5691 Gen Sa RPT 0017 0

DOC NO.
5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0017
FRONT-END ENGINEERING DESIGN (FEED)
SERVICES FOR THIEN UNG FIXED PLATFORM REV. NO. 0
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hazard Operation (HAZOP) study was performed by Technip Geoproduction Malaysia (TPGM), Sdn.
Bhd. for Vietsovpetro JV as part of Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) Services for Thien Ung
Fixed Platform Project.
In very brief terms, the objective of the HAZOP is to identify the potential hazards associated with
Thien Ung Fixed Platform and improve the design of the facility to ensure the facility is inherently
safe.
The HAZOP workshop was conducted on the 13th of June 2011 till 22nd June 2011 at Thien Ung
Meeting Room, 10th floor in Menara JCorp. It was attended by a multi-disciplinary team with
experience and understanding in their respective fields from Technip Geoproduction (TPGM), Det
Norske Veritas (DNV) and Vietsovpetro JV
The HAZOP review utilizes the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is broken
down into manageable sections/ nodes and a set of standard Guide Words is applied.
Several nodes especially vendor package skid were not reviews during this HAZOP session due to
lack of information and time constraint. It is therefore being rescheduled to be HAZOP during Detailed
Design.
For Thien Ung Fixed Platform Project, a total of 120 recommendations were made. Technip
Geoproduction Malaysia (TPGM), Sdn. Bhd. and Vietsovpetro JV will implement the
recommendations made.
DOC NO. 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0017
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION 4
1.1 General 4
1.2 Objective 5
1.3 Abbreviations 5
2.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY 6
2.1 Overview 6
2.2 Methodology 6
2.3 HAZOP Review Guidewords 7
3.0 TEAM MEMBERS 8
4.0 HAZOP SESSION 9
4.1 P&ID Review Document List 11
5.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 12
6.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13
ATTACHMENT A- HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS
ATTACHMENT B- HAZOP WORKSHEET
ATTACHMENT C- HAZOP P&ID

HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
The Thien Ung field is located in the middle part of Block 04.3 in the Nam Con Son Basin,
offshore the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, approximately 15 km of Dai Hung field and
approximately 270 km southeast of Vung Tau. The block 04.3 covers an area of
approximately 2600 km2. The Thien Ung field is including its 2 structural part. Thien Ung
structure discovery was made in 2004 with the 04.3-TU-1X well. Two subsequent appraisal
wells (04.3-TU-2X and 04.3-TU-3X), drilled and tested respectively, delineated the field.
Location of Thien Ung field is shown in Figure 1.1 below.
Figure 1.1: Thien Ung Reservoir Location

HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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1.2 Objective
A HAZOP Study is a structured hazard identification tool using a multidiscipline team. It has
become accepted as the main technique for the identification of process hazards in the design
and operation of a facility.
Other identification techniques by discipline review or compliance with checklists are limited by
their reliance on previous experience and constrained by their narrow approach. HAZOP is
based on structured brainstorming from a guide word list.
The objectives of this HAZOP Study are as follows:

Identification of HSE hazards and threats for the Thien Ung Fixed Platform Project;
Improvement of the design of the facility to ensure the facility is inherently safe;
Assessment of the importance and interdependence of the identified hazards;
Establishment of the requirements for further assessment of the identified hazards in
the subsequent project activities.
1.3 Abbreviations
BDV Blowdown Valve

CPP Central Processing Platform
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FDP Fixed Drilling Platform
FEED Front End Engineering Design
F&G Fire and Gas
GTG Gas Turbine Generator
P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram
PSD Process Shutdown
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
SCSSV Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety Valve
SITHP Shut-In Tubing Head Pressure
SITHT Shut-In Tubing Head Temperature
SDV Shutdown Valve
TEG Triethylene Glycol
USD Unit Shutdown
VSP VIETSOVPETRO J.V.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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2.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY
2.1 Overview
The HAZOP review utilizes a well-defined, systematic procedure carried out by a

knowledgeable and qualified team of appropriate experts in various disciplines. It is a review of
process and other safety critical design aspects that utilized a formal and systematic approach
for identifying and assessing potential safety hazards and operability concerns associated with
the facilities.
The reviews are based on the collective experience of the multi-disciplinary personnel who
make up the HAZOP team. Effort is to be made for necessary experts in the area of offshore
facilities and operations to participate in the review to ensure that the study is conducted
objectively and in a professional manner.
2.2 Methodology
The HAZOP review utilizes the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is
broken down into manageable sections/ nodes and a set of standard Guide Words is applied.
Each node is then taken in turn and the Guide Words are applied to act as prompts to
generate causes/ concerns that may result in deviations of the process away from normal
operating conditions. The methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process
activity to determine if any potential problems in safety or operations may arise due to
deviations in the process parameters. The structure of a HAZOP is to consider causes/
concerns that arise within the node currently being reviewed.
Once all the Causes are identified then the ultimate Consequences of each cause/ concern
are identified – irrespective of any safeguards that may be in place. This is important to note
as only by considering what could happen will the team start to be able to determine if any
existing safeguards are sufficient in the context of the perceived severity of the hazard. The
HAZOP team then evaluates the severity of the problem and the adequacy of existing
safeguards, and where necessary, recommends additional safeguards as Actions.
The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of the review are documented
in the HAZOP worksheet. An example of HAZOP worksheet is in Attachment B.
A summary of the HAZOP review process is as follows:

Node – select the appropriate section of the plant;
Design conditions – define the Node’s design intent and process conditions;
Guide word – apply the first/ next guide word, which when combined with the parameter will
give the deviation;
Cause – determine (by brainstorming) all the potential causes of the deviation, agree the
credibility of each cause;
Consequence – assess the consequences of each cause;
Protection – assess the protection provided against the causes and its consequences;
Recommendation – agree a recommendation for action or further consideration of the
problem;
Guide Word – apply the next guide word
Move onto the next node of the system until the whole study has been examined
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Term Description
Nodes The division of the facility into appropriately sized nodes containing
process lines and/ or equipment is made by the Facilitator prior to the
review.
Guide Words The usual guide words include no, more and less but there are a number
of others commonly used. Not all guide words are applicable to each
parameter (i.e flow, pressure, level,start up, maintenance, etc)
Deviations The combination of parameters and guide words, in sequence, will

identify all the deviations (eg. No flow, more temperature, etc.). There
may be significant overlap between the deviations considered (eg. No
flow may have same effect as more pressure). These will be identified
and excluded during the team discussion.
Causes The team will brainstorm to find all the potential causes of the deviation.
There is frequently more than one cause, eg. No flow would be caused
by blockage, but there may be several different causes of blockage. All
potential causes should be identified and discussed. If only the generic
cause is covered, methods of prevention and operational issues will be
missed.
Consequences The potential consequences for each deviation are discussed and
assessed within the limits of the information available and the expertise of
the team.
There may be several consequences involving escalation to other pieces
of equipment.
Protection For each of the consequence, the protection provided is assessed to give
the net overall effect.
Recommendation The recommendations can take the form of closed or open actions.
Closed actions (instructions) will be made when the team agree the
solution and it is within their level of competency. Open actions, calling
for further work outside the study, will be made for those cases where the
situation is complex and the solution is not obvious. Wherever possible
the number of open actions should be minimized but the Facilitator must
balance this with the requirement not to unduly lengthen the discussion of
complex issues.
2.3 HAZOP Review Guidewords
Definition
Guide words are simple words or phrases used to qualify or quantify the intention and
associated parameters in order to suggest deviations.
Application
The full sets of Guide Words used in the HAZOP Review are listed in Table 2.1.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Table 2.1: Typical HAZOP Guide Words
No. Guide Word No. Guide Word

1 No Flow 12 Contamination/ Composition
2 Less Flow 13 Corrosion/ Erosion
3 More Flow 14 Instrumentation/ Sampling
4 Reverse Flow 15 Occupational Safety
5 Misdirected Flow 16 Maintenance
6 Less Pressure / Vacuum 17 Operations/ Testing / Commissioning
7 More Pressure 18 Others
8 Less Temperature 19 Unit Shutdown
9 More Temperature 20 Draining
10 Less Level 21 Start up
11 More Level 22 Engineering
3.0 TEAM MEMBERS
The HAZOP team members were selected from various disciplines based on their breath and
depth of experience. Team members who participated in the HAZOP Workshop are shown in
Table 3.1. The attendance list is attached in Attachment A.
Table 3.1: HAZOP Workshop Attendee

No Name Company Designation
1 Ong Thean Guan TPGM HAZOP facilitator
2 Nur Hamizah Shaidan TPGM Safety Engineer ( Scribe)
3 Sreenivasan Subramanian TPGM Lead Mechanical Engineer
4 Cheaw Yee Soon TPGM Instrument Engineer
5 Zailan Yasin TPGM Instrument Engineer
6 Mohan Damuderan TPGM Safety Engineer
7 Cheah Sern Hoe TPGM Lead Process Engineer
8 U.K. Kannan TPGM Engineering Manager
9 Chai Siew Wun TPGM Process Engineer
10 Yap Min Yee TPGM Process Engineer
11 Tan Bee Ling TPGM Process Engineer
12 Lee Ying Hong TPGM Process Engineer
13 Saiful Bahrin Harris TPGM Process Engineer
14 Odile Lajeunesse TPGM Process Engineer
15 Lum Yew Kuan TPGM Process Engineer
16 Bao Do Technip Process Engineer
Vietnam
17 Le Viet Dung VSP Engineering Manager
18 Nguyen Anh Dao VSP Coordinator
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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No Name Company Designation

19 Nguyen Van Thanh VSP Coordinator
20 Nguyen Nghia Phu VSP Lead Process and Piping Engineer
21 Bui Hong Duong VSP Process Engineer
22 Pham Quoc Bao VSP Lead HSE
23 Luu Anh Tuan VSP Installation Engineer
24 Vo Viet Hai VSP Lead Instrument Engineer
25 Le Tien Dung VSP Drilling Specialist
26 Tong Canh Son VSP Lead Flow Assurance
27 Tran Van Vinh VSP VSP Team Leader
28 Le Huu Toan VSP Process Engineer
29 Dang Ngoc Tan VSP Process Engineer
30 Bui Trong Han VSP Process Engineer
31 Hoang Van Tan DNV Process & Safety Engineer
4.0 HAZOP SESSION
The HAZOP workshop was held from 13th of June 2011 to 22th of June 2011 at Thien Ung
Meeting Room, 10th Floor, Menara JCorpThe nodes considered in HAZOP session are shown in
Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Nodes considered in HAZOP Workshop
No. Nodes
N1 Wellhead
N2 Test separator System
N3 Closed Drain Systems FDP
N4 Hazardous Open Drain System FDP
N6 Production Cooler and Production Separator
N7 Gas Compression Train 1
N8 Gas Dehydration System
N11/ N12/ Condensate Dehydration System
N13 i) Filters and Coalescers
ii)Gas side
iii) Liquid Side
N15 Production Launcher(s)
N24 Fuel Gas System
N25 HP Flare System
N26 LP Flare System
N27 Closed Drain Systems CPP
N28 Open Drain Systems CPP
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Several nodes which were schedule to be HAZOP during this session were not reviewed due to:
I. Lack of information.
Packages were excluded from HAZOP review, since the actual configuration inside the
packages are not yet known.
Future compression system Train 2 and Booster compressor system were excluded
from HAZOP review, since the actual details are not yet known.
II. Time constraint
The nodes are shown in Table 4.2. These nodes are therefore being rescheduled to be HAZOP
during Detailed Design.
Table 4.2: Nodes to be HAZOP during Detailed Design
No. Nodes
N5 Annulus Bleed/Header
N9 TEG Regeneration System
N10 Gas Metering System
N14 Export Condensate Metering System
N16 Hydrocyclones and Induced Gas Floatation (IGF)
N17 Potable water and Wash Water System
N18 Seawater System
N19 Instrument and Utility Air System
N20 Waste Heat Recovery
N21 Hot Oil System
N22 Sewage System
N23 Nitrogen system
N29 Aviation Fuel System
N30 Diesel Fuel System
N31 Methanol Injection System
N32 Corrosion Inhibitor Injection System
N33 Gas Turbine Generator and Emergency Generator
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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4.1 P&ID Review Document List
The P&ID reviewed are listed in Table 4.3. Marked up Rev A P&IDs were used in the HAZOP
session. The P&ID are attached in Attachment C - HAZOP P&IDs
Table 4.3: P&IDs reviewed during HAZOP

Drawing No Drawing Title Rev
5691-FDP-PR-PID-0131 Wellheads and Flowlines A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-2031 Production and Test Header A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-2032 Test Separator A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-6431 FDP Closed Drain Vessel and Pumps A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-6531 FDP Hazardous Open Drain Header A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-6532 FDP Hazardous Open Drain Caisson and Pump A
5691-BRG-PR-PID-9931 FDP-CPP Bridge A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2031 Production Coller A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2031 Production Separator A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2231 TEG Inlet Scrubber and Contactor A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2232 Lean TEG/ Dehydrated Gas Heat Exchanger A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2431 Gas Compressor Suction Scrubber ‘A’ (Future) A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2432 Gas Compressor Package ‘A’ (Future) A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2433 Gas Compressor After Cooler ‘A’ (Future) A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2631 Export Gas Custody Metering Skid A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2931 Gas and Condensate Export Header A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-2932 Production Launcher A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3031 Production Separator Condensate Pump A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3032 Train 1 Condensate Filters and Coalescers A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3033 Condensate Transfer Pump (Future) A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3034 Condensate dehydrator A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3036 Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Scrubber A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3037 Rewetted Stripping Gas Compressor A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3038 Condensate Booster Pump A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-3231 Condensate Custody Metering Skid A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6031 Fuel Gas Pre Heater ‘A’ A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6032 Fuel Gas Scrubber ‘A’ A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6033 Fuel Gas Filter ‘A’ A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6034 Fuel Gas Superheater ‘A’ A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6232 HP Flare KO Drum and Pumps A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6233 LP and HP Flare Tip and LP and HP Flare A
ignition Package
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6235 LP Flare KO Drum A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6236 LP Flare KO Drum Booster Pumps and Transfer A
Pumps
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6431 CPP Closed Drain Vessel and Pumps A
5691-CPP-PR-PID-6532 CPP Open Drain Caisson A
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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5.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The full well stream from Thien Ung wells will letdown through choke valve and flow to
production header at FDP via the production flowline. The well fluid collected in the
production header is routed to the CPP for further treatment via the interconnecting bridge.
Well testing facility is provided at the FDP. During well test, FWS from the test well will be
sent to the Test Separator. The separated gas, condensate and produced water will be
measured and checked for well performance. The separated well fluid is then combined and
flow back to the production header.
At CPP, the well fluid is cooled by the Production Cooler to 50 °C. The cooled well fluid is fed
to the Production Separator for three-phase separation of gas, condensate and produced
water. During early production year when the wells have sufficient flowing pressure to flow
directly to export pipeline, the separated gas is fed directly to the TEG Contactor for
dehydration. Dry gas from the TEG Contactor will exchange heat with the hot lean TEG in
Lean TEG/Dry Gas Exchanger to cool the lean TEG that feeds to TEG Contactor. The
dehydrated gas is metered prior to export.
The separated condensate from Production Separator is pumped by the Condensate Booster
Pumps to Condensate Filters and Coalescer. In Condensate Filter, condensate is filtered to
remove solids whereas fine separation of condensate and water takes place in the
Condensate Coalescer. The dewatered condensate is metered before commingled with the
dehydrated gas. The comingled product is exported via the 26-inch two-phase Nam Con Son
2 Pipeline to onshore.
Produced water separated from the Production Separator is routed to the Produced Water
Treatment System for removal of oil and grease in water to meet the Project and legislative
specifications prior discharge to sea.
Thien Ung field performance estimated that the well pressure will be depleted further after
approximately five (5) years of production. During that period, the wells are unable to flow
under its own pressure for export. Hence, Compression System is required to boost the gas
pressure to meet the export pressure. The Compression System will compress the wet gas
from Production Separator prior sending the gas for dehydration (HOLD).
In line with the Gas Compression System, the Condensate System pressure has to be
increased to enable the condensate flows into the two-phase export pipeline. Hence,
Condensate Transfer Pumps will be installed at downstream of the Condensate Coalescer to
increase the Condensate System Pressure for export.
When the gas pressure drops further in the later year, Booster Compression System shall be
installed upstream of the Gas Compression System to boost the pressure of gas from
Production Separator so that it meets the required suction pressure of Gas Compression
System.
Besides the process facilities, appropriate utility systems such as Fuel Gas system, Flare
System, Drain System, Instrument/Utility Air System, Nitrogen System, Seawater System,
Potable Water/Wash Water System, etc. have been installed to support the FDP and CPP
operation.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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6.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A total of 120 recommendations were raised by the HAZOP team throughout the sessions
and tabulated as shown in Table 6.1. All the recommendations identified in Table 6.1 are to
be followed up and closed out by the respective action parties. The close-out actions shall be
recorded in a separate HAZOP Close out Report (5691-GEN-PR-RPT-9904).
Some of the recommendations from this HAZOP sessions can be implemented with minimal
cost implications and others may require introduction of a new procedure or system which
would only be considered in the detail engineering phase. It is therefore important that all
such decisions and their justifications are documented in future so that their hazards and
operability constraints can be managed.
Table 6.1 Recommendations from HAZOP
Rec Action
No. Node Recommendation Party
1 1 Provide high alarm for 01PI'I' upstream of choke valve. TPGM
2 1 Consider to put the choke valve as part of wellhead vendor TPGM/VSP

scope.
3 1 Provide CSC for the isolation valve for the drain valve. TPGM
4 1 Consider to reduce the size of the drain line of the flow line. TPGM
5 1 Consider providing spectacle blind on drain line. TPGM
6 1 Provide PZAHH for the flow line downstream of choke (set TPGM
point to suit design pressure of Test Separator).
7 1 Provide the temperature indicator near to the choke to monitor TPGM
fluid temperature during start up
8 1 Provide the LL temperature trip near to the choke TPGM
9 1 Ensure the minimum design temperature is updated upon TPGM

completion of blowdown study.
10 1 Provide well kill facilities (cement pump by drilling contractor TPGM/
and connection by topsides). At present, this facility is not MDR
shown in P&ID. The well kill header shall be designed to be
permanently installed on platform even the cement pump is
removed in future after completion of drilling.
11 1 If pocket in the flow line can be avoided and liquid in the flow TPGM
line can be free flow down to production header then delete
the drain line for the flow line.
12 2 To provide high pressure trip at individual flow line to shut the TPGM
well.
13 2 Provide high flow alarm for the gas meter at test separator gas TPGM
outlet
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Rec Action
14 2 Provide high flow alarm for the condensate meter at test TPGM
separator condensate outlet
15 2 Provide high flow alarm for the water meter at test separator TPGM
water outlet
16 2 To investigate type of personnel protection that suitable for TPGM
use on vessel , taking into account the vessel dimension and
corrosion issue ( wire mesh)
17 2 To include manual depressuring line for the test separator TPGM
18 2 To provide spectacle blind on drain line from test header TPGM
19 2 Add one isolation valve upstream of gas meter TPGM
20 2 Review the valving requirement for test separator based on TPGM/VSP

operation and isolation requirement of VSP
21 2 To provide start up bypass for 20SDV1720 TPGM
22 2 To include one isolation valve upstream of PSV( CSO). TPGM
23 2 To provide limit switches for one of the isolation valve on TPGM

each flow line to test header to indicate which well is in test
24 3 To provide blinded utility connection at beginning of closed TPGM
header to flush sand accumulation in closed drain header.
25 3 Delete 64SDV1790 as the inventory of the vessel is small and TPGM
liquid content is less volatile.
26 3 Sampling point need to be provided at pump discharge line TPGM
27 3 Verify temperature of the fluid inside the Closed Drain Vessel TPGM
after drained down is not exceeding the threshold limit (65
degC), or else personal protection shall be applied for the
vessel.
28 3 Verify that space is available to pull out the heater bundle and TPGM
appropriate handling facility is available to handle the heater
after pull out for maintenance.
29 3 VSP does not experience vapour lock during start up for the TPGM
pump in the similar set up. As such, the vapour venting line
with RO at pump discharge line to be deleted.
30 3 Provide CSO on pump discharge isolation valve TPGM
31 4 To provide filter/strainer at the end of Open Drain Header TPGM

before entering Open Drain Caisson to remove trashes in the
drain liquid
32 4 To provide continuous nitrogen purge at top of the caisson TPGM
( common practice of VSP)
33 4 VSP need to carry out screening on the chemical (for normal VSP
operation or during drilling) to be use to meet the
environmental requirement.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Rec Action
34 4 To add sampling connection at the end of caisson to check the TPGM
quality of liquid before discharge to sea to comply with
environmental requirement
35 4 Configure the Open Drain Pump to be manual start and auto TPGM
stop.
36 4 Delete Seal Tank for open drain pump TPGM
37 4 Move the isolation valve upstream of the sampling line on TPGM

open drain caisson pump discharge to downstream of
sampling line to allow sample to be taken before routing the
liquid to process system.
38 4 VSP will revert to route the pumped liquid to transfer pot only , VSP
or recover to the system and ensure the system is designed to
take/withstand sea water.
39 6 Provide high high pressure switch on production header TPGM
40 6 To link the valve close position of 20SDV1040 to stop the TPGM

production separator condensate pumps(30P105A/B/C).
41 6 To provide pressure HH protection (PSV,trips) for full well TPGM

stream from satellite
42 6 Check the possibility of hydrates formation downstream of TPGM

Production Cooler
43 6 Provide pressure gauge for monitoring the Production TPGM

Separator pressure especially during depressuring.
44 6 To provide spectacle blind (2")on vapour return line on TPGM

Production Separator
45 6 (General)Change the bypass for manual valve to bypass for TPGM

20SDV1020
46 6 TPGM
Update legend sheet to show position indication for control
valve
47 7 Ensure that HP Flare System is capable of handling full flow TPGM
relief from 24PSV1137/1138/1139 .
48 7 Check that LP Flare System is designed to handle gas blow TPGM

by through 24LV1106
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Rec Action
49 8 Consider deleting 22PV1069A/B during day 1 operation. TPGM
50 8 Provide High High temperature trip on the lean Glycol line to TPGM
TEG contactor in case that the hot lean TEG temperature
exceed the design temperature of TEG contactor
51 8 Ensure that TEG contactor specification to vendor includes the TPGM
requirement to provide pumps that can cope with variation in
circulation rate.
52 8 Ensure that moisture analyzer is provided rather than moisture TPGM
sensor at TEG contactor outlet.
53 8 Capacity of LP Flare KO Drum need to check for this blow by TPGM

gas flow from 22LV1055
54 8 Ensure that the TEG vendor designed the PSV of TEG Flash TPGM
Drum for the gas blow by case.
55 8 Minimum distance between TEG contactor and 22SDV1071 to TPGM

be implemented.
56 8 Consider to provide some space for maintenance of 22E120 TPGM
57 8 Provide drain line for lean TEG section for TEG Regeneration TPGM
System
58 8 Consider to replace spare 22LV1060B with manual bypass TPGM

throttling valve.
59 8 To provide additional PV at the gas outlet of TEG contactor for TPGM

venting the off specs gas to flare during start up
60 11 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to determine the TPGM

possibility of relocating the shutdown valve from Production
Separator liquid outlet to pump discharge line.
61 11 Investigate the possibility in incorporating low low trip using TPGM
the flow element provided at Production Separator
Condensate Pump discharge.
62 11 Check requirement for PSV at discharge of Production TPGM
Separator Condensate Pump in case of pumping water during
startup.
63 11 Provide high flow alarm for 30FIC1442/1452/1462. TPGM
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Rec Action
64 11 To check that drip pans to be provided underneath filters , TPGM
coalescers and pumps.
65 11 To check the filter cartridge and coalescer internal maximum TPGM

allowable pressure drop
66 11 To check pump shut in pressure does not exceed piping TPGM

design pressure or pressure relief valve to be provided on
pump discharge.
67 11 To check if low temperature exceed below minimum design TPGM
temperature during blowdown for Condensate Dewatering
system
68 11 Provide sampling point downstream of Condensate TPGM
Coalescers.
69 11 To provide PG on the Condensate Coalescers TPGM
70 11 To provide manual bypass across 30LV1488/81 TPGM
71 11 (General) All drain level tubing to be relocated downstream of TPGM

spectacle blind/isolation valve.
72 11 To provide bypass on the inlet isolation valve of filters and TPGM

coalescers during startup
73 11 (General)To provide guided wave radar for interface level TPGM

transmitter
74 12 To check the design pressure of LP Flare KO Drum for the TPGM

gas blow by through the LV and manual bypass line.
75 12 To confirm the suitability of piping material specified for TPGM

blowdown system upon completion of blowdown study
76 12 To provide additional spacer downstream of 30SDV1540/41 TPGM

and upstream of check valve
77 12 Consider to route the liquid outlet line from rewetted stripping TPGM
gas suction scrubber to HP Flare KO Drum
78 13 TPGM
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to determine the
possibility of relocating the shutdown valve from Condensate
Dehydrator liquid outlet to pump discharge line.
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
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Rec Action
79 13 TPGM
Investigate the possibility in incorporating low low flow trip
using the flow element provided at condensate booster pump
discharge.
80 13 TPGM
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to determine the
requirement of additional shut down valve located in the
Condensate Dehydrator inlet.
81 13 To provide high temperature alarm on Condensate Dehydrator TPGM
(liquid portion)
82 13 Consider to provide different pump impeller for Condensate TPGM

Booster Pump to cover the minimum production rate if Booster
Pump needs to be installed. The same apply for Production
Separator Condensate Pump
83 13 To relocate the sampling connection downstream of TPGM
30SDV1530
84 13 Provide manhole at the top portion of column TPGM
85 13 If possible, consider to combine Condensate Booster Pump TPGM

with Condensate Transfer Pump. If only one pump is used and
the pump is reciprocating type, ensure that the control scheme
shall be modified to allow reciprocating pump to work.
86 15 Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) to review the TPGM
requirement of 32SDV1310
87 15 Quantitative risk assessment (QRA)) to review the TPGM

requirement of 26SDV1316
88 15 To provide High High pressure trip for 29PIZA1337 TPGM
89 15 To provide 2 out of 3 voting for 29PIZALL1337 TPGM
90 15 To consider additional atmospheric vent for Launcher to safe TPGM

location.
91 15 Review the startup requirement TPGM
92 15 To provide PSV on Launcher design for fire case. TPGM
93 15 To provide welded connection for riser valve. TPGM

HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Page 19 of 23
Rec Action
94 15 If pigging operation is very frequent, to provide local TPGM/VSP
mechanical interlock or other possible form of interlock (upon
VSP advice) for pigging operation to minimize the risk of
operator error.
95 15 Provided methanol injection fitting downstream of gas TPGM
metering unit for possible used during startup. The
requirement of methanol will be further verified during detail
design.
96 25 To consider removing 62SDV1421, however it is based on TPGM
QRA Study
97 25 Review the material for HP Flare KO drum and piping header TPGM
after low temperature study for blowdown is carry out
98 25 VSP to confirm if metering of flare is required. VSP
99 25 Verify temperature of the fluid inside the HP Flare KO Drum TPGM

is not exceeding the threshold limit (65 degC), or else
personnel protection shall be applied for the vessel.
100 25 To provide access staircase/ladder to Flare Tip platform TPGM
101 25 Consider routing the process drain from LP Flare KO Drum to TPGM
HP Flare KO Drum but taking into account the operating
pressure of the operating equipment
102 25 With the above recommendation, swap the LP Flare KO TPGM
Drum,Booster Pumps and Transfer Pump with HP Flare KO
Drum and Transfer Pumps to HP Flare and LP Flare
respectively
103 25 To change pilot/ ignition line material from carbon steel to SS TPGM
104 26 To provide low low pressure trip on LP Flare Booster Pump TPGM
discharge
105 26 To provide check valve at the tie in from LP Flare KO Drum TPGM
Pump to Production Separator inlet
106 26 To remove standby PSV for LP Flare KO Drum pump because TPGM
(3 x 50%) provided
107 26 To provide single isolation valve at suction of LP Flare KO TPGM

Drum main pumps
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Page 20 of 23
Rec Action
108 26 To study recycle line for LP Flare level control (continuous ) TPGM
109 26 Recycle line to be study for start up operation to avoid surge TPGM
110 26 To study the possibility of combining both LP Flare KO booster TPGM

and transfer pump.
111 26 To study the possibility of free draining from HP Flare KO TPGM

Drum to LP Flare KO Drum. Hence, eliminating HP Flare
transfer pumps.
112 24 To provide dedicated pressure transmitter for each control TPGM
valve 60PV1379/1380
113 24 To provide low pressure alarm to alert operator to open TPGM

standby pressure regulator valve set.(60PT1377)
114 24 To provide 60FICAH1358 to alert operator regarding the high TPGM

flow in the system
115 24 To verify the requirement of overpressure protection to be TPGM

provided downstream of 60PV1379/80 in regards to fuel gas
line rating inside Gas Turbine Generator
116 24 To replace 60HS1373 with manual blowdown valve on outlet TPGM/VSP
of Fuel Gas Superheater
117 27 To consider providing blinded utility connection at beginning of TPGM

closed header to flush sand accumulation in Closed Drain
header.
118 27 Consider to delete 64SDV1487 as the inventory of the vessel TPGM
is small and liquid content is less volatile.
119 27 To check the requirement of 64LIZAHH1473 TPGM
120 28 To provide trough (mesh) at the end of Open Drain Header TPGM
before entering Open Drain Caisson to remove trashes in the
drain liquid
HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Page 21 of 23
ATTACHMENT A – HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS

HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Page 22 of 23
ATTACHMENT B – HAZOP WORKSHEET

Node 1 Abbreviations
Review date 13th June 2011 SSV Surface Safety Valve FTHP Flowing Tubing Head Pressure
Client VIETSOVPETRO JV SCSSV Surface Control Subsurface Safety Valve FTHT Flowing Tubing Head Temperature
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP CITHP Close In Tubing Head Pressure CSC Car Sealed Closed
Facility Fixed Drilling Platform (FDP) & Central Processing Platform( CPP) CITHT Close In Tubing Head temperature CSO Car Sealed Opened
Section Wellheads SSC Sulfide Stress Cracking SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Design Intent Gas from production wells are routed to the production and test header
Design Pressure = SITHP of 491 barg (497 atm).

Conditions With this SITHP, the system shall be rated to API 10000.
Op Pressure = 248 -507 barg ( CITHP), Max 235 barg (FTHP)

Conditions Temperature = 44 degC (min) 100 degC (max)
Flowrate = 1 MMscmd per well (9% of CO2, assume H2S 20ppm)
Drawing Title Wellheads and Flowlines Drawing No. 5691-FDP-PR-PID-0131 Revision A
Production and Test Header 5691-FDP-PR-PID-2031 A
No. Deviation / Guide HAZOP Item Causes/ Concerns Consequences Protections Rec. No. Comments/ Recommendations Action Remarks
Words Party
1.1 No Flow 1.1.1 SCSSV closed Loss of production from affected well Low pressure alarm of 01PIA'AI' on
hydraulic oil tubing to SCSSV. Standard
operating procedure is to check the cause of
low pressure alarm.
1.1.2 SSV closed Loss of production from affected well Closed position indication with alarm is
provided by 01ZSC'C'.Standard operating
procedure is to check the cause of SSV
closed .
1.1.3 Wing Valve closed Loss of production from affected well Closed position indication with alarm is
provided by 01ZSC'E'.Standard operating
procedure is to check the cause of Wing
Valve closed .
1.1.4 Hydrates blockage during start up Loss of production from affected well Line rated for CITHP of the wells. 1 Provide high alarm for 01PI'I' upstream of TPGM
choke valve.
1.2 Less Flow 1.2.1 SCSSV partially closed Reduced production from affected SOP
well
1.2.2 SSV partially closed Reduced production from affected Discrepancy alarm against intended
well position
1.2.3 Wing Valve partially closed Reduced production from affected Discrepancy alarm against intended
well position
1.2.4 Manual Choke Valve set in wrong Reduced production from affected SOP 2 Consider to put the choke valve as part of TPGM/
position well wellhead vendor scope. VSP
1.3 More Flow 1.3.1 Manual Choke Valve set in wrong More production from affected well 20PIZAHH-1722 on Test Separator
position leading to potential impact on test
separator.
Technip N13 Page 1 of 60

Words Party
1.3.2 Well produce better than expected More production from affected well 20PIZAHH-1722 on Test Separator
leading to potential impact on test
separator.
1.4 Reverse Flow 1.4.1 Backflow from other wells when the well Loss of production through closed 1)Check valve located in flowline. 3/4/5 1)Provide CSC for the isolation valve for the TPGM
is not producing/closed drain valve drain line resulting in potential 2) SOP to depressurise the line via vent line drain valve.
accidentally open. overpressure of the closed drain 2)Consider to reduce the size of the drain
vessel. line of the flow line.
3) Consider providing spectacle blind on
drain line.
1.5 Misdirected Flow 1.5.1 Flow intended for production Exceeding the test separator design refer to 1.3.1 6 Provide PZAHH for the flowline TPGM
misdirected to test separator while capacity leading to overpressure of downstream of choke (set point to suit
testing on other well is being carried out. the vessel. design pressure of test separator).
1.5.2 Flow intended for production loss of production

misdirected to test separator while test
separator is offline.
1.5.3 Drain valve is left open after Loss of production through closed SOP inplace to close the spectacle blind
maintenance. drain line resulting in potential after draining
overpressure of the closed drain
vessel.
1.6 Less 1.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of vapour cloud leading to 1)01PIZALL'S' is provided on flowline
Pressure/Vacuum potential fire and explosion. downstream of choke.
2)Flowline upstream of choke less than 3m.
3)Fire and gas detection system
1.7 More Pressure 1.7.1 Refer to No Flow
1.8 Less Temperature 1.8.1 Cold temperature downstream of choke The flowline may experience start up SOP in place to control of start up flowrate 7/8 1)Provide the temperature indicator near to TPGM
due to well start up temperature below its minimum to avoid flowline temperature drops below the choke to monitor fluid temperature
design temperature. its minimum design temperature. during start up
2) Provide the temperature trip near to the
choke
1.8.2 Cold temperature due to blowdown of The flowline may experience Minimum design temperature assigned is 9 Ensure the minimum design temperature is TPGM
flowline. temperature below its minimum intended to cover the blowdown updated upon completion of blowdown
design temperature after blowdown. temperature. study.
1.9 More Temperature 1.9.1 No concern
1.10 Less Level 1.10.1 NA
1.11 More Level 1.11.1 NA
1.12 Composition/ 1.12.1 Sand Erosion in the flowline and choke 1)Line is sized based on erosional velocity.
Contamination valve. Potential damage to choke 2) Acoustic non- intrusive sand detector
valve 01XT'R' is provided with high sand loading
alarm.
1.12.2 CO2 Potential corrosion on the flowline Meterial selection is Duplex SS for system
handling wet fluid.

