UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.
Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Aquino vs.Mun. Of Malay, Aklan
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
By: Aguilando, M.L
Bar Question:
A applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay. The application was denied since
the proposed construction site is within the “no build
zone.” A notice of assessment was sent to A asking for
settlement of unpaid taxes and other liabilities and if
not complied with, the business of A will be closed. The
municipal treasurer refused to accept the payment. A
then continued its construction and operation of the
hotel. A cease and desist order was issued by the
municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort. Then, the Mayor of Malay issued an EO 10
ordering the closure and demolition of the resort. The
EO was partially implemented. Hence, A filed a Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief before the
CA assailing the executive order issued. The CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that a petition for
certiorari is not a proper remedy but a petition for
declaratory relief.
Is the Court of Appeals correct?
Suggested Answer:
No, the Court of Appeals is not correct.
It is settled in the jurisprudence that an action for
declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no
actual breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it
refers.
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief became
unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
implementation. The closure and demolition of the
hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may
be issued by the trial court for carrying out the
directives in the challenged EO 10.
Thus, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief
is the proper remedy given such a situation.
Topic: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Social Justice Society vs. Lim
742 SCRA 1 November 25, 2014
By: Ambrosio, S.
Bar Question:
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8027 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta.
Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to
Commercial I. An action for mandamus was filed to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027. The Court granted the
petition for mandamus, and directed Mayor A to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. The oil
companies filed an action for the annulment of
Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction. Writs were issued in their favor.
Mayor A approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and providing
for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto. The oil companies and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DOE, filed their motions
for leave to intervene and for reconsideration. The
Court ruled on the constitutionality and validity of the
assailed Ordinance.
During the incumbency of former Mayor L, who
succeeded, Mayor A, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
enacted Ordinance No. 8187 where the Industrial Zone
under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light
Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the
list a Medium Industrial Zone and a Heavy Industrial
Zone, where petroleum refineries and oil depots are
now among those expressly allowed. Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction against
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 was filed by
former Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and then Mayor A, together with
other residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila
alleging violation of the right to health of the people
and the right to a healthful and balanced environment
under Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Is the
remedy under Rule 65 proper?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, it was a proper remedy.
Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for
certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this
Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. The court initially found convincing the
argument that the petitions should have been filed with
the Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In this case, the petitions should have been filed with
the Regional Trial Court, but the court have, time and
again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for
prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching
implications and transcendental issues that need to be
resolved,as in these present petitions.
Hence, the remedy is proper.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Declaratory Relief
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V. PEZA
742 SCRA 524
By: Arrabis, C.
Bar Question:
PEZA was created by virtue RA No. 7916 or ‘Special
Economic Zone act of 2005’ to operate, administer,
manage and develop economic zones in the country.
The PEZA was granted the power to register, regulate,
and supervise the enterprises located in the economic
zones. By virtue of the law, the export processing zone
in Mariveles, Bataan became the Bataan Economic
Zone16 and the Mactan Export Processing Zone the
Mactan Economic Zone.
Thereafter, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of
the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA payment in
real property taxes on the PEZA’s properties located in
the Mactan Economic Zone.. It cited Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that
withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously
granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City
pointed out that no provision in the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from
payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of
Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for
EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly
exempted the PEZA from payment of real property
taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA.
PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
of Pasay City. Trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief and declared it exempt from payment
of real property taxes that PEZA remained tax-exempt
regardless of Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995. It ruled that Section 24, which taxes real
property owned by developers of economic zones, only
applies to private developers of economic zones, not to
public developers like the PEZA. The PEZA, therefore, is
not liable for real property taxes on the land it owns.
Is PEZA correct by availing the petition for declaratory
relief ?
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Suggested Answer:
No, PEZA is incorrect in availing declaratory relief, it
should be injunction.
Injunction “is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
certain act.” “It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as incident in the main
action.” The essential requisites of a writ of injunction
are: “(1) there must be a right in esse or the existence
of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which
the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of
such right.”1
In this case, PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already
issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-
exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition
for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The
trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the
petition for declaratory relief.
Instead of a petition for declaratory relief, the PEZA
should have directly resorted to a judicial action. The
PEZA should have filed a complaint for injunction, the
“appropriate ordinary civil action” to enjoin the City
from enforcing its demand and collecting the assessed
taxes from the PEZA. After all, a declaratory judgment
as to the PEZA’s tax-exempt status is useless unless the
City is enjoined from enforcing its demand.
The City confused the concepts of jurisdiction and
venue in contending that the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay had no jurisdiction because the real properties
involved in this case are located in the City of Lapu-
Lapu.
Therefore, the filing of declaratory relief is incorrect.
Topic: Certiorari in relation to Rule 64
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
GR 178831-32, April 1, 2009
By: Bautista, S
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Bar Question:
On March 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the House of
Representatives. Contending that she is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen, two separate disqualification cases
were filed against her before the COMELEC.
Subsequently, Limkaichong emerged winner in the
elections.
On May 17, 2007, the COMELEC granted the petitions in
the disqualification cases and directed Provincial Board
of Canvassers (PBOC) to strike her name from the list of
eligible candidates. Aggrieved, Limkaichong filed a
Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC.
Subsequently, COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the latter.
On August 1, 2007, she filed with the Supreme Court
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64 praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007
Joint Resolution of the COMELEC the June 29, 2007
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the
disqualification cases for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64 was proper.
Suggested Answer:
No, the certiorari was not properly filed.
Section 1 of Rule 64 provides that the rule shall govern
the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
In the case at bar, the May 17, 2007 resolution of the
COMELEC disqualifying Limkaichong and suspending her
proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering
that she timely filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus,
pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint
Resolution has not yet attained finality for it to be
implemented.
Therefore, having no finality yet of the judgment, Rule
65 in relation to Rule 64 cannot be properly assailed in
this case.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Review of Judgments of COMELEC and COA
TESDA vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 196418. February 10, 2015
By: Brigoli, C.
Bar Question:
X authorized the payment of healthcare maintenance
allowance to all its officials and employees, including its
bureaus and attached agencies. Y is an attached agency.
COA issued a Notice of Disallowance to Y for the lack of
legal basis of the grant of allowance.
Y argued that there was legal basis as it was pusuant to
DOLE directive which was based from M.C. No. 33 and
2003 GAA.
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Notice of Disallowance.
Suggested Answer:
No there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COA.
COA has the power to ascertain whether public funds
were utilized for the purpose intended by law.
In the case at bar, the cited bases were misplaced. The
giving of allowance to Y's employees was not among
any of the hospitalization services or examinations
listed in M.C. No. 33. 2003 GAA only reiterated the rule
that the personnel benefits costs of government
officials and employees should be charged against the
funds from which their compensations are paid. This
was neither a source of right nor an authority to hastily
fund any or all personnel benefits without the
appropriation being made by law. No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
There being no legal basis, there can be no grave abuse
of discretion as COA is justified in issuing the Notice of
Disallowance.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Review of Judgments of Comelec and COA
CAUSING VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 199139, September 09, 2014
By: Bulanon, J.
Bar Question:
Mayor B issued a memorandum ordering the detail of
EC, the Municipal Civil Registrar, be transferred to the
Mayor's office. EC filed a complaint claiming that the
memorandum issued being within the election period
and without prior authority from the COMELEC was
illegal. The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended
the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings
and recommendation. Hence, EC then filed certiorari
under Rule 64. Mayor B claimed that EC’s motion
should be dismissed because of the failure to file a
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC.
Is Mayor B correct?
Suggested Answer:
Yes Mayor B is correct.
Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule
65, except as to the period of the filing of the petition
for certiorari. It is a well-established rule is that the
motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is
intended to afford to the public respondent the
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal
and factual aspects of the case. However, this rule is not
absolute, considering that jurisprudence has laid down
exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition
for certiorari without first filing a motion for
reconsideration.
The case at bar shows that none of the exceptions was
applicable herein. Hence, EC should have filed the
motion for reconsideration, especially because there
was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
election offense cases.
Hence, EC’s petition should be dismissed.
Principle:
Filing a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before a party can resort to filing certiorari
under Rule 65, however with the following exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
Topic: Review of Judgments of COMELEC and COA
Emilio Ramon "E.R." Ejercito vs. Hon. Commission on
Elections and Edgar San Luis
G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014
By: Capao, H.
Bar Question:
Three days prior to the elections, A filed a
disqualification case for gubernatorial position against B
before the Office of the COMELEC alleging that B
committed election offenses, such as overspending and
vote-buying. The COMELEC First division granted the
petition for disqualification against B. Such decision was
agreed by the COMELEC en banc. A filed a petition for
certiorari against the COMELEC.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Was B correct in filing a petition for certiorari against
the COMELEC?
Suggested Answer:
No, A was not correct in filing a petition for certiorari
against the COMELEC.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is
available only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution
of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct
simple errors of judgment. More importantly, it will
only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
is actually proved to exist.
In the case at bar, A failed to prove that the COMELEC
rendered its decision with grave abuse of discretion.
The petition for disqualification against B for campaign
over-spending before the Commission is heard and
resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68
of the OEC. It is through this administrative proceeding
that this Commission, initially through its divisions,
makes a factual determination on the veracity of the
parties' respective allegations in a disqualification case.
Therefore, B was not correct in filing a petition for
certiorari against the COMELEC.
TOPIC: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITON AND MANDAMUS
Heirs of Julio Sobremonte vs. CA
G.R. No. 206234 October 22, 2014
By: Casanares, A.
Bar Question:
The heirs of X and Y co-owned a lot which was placed
under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
program pursuant to PD 27 on emancipation of tenants
and declaring ownership of land by tenants. During X’s
lifetime, she filed a protest before the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) alleging that no tenancy
relationship existed between her and the identified
farmer-beneficiaries of the property. DAR Secretary
affirmed MARO’s and DAR Regional Director’s decision
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
dismissing the complaint. X filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA which was dismissed by the
latter. X then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Should the action be granted?
Suggested Answer:
No, the action should not be granted.
A writ of certiorari maybe issued only for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as its
function is limited to keeping the inferior court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction."Grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, no abuse of discretion, grave or simple in
nature was committed by the CA in dismissing the
petitioners’ certiorari petition for being the wrong
mode of appeal. The CA’s dismissal of the certiorari
petition is, in fact, well-supported by law and
jurisprudence. It was held that Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court shall govern the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary,
and that an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the
CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.
The CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed resolutions. Hence, the action should
be dismissed.
Topic: CERTIORARI, PRHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA
G.R. No 166995, January 13, 2014
By: De las llagas, D.
Bar Question:
Y works as an accountant of Company ABC while X in
the president and general manager. Through
investigations conducted, Y was found by X encashing
checks changing the amount stated therein and
converting it to her own personal use and benefit.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Respondent Y was charged for the crime of qualified
theft thru falsification of commercial document. The
trial court found Y guilty of the crime with the evidence
presented that constituted proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Y appealed to the CA in which reversed the
decision of the lower court acquitting her of the crime
charged. Hence, petitioner filed with the SC a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Is the action for certiorari proper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 filed by X is
not proper.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45, a party aggrieved by the
decision of final order of the CA, Sandiganbyaan, RTC or
other courts may file a petition for review on certiorari
with the SC. But this must be read in relation to Section
1 of Rule 122 which provides that any party may appeal
from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will
thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment
that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged
in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and
not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from
appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for
review.
In the case at hand, the petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In applying the principles stated, since the case is one of
acquittal, X is barred from appealing such judgment of
acquittal by a petition for review. This is because for
Rule 45 to apply it must only be upon a judgment
convicting the accused. Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The
rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final
and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and
that accordingly, the State may not seek its review
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or
on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from
appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But a
judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
However, in such case, the People is burdened to
establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, trial court, or CA acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 filed
by X is not proper.
TOPIC: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
INC SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC VS MORADAS
713 SCRA 475
By: Dimol, C.
Bar Question:
Mr. X was employed as a wiper for the vessel owned by
Y Company.
Mr. X met an accident while working in the vessel.
Certain chemicals splashed all over his body because
the vessel’s incinerator exploded and suffered deep
burns because of the explosion. The burns suffered
rendered him permanently incapable as a seaman. So,
Mr. X filed a labor complaint demanding payment of his
full disability benefits under the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) and Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) to Y Company. Y Company refused
to heed because the injuries suffered were self-inflicted
hence not compensable under the POEA-SEC.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Y Company. The
NLRC sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. It gave
due credence to the evidence presented absent any
showing that Y Company was motivated by ill-will. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the NRLC holding grave abuse of discretion.
Was there grave abuse of discretion?
Suggested Answer:
No, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Based on jurisprudence, it is well-settled that an act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, having established through substantial
evidence that Mr. X’s injury was self-inflicted and,
hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20 (D) of
the 1996 POEA-SEC. No grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed against the NLRC in upholding LA’s decision to
dismiss his complaint for disability benefits.
Principle:
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a
court or tribunal was done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment asis equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Topic: Certiorari
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar
714 SCRA 514
By: Fabe, J.
Bar Question:
X filed a complaint for collection of sum of money for
the unpaid water bills against Y under Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC. In his defense,
Y contended that he religiously paid X the agreed
monthly flat rate for her water consumption. MTCC
ruled in favor of Y prompting X to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC which was
dismissed by the latter finding that the said petition was
only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of
small claims cases. X then filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC.
Should the action be granted?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the action should be granted.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
The Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is always available where there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Considering the final
nature of a small claims case decision under the above-
stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and
the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in
small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy does not preclude the
aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, X correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in
the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s
ruling. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent
upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors
tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could
either grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused
its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the
controversy. Likewise, X filed the petition before the
proper forum.
In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on
the ground that it was an improper remedy. Hence, the
action should be granted.
Topic: Certiorari
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
722 SCRA 211 - April 21, 2014
By: Gala, L.
Bar Question:
X, through the PCGG, commenced a complaint for
"reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against Y. Pre-trial commenced and the
temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to "LLL" of X,
together with their sub-markings, were adopted.
However, over the objections of Y, the PCGG produced
and caused the pre-marking of additional documents,
Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA." Y filed a "Motion under
Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming that the
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
additional documents were never produced at the
discovery proceedings and praying that X be sanctioned
for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied, but later
granted the motion.
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of
discretion in excluding the documents due to
petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-
trial?
Suggested Answer:
No, the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion
over evidence formally offered by the prosecution.
Nothing therein shows that the court gravely exceeded
its jurisdiction. For the reviewing court to interfere with
the exercise of discretion by the lower court, the
petitioner must show that the former's action was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual
refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in
contemplation of the law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of this power
is neither whimsical nor oppressive. A writ of certiorari
is available only to review final judgments or decrees,
and will be refused where there has been no final
judgment or order and the proceeding for which the
writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the
lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held
that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery
orders made prior to trial. After failing to submit the
documentary evidence during discovery, when it was
clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also repeatedly
failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of
the documents. Having failed in its belated attempts to
assuage the Sandiganbayan through the submission of
secondary evidence, petitioner may not use the present
forum to gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in excluding the documents due to
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-
trial.
Topic: Certiorari
Bank Of Commerce Vs Radio Philippines Network Inc.
G.R. NO. 195615 APRIL 21, 2014
By: Gimang, M.
Bar Question:
BC Bank entered into a Purchase & Assumption
Agreement with TR Bank and acquired its specific assets
and liabilities, excluding liabilities arising from judicial
actions which were to be covered by the BSP mandated
escrow of 50 million pesos. To comply with the
mandate, TR Bank placed the specified amount to MT
Bank to answer for those claims and liabilities that were
excluded.
Shortly after approval, acting in TR Bank vs RP Network
case, the court ordered TR Bank to pay RP Network
actual damages plus 12 % legal interest and some
amounts. RP Network, rather than pursuing a levy on
execution filed a supplemental motion for execution
based on the assumption that TR Bank had been
merged to BC Bank.
Having learned such, BC Bank filed an opposition
thereto questioning the jurisdiction and denying the
merger of the TR Bank and BC Bank. RTC issued and
order granting and issuing the writ of execution to cover
all the assets including those subject to the P & A
Agreement. This prompted BC Bank to file for petition
for certiorari in CA. CA, however, modified only the
lower court’s decision.
Did the CA gravely erred in holding that BC Bank had no
valid excuse in failing to file the required motion for
reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order before
coming to the CA via petition for certiorari.
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that that BC
Bank had no valid excuse in failing to file the required
motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order
before coming to the CA.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that a petition
for certiorari may only be filed when there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Since a motion for reconsideration is generally regarded
as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the failure to
first take recourse to is usually regarded as fatal
omission. However, there are some recognize
exceptions to the rule: a) there was an urgent necessity
for the CS to resolve the questions it raised and further
delay would prejudice its interest; b) under
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would have
been useless; c) petitioner would have been deprived of
its right to due process when the RTC issued the
challenge order ex parte, depriving an opportunity to
object; and d) the issues raised were purely questions of
law.
In this case, BC Bank fell the recognized exceptions to
the need to file a motion for reconsideration before
filing a petition for certiorari. First, the filing of a motion
for reconsideration would be redundant since actually
the RTC’s Order granted the application for the issuance
of the alias writ of execution. Second, an urgent
necessity for the immediate resolution of the case by
the CA existed because any further delay would have
greatly prejudiced BC Bank. The Sheriff had been
resolute and relentless in trying to execute the
judgment and dispose of the levied assets of BC Bank.
Clearly, BC Bank has valid justifications for skipping the
technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
Topic: Certiorari; Perfection of an appeal
Sarah Lee Philippines, Inc. vs. Emilinda Macatlang et al
G.R. No. 180147. June 4, 2014
By: Icao, G.
Bar Question:
A Notice of Permanent Closure filed by Aris with the
DOLE stating that it will permanently cease its
operations. The Union, which represents the rank-and-
file employees of Aris, staged a strike for violation of
duty to bargain collectively, 7 union busting and illegal
closure. A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed,
incorporating FAPI. The Labor Arbiter rendered
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
judgment dismissing the 5,984 complainants as illegal
and awarding them separation pay and other monetary
benefits amount to P3.4 billion. The Corporations filed a
Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond
and to Admit Reduced Amount with NLRC. They asked
NLRC to reduce the appeal bond claiming that it would
be impossible for the insurance to cover the appeal
bond. NLRC granted the reduction of the bond.
Macatlang, et al., filed a petition for certiorari before CA
claiming that it committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the appeal despite the gross
insufficiency of the cash bond. While the case was
pending, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the labor
arbiter and remanding the case for further proceeding.
As a result, the Corporations filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for certiorari for being moot and academic.
Court of Appeals subsequently reverse and set aside the
decision of the NLRC and deemed it reasonable to order
the posting of an additional appeal bond.
Did the subsequent NLRC ruling on the merits during
the pendency of the petition questioning an
interlocutory order renders the petition moot and
academic?
Suggested Answer:
No. The requisites for perfection of appeal as embodied
in Article 223 of the Labor Code are: 1) payment of
appeal fees; 2) filing of the memorandum of appeal;
and 3) payment of the required cash or surety bond.
These requisites must be satisfied within 10 days from
receipt of the decision or order appealed from. NLRC
Rules and Procedure allow the filing of a motion to
reduce bond on two (2) conditions: (1) that there is
meritorious ground and (2) a bond in a reasonable
amount is posted. Compliance with the two conditions
stops the running of the period to perfect an appeal
provided that they are complied within the 10-day
reglementary period.
In this case, when the NLRC granted the motion to
reduce the appeal bond and the Corporations posted
the required additional bond, the appeal was deemed
to have been perfected. The act of the NLRC in deciding
the case was based on petitioner’s appeal of the labor
arbiter's ruling, which it deemed to have been perfected
and therefore, ripe for decision. Prudence however
dictates that the NLRC should not have decided the case
on its merits during the pendency of the instant
petition. The very issue raised in the petitions
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
determines whether or not the appeal by the
Corporations has been perfected. Until its resolution,
the NLRC should have held in abeyance the resolution
of the case to prevent the case from being mooted. The
NLRC decision was issued prematurely.
Topic: Certiorari
Madarang vs Morales
GR No. 199283, June 9, 2014
By: Lacida, N.
Bar Question:
On September 24, 2010, D filed a petition for relief from
judgment rendered by the trial court on January 29,
2010, blaming old lawyer who failed to file the notice of
appeal within the reglementary period. The trial court
denied the petition for it was filed beyond 60 days from
the finality of the trial court’s decision.
On July 13, 2011, D filed the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
outright the petition for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
relief from judgment. D filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the petition
before the court arguing they need not file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their petition for
relief from judgment because the questions they raised
were purely questions of law.
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright
petitioner’s petition for certiorari for failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
petition for relief from judgment.
Suggested Answer:
No.Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
available to a party before a petition for certiorari is
filed.
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment is the
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
this remedy. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari.
PRINCIPLE: A motion for reconsideration is required
before a petition for certiorari is filed “to grant the
court which rendered the assailed judgment or order an
opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.
Topic: Certiorari
Dr. Joel Mendez vs People of the Philippines
GR NO. 179962 June 11, 2014
By: Licayan, A.
Bar Question:
BIR filed information with CTA. BIR alleged that A failed
to file his income tax returns for year 2001-3003. A
countered that his business was registered only in 2003.
BIR filed a motion to amend information. The CTA ruled
in favor of the BIR. A filed a motion for reconsideration
but CTA denied. A filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 questioning the denial of its
motion for reconsideration.
Is certiorari the proper remedy in questioning the CTA
resolution?
Suggested Answer:
Yes the certiorari is the correct remedy.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is
available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of
the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a
particular stage of the same action, in such case the
remedy available is appeal. If the order however merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more
to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is
interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s only remedy
after failing to obtain a reconsideration of the ruling is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
In this case, the CTA resolution allowed the amendment
of information by BIR. The resolution merely resolves
incidental matters. After failing in his bid for the CTA to
reconsider its admission of the amended information,
the only remedy left to A is to file a petition for
certiorari.
Topic: Certiorari
Trajano vs Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club
GR No. 190253, June 11, 2014,
By: Lim, N.
Bar Question:
R filed a complaint to get the refund of the total value
of misdelivered, unsalable, defective and/or damaged
goods, and to enjoin A and P from encashing the
remaining post-dated checks in their possession. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No 1, was raffled to
RTC Branch 1, which was presided by Judge M. The RTC
issued a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting A and
P from encashing the postdated checks. P moved to
reconsider the issuance of the writ for lack of factual
basis. The RTC issued an order sustaining the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction. A and P separately
moved for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mfor his
alleged bias towards R. Judge M recused himself from
the case, but R moved to reconsider his voluntary
inhibition. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to the RTC
Branch 2, which was presided by Judge E.
R contested the re-raffling of the case due to its
pending motion for reconsideration of Judge M’s
voluntary inhibition. Judge M denied R’s motion for
reconsideration and the records of the case were
subsequently transferred to Branch 3. P filed a petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA. In his petition, P sought to
dissolve the writ enjoining him from encashing the post-
dated checks. The CA dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction with respect to P for lack of factual basis. The
CA held that R failed to prove that it had a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected that warrants the
issuance of the writ. This decision eventually became
final and entry of judgment was made.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
R assailed Judge M’s inhibition from the case in a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123
before the CA. R argued that Judge M’s perceived bias
in its favor was unfounded, and that the preservation of
the parties’ trust and confidence was an insufficient
ground for Judge M’s inhibition. The RTC held that the
issue of whether Judge M should hear Civil Case No. 1
presented a jurisdictional question that prevented
Branch 3 from resolving P’s pending motions. Hence, P
filed a petition for certiorari assailing the orders of the
RTC before the CA. In a decision, the CA ruled that the
events that had transpired before Branch 1 of the RTC
provoked the parties’ suspicions that Judge M
prejudged the case, which warranted his
inhibition.41 The CA also denied R’s motion for
reconsideration,42 prompting R to elevate the case
before the Supreme Court in R vs A docketed as G.R.
No. 193972, before the Court’s First Division
Whether the petition availed of the proper remedy in
appealing the CA resolution.
Whether the CA erred in not finding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1.
Suggested Answer:
1. Yes, Trajano(P) properly availed of a Rule 45 petition
in assailing the January 3, 2008 decision and the
October 28, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court invokes the Court's appellate jurisdiction
over questions of law that has been decided by the
lower courts with finality. The CA decision assailed by
the present petition involves its final order regarding
the alleged grave abuse of discretion involved in the
RTC's interlocutory orders.This CA decision should not
be confused with the RTC's interlocutory orders that
had been disputed before the CA, which was correctly
contested by Trajano(P) through a petition
for certiorari. In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of
Appeals,[50] we stated that a petition for certiorari is an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1)
when the tribunal issued such order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
In the case at bar, Trajano(P) correctly filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA in order to strike down the
RTC's interlocutory orders that he claims to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the same vein,
Trajano's(P) present petition for review on certiorari is
also the proper remedy, as it questions the CA's final
order regarding the RTC's interlocutory orders.
Therefore, The petition is not procedurally infirm
because Trajano(P) properly availed of a Rule 45
petition
2. Yes, The RTC should continue with the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1 during the pendency of G.R. No. 193972
The mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower court does not automatically interrupt
the proceedings in the lower court. A petition
for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of
jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending
before them. A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal,
is an original action; it is not a continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct
only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the higher court should issue against the public
respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course
of the principal case.
In the case at bar, the appellate court erroneously
applied the principle of judicial courtesy in the current
case. There is no strong probability that the issue of the
propriety of Judge M's voluntary inhibition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 123 would be rendered moot and academic by the
continuation of the proceedings in the trial court.
Furthermore, whether Judge M properly inhibited
himself from the case does not pose any jurisdictional
problem in resolving the issues in Civil Case No. 1.
We agree with P that jurisdiction vests in the trial court,
not in the judges. We also point out in this respect that
the various branches of the RTC are coordinate and co-
equal courts whose totality constitutes only one RTC.
Each of the RTC's branches is not a court separate and
distinct from the other branches. When a complaint is
filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not
attach to this branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may
continue by and before another branch or judge. The
different branches in the RTC do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with
each other.
