A.C. No.

9120 March 11, 2013

(Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1783)

AUGUSTO P. BALDADO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, Respondent.

On July 17, 2006, complainant Augusto P. Baldado filed a Complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar

Discipline, charging respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica with gross incompetence, gross negligence and gross ignorance of
the law for his failure to render legal service to the complainant as mandated by Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.01,
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts are as follows:

Complainant Augusto P. Baldado was a former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern
Samar. He ran and won in the 2004 National and Local Elections.

Florentino C. Nival, a losing candidate during the said elections, filed a Petition for Quo Warranto with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar against complainant, questioning his qualifications as a candidate, as he was
allegedly an American citizen. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3900 and assigned to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch 2 (trial court).

Complainant hired the legal services of respondent for the said case.

Respondent filed an Answer, and later filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
the case due to the failure of Florentino C. Nival to pay the appropriate filing or docket fee.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the motion is proscribed after the filing of an Answer, as
provided in Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the denial of the motion to dismiss. In a Resolution1 dated January 14,
2005, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that there was no notice of hearing pursuant to Sections 4, 5 and 6,
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated April 29,
2005, for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision,2 directing the issuance of a Writ of Quo Warranto ousting complainant
Augusto P. Baldado from the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, and declaring
vacant the position of complainant as Sangguniang Bayan member.3 The trial court stated that when complainant, formerly
an American citizen, reacquired his Philippine citizenship on September 29, 2003, he also reacquired his residency in the
Philippines on September 29, 2003, short of the required one-year period immediately preceding the election. Hence, the
trial court held that complainant was not eligible to register as a candidate for the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sulat,
Eastern Samar during the May 2004 elections.

On May 19, 2005, respondent received a copy of the Decision of the trial court, and he had a period of five days within
which to appeal the trial court's Decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On May 21, 2005, complainant and his wife, having obtained their own copy of the trial court's Decision, proceeded hurriedly
to respondent and urged him to immediately file a notice of appeal from the said decision.

Respondent did not heed the prodding of complainant to file a Notice of Appeal, because according to respondent, the notice
of the decision could not be deemed to have been officially received by him as the said decision had not yet been promulgated
in open court; hence, the prescriptive period to appeal would not toll yet.

On May 26, 2005,4 respondent filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for restraining
order and/or injunction to annul or set aside the trial court's Resolutions dated January 14, 2005 and April 9, 2005,
denying the motions for reconsideration of the trial court's Resolution dated November 10, 2004, denying the motion to
dismiss the quo warranto case. Respondent did not appeal from the trial court's Decision dated May 6, 2005.

On May 16, 2006, the First Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution 5 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. It held that the correct filing fees had been paid by petitioner Florentino P. Nival, as evidenced by the Legal Fees
Form,6 which barred complainant from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court. The COMELEC declared that
complainant's petition was moot and academic with the rendition of the trial court's Decision in the quo warranto case. It
stated that as the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, the remedy of complainant should have been to appeal
the trial court's Decision under Section 14, Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides that from any
decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the COMELEC within five days after the promulgation of
the decision. On the other hand, certiorari, under Section 1, Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is allowed only
when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The COMELEC
stated that petitioner lost his opportunity to appeal granted by law.
Florentino Nival filed a motion for execution in the quo warranto case, which was granted by the trial court. On July 11,
2005, complainant was removed from his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern
Samar.

Complainant hired a new counsel, who filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the First Division of the
COMELEC, dated May 16, 2006. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the COMELEC en
banc in a Resolution7 dated June 21, 2007.

On July 17, 2006, complainant filed this administrative case against respondent. Complainant contended that in handling
his case, respondent committed these serious errors: (1) Respondent improperly filed a Motion to Dismiss after he had filed
his Answer, allegedly due to lack of jurisdiction for failure of therein petitioner Florentino C. Nival to pay the correct docket
fees, but the trial court denied said motion because a motion to dismiss is proscribed after filing an Answer; (2) Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the denial of his Motion to Dismiss which was denied for failure to attach the Notice
of Hearing; (3) respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was again denied on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading; and (4) Respondent refused to file a Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the trial court on the Petition
for Quo Warranto without justification despite the advice and insistence of complainant, and instead filed a petition for
certiorari before the COMELEC, assailing the trial court's Resolutions dated January 14, 2005 and April 29, 2005 denying
the motions for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss the quo warranto case.

Complainant contended that respondent's mishandling of his case amounted to gross incompetence and gross negligence
in rendering service to his client, as well as gross ignorance of the law, in violation of Canon 17 and Canon 18: Rules 18.01,
18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 8 for which respondent should be disbarred or suspended from
legal practice. Complainant stated that respondent's failure to render legal service, in accordance with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, caused him (complainant) to lose in the quo warranto case, which resulted in his removal from
his office, and made him suffer grave and irreparable damage, mental anguish, wounded feelings and social humiliation.

In his Position Paper,9 respondent explained that a Motion to Dismiss was filed after the Answer was filed, because he found
out days after filing the Answer that Florentino C. Nival failed to pay the filing fee amounting to ₱300.00. Respondent claimed
that the trial court failed to understand that Section 1, Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss) of the Rules of Court is the general rule,
while the exceptions are found in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which provides that lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, among others, is a defense that is not deemed waived even if it is not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer.

Respondent stated that he failed to place a notice of hearing in his motion for reconsideration (of the denial of his motion to
dismiss) due to inadvertence. However, he contended that since the adverse party submitted an Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration, it is sufficient proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard; hence, the dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration due to the absence of notice of hearing was improper.

Moreover, respondent asserted that the alleged omission or negligence regarding the failure to file an appeal from the trial
court's Decision was neither induced by bad faith nor malice, but founded on good faith and a well-researched legal opinion
that the five-day period within which to file a notice of appeal did not commence due to the failure of the trial court to
promulgate its decision, as required under Section 12, Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, found respondent liable
for gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and gross negligence, and recommended that respondent be suspended
for six months from legal practice with a warning that the commission of infractions in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-234,10 adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent guilty of gross negligence of the
law, gross incompetence and gross negligence, and imposing upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six months with a warning that a future infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-2011-
37011 dated June 26, 2011.

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the Board of Governors of the IBP that respondent is guilty of gross
negligence, gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for failing to appeal the Decision of the trial court in the quo
warranto case before the COMELEC within the reglementary period.

It appears that respondent failed to appeal from the Decision of the trial court, because he was waiting for a notice of the
promulgation of the said decision, as Sections 12 & 14, Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure state:

Sec. 12. Promulgation and Finality of the Decision. - The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of
which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after its promulgation.

No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Sec. 14. Appeal. - From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections,
without five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.

In his Position Paper,12 respondent stated that the furnishing of the trial court's Decision through the post office/mail could
not be considered as promulgation under Section 12 above, which requires that the court must set the date when the
decision shall be promulgated with due notice to the parties. Respondent contended that, in view of the absence of the
promulgation of the trial court's decision, he did not file an appeal because the five-day period within which to file a notice
of appeal has not commenced up to the present.
The Court notes that respondent cited Lindo v. COMELEC,13 in his Position Paper. Lindo v. COMELEC should have
enlightened respondent about his confusion regarding when the trial court's Decision in an election case is promulgated,
and when he should have filed an appeal from the trial court's Decision with the COMELEC. As Lindo v. COMELEC stated:

It is the contention of petitioner Lindo that the act of merely furnishing the parties with a copy of the decision, as was done
in the trial court, violated COMELEC rules and did not constitute a valid promulgation. Since there was no valid
promulgation, the five (5) day period within which the decision should be appealed to the COMELEC did not commence to
run.

This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made
known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel. (Neria v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of
court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement
imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence, We
do not agree with petitioner's contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not
deny that it had officially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent
to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioner himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.

What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the failure
of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The
failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial
court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor of
the promulgation of said decision.

xxxx

Petitioner's protestations of denial of due process when his notice of appeal was denied for having been filed out of time
must also fail. The records show that petitioner's counsel of record, Atty. Amador Montajo, received a copy of the decision
on February 12, 1990. The five-day period for petitioner to file his appeal from the decision of the trial court commenced to
run from such date. Petitioner's notice of appeal was filed with the trial court only on February 26, 1990, fourteen (14) days
after his counsel was served a copy of the decision. Clearly, his notice was filed out of time. x x x14

From the foregoing, herein respondent should have filed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court within five days from
receipt of a copy of the decision on May 19, 2005.15

As regards the filing of the motion to dismiss after filing an Answer, Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation16 held that the requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for filing the answer is not
absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1)
lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would
constitute a ground for dismissal.17 In this case, respondent sought the dismissal of the quo warranto case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Even if the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, respondent could still have raised the alleged
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court in the appeal of the trial court's decision to the COMELEC; however, no such appeal
was filed.