Words Party
1.12.3 Drilling Mud ( before start up) Blockage in wellhead system Drilling mud will be collected separately in Well cleaning facility is provided to
well test separator. clean up the well after drilling before
production starts to minimize
contamination
1.12.4 H2S ( not anticipated however design for It will cause SSC and lead to system Design for sour service for the system
20ppm) failure where applicable.
1.13 Corrosion/ 1.13.1 refer to CO2, H2S and Sand (section

Erosion 1.12)
1.14 Instrumentation/ 1.14.1 No concern Sampling point is provided in the

Sampling flowline
1.15 Occupational 1.15.1 No concern

Safety
1.16 Maintenance 1.16.1 No concern
1.17 Operations/ 1.17.1 No concern

Testing /
Commissioning
1.18 Others 1.18.1 well kill facilities 10 Provide well kill facilities (cement pump by TPGM/
drilling contractor and connection by MDR
topsides). At present , this facility is not
shown in P&ID.The well kill header shall be
designed to be permanently installed on
platform even the cement pump is remove in
future after completion of drilling.
1.19 Unit Shutdown 1.19.1 No concern
1.20 Draining 1.20.1 Draining at low point blocked by sand Cannot drain the line SOP 11 If pocket in the flowline can be avoided and TPGM
liquid in the flowline can be free flow down
to production header then delete the drain
line for the flowline.
1.21 Startup 1.21.1 Potential mishap caused by operator Leakage Proper permit to work and SOP inplace
error or incorrect procedure.
1.21.2 Cold temperature downstream of choke Refer to 1.8

due to well start up

Review date 13th June 2011 CITHP Close In Tubing Head Pressure
Client VIETSOVPETRO JV CSO Car Sealed Opened
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP
Facility Fixed Drilling Platform (FDP) & Central Processing Platform( CPP)
Section From Test Header to Production Header via Test Separator
Design Intent Test separator is provided to test the well fluid conditions prior routing to CPP Platform during well test.
Design Conditions Pressure = 135 barg
Temperature = 115 /-20°C
Op Conditions Pressure = 8- 127 barg

Temperature = max 95°C
Flowrate = 1MMscmd of gas
15.5 m3/h of condensate
2.3 m3/h of water
Drawing Title Production and Test Header Drawing No. 5691-FDP-PR-PID-2031 Revision A
Test Separator 5691-FDP-PR-PID-2032 A
5691-FDP-PR-PID-6431 A
No. Deviation / Guide HAZOP Item Causes/ Concerns Consequences Protections Rec. Comments/ Recommendations Action Remarks
Words No. Party
2.1 No Flow 2.1.1 20SDV 1720 fail close at inlet test 1)Loss of production Inlet line is fully rated to CITHP 12 To provide high pressure trip at individual TPGM
separator 2)No testing flowline to shut the well.
2.1.2 20PDV1735 stuck close at the gas line 1) Pressure build up in the test 1)20PIZAHH1722 is provided to trip
separator up to CITHP and damage close test separator inlet SDV on high
the separator high pressure
2) 20PSV1728 is provided to provide
blocked discharge relief to the
separator
2.1.3 20SDV1743 fail close at the outlet of test 1) Pressure build up in the test 1)20PIZAHH1722 is provided to trip
separator separator up to CITHP and d damage
d close
l test separator inlet
l SDV on high
h h
the separator high pressure
2) Condensate level build up in the 2) 20PSV1728 is provided to provide
test separator up to LZAHH blocked discharge relief to the
3) Water interface level build up in the separator
test separator up to interface LZAHH 3)20LIZAHH1727 is provided to shut
down test separator on HH
condensate level
4)20LIZAHH1726 is provided to shut
down test separator on HH interface
water level
2.1.4 20LV1738 stuck close at condensate outlet Condensate level build up in the test 20LIZAHH1727 is provided to shut
separator up to LZAHH down test separator on HH
condensate level
2.1.5 20LV1725 stuck close at the water outlet Water interface level build up in the 20LIZAHH1726 is provided to shut
test separator up to interface LZAHH down test separator on HH interface
water level
2.2 Less Flow 2.2.1 20SDV1720 partially stuck close at inlet Inaccurate well test data but no safety
test separator impact
2.2.2 20PDV1735 partially close at the gas line Inaccurate well test data but no safety
impact
Words No. Party
2.2.3 20SDV1743 partially stuck close at the Inaccurate well test data but no safety
outlet of test separator impact
2.2.4 20LV1738 partially stuck close at Inaccurate well test data but no safety
condensate outlet impact
2.2.5 20LV1738 partially stuck close at Inaccurate well test data but no safety
condensate outlet impact
2.2.6 Partial strainer blockage 20SFS101 on Inaccurate well test data but no safety 20PDIAH1741 is provided for strainer
condensate line impact
2.2.7 Partial strainer blockage 20SFS102 on Inaccurate well test data but no safety 20PDIAH1742 is provided for the
water line impact strainer
2.3 More Flow 2.3.1 More gas flow from upstream 1)Pressure build up in the test 1)20PIZAHH1722 is provided to trip 13 Provide high flow alarm for the gas meter at TPGM
separator that lead to HH pressure close test separator inlet SDV on high test separator gas outlet
trip high pressure
2) Potential erosion on the gas line 2) 20PSV1728 is provided to provide
blocked discharge relief to the
separator
2.3.2 More condensate flow from upstream 1)Level build up in condensate section 20LIZAHH1727 is provided to shut 14 Provide high flow alarm for the condensate TPGM
of test separator that lead to HH level down test separator on HH meter at test separator condensate outlet
trip condensate level
2) Potential erosion on the condensate
line
2.3.3 More water flow from upstream 1)Interface level build up in 20LIZAHH1726 is provided to shut 15 Provide high flow alarm for the water meter TPGM
water/condensate section of test down test separator on HH interface at test separator water outlet
separator that lead to HH interface water level
level trip
2)Potential erosion on the water line
2.4 Reverse Flow 2.4.1 Reverse flow from production header to No concern
test separator
2.5 Misdirected Flow 2.5.1 Manual drain valve left open Overpressure of closed drain vessel SOP
2.6 Less Pressure 2.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of vapour cloud leading to 1)Low low pressure trip,
potential fire and explosion. 20PIZALL1722
2.6.2 PSV passing Possibility of hydrates formation 1)PSV discharge line is electrical heat
downstream of PSV tracing.
2)PSV periodic testing
2.7 More Pressure 2.7.1 20PDV1735 stuck close at the gas line Refer to section 2.1.2
2.7.2 20SDV1743 fail close at the outlet of test Refer to section 2.1.3
separator
2.7.3 More gas flow from upstream Refer to section 2.3
Words No. Party
2.8 Less Temperature 2.8.1 Cold temperature due to blowdown of Potentially test separator may Test separator is designed for -20
test separator. experience temperature below its degC based on blowdown study.
minimum design temperature after
blowdown.
2.10 Less Level 2.10.1 20LV1738 on condensate line stuck open Potential gas blow by from test Low low level trip 20LIZALL1727
separator to production header
2.10.2 20LV1725 on water line stuck open Potential gas blow by from test Low low level trip 20LIZALL1726
separator to production header
2.11 More Level 2.11.1 20SDV1743 fail close at the outlet of test Refer to 2.1.3
separator
2.11.2 20LV1738 stuck close at condensate outlet Refer to 2.1.4
2.11.3 20LV1725 stuck close at the water outlet Refer to 2.1.5
2.12 Composition/ 2.12.1 Sand Sand accumulation inside test Provision is given to the separator to
Contamination separator obstructing level install sand removal system in future
measurement
2.12.2 CO2 Corrosion of vessel lead to leakage Vessel is designed with SS cladding to
withstand corrosion
2.12.3 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to vessel Vessel is designed to meet NACE MR
failure 0175 requirement for sour service.
2.13 Corrosion 2.13.1 Refer to CO2, H2S
Erosion 2.13.2 Refer to more flow
2.14 Instrumentation/ 2.14.1 No concern sampling points provided for

Sampling gas, condensate and water outlet of test
separator
2.15 Occupational Safety 2.15.1 Hot surface on test separator Personnel injury Personnel protection provided 16 To investigate type of personnel protection TPGM
that suitable for use on vessel, taking into
account the vessel dimension and corrosion
issue ( wire mesh)
2.16 Maintenance 2.16.1 Maintenance during normal operation
Double block and bleed

philosophy during normal
operation to be confirmed.
2.16.2 No manual depressuring line provided Not able to depressure the vessle for 17 To include manual depressuring line for the TPGM
only emergency blowdown line is operations purpose. test separator
available
2.16.3 No spectacle blind on the drain line form 18 To provide spectacle blind on drain line from TPGM
test header test header
2.16.4 No isolation valve upstream of gas Cannot isolate the meter from vessel 19 Add one isolation valve upstream of gas TPGM
flowmeter during maintenance meter
Words No. Party
2.16.5 Double block valve provided upstream Excessive valving considering that the 20 Review the valving requirement for test VSP/
and downstream of flowmeters and/or vessel will always be depressurized separator based on operation and isolation Technip
control valve before any maintenance to be carry requirement of VSP
out for the test separator system.
2.17 Operations/ Testing 2.17.1 No concern

/ Commissioning
2.19 Draining 2.19.1 No concern
2.20 Startup 2.20.1 No concern 21 To provide start up bypass for 20SDV1720 TPGM
2.21 Engineering 2.21.1 22 To include one isolation valve upstream of TPGM

PSV( CSO).
23 To provide limit switches for one of the TPGM
isolation valve on each flowline to test header
to indicate which well is in test
Review date 14th June 2011
Client VIETSOVPETRO JV
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Facility Fixed Drilling Platform (FDP) & Central Processing Platform( CPP) SSC Sulfide Stress Cracking
Section FDP Closed Drain System. CSO Car Sealed Opened
Design Intent The FDP Closed Drain System shall be designed to collect only the maintenance drains from the pressurised process system on FDP in order to contain any high-pressure gas that might be blown through when draining of these facilities.
Design Conditions FDP Closed Drain Vessel (64V105) FDP Closed Drain Vessel Pumps
Pressure = 10 bar (64P110 A/B)
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = 115 / 0°C Rated Capacity = 5 m3/hr EACH
Op Conditions FDP Closed Drain Vessel (64V105)

Pressure = ATM
Temperature = AMB - 95°C

Production and Test Header 5691-FDP-PR-PID-2031 A
FDP Closed Drain Vessel and Pumps 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6431 A
Words No. Party
3.1 No Flow 3.1.1 Duty pump 64P110A trips No liquid transfer to LP flare KO Standby pump 64P110B available.
Drum. Level build up in the vessel and
it will cause liquid carry over to LP flare
h d
header.
3.1.2 Potential sand and wax blockage on Liquid cannot drain to Closed drain 1)Electrical heat tracing is provided 24 To provide blinded utility connection at TPGM
closed drain header vessel. to minimize wax blockage. beginning of closed header to flush sand
2) 4" header line is provided which accumulation in closed drain header.
consider sufficiently large to avoid
blockage.
3.1.3 64SDV1790 fail close 1)Liquid build up in the vessel 25 Delete 64SDV1790 as the inventory of the TPGM
2)Potential pump damage due to vessel is small and liquid content is less
cavitation volatile.
3.2 Less Flow 3.2.1 Y- strainer on pump suction line blocked Potential pump damage due to SOP inplace to inspect and clean up
cavitation the strainer on regular interval.
3.2.2 Drain line is partially block Reduced draining to Closed drain SOP refer to 3.1.2
vessel.
3.3 More Flow 3.3.1 Two pumps running in manual mode 1)Higher than anticipated liquid SOP to ensure that two are not
velocity on discharge line.No concern running
2)Higher than anticipated liquid
velocity on the suction line causing
higher pressure drop which may lead to
cavitation.

Words No. Party
3.3.2 Drain valve is left open after Higher than anticipated liquid and gas SOP inplace to close the spectacle
maintenance flow entering the closed drain blind after draining
vessel.Design capacity of the vessel may
exceed and leading to excessive liquid
carry over to LP Flare system.
3.4 Reverse Flow 3.4.1 Liquid from Open Drain Caisson Pump Liquid build up in Closed Drain Vessel 1)Check valve on pump discharge
backflow to Closed Drain Vessel. line.
2)Bleeding flow line isolation valve is
normally close.
3.5 Misdirected Flow 3.5.1 Liquid flow from pump misdirected to Liquid can be discharge to overboard Check valve provided on the Open
open drain caisson. Drain Pump line.
3.6 Less 3.6.1 Loss of containment from Closed Drain Environmental spill Liquid spill to drip pan which will
Pressure/Vacuum Vessel eventually be collected in the Open
Drain Caisson . Small inventory
unlikely to escalate.
3.7 More Pressure 3.7.1 Back pressure from CPP Overpressure of Closed Drain Vessel The Closed Drain Vessel on FDP is
having same design condition as LP
Flare KO Drum on CPP (10 barg)
3.7.2 Pump pumping against dead head Discharge piping rupture Discharge pipe is design for shut off
head of the pump based on highest
liquid density (water)
3.8 Less Temperature 3.8.1 Closed drain vessel heater failure Gel formation inside vessel and Low low temperature trip In case the well fluid pour point
obstructing pumping of liquid 64TIZALL1771 is provided on liquid does not result in gel formation
side of the vessel. at minimum ambient
temperature, electric heater
might not be required.
3.9 More Temperature 3.9.1 Heater malfunction Liquid may boiled off and exposed the 1)High high temperature trip
heater element resulting in damage 64TZAHH1771 is provided on the
heater liquid side to measure high liquid
temperature
2) High high temperature trip
64TZAHH1775 is provided for the
heating element to trip heating
element which has malfunction .
3.10 Less Level 3.10.1 ON/OFF level control loop for 1) Lead to pump cavitation due to Low low level trip 64LIZALL1773
Start/Stop pump malfunction pumping dry
2) Exposing heater element and
demaging the heater
3.11 More Level 3.11.1 Pump failure Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header 1)LP Flare KO drum CPP is provided
to knock out the carry over liquid.LP
Flare KO Drum is provided with HH
level trip
2) Standby pump 64P110B is
available

Words No. Party
3.11.2 Draining more than holding capacity Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header see above 3.11.1
3.11.3 on/off level control loop for start/stop Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header see above 3.11.1
pump malfunction
3.12 Composition/ 3.12.1 Sand Sand accumulation inside Closed Drain Provision is given to the Closed
Contamination Vessel obstructing level measurement Drain Vessel to install sand removal
system in future
3.12.2 CO2 Corrosion of vessel lead to leakage Vessel is designed with SS cladding
to withstand corrosion
3.12.3 H2S Potential SSC which may lead to vessel Currently, vessel is designed to meet
failure NACE MR 0175 requirement for sour
service.
3.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 3.13.1 Refer to CO2, H2S for corrosion.

Erosion- no concern
3.14 Instrumentation/ 3.14.1 No sampling point for liquid line Cannot take sample to analyse the 26 Sampling point need to be provided at pump TPGM
Sampling liquid discharge line
3.15 Occupational Safety 3.15.1 Draining of liquid at high operating Personnel Injury 27 Verify temperature of the fluid inside the TPGM
temperature closed drain vessel after drained down is
not exceeding the threshold limit (65 degC),
or else personal protection shall be applied
for the vessel.
3 16 Maintenance
3.16 3 16 1
3.16.1 Space is needed to pull out heater 28 Verify that space is available to pull out the TPGM
bundle for maintenance heater bundle and appropriate handling
facility is available to handle the heater after
pull out for maintenance.
3.17 Operations/ Testing / 3.17.1 No concern

Commissioning
3.20 Startup 3.20.1 No concern in FEED phase Detail design HAZOP to look at
introduction of liquid to cover
the heater bundle prior starting
up the heater.
3.21 Engineering 3.21.1 Vapour return line from pump 29 VSP does not experience vapour lock during TPGM
discharge to vessel for start up start up for the pump in the similar set up.
As such, the vapour venting line with RO at
pump discharge line to be deleted.
30 Provide CSO on pump discharge isolation TPGM

valve

Review date 14th June 2011 KO Knock Out
Client VIETSOVPETRO JV SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Section FDP Hazardous Open Drain and Hazardous Open Drain Caisson System.
Design Intent The Open Drain System is segregated into hazardous and non-hazardous open drain headers. Liquids and spillage containing hydrocarbons collected from drip pans are routed to the hazardous open drain header and liquid from non-
hazardous area is routed to the non-hazardous open drain header. Both the hazardous and non-hazardous open drain headers are terminated in the same Open Drain Caisson but with non-hazardous open drain header being terminated
deeper than hazardous open drain header to prevent possible backflow of hydrocarbon gas to non-hazardous area
Design Conditions FDP Open Drain Caisson (65T105) FDP Open Drain Caisson (65P110)
Pressure = 3.5 bar
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = 65°C
Op Conditions FDP Open Drain Caisson (65T105)

Pressure = ATM
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = AMB

FDP Closed Drain Vessel and Pumps 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6431 A
FDP Hazardous Open and Headers 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6531 A
FDP Hazardous Open Drain Caisson and Pump 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6532 A
Words No. Party
4.1 No Flow 4.1.1 Pump 65P110 trips Hydrocarbon will accumulate inside 1) SOP to check the high level alarm
the caisson which may eventually lead
to under flow from caisson and
polluting the sea.
4.1.2 Open Drain header is blocked Not able to drain the liquid from deck 31 To provide filter/strainer at the end of open TPGM
drain header before entering open drain
caisson to remove trashes in the drain liquid
4.2 Less Flow 4.2.1 Open drain line is partially block refer to 3.1.2
4.3 More Flow 4.3.1 NA
4.4 Reverse Flow 4.4.1 Liquid from CPP LP Flare KO Drum or Pollution to sea Check valve on pump discharge line
FDP closed drain vessel pump backflow that tie in to the FDP closed drain
to open FDP open drain pump discharge vessel pump discharge line.
line and through the sampling line and
spill out to open sea .
4.5 Misdirected Flow 4.5.1 Liquid flow from open drain caisson Pollution to sea SOP to ensure that isolation valve is
vessel misdirected to drain pots at cellar normally closed during pump
deck but the drain pots are not in place transfer
4.6 Less 4.6.1 Tide movement 1)Air ingress into caisson and air expel 1)Vent is terminated at safe location 32 To provide continuous nitrogen purge at top TPGM
Pressure/Vacuum through the atmospheric vent 2) Flame arrestor is provided on the of the caisson ( common practice of VSP)
2)Formation of explosive mixture inside vent line to prevent flash back
caisson which can lead to explosion
4.7 More Pressure 4.7.1 Pump pumping against dead head Discharge piping rupture Discharge pipe is design for shut off