Therefore, The mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower court does not automatically interrupt
the proceedings in the lower court.
Topic: Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Philtranco
Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor
Organization , 717 SCRA 340
By: Tamse, H
Bar Question:
PS Inc., a local land transportation company, retrenched
21 of its employees on the ground that it was suffering
business losses. Consequently, the company union, PW
Union, filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), claiming that petitioner
engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to settle their
differences in the preliminary conference, the case was
referred to the Office of the Secretary of DOLE.
On June 13, 2007, the DOLE Secretary issued an order
against the PS Inc directing the company to reinstate
the 17 illegally terminated officers to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and pay them
BACKWAGES from the time of termination until their
actual or payroll reinstatement.
PS Inc. received a copy of the petition on the following
day and filed a motion for reconsideration on June 25,
2007 which was declined by the DOLE Secretary citing a
DOLE regulation which provided that voluntary
arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards
shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration.
On August 29, 2007, PS Inc. filed before the CA an
original Petition for Certiorari but was dismissed since
petitioner erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
properly covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators.
The CA added that since the assailed Decision was not
timely appealed within the reglementary 15–day period
under Rule 43, the same became final and executory.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
Is the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states that
where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that petitioner availed of the erroneous remedy in filing
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 instead of under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It has long been settled
that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or
resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as precondition for any
further subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Petitioner received a
copy of the Acting Secretary of Labor’s Decision on June
14, 2007. It timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
June 25, which was a Monday, or the first working day
following the last day (Sunday, June 24) for filing the
motion. But for lack of procedural basis, the same was
effectively denied by the Secretary of Labor via his
August 15, 2007 Order which petitioner received on
August 17. It then filed the Petition for Certiorari on
August 29, or well within the fresh 60–day period
allowed by the Rules from August 17.
Page 13
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Certiorari
Lui Enterprises, Inc Vs Zuellig Pharma Corporation
G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014
By: Abastillas, T
Bar Question:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and ZuelligPharma Corporation
entered into a 10–year contract of lease over a parcel of
land.
ZuelligPharma received a letter from the Philippine
Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner
of the leased property, the bank asked ZuelligPharma to
pay rent directly to it. ZuelligPharma promptly informed
Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of
Communications’ claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to
ZuelligPharma and insisted on its right to collect the
leased property’s rent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the
Philippine Bank of Communications over the rental
payments, ZuelligPharma filed a complaint10 for
interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In
its complaint, ZuelligPharma alleged that it already
consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments.
ZuelligPharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in
court its succeeding monthly rental payments and that
Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications be ordered to litigate their conflicting
claims.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification
of deed of dation in payment case pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the
interpleader case.16Lui Enterprises filed this nullification
case against the Philippine Bank of Communications
with respect to several properties it dationed to the
bank in payment of its obligations. The property leased
by ZuelligPharma was among those allegedly dationed
to the Philippine Bank of Communications.
ZuelligPharma filed its opposition22 to the motion to
dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be
denied for having been filed late. Under Rule 16,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion
to dismiss should be filed within the required time given
to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
from service of summons on the defendant.23 Summons
was served on Lui Enterprises on July 4, 2003. It had
until July 19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss, but Lui
Enterprises filed the motion only on July 23, 2003.
As to Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader case
was filed without authority, ZuelligPharma argued that
an action interpleader “is a necessary consequence of
the action for consignation.”25ZuelligPharma consigned
its rental payments because of “the clearly conflicting
claims of [Lui Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bank of
Communications].”26 Since Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was
authorized to file a consignation case, this authority
necessarily included an authority to file the interpleader
case.
In its manifestation and motion to dismiss, Lui
Enterprises reiterated its prayer for the dismissal of the
interpleader case to prevent “the possibility of [the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City] and [the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City] rendering
conflicting rulings [on the same issue of which
corporation has the better right to the rental
payments].”
In this petition for review on certiorari ,62Lui Enterprises
argued that the Court of Appeals applied “the rules of
procedure strictly”63 and dismissed its appeal on
technicalities. According to Lui Enterprises, the Court of
Appeals should have taken a liberal stance and allowed
its appeal despite the lack of subject index, page
references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and
statutes cited, and the statement of issues in its
appellant’s brief.
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its
comment68 on the petition for review on certiorari . It
argued that Lui Enterprises failed to raise any error of
law and prayed that we affirm in toto the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
For ZuelligPharma, it manifested that it was adopting
the Philippine Bank of Communications’ arguments in
its comment
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui
Enterprises’ appeal for lack of subject index, page
references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and
statutes cited, and the statement of issues in Lui
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Enterprises’ appellant’s brief;
Suggested Answer:
No. Lui Enterprises did not comply with the
rules on the contents of the appellant’s
brief
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply
with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It
admitted that its appellant’s brief lacked the required
subject index, page references to the record, and table
of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did
not even correct its admitted “technical omissions”82 by
filing an amended appellant’s brief with the required
contents.83 Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of
the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index,
page references to the record, and a table of cases,
textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements
“were designed to assist the appellate court in the
accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance
the orderly administration of justice.”92 This court will
not disregard rules on appeal “in the guise of liberal
construction.”93 For this court to liberally construe the
Rules, the party must substantially comply with the
Rules and correct its procedural lapses.94Lui Enterprises
failed to remedy these errors.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Lui Enterprises’ appeal. It failed to comply with Rule 44,
Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on the required contents of the
appellant’s brief.
Topic: Certiorari
Omni Hauling Services, Inc. vs. Bon
G.R. No. 199388 September 3, 2014
By: Abangan, R.
Bar Question:
Omni was awarded one year service contract by the
local government to provide garbage hauling services.
Omni hired Bon and his co-workers (Bons) as garbage
truck drivers and paleros. When the service contract
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
was renewed for another year, Omni required each of
its employee to sign employment contracts which
provide that they will be “re-hired” only for the
duration of the same period. However, Bons refused to
sign the employment contracts. They were claiming that
they were regular employees since they were engaged
to perform activities which were necessary and
desirable to Omni’s usual business or trade. LA and
NLRC ruled that Bons were not illegally dismissed on the
ground that they were not regular but merely project
employees whose hiring was solely depended on the
aforesaid service contract. Thus, when respondents
refused to sign the employment contracts for the
subsequent period, there was no dismissal to speak of,
but rather, a mere expiration of respondents’ previous
contracts. In petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the NLRC’s earlier
pronouncements for failure of Omni to establish Bon’s
project employment status through substantial
evidence.
Was the Court of Appeals correct in granting Bons’
petition for certiorari?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon it. Grave abused of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and
whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” discretion must
be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when,
inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached
thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This
requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed
in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which
provides that “[i]n cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the
CA correctly granted respondents’ certiorari petition
since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it
held that respondents were project employees despite
petitioners’ failure to establish their project
employment status through substantial evidence.
Principle: To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it.
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
Bahia Shipping Services vs. Joel P. Hipe, Jr.
G.R. No. 204699 November 12, 2014
By: Abragan, M.
Bar Question:
X was hired by Bahia as plumber for a vessel under a six
month contract. After the lapse of the contract X
continued to work in the vessel without a new contract.
Sustained back injuries while he was doing his plumbing
job. His conditioned worsened. Acting on his request he
was repatriated in Manila.
A company physician examined him. Bahia paid for his
rehabilitation and medications. The physician declared
him fit to work. HIpe sought a second opinion from
another doctor this time not from the company. The
second doctor declared him as unfit for work.
X filed a case for payment of permanent disability to
work with the Labor Arbiter. X argued that he sustained
injuries in the course of his employment. Y argued that
he was repatriated not for medical reasons but due to
the termination of his contract.
Can the court grant the petition for certiorari although
the petitioner was not able to establish his claim
through substantial evidence?
Suggested Answer:
No, the court cannot grant the petitioner for certiorari.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
The grant of the remedy of certiorari must be given only
when a petitioner can show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused its discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in
contemplation of law.
In labor disputes there is grave abuse of discretion
when a decision of the NLRC are not supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
CA committed reversible error in granting X’s certiorari
petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent
disability because X failed to establish his claim through
substantial evidence.
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Center v.
Ortiz
G.R. No. 189861, November 19, 2014
By: Bejasa, K
Bar Question:
X was employed by Z Corporation as Personnel
Manager. Later on, Z Corporation informed X of the
termination of his employment on the ground of
redundancy. Consequently, X filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Z Corporation. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint. Upon appeal,
the NLRC dismissed X’s appeal reasoning that the
latter’s Memorandum of Appeal was not accompanied
by a certificate of non-forum shopping in violation of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure. X then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the NLRC denied such for filing
beyond the 10-day reglementary period to perfect the
same, in violation of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. X
then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
the CA alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing his complaint.
If you were the judge, how would you rule on X’s
petition for certiorari?
Suggested Answer:
If I were the judge, I would dismiss X’s petition for
certiorari.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious
and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction . To be considered "grave," the discretionary
authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In this case, it is clear that the NLRC, in due observance
of its own procedural rules, had amply justified its
dismissal of X’s appeal in view of his numerous
procedural infractions, namely: (a) his failure to attach
to his Memorandum of Appeal a certificate of non-
forum shopping and; (b) his filing of a motion for
reconsideration was beyond the 10 day reglementary
period. Hence, there is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the NLRC in dismissing X’s
appeal.
Topic: Certiorari
Crisologo v JEWM
GR 196894, March 03, 2014
By: Calo, M.
Bar Question:
X and Y filed a collection case against Z, the owner of
various properties including two (2) parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject
properties), which were attached by various creditors.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
the levies were annotated on the back of the said titles.
B, also filed a collection case against Z. The Trial court
rendered a decision based on the compromise
agreement between Z and will transfer the properties in
favor of B, who later sold the properties to C and later
sold it to Company Z to which the annotations
remained. X and Y prevailed in their collection case and
scheduled a notice of sale of the properties of Z, which
included the parcel of lands now under the name of
Company Z. To protect its interest, JEWM filed a
separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. X and Y
questioned the authority of the court and Company Z
argued that they are not parties to the in the case. CA
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the proceeding may
proceed without them being impleaded, X and Y claim
that there fundamental right to due process was
violated. Company Z asserts that X and Y’s failure to file
a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal
or annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy
and adequate remedies then available to them,
rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; lacked the
legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they were
not impleaded in the proceedings before the trial court
and were not indispensable parties since their rights
over the properties had been rendered ineffective by
the final and executory which disposed unconditionally
and absolutely the subject properties.
Is Company Z correct? Decide.
Suggested Answer:
No. Company Z is not correct.
As persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the
cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In
other words, they are as indispensable as Company Z
itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation,
being one of the many lien holders.
As indispensable parties, X and Y should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. –
Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The reason behind this
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
complete determination of all possible issues, not only
between the parties themselves but also as regards
other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule
as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal
standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the
persons whose interests are indispensible to the final
disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted
litigation as X and Y will be forced to rely on a petition
for the annulment of judgment before the CA, which
may again reach this Court.
To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift
administration of justice, the CA should have applied
liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite
the lack of legal standing on the part of X and Y to file
the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking
requirement, of which X and Y were not even at fault, is
precisely the reason why this controversy arose.
Petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14. Petition All told,
the CA erred in dismissing the amended is granted.
Topic: Certiorari
Tesoro, et al. vs. Metro Manila Retreaders, et al.
G.R. NO. 171482 MARCH 12, 2014
By: Demonteverde, R.
Bar Question:
Petitioners XX quit their jobs as salesmen and entered
into separate Service Franchise Agreements (SFAs) with
B for the operation of their respective franchises. Under
the SFAs, B would provide funding support to the
petitioners subject to a regular or periodic liquidation of
their revolving funds. At first, XX managed and operated
their respective franchises without any problem. After a
length of time, however, they began to default on their
obligations to submit periodic liquidations of their
operational expenses in relation to the revolving funds
B provided them.
Consequently, B terminated their respective SFA.
Aggrieved, XX filed a complaint for constructive
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
dismissal, non-payment of wages, incentive pay, 13th
month pay and damages against B with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). XX contend that,
notwithstanding the execution of the SFAs, they
remained to be B’s employees, the SFAs being but a
circumvention of their status as regular employees.
For its part, B pointed out that petitioners freely
resigned from their employment and decided to avail
themselves of the opportunity to be independent
entrepreneurs under the franchise scheme that B had.
Thus, no employer-employee relationship existed
between XX and B.
LA, NLRC and CA ruled that there is no employer-
employee relationship.
It also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA) ascribing
grave abuse of discretion. On July 29, 2005 the CA
rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. It also denied their motion for reconsideration on
February 7, 2006.
Is grave abuse of discretion present in the case?
Suggested Answer:
No, there is no grave abuse of discretion in this case.
The law provides that the purpose of certiorari is to
designed for correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of Judgment.
In the case at bat, there is no employer-employee
relationship. B’s SFAs created on their faces an
arrangement that gave petitioners the privilege to
operate and maintain B’s branches in the way of
franchises, providing tire repair and retreading services,
with petitioners earning profits based on the
performance of their branches. When petitioners
agreed to operate B’s franchise branches in different
parts of the country, they knew that this substantially
changed their former relationships.
