has to be submitted to the LRA.
Furthermore, accused had not presented [any] document that Evangelista is his partner in [the] housing
business or has interest in accused's housing venture.

On the same breath, the averments of accused that he suffered business reverses and personal problems
would not inure to [the] accused['s] advantage. On the contrary, such declaration is equivalent to
admission of liability.

The issuance of the checks in favor of Evangelista is not in payment of the original obligation accused
contracted from the former but to assure Evangelista that he will not be holding an "empty bag" if and
when accused reneged on his undertaking to use the title as collateral to secure [a] loan from the
[HDMF] because if the checks were intended as payment for the original obligation, it would simply be
an exchange of the title which is still in the name of the corporation of the accused and the checks
accused issued in favor of Evangelista

On his part, accused interjected transactions between him and Atty. Fernandez which pertained to a
two million (₱2,000,000.00) peso loan extended by the latter to him. Nonetheless, he admitted that the
Deed of Mortgage is four million and seven hundred fifty (₱4,750,000.00) pesos. He testified that he
did not pay Evangelista from the first release of Nine Million (₱9,000,000.00) pesos because he has to
pay the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara He further averred that he did not inform Evangelista when he
signed the memorandum of agreement that he still [had] some unpaid creditors.

In view of the admission of the accused himself that he reneged on his undertaking to use the title
entrusted to him to secure a loan from [HDMF] to pay his obligation to Evangelista, his admission that
he had received ₱9,000,000.00 million pesos from the [HDMF] but did not pay Evangelista, and
instead paid other creditors like the Sta. Barbara Rural Bank, and the testimony of Arthur David that
TCT No. 261204 [has] already been cancelled and a new title has been issued covering the land
described in said title, the Court finds and so holds that he is liable for Estafa defined under Article 315
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, penalized by Reclusion Temporal with a duration of Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years considering that the amount is ₱4,784,000.00.
Nonetheless, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Cason should be sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14)
Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

It appearing that Evangelista had previously made reservation of filing an independent civil action
arising from the incident subject matter of this case, this Court finds and holds that no pronouncement
can be had as to the civil liability of the accused.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jess "Jesus" Coson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, l(b) and is
hereby sentenced to suffer au Indeterminate penalty of Tm (10) Years of Prision Mayor as
minimum to Fourteen (l 4) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.

So ordered.18

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA found no reversible error in the ruling of the RTC and affirmed it in toto. In its Decision19
dated January 30, 2015, the CA held that the prosecution had proven all the elements of Estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) charged against petitioner. The CA ruling is as follows:

In this case, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of Estafa beyond moral certainty. Jesus
acknowledged the receipt of the TCT No. 261204 from Nolan in trust for the latter. This act is
evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement, duly signed by the parties. The Memorandum of
Agreement, shows that Jesus borrowed the TCT No. 261204 from Nolan for the purpose of using the
same as collateral to his [lIDMF] loan application, thus:

'Direct Examination of Nolan Evangelista conducted by Pros. Bayubay:

Q: Do you have a copy of a memorandum of agreement?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Attached to the record is a copy of a memorandum of agreement consisting of two (2) pages already
marked as Exhibit C, what is the relationship of this memorandum of agreement with the one that you
entered with the accused?

A: This is the Memorandum of Agreement evidencing our agreement wherein I would lend him the
title and he could offer it as collateral to the Pag-ibig for the purpose of raising funds to pay me by
funding the checks he issued to me and in the event that he would be unable to borrow from the Pag-
ibig this memorandum of agreement also shows that he had to return to me the title that he was
borrowing.

x x xx

Q: Now, was the accused able to secure [a] loan from the Pagibig as he proposed?

A: I have discovered that he was able to get a loan from the Pag-ibig.

Q: And did he pay his obligation to you as agreed upon?

A: He was not able to fund the checks that he issued to me as per agreement that he should fund it from
the proceeds of his loan from the Pag-ibig.

Q: Why do you say that he did not fund the checks he issued to you Mr. Witness?

A: Because when the first check was deposited x x x that check bounced.'

Evidently, the testimony of Nolan shows the purpose of lending TCT No. 261204 to Jesus and the
latter's obligation to return the same. Despite the agreement, Jesus failed to return TCT No. 261204 to
Nolan. Considering the testimony of Nolan, Jesus' guilt for the crime of Estafa was established beyond
reasonable doubt.

xxxx

Further, Jesus converted TCT No. 261204 for a purpose other than that agreed upon in the
Memorandum of Agreement. Jesus allowed the construction and sale of 139 residential units built on
smaller lots covered by TCT No. 261204. This misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204 to
the prejudice of the owner constitutes Estafa under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. 20

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA's Resolution21 dated June 4,
2015.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 raising as ground for its allowance the following:

The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals are patently erroneous and
contrary to law and jurisprudence.22

Petitioner argues that he could not be held liable for Estafa. He claims that the obligation to return TCT
No. 261204 to private complainant is not absolute but conditional; i.e., if the PAG-IBIG Fund approves
the application for loan, the obligation to return TCT No. 261204 is extinguished. And since the PAG-
IBIG Fund approved the loan and in fact already released the proceeds of the first tranche, petitioner
insists that he is no longer obliged to return TCT No. 261204 to the private complainant.