Words No. Party
4.8 Less Temperature 4.8.1 NA
4.9 More Temperature 4.9.1 NA
4.10 Less Level 4.10.1 ON/OFF level control loop for Pump pumping sea water to process Sampling point is provided to take
Start/Stop pump malfunction system if the discharge line up to LP sample and measure the quality of
Flare KO drum and causing potential pumping fluid. VSP will revert to route
corrosion for the facility. the pumped liquid to
transfer pot only , or
recover to the system and
ensure the system is
designed to
4.11 More Level 4.11.1 Pump failure Liquid accumulated in the caisson until High level alarm is provided To check with Electrical
underflow from the bottom and causing 65LICAH1800. on pump failure status
pollution
4.11.2 Draining more than holding capacity Liquid accumulated in the caisson until High level alarm is provided
underflow from the bottom and causing 65LICAH1800.
pollution
4.12 Composition/ 4.12.1 Chemical injected in the well fluid Chemical maybe toxidic to the marine 33 VSP need to carry out screening on the VSP
Contamination life chemical (for normal operation or during
drilling) to be use to meet the environmental
requirement.
4.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 4.13.1 Corrosion- Caisson incontact with sea Corrosion on the caisson causing 1)Coating is provided at the splash
water which is highly corrosive leakage and environmental pollution zone of caisson
Erosion- no concern 2) Sacrifical anode is installed for
i
caisson.
4.14 Instrumentation/ 4.14.1 Quality of discharge liquid to sea shall 34 To add sampling connection at the end of TPGM
Sampling comply with environmental requirement caisson to check the quality of liquid before
discharge to sea to comply with
environmental requirement
4.15 Occupational Safety 4.15.1 No concern
4.17 Operations/ Testing / 4.17.1 Pump is auto start, thus, no chance to May introduce sea water or other 35 Configure the open drain pump to be TPGM
Commissioning take sample to test the quality of the contaminants into the process system manual start and auto stop.
fluid
4.20 Startup 4.20.1 No concern
4.21 Engineering 4.21.1 36 Delete Seal Tank for Open Drain Pump TPGM

Words No. Party
4.21.2 37 Move the isolation valve upstream of the TPGM

sampling line on Open Drain Caisson Pump
discharge to downstream of sampling line to
allow sample to be taken before routing the
liquid to process system.
4.21.3 38 VSP will revert to route the pumped liquid VSP

to transfer pot only , or recover to the system
and ensure the system is designed to

Review date 15th June 2011 SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Client VIETSOVPETRO JV SSC Sulfide Stress Cracking
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP CSO Car Sealed Opened
Section Production cooler and production separator
Design Intent The hot well fluid from Thien Ung field is cooled by the Production Cooler prior enter to the Production Separator. Production Separator is for handling Train 1 production performs separation of feed stream into
gas,condensate and water.
Design Production cooler Production separator
Conditions Pressure = 135 barg Pressure = 135 barg
Temperature = 115 /-20°C Temperature = 80 /-20°C
Op Pressure = 9- 127 barg (inlet) Pressure = 8- 126 barg
Conditions 8-126 barg(outlet) Temperature = 18-50°C
Temperature = 57-91°C (inlet)
50-91°C (outlet)
Duty = 7356 kW
Drawing Production and Test Header Drawing No. 5691-FDP-PR-PID-2031 Revision A

Title FDP-CPP Bridge 5691-BRG-PR-PID-9931 A
Production Cooler 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2031 A
Train 1 Production Separator 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2032 A
TEG Inlet Scrubber and Contactor 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2231 A
No. Deviation / HAZOP Item Causes/ Concerns Consequences Protections Rec. Comments/ Recommendations Action Remarks
Guide Words No. Party
6.1 No Flow 6.1.1 20SDV1020 fail close at inlet Production 1)Loss of production 1) 20PSV1704A/B designed for 39 Provide high high pressure switch on TPGM
Separator 2) Overpressure upstream of blocked discharge production header
shutdown valve 20SDV1020 2) limit switch provided on
20SDV1020
6.1.2 20SDV1040 fail close at the condensate 1) Level in production separator rise 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut 40 To link the valve close position of TPGM
outlet of Production Separator leading to liquid carry over to TEG down production separator on HH 20SDV1040 to stop the production
contactor condensate level separator condensate
2) No flow to production separator pumps(30P105A/B/C).
condensate pumps causing cavitation
to condensate pumps
6.1.3 20LT1038 level control loop failure 1)Level in production separator rise 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
leading to level control valve in leading to liquid carry over to TEG down production separator on HH
20LV1038A/B to close contactor condensate level
2) Production separator condensate
pumps in recycle mode however no
outlet for liquid
6.1.4 20SDV1027 fail close at the water outlet Water interface level build up in the 20LIZAHH1021 is provided to shut
of Production Separator production separator and overflow down production separator on HH
into condensate compartment leading water level
to overloading of condensate
dewatering system.Interface LZAHH
exceeded.
6.1.5 20LT1023 level control loop failure Water interface level build up in the 20LIZAHH1021 is provided to shut
leading to interface level control valve in production separator and overflow down production separator on HH
Hydrocyclone Package to close into condensate compartment leading water level
to overloading of condensate
dewatering system.Interface LZAHH
exceeded.
6.2 Less Flow 6.2.1 Refer to no flow
6.2.2 Blowdown valve 20BDV1702 Loss of production Limit switch provided on 20BDV1702
inadvertently open
6.2.3 Blowdown valve downstream of cooler Loss of production Limit switch provided on
20BDV1XXX inadvertently open 20BDV1XXX
6.2.4 20PV1034 to flare fail open Loss of production Position indication provided for
20PV1034
6.2.5 Blowdown valve 20BDV1028 Loss of production Limit switch provided on 20BDV1028
inadvertently open
6.3 More Flow 6.3.1 More gas flow from upstream above 1)Pressure build up in the Production 1)20PSV1704A/B in production 41 To provide pressure HH protection TPGM
design (8MMscmd) Separator. header (PSV,trips) for full well stream from
2) Potential erosion on the gas line satellite
3)W t d
3)Water dew pointi t after
ft d h d ti
dehydration
may be exceeded.
6.3.2 More condensate flow from upstream 1)Level build up in condensate 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
above design section of Production Separator that down production separator on HH
lead to HH level trip condensate level
2) Potential erosion on the
condensate line
3) Water content in the condensate
may exceed the requirement value.
6.3.3 More water flow from upstream 1) Water interface level build up in 20LIZAHH1021 is provided to shut
the production separator and down production separator on HH
overflow into condensate water level
compartment leading to overloading
of condensate dewatering
system.Interface LZAHH exceeded.
2) Water that discharge overboard
may exceed the allowable limit oil-in-
water content.
6.3.4 More flow from LP Flare Ko Drum 1)Level build up in 1)20LIZAHH1022 is
Pumps ,62P140A/B/C. condensate/water section of provided to shut down
Production Separator that lead to HH production separator on
level trip HH condensate level
2) Potential erosion on the 2)20LIZAHH1021 is
condensate/water line provided to shut down
3) water content in the condensate production separator on
may exceed the requirement value. HH water level
6.4 Reverse Flow 6.4.1 No concern
6.5 Misdirected 6.5.1 Satellite flow misdirected back to Production Cooler operation Check valve on opposing line
Flow ProductionHeader obstructed
6.6 Less Pressure 6.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of vapour cloud leading to 1)Low low pressure trip,
potential fire and explosion. 20PIZALL1025
6.6.2 20PSV1031/32 passing Possibility of hydrates formation 1)PSV discharge line is electrical heat
6.6.3 20PSV1704A/B passing Possibility of hydrates formation 1)PSV discharge line is electrical heat
6.7 More Pressure 6.7.1 20PV1034 stuck close while required to Pressure build up to the design 20PSV1704A/B on the production
open pressure of the Production Separator header
6.7.2 More gas flow from upstream refer to more flow
6.8 Less 6.8.1 Cold temperature due to blowdown of Potentially production separator may production separator is designed for -
Temperature production separator. experience temperature below its 20 degC based on blowdown study.
blowdown.
6.8.2 Temperature control failure during low 1)Potential hydrates formation at 1)SOP- Operator to do corrective 42 Check the possibility of hydrates TPGM
ambient temperature (night time) cooler outlet action upon low temperature alarm formation downstream of Production
2) Colder stripping gas to Condensate 20TICA1006L Cooler
Dehydration System result in water 2)Temporary off spec for condensate
dew point for dehydrated condensate in term of water content is allowed
off spec by VSP(this operating mode should
not exceed one week) and corrosion
inhibitor injection is available to
inhibit corrosion on the pipeline that
due to water drop out in the
pipeline.
6.9 More 6.9.1 Some cooler fans malfunction 1)Design temperature downstream of 1)High high temperature trip
Temperature cooler may exceeded 20TIZAHH1007 is provided
2)Water dew point of dehydrated gas downstream of the cooler.
may be exceeded 2)Design temperature downstream of
the cooler is designed to account of
max temperature with one or two
cooler fan shut down
6.10 Less Level 6.10.1 20LV1038A/B stuck open Production Separator Condensate 20LIZALL1022 will trip and shut the
Pump cavitation pump
6.10.2 Level control valve inside hydrocyclone Loss of interface level and if prolong, 1)20LIZALL1021 will shut
stuck open gas blowby to IGF vessel. 20SDV1027 at water outlet.
2)IGF vessel PSV will be sized for gas
blow by in production separator.
6.11 More Level 6.11.1 refer to no flow
6.12 Composition/ 6.12.1 refer to 2.12

Contamination
6.13 Corrosion 6.13.1 refer to 2.13
Erosion 6.13.2 refer to more flow
6.14 Instrumentation 6.14.1 43 Provide pressure gauge for monitoring TPGM

/ Sampling the Production Separator pressure
especially during depressuring.
6.15 Occupational 6.15.1 No concern

Safety
6.16 Maintenance 6.16.1 44 To provide spectacle blind (2")on vapour TPGM
return line on Production Separator

Testing /
Commissioning
6.20 Startup 6.20.1 Start up bypass is provided for manual 45 (General)Change the bypass for manual TPGM
valve upstream of 20SDV1020 valve to bypass for 20SDV1020
6.21 Engineering 6.21.1 46 Update legend sheet to show position TPGM
indication for control valve

Section Gas compression system train 1(future)
Design Intent A 2 x 50% gas compression trains will be installed in the future when the well pressure depleted to 50 barg to meet the required
departure pressure for the two-phase export pipeline.
Design Conditions Gas Compressor Suction Srubber 'A' Gas Compressor 'A' Gas Compressor After Cooler 'A'
Pressure = 180 barg Pressure = 180 barg Pressure = 180 barg
Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 200 /-20°C Temperature = 200 /-20°C
Op Conditions Pressure = 50 barg Pressure = 50 barg (suction) Pressure = 162 barg (inlet)
Temperature = 17-49°C =162 barg (discharge) =161 barg (outlet)
Temperature = 17-49°C (suction) Temperature = 147-154°C (inlet)
=147-154°C (discharge) =50°C (outlet)
Drawing Title Lean TEG /Dehydrated Gas Heat Exchanger Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2232 Revision A
Gas Compressor Suction Srubber 'A' (Future) 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2431 A
Gas Compressor Package 'A' (Future) 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2432 A
Gas Compressor After Cooler 'A' (Future) 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2433 A
Words Party
7.1 No Flow
7.2 Less Flow
7.3 More Flow
7.4 Reverse Flow
7.5 Misdirected Flow

Flow will be review during
design of gas compression
system
7.6 Less Pressure
7.7 More Pressure 7.7.1 24SDV1167 at downstream of 24E115A Potential overpressure on compressor 1)High High Pressure Trip 47 Ensure that HP Flare System is capable TPGM
fail close discharge line 24PIZAHH1143 is provided at of handling full flow relief from
compressor discharge 24PSV1137/1138/1139 .
2)24PSV1137/1138/1139 are
provided for pressure relief
Words Party
7.8 Less Temperature
7.9 More 7.9.1 24E115A malfunction Potential high operating temperature High High Temperature trip
Temperature exceeding design temperature of 24TIZA1164 is provided
downstream system including pipeline
7.10 Less Level 7.10.1 24LV1106 at liquid outlet of 24V105A Loss of liquid level in 24V105A that lead Low Low Level trip 24LIZALL1105 is 48 Check that LP Flare System is designed TPGM
stuck open to gas blow by to LP Flare KO Drum provided to handle gas blow by through 24LV1106
7.11 More Level
7.12 Composition/
Contamination
7.13 Corrosion/
Erosion
7.14 Instrumentation/
Sampling
7.15 Occupational
Safety
7.16 Maintenance
7.17 Operations/
Testing /
Commissioning
7.18 Unit Shutdown
7.19 Draining
7.20 Startup
7.21 Engineering 7.21.1 To consider settle out

pressure for compressor
during detail study
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP CSO Car Sealed Opened
Section Gas Dehydration
Design Wet gas from Train 1’s Production Separator or Train 2’s Slug Catcher is sent to the Gas Dehydration System to treat the gas to meet the export gas quality in term of water dew point.
Intent
Design TEG Contactor Inlet Scrubber TEG Contactor Lean TEG/Dehydrated gas heat exchanger water content of dehydrated gas
Conditions Pressure = 135 barg Pressure = 135 barg Pressure = 135 barg (shell) = 2 Ib H2O/MMscf (32kgH2O/MMscm)
Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 80 /-20°C 135 barg (tube)
Temperature = by vendor (shell)
=80/-20degC (tube)
Op Pressure = 52.5- 126 barg Pressure = 52.5- 126 barg

Conditions Temperature = 18-50°C Temperature = 18-50°C
Drawing TEG Inlet Scrubber and Contactor Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2231 Revision A
Title Lean TEG/Dehydrated Gas Heat Exchanger 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2232 A
Condensate Dehydrator 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3034 A
Rewetted Stripping Gas Compressor 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3037 A
Words Party
8.1 No Flow 8.1.1 22SDV1049 or 22LV1055 at liquid Liquid level build up in 22V105 and High high level trip 22LIZAHH1054
outlet of 22V105 fail close and stuck causing carry over to TEG contactor is provided
close respectively. which will result in heavy foaming
and lost of TEG
8.1.2 22SDV1070 or 22PV1069A/B at gas Pressure build up in TEG contactor 20PSV1704 on production header 49 Consider deleting 22PV1069A/B during TPGM
outlet of 22E120 fail close and stuck up to design pressure provide the required over pressure day 1 operation.
close respectively. protection for full flow relief.
8.1.3 22SDV1061 or 22LV1060A/B at rich 1)Rich

) TEG level build up
p in TEG High
g High
g level trip
p 22LIZAHH1058
TEG outlet of 22V110 fail close and contactor and eventually will lost is provided for TEG contactor.
stuck close respectively the TEG circulation.
2)Water content of dehydrated gas
will off spec.
8.1.4 22SDV1071 at lean TEG to 22V110 fail 1)Loss of TEG circulation Low flow alarm 22FIAL1085 which During detail design,
close 2)Water content of dehydrated gas will alert operator to remedy the investigate that vendor
will off spec upset condition. provide appropiate
overpressure protection at
the glycol pump discharge
in case 22SDV1071 fail close
8.2 Less Flow 8.2.1 Temperature control valve Higher lean TEG temperature to 22TICAH1081 high alarm 50 Provide High High temperature trip on TPGM
22TV1XXXA/B open more than contactor which may exceed the the lean Glycol line to TEG contactor in
require causing than less gas will be design temperature of contactor. case that the hot lean TEG temperature
going into the heat exchanger exceed the design temperature of TEG
contactor
Words Party
8.2.2 Glycol circulation rate is lower than Water content in the gas will be off 1)High water content alarm 51/52 1)Ensure that TEG contactor TPGM
the require circulation rate of that spec leading to water drop off in the 22MIAH1068 specification to vendor include the
correspond to the gas rate pipeline and causing corrosion. 2)Corrosion inhibitor is available to requirement to provide pumps that can
inhibit corrosion in the pipeline. cope with variation in circulation rate.
2) Ensure that moisture analyzer is
provided rather than moisture sensor at
TEG contactor outlet.
8.2.3 Refer to no flow
8.3 More Flow 8.3.1 More gas flow from upstream above 1)Pressure build up in TEG contactor 1)20PSV1704 on production header
design (8MMscmd) up to design pressure provide the required over pressure
2) Potential erosion on the gas line protection for full flow relief.
3)Water dew point after dehydration 2)High water content alarm
may be exceeded. 22MIAH1068
8.3.2 Glycol circulation rate is higher than Gas entrainment in the structured 1)High water content alarm
the required circulation rate of that packing lead to obstruction in 22MIAH1068
correspond to the gas rate column hydraulic which will lead to 2) High differential pressure alarm,
off spec of the dehydrated gas and 22PDIAH1063 is provided across the
also high pressure drop across wire mesh and structured packing
packing.
8.3.3 Temperature control valve Higher lean TEG temperature to 22TICAH1081 high alarm See recommendation for 8.2.1
22TV1XXXA/B stuck open contactor which may exceed the
design temperature of contactor.
8.3.4 22LV1055 at liquid outlet of 22V105 Loss of liquid level in the 22V105 Low Low level trip 22LIZALL1054 is 53 Capacity of LP Flare KO Drum need to TPGM
stuck open which result in gas blow by to LP provided check for this blow by gas flow from
Flare KO Drum 22LV1055
8.3.5 22LV1060A/B at rich TEG outlet of Loss of liquid level in the 22V110 Low Low level trip 22LIZALL1058 is 54 Ensure that the TEG vendor designed TPGM
22V110 stuck open which result in gas blow by to TEG provided the PSV of TEG Flash Drum for the gas
Flash Drum blow by case.
8.4 Reverse Flow 8.4.1 sour gas from TEG contactor reverse Gas will breakthrough the TEG Two check valves in series is 55 Minimum distance between TEG TPGM
flow to TEG regeneration skid. Regeneration Skid. provided at the lean TEG line contactor and 22SDV1071 to be
implemented.
8.5 Misdirected Flow 8.5.1 No concern
8.6 Less Pressure 8.6.1 loss of contaiment Formation of vapour cloud leading 1)Low low pressure trip, Presently QRA undertaken
to potential fire and explosion. 22PIZALL1067 on the TEG contactor by technical safety to access
gas outlet leading to train 1 the fire risk based on system
shutdown inventory. Whenever
2)Fire and gas detection system neccesary additional
shutdown valve will be
recommended to reduce the
inventory
8.6.2 22PSV1052/53 passing Possibility of hydrates formation PSV periodic testing

downstream of PSV
Words Party
8.6.3 22BDV1064 inadvertently open Loss of production Limit switch provided on
22BDV1064
8.7 More Pressure 8.7.1 22SDV1070 or 22PV1069A/B at gas Pressure build up in TEG Contactor 20PSV1704 on Production Header
outlet of 22E120 fail close and stuck up to design pressure provide the required over pressure
close respectively. protection for full flow relief.
8.7.2 More gas from upstream 1)Pressure build up in TEG 22PSV1704A/B in Production Refer to 6.1.1 recommendation
Contactor Inlet Scrubber and TEG Header provide the full flow relief
Contactor . for TEG contactor
2) Potential erosion on the gas line
3)Water dew point after dehydration
may be exceeded.
8.8 Less Temperature 8.8.1 Cold temperature due to blowdown Potentially TEG Contactor may TEG Contactor is designed for -20
of TEG Contactor. experience temperature below its degC based on blowdown study.
blowdown.
8.9 More 8.9.1 22TV1xxxA/B stuck open Higher Lean TEG temperature to 22TICAH1081 high alarm See recommendation for 8.2.1
Temperature contactor which may exceed the
design temperature of contactor.
8.10 Less Level 8.10.1 22LV1055 at liquid outlet of 22V105 refer to more flow, 8.3.4
stuck open
8.10.2 22LV1060A/B at rich TEG outlet of refer to more flow, 8.3.5