Thus, there is no grave abuse of discretion by the court
in rendering the said judgment.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
Lanier vs People of the Philippines,
719 SCRA 477
By: Dy, I.
Bar Question:
The police operatives conducted a test-buy at A’s
residence where they were able to purchase shabu and
marijuana from A. On the basis of the test-buy
operation, they were able to secure a search warrant
from the RTC. Thereafter, A was placed under arrest. B,
the assistant prosecutor filed an information charging A.
A filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the
RTC but the RTC denied the motion and remanded the
case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary
investigation. The prosecutor upheld the Information
and directed the return of the records to the RTC for
disposition.
A filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Sec. of
Justice favored the petitioner on the belief that the
evidences seized were planted. The secretary, in a
Resolution, directed the prosecutor to withdraw the
Information before the RTC. RTC then granted the
Motion to Withdraw Information by the prosecutor.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari seeking to annul
the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA found probable cause
to sustain the petitioners’ indictment and reinstated the
Information against A. CA nullified and set aside the DOJ
Resolution and the Order of the RTC.
Did the Court of Appeals commit any error in reversing
the DOJ Resolution? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.
It is a well settled rule, that once a criminal Complaint
or Information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, dismissal, acquittal or conviction rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the
trial court. The rule applies to a Motion of the public
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
prosecutor to dismiss the case even before or after the
arraignment of the accused.
When the Secretary of Justice made a determination
and concluded that the evidences were planted, he
went into the merits of the defense and exceeded his
jurisdiction. On the part of the RTC, it having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by the
Resolution of the DOJ but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding further with the trial. While the
Secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on
courts.
Topic: Contempt
St Louis University V. Olairez
G.R. No. 162299 March 26, 2014
By: Elumbaring, J
Bar Question:
On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the Olairez group as graduates of the College of
Medicine, SLU. The next day or, on July 17, 2003, the
Olairez group trooped to SLU and insisted on its
immediate compliance with the RTC ruling. Unable to
get a favorable reply from SLU, the Olairez group filed,
on the same day, a "Very Urgent Motion to Cite
Defendants in Contempt" setting the hearing of the
motion for July 18, 2003. Meanwhile, SLU filed its
Notice of Appeal before the RTC. Thereafter, the
hearing of the motion to cite SLU in contempt
proceeded on the same day without any participation of
SLU and its officials.
Is SLU guilty of contempt?
Suggested Answer:
No. Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3.Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
xxx
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of
is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it
is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in
good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence
of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to
be determinative of its character. A person should not
be condemned for contempt where he contends for
what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes
proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may
be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper purpose.
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when
the Olairez group visited the school on July 17, 2003 to
demand their compliance with the decision was not
borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a
judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies
willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the
contrary, SLU was well within its rights to appeal the
decision and not immediately heed the demand of the
Olairez group.
Therefore, they were not guilty of contempt.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
PAGCOR vs. Thunderbird Philippines Hotels and
Resorts, Inc.
G.R. No. 197942-43, 199528, March 26, 2014
By: Eupena, R.
Bar Question:
PAGCOR granted T an authority to operate (ATO) a
casino for 6-months but was subsequently granted a
permanent ATO, co-terminus with PAGCOR’s franchise,
or up to July 11, 2008 but is extendible if and when
PAGCOR’s authority to issue licenses is extended. With
that passage of the law extending PAGCOR’s franchise,
T sought the formal extension of their ATO’s to be made
co-terminus with PAGCOR’s new franchise. PAGCOR
send T separate blank renewal ATO’s bearing a period
of only six months retroactive to July 12, 2008. Insisting
that the T’s ATOs had expired on August 6, 2009
without a renewal, PAGCOR served notice upon the
respondents to cease their casino operations, as well as
gave them until June 3, 2011 to signify their
unconditional acceptance of its new terms of reference
for their new licenses, or “PAGCOR will have no choice
but to initiate cessation proceedings.” T filed a
complaint with the RTC for specific performance with
application for TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction. Judge R issued an ex-parte 72 hour TRO on
June 3, 2011 and was extended to 20 days on June 7,
2011 and subsequently issued a writ for preliminary
prohibitory injunction. PAGCOR, without seeking a
motion for reconsideration of the said order, directly
filed with the SC certiorari petitions pleading
transcendental importance of the issues.
Are the acts of PAGCOR proper?
Suggested Answer:
No, it was not proper. PAGCOR is not justified in failing
to file a requisite motion for reconsideration, and to
observe the hierarchy of courts.
In a case decided, the SC ruled that a Motion for
Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. To grant an
exception to the rule, the issue must be of
transcendental importance to justify its action of
skipping the hierarchy of courts
In this case, PAGCOR’s argument that the issue is of
transcendental importance does not hold water. The
petitions deal with the manner PAGCOR has exercised
its licensing and regulatory powers over the respondent
casino operator. There are no special and important
circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this
court.
Topic: Injunction
Republic, Represented by the National Irrigation
Administration vs. Spouses Lazo
GR 195594 September 29, 2014
By: Jongoy, K.
Bar Question:
The Federal Republic of the Philippines (FRP) made an
irrigation project in Ilocos City. Before the start of the
project, the FRP expropriated the land of Mr. Marcos.
Mr. Marcos is currently developing his land as a
residential subdivision. Mr. Marcos hired Dr. Luis
Singson to conduct a geohazard study on the irrigation
project. The study found that the project will have
negative environmental effects. The city council of
Ilocos issued a resolution recommending the study and
to stop the ongoing construction of the project. Mr.
Marcos then filed a temporary restraining order for the
purpose of stopping the construction. FRP assailed RA
8975 which prohibits the lower courts from issuance of
TRO against government projects. RTC issued and
granted the TRO.
Was the issuance and grant of TRO valid?
Suggested Answer:
NO, the issuance and grant of the temporary restraining
order (TRO) was not valid.
RA 8975 prohibits the lower courts from issuing
restraining order and preliminary injunctions against
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
the government to ensure the expeditious and efficient
implementation and completion of governmental
infrastructure projects. However, this admits of an
exception when the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise.
In the case at bar, the TRO filed by Mr. Marcos does not
fall within the exception provided by RA 8975. Mr.
Marcos filed the TRO based on the hazard study and
City Council resolution which failed to demonstrate that
there is a constitutional issue or if there is such, a
constitutional issue of extreme urgency.
Hence, the TRO issued by the RTC is not valid. It does
not fall within the exception provided by RA 8975, thus,
it is in contravention of the prohibition against the
lower courts from issuance of res.
Topic: Forcible Entry
Teodoro Vs Espino
GR 189248
By: Juarez, J.
Bar Question:
Principle: Forcible entry is proper when one employs
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive
another of physical possession of real property.
The subject property is registered in the name of X, long
deceased ascendant of all the parties. Of all X’s
children, only Z occupied the subject property, living at
the ancestral house.
After Z’s death, her purported will, a holographic will,
was probated. In the will, Z, asserting ownership,
devised the subject property to Y, her nephew. Y
effected the demolition of the ancestral house,
intending to use the subject property for other
purposes.
A,B and C, who resided at portions of Lot No. 2476 that
surround the subject property on which the ancestral
house previously stood, erected a fence on the
surrounding portion, barricaded its frontage, and put up
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
a sign thereat, effectively dispossessing Y of the
property.
Y’S filed the complaint for forcible entry against A, B
and C.
If you were the judge would you grant the complaint?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. I will grant the complaint.
Under the rules, Forcible entry is when one employs
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive
another of physical possession of real property.
In the instant case, there was unlawful dispossession.
The whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now
litigated is, owing to the fact that it has remained
registered in the name of X who is the common
ancestor of both parties herein, co-owned property. Y
cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue
of Z bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own
right of possession that comes from his co- ownership
of the property.
Therefore, the heirs substituting Y in this suit, should be
restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area.
Topic: Certiorari
People vs Espinosa
721 SCRA 53
Surname: Lim, E.
Bar Question:
E, C and D were accused of killing R. The trial court on
August 12, 2010 dismissed the case the against E for
insufficiency of evidence. P filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the court on
October 7, 2010. Petitioner P, filed a petition for review
under rule 65 and pass the draft of its petition to the
office of the solicitor general on Nov. 30, 2010. It was
only on Dec. 3, 2010 when the draft of the petition
arrived to the office of the solicitor general, and was
assigned on Dec. 8, 2010 to the handling solicitors.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Can the period to file a petition for review be extended
beyond the 60 day reglementary period?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the 60 day reglementary period to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65 may be extended.
The Supreme Court held that the 60 day reglementary
period to file a petition for review on certiorari may be
extended when the failure to file within the required
period is not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules. In the case at bar, P were able to send
promptly their draft of the petition on Nov. 30, 2010. It
was only that the draft arrived to the office of the
solicitor general on Dec. 3, 2010, and was assigned to
the handling solicitor only on Dec. 8, 2010.
Principle
The 60-day period may be extended under any of these
circumstances:
1. most persuasive and weighty reasons; 2. to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; 4.the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; 5. the merits of the case; 6. a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; 7. a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; 8. the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; 9. fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; 10.
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; 11. in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; 12. importance of the issues involved; and
13. exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by
all the attendant circumstances.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
TOPIC: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
TENAZASVS R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT
720 SCRA 467
By: Lleve, A.
Bar Question:
A, B and C are taxi drivers of Villegas Taxi Transport
Company (Taxi Operator) who filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the Taxi operator. The Taxi
Operator denied the fact they were illegally dismissed.
In fact, both A and B failed to report back to work for no
apparent reason. The Taxi Operator even admitted that
A and B were employees in the company. However, the
Taxi Operator denied the employment of C.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Taxi Operator
saying that there was no illegal dismissal. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
appealed decision. It premised its conclusion on the
pieces of evidence submitted by A, B and C which might
have been overlooked by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
It ruled that A and B were employees of the company,
but ruled otherwise in the case of C for failing to
establish his relationship with the company. It also
deleted the award of separation pay and ordered for
reinstatement of A and B.
Dissatisfied, A, B and C filed a petition for certiorari. Will
the petition prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petition will not prosper.
Based on jurisprudence, Judicial review of decisions of
the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as a
general rule, is confined only to issues of lack or excess
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals does not assess and
weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the LA
and the NLRC based their conclusions. The issue is
limited to the determination of whether or not the
NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
resolution, except if the findings of the NLRC are not
supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, the sufficiency of evidence presented to the
LA and NLRC to which both agencies based its decisions
is not subject to the assessment of the Court of Appeals,
hence, not subject for review under Rule 65 failing to
qualify as grave abuse of discretion.
Principle:
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is confined
only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRCin rendering
the resolution, except if the findings of the NLRC are not
supported by substantial evidence.
TOPIC: Certiorari, Period of Filing
PLDT vs. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 163999, July 09, 2014
By: Santiago, F.
Bar Question:
For having found to be engaged in illegal international
simple resale (ISR) and after obtaining several
computers as evidence, the respondents were charged
with theft in the RTC. The respondent questions the
validity of the search warrant and filed for an issuance
of subpoena ducestecum but was denied by the RTC
which prompted the respondents to file for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied again and the
respondents notified on October 18, 2002. On January
20, 2003, a petition for certiorari under rule 65 was filed
by the respondent assailing the order of the RTC. The
RTC denied the petition arguing that the respondents
failed to file the petition within 60 days after the denial
of the motion for reconsideration, but was reversed by
the Court of Appeals prompting the petitioner to file
this petition assailing the reversal by the CA.
Did the Court of appeals erred giving due course to and
reversing the petition?
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the CA erred in reversing the decision.
Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
a special civil action for certiorari should be instituted
60 days from notice of judgment, order, or resolution,
or from the notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution
being assailed.
In this case, the respondents were notified of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration on October 18, 2002
which gives them until December 17, 2002 within which
to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The 60 day limitation may be relaxed only for the most
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases which
must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking it, in
which the respondents failed to do so.
Topic: Certiorari Case
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURE VS. CHIONGBIAN
G.R. No.197530, July 9, 2014
By: Silawan, D.
Bar Question:
Company A, B and C entered into an agreement
whereby Company A and B would transfer various
inventories assets to Company C in exchange for
Company C’s shares of stock. Resulting to a merged
company named Company D.
Pursuant to such agreement, Company C will acquire
the inventories of Company B, the total aggregate
amount shall not exceed 400million. Later on, the
inventories were assessed to have a value of 558million.
Thus, Company C paid the amount of 400million plus
shares of stock from Company D. However, even with
such payment, there was still a balance. So company B
sent demand letters for the return of excess
inventories.
Claims still not having satisfied, Company B filed a
complaint against Company C and D before the RTC of
Cebu. Company C and D filed a motion to dismiss but
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for review
under Rule 45.
Is the petition proper?
Suggested Answer:
No. It is elementary that an appeal may only be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case. As such, no appeal may be taken from an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is not
appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on
the merits for a contrary rule would delay the
administration of justice and unduly burden the courts.
In this case, Company C and D filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 which is not allowed
considering the fact that the order they assailed from
was only an interlocutory order. However, under the
jurisprudence, in many instances, the Court has treated
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, such as in cases where the subject of the
recourse was one of jurisdiction, or the act complained
of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, the petition is not proper
Topic: Certiorari Case
Candelaria v. RTC Branch 42 City of San Fernando
Pampanga, 730 SCRA 1
By: Sultan, Joharey L.
