CASE Nerwin v PNOC Author

G.R No. 167057 Notes

Topic Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws
Facts In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ( NEA ) published an invitation to pre-qualify
and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty
thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the
countryâs Rural Electrification Project. · Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids
where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/componentsof the
contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondent s [Nerwin s] manufacturing
plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and
deliver NEA s requirements. · Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-
ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil CaseNo. 03106921
entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon,
as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to
subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

· Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no
cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs,
contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no
authority to sign and file the complaint.

· . Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-
GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing
the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in
default; and in disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them.
Issues Issues/s Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting
the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme
Court, on government projects.
Held The petition fails. In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003,and why it altogether
dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
Ratio Ruling: 1. a. It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respond Judge s
issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter. b. Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in entertaining an application for /preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a
preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW
Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus,
already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 292.
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which underscored the
prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court,
2003.

Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws (shall or shall not, must
or must not, may or may not) shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
  Kinds of mandatory legislation a. Positive- something must be done. b. Negative/ Prohibitory-
something should not be done.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
A preliminary injunction, in equity, is an injunction entered by a court prior to a final determination of
the merits of a legal case, in order to restrain a party from going ahead with a course of conduct or
compelling a party to continue with a course of conduct until the case has been decided.
CASE DM Consunji v CA Author
G.R No. 137873 Notes
Topic Waiver of Rights
Facts FACTS:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to
his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he wasthen on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the company
anymore an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Labor Code. After trial, the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC in toto.
Issues Whether the waiver accomplished by the private respondent, (Maria), is valid?
Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the Civil Code after
recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code.
Held The Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Ratio The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the Worker’s
Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In the case at bar, the CA ruled that
the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of
her rights and courses of action. When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between
inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected
remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature,
the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to
prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party
between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. However, waiver requires a knowledge of the
facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and
intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make
an intelligent decision. In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her
election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner-
 company. Petitioner’s argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that “Ignorance of the law excuses no
one” cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.

Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

CASE Villareal v People Author

G.R No. 151258 Notes
Topic Waiver of Rights
Facts
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition
raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R.
No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of
Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus
asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of
the accused.
Issues [1] G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: Did the death of Villareal extinguish his criminal liability?
Held In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently,
his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
Ratio According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term "pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers
to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability
ex delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death
of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.

Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion
CASE Dizon v People Author
G.R No. 155101 Notes
Topic Waiver of Rights
Facts
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.

Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the
proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as
a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify
until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates
constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to
present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in
clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained
the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due
process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the
other accused.
Issues [1] G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: Was Dizon deprived of due process?
Held In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently,
his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
 Ratio

Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Kida v Senate Author

G.R No. 196271 Notes
Topic Repeal of Laws
Facts Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with
the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Issues Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
Whether or not RA 10153 is constitutional.
Held [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1.
Ratio YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections, including the ARMM elections.
 Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked.
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42
of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.
Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall
remain valid.

CASE Virtucio v Alegarbes Author

G.R No. 187451 Notes
Topic Judicial Decisions
Facts Respondent Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land
situated in Basilan. His application was approved however years after, the land was subdivided into
three (3) lots – Lots No. 138, 139, and 140, Pls - 19 as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot
139 was allocated to Custodio, while Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio. Alegarbes
opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved
application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio
that he is in possession of Lot 140. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that
Alegarbes is in possession of Lot 140. Thus, Virtucio sought to reverse the ruling of CA on the ground
that The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in CA-GR CV-26286 for Recovery
of Possession and Ownership, Custodio vs Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances as in
this case and ruled against Jose Alegarbes.
Issues: Won the decision in Custodio vs Alegarbes should apply as stare decisis to the present case.
Held: No
Ratio: It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio
and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said
favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. Moreover, it
is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. “The principle of stare decisis
enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further and closed for further argument.
 Case Law/Doctrine Only final decisions of this court are considered precedents.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Republic v Remman Enterprises Author