22V110 stuck open
8.10.3 22SDV1071 at lean TEG to 22V110 refer to no flow, 8.1.4

stuck close
8.11 More Level 8.11.1 Refer to no flow
8.12 Composition/ 8.12.1 CO2 Corrosion of vessel lead to leakage Vessel is designed with SS cladding
Contamination to withstand corrosion
8.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to vessel vessel is designed to meet NACE
failure MR 0175 requirement for sour
service.
8.12.3 variation in gas composition Potential impact the dehydration TEG contactor has been designed
performance on TEG contactor based on the range of the gas
composition and water content from
HMB cases that developed based on
the base compositions given by VSP
in design basis
8.13 Corrosion/ 8.13.1 refer to CO2 and H2S

Erosion
8.14 Instrumentation/ 8.14.1 No concern
Sampling
8.15 Occupational 8.15.1 Hot lean TEG line from regenaration Personnel injury Personnel Protection is provided for
Safety package the pipe and 22E120
Words Party
8.16 Maintenance 8.16.1 Maintenance of 22E120 56 Consider to provide some space for TPGM
maintenance of 22E120
3D model to review
accessiblity of upper
manhole for TEG contactor
Testing /
Commissioning
8.19 Draining 8.19.1 22E120 lean glycol side no draining Unable to drain the equipment 57 Provide drain line for lean TEG section TPGM
during maintenance for TEG Regeneration System
8.20 Startup 8.20.1 Flaring of off spec gas
Requirement for startup

over ride will be defined in
later stage
8.20.2
Relocate the pressure

control valve 20PV1034 at
Production Separator outlet
to TEG Contactor Gas outlet.
Providing spare connection
to install PV in future at
Production Separator outlet
when Booster Compressor
installed.
8.21 Engineering 8.21.1 58 Consider to replace spare 22LV1060B TPGM
with manual bypass throttling valve.
8.21.2 59 TPGM
To provide additional PV at the gas
outlet of TEG contactor for venting the
off specs gas to flare during start up
Review date 17th June 2011 PSD Platform Shut Down
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP SSC Sulfide Stress Cracking
Section Condensate Dehydration System (production separator condensate pump,train1 condensate
filters and coalescers)
Design Intent Separated condensate from the Production Separator is pumped, dewatered or dehydrated and metered prior entering the two-phase export pipeline.
Design Condensate Filters Condensate Coalescers Production Separator Condensate Pumps Condensate Transfer Pumps
Conditions Pressure = 138 barg Pressure = 138 barg Rated capacity= 85 m3/h Rated capacity= 77m3/h
Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 80/-20°C
Design capacity= 170m3/h
Op Conditions Pressure = 13-131 barg Pressure =11-129 barg

Temperature = 18-50°C Temperature = 18-50°C (suction)
Drawing Title Production Separator Condensate Pumps Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3031 Revision A
Train1 Condensate Filters and Coalescers 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3032 A
Condensate Dehydrator 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3034 A
Words Party
11.1 No Flow 11.1.1 20SDV1040 fail close at the No flow to Production Separator 60/61 1) Quantitative Risk Assessment TPGM
condensate outlet of Production Condensate Pumps causing cavitation to (QRA) to determine the possibility
Separator Condensate Pumps of relocating the shutdown valve
from Production Separator liquid
outlet to pump discharge line.
2) Investigate the possibility in
incorporating low low trip using the
flow element provided at
Production Separator Condensate
Pump discharge.
11.1.2 Level control valve 20LV1038A/B Condensate level build up in the 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
stuck close Production Separator up to LZAHH.
LZAHH down Production Separator on HH
Condensate pump running in recycle condensate level
mode.
11.1.3 Interface level control valve Water level build up in the water boot of High High interface level trip
30LV1488/1481 at 30S115A/B Condensate Coalescer which may lead to 30LIZAHH1490/1483 is provided for
water outlet line stuck close carry over of water to Condensate the Coalescer.
Dehydrator and causing condensate to be
off spec
11.1.4 Recycle valve 30FV1442/1452 stuck High pressure build up in the pump High High pressure trip 62 Check requirement for PSV at TPGM
close when required to discharge line 30PIZAHH1441/1451/1461 is discharge of Production Separator
open(recycle mode) provided Condensate Pump in case of
pumping water during startup.
11.2 Less Flow 11.2.1 Pump mechanical failure (one Condensate level build up in the 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
pump) Production Separator up to LZAHH. down Production Separator on HH
mode.
11.2.2 Recycle valve 30FV1442/1452 stuck Condensate level build up in the 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
open Production Separator up to LZAHH. down production separator on HH
Condensate Pump running in recycle condensate level
mode.
Less production rate
11.2.3 Y strainer at pump suction partially Cavitation on condensate pump SOP to inspect the strainer on regular
block interval
Words Party
11.2.4 Condensate filter partially block Less flow to condensate dehydrator High differential pressure alarm
30PDIA1472/1476 is provided
11.2.5 Condensate coalescer partially Less flow to condensate dehydrator High differential pressure alarm
block 30PDIA1487/1480 is provided
11.2.6 30BDV1493 downstream of Less flow to condensate dehydrator Limit switch provided on 30BDV1493
coalescer inadvertantly open
11.2.7 20LV1038A/B close more than Condensate level build up in the 20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
required Production Separator up to LZAHH. down production separator on HH
mode.
11.2.8 30LV1488/81 close more than Water level build up in the water boot of High High interface level trip
required condensate coalescer which may lead to 30LIZAHH1490/1483 is provided for
carry over of water to condensate the coalescer.
dehydrator and causing condensate to be
off spec
11.2.9 Vapour locked in the coalescer Condensate unable to flow through the 1)Vapour return line is provided for
coalescer.Dewatered condensate will be the coalescer to vent off the trapped
offspec vapour to Production Separator.
2)SOP, from time to time open valve
located at vapour return line
11.3 More Flow 11.3.1 30LV1488/81 stuck open Loss of interface level in Condensate Low Low interface level trip
Coalescer which lead to excessive 30LIZALL1483/1490
condensate being sent to Hydrocyclone
causing treated produced water to offspec
11.3.2 20LV1038A/B stuck open Higher condensate flow through coalescer High moisture alarm 20MIAH1531 is 63 Provide high flow alarm for TPGM
result in water content in dewatered provided at Condensate Dehydrator 30FIC1442/1452/1462
30FIC1442/1452/1462.
condensate higher than design . Flow to outlet.
pipeline have potential to offspec in terms
of water content.
11.4 Reverse Flow 11.4.1 Reverse flow from operating pump No adverse impact Check valve is provided on the pump
to standby pump discharge discharge line
11.6 Less Pressure 11.6.1 Loss of contaiment Formation of condensate pool leading to 1)Low low pressure trip, 64 To check that drip pans to be TPGM
potential pool fire 30PIZALL1441/1451/1461 provided underneath filters ,
2)Fire and gas detection system coalescers and pumps.
11.6.2 30PSV1470/74 passing on the filter Minor leakage to HP flare KO drum PSV periodic testing
11.6.3 30PSV1485/78 passing on coalescer Minor leakage to HP flare KO drum PSV periodic testing
11.6.4 30BDV1493 inadvertently open on 1)Large differential pressure inside the 1)30PDIAH1487/1480 which will 65 To check the filter cartridge and TPGM
the coalescer outlet coalescers leading to potential damage to alert the operator to carry out coalescer internal maximum
coalescers internal and filter cartridge. corrective actions allowable pressure drop
2)Minor leakage to HP flare KO drum 2) Limit switch at 30BDV1493
Words Party
11.6.5 Filters clogged 1)Vapour formed in the coalescers leading 1)30PDIAH1472/1476 which will
to offspec of Dehydrated Condensate alert the operator to carry out
2)High differential pressure inside the corrective actions
filter
11.6.6 Coalescers clogged 1)Vapour formed in the coalescers leading 1)30PDIAH1487/1480 which will
to offspec of Dehydrated Condensate alert the operator to carry out
2)High differential pressure inside the corrective actions
coalescers
11.7 More Pressure 11.7.1 Recycle valve 30FV1442/1452 stuck Pressure will potentially exceed the design High High pressure trip 66 To check pump shut in pressure TPGM
close when require to open pressure 30PIZAHH1441/51/61 are provided does not exceed piping design
and will trip individual pump pressure or pressure relief valve to
be provided on pump discharge.
11.7.2 20LV1038A/B stuck close 1)No condensate flow to Condensate 1)High High pressure trip
Dehydrator 30PIZAHH1441/51/61 are provided
2) Production Separator liquid level and will trip the Production
increase Separator Condensate Pumps
3) Pressure will potentially exceed the 2)High High level trip
piping and equipment design pressure 20LIZAHH1022 is provided leading
to PSD
11.8 Less Temperature 11.8.1 30BDV1493 fail open Potential low temperature downstream of 67 To check if low temperature exceed TPGM
BDV below minimum design temperatue
during blowdown for Condensate
Dewatering system
11.10 Less Level 11.10.1 See more flow
11.11 More Level 11.11.1 Interface level control valve Water level build up in the water boot of High High interface level trip
30LV1488/1481 at 30S115A/B Condensate Coalescer which may lead to 30LIZAHH1490/1483 is provided for
water outlet line stuck close carry over of water to Condensate the coalescer.
off spec
11.11.2 30SDV1491/84 fail close Water level build up in the water boot of High High interface level trip
Condensate Coalescer which may lead to 30LIZAHH1490/1483 is provided for
carry over of water to Condensate the coalescer.
off spec
11.12 Composition/ 11.12.1 CO2 Corrosion of filters and coalescers lead to Vessel is designed with SS cladding
Contamination leakage to withstand corrosion
11.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to filters and Vessel is designed to meet NACE MR
coalescers failure 0175 requirement for sour service.
11.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 11.13.1 refer to composition
11.14 Instrumentation/ 11.14.1 No sampling point after coalescer Unable to determine the performance of 68 Provide sampling point TPGM
Sampling coalescer downstream of Condensate
Coalescer.
Words Party
11.16 Maintenance 11.16.1 No PG on coalescers Unable to read pressure when coalescer is 69 To provide PG on the Condensate TPGM
down during maintenance Coalescers
11.16.2 In case level 30LV1488/81 1)To carry out remedy on 30LV1488/81 Interface low low level trip 70 To provide manual bypass across TPGM
malfunction without Condensate Coalescer offline 30LIZALL1483/90 30LV1488/81
2)Potential condensate overload to
Hydrocyclone leading to offspec of
produced water

/ Commissioning
11.19 Draining 11.19.1 Draining of level instrument 71 (General) All drain level tubing to TPGM
be relocated downstream of
spectacle blind/isolation valve.
11.20 Startup 11.20.1 High differential pressure across 72 To provide bypass on the inlet TPGM
manual isolation valve during start isolation valve of filters and
up coalescers during startup
11.21 Engineering 11.21.1 73 (General)To provide guided wave TPGM

radar for interface level transmitter
Section Condensate Dehydration System ( rewetted stripping gas suction scrubber,rewetted stripping
gas compressor)
Design Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Scrubber Rewetted Stripping Gas Compressor
Conditions Pressure = 138 barg Pressure = 138 barg
Temperature = 80/-20°C Temperature = 115/-20°C
Op Conditions Pressure =49.5-123 barg Pressure = 49.5-123 barg (suction)

Temperature = 18-50°C =53.5-127 barg (discharge)
Temperature = 80-50°C (suction)
=20-52°C(discharge)
Drawing Title Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Scrubber Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3036 Revision A
Rewetted Stripping Gas Compressor 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3037 A
Words Party
12.1 No Flow 12.1.1 30SDV1540 fail close on the No flow to compressor leading to 1)Limit switch is provided in
rewetted stripping gas scrubber compressor damage 30SDV1540 to trip compressor (fast
inlet stop)
2)30PIZALL1564
3) Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
open
12.1.2 30SDV1548 fail close or 30LV1546 Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 30LIZAHH1545 is provided to trip
stuck close at rewetted stripping over to rewetted stripping compressor. the compressor
gas suction scrubber outlet line
12.1.3 30SDV1587 fail close at the Blocked discharge leading to 1) 30PIZAHH1583

compressor outlet overpressure on compressor 2) 30PSV1577/78/79
3)Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
open
4) Limit switch is provided at
30SDV1587
12.1.4 compressor trip 1)No rewetted gas to TEG Contactor Inlet 30PICAxxx at gas outlet of
Scrubber and no impact on TEG Condensate Dehydrator will sent gas
Contactor to flare
2)Pressure build up in Condensate
Dehydrator
12.1.5 30SDV1529 or 30FV1532A/B fail 1) No stripping gas to Condensate 30PIZALL1564 will trip the
close Dehydrator leading to offspecs compressor
2) Compressor will running in recycle 2) Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
mode open
12.2 Less Flow 12.2.1 30FV1532 close more than required 1) Less stripping gas to condensate 1)30PIZALL1564 will trip the
dehydrator leading to offspecs compressor
2) Compressor will running in recycle 2) Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
mode open
Words Party
12.2.2 30BDV1588 fail open Rewetted stripping gas to flare Limit switch on 30BDV1588
12.2.3 Suction strainer blockage Damaged to compressor 30PDIAH1560
12.2.4 Demister blockage , however Damaged to compressor 1)30PIZALL1564 will trip the
unlikely compressor
12.2.5 30PICAxxx at gas outlet of Less flow to compressor leading to 1)30PIZALL1564 The anti surge and capacity
condensate dehydrator stuck open compressor damage 2) Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will controller by vendor
open
12.2.6 Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 fail Compressor will running in recycle. If High High temperature trip
open this condition persist, temperature will 30TIZAHH1584 is provided at the
rise and possible to exceed the design compressor discharge.
temperature of Rewetted Scrubber and
piping.
12.3 More Flow 12.3.1 30FV1532A stuck open 1)Liquid carry over to Rewetted Suction 1)30FICAH1532
Scrubber 2)30LIZAHH1545
2) Pressure build up in the Condensate
Dehydrator and overload the compressor
12.3.2 30LV1546 stuck open Gas blow by to process drain header and 30LIZALL1545 will shut 30SDV1548 74 To check the design pressure of LP TPGM
potentiall overpressure to LP Flare
l KO Flare
l KO Drum ffor the
h gas bl
blow b by
Drum through the LV and manual bypass
line.
12.4 Reverse Flow 12.4.1 Backflow from TEG contactor inlet Potential damage to compressor Two check valves in series on the
scrubber to compressure discharge line of compressor
12.5 Misdirected Flow 12.5.1 30FV1532A stuck open 1)Liquid carry over to Rewetted Suction 1)30FICAH1532
Scrubber 2)30LIZAHH1545
2) Pressure build up in the Condensate
Dehydrator and overload the compressor
12.6 Less Pressure 12.6.1 Loss of contaiment Formation of vapour cloud leading to 1)Low low pressure trip,
potential fire and explosion. 30PIZALL1564 on the compressor
suction line
2)Low low pressure trip,
30PIZALL1583 on the compressor
discharge line
12.6.2 30PSV1550/51 passing on rewetted Loss of rewetted stripping gas to flare SOP.PSV periodic testing
stripping gas suction scrubber
discharge
Words Party
12.6.3 30PSV1577/78/79 passing on Loss of rewetted stripping gas to flare SOP.PSV periodic testing
compressor discharge
12.6.4 30BDV1588 fail open Loss of rewetted stripping gas to flare Limit switch on 30BDV1588 to trip
the compressor vendor scope
12.6.5 strainer clogged Damaged to compressor 30PDIAH1560
12.6.6 30PICAxxx at gas outlet of Less flow to compressor leading to 1)30PIZALL1564

condensate dehydrator stuck open compressor damage 2) Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
open
12.7 More Pressure 12.7.1 30SDV1587 fail close at the Blocked discharge leading to 1) 30PIZAHH1583
compressor outlet overpressure on compressor 2) 30PSV1577/78/79
3)Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 will
open
4)Limit switch is provided at
30SDV1587
12.7.2 High pressure from production 30PICAHxxx will flare the gas
separator
12.8 Less Temperature 12.8.1 30BDV1588 fail open Potential low temperature downstream of Rewetted stripping gas system is 75 To confirm the suitability of piping TPGM
BDV designed for -20 degC material specified for blowdown
system upon completion of
blowdown study
12.9 More Temperature 12.9.1 Anti surge valve ,30FV1585 fail Compressor will running in recycle. If High High temperature trip
open this condition persist, temperature will 30TIZAHH1584 is provided at the
rise and possible to exceed the design compressor discharge.
temperature of rewetted scrubber and
piping.
12.10 Less Level 12.10.1 30LV1546 stuck open Gas blow by to process drain header and 30LIZALL1545 will shut 30SDV1548
potential overpressure to LP Flare KO
Drum
12.10.2 Manul bypass valve left in open Gas blow by to process drain header and 30LIZALL1545 will shut 30SDV1548
position on the liquid discharge of potential overpressure to LP Flare KO
Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Drum
Scrubber
12.11 More Level 12.11.1 30LV1546 or 30SDV1548 stuck Liquid carry over to compressor 30LIZAHH1545
close
12.11.2 Liquid carry over from upstream Overload of suction scrubber leading to 1)30LIZAHH1545
more than expected liquid carry over to compressor
12.12 Composition/ 12.12.1 CO2 Corrosion of scrubber lead to leakage Vessel is designed with SS cladding
Contamination to withstand corrosion
To confirm which discipline to
specify cladding thickness .
Words Party
12.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to scrubber Vessel is designed to meet NACE
failure MR 0175 requirement for sour
service.
12.12.3 saturated water Corrosion of scrubber lead to leakage Vessel is designed with SS cladding
to withstand corrosion
12.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 12.13.1 refer to

composition/contamination
Sampling
12.16 Maintenance 12.16.1 Frequent maintenance of 76 To provide additional spacer TPGM

compressor downstream of 30SDV1540/41 and
upstream of check valve
12.16.2 Depressurizing of compressor Upon completion of

compressor type selection, to
review the need of two
depressurizing line provided
on the suction and discharge of
compressor.

/ Commissioning
12.21 Engineering 12.21.1 77 Consider to route the liquid outlet TPGM

line from rewetted stripping gas
suction scrubber to HP Flare KO
Drum
Section Condensate Dehydration System (condensate dehydrator , condensate booster pumps and
condensate transfer pumps(future))
Design Condensate Booster Pumps Condensate Transfer Pumps(future) Condensate Dehydrator Condensate Transfer Pumps
Conditions Rated capacity= 85 m3/h Rated capacity= 77m3/h Pressure = 138 barg Rated capacity= 77m3/h
Differential pressure =4 bar Temperature = 80/-20°C
Op Conditions Pressure =9-123.5 barg

Temperature = 18-50°C (suction)
Drawing Title Condensate Dehydrator Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3034 Revision A

Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Scrubber 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3036 A
Condensate Booster Pumps 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3038 A
Condensate Transfer Pumps(future) 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3033 A
Words Party
13.1 No Flow 13.1.1 30SDV1530 fail close at condensate 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 78/79/80 1) Quantitative risk assessment TPGM
outlet line of over to Rewetted Compressor. (QRA) to determine the possibility
CondensateDehydrator 2) Pump 30P115A/B/C damaged of relocating the shutdown valve
from Condensate Dehydrator
liquid outlet to pump discharge
line.
2)Investigate the possibility in
incorporating low low flow trip
using the flow element provided at
condensate booster pump
discharge.
3)Quantitative risk assessment
(QRA) to determine the
requirement of additional shut
d
down valve
l located
l d in
i the
h
Condensate Dehydrator inlet.
13.1.2 20LV1038A/B fail close at 1)Condensate level build up in the 1)20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
Condensate Dehydrator Inlet Production Separator up to LZAHH. down Production Separator on HH
2)Liquid level in Condensate Dehydrator condensate level
level low 2) Low Low trip 30LIZALL1526 is
provided and lead to condensate
system trip
13.1.3 30SDV1529 or 30FV1532A/B fail 1)Offspecs condensate Low Low pressure trip
close at the stripping gas to 2) Low pressure inside Condensate 30PIZALL1525 is provided at the gas
Condensate Dehydrator Dehydrator line to Rewetted Stripping Gas
Suction Scrubber and tripping the
condensate system and rewetted
compressor.
13.1.4 30SDV1540 fail close on the 1)Pressure build up in the Condensate 1) Position indicator 30SDV1540
Rewetted Stripping Gas Scrubber Dehydrator. 2)Compressor shutdown
inlet 2) Stripping gas lost to flare 3) Pressure control valve will
maintain pressure in Condensate
Dehydrator
Words Party
13.1.5 32LV1528A/B fail close 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 1)Pump running in recycle mode
over to Rewetted Compressor. 2)High High level trip
2) Pump pumping against dead head 30LIZAHH1526 is provided and lead
to condensate system trip
13.2 Less Flow 13.2.1 Condensate Booster Pump Condensate level build up in the 30LIZAHH1526 is provided to shut
30P115A/B/C mechanical failure condensate dehydrator up to LZAHH. down the condensate system
(one Condensate Booster Pump)
13.2.2 Recycle valve 30FVXXX from Condensate level build up in the 30LIZAHH1526 is provided to shut
Condensate Booster Pump stuck Condensate Dehydrator up to LZAHH. down the condensate system
open(unlikely)
13.2.3 Y strainer at condensate booster Cavitation on condensate booster pump SOP to inspect the strainer on regular
pump suction partially block interval
13.2.4 20LV1038A/B on the inlet of Level build up in Production Separator High High level trip on production
Condensate Dehydrator close more separator 20LIZAHH1022 which will
than required lead to PSD
13.2.5 32LV1528A/B downstream of Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 1)Pump running in recycle mode
Condensate Metering close more over rewetted compressor. 2)High High level trip
than required 30LIZAHH1526 is provided and lead
13.2.6 20LV1532A/B on stripping gas line Offspecs condensate 1)Moisture analyzer 30MIA1531H
close more than required 2)Low flow alarm 30FICAL1532
13.2.7 Pressure control loop failure(PT Loss of rewetted gas to flare 1)Limit switch for 30BDV1521
failure) 30PTxxx 2)30PICALxxx
13.2.8 Condensate Transfer Pump Level build up in Condensate Dehydrator 30LIZAHH1526 is provided
30P120A/B/C mechanical failure
(one condensate transfer pump)
13.3 More Flow 13.3.1 20LV1038A/B stuck open Level build up in Condensate Dehydrator 30LIZAHH1526 is provided
13.3.2 30FV1532A/B stuck open Liquid entrainment in the Dehydrator 30FICAH1532 is provided
leads to liquid droplet carry over into
Rewetted Stripping Gas Suction Scrubber
13.3.3 32LV1528A/B downstream of Low level in the Condensate Dehydrator Low Low Level trip 30LIZALL1526 is
Condensate Metering stuck open provided
Words Party
13.4 Reverse Flow 13.4.1 Reverse flow from operating pump No adverse impact Check valve is provided on the pump
to standby pump discharge discharge line
13.5 Misdirected Flow 13.5.1 30PVxxx stuck open Loss of rewetted gas to flare 30PICALxxx
13.6 Less Pressure 13.6.1 Loss of contaiment Formation of condensate pool leading to 1)Low low pressure trip,
potential pool fire 30PIZALL1525
13.6.2 30PSV1533/34 passing on the Minor leakage to HP flare KO drum PSV periodic testing
Condensate Dehydrator
13.6.3 30BDV1521 on the Condensate Loss of rewetted gas to flare 30PICALxxx

Dehydrator outlet inadvertently
open
13.6.4 30PVxxx stuck open Loss of rewetted gas to flare 30PICALxxx
13.6.5 30BDV1520 on transfer pump Loss of condensate to flare Low Low trip 30PIZALLxxx are
suction inadvertently open provided on Condensate Booster
Pump discharge
13.6.6 32BDV1311 on Condensate Loss of condensate to flare Low Low trip 30PIZALL1501/04/07
Metering outlet inadvertently open are provided on Condensate Transfer
Pump Discharge
13.7 More Pressure 13.7.1 30SDV1540 fail close on the 1)Pressure build up in the Condensate 1) Position indicator 30SDV1540
Rewetted Stripping Gas Scrubber Dehydrator. 2)Compressor shutdown
inlet 2) Stripping gas lost to flare 3) Pressure control valve will
maintain pressure in Condensate
y
Dehydrator
13.7.2 32LV1528A/B fail close 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 1) High High level trip
over to Rewetted Compressor. 30LIZAHH1526 will trips the
2) Condensate Transfer Pump pumping condensate system
against dead head 2)High High pressure trip
30PIZAHH1501/04/07 is provided
and lead to Condensate Transfer
Pump trips and 30PSV1500/03/06
13.8 Less Temperature 13.8.1 Cold temperature due to Potentially Condensate Dehydrator may Condensate dehydrator is designed
blowdown of Condensate experience temperature below its for -20 degC based on blowdown
Dehydrator. minimum design temperature after study.
blowdown.
13.10 Less Level 13.10.1 20LV1038A/B fail close at inlet to 1)Condensate level build up in the 1)20LIZAHH1022 is provided to shut
Condensate Dehydrator Production Separator up to LZAHH. down Production Separator on HH
2)Liquid level in Condensate Dehydrator condensate level
level low 2) Low Low Level trip
30LIZALL1526 is provided and lead
Words Party
13.10.2 Less Condensate Production Condensate Booster Pump running in 81 To provide high temperature alarm TPGM
recycle mode which could potentially on Condensate Dehydrator (liquid
exceed the design temperature of the portion)
Condensate Dehydrator and piping.
13.10.3 32LV1528A/B downstream of Low level in the condensate dehydrator Low Low level trip 30LIZALL1526 is
condensate metering stuck open provided
13.11 More Level 13.11.1 30SDV1530 fail close at Condensate 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry refer to 13.1 .1 recommendation
Dehydrator outlet line over to Rewetted Compressor.
2) Pump 30P115A/B/C damage
13.11.2 32LV1528A/B fail close 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid carry 1)Pump running in recycle mode
over Rewetted Compressor. 2)High High level trip
2) Pump pumping against dead head 30LIZAHH1526 is provided and lead
13.11.3 20LV1038A/B stuck open Level build up in Condensate Dehydrator 30LIZAHH1526 is provided
13.12 Composition/ 13.12.1 Varying condensate flowrate 82 Consider to provide different TPGM To provide stripping gas
C
Contamination
i i / pump impeller
i ll for
f C Condensate
d b l i ffor controll valve
tabulation l
production rate Booster Pump to cover the 30FV1532A/B set point
minimum production rate if Booster
Pump need to be installed. The
same apply for Production
Separator Condensate Pump
13.12.2 CO2 Corrosion of Condensate Dehydrator lead Vessel is designed with SS cladding
to leakage to withstand corrosion
13.12.3 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to Condensate Vessel is designed to meet NACE MR
Dehydrator failure 0175 requirement for sour service.
13.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 13.13.1 Corrosion due to offspec Pitting on downstream equipment and 1)30MIAH1531
condensate piping/pipeline 2) CI injection for pipeline
13.14 Instrumentation/ 13.14.1 Sampling connection leakage 83 To relocate the sampling connection TPGM
Sampling downstream of 30SDV1530
13.16 Maintenance 13.16.1 No access to top portion of 84 Provide manhole at the top portion TPGM Provide service platform (3D
Condensate Dehydrator of column review)
Words Party
13.17 Operations/ Testing 13.17.1 No concern To be further evaluated after
/ Commissioning design optimization and
during DD
13.21 Engineering 13.21.1 Level control valve 32LV1528A/B 85 If possible, consider to combine TPGM
unable to control due to constant Condensate Booster Pump with
volume. Condensate Transfer Pump. If only
one pump is used and the pump is
reciprocating type,ensure that the
control scheme shall be modified to
allow reciprocating pump to work.
Section gas and condensate export header and production launcher
Design Intent To export gas and condensate from CPP for the 26-inch two-phase export pipeline
Design Conditions Static Mixer Production Launcher
Pressure = 180 barg Pressure = 180 barg
Temperature = 80/-20°C Temperature = 80/-20°C
Op Conditions Pressure = 76.5-157.0 barg Pressure = 76.5-157.0 barg

Temperature = 18-50°C Temperature = 18-50°C
Drawing Title Gas and Condensate Export Header Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2931 Revision A
Production Launcher 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2932 A
Export Gas Custody Metering Skid 5691-CPP-PR-PID-2631 A
Condensate Custody Metering Skid 5691-CPP-PR-PID-3231 A
Words Party
15.1 No Flow 15.1.1 32SDV1310 or 32LV1528A/B fail 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid 1)Pump running in recycle mode 86 Quantitative risk assessment TPGM
close at the condensate line from carry over to Rewetted Compressor. 2)High High level trip (QRA) to review the requirement of
Custody Metering Skid 2) Pump pumping against dead head 30LIZAHH1526 is provided and 32SDV1310
lead to condensate system trip
15.1.2 26SDV1316 or 26PV1315A/B fail Potential overpressure on compressor 1)Anti surge valve on gas 87 Quantitative risk assessment TPGM
close at the gas line from Custody discharge line compressor ,24FV1145 (QRA)) to review the requirement
Metering Skid 2)High High Pressure trip of 26SDV1316
24PIZAHH1143 is provided at
3)24PSV1137/1138/1139 are
15.1.3 Riser valve 29SDV1338 fail close No gas and condensate export to pipeline 1)Limit switch provided on
29SDV1338
2)Pressure high high trip provided
on upstream component
15.1.4 29MOV1335 fail last position No gas and condensate export to pipeline Pressure High High trip is provided
during start up on upstream component
15.2 Less Flow 15.2.1 32LV1528A/B close more than 1)Liquid level build up lead to liquid 1)Pump running in recycle mode
required at the condensate line carry over to Rewetted Compressor. 2)High High level trip
from Custody Metering Skid 2) Pump pumping against dead head 30LIZAHH1526 is provided and
lead to condensate system trip
15.2.2 26PV1315A/B close more than Potential overpressure on compressor 1)Anti surge valve on gas
required at the gas line from discharge line compressor ,24FV1145
Custody Metering skid 2)High High pressure trip
Compressor Discharge
3)24PSV1137/1138/1139 are
Words Party
15.2.3 26BDV1313 fail open Gas lost to flare 1)Limit switch at 26BDV1313
2)29PIZALL1xxx is provided
15.2.4 32BDV1311 fail open Condensate lost to flare Limit switch at 32BDV1311
15.2.5 29BDV1321 fail open Gas and condensate lost to flare 1) Limit switch at 29BDV1321
2)29PIZALL1337 is provided
15.3 More Flow 15.3.1 32LV1528A/B stuck open at the Low Level in the Condensate Dehydrator Low Low Level trip 30LIZALL1526
condensate line from Custody is provided
Metering Skid
15.3.2 26PV1315A/B stuck open at the Gas build up to pipeline pressure 1)26PICAH1315 is provided
gas line from Custody Metering 2)position feedback provided on
Skid 26PV1315A/B
15.3.3 More production from wells refer to node 1 more flow
15.4 Reverse Flow 15.4.1 No causes
15.5 Misdirected Flow 15.5.1 kicker line open during normal Pressure build up inside launcher Launcher is designed for 180 barg
operation
15.5.2 29MOV1335 left open during Unable to launch pig into pipeline SOP
pigging operation
15.6 Less Pressure 15.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of vapour cloud leading to 1)29PIZALL1337 is provided
potential fire and explosion 2)Fire and gas detection system
15.6.2 26BDV1313 fail open Gas lost to flare 1)Limit switch at 26BDV1313
2)29PIZALL1xxx is provided
15.6.3 32BDV1311 fail open Condensate lost to flare Limit switch at 32BDV1311
15.6.4 29BDV1321 fail open Gas and condensate lost to flare 1) Limit switch at 29BDV1321
2)29PIZALL1337 is provided
15.7 More Pressure 15.7.1 Line pack condition inside pipeline No concern
15.7.2 Pig stuck in the pipeline due to Platform shutdown VSP to provide wax
wax formation inside pipeline property for topsides flow
assurance study
Words Party
15.7.3 Riser valve 29SDV1338 fail close No gas and condensate export to pipeline 1)Limit switch provided on 88 To provide High High pressure trip TPGM
29SDV1338 for 29PIZA1337
2)High High Pressure trip provided
on Gas Compressor and Condensate
Pump
3) Piping Design pressure is 180barg
15.7.4 26SDV1316 or 26PV1315A/B fail Potential overpressure on compressor 1)Anti surge valve on gas
close at the gas line from Custody discharge line compressor ,24FV1145
Metering Skid 2)High High Pressure trip
3)24PSV1137/1138/1139 are
15.8 Less Temperature 15.8.1 26BDV1313 fail open Potentially blowdown line may Blowdown line is designed for
experience temperature below its -20 degC based on blowdown study.
blowdown.
15.8.2 32BDV1311 fail open Potentially blowdown line may Blowdown line is designed for
blowdown.
15.8.3 29BDV1321 fail open Potentially blowdown line may Blowdown line is designed for
blowdown.
15.10 Less Level 15.10.1 NA
15.11 More Level 15.11.1 NA
15.12 Composition/ 15.12.1 CO2 Corrosion of export piping lead to Corrosion inhibitor provided
Contamination leakage upstream of Static Mixer
15.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to piping 1)Export gas is dry
failure 2) Piping is designed for NACE
MR0175
15.12.3 saturated water Corrosion of export piping lead to Corrosion inhibitor provided
leakage upstream of static mixer
15.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 15.13.1 refer to

composition/contamination
Words Party
15.14 Instrumentation/ 15.14.1 single 29PIZALL1337 89 To provide 2 out of 3 voting for TPGM
Sampling 29PIZALL1337
15.16 Maintenance 15.16.1 Opening of Launcher down with 90 To consider additional atmospheric TPGM
residue gas after pigging operation vent for Launcher to safe location.
15.17 Operations/ Testing 15.17.1 refer to maintenance

/ Commissioning
15.20 Startup 15.20.1 Start up after compressor Unable obtain topsides pressure in order 91 Review the startup requirement TPGM
installation to open riser valve.
15.21 Engineering 15.21.1 To consider launcher as pressure 92 To provide PSV on Launcher TPGM
vessel(ASME code) design for fire case.
15.21.2 93 To provide welded connection for TPGM

riser valve.
15.21.3 94 If pigging operation is very TPGM/

frequent, to provide local VSP
mechanical interlock or other
possible form of interlock (upon
VSP advice) for pigging operation
to minimize the risk of operator
error.
15.21.4 95 Provided methanol injection fitting TPGM

downstream of gas metering unit
for possible used during startup.the
requirement of methanol will be
further verified during detail
design.
Review date 21st-June-2011 PSD Platform Shut Down
Section HP Flare System
Design Intent HP Flare System are provided for safe disposal of hydrocarbons released from pressure reliefs, blowdown, continuous and intermittent operational flaring.
Design HP Flare KO Drum Piping :

Conditions Pressure = 10barg Low Temperature Sour Service SS (ANSI
Temperature = 115 /-70°C 150)
capacity: 21MMscmd (for integrity purpose only)
Op Conditions Pressure = 0-7 barg

Temperature = 90/-50°C
Drawing Title HP Flare KO Drum and Pumps Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6232 Revision A
LP and HP Flare Tip and LP and HP Flare Ignation Package 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6233 A
Words Party
25.1 No Flow 25.1.1 HP Flare Transfer Pump trips Liquid build up in the HP KO Drum and 1) Lead lag pump configuration
when pumping liquid to LP Flare lead to liquid carry over to HP Flare tip 2) 62LIZAHH1415 is provided
leading to ESD
25.1.2 62SDV1404 stuck close on backup Air ingress to HP flare KO Drum. 1) Nitrogen purge Fuel gas as primary purge
purge line from Fuel Gas System Potential deflagration inside the HP KO 2)62FIZALL1401 source and Nitrogen as
Drum secondary source
25.1.3 62SDV1421 fail close on Transfer Damage to pump 1)Limit switch on 62SDV1421 96 To consider removing 62SDV1421, TPGM
Pump suction however it is based on QRA Study
25.2 Less Flow 25.2.1 Strainer blockage Damage to pump SOP
25.2.2 Less flow from Nitrogen Air ingress to HP Flare KO Drum. Backup valve 62SDV1404 will open
generation system Potential deflagration inside the HP KO
Drum
25.3 More Flow 25.3.1 Two pumps running Low level inside HP KO drum Low Low level trip 62LIZALL1418
will eventually trip both pumps
25.4 Reverse Flow 25.4.1 Fuel Gas/ Flare Gas ingress into Hydrocarbon gas being introduce into 1)Dissimiliar type of check valves (2
Nitrogen system Nitrogen distribution system (very check valves in series)
unlikely due to separate different header)
25.5 Misdirected Flow 25.5.1 see reverse flow

Words Party
25.6 Less 25.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of condensate pool leading to Fire and gas detection system
Pressure/vacuum potential pool fire
25.7 More Pressure 25.7.1 Full blowdown relief Overpressure of piping HP flare system is designed for full
blowdown relief
25.8 Less Temperature 25.8.1 Low temperature experienced Brittle fracture in the piping/vessel Piping/vessel designed for low 97 Review the material for HP Flare TPGM
during blowdown temperature sour service SS (ANSI KO drum and piping header after
150) low temperature study for
blowdown is carry out
25.8.2 Low ambient temperature (normal Wax formation 1)Headers routing is slope towards
condition) HP Flare KO Drum.
2)Heat tracing
3) 62F110 heater provided on HP
Flare KO Drum
25.8.3 Heater malfunction Potential wax formation inside HP flare 1)62TIZALL1417 is provided and
KO Drum trip the pump
2) 62TICAL1416
25.9 More Temperature 25.9.1 Heater malfunction Potential to exceed design temperature of 1) 62TIZAHH1417 is provided and
HP KO Drum trip the heater
25.10 Less Level 25.10.1 see more flow
25.11 More Level 25.11.1 Two pumps fail Liquid build up in the HP KO Drum and 62LIZAHH1415 is provided leading
lead to liquid carry over to HP Flare tip to ESD
25.11.2 62SDV1421 fail close Liquid build up in the HP KO Drum and 62LIZAHH1415 is provided leading
lead to liquid carry over to HP Flare tip to ESD
25.12 Composition/ 25.12.1 CO2 Corrosion on HP Flare header/KO Drum Piping/vessel designed for low
Contamination leading to leakage temperature sour service duplex SS
(ANSI 150)
25.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to piping Piping/vessel designed for low
failure temperature sour service duplex SS
(ANSI 150)
Words Party
25.12.3 saturated water Corrosion on HP flare header/KO Drum Piping/vessel designed for low
leading to leakage temperature sour service duplex SS
(ANSI 150)
25.12.4 refer to reverse flow
25.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 25.13.1 see composition
25.14 Instrumentation/ 25.14.1 Instrumentation on ignition Vendor to provide

Sampling package instrumentation interface
details
25.14.2 Flare metering 98 VSP to confirm if metering of flare TPGM

is required.
25.15 Occupational Safety 25.15.1 High operating temperature Personnel injury 99 Verify temperature of the fluid TPGM
inside the HP Flare KO Drum is
not exceeding the threshold limit
(65 degC), or else personnel
protection shall be applied for the
vessel.
25.16 Maintenance 25.16.1 Maintenance of heater bundle To be verify during 3D

model review
25.16.2 Flare tip maintenance 100 To provide access staircase/ladder TPGM

to Flare Tip platform

/ Commissioning
25.20 Startup 25.20.1 Purging during startup

Utility connection will be
provided at the initial point
of header
25.21 Engineering 25.21.1 101 Consider routing the process drain TPGM
from LP Flare KO Drum to HP
Flare KO Drum but taking into
account the operating pressure of
the operating equipment
Words Party
25.21.2 102 With the above recommendation, TPGM

swap the LP Flare KO
Drum,Booster Pumps and Transfer
Pump with HP Flare KO Drum
and Transfer Pumps to HP Flare
and LP Flare respectively
25.21.3 103 To change pilot/ ignition line TPGM

material from carbon steel to SS
Review date 21st-June-2011
Section LP Flare System
Design Intent LP Flare System are provided for safe disposal of hydrocarbons released from pressure reliefs, blowdown, continuous and intermittent operational flaring.
Design LP Flare KO Drum LP Flare KO Drum Booster Pumps LP Flare KO Drum Pumps Piping
Conditions Pressure = 10barg Type: Centrifugal Type: Reciprocating low temperature sour service SS
Temperature = 115 /-20°C (ANSI 150)
Op Conditions Pressure = 0-3 barg

Temperature = ambient
Drawing Title LP Flare KO Drum Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6235 Revision A

LP Flare KO Drum Booster Pumps and Transfer pumps 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6236 A
No. Deviation / Guide HAZOP Causes/ Concerns Consequences Protections Rec. No. Comments/ Recommendations Action Remarks
Words Item Party
26.1 No Flow 26.1.1 62SDV1446 fail close on LP Flare 1) Liquid build up in the LP KO Drum 1)62LIZAHH1441A/B/C is
KO Drum booster and lead to liquid carry over to LP Flare provided leading to ESD.
pumps(62P135A/B) suction Tip (2 out of 3 voting)
2) Pump damage
26.1.2 62SDVxxx stuck close on backup Air ingress to LP Flare KO Drum. 1) Nitrogen purge
purge line from Fuel Gas System Potential deflagration inside the LP KO 2)62FIZALLxxx
Drum
26.1.3 20SDV1020 fail close 1) Pumping against dead head 1)62PIZAHH1462/63/64

2)Pressure inside LP Flare KO Drum will 2) 62PSV1453A/B,
increase 62PSV1454A/B,62PSV1455A/B
sized for blocked discharge
26.2 Less Flow 26.2.1 Strainer blockage Damage to pump SOP
26.2.2 One LP Flare KO Drum Booster LP Flare KO Drum Transfer pump No protection 104 To provide low low pressure trip TPGM
pump trips damage. on LP Flare Booster Pump
discharge
26.2.3 One LP Flare KO Drum Pump trips The fluid will slowly heat up SOP and 62PIAH1450 will alarm the
but Booster pump running operator
26.3 More Flow 26.3.1 Three pumps running 1)Choke flow 62LIZALL1442 Ensure that pump control
simultaneously 2)Less level in LP KO Drum logic will only start 2 pairs
pump in operation
26.4 Reverse Flow 26.4.1 Fuel Gas/ Flare Gas ingress into Hydrocarbon Gas being introduce into 1)Dissimiliar type of check valves (2
Nitrogen system Nitrogen Distribution System (very check valves in series)
unlikely due to separate different header)
Words Item Party
26.4.2 Reverse flow from Production 105 To provide check valve at the tie in TPGM
Separator from LP Flare KO Drum Pump to
Production Separator inlet
26.5 Misdirected Flow 26.5.1 see reverse flow
26.6 Less Pressure 26.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of condensate pool leading to 1)Low low pressure trip,
potential pool fire 30PIZALL1462/63/64 on the pump
discharge line
26.7 More Pressure 26.7.1 Gas blow by from process level Potential over pressure LP Flare System is designed for gas
control blow by case
26.8 Less Temperature 26.8.1 No concern
26.9 More Temperature 26.9.1 refer to less flow, 26.2.3
26.10 Less Level 26.10.1 see more flow 26.3.1
26.11 More Level 26.11.1 62SDV1446 fail close on LP Flare 1) Liquid build up in the LP KO Drum 1)62LIZAHH1441A/B/C is
KO Drum Booster and lead to liquid carry over to LP Flare provided leading to ESD.(2 out of 3
Pumps(62P135A/B) suction Tip voting)
2) Pump damage
26.12 Composition/ 26.12.1 CO2 Corrosion on LP Flare Header/KO Drum 1)LP Flare KO drum material is CS
Contamination leading to leakage with SS cladding.
2) Piping material used is SS
26.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to piping 1)LP Flare KO drum material is CS
failure with SS cladding.
26.12.3 saturated water Corrosion on LP Flare header/KO Drum 1)LP Flare KO drum material is CS
leading to leakage with SS cladding.
26.12.4 Sea water from open drain caisson Corrosion on LP Flare header/KO Drum To be captured in open
leading to leakage drain caisson system (node
27)
26.12.5 refer to reverse flow
26.13 Corrosion/ Erosion 26.13.1 refer to Composition/

Contamination
26.14 Instrumentation/ 26.14.1 refer to 25.14 for flare metering
Sampling
Words Item Party
26.16 Maintenance 26.16.1 Maintenance of PSV 106 To remove standby PSV for LP TPGM
Flare KO Drum pump because (3 x
50%) provided
26.16.2 Manual isolation valve on transfer 107 To provide single isolation valve at TPGM
pump suction suction of LP Flare KO Drum main
pumps
26.17 Operations/ 26.17.1 Surging during start up 108/109 1) To study recycle line for LP Flare TPGM The control scheme of the
Testing / level control (continuous ) pump is pending on the
Commissioning 2) Recycle line to be study for start pump operation mode,
up operation to avoid surge whether continuous or
on/off
26.20 Startup 26.20.1 refer to Operations/ Testing /

Commissioning
26.21 Engineering 26.21.1 110 To study the possibility of TPGM
combining both LP Flare KO
booster and transfer pump.
26.21.2 111 To study the possibility of free TPGM

draining from HP Flare KO Drum
to LP Flare KO Drum . Hence ,
eliminating HP Flare transfer
pumps.
Review 22nd June 2011 SOP Standard Operating Procedure
d
Project THIEN UNG FEED HAZOP FG Fuel Gas
Facility Fixed Drilling Platform (FDP) & Central Processing Platform( CPP) GTG Gas Turbine Generator
Section Fuel gas system
Design Fuel Gas System will provide high-pressure gaseous fuel for gas turbines of main power generators and gas compressors installed in the future. The system also supplies low-pressure fuel gas as pilot gas/ignition gas for
Intent the HP/LP flare tips, as back-up purge gas for the HP/LP flare header, as stripping gas for TEG and as floatation gas for Induced Gas Floatation Unit.
Design Fuel Gas Pre-Heater Fuel gas scrubber Fuel gas filter Fuel gas superheater Piping class = low temperature SS sour
Conditions Pressure = 180 barg Pressure = 44 barg Pressure = 44 barg Pressure =44 barg service
Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 80 /-20°C Temperature = 80 /-20°C
Op Pressure = 80-161 barg Pressure = 41 barg Pressure = 41 barg Pressure = 41 barg
Conditions Temperature = 18-50 degC Temperature = 15-47 degC Temperature = 15-47 degC Temperature = 15-47 degC
Drawing Fuel Gas Pre Heater 'A' Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6031 Revision A
Title Fuel Gas Scrubber 'A' 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6032 A
Fuel Gas Filter 'A' 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6033 A
Fuel Gas Superheater 'A' 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6034 A
Words No. Party
24.1 No Flow 24.1.1 60SDV1303 fail close at preheater 1)No fuel gas to train A 1) Limit switch at 60SDV1303 and
inlet 2) High Temperature train B online and provide required
fuel gas Two fuel gas system are in
2) 60TIZAHH1306 will trip pre- operations (2x100%), so, the
heater realibility is better than one fuel
3) 60TIZAHH1307 will trip train A gas system on duty and one
system on standby(2x100%). VSP
will revert with spare concept.
concept
24.1.2 60PV1355 stuck close at Fuel Gas 1)No fuel gas to train A 1) 60TIZAHH1306 will trip pre-
Scrubber inlet 2) High Temperature heater
2) 60TIZAHH1307 will trip train A
24.1.3 60SDV1334 or 60LV1333 stuck Level build up in Fuel Gas Scrubber 'A' 60LIZAHH1331 is provided
close at Fuel Gas Scrubber liquid leading to liquid carry over and flood the
outlet filter
24.1.4 60SDV1381 fail close at Fuel Gas Overpressure 300# system (i.e Fuel Gas 60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of Fuel
Superheater discharge Scrubber, Fuel Gas Filter) upstream of Gas Scrubber which will trip train A
60SDV1381
24.1.5 60PV1379/1380 fail close at Gas No fuel gas to Gas Turbine Gas Turbine is dual fuel 112 To provide dedicated pressure transmitter TPGM
Turbine Generator inlet for each control valve 60PV1379/1380
Show isolation valve 60PV1380 in
open position
24.1.6 60PCV1375/76 stuck close at LP No fuel gas/blanket gas/pilot/stripping 113 To provide low pressure alarm to alert TPGM
users inlet line to end users operator to open standby pressure regulator
valve set.(60PT1377)
Words No. Party
24.2 Less Flow 24.2.1 60SDV1303 partially close at 1)No fuel gas to train A 1) Train B online and provide
preheater inlet 2) High Temperature required fuel gas
2) 60TIZAHH1306 will trip pre-
heater
24.2.2 60PV1355 close than require at 1)No fuel gas to train A 1) 60TIZAHH1306 will trip pre-
Fuel Gas Scrubber inlet 2) High Temperature heater
24.2.3 60SDV1334 or 60LV1333 partially Level build up in Fuel Gas Scrubber 'A' 60LIZAHH1331 is provided
close at Scrubber liquid outlet leading to liquid carry over and flood the
filter
24.2.4 60SDV1381 partially close at Fuel Overpressure to 300# system (i.e fuel gas 60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of fuel
Gas Superheater discharge scrubber, fuel gas filter) upstream of gas scrubber which will trip train A
60SDV1381
24.2.5 60PV1379/1380 partially close at Less fuel gas to Gas Turbine Gas turbine is dual fuel
Gas Turbine Generator inlet
24.2.6 60BDV1374 inadvertently open 1)Low temperature at Fuel Gas 114 To provide 60FICAH1358 to alert operator TPGM
Superheater outlet regarding the high flow in the system
2) Low pressure experience in train A
24.2.7 60BDV1300 inadvertently open 1)Less flow to users and more flow to HP 1) Limit switch on 60BDV1300
Flare system 2) 60PIAL1328 to alaert operator low
2)Low temperature experienced during pressure in Fuel Gas System
blowdown
24.2.8 Filter blockage 1)Less fuel gas to end users.However, 1)60PDIAH1346 will alert the
train B is online operator
2) High temperature at outlet of Fuel Gas 2)60TIZAHH1360 to trip the Fuel Gas
Superheater Superheater
24.3 More Flow 24.3.1 60PV1355 stuck open at Fuel Gas Pressure will increase leading to over 60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of Fuel
Scrubber inlet pressure of Fuel Gas Scrubber Gas Scrubber which will trip train A
24.3.2 60LV1333 stuck open at Fuel Gas Low level in Fuel Gas Scrubber leading to 1)Low Low level trip 60LIZALL1331
Scrubber liquid outlet gas blow by to LP Flare KO Drum 2) LP Flare KO Drum is sized for gas
blow by case
Words No. Party
24.3.3 60PV1379/1380 stuck open at Gas Overpressure on Gas Turbine Generator 115 To verify the requirement of overpressure TPGM
Turbine Generator inlet protection to be provided downstream of
60PV1379/80 in regards to fuel gas line
rating inside Gas Turbine Generator
24.3.4 60PCV1375/76 stuck open at LP Overpressure to end users 1) 60PSVxxx sized for CV failure
users inlet line 2) Pressure high alarm 60PIAH1377
24.5 Misdirected Flow 24.5.1 60BDV1374 inadvertently open at refer to less flow, 24.2.6
Fuel Gas Superheater outlet
24.5.2 60BDV1300 inadvertently open refer to less flow,24.2.7
24.6 Less Pressure 24.6.1 Loss of containment Formation of vapour cloud leading to fire 1)60PIZALL1326 on scrubber outlet
and explosion which will trip the whole train
2) 60LIZALL1331 is provided
3) Fire and gas detector
24.6.2 60PSV1302 passing at Fuel Gas Pre- 1) Fuel Gas lost to flare 1)60TIAL1308
Heater 2) Less temperature on the outlet Fuel Gas 2) SOP- PSV periodic testing
Pre Heater 3) piping slope to HP Flare KO Drum
3) Potential hydrates formation at the 4) Piping designed for low
outlet of 60PV1355 during g startup
p temperature
p SS
24.6.3 60PSV1335 passing at Fuel Gas 1) Fuel Gas lost to flare 1)60PIZA1326LL
Scrubber 2) Less temperature on the outlet Fuel Gas 2)60TIZA1327LL
Pre Heater 3) SOP- PSV periodic testing
3) Potential hydrates formation at the 4) Sloped piping is provided to HP
outlet of 60PV1355 during startup Flare KO Drum
5) Piping designed for low
temperature SS
24.6.4 60PSVxxx passing Fuel Gas lost to flare 1) SOP- PSV periodic testing refer to rec 112
2) Sloped piping is provided to HP
Flare KO Drum
3) Piping designed for low
temperature SS
24.6.5 60PV1379/1380 stuck open at Gas 1)Overpressure on gas turbine generator 1)60TIZALL1360
Turbine Generator inlet 2)Potential condensation due to flow rate
higher than duty of superheater
24.6.6 60PCV1375/76 stuck open at LP Overpressure to end users 1) 60PSVxxx sized for CV failure
users inlet line 2) Pressure high alarm 60PIAH1377
24.6.7 refer to 24.2.6 and 24.2.7