Bar Question:
An alleged buy-bust operation conducted whereby the
P were arrested at the corner of Gueco St. and
MacArthur Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for
delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of
counterfeit Fundador Brandy. P was formally charged in
Information in violation of Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines. After they were arraigned and had
pleaded not guilty to the charge. P filed a Motion to
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on inadmissibility of
evidence. They contended that the evidence the
prosecution intended to present were obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The RTC denies
their Motion contending that the motion was anchored
on P’s illegal arrest and any objection to an arrest must
be made before an accused enters his plea on
arraignment.
This prompted the P to file petition for Certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Is the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion?
Suggested Answer:
No. The RTC did not committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying there motion.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking the
writ whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
must be able to show that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. "[H]e must allege in his petition
and establish facts to show that any other existing
remedy is not speedy or adequate remedy.
In the case at bar, the petitioner fails to allege that
there is neither appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as to
justify resort to certiorari. Assuming the assailed
motion to be erroneous, the mistake is an error in
judgment which is beyond the ambit of certiorari. And
even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari
proper, the petition must still be dismissed for their
failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. "Grave
abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari under rule 65 is
untenable.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Certiorari
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
G.R. No. 190277, July 23, 2014
By: Abastillas, T.
Bar Question:
Sherwood Holdings Corporation and Spouses Sandy Ang
and Arlene Ang filed a case for sum of money against
private respondent Absolute Management Corporation
before the Regional Trial Court. Private respondent filed
its answer and incorporated a third-party complaint
against petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company.
The trial court set the case for pre-trial. When the
counsels of the parties were asked by the trial court to
produce their respective authorizations to appear at the
said hearing, counsel for petitioner manifested that her
authority to appear for petitioner was submitted by
them at the first pre-trial hearing way back in
2004.When respondent’s counsel was given the chance
to go over the records of the court a quo to look for the
Secretary’s Certificate and the SPA that she allegedly
submitted in 2004, these documents could not be found
from the records of the case.
When this case was called for pre-trial conference, co-
plaintiff Sandy Ang failed to appear despite notice, thus,
this case is dismissed, insofar as he is concerned.
Accordingly, defendant Absolute Management Corp.
adduced evidence ex parte in support of its
counterclaim against co-plaintiff Sandy Ang.
As a result thereof, the trial court, upon motion of the
private respondent, declared petitioner in default.
Accordingly, the trial court allowed private respondent
to present evidence ex-parte.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to lift the
order of default,
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the aforestated Orders. In its
assailed decision, the CA reversed the trial court’s ruling
that respondent’s counsel cannot validly represent
respondent due to “the failure on the part of the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
representative of respondent to present a Secretary’s
Certificate and Special Power of Attorney authorizing
her to represent [respondent] during the pre-trial stage.
The CA ruled that the RTC’s determination holding that
respondent’s counsel cannot validly represent
respondent due to lack of authorization lacks merit.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Suggested Answer:
We grant the petition.
A petition for certiorari may be filed if the trial court
declared the defendant in default with grave abuse of
discretion. However, an act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The court a quo did not commit such
grave abuse of discretion in the case at bar.
With respect to the third-party complaint of Absolute
Management Corp., against third-party defendant
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company whose counsel
failed to present a Secretary’s Certificate and Special
Power of Attorney authorizing her to represent said
bank in today’s pre-trial, said third-party plaintiff is
hereby allowed to present evidence ex parte pursuant
to the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Indubitably, the appellate court ruled on the capacity of
respondent’s counsel to represent it as its lawyer, or as
its attorney, in the court a quo. Perforce, it ruled that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
declared that respondent’s counsel did not have the
authority to represent it. We are constrained to
disagree with this ruling. The crux of this controversy is
whether respondent’s counsel had the authority to
represent respondent in her capacity as its
representative during the subject pre-trial, and not in
her capacity as its counsel. Presiding from the foregoing
disquisitions, we agree with the court a quo that
respondent’s counsel did not have the proper authority.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
VILLAROSA VS. FESTIN
G.R. No. 212953, August 05, 2014
By: Aguilando, M.L
Bar Question:
V and F are rival candidates for the mayoralty post in
Mindoro. F was proclaimed the victor. V then filed a
Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the RTC alleging
irregularities in the conduct of elections. The RTC
rendered a decision declaring the proclamation of F
void. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with
injunctive relief with the COMELEC. The COMELEC
granted the relief prayed for enjoining the RTC
Decision’s execution pending appeal. V filed an urgent
motion for the quashal of the issued injunction which
was denied by the COMELEC First Division. He then filed
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64.
Is the action of V proper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the action of V is not proper.
Sec. 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure pertains
to the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and COA. The Supreme
Court had interpreted the provision to limit the remedy
of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of
the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Certiorari will not
generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a
COMELEC division for being premature, taking into
account the availability of the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. A
party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not
directly assail the said order in this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek
the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal
of the decision of the Division in due course
In this case, the assailed order is an interlocutory order
issued by the COMELEC First Division and not a final
order of the COMELEC En Banc. It is not a valid subject
matter for a petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
Thus, the said action is premature and not proper.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
Olongapo City vs. Subic Water and Sewerage
SCRA 132 August 06, 2014
By: Ambrosio, S.
Bar Question:
City of Maligaya filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against Y Water District. It alleged that Y failed
to pay its electricity bills to petitioner and remit its
payment under the contract to pay, pursuant to Y’s
acquisition of petitioner’s water system. Y posed a
counterclaim against petitioner for unpaid water bills.
SW took over Y’s water operations in City of Maligaya.
To settle their money claims they entered into a
compromise agreement. Trial court approved the
compromise agreement. City of Maligaya and Y
executed a Deed of Assignment. Y assigned all of its
rights in the JVA in favor of the Y.
City filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. It was granted but did not issue the
corresponding writ of execution. The City through its
counsel prayed again for the issuance of a writ of
execution against Y. Atty. AA filed a manifestation
alleging that Y had already been dissolved and that SW
is now the former Y Water District. SW also filed a
manifestation that Y is not SW. It indicated that Y was
only a 10% shareholder of SW; and that its 10% share
was already transferred to City of Maligaya pursuant to
the Deed of Assignment. SW filed a special appearance
with motion. The trial court denied it. SW then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
to RTC.
Is the petition for certiorari a proper remedy?
Suggested Answer:
No, it is not a proper remedy.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate
only if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
available to the aggrieved party. As we have distinctly
explained in the case of Pasiona v. Court of Appeals:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a
decision or final order of the CA viaRule 65 because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In
this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a
special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the
correct remedy.Settled is the rule that where appeal is
available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action
for certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if
one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse.
Since the CA’s pronouncement completely disposed of
the case and the issues raised by the parties, it was the
proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. It was already a
final order that resolved the subject matter in its
entirety, leaving nothing else to be done. With the lapse
of the prescribed period for appeal without an action
from the petitioner, the present petition for certiorari–
a mere replacement –must be dismissed.
Hence, a petition for certioraris not a proper remedy.
Topic: Grave Abuse of Discretion
OSG Ship Management Manila V. Pellazar
G.R. No. 198367, August 6, 2014
By: Arrabis, C.
Bar Question:
P was an oiler in the vessel of M/T Delphina filed for
total disability benefits and damages against OSG. The
company-designated physician gave Pa Grade 10
disability ‘for loss of grasping power for large objects
between fingers and palm of one hand. P consulted
another physician of his choice and Dr. S who diagnosed
him with ‘loss of grasping power of 5th finger, loss of
opposition between finger and thumb and ankylosis of
Page 27
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
the 5th finger’ ad certified that he was ‘permanently
unfit for any sea duty.
OSG argued that P is not entitled compensation higher
than grade 10 disability rating. The Labor Arbiter
awarded P permanent total disability. But the NLRC
modified LA’s decision. It ruled that P Is only entitled to
an Grade 10 disability rating under POEA Standard
Employment Contract.
P seeks relief in CA through petition for Certiorari. CA
granted the petition and reversed the ruling of NLRC
and reinstated the ruling of LA.
Is the CA correct in reversing the decision of NLRC?
Suggested Answer:
No. The CA has limited scope of reviewing the NLRC
decision because of the intrinsic limitation of the sole
available remedy itself. A writ of certiorari is a remedy
that lies only to correct acts rendered without
jurisdiction in excess in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion and not mere errors of
judgment. For emphasis therefore, when a petition for
certiorari is filed, the judicial inquiry should be limited
to issue of whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and not whether the NLRC ruling is intrinsically correct
or not.
The NLRC mere disagreement with the LA, however,
does not give rise to grave abuse of discretion, unless
the NLRC’s contrary conclusion had no basis in fact and
law. In the present case, the NLRC ruling was actually
based on extensive evaluation and treatment of P’s
medical condition by the company doctors. Under Rule
65 petition, the CA does not determine which of the
conflicting finding assessment should be preferred; but
rather, whether in deciding to uphold one over the
other, the NLRC exceed the bounds of its jurisdiction or
committed grave abuse of discretion abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the CA determination is incorrect.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Certiorari
Vinuya vs Romulo
732 SCRA 595
By: Bautista, Sheryl Yu
Bar Question:
In 1998, victims of the “comfort women system”
approached the Executive Department through the
Department of Justice in order to request assistance to
file a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. Subsequently, the
Executive Department ignored their request and
refused to file a claim against the said Japanese officials
and military. Thereafter, said victims approached the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
but were similarly disregarded.
Aggrieved on the denial of their request, on May 8,
2004, petitioners file a petition for certiorari claiming
that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort
women.
Does the certiorari timely filed?
Suggested Answer:
No, the resort to certiorari was not timely.
Section 4 of Rule 65 provides that the petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) daysfrom notice of
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run
from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment,
final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of
the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the
assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018

denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial
must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition
for certiorari must be dismissed. There are three
essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was
received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the
denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to
comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance
with the Rules.
Thus, the petition alone in the year 1998 only as the
time when petitioners approached the Department of
Justice for assistance, but does not specifically state
when they received the denial of their request for
assistance warranted the outright dismissal of the
petition. Even assuming that petitioners received the
notice of the denial of their request for assistance in
1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004
was still way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most
compelling reasons could justify the Court’s acts of
disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the
period.
against JBC as they are not exercising quasi-judicial
functions.
Decide on the two contentions of JBC.
Suggested Answer:
1. Yes, JBC is correct; the writ of mandamus is an
improper remedy in this case.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will
not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposes upon said
public officer the right and duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act.
JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
be compelled to do something. Having the discretion, a
mandamus cannot be filed against them to compel
them to include J in the list.
2. No, JBC is not correct.

Certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any

Topic: Mandamus branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
Jardeleza vs Sereno or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014 instrumentality of the government, even if the latter
By: Bulanon, J. does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.

In the case at bar, though JBC is not exercising judicial

Bar Question: or quasi-judicial functions, a petitioner for certiorari
under rule 65 can still be availed against them as part of
J was not included on the list for recommendation for the Judicial Power of the courts.
the position of Associate Justice, due to his allegedly
dubious integrity. He answered that he would defend
himself provided that due process will be observed, but
his request was denied. Hence, J filed for certiorari and
mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and
CJ-Sacted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding
him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of
votes to qualify for the position. JBC opposed the
petition in two points; (1) Mandamus is not available
against JBC; (2) Certiorari under Rule 65 is not available
Page 29
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Manuel Jimenez vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014
By: Capao, H.
Bar Question:
A confessed his participation in the killing of X and
naming B, C, D, E, and F, as his conspirators. B, et. al.,
and A were charged of murder for the killing of X. A filed
a motion for his discharge as accused pursuant to the
witness protection program. The RTC granted the
motion to discharge filed by A following the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness. B filed a petition for
certiorari against the RTC.
Did the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the
motion filed by A?
Suggested Answer:
No, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
granting the motion filed by A.
In settled in jurisprudence that a petition
for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over
a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
clear and patent. The burden is on the part of the
petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has
defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.
In the case at bar, the prosecution had presented clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence showing
compliance with the requisites under Section 17, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to discharge A as a
state witness.
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Moran, Jr., vs. Office of The President
G.R. No. 192957 September 29, 2014
By: Casanares, A.
Bar Question:
A filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
complaint against B for the product imperfections of a
BMW car which it sold to A pursuant to RA 7394.CAO
rendered a decision in favor of A. As a DTI
administrative case, B appealed to the Secretary of DTI
however it was dismissed then B filed an appeal with
the Office of the President (OP). The OP granted the
appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary’s Resolution, and
dismissed the complaint. A then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the OP. CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari that it was a wrong mode of appeal.
Is the action for certiorari before the CA the proper
remedy?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the action is the proper remedy.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available in
extraordinary cases where a tribunal, board or officer,
among others, completely acted without jurisdiction. A
judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void. While errors of judgment are correctible
by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by
certiorari.