Petitioner also contends that the RTC and CA erred in finding that he misappropriated or converted
another's property for his personal use. He asserts that the CA erred in its finding that the subject
property covered by TCT No. 261204 is owned by private complainant; that GGDC or petitioner
disposed of it for a purpose other than what was agreed upon; or that petitioner failed to return or
account the proceeds thereof Petitioner posits that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was novated by
the subsequent execution of the MOA. As such, when petitioner failed to pay the private complainant,
the latter could no longer demand the return of TCT No. 261204 which was already surrendered to the
PAG-IBIG Fund.

Moreover, petitioner assails the CA ruling that he used the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan for a
purpose other than what was stated in the MOA, which supposedly amounted to misappropriation.
Petitioner posits that the CA failed to take into account the primary purpose of the loan from the PAG-
IBIG Fund, that is, to fund GGDC's development and construction of a subdivision or the Carolina
Homes project. Likewise, petitioner avers that private complainant was fully aware of said purpose.

Finally, petitioner claims that the CA totally forgot that GGDC is the owner of the property covered by
TCT No. 261204, and not private complainant. Thus, there is no factual basis . to its pronouncement
that the misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204 resulted in the prejudice of the owner
(referring to private complainant) and such constitutes Estafa.1âwphi1 Petitioner contends that without
the obligation to return or deliver, the relatio~ship between private complainant and petitioner becomes
one of debtor and creditor. "And the obligation of GGDC or petitioner under the [MOA] is not to return
or deliver the money loaned from him but to pay [private complainant] from the proceeds of the [PAG-
IBIG Fund] loan in order to satisfy the obligation owing him." 23 ·

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that only questions of law may be raised in a petition filed under
Rule 45 thus, the factual questions raised by petitioner should not be entertained by the Court. In any
event, the respondent alleges that even if the factual issues were to be considered, the CA committed
no reversible error in affirming the findings of the RTC.1âwphi1

The Issue

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA erred in affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315, par. l(b) of the RPC.

Our Ruling

The Petition has merit.

While it is jurisprudentially settled that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, 24 this rule admits of
exceptions, as follows:

(1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures;

(2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken;

(3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and

(5) the findings of the trial court are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.25

The exceptions mentioned above are present here. The rulings of both the RTC and the CA are
anchored on their findings that all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC have
been proven by the prosecution.

We disagree.

The essential elements of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) are as follows:

1. [T]hat money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same;

2. [T]hat there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of the receipt thereof;

3. [T]hat the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

4. [T]hat there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 26

Citing the case of Pamintuan v. People,27 both courts (RTC and CA) found and concluded that
petitioner has misappropriated the proceeds of the P AG-IBIG Fund loan, or converted TCT No.
261204 to a purpose other than that agreed upon. These finding and conclusion are not in accord with
the evidence on record.

It is clear from the evidence on record that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 28 dated May 29, 2003 and
the MOA dated July 29, 200329 were both executed by petitioner, as the duly authorized officer of
GGDC. GGDC is also the borrower from the PAG-IBIG Fund. The May 29, 2003 Real Estate
Mortgage expressly stated that petitioner was authorized to enter into such transaction by virtue of
Board Resolution No. 0093, series of 200230 of GGDC; that GGDC is the registered owner of the
property covered by TCT No. 261204; and, finally, petitioner signed said document as Chainr1an and
CEO of GGDC, and not in his personal capacity. On the other hand, the first Whereas Clause of the
MOA categorically stated that petitioner was expressly authorized by GGDC to enter into such
transaction; and that GGDC, through petitioner, was desirous of borrowing TCTNo. 261204 to be
surrendered to PAG-IBIG Fund in support ofits loan application.

The evidence on record also disclose that the loan granted by the PAGIBIG Fund is a developmental
loan to finance the housing project of GGDC on the two lots covered by TCT No. 252245 and TCT
No. 261204 (the disputed title), both registered in the name of GGDC. Private complainant is not
totally unaware of this fact as evidenced by the very MOA dated July 29, 2003 which was the basis of
his complaint for Estafa against petitioner. The pertinent provision of the said MOA reads:

5. In the event that after sixty (60) days of default, the FIRST PARTY shall not have paid the total
accelerated amount, the FIRST PARTY shall surrender back Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261204
to the SECOND PARTY within a period of five (5) days after the aforementioned lapse of sixty (60)
days. In the event further that the FIRST PARTY is unable to return Transfer Certificate of Title No.
261204 to the SECOND PARTY within the time prescribed, the FIRST PARTY shall within five (5)
days therefrom execute and cause to be executed any and all documents assigning and conveying the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261204 and the entire Good God Development
Corporation Housing Project denominated as CAROLINA HOMES SUBDNISION located at
Barangay Maningding, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan inclusive of all the project's appurtenants to the
SECOND PARTY. For this purpose, the FIRST PARTY shall be obliged and hereby undertakes to
execute and cause to be executed by the concerned entities and personalities all necessa;r documents,
both principal and collateral, under the pain of fraudulent breach. 31

Likewise on record are the letters of petitioner to private complainant updating the latter on the status
or progress of the development of the subdivision project in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan and his efforts.at
securing additional funding to settle his obligation with private complainant. 32

Based thereon, there cannot be any misappropriation or conversion by petitioner to his own personal
use, benefit or advantage, of TCT No. 261204 or the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG~Fund loan granted to
GGDC since private complainant is fully aware of the purpose ofpetitioner/GGDC for borrowing TCT
No. 261204 and how the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan should be applied. Moreover, TCT No.
261204 and the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds are owned by GGDC and not by petitioner, and more
so, not owned by private complainant. If there was any misappropriation or conversion of TCT No.
261204 or the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds, the aggrieved party should be GGDC, and certainly not
the private complainant. For his uncollected debt, private complainant's remedy is not a criminal
action, but a civil action against petitioner. The MOA dated July 29, 2003 in fact clearly stipulates in
Section 5 thereof33 the remedy of private complainant in case of default by petitioner.

To stress, misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of another's property as if it were his
own or devoting it to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of one's property without any
right.34 As earlier stated, TCT No. 261204 and the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds belong to and are
owned by GGDC, and not by private complainant

Other palpable mistakes or erroneous conclusions of fact of the RTC in its questioned Decision need be
mentioned here:

In its Decision, the RTC erroneously stated that the loan "in the amount of [₱4,750,000.00 was]
secured by a real estate mortgage x x x constituted over a piece of land registered in the name of herein
accused Cason covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261204." 35 This is a manifest error since
TCT No. 26120436 as shown by the evidence on record is registered in the name of GGDC, and the
amount of the mortgage loan is ₱4,784,000.00 37 and not "₱4,750,000.00".

Likewise the RTC stated in its Decision that "accused did not present any document that would show
that indeed the title has to be submitted to the Land Registration Authority (LRA). Furthermore, the
accused had not presented any document that Evangelista (herein private complainant) is his partner in
the housing business or has interest in accused's housing venture." 38 This finding is contrary to the
evidence on record. Accused (petitioner herein) submitted in evidence the Loan Agreement 39 and
Memorandum of Agreement40 both dated September 8, 2003 executed by the petitioner and the PAG-
IBIG Fund which stipulate that the PAG-IBIG Fund "will lend said Certificate of Title to the
BORROWER so that the same may be cancelled and replaced with the individual titles corresponding
to the smaller lots into which the land shall have been subdivided in accordance with the approved
subdivision plan of the land."41 Prosecution witness Arthur David, Records Custodian of the Register
of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan testified to the effect that TCT No. 261204 had been cancelled new
titles had been issued covering the land.42 This testimony corroborates the evidence of the petitioner.

Regarding the finding of the RTC that "accused had not presented the document that Evangelista is his
partner in the housing business or has interest in accused's housing venture,"43 the three letters44 of
petitioner to private complainant on the status of the housing project of GGDC present ample proof of
private complainant's interest in the housing venture of GGDC.

Lastly, the conclusion of the RTC that the "issuance of the checks in favor of Evangelista is not in
payment of the original obligation accused contracted from the former but to assure Evangelista that he
will not be holding an 'empty bag' if and when accused reneged on his undertaking to use the title as
collateral to secure a loan from the MHDF [sic ]" 45 is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The checks issued were really intended for the payment of the loan obligation of petitioner
to private complainant and not merely to assure the latter that he would not be holding an "empty bag".
As per testimony of private complainant himself, when the first check became due, he deposited it but
it was dishonored for lack of funds.46

In fine, based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and so holds that no Estafa under Article 315, par.
l(b) was committed by petitioner. There was no misappropriation or conversion ofTCT No. 261204 or
the proceeds of the PAGIBIG Fund loan by petitioner to his own personal use, benefit or advantage. In
all his dealings with private complainant, he acted for and in behalf of GGDC which owns the title and
the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan from private complainant and from the PAG-IBIG Fund
was in pursuance of the housing business of GGDC, which is not totally unknown to private
complainant. Moreover, the Promissory Note dated May 29, 2003 47 of petitioner acknowledging his
indebtedness and the demand letters of private complainant to petitioner to pay his obligation 48
clearly show that the obligation contracted by petitioner on behalf of GGDC is purely civil and for
which no criminal liability may attach.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 30, 2015 and Resolution dated June 4, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35837 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered ACQUITING petitioner Jesus V. Coson of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.