Words No. Party
24.7 More Pressure 24.7.1 60PV1355 stuck open at Fuel Gas Pressure will increase leading to over 1)60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of Fuel
Scrubber inlet pressure of Fuel Gas Scrubber Gas Scrubber which will trip train A
2)60PSV1335 design for CV failure
24.7.2 60SDV1381 fail close at Fuel Gas Overpressure to 300# system (i.e Fuel Gas 1)60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of Fuel
Superheater discharge Scrubber, Fuel Gas Filter) upstream of Gas Scrubber which will trip train A
60SDV1381 2)60PSV1335 design for CV failure
24.7.3 60PV1379/1380 fail close at Gas Overpressure to 300# system (i.e Fuel Gas 1)60PIZAHH1326 on the inlet of Fuel
Turbine Generator inlet Scrubber, Fuel Gas Filter) upstream of Gas Scrubber which will trip train A
60SDV1381 2)60PSV1335 design for CV failure
24.8 Less Temperature 24.8.1 Fuel Gas Pre Heater 1) More condensate in Fuel Gas Scrubber 1)60TIZALL1327
malfunction/trips leading to condensate carry over to users 2)60LIZAHH1331
2)Potential hydrates formation at the
outlet of 60PV1355 during startup
24.8.2 Fuel Gas Superheater Condensate flow to users 60TIZALL1360

malfunction/trips
24.8.3 60BDV1374 inadvertently open 1)Low temperature at Fuel Gas refer to rec 113
Superheater outlet
2) Low pressure experienced in train A
during blowdown
24.8.4 60BDV1300 inadvertently open 1)Less flow to users and more flow to HP 1) Limit switch on 60BDV1300
Flare System 2) 60PIAL1328 to alert operator
2)Lo temperature eexperienced
2)Low perienced during regarding lo
low pressure in Fuel Gas
blowdown System
24.9 More Temperature 24.9.1 Fuel Gas Pre Heater malfunction Temperature will exceed Fuel Gas System 1)60TIZAHH1307
piping/equipment design temperature 2)60TIZAHH1306
24.9.2 Fuel Gas Superheater malfunction Temperature will exceed Fuel Gas System 1)60TIZAHH1360
piping/equipment design temperature 2)60TIZAHH1362
24.10 Less Level 24.10.1 60LV1333 stuck open at Fuel Gas Low level in Fuel Gas Scrubber leading to 1)Low low level trip 60LIZALL1331
Scrubber liquid outlet gas blow by to LP Flare KO Drum will close 60SDV1334
2) LP Flare KO Drum is sized for gas
blow by case
24.10.2 Auto drain passing Fuel Gas to LP Flare KO Drum 1)LP Flare KO drum is sized for auto
(60SDL101/102) drain passing
2) SOP
24.11 More Level 24.11.1 60SDV1334 or 60LV1333 stuck Level build up in Fuel Gas Scrubber 'A' 60LIZAHH1331 is provided and trip
close at Fuel Gas Scrubber liquid leading to liquid carry over and flood the the whole train
outlet filter
Words No. Party
24.11.2 Auto drain stuck close Level build up in filter 60LIAH1345/48 to alert the operator
(60SDL101/102)
24.12 Composition/Conta 24.12.1 CO2 Corrosion leading to leakage 1) Carbon steel with 3mm CA
mination 2)Process drain -duplex SS
24.12.2 H2S It will cause SSC and lead to piping failure 1) Carbon steel with 3mm CA
2) Process drain -duplex SS
24.12.3 Saturated water (during startup) Corrosion leading to leakage 1) carbon steel with 3mm CA
2) process drain -duplex SS
24.12.4 Corrosion under insulation Potential pitting Regular inspection Check painting specs for
corrosion protection
24.13 Corrosion/erosion 24.13.1 for corrosion refer to

Composition/Contamination.
No concern for erosion

Sampling
24.15 Occupational Safety 24.15.1 Heat conservation between Pre Insulation is provided between Pre
Heater and FG Scrubber (elevated Heater to FG Scrubber
temperature)
24.16 Maintenance 24.16.1 FG Pre Heater and FG Superheater 3D model review to check the
tube bundles accesibility for changing the tube
bundle

/ Commissioning
24.20 Startup 24.20.1 Start up bypass is provided for refer to rec 43

manual valve upstream of
60SDV2303
24.21 Engineering 24.21.1 116 To replace 60HS1373 with manual TPGM/

blowdown valve on outlet of Fuel Gas VSP
Superheater
Review date 22nd June 2011 SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Section CPP Dlosed Drain System
Design Intent Closed Drain System is designed to collect only the maintenance drains from the pressurized process and utility systems on CPP in order to contain any high-pressure gas that might be blown through when draining
of these facilities.
Design CPP Closed Drain Vessel CPP Closed Drain Pump

Conditions Pressure = 10bar capacity= 5m3/h EACH
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) =115/0°C
Op FDP Open Drain Caisson (65T105)

Conditions Pressure = ATM
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = AMB-50degC
Drawing CPP Closed Drain Vessel and Pumps Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6431 Revision A
Title
27.1 No Flow 27.1.1 Duty pump 64P120A trips No liquid transfer to LP Flare KO Standby pump 64P120B available.
Drum. Level build up in the Closed
Drain Vessel and it will cause liquid
carry over to LP Flare header.
27.1.2 Potential sand and wax blockage Liquid cannot drain to Closed Drain 1)Electrical heat tracing is provided 117 To consider providing blinded utility TPGM
on closed drain header Vessel. to minimize wax blockage. connection at beginning of closed header to
2) 4" header line is provided which flush sand accumulation in Closed Drain
consider sufficiently large to avoid header.
blockage.
refer node 15.7.2

27 1 3
27.1.3 64SDV1487 fail close 1)Liquid build up in the vessel 118 Consider to delete 64SDV1487 as the TPGM
2)Potential pump damage due to inventory of the vessel is small and liquid
cavitation content is less volatile.
27.2 Less Flow 27.2.1 Y- strainer on pump suction line Potential pump damage due to SOP inplace to inspect and clean up
blocked cavitation the strainer on regular interval.
27.3 More Flow 27.3.1 Two pumps running in manual 1)Higher than anticipated liquid SOP to ensure that two are not
mode velocity on discharge line.No concern running
2)Higher than anticipated liquid
velocity on the suction line causing
higher pressure drop which may lead to
cavitation.
27.3.2 Drain valve is left open after Higher than anticipated liquid and gas SOP inplace to close the spectacle
maintenance blow by entering the closed drain blind after draining
vessel.Design capacity of the vessel may
exceed and leading to excessive liquid
carry over to LP Flare system.

27.4 Reverse Flow 27.4.1 Liquid from LP Flare KO Drum Potential back flow to closed drain Check valve provided
backflow to Closed Drain Vessel vessel. No concern
27.6 Less Pressure/ 27.6.1 Loss of containment from Closed Environmental spillage Liquid spill to drip pan which will
Vacuum Drain Vessel eventually be collected in the Open
Drain Caisson . Small inventory, thus To inform Structural that
unlikely to escalate. drip pans to be provided
for Closed Drain Vessel
and Pumps
27.7 More Pressure 27.7.1 refer to more flow 27.3.2
27.7.2 Pump pumping against dead head Discharge piping rupture Discharge pipe is design for shut off
27.8 Less 27.8.1 Closed Drain Vessel Heater failure Gel/wax formation inside vessel and Low low temperature trip
Temperature obstructing pumping of liquid 64TIZALL1472 is provided on liquid
side of the vessel.
27.9 More 27.9.1 Heater malfunction Liquid may boiled off and exposed the 1)High high temperature trip
Temperature heater element resulting in damage 64TIZAHH1472 is provided on the
heater liquid side to measure high liquid
temperature
2) High high temperature trip
64TIZAHH1475 is provided for the
heating element to trip heating
element which has malfunction .
27.10 Less Level 27.10.1 on/off level control loop for 1)Lead to pump cavitation due to Low low level trip 64LIZALL1473
start/stop pump malfunction pumping dry
2) Exposing heater element and
demaging the heater
27.11 More Level 27.11.1 Pump failure Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header 1)LP Flare KO Drum is provided to
knock out the carry over liquid.LP
Flare KO Drum is provided with HH
level trip
2) Standby pump 64P120B is
available

27.11.2 Draining more than holding Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header see above 27.11.1
capacity
27.11.3 on/off level control loop for Liquid carry over to LP Flare Header see above 27.11.1
start/stop pump malfunction
27.12 Composition/Co 27.12.1 Sand Sand accumulation inside Closed Drain Provision is given to the Closed
ntamination Vessel obstructing level measurement Drain Vessel to install sand removal
system in future
27.12.2 CO2 Corrosion of vessel lead to leakage Material used for Vessel is CS with
SS cladding to withstand corrosion
27.12.3 H2S Potential SSC which may lead to vessel Material used for Vessel is CS with
failure SS cladding to withstand corrosion
27.13 Corrosion/ 27.13.1 refer to CO2, H2S for corrosion.

Erosion Erosion- no concern
27.14 Instrumentation 27.14.1 No sampling point for liquid line Cannot take sample to analyse the refer to rec 25
/ Sampling liquid
27.15 Occupational 27.15.1 Draining of liquid at high Personnel injury refer to rec 26
Safety operating temperature
27.16 Maintenance 27.16.1 Space is needed to pull out heater refer to rec 27
bundle for maintenance

Testing /
Commissioning

27.20 Startup 27.20.1 No concern in FEED phase
27.21 Engineering 27.21.1 119 To check the requirement of 64LIZAHH1473 TPGM
27.21.2 Vapour return line from pump refer to rec 28

discharge to vessel for start up

Review date 22nd June 2011 SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Section CPP Open Drain Caisson
Design Intent Liquids and spillage containing hydrocarbons collected from drip pans in CPP are routed to CPP Open Drain Caisson
Design O D i C i
CPP Open Drain Caisson (65T125) CPP Open Drain Caisson
Conditions Pressure = 3.5 bar Pump(65P130)
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = 65°C Rated Capacity = 5m3/h
Op CPP Open Drain Caisson (65T125)

Conditions Pressure = ATM
Temperature ( MAX/MIN) = AMB
Drawing CPP Open Drain Caisson Drawing No. 5691-CPP-PR-PID-6532 Revision A

No. Deviation / Guide HAZOP Causes/ Concerns Consequences Protections Rec. Comments/ Recommendations Action Remarks
Words Item No. Party
28.1 No Flow 28.1.1 Pump 65P130 trips Hydrocarbon will accumulate inside 1) SOP to check the high level alarm
the Caisson which may eventually lead 2) Caisson will be sized to avoid
to under flow from caisson and underflow
polluting the sea.
28.1.2 Open drain header is blocked Unable to drain the liquid from deck 120 To provide trough (mesh) at the end of TPGM
Open Drain Header before entering Open
Drain Caisson to remove trashes in the drain
liquid
28.2 Less Flow 28.2.1 Open drain line is partially block refer to 28.1.2
28.3 More Flow 28.3.1 NA
28.5 Misdirected Flow 28.5.1 Liquid flow from Open Drain Caisson Pollution to sea SOP to ensure that isolation valve is
vessel misdirected to Drain pots at normally closed during pump
Cellar Deck. However, the drain pots transfer
are not in place
28.6 Less Pressure/ 28.6.1 Tide movement 1)Air ingress into caisson and expel 1)Vent is terminated at safe location refer to rec 31
Vacuum through the atmospheric vent 2) Flame arrestor is provided on the
2)Formation of explosive mixture vent line to prevent flash back
inside caisson which can lead to
explosion
28.7 More Pressure 28.7.1 Pump pumping against dead head Discharge piping rupture Discharge pipe is design for shut off
28.8 Less Temperature 28.8.1 NA
28.9 More Temperature 28.9.1 NA

28.10 Less Level 28.10.1 on/off level control loop for start/stop Pump pumping sea water to process Sampling point is provided to take
pump malfunction system if the discharge line up to LP sample and measure the quality of
Flare KO Drum and causing potential pumping fluid.
corrosion for the facility.
28.11 More Level 28.11.1 Pump failure Liquid accumulated in the caisson until 1)High level alarm is provided
underflow from the bottom and 65LICAH1500.
causing pollution 2) Caisson is sized to avoid
underflow
28.11.2 Draining more than holding capacity Liquid accumulated in the caisson until 1)High level alarm is provided
underflow from the bottom and 65LICAH1500.
causing pollution 2) Caisson is sized to avoid
underflow
28.12 Composition/ 28.12.1 Chemical injected into topsides (during Chemical maybe toxidic to the marine refer to rec 32
Contamination startup) life
28.13 Corrosion/ 28.13.1 Corrosion- Caisson incontact with sea Corrosion on the caisson causing 1)Coating is provided at the splash
Erosion water which is highly corrosive leakage and environmental pollution zone of caisson
Erosion- no concern 2) Sacrifical anode is installed for
caisson.
28.14 Instrumentation/ 28.14.1 Quality of discharge liquid to sea shall refer to rec 33
Sampling comply with environmental
requirement
28.15
28 15 Occupational 28.15.1
28 15 1 No concern
Safety

Testing /
Commissioning

28.21 Engineering 28.21.1

HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Page 23 of 23
ATTACHMENT C – HAZOP P&ID

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NODE 11
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NODE 13
NODE 15
NODE 24
NODE 25
NODE 26
NODE 27
NODE 28

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DOC NO.

ATTACHMENT A- HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS

ATTACHMENT B- HAZOP WORKSHEET

ATTACHMENT C- HAZOP P&ID

Location of Thien Ung field is shown in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1: Thien Ung Reservoir Location

The objectives of this HAZOP Study are as follows:

BDV Blowdown Valve

2.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY

The HAZOP review utilizes a well-defined, systematic procedure carried out by a

A summary of the HAZOP review process is as follows:

Deviations The combination of parameters and guide words, in sequence, will

2.3 HAZOP Review Guidewords

Table 2.1: Typical HAZOP Guide Words

No. Guide Word No. Guide Word

3.0 TEAM MEMBERS

Table 3.1: HAZOP Workshop Attendee

No Name Company Designation

4.0 HAZOP SESSION

Table 4.2: Nodes to be HAZOP during Detailed Design

4.1 P&ID Review Document List

Table 4.3: P&IDs reviewed during HAZOP

5.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

6.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Table 6.1 Recommendations from HAZOP

2 1 Consider to put the choke valve as part of wellhead vendor TPGM/VSP

5 1 Consider providing spectacle blind on drain line. TPGM

9 1 Ensure the minimum design temperature is updated upon TPGM

18 2 To provide spectacle blind on drain line from test header TPGM

19 2 Add one isolation valve upstream of gas meter TPGM

20 2 Review the valving requirement for test separator based on TPGM/VSP

22 2 To include one isolation valve upstream of PSV( CSO). TPGM

23 2 To provide limit switches for one of the isolation valve on TPGM

31 4 To provide filter/strainer at the end of Open Drain Header TPGM

37 4 Move the isolation valve upstream of the sampling line on TPGM

40 6 To link the valve close position of 20SDV1040 to stop the TPGM

41 6 To provide pressure HH protection (PSV,trips) for full well TPGM

42 6 Check the possibility of hydrates formation downstream of TPGM

43 6 Provide pressure gauge for monitoring the Production TPGM

44 6 To provide spectacle blind (2")on vapour return line on TPGM

45 6 (General)Change the bypass for manual valve to bypass for TPGM

48 7 Check that LP Flare System is designed to handle gas blow TPGM

53 8 Capacity of LP Flare KO Drum need to check for this blow by TPGM

55 8 Minimum distance between TEG contactor and 22SDV1071 to TPGM

56 8 Consider to provide some space for maintenance of 22E120 TPGM

58 8 Consider to replace spare 22LV1060B with manual bypass TPGM

59 8 To provide additional PV at the gas outlet of TEG contactor for TPGM

60 11 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to determine the TPGM

65 11 To check the filter cartridge and coalescer internal maximum TPGM

66 11 To check pump shut in pressure does not exceed piping TPGM

69 11 To provide PG on the Condensate Coalescers TPGM

70 11 To provide manual bypass across 30LV1488/81 TPGM

71 11 (General) All drain level tubing to be relocated downstream of TPGM

72 11 To provide bypass on the inlet isolation valve of filters and TPGM

73 11 (General)To provide guided wave radar for interface level TPGM

74 12 To check the design pressure of LP Flare KO Drum for the TPGM

75 12 To confirm the suitability of piping material specified for TPGM

76 12 To provide additional spacer downstream of 30SDV1540/41 TPGM

82 13 Consider to provide different pump impeller for Condensate TPGM

84 13 Provide manhole at the top portion of column TPGM

85 13 If possible, consider to combine Condensate Booster Pump TPGM

87 15 Quantitative risk assessment (QRA)) to review the TPGM