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by
Administrative Order No. 18 which provides that "a
decision or order issued by a department or agency
need not be appealed to the Office of the President
when there is a special law that provides for a different
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
mode of appeal." In this case, a special law, RA
7394,likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial
relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a
petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, B
should have elevated the case directly to the CA
through a petition for certiorari.
Considering that the OP had no jurisdiction to entertain
private respondent’s appeal, certiorari lies to correct
such jurisdictional error. In filing a petition for certiorari
before the CA raising the issue of the OP’s lack of
jurisdiction, thus availed of the proper remedy.
Topic: Foreclosure Of Real Estate Mortgage
680 Home Appliances, Inc vs. CA
G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014
By: De las llagas, D.
Bar Question:
XYZ Corporation consolidated its ownership after ABC
Homes failed to redeem the property which was
foreclosed previously. A new certificate of title was
issued in FSAMI’s name. An application for a writ of
possession was issued in favor of XYZ Corporation; the
writ, as well as the notice to vacate, were issued. As the
current occupant of the property, respondent W filed a
motion to intervene in the case, claiming that it
possessed the property as lessee of ABC Homes. ABC
Homes filed a petition to cancel the writ but was denied
by the trial court for being prematurely filed. But the CA
affirmed the trial court’s ruling for although a writ of
possession was issued the property remained in the
possession of W. Hence, the 30-day period to file a
petition to cancel a writ under Act No. 3135 has not yet
commenced. To question the ruling of the CA, ABC
Homes filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Is the action filed by ABC Homes is proper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the action filed by ABC Homes is not proper.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Under Section 8 of Act no. 3135 allows a judgment
debtor to file a petition for cancellation of the writ of
possession within 30 days after the purchaser obtained
possession of the subject property. The law is clear that
the purchaser must be first placed in possession of the
mortgaged property pending proceedings assailing the
issuance of the writ of possession. But this rule is
applicable only during the redemption period. Section 8
of Act No. 3135 finds no application when the
redemption period has expired without the debtor
exercising his right, and the purchaser in the foreclosure
sale has already consolidated his ownership over the
property and moved for the issuance of the writ of
possession.
In the case at hand, ABC Homes cannot avail of the
remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 not because of
W’s continued possession of the property that
prevented XYZ Corporation from taking over despite
having a writ of possession issued in its favor but
because the petition for cancellation was filed beyond
the one-year redemption period and ownership of the
property has already been transferred to the purchaser.
Therefore, ABC Homes action is not proper.
Topic: Certiorari
Tze Sun Wong vs Kenny Wong
743 SCRA 567
By: Dimol, C.
Bar Question:
Mr. Wong is a Chinese national who immigrated to the
Philippines and subsequently acquired a permanent
resident status. Mr. Wang filed a case against Mr. Wong
in the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) because the latter
had misrepresented in his driver’s license that he was a
Filipino citizen. Subsequently, the BOI Board of
Commissioners ordered his deportation on the grounds
of (a) illegal use of alias which appeared in the driver’s
license application; and (b) misrepresenting himself as a
Filipino citizen in the same application in violation of RA
6085 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Mr. Wong filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion. Will the petition
prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petition will not prosper.
Based on jurisprudence, in a special civil action
for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden to prove
that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Further, courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative departments
over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in
a better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
respect, if not finality, by the courts.
In this case, the BOI did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in deporting Mr. Wong. The BOI is the best
body that would determine if there has been violation
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as in this case
is misrepresentation which would warrant deportation.
The court finds great respect on their findings by reason
of the special knowledge and expertise therein hence
such decision cannot be said to be in grave abuse of
discretion.
Principle:
Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling within their jurisdiction.
Topic: Certiorari
Philippine Electric Corporation vs. CA
744 SCRA 361
By: Fabe, J.
Bar Question:
X is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
and repairs of high voltage transformers. XWU (X
Worker’s Union) is a legitimate labor organization and
the exclusive bargaining representative of X’s rank-and-
file employees. Claiming that X failed to follow the steps
in increasing the basic salary in case of promotion as
enunciated in Article X, Section 4 collective bargaining
agreement, XWU submitted the grievance to the
grievance machinery. The parties filed a submission
agreement with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, and designated Mr. Y as Voluntary
Arbitrator. The latter ruled that X violated the collective
bargaining agreement. X, then filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA which was
dismissed for lack of merit. Thus, X filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC.
Is the action for certiorari proper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the action for certiorari is not the proper remedy.
As a rule, a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or decision
shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10
days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the
aggrieved party choose to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator the
motion must be filed within the same 10-day period
since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the
period for taking an appeal. A petition for certiorari is a
special civil action "adopted to correct errors of
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-
judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of such court or agency
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
extraordinary remedy a petition for certiorari may be
filed only if appeal is not available. If appeal is available,
an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon
is grave abuse of discretion. As an exception to the
rule, this court has allowed petitions for certiorari to be
filed in lieu of an appeal "(a) when the public welfare
and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when
the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the
writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Thus, the present case does not fall to any of the
exceptions. There being no appeal seasonably filed in
this case, Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision became final
and executory after 10 calendar days from X’s receipt
of the resolution denying its motion. Hence, Voluntary
Arbitrator’s decision is already beyond the purview of
this Court to act upon.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
denied being an improper remedy.
Topic: Prohibition and Mandamus
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs Robredo,
et al 730 SCRA 322 - July 22, 2014
By: Gala, L.
Bar Question:
The members of X occupied parcels of land in the cities
of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. Y sent the members
of X notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to
the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions
and demolitions without any court order when persons
or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
The members of X directly filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to
compel Y to first secure an eviction and/or demolition
order from the court prior to their implementation of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. The members of X
argued that they have no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.Y, on the other
hand, prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for
its serious procedural defects since the members of X
incorrectly availed of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.Is it correct for the members
of X to avail of the petition for prohibition and
mandamus?
Suggested Answer:
No, the members of X wrongly availed themselves of a
petition for prohibition and mandamus.
A writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person’s exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. A writ of
prohibition is issued to afford the aggrieved party a
relief against the respondent’s usurpation or grave
abuse of jurisdiction or power. On the other hand, a
petition for mandamus is merely directed against the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person who
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station or who unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled. Thus, a writ of mandamus will only
issue to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty.
It will not control a public officer’s exercise of discretion
as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act precisely because it is his judgment that
is to be exercised, not that of the court.
In the case at bar, the acts complained of are beyond
the scope of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.
The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the
public respondents have discretion when their duty to
execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be
performed. Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Thus, the members of X wrongly availed themselves of a
petition for prohibition and mandamus.
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
Araullo vs Aquino III
728 SCRA 1
By: Gimang, M.
Bar Question:
On a privilege speech made by Senator JE, he revealed
that some senators, including himself, had been given
an additional 50 million pesos each as an “incentive” for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice C.
Responding to such revelation, Secretary A issued a
public statement explaining that the funds released to
the Senators had been part of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, a program designed by the DBM
to ramp up the spending to accelerate economic
expansion. This was bought to the consciousness of the
nation, prompting nine petitions were consolidated
assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and issuances
relation to it.
One of the contentions made by the respondent is that
there is no actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between
the parties. Furthermore, they aver that the special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition are not proper
actions for directly assailing the constitutionality of the
DAP and other executive issuances implementing the
DAP.
The respondents argue that it is the application of the
DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can
question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if
the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of
the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the
decision of the trial courts by petition for review on
certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the
COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Does certiorari , prohibition, and mandamus the proper
remedies to assail the validity of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the petitions under Rule 65 are the proper
remedies to assail the validity of Disbursement
Acceleration Fund.
The expanded concept of judicial review provides that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." Furthermore, the present Rules of
Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. The remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued
to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to
set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.
In this case, the Supreme Court in discharging its duty
under Section 1, Article VIII, to set right and undo any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded
from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The
Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the
validity of any assailed legislative or executive action.
This entrustment is consistent with the republican
system of checks and balances.
Thus, petitioners in availing the remedy of special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition is correct.
Page 34
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Prohibition
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, Inc.
G.R. No. 193796. July 2, 2014
By: Icao, Gean Pearl
Bar Question:
Land Bank and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) entered into
Loan Agreement provided that at least two (2) local
government units will participate through Subsidiary
Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank. Land Bank
entered into an SLA with the Iligan City. There was a
public bidding through BAC. Atlanta participates but
finished second to the lowest bid. BAC informed Atlanta
that the bidding was declared a failure upon the
recommendation of Land Bank and it also disqualified
Atlanta. There was a re-bidding. During the pre-bid, BAC
declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184
or by any of the GPPB's issuances. Atlanta filed Petition
for Prohibition and Mandamus with TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the re-bidding in Manila
RTC. Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and
void and enjoined the City Government of Iligan and
BAC. Land Bank and the BAC asserted that the case was
dismissible for improper venue, mootness, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Did Manila RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the
instant prohibition case?
Suggested Answer:
No. Section 4 of the Rule 65 provides that petition for
prohibition must be filed "in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Court." BP 129 also provides that
Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and injunction but lays down the
limitation that the writs issued therein are enforceable
only within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
In this case, the writ of prohibition issued by the Manila
RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
null and void. Also on a matter of procedure, the Court
further discerns that the Manila RTC should have
dismissed the case outright for failure of Atlanta to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Topic: Prohibition
Civil Aviation Authority Of The Philippines Employees’
Union Vs. Civil Aviation Authority Of The Philippines
739 SCRA 570
By: Lacida, N.
Bar Question:
R.A. No. 9497 was passed directing the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) to
continue to hold office and assume the powers of the
CAAP Director General until his successor shall have
been appointed and inducted into office in accordance
with said law. Likewise, retirement packages were
provided to ATO employees who were willing to retire
from the service. Respondent, who is an appointed
Acting Director General of the CAAP, issued orders and
memoranda for the active participation of incumbent
and organic personnel of the defunct ATO along with his
hired consultants in the crafting and formulation of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9497, the new Organizational Structure and Staffing
Pattern (OSSP) and the Qualification Standards (QS) for
the proposed new plantilla of positions within the
CAAP. Petitioner, a legitimate union of employees of
respondent Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines,
asserts that the issuances of said orders and
memoranda resulted in the classification and treatment
of the incumbent personnel of ATO and security of
tenure of government employees. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed the Original Petition for
Prohibition directly before this Court.
Will the petition for prohibition prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
Page 35
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility.
In the case at bar, there is no grave abuse of discretion
when Section 60 of the IRR provided for a "hold-over"
status on the part of ATO employees. A careful perusal
of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497 reveals that the transfer
of ATO personnel, unless they opted to retire from the
service, to the CAAP implies the application of the hold-
over principle. There being no express, much less
implied prohibition of the application of the hold-over
principle in R.A. No. 9497 per se, such proviso in the
latter’s IRR does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
PRINCIPLE: A petition for prohibition will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is manifested. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave.
Topic: Mandamus
Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency Inc. vs
Puerto Princesa City
GR NO. 181792 April 21, 2014
By: Licayan, A.
Bar Question:
SSWDA owns parcels of land in Puerto Princesa. When
the government established a military camp in Puerto
Princesa, SSWDA’s lands were used as a road right of
way named Wescom Road. Later the road was
developed by the government. SSWDA filed an action
for payment of just compensation. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of SSWDA. Later, SSWDA filed another
complaint for failure to pay the full amount of
compensation and demanded execution. RTC denied on
the ground that government funds cannot be subject to
execution and levy. SWWDA file a petition for
mandamus to direct, command and compel Puerto
Princesa to pay the judgment award.
Is the remedy of mandamus proper to compel Puerto
Princesa to pay the judgment award to SSWDA?
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Suggested Answer:
No.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party
to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.
The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of
a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As a rule,
mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or
person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust,
or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. Mandamus can be issued only in cases where
the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief. That there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked.
In this case, SSWDA still has another remedy. Regarding
final money judgment against the government or any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, the legal remedy is to
seek relief with the COA pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular. SSWDA should have filed a
petition for certiorari with COA. COA has primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claims. The COA still
retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim
even after the issuance of a writ of execution.
Page 36
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Mandamus
Buena Jr vs Benito
GR No. 181760, October 14, 2014,
By: Talisic, E
Bar Question:
Regional Governor A of the ARMM appointed Dr. R as
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the
Department of Education (DepEd) Division in a
temporary capacity. In 2005, A reappointed R in the
same position but in a permanent capacity. A requested
the Civil Service Commission Regional Office of the
ARMM to attest to R’s appointment. However, Regional
Director P declined on the ground that R did not possess
the career executive service eligibility required for the
said position.
The R filed a petition for Mandamus before the Regional
Trial Court to compel the Regional Office to attest to his
permanent appointment arguing that the position does
not belong to the Career Executive Service under the
Administrative Code of 1987, thus, the position does
not require Career Executive Service eligibility. He
further claimed that under RA 9054, Regional Governor
of the ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in
the civil service in the region.
Since A already exercised his discretion, the Regional
Office had no choice but to attest to his appointment. P
claimed that the permanent appointee must have
career executive service eligibility. According to P, the
Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the ARMM.
However, until the region enacts its own regional civil
service law, the Regional Office shall carry on with the
Civil Service Commission’s mandate under the
Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws
and rules.
