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icipality of Jimenez.

 1988: Pursuant to said technical description, Sinacaban laid with the Provincial Board a claim to a portion of
particular barrios. However, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. 258 the disputed area is
part of Sinacaban, asserted jurisdiction over the same areas on the basis of an agreement it had entered into with
the Sinacaban.
o Said agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77
which provided that barrios Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site as part of Jimenez.
 The Provincial Board declared the disputed area part of Sinacaban.
o HELD: The resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board
had no power to alter the boundaries as fixed in E.O. 258.

Jimenez files a petitioner for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with the RTC.

 Following the Pelaez v. Auditor General doctrine, Jimenez contends that “the power to create municipalities is
essentially legislative, and consequently, Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal
personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.
 RTC ruled in Sinacban’s favor.
o That Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even prior to the Pelaez
case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before the existence was questioned;
o That Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being
reversed to the State in quo warranto proceedings;
o That Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban after having entered into
an agreement with it;
o That any question as to Sinacaban’s legal existence has been cured by Sec 442(d) of the LGC, which
provides: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.

WoN Sinacaban legally exists (Yes, as a de facto corporations)

Though, as ruled in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
cannot be created by the executive, the court has since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order
is later impliedly recognized, its creation can no longer be questioned.

 In the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr, the SC took into consideration the following
1. The fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged;
2. The fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality;
3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality in the Constitution apportioning
the seats in the House of Representatives.
4. That the Sec. 442(d) of the LGC was curative.
o The same factors exist to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation.
 It must be kept in mind that Sinacaban was created in 1949, and it has therefore been in existence for already 40
years before it was questioned.
o This is emphasized given that Rule 66(16), on quo warranto suits against a corporation, must be
commenced within 5 years from the time the act complained of was done.
o On the contrary, the State and Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacaban’s existence.
 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980: Sinacaban is constituted as part of the municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
 Jimenez-Sinacaban Agreement- Speaks for itself.
 Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution: Apportioning legislative districts throughout the
country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District.
o Moreover, indeed, Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is deemed to have cured whatever doubts there may have
been to Sinacaban.
WoN Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is invalid in failing to conform to the constitutional and statutory requirement of plebiscite in
the creation of new municipalities (No)

 First of all, the requirement only applies to new municipalities created under the 1987 Constitution.
 Secondly, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect.
 Thirdly, the requirement of plebiscite was fist introduced in the 1973 Constitution which took effect on January 17,
1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the municipality of
Sinacaban (1949).

WoN the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban (No)

 The barrios enumerated in E.O. 258 are not necessarily exclusive. “Sinacaban contains…” may include others.
 Whether or not the agreement entered into by Jimenez and Sinacaban is valid will be determined by the result of
the survey.
o Pelaez v. Auditor General: Power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative
nature.” Thus it is limited to implementing the law, and not amending it.
o If any alterations of boundaries were made, Resolution 77 cannot be said to be merely administrative, nor
valid. In gist, if Resolution 77 is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot
be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED