Adam Brewer

PHIL 391
3 February 2005

Reversal in Protagoras: Argument or Αρετή?

In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras the two chief interlocutors – Socrates and Protagoras – are each

of differing opinions as to whether or not αρετή1 can be taught: Socrates asserts that it cannot, while

Protagoras claims that it can. By the end of the dialogue it appears that they have both reversed their

positions and are arguing for the opposite side. This reversal seems odd as they both held their original

convictions so strongly. Upon closer examination one can see that the reversal is not in fact a change in

their positions, but a semantic change in the use of the word αρετή and assumptions made by Socrates.

In response to Protagoras’ claims of what he will teach young Hippocrates, Socrates claims that,

“…I have never thought that [good citizenship] can be taught.”2 He immediately follows this claim with

the exemplum of the common citizen, regardless of his technical expertise or training (i.e. his

knowledge), giving advice to the city council. This, he claims, is because all men are good citizens by

nature; they require no training in the matter. If this were not the case then the council would ridicule the

common citizen and want proof of his particular expertise in the matter, by none is requested, and so it is

assumed that everyone is already a good citizen. Socrates then moves his argument into the private

realm stating that, “…the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others αρετην that they

possess.”3 Then he cites the sons of Pericles as exempla of how people are left to their own devices to

become virtuous and cannot be taught it. He then restates his original assertion that, “…I just don’t think

that αρετή can be taught.”4 In using αρετή here in lieu of good citizenship Socrates identifies his initial

definition of αρετή as something which is not knowledge and, therefore, not teachable.

1
This is most often translated as, “virtue, excellence, or goodness,” but for the sake of consistency I will use the original,
more inclusive, αρετή. The words αρετήν and αρετην will also be used and are simply different declensions of the same word
carrying the same meaning in all cases.
2
Plato. Protagoras. 319.b
3
Ibid. 319.e. It is interesting to note here that Socrates has just moved from good citizenship to αρετή. Whether or not this is
a justified move is immaterial for the purposes of this argument; what is important is that he considers the two to be self-
same.
4
Ibid. 320.b
1
 Adam Brewer
PHIL 391
3 February 2005

Protagoras posits a two-fold theory concerning αρετή.5 The first point comes just before

Socrates’ initial thoughts on the matter, where Protagoras claims that “…if you study with me: The very

day you start, you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day,

day after day, you will get better and be better.”6 This is immediately followed by the further assertion

that he will also teach “...sound deliberation, both in domestic matters – how best to manage one’s

household, and in public affairs – how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in political debate

and action.”7 So this first claim (a) of Protagoras’ can be summed up as follows: “it is possible to teach

someone how to be a good man, in a broad sense of ‘teach’ which includes conditioning in social mores

as well as instruction in specific techniques such as rhetoric.”8 This claim is further supported in his

“great speech”9 where he argues that the structure of societal justice/punishment is proof that every

citizen needs to be taught αρετή.

Protagoras’ second claim (b) is that the parts of αρετή are distinct from one another. His choice

of Socrates’ face analogy as opposed to the gold analogy10 illustrates Protagoras’ claim of the

distinctness of the constituent parts of αρετή. In spite of Socrates’ numerous attempts throughout the

dialogue to show the different parts as identical11 Protagoras never actually endorses that position, he

only admits that they resemble one another, as everything resembles everything else in some way,12 but

he holds that they are still different entities.

C.C.W. Taylor13 states that Protagoras must deny that every kind of virtuous conduct arises from

the application of a single universal knowledge – as Socrates attempts to prove with his identities – in
5
Taylor, C.C.W. Plato Protagoras. 214. Taylor comments on how the apparent reversal is untrue as Protagoras remains
consistent with his two claims throughout the dialogue.
6
Plato. Protagoras. 318.a-b
7
Ibid. 319.a
8
Taylor. p. 214, n. on 361b7-c2.
9
Plato. Protagoras. 319.a-328.d
10
Ibid. 329.d-e
11
For exegesis on why Socrates’ arguments of identity fail see Devereux, Daniel T. “The Unity of Virtue in Plato’s
Protagoras and Laches,” The Philosophical Review 101:4 765-789. esp. pp. 769-770.
12
Plato. Protagoras. 331.d-e
13
See n. 8, p. 1 above.
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 Adam Brewer
PHIL 391
3 February 2005

order to uphold (b). Taylor goes on to argue that by doing this Protagoras is not committed to

abandoning (a); “for he can still maintain that, in his broad sense of ‘teach’, it is possible to teach

someone to be a good man, even though it is not the case that good action invariably springs from the

application of some knowledge describable as ‘knowledge of how to be a good man’.”14 By continuing

to hold contention (a) Protagoras is still free to account for natural abilities of the individual that he

argued for in the second half15 of his “great speech.” An adapted form of Taylor’s example can be used

to illustrate how (a) and (b) can co-exist. One can be taught how to be a good Baseball player by giving

them a general instruction in the fundamentals of the game as well as in individual techniques in batting,

pitching, and fielding, but none of those fundamentals or techniques arise from a solitary knowledge or

science of ‘how to be a good Baseball player.’ So we see that Protagoras is able to remain consistent in

his claims and, in fact, does not ever actually deviate from them.

By the end of the dialogue Socrates seems to be arguing for the opposite position from where he

started. He develops the definition of αρετή throughout the latter portion of the dialogue to be very

different from his original meaning. In his final argument of the measurement of pleasures and pains

Socrates posits that αρετή (leading to the preservation of our lives) relies on our good choices regarding

pleasures and pains. He then states that pleasures and pain are measurable and are, therefore, a type of

knowledge.16 The conclusion then follows that αρετή is knowledge and, as such, is ultimately teachable.

So it would seem that the argument has been reversed. However, the argument here seems to be that

something we can have knowledge of is teachable and something which we can not know is not

teachable. Socrates remains consistent with this throughout the dialogue. It is only because of his change

in the definition of αρετή that he has been forced into an opposing position to his original claim that

14
Ibid.
15
Plato. Protagoras. 327.a-328.d
16
Ibid. 357.b
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PHIL 391
3 February 2005

αρετή is not teachable. Aρετή went from something which is not known to something which is known,

so the reversal is due to a semantic distinction, not a change in argumentation.

Socrates obviously fails to realize the distinction he has made in the dialogue between αρετή as

unknown and αρετή as knowledge. Because he failed to see this, he believes, by the close of the

dialogue,17 that he and Protagoras have changed their arguments to opposite sides of the issue. This is a

fallacious belief as Protagoras has remained consistent in his two claims – (a) and (b) – and Socrates has

not wavered from his argument that only that which can be known is teachable. The reversal that

Socrates sees are in fact caused by his changed definition of αρετή and his assumption that Protagoras

agreed with Socrates’ earlier identity arguments when in fact Protagoras was remained opposed to them

and upheld his original claims.

17
Ibid. 361.a-d
4