Whether R correctly availed himself of a petition for
mandamus against the Civil Service Commission's
refusal to attest to his appointment
Suggested Answer:
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Yes. A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to
compel the Civil Service Commission to attest to the
appointment of respondent
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled. For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be
enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done."The tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act wherein the officer has
the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil
service, this court has ruled that the Civil Service
Commission's attestation is a ministerial duty once it
finds the appointee eligible for the position. The
Commission "is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether or not the person
appointed meets all the required conditions laid down
by the law." If the appointee possesses the required
civil service eligibility, the Commission has "no choice
but to attest to the appointment."
In the case at bar, respondent R availed himself of the
correct remedy. Given his claim that he possesses the
required civil service eligibility for the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, he correctly
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil
Service Commission to approve his appointment. The
Regional Office argues that respondent R availed
himself of the wrong remedy considering that the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission proper was still available. The trial
court should have dismissed R’s petition for mandamus.
The general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies requires
that a party "exhaust all administrative remedies to give
the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to the courts. Nevertheless, there are exceptions
to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. In
this case, the facts are undisputed. R is not career
executive service eligible. The question is whether the
position for which he was appointed (Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent of DepEd) requires career
executive service eligibility. This is a purely legal
question which is an exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Therefore, R did not err in filing a petition for
mandamus with the trial court.
Topic: Mandamus
Martinez vs. Martin
743 SCRA 718
By: Sios-e, B.
Bar Question:
In compliance with the Court's Decision in the case
entitled Natalia v. CA, the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 73 (RTC) issued an alias writ of
execution dated February 20, 2004 (February 20, 2004
Alias Writ) granting in favor of petitioner Antonio
Martinez (petitioner), among others, possession of
portions of two (2) parcels of land located in Sitio
Banabas, Antipolo City, covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now both covered
by TCT No. N-67845) (subject lots).On March 30, 2004,
respondent Deputy Sheriff Rolando Palmares (Deputy
Sheriff) of the same court executed a Certificate of
Delivery of Possession, attesting that the 86.26-hectare
portion of the subject lots covered by TCT No. N-67845
was already delivered to petitioner and his co-parties in
Civil Case No. 359-A.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of another
alias writ of execution before the RTC, arguing that such
issuance was necessary in view of private respondent’s
refusal to comply with the February 20, 2004 Alias Writ.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
In an Omnibus Order dated September 10, 2007, the
RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It found no need to
issue another alias writ of execution since the February
20, 2004 Alias Writ had already been duly served,
implemented, and fully satisfied.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration. Acting
on the belief that the RTC would deny the motion or
might take a long time to resolve the same, petitioner
then filed a petition for mandamus before the Court to
compel the RTC to issue another alias writ of execution
against private respondent and for such alias writ to be
immediately executed and fully implemented after its
issuance. In a Resolution dated July 21, 2008, the Court
remanded the petition to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 105092.
Did the CA correctly dismiss the petition for mandamus
for lack of merit?
Suggested Answer:
No. The petition lacks merit.
As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a command
issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person, requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. Being an extraordinary
remedy, mandamus is available only when there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration.
The proper procedure if the [losing party] refuse[s] to
deliver possession of the lands is not for the court to
cite them for contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess
them of the premises and deliver the possession
Page 38
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
thereof to the [winning party]. However, if subsequent
to such dispossession, [the losing party) enter[s) into or
upon the properties for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession or in any manner disturb the
possession of [the winning party), then and only then
may [the losing party) be charged with and punished for
contempt.
Topic: Writ of Possession
LZK Holdings and Dev Corp v. Planters Development
Bank 714 SCRA 294
By: Tamse, H.
Bar Question:
LZK Holdings obtained a ₱40,000,000.00 loan from
Planters Bank on December 16, 1996 and secured the
same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in
La Union. The real estate mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed due to non-payment and the lot was sold at
a public auction. Planters Bank emerged as the highest
bidder during the auction sale.
LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, a
complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure
and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.
Consequently, the RTC of Makati issued a TRO effective
for 20 days enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating
its title over the property and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On December 27, 1999, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the
RTC of San Fernando but was suspended in view of the
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
RTC of Makati.
Planters Bank appealed the order of the RTC of San
Fernando which held in abeyance the resolution of its
ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The Court of Appeals granted the appeal and annulled
the assailed order of the RTC of San Fernando. LZK
Holdings sought recourse with the Supreme Court in a
petition for review docketed as G.R. 167998 but on April
27, 2007, the Supreme Court affirmed CA’s ruling and
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
decreed that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled
to a writ of possession as the purchaser of the property
in the foreclosure sale.
Planters Bank filed before the RTC of San Fernando a
motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ
of possession contending that as the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale, it may apply for a writ of possession
during the redemption period. LZK Holdings opposed
the motion but such motion was denied by the RTC of
San Fernando and set the hearing on April 14, 2008.
On April 8, 2008, the RTC of San Fernando issued an
order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and
academic granting Planter Bank’s ex-parte motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession of the subject parcel
of land, together with all the improvements existing
thereon upon the filing of bond by Planters Bank in the
amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Did the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
affirming the issuance of writ of possession by the RTC
of San Fernando?
Suggested Answer:
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible
error in affirming the issuance of writ of possession by
the RTC of San Fernando.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment postulates that ''when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them.
In the case at bar, all the elements of the doctrine are
present. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was
rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over
the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a
judgment on the merits of Planters Banks’s right to
apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the
parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved
in the present case.
Page 39
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Therefore, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter
Bank’s right to a writ of possession over the subject
property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue.
Topic: Prohibition
Quintos vs. DARAB
715 SCRA 592 February 10, 2014
By: Abangan, Richard Jr.
Bar Question:
GCFI contracted substantial loans with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), which were secured by several real
estate mortgages over GCFI properties, including the
subject property. PNB and DBP transferred their
financial claims against GCFI to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT). PNB and DBP initiated extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings against the GCFI properties for
GCFI’s continuous failure to pay its loans. However, the
said foreclosure proceedings were enjoined by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). APT entered into a verbal
agreement with 53 members of KAMIFCI, allowing the
latter to be installed as tenants of the mango orchard
within the subject property.
Is the tenancy agreement valid?
Suggested Answer:
No. It is settled that a mortgagee does not become the
owner of the mortgaged property until he has
foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale. With the foreclosure
proceedings having been enjoined, APT could not have
been regarded as the “landowner” of the subject
property. Thus, since the consent of the standing
landowner, GCFI, had not been secured by APT in this
case, it had no authority to enter into any tenancy
agreement with the KAMIFCI members.
In the present case, a tenancy-relationship exists
between GCFI and the 33 KAMIFCI members who were
allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the “legal
possessor” of the mango orchard at that time. Records,
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
are however, bereft of any showing that APT was
authorized by the property’s landowner, GCFI, to install
tenants thereon. To be sure, APT only assumed the
rights of the original mortgagees in this case, i.e., PNB
and DBP, which, however, have yet to exercise their
right to foreclose the mortgaged properties due to the
RTC’s order enjoining the same.
Principle: It is settled that a mortgagee does not
become the owner of the mortgaged property until he
has foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale.
Topic: Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Spouses Sombillon vs Atty. Garay
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
By: Abragan, M.
Bar Question:
X and Y were previous owners of a property. The
property was mortgaged as security for their loan with
Q. The property was subsequently foreclosed by Q. The
property was not redeemed even after the lapse of the
redemption.
X and Y asked Z to repurchase the property in exchange
they promised Garay that they will sell a portion of the
lot to him. Z found out that Q was selling the entire
property for a lesser cost. So Z went to Q to buy the said
property. A writ of possession was issued in favor of Q.
X and Y moved for reconsideration of the issuance of
the writ of possession because according to them Z was
their former counsel in another case.
The lower court Issued an order holding in abeyance the
implementation of the writ of possession.
Can the court grant the petition for certiorari even if
there was failure to file a motion for reconsideration
where the decision assailed is null or violates due
process?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the court can grant the petition for certiorari.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Under the law, once title is consolidated under the
name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes a ministerial on the part of the
court and no discretion is left to the court. The
regularity and validity of the mortgage or the
foreclosure may not be raised as a ground to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession. Thus, it
was ministerial upon the judge to issue the writ of
possession in favor of Q and Z.
In this case, the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order in abeyance. Failure to
move for a reconsideration of the assailed order prior to
the availment of a special civil action for certiorari may
be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity
or where there is a violation of due process.
Thus, the grant of the petition for certiorari was valid.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Cabling v. Lumapas
G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014
By: Bejasa, K
Bar Question:
X was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale over a property. Later on, X filed an Application for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the RTC
granted. Y filed a Motion for Leave of Court for
Intervention as Party Defendant with urgent motion to
Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Writ of Possession,
claiming that the property had previously been sold to
her by the property’s registered owner which is the
judgment debtor/mortgagor in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of Conditional Sale.
The RTC granted the Motion filed by Y reasoning that an
ex parte writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No.
3135 cannot be enforced against a third person who is
in actual possession of the foreclosed property and who
is not in privity with the debtor/mortgagor.
Is the RTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
The RTC is not correct.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made
applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages, the possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a
third party is actually holding the property in a capacity
adverse to the judgment obligor, and thus, the court’s
obligation to issue an ex parte writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale ceases to be ministerial when there is a third party
in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to
that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
However, in the present case, Y cannot be said to
possess the subject property by adverse title or right as
her possession is merely premised on the alleged
conditional sale of the property to her by the judgment
debtor/mortgagor, considering that the execution of a
contract of conditional sale does not immediately
transfer title to the property to be sold from seller to
buyer.
Topic: Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer
Berot v. Siapno
729 SCRA 475
By: Calo, M
Bar Question:
A and Spouses C & D obtained a loan from E. As security
for the loan, they mortgaged a portion of parcel of land.
A died and the mortgagors defaulted.
E filed an action for foreclosure. Spouses C and D
alleged that the lower court has no jurisdiction over A
for the reason that no summons was served upon the
latter. Thus the complaint was amended by substituting
the estate of A in her stead. Is this correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. This is incorrect.
A deceased does not have such legal entity as is
necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to
substitute cannot lie and should be denied.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
An action begun by a decedent’s estate cannot be said
to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is
not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a
motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie,
there being nothing before the court to amend.
Principle:
A decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
Topic: Jurisdiction
Inocencia Tagalog v. Maria Lim Vda De Gonzalez
G.R. No. 201286, July 18, 2014
By: Chavez, E.
Bar Question:
Plaintiffs (Respondents) A,B,C,D, E, F and G are among
the registered owners of parcel of land XXX, for quit
sometime, T the defendant (petitioner) has been
occupying a portion of the parcel of land, as lessee
thereof, where her house was being built with a light
materials and was paying rentals over the same by
virtue of a verbal lease on a month to month basis. Such
house was damaged by a strong typhoon and T with her
family were no longer staying and even stop paying the
rental for quite some time. As a consequence, the
verbal contract is deemed expired, the Plaintiff
(Respondents) demanded the Defendant (petitioner) to
remove the scattered debris and notified that they
already intending to use the property and subdivide or
develop it for their personal use. T refused to remove
the scattered debris instead brought in cement, large
steel bars, hollow blocks, sand and gravel and other
construction materials into the premises because he is
claiming that he still the lessee of that parcel of land.
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter
Suggested Answer:
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
The petition is meritorious,
Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is for
unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by first level court or
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Since the case was filed
with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s decision
should be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction over the
case. The Jurisdiction of a particular court is determined
by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. In order to determine
whether the lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary
to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed
before it.
In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of
possession, preliminary mandatory injunction with a
prayer for temporary restraining order with damages
and attorney’s fees. In sum, since respondents
’complaint should have been filed with the MTC, the
RTC seriously erred in proceedings with the case.
Wherefore, we grant the petition, and set aside the
resolutions without prejudice to the parties seeking
relief in the proper forum. So Ordered.
Topic: Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Okabe vs Saturnino,
733 SCRA 652
By: Dy, I.
Bar Question:
Spouses A and B obtained a loan with Z bank, which was
secured by the subject property. The couple failed to
settle their loan obligation with the bank. Z bank then
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Certificate of
Sale was then issued, considering that the property was
not redeemed by the spouses during the redemption
period, consolidation of ownership was then inscribed
and a new TCT was issued in favor of the bank, Z.
Without taking possession of the subject property, Z
sold the land to C.C filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject property.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Is an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession the proper remedy of C in obtaining
possession of the subject property? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No, Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33.Deed and possession to be given
at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. – If no redemption be made
within one (1) year from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty
(60) days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof
given, and the time for redemption has expired,
the last redemptioner is entitled to the
conveyance and possession; but in all cases the
judgment obligor shall have the entire period of
one (1) year from the date of registration of the
sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be
executed by the officer making the sale or his
successor in office, and in the latter case shall
have the same validity as though the officer
making the sale had continued in office and
executed it.
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court be applied to cases involving
extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were
bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-
party-purchasers after the lapse of the
redemption period. The remedy of a writ of
possession, a remedy that is available to the
mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of
the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is
made available to a subsequent purchaser, but
only after hearing and after determining that
the subject property is still in the possession of
the mortgagor.
Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a
third party during the redemption period, a writ
of possession may issue ex-parte or without
hearing.(see Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act no. 4118)
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
In other words, if the purchaser is a third party
who acquired the property after the
redemption period, a hearing must be
conducted to determine whether possession
over the subject property is still with the
mortgagor or is already in the possession of a
third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property
is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of
possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the
remedy of a writ of possession is no longer
available to such purchaser, but he can take
possession over the property through an
ordinary action of ejectment.
Topic: Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Robles vs Yapcinco
G.R. No. 169568, October 22, 2014
By: Elumbaring, J
Bar Question:
The property in litis was originally registered in the
name of Fernando F. Yapcinco, married to Maxima
Alcedo. In May 4,1944, Yapcinco constituted a mortgage
on the property in favor of Jose C. Marcelo to secure
the performance of his obligation. In turn, Marcelo
transferred his rights as the mortgagee to Apolinario
Cruz on October 24, 1944. When Yapcinco did not pay
the obligation, Apolinario Cruz brought an action for
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Apolinario Cruz
was adjudged the highest bidder in the public auction
held on March 18, 1959. In his favor was then issued
the certificate of absolute sale, and he took possession
of the property in due course. However, he did not
register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial
confirmation of sale issued.
Are the heirs of the mortgagor lawfully entitled to the
property in litis because there was no registration of the
certificate of sale or confirmation from the court?
Answer: No.
The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the
foreclosure sale, was Section 3, Rule 7037 of the Rules
of Court, which relevantly provided that: "Such sale
shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
incumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and
when confirmed by an order of the court, it shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject
to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
The effect of the failure of Apolinario Cruz to obtain the
judicial confirmation was only to prevent the title to the
property from being transferred to him. For sure, such
failure did not give rise to any right in favor of the
mortgagor or the respondents as his successors-in-
interest to take back the property already validly sold
through public auction. Nor did such failure invalidate
the foreclosure proceedings. To maintain otherwise
would render nugatory the judicial foreclosure and
foreclosure sale, thus unduly disturbing judicial stability.
The non-transfer of the title notwithstanding,
Apolinario Cruz as the purchaser should not be deprived
of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale. With
the respondents having been fully aware of the
mortgage, and being legally bound by the judicial
foreclosure and consequent public sale, and in view of
the unquestioned possession by Apolinario Cruz and his
successors-in-interest (including the petitioner) from
the time of the foreclosure sale until the present, the
respondents could not assert any better right to the
property. It would be the height of inequity to still
permit them to regain the property on the basis alone
of the lack of judicial confirmation of the sale. After all,
under the applicable rule earlier cited, the judicial
confirmation operated only "to divest the rights of all
the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may
be allowed by law."
Therefore, the late Fernando F. Yapcinco and the
respondents as his successors-in-interest were divested
of their right in the property, for they did not duly
exercise the equity of redemption decreed in the
decision of the trial court. With Yapcinco having thereby
effectively ceased to be the owner of the property sold,
the property was taken out of the mass of the assets of
Yapcinco upon the expiration of the equity of
redemption.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Topic: Forcible Entry And Unlawful Detainer
Acbang vs. Luczon Jr.
G.R. No. 164246, Jan. 15, 2014
By: Eupena, R.
Bar Question:
Spouses X commenced an ejectment suit against Y and
her son and wife in the MTC. Y did not file an answer,
thus declaring them in default, and the court rendered
judgment against them. Y then appealed to RTC. While
the case is pending appeal, Spouses X moved for the
execution of the decision pending appeal alleging that
the defendants’ Y had not filed a supersede as bond to
stay the execution. Y opposed the motion for execution
pending appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses
X to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a
waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and
that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the
filing of the supersede as bond unnecessary. Judge L
granted the motion for immediate execution.
Did the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion for execution?
Suggested Answer:
No, the judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Jurisprudence provides that a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory
upon motion, but the defendant, to stay its immediate
execution, must:
(1) Perfect an appeal;
(2) File a supersede as bond; and
(3) Periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during
the pendency of the appeal.
In this case, there was a perfection of appeal by Y for
filing a notice of appeal. However, it did not suffice to
stay the immediate execution of the decision without
the filing of the sufficient supersede as bond and the
deposit of the accruing rentals.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Therefore, not having complied with the requirements
to stay the immediate execution, the Judge correctly
granted the motion.
Topic: Certiorari
Pascual vs Daquiog
GR 162063
By: Juarez, J.
Bar Question:
X filed a Free Patent Application over a lot. Y presented
a protest, claiming that X had no right to apply for title
over the properties.
The the free patent application of X was denied.
Y is advised to file Free Patent Applications immediately
after the finality of this Decision.
Z directing respondents A, B and C to implement the
writ of execution against X.
X filed a special civil action for certiorari to assail the
memorandum issued by Z.
Decide on the case.
Suggested Answer:
The special civil action for certiorari should be denied.
Under the rules, A special civil action for certiorari is the
proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi–judicial function has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The exercise of judicial function consists in the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights
of the parties.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
In the instant case, Z was not thereby called upon to
adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to
exercise any discretion of a judicial nature, but only
performing an administrative duty of enforcing and
implementing the writ.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari should be denied
for lack of merit.
Principle: The issuance of a memorandum
implementing a writ of execution did not derive from
the performance of a judicial or quasi–judicial function
therefore not covered under the petition for certiorari.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Mangaser vs Ugay
744 SCRA 13
By: Lim, E.
Bar Question:
M filed a forcible entry case against U. M alleged that he
was the registered owner and possessor of the subject
land; and that U stealthy intruded to his land and built a
residential house without his consent. U alleged, on the
other hand, that M was never in the actual possession
of the property occupied by him.
Is the action for forcible entry proper?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the action for forcible entry is proper. The Supreme
Court held that for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the
plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was
filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or
legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
physical possession of the property. In the case at bar,
petitioner M has acquired juridical possession over the
subject land through its registration with the register of
deeds. M does not need to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground to be considered that he is
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
in possession of the subject lot.
Principle:
The Supreme Court held that for a forcible entry suit to
prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that
they have prior physical possession of the property; (b)
that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the
action was filed within one (1) year from the time the
owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation
of the physical possession of the property.
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Sps. Marcelo v Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay
A.M. No.MTJ-13-1838; March 12, 2014
By: Lleve, A.
Bar Question:
X (Sps. Marcelo) were the plaintiffs in a civil case for
unlawful detainer before Judge Y (Judge Pichay), the
presiding judge of the MeTC. Judge Y decided the case
in favor of X and ordered Z to vacate and surrender the
possession of the property through a writ of execution.
X obtained the possession of the subject property,
however, Z re-entered the property on the same day. X
moved to cite Z for indirect contempt but Judge Y
decided not to. Judge Y ordered instead Z to surrender
the subject property to X with 10 days. Z then filed a
supplemental motion and reply alleging that the
miscellaneous sales application of X over the subject
property had been denied by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. In result, Judge Y
directed X to file their opposition to the Supplemental
Motion and Reply. X failed to file. Disconcerted of Judge
Y’s inaction over the case, X filed an administrative case,
alleging that Judge Y attributed the delay to the new
argument of the defendant.
Is Judge Y administratively liable?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. Judge Y is liable on the administrative case against
him.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Based on jurisprudence, ejectment cases are summary
proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means
of protecting actual possession or right of possession of
property and that it becomes mandatory or ministerial
duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce
the judgment which has become executory.
In the case at bar, Y continued with the proceedings by
setting the motions for hearing, notwithstanding that
the matter had already been submitted for resolution,
to the effect of unreasonably delaying the execution of
the subject decision.
Therefore, Y is administratively liable.
Principle:
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right of possession of property and that it
becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to
issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which
has become executory.
Topic: Unlawful Detainer
Amada Z. Zacarias vs. Anacay
G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014
By: Santiago, F
The Petitioner filed for a case of Unlawful detainer
against the respondents and order the same to vacate
the formers lot. The petitioner alleged in its complaint
that sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and
occupied the same. The MCTC ruled that it has no
jurisdiction since the case being one of forcible entry
and the case has already prescribed after the lapse of
one year from its discovery.
Is the ruling of the MCTC correct?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the ruling of MCTC is correct.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential
that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in
May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have
entered the subject property and occupied the same
would show that respondents entered the land and
built their houses thereon clandestinely and without
petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of
forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
For failure of the petitioner to show that the possession
by the respondent is lawful at first, the ruling of the
MCTC must be upheld.
Topic: Ejectment
Dela Cruz vs.Capco
G.R. No. 176055, March 17, 2014
By: Silawan, D.
Bar Question:
Petitioner P’s mother, M, acquired ownership of the
land that was duly registered under her name. M, out of
neighborliness and blood relationship tolerated R’s
occupation of the said land.
Subsequently, the subject land was conveyed to P.
Intending to construct a house, P, demanded R to
vacate the property, but R refused, he asserted that he
have all the right to occupy such land since he is an heir
of the alleged true owner of the land. Hence, P filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against R.
Can the Court pass upon the issue on ownership in a
case of unlawful detainer?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. Under the jurisprudence, the only issue in an
ejectment case is the physical possession of real
property – possession de facto and not possession de
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
jure. But where the parties to an ejectment case raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that
issue to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property.
In this case, both parties anchor their right to possess
based on ownership, P by his own ownership while R by
the ownership of his ascendant as one of the heirs of
the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the Court
may passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to
determine the issue of possession. However, it must be
emphasized that the adjudication of the issue of
ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the
property.
Thus, the court may pass upon the issue of ownership in
this case.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. v. Tormil Realty and
Dev. Corp, 730 SCRA 104
By: Sultan, J.
Bar Question:
On March 6, 1991,P entered into an agreement with E
for the rent of a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building.
Prior to the agreement, a case was held in favor of T
against E over the right of ownership of the building in
the ruling of SEC. On November 5, 1998, T sent letters
to E and P asking them to validate their
possession/enter into a lease contract with T and at the
same time settle their past and current rentals. The
letters were ignored, T, on November 16, 1998 sent
them separate demands to vacate the premises and pay
the monthly rental of ₱20,000.00 from the time of their
occupation thereof until the same are actually turned
over to T. Subsequently, T filed a case of unlawful
detainer against E and P. The METC, RTC and CA ruled
that the payment of the rentals is reckoned from the
time they failed and refused to heed the demand letters
to vacate and surrender the possession. With respect to
P, it was ordered to pay rental of the premises from
June, 1995 until the premises is fully vacated.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Is the decision of the court correct?
Suggested Answer:
No. The decision of the court is incorrect.
Under the law, "In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of
the property but his possession eventually becomes
unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to
possess." In other words, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the
Rules of Court requires the filing of such action within a
year after the withholding of possession. Meaning that
"if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year, then an ejectment proceeding (in this case
unlawful detainer) is proper ."
In the case at bar, while indeed T, as the victor in the
unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value
for the use and occupation of the unit in the building,
such compensation should not be reckoned from the
time P began to occupy the same, but from the time of
the demand to vacate. Here, from the moment P
started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to
November 15, 1998, the right of P to possess the
premises was not challenged. It was only after T
prevailed over E in its ownership of the same that it
terminated P right to possess the unit it was occupying
through a letter to vacate dated November 16, 1998.
Hence, it is only from that point that T is considered to
have withdrawn its tolerance of P occupation.
Conversely, P possession became unlawful at that same
moment.(November 16, 1998)
Therefore, P is to pay for the fair and reasonable rental
of the premises in the amount of ₱20,000.00 per month
with legal interest beginning November 16, 1998 up to
the time that the premises are fully vacated.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Midway Maritime And Technological Foundation Vs.
Castro, et al. G.R. No.189061, Aug. 6, 2014
By: Aguilando, L.
Bar Question:
Two parcels of land, which a residential building stands,
were owned by C. The said parcels of land were
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
foreclosed by Union Bank and the same were sold to T
in an auction. T leased the same to M and thereafter,
sold the parcels of land to A, wife of M. M leased the
residential building from L, mother of C. C filed an
action for Ownership and Recovery of Possession
against M, alleging that she is the owner of the
residential building and that M failed to pay the rent.
She prayed that she be declared as owner of the
residential building and that M be ordered to vacate the
same and pay the rent in arrears. M contended that C is
not the owner of the residential building and claimed
that A owns the building, having bought the same
together with the land on which it stands.
Is the contention of M correct?
Suggested Answer:
No, the contention of M is not correct.
It is settled that once a contract of lease is shown to
exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any
proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a
better right of possession to the subject premises than
the lessee. The Court expounded on the rule on
estoppel against a tenant and further clarified that what
a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation.
In this case, it is not improbable that at the timeM
leased the residential building from L, he was aware of
the circumstances surrounding the sale of the two
parcels of land and the nature of the respondents’ claim
over the residential house. Yet, the petitioner still chose
to lease the building. Consequently, the petitioner is
now estopped from denying the respondents’ title over
the residential building.
Therefore, the contention of M is not correct.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Fernandez vs. Villegas
SCRA 548 August 20, 2014
By: Ambrosio, S.
Bar Question:
X and Y filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
Z seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land. X
and Y averred that they are the registered owners of
the subject property. The house was destroyed by
typhoon "Cosme," X transferