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99-83905-A
Halleck Richardson,
Petitioner-Appellee.
and
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Lawrence, KS 66044
(785) 841-4700
Attorney for Appellant
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Nature of the Case ................................................... " 1
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2
Issue. The district court's orders concerning residence, custody, and visitation
fly in the face ofthe best interests of the minor child and violate the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5, 6
Green v. Greene. 201 Kan. 701, 443 P.2d 1356 (1980) .............. 5
· ................................................ " 6
Anhalt v. Fesler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, SyI. 1[ 1~ 636 P.2d 224 (1981)
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
Carney v. Carney, I Kan. App. 2d 544, Syl. ~ 2,571 P.2d 56, rev. denied
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8
In the Matter of the Marriage of Whipp, 265 Kan. 500, P.2d _ (1998) .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 13
K.S.A.60-1610(a)(3)(B) ..................................... 9
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 228 Kan. 290, 613 P.2d 1356 (1980), ......... 11
12
Smith v. Printup., 262 Kan. 587, 592, 938 P.2d 1261 (1997). . . . . . . . .. 12
Concl~sion ............................................... , 13
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No. 99-83905-A
Halleck Richardson,
Petitioner-Appellee.
and
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal from orders entered and actions taken by the district court
with respect to the custody of the minor child of the parties. The district court's
orders disregard the emotional and physical safety ofthe minor child, subjecting her
and her mother. the appellant herein, to the dangerous potential for abuse and
violence that appellee poses to them. The district court has gone so far as to limit
Appellant.seeks relief from these orders of the district court iR-this appeal.
1
Issue. The district court's orders concerning residence, custody, and visitation
fly in the face of the best interests of the minor child and violate the
Statement of Facts
On June 28, 1999. the district court entered its Order to Enforce Prior Order;
Surname. (R.XII at 32-36.) It is these orders, which govern the custody. residence,
and visitation ofthe parties with their minor child, Rildci, that are the subject ofthis
appeal.
The parties share joint custody of Rikki, with appellant designated as the
primary physical custodian. (RXII at 32.) On December 1, 1997, the district court
resides, from the home she had established for herself and Rikki in Lamed, Kansas.
(R.XII at 13.) Appellant's earlier appeal from the district court's order that she
relocate, which was based primarily on arguments about the procedure that led to
the initial custody and visitation provisions of the divorce decree. was unsuccessful;
the orders subsequently entered by the district court on June 28, 1999, provide for
2
in circumstances calling for modification ofthe relocation order. (R.XII at 32-33.)
By the time of the entry of its June 28, 1999, orders by the district court,
appellant had been settled with Rikki in the Larned, Kansas area for approximately
three years. (R.XV at 13, 26-5 L) Appellant had gainful employment in Lamed, as
a licensed practical nurse that was unavailable to her in any other location due to a
foot disability that affects her strength and mobility. Appellant owns a home in
Pawnee Rock, which is approximately eight (8) miles from Larned. Rikki was in the
midst of receiving specialized medical care for problems with her ears in Great
Bend, Kansas, which is approximately 20 miles from Lamed and twelve (12) miles
from Pawnee Rock. Rikki has also been to counseling in Lamed from the affects
ofthe past abuse she obseIVed from her father, the Appellee. Rikki had friends and
Appellee had voluntarily suspended any visitation with Rikki for more than
characterized by the violence to which appellant and Rikki had previously been
subjected by appellee. (R.ll at 315-318.) Appellant had been seriously harassed and
abused by appellee in the past, including having been the victim ofan armed assault
and battery that led to the issuance of restraining orders against appellee. After
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the result was a reduction in the physical violence that had ruled the relationship
between the parties. (R.ll at 315-318.) The district court's orders for visitation still
require that appellee's visits with the minor child occur at and under the supervision
ofthe staffofthe YMCA Safe Visit location, and appellant agreed to transport Rikki
Nevertheless, the district court has reiterated its order that appellant and the
minor child move their residence from the Lamed area back to Topeka. According
to the district court. if appellant does not comply with this order, sole residential
custody of the minor child will be awarded to appellee, a person who is still not
allowed to visit the child without supervision, who voluntarily forewent his
visitation rights for nearly two years, who has failed to made regular child support
payments, and who has a history of alcohol abuse that necessitated an order from
the district court prohibiting appellee from consuming alcohol with 4 hours or
The district court has compounded the dangers posed by appellee to appellant
and the minor child by issuing an additional, patently illegal, order prohibiting
appellant ,from calling law enforcement authorities for help or protection from
appellee without first consulting the case manager who was appointed by the district
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Appellant submits that these orders ofthe district court cannot be reasonably
interpreted to protect the best interests ofthe minor child, and that the circumstances
of this case require that the orders of the district court be vacated or modified.
Issue. The district court's orders concerning residence, custody, and visitation
fly in the face of the best interests of the minor child and violate the
consistent with the best interests of the minor child and the legal rights ofthe child
and the parties. Green v. Greene, 201 Kan. 701,443 P.2d 1356 (1980). This Court
must also respect the fundamental nature of the relationship between parent and
child that has been described by the United States Supreme Court. Stanley v.
lllinois, 405 U.S. 645,31 L.Ed.2d 551,92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972). The Kansas Supreme
Court has also recognized that a parent's right to the custody. care and control ofher
Constitution ofthe United States. In re Cooper; 230 Kan. 57, 631 P.2d 632 (1981).
Ifthese well-established legal standards are applied in this case, this Court will fmd
5
This is not a case in which a custodial parent has taken the child out of state.
Rikki still lives in Kansas, at a location only three hours away from appellee, and
appellant must bear the expense of transporting Rikki to Topeka for her supervised
visitations with appellee. Under these circumstances, Riklci's best interests cannot
possibly dictate that she be moved from her stable home environment to a different
in-state location that is within easy driving distance ofappellee" s place ofresidence.
In Carlson v. Carlson. 8 Kan. App. 2d 564, 661 P.2d 833 (1983), the
children's mother wanted to move from Kansas to Arizona, and she contended that,
by reason of the residency restriction contained in the fmal custody order entered
by the district court, and in order for her to have custody of the children, she had
been required to move her residence from the state of Arizona to McPherson
County. Kansas. She also contended that the restriction contained in the order
6
2d 921, SyI. 1f 1, 636 P.2d 224 (1981): "The same
considerations which detennine the custody ofchildren
are applied to the question ofremoval ofchildrenfrom
the state. [emphasis added. J Ofprimary concern are the
best interests and welfare of the children; all other
issues are subordinate,,,. It is apparent that a divorced
person may ordinarily move about without restraint or
limitation imposed by the desires or the wishes of a
former spouse, However, as to a divorced parent to
whom custody of minor children has been en1rusted,
such person may be required to forego or forfeit some
rights to custody or visitation, as the case may be,
consistent with the best interests iUld welfare of the
children and the rights ofthe other parent. ... [emphasis
added.] See In re Hipple. 124 Kan. 3,256 Pac. 1015
(1927}." Carlson. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 567. See also
Carney v. Carney, I Kan. App. 2d 544, SyI. ~ 2, 571
P.2d 56, rev. denied 222 Kan. 749 (1977).
The orders of the district court in the instant case are not "consistent with the best
interests and welfare of the [child]. ... " See Carlson. 8 Kan. App. 2d at 567.
Moreover, the simple passage oftime during which Rikki has been healthily
circ~stance that demands that the relocation order entered by the district comt
7
reason to modify a visitation or relocation order even without a showing of a
interests ....
Quoting Simmons y. Simmons, 223 Kan. 639, 642,576 P.2d 589 (1978); in
the case of In the Matter of the Maniage of Whipp, 265 Kan. 500, _ P.2d _
(1998), the Kansas Supreme Court discussed the fonowing rules of law for
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circumstances, K.S.A. 60-1610(a) vests the trial court
with continuing jwisdiction to modifY a custody order.
Therefore, a decree awarding child custody is res
judicata with respect to the facts existing at the time of
the decree. [Citations omitted.] However, when facts
and circumstances change, custody may be changed....
[Citations omitted.]'
K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B) outlines the considerations on which the decision should
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respect and appreciate the bond between the child and
the other parent and to allow for a continuing
relationship between the child and the other parent; and
(vii) evidence of spousal abuse.
Neither parent shall be considered to have a vested
interest in the custody or residency of any child as
against the other parent, regardless of the age of the
child...
According to Whipp:
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silent as to what constitutes a material change in
circumstances. Rather, there has been a universal focus
on what is in the best interests of the child m
determining whether a change of custody IS
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circumstances. We said:
"In the case now before us, both Deanna and Gregory
have established new homes with new mates since the
divorce was granted. Their life styles have changed.
The trial court had an opportunity to observe the
parents and their new spouses in the courtroo~ to hear
and evaluate the testimony, and to weigh the evidence.
There were many things ofimportance which the court
considered in addition to the then unmarried status of
Deanna and Cooper. The evidence ofdrug usage and its
impact upon the child, Cooper's prior felony record,
attempted denial of visitation privileges, neglect of
Alex's health and clothing needs, lack of discipline,
leaving the child unattended, and taking him to a tavern
late at night, all support the trial court's finding that the
home was unfit. We find adequate substantial evidence
as a basis for the trial court's order, and we :find no
abuse ofdiscretion." 228 Kan. at 292.
In Merriweather v. Merriweather, 190 Kan. 598, 376
P.2d 921 (1962), the question ofwhetber there was a
material change in circumstances was not addressed.
Instead, we stated: "It goes almost without saying that
the real problem posed here is the question of the best
interest of the child involved." 190 Kan. at 599.
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should not be disturbed unless it has abused its
discretion. Dickison v. Dickison. 19 Kan. App. 2d 633,
638, 874 P.2d 695 (1994). Discretion is abused when
no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. Smith v. Printup,. 262 Kan. 587, 592,938
P.2d 1261 (1997).
Whipp, 265 Kan. 510.
the minor child, which must be given paramount significance even over a material
. :-::56.)
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the orders ofthe district court must be vacated or
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REBEC A. KING
SUPREME COURT REG. NO. 16772
ATTORNEY AT LAW
RILING, BURKHEAD & NITCHER, CHID.
P.O. BOX B
808 MASSACHUSETTS
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66044
Telephone: (758)841-4700
Fax: (785)865-0161
Attorney for Respondent-Appellant
Date: December 14, 1999
Certificate of Service
I hereby certifY that five (5) true and correct copies of the foregoing brief
were placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Don R.
Hoffman, Esq.~ J~ffman and Hoffman, 112 W. Th St. Garden Suite, To ek~ KS
66603, on this ~ tlay of December, 1999. . .
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