G.R No. 199319 Notes
Topic Judicial Decisions
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines. (n)
CASE People v Ritter Author
G.R No. Notes
Topic Duty to Render Judgment
Facts Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involvinga young girl of
about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because aforeign object left
inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty".Thereafter, the case was
set for trial on the merits. The trial court rendered a decision convictingthe appellant of such crime.
Issues Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court?
Held The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
Ratio nasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of convictiononly if the
guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exertthe most
painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy
judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act. Before theconviction is
affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbanovs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: “xxx The rule is that the death of thevictim must be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him bythe accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accusedcaused the victim's death must convince
a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. xxx”We cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The protections of theBill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if
not more so, for the perverts andoutcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding
people. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or
conviction that the accused didcommit the offense has not been satisfied. The established facts do
not entirely rule out thepossibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside
Rosario's vagina. Thisobject may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the
guilty person.However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities.
Suspicionsand possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the
accused.(People v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals,
goodcustoms, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has
abusedFilipino children, enticing them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws
whichwilladequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps,
their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on
statutoryrape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of
pedophilestaking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. We
have toacquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express
theCourt's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against
them.Something must be done about it.
Case Law/Doctrine RPC Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
legislation.

Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Alonzo v Padua Author

G.R No. Notes
Topic Duty to Render Judgment
Facts Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso(undivided) shares a parcel of land
registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds
of Tarlac. On March 15, 1963, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share by way of absolute
sale amounting to P550.00 to the couple Carlos and Casimira Alonzo (collectively will be called
Alonzos). A year later on April 22, 1964, Eustaqia Padua, one of the siblings, also sold her shares to the
Alonzos for the amount of P440.00. The Alonzos occupied an area two-fifths of the lot representing
the area that was sold to them. They enclosed the area with a fence and in 1975 allowed their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife to build a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. On
February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed as he was found to be an American Citizen. However his sister, Tecla Padua
also made the same complaint a year later on May 27,1977. The trial court also dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that the right to redemption had lapsed, not having been exercised within
thirty days from notice of the sales in 1964. Although no written notice was made, they ruled that
actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs is sufficient. It was not possible for the Paduas not to
notice the fence and semi-concrete house, also they were friends and neighbors. The respondent
court however declared that only a written notice would satisfy the requirement and upon the
issuance of this notice, the thirty day redemption period start running. But the court
cannot ignore the established facts, they cannot accept the respondents’ pretense that they are
unaware of the sales made by their siblings. Sometime between the sale and the first complaint, the
other co-heirs were informed of the sale therefore the thirty day period started and expired even
before Tecla Padua made her complaint
Issues Whether or not the Court should render a ruling in strict accordance to the written law or to
the spirit and intent of the lawmakers in enacting the law?
Held The petition is granted in favor of the Alonzos. The decision of the respondent court is reversed
and the trial court is reinstated.
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion
 CASE Barcellano v Barza Author
G.R No. Notes
Topic Duty to Render Judgment
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

NCC ARTICLE 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
NCC ARTICLE 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)
RPC Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

CASE Martinez v Van Buskirk Author

G.R No. Notes
Topic Presumption and Applicability of Custom
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Internal Revenue v Primetown Author

G.R No. 162155 Notes
Topic Legal Periods
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Montajes v People Author

G.R No. 183449 Notes
Topic Legal Periods
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE ATCI Overseas Corp v Echin Author

G.R No. 178551 Notes
Topic Binding Effect
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion
CASE Tuna Processing Inc v Phil Kingford Author
G.R No. 185582 Notes
Topic Binding Effect
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Amos v Bellis Author

G.R No. Notes
Topic Binding Effect
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Raytheon v Rouzie Author

 G.R No. 162894 Notes
Topic Binding Effect
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion

CASE Tamano v Ortiz Author

G.R No. 126603 Notes
Topic Binding Effect
Facts
Issues
Held
Ratio
Case Law/Doctrine
Dissenting/Concurring Opinion
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