Hence, respondent's negligence in protecting the interest of his client was the failure to appeal the trial court's decision in
the quo warranto case before the COMELEC. The circumstances of this case show violation of Canon 18: Rules 18.01, 18.02
and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which state:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who
is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.18 He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.1âwphi1

The Court notes that this is the first case respondent handled after he passed the bar examinations in September 2003,
took his oath and signed the roll of attorneys. Respondent prays for compassionate justice as he is the only breadwinner in
the family. In Tolentino v. Mangapit,19 the Court took into consideration the fact that the omission committed by respondent
counsel therein to inform her client and the latter's other lawyers of the adverse decision may be traced to her inexperience,
as the case and decision was the first she handled after passing the bar, and she acted under an honest mistake in the
exercise of her duty as a lawyer. Thus, in Tolentino, the Court merely admonished the respondent instead of suspending
her from the practice of law for at least a month, as recommended by the Solicitor General. In this case, suspending
respondent from the practice of law for three months is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, approving and adopting the Decision of the Investigating
Commissioner, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 5834 December 11, 2003

TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. 1The
Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 17. – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

We are once again called upon to reiterate these dicta in the instant administrative matter before us.

On July 31, 2001, Teresita D. Santeco filed a Verified Complaint2 with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines praying that appropriate sanctions be meted on respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling
Civil Case No. 97-275.

Complainant averred that she was the defendant in an action for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 50988 filed with
Branch 62 of the Makati City Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). On March 3, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment against
her. Thereafter, she filed a supersedeas bond with the Clerk of Court of the Makati MTC.

Sometime in February 1997, during the pendency of the ejectment case, complainant filed an action to Declare Deed of
Absolute Sale Null and Void and for Reconveyance with Damages with Branch 147 of the Makati City Regional Trial Court.
The case was entitled, "Feliciana David Santeco, et al. v. Ramon Gutierrez, et al.," and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-275.

On or before March 1998, complainant terminated the services of her then counsel and engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance as her counsel de parte in both cases. Complainant agreed to and did pay respondent P12,000.00 as
acceptance fee for her services.3

In June 1997 and August 2000, complainant paid respondent the sums of P1,500.00 and P500.00 respectively in full
satisfaction of their acceptance fee. However, respondent refused to issue to complainant the corresponding receipts
therefor, despite demands to do so.

In an Order dated July 6, 1998 in Civil Case No. 97-275, the Presiding Judge of Branch 147 of the Makati City RTC expunged
from the record the testimony of a witness for complainant, who was one of the plaintiffs therein. 4Respondent, as her
counsel, filed a "Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of July 6, 1998."5 The motion was denied by the trial court in
an Order dated June 30, 1999.6 Thereafter, on August 27, 1999,7 Civil Case No. 97-275 was dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Respondent filed a "Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of August 27, 1999."8

Subsequently, respondent made representations with complainant that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, assailing the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-275. For the proposed service, respondent charged
complainant the total sum of P3,900.00, which the latter paid.9 After waiting for some time without any word from
respondent, complainant personally verified with the docket section of the Court of Appeals whether or not a petition for
certiorari was filed. She was dismayed to discover that no such petition had been filed.

Complainant also alleged that respondent took from her the official receipt and pictures of the torn-down structures which
were the subject of Civil Case No. 50988, issued by the Clerk of Court of Branch 62 of the Makati City MTC, evidencing her
deposit of the supersedeas bond. Respondent obtained the same under the pretext that she needed them in the motion for
the withdrawal of complainant’s deposit.

Complainant further averred that respondent told her to go to the court to claim the check for the supersedeas bond and
have the same encashed with the Landbank. However, upon verification with the MTC, she discovered that there was no
such check and that she needs to present the official receipt to withdraw said deposit. She tried to recover the official receipt
from respondent but the latter kept avoiding her.
Thus, complainant filed an action against respondent before the Barangay Office of Barangay Nangka, Marikina City.
Respondent, however, repeatedly failed to appear at the conciliation proceedings, despite notice of the hearings, prompting
the Lupong Tagapayapa, to issue a certification to file action. 10 Since then, respondent persistently avoided complainant
and failed to represent her in Civil Cases Nos. 50988 and 97-275. According to complainant, respondent just stopped
appearing as her counsel of record without any justifiable reason. Hence, she prayed that appropriate sanctions be meted
on respondent.

After the filing of the administrative complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 01-861, an Order dated August 1, 200111was
issued by the Commission on Bar Discipline requiring respondent to submit her Answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof. A copy of said Order was received by respondent on August 8, 2001. Respondent failed to file her Answer, which
compelled complainant to file a "Motion To Declare Respondent In Default And To Set Case For Hearing Ex Parte". 12 She
furnished respondent copy of the motion by personal service. The copy was received by one Kins Avance on October 3,
2001.13

Respondent still failed to file her Answer. Thus, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order dated October 30, 2001
setting the case for hearing on November 20, 2001. This Order was received by respondent on November 8, 2001, as reflected
in the Registry Return Receipt thereof.

On the scheduled hearing on November 20, 2001, only the complainant appeared.14 In order to abbreviate proceedings, the
Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order15 requiring both parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty
(20) days from receipt, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for decision with or without memoranda. Respondent
received a copy of the Order on November 27, 2001, per the Registry Return Receipt.

Pursuant to the foregoing Order, complainant filed her Position Paper on December 13, 2001.16 Again, respondent did not
file her memorandum.

On March 14, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a Report finding respondent culpable as
charged and recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. She found that:

As it is, respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having failed to account to the
complainant the official receipt of the supersedeas bond she got from complainant to withdrew (sic) the same from the court
relative to the ejectment case.

Respondent also violated Canon 18.03 for having failed to file the [petition for] certiorari before the Court of Appeals as she
promised the complainant and even got litigation expenses relative to the same.

Likewise, respondent violated Canon 20 when she discontinued her legal services for complainant without any notice of
withdrawal and even ignored the issuances of the Commission for her to answer the complaint filed against her.

On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-02-408,
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

While we agree that indeed respondent is liable, we find the recommended penalty not commensurate to the degree of her
malfeasance.

There can be no question that respondent was grossly remiss in the performance of her duties as counsel for complainant.
The records show that in engaging the services of respondent, complainant agreed to and did pay respondent P12,000.00
as acceptance fee.17 It also appears that on April 20, 1998, a witness for complainant in Civil Case No. 97-275 testified
before the court on direct examination. For lack of material time, the cross-examination was reset to June 1, 1998. However,
the witness failed to attend the hearing on the said date. Respondent, on the other hand, arrived late. Over the vehement
objections of defense counsel, the trial court reset the hearing to July 6, 1998, with the warning that in the event the witness
fails to appear on said date, her direct examination shall be expunged. The witness again failed to appear at the next hearing
because she went to Baguio. Respondent was likewise not around when the case was called. Thus, on motion of adverse
counsel, the trial court ordered that the testimony of the witness be stricken off the record.18

These incidents show respondent’s lackadaisical manner in handling her client’s cause. Again, for respondent’s failure to
appear during the hearings scheduled on August 23 and 27, 1999, Civil Case No. 97-275 was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.19 Her failure to appear during those hearings constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause
of complainant.20 She thereafter filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of August 27, 1999 on February 8,
200021 – way beyond the reglementary period for the filing thereof. She proffered the lame excuse that notices sent to her
were returned to the trial court with the notation: "Moved."22 However, it was her duty to notify the court of the change in
her address, if she had indeed moved.

Even as the aforesaid motion for reconsideration was pending, she made representations with complainant that she would
file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-275. For the
filing and preparation thereof, she charged and was paid the sum of P3,900.00 by complainant.23Respondent, however, did
not file the petition without notifying the complainant.

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him. Her negligence in connection therewith shall render her liable. Verily –

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter’s
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to
the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 24

Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, respondent abruptly stopped appearing as complainant’s
counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This was in
gross violation of the following:

CANON 22. A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. (Italics supplied)

It must be remembered that while the right of the client to terminate the relation is absolute, i.e., with or without cause,25 the
right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. 26 Among
the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates
to carry it to its termination.27 He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.28

The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services are well-defined,29 and the abruptness of respondent’s withdrawal
hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may, whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing from a case, he
can not just do so and leave the client out in the cold unprotected. 30 An attorney may only retire from a case either by
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the lawyer should
see to it that the name of the new counsel is recorded in the case.31

Respondent’s consistent refusal to comply with lawful orders in the proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline,
with no explanation offered to justify them, not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority, but also a defiance
for law and order which is at the very core of her profession. Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the
administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else
would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives?
The first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

The inevitable conclusion is that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in her and with
palpable bad faith. Her persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so,
is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion.

A lawyer has the duty to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times and to faithfully perform her
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.32 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch
the fair name of an honorable profession.

All told, respondent has dismally failed to do her duty to her client and has clearly violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct,
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is provided by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.1âwphi1 – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The penalty of suspension "for a period of two (2) years" recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP is too light and
inadequate given the prevailing facts of this case. For the deliberate violation and defiance of not merely one but several
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with palpable bad faith and dishonesty in her dealings with
complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty – that of suspension for a period of five (5) years from the practice of
law.33

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of five (5) years. She is directed to return to complainant the amount of P3,900.00 within ten (10) days from
notice.

This decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondent’s personal record. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298

Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of

criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case

before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena,

as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a

mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation

pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter

sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice,

respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his clients claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the

following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition
to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed an

administrative complaint[2] with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent

filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims) [3] claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson,

complainants legal counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges

against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated

only to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages

and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for

Usurpation of Public Functions[4] and for violation of the Notarial Law.[5]

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear.[6] Both parties were

thereafter required to submit their position papers.

The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that complainant,

failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum

shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10

July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the

records of the case.[9] Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred million

pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal

fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit.[11]

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on

respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP dismissed

his complaint without considering his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.

Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006 Resolution [13] of the IBP Board

of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition

on the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed his position paper on 21 December

2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was

received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same document also shows that it was sent

by registered mail to respondent on the same date. [14]

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his failure to attach a

certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.

The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8

February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular

No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-

judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause

for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the

party concerned.[16]

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the

certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,

disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its

adjudication.

The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the

certification against forum shopping requirement, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit

of complainants complaint against respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary proceedings against

lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
 profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the

complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings

against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as

the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of

the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and

thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court

processes,[19] which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds

to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[20] Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks

to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to

promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious

time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting

resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[21]

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping to

a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the

possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either

taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of

any person.[22] Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping,

the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have

previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, should not

be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules

of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[23]

At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect in the original

complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6 December

2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents Motion to Dismiss the present petition.

Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies the grant of the present petition.

Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that

the letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within

the bounds of the law, reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of

justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously

observant of law and ethics.[24] In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means

to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded

criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or

threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a

leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client. [25]

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened

complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger

amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and
cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon

19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public

prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing

some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and

synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the

exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by

promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.[26]

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one

which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondents disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible

criminal prosecution.[28] While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of

respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out

massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under obligation to tell the

truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of

demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondents threat to file the cases

against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his clients demands. It was not

respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even

contains an implied promise to keep silent about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by

a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of

his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such

as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more

than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have

nothing to do with his clients claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel

complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private

communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed

when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a

penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his clients

interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of

Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of

Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND,

with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5736 June 18, 2010

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors1 of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI)
Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for "acts constituting grave coercion and threats when
he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and operation
of the bank through force, violence and intimidation."

The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.2 RBCI alleged that respondent violated his
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr.
Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed
men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the
bank manager, destroyed the bank’s vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCI’s allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the authority
granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI.
Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination
notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations,
respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted
violently and grappled with the security guard’s long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry
into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the
Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the bank’s vault.

Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already dismissed;
while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent
said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCI’s
counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that
the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and
declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice.3 Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a
more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly
take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the
right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No.
6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it
was a "naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever."

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent of
the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI
complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits.
Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead,
simultaneously submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent
dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law
for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty. 4

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied
respondent’s motion.5

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors’ resolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land.6 Likewise, it is the lawyer’s duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to
abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.7

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this
reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. 8 It is his duty to
counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to
their adversaries.9

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.’s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of
truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but,
first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients’ interests is secondary to their obligation
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy
or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense
of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.10

A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. 11 Any means, not honorable, fair
and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and
unethical.12

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7749, July 08, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR.,Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar (complainant) against
Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972, 2 filed by the heirs of one
Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was represented by
respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed to submit a pre-
trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the
case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order3 dated November 27, 2003. When complainant
confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to worry, assuring her that she will
not lose the case since she had the title to the subject property.

On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision4 (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to vacate and turn-
over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint. 5 Later
however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s ruling and reinstated the MTC Decision.6 Respondent received a copy
of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant about the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact
that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did respondent pursue any further action.7 As such, complainant decided
to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking other available remedies. Due to respondent’s failure
to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such other remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based
on these incidents, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, alleging that respondent’s acts amounted to
gross negligence which resulted in her loss.8

In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the administrative complaint within
ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance10 dated May 19, 2008, admitting to have agreed to represent
complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the subject property owned by the late Pelagia Lascano
(Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he noticed a discrepancy
between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which complainant
supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and separate
from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of
further proceedings and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the true
identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the manner of the proposed
re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose.
In relation, the heirs’ counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in his office11 certain documents which indicated the subject
property’s description. Thus, pending the conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary conference was tentatively
reset to November 27, 2003.12

As it turned out, the heirs’ counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated documents, notwithstanding
their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary conference scheduled on November 27, 2003 would not
push through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened to coincide with an important provincial
conference which he was required to attend. As such, he inadvertently missed the hearing.13 Nonetheless, he proffered that
he duly appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the RTC,14 resulting to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer complaint,
albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the disputed property was
subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 15filed by Pelagia against
complainant’s mother, Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents furnished to him by certain DAR personnel,
respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property for a long time and actually tilled the same in the
name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information, respondent was convinced that Placida
– and consequently, complainant (who took over the tilling) – was indeed entitled to the subject property. Hence, he advised
complainant that it would be best to pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of contesting the appeal filed by
the heirs before the CA. It was respondent’s calculated legal strategy that in the event the CA reverses the decision of the
RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution or a motion to quash such writ may be filed based on the afore-
stated reasons, especially if an approved plan and later, an emancipation patent covering the subject property is issued. 16

Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,000 square
meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title of Pelagia.
Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice, and
promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainant accused
respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn sour and
eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the services of another lawyer. 17

In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 2009 19 and required the parties
to submit their respective position papers.20

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating Commissioner), issued a
Report and Recommendation (Commissioner’s Report), 21 finding respondent to have been negligent in failing to attend the
preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the immediate submission of
the said case for decision and eventual loss of complainant’s cause.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the
court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push through, considering that the November 27, 2003 setting
was only tentative and the heirs’ counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact that respondent had to attend
an important provincial conference which coincided with the said setting hardly serves as an excuse since he should have
sent a substitute counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned any legal remedy that he undertook when the
heirs elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not file any comment or opposition to the heirs’ appeal.
Finally, respondent’s enumerations of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainant’s interests were found to be
thought only after the fact.22

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise ordinary diligence in
handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. 23

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XIX-2011-26624 dated May
14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and in accord with applicable laws and rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-2012-51726 dated
December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence
in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to
devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free.27 Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential directives and
thus, respectively state:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

x x x x

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him
or her to do so.28

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. 29 While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.30

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainant’s cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing in Civil Case No.
1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the said hearing would push
through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and considering further that he was yet to confer with the opposing
counsel. The fact that respondent had an important commitment during that day hardly exculpates him from his omission
since the prudent course of action would have been for him to send a substitute counsel to appear on his behalf. In fact, he
should have been more circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not have been left unattended in view of its
adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendant’s failure to appear at the preliminary conference already entitles the plaintiff
to a judgment.31 Indeed, second-guessing the conduct of the proceedings, much less without any contingent measure,
exhibits respondent’s inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause.

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs’ appeal before the CA. Records disclose
that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected to inform her about the CA ruling which he had duly
received, thereby precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As regards respondent’s suggested legal strategy to
pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state that the same does not excuse him from failing to file a comment
or an opposition to an appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably, these are
basic courses of action which every diligent lawyer is expected to make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the above-cited provisions of
the Code.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda,32 a lawyer
who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision
was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v.
Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended
for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the
Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6)
months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.

For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant)
against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.

The facts

Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), 2 a British national who passed away on June 18,
2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the
shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc.4 (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.5

On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui Bantegui), 6 a major stockholder of
Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the company.8 They agreed to another meeting
which was, however, postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide
something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to the scheduled meeting,
complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the
same was legal.10

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and respondent, which
impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to
give them a duplicate key.11

Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge
office door,12 which prevented the employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This
prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutor’s Office) a complaint for grave
coercion against complainant and respondent.13 In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases
should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting
Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of Agreement,15 whereby respondent undertook the
filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of ₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed
herself to pay respondent ₱1,000.00 for every court hearing.16

On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution17 dated October 13, 2004, finding probable cause to
charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of
course, warrants of arrest were issued against them.18 Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into
hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion
case and stopped communicating with complainant.19 Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts,20 complainant
filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1689.

Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The case was set for mandatory
conference on November 24, 2006,22 which was reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence
of respondent. The last notice sent to respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason "moved out."24 In view
thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference terminated and required
the parties to submit their position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits.25

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) issued a Report and
Recommendation,26 observing that respondent failed to safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in
the grave coercion case. Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant as
subrogee of David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her interest in
Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company
premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal measures to his
actions, he abandoned his client's cause.28 Commissioner Magpayo found that respondent’s acts evinced a lack of adequate
preparation and mastery of the applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 5 29 of the Code of Professional Responsibity
(Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.30

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-
2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules.31

In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s November 19, 2011 Resolution, and referred
the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.33

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation 34 dated February 6, 2013, concluding that
respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton
disregard of his duties as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the
IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be suspended for three years. 36 Likewise,
it ordered respondent to return the ₱150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee.37

The Court's Ruling

After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the OBC.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times
a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means
to attain lawful objectives.39 These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon
19 of the Code which respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

xxxx

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.

xxxx

Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling
complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional
advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against
them was pending.

Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her deceased husband, David,
has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim
of ownership over the latter’s interest in Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby
prevented the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said company – was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot
take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising
complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice
since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly
violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice,40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only improper but also erroneous,
respondent equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same
regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him – in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide
her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests – thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.

With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely abandoned complainant
during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this notwithstanding petitioner’s efforts to reach him as well
as his receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without
prodding from the client or the court.41 Hence, considering respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client
totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.

In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite due notice.1âwphi1 This
demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs,
is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges leveled against him.42 In fine, respondent should be held
administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent.

Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those committed
by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,43 a lawyer who neglected
his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend
the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares, 44 the Court meted a similar penalty
against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the money
and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for
information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 45 a
lawyer who neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s money and to return the
documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and
failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law
for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she
was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not
for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the proceedings, complainant
would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice
caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.

In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee received
by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s
administrative and not his civil liability,46 it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee in
this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondent’s receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee from
complainant remains undisputed,47 the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.

WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the ₱150,000.00
acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with
the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED

A.C. No. 5303 HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A.
JALANDONI, Complainant, -versus-

ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent. Promulgated: June 15, 2006

x----------------------------------------x

Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7,
2000.[2] On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially
interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:

1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;

2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.

In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated. [3] On
February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:

(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dismissing the case against respondent for lack of merit; and

(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent. [4]

No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records. The Court is
now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.

The complaint read:

AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

- II -

That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental Chapter. That sometime on September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued
before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal
services of herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot
A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A.
Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence
delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The
latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters
affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all
transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel.

- III -

That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented
Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally resting his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without due
notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing
on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was
furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to
(sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved
adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent
caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly
[suffered] unexpected defeat.

- IV -

That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained
counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be
the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G.
Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other
directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in
accordance with her wishes, with the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the
incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent further stated that he cannot
refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot
A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J.
Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21)
days prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his
appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date
he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case
filed by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already appeared for and
in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.
in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an
equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding
the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients
at the same time. The corporations complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J.
Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin. Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of
desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored
our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases
filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City
(PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-
2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315
under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena).

AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

-I-

xxx xxx xxx

There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts
and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and information
was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent and his clients. Using the said classified information
which should have been closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and
confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against
his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of
Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the
assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of
quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a
position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra
Hotel.

- II -

Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the
Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands
from [his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the
marked exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel by the
court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or
simultaneous to the turnover of said documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency of
the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was duly received by respondents
office on the same date. Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni
eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].

Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which
extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy
Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family
circle. During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case
file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona,
counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy
to] as counsel of said client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and
including the entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally
witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the hearing. However, the particular
portion showing the said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the
transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel
of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such
proceedings. Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which [transpired] on
said pre-trial.[5] (emphasis ours)

In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the
Rules of Court ― perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected
the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6]

In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000
because, in his verification, Lim stated:

3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same
are all true and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours)

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified
or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-
2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)

While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8] the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. [9] We find
that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.

In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:

[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/is NOT duly
authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was
Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto
C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney
allegedly granted to him by the complainants.[10]

To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his
defense:

FACTS OF THE CASE

xxx xxx xxx

That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and
Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.

That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost
ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs.
Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the
effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.

That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the sisters.

That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses
to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against them.

II.

That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer
With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.

That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest on public documents (the various titles issued
to the land in question because of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual occupation
and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant
for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is
based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly
entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all
transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever transactions the corporation may have been
involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.

There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were]
discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that the
whole world knows about them.

That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in]
the entire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April
26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for
[the] entire proceedings of the case?

Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw
was APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility of a conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx. [11]

Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil case. He insisted that it took
him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of the case to Lim. [12] While he admitted an oversight in
addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel
Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to
withdraw[13] since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually
belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was
already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date. [14] In fact, respondent contended, it was he
who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]

As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:

That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr.
conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et
al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so now. [He]
cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]

In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:

the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni
family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints
and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members. [17]

On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and recommendation:

xxx xxx xxx

After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a
case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties
were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after
respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.

Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon
Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative
complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys].

From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the
latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative.

We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and trust
between complainants and respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases.

Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client Jalandoni
of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility.

As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved
to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.[19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002
but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to this
Court.[20]

Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.

Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to
Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.[21] Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:

[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved
party to any third person unless expressly authorized by law.

We must note, however, the following:

SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.[22] (emphasis ours)

Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private
vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file
a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.[23] Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:

SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect
has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the
circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)

Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in form and substance, and that
entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the
onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]

The core issues before us now are:

1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and

2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and
deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we
must look into the cases involved.

In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was a case for the
recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.

In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and
the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks
issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ
Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against
PRC for an unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:

11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos.
0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of
any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis
Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks (as evidenced
by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and
cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB.[28]

Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:

There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw,
Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo
S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-
I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]

Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against
PRCs interests.

And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of
respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel.[30]

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the
dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client;
otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. [31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this
manner:

There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[32] (emphasis ours)

The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[33]

Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are
present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the
adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or
indirectly, to the present controversy.[34] (emphasis ours)

The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved
the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some
of the cases mentioned.

An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he
cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to,
or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is
very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35] (emphasis
ours)

The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a
full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. [36]

Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members [37] was improper because the
written consent of all concerned was still required.[38] A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any
of the parties to it.[39]

WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865

The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case
No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim,
against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was
he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case
with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.

The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:

The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of
circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer.The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails
certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer.[40]

Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient
cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:

Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice
and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. [41] A lawyer
who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. [42] He
must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing,
otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43]Respondent made no such move. He admitted that
he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The
conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court,
supposedly in his place.

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then
enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter
retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be
dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel.[45] Mrs.
Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw
as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support
in the records of this case.

Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel[46] would be granted by the court. Yet, he
stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was
shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting
his motion:

When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor
Villarosa has already withdrawn his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears
the conformity of the defendants.[47] (emphasis ours)

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas professional engagement on her behalf despite respondents withdrawal
did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests
already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of
a conflict of interest.[48]

Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000 from
petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain
possession of a clients documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his
professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49]

Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax certificate number in his complaint
for disbarment against respondent.[50] This is not, however, the forum to discuss this lapse.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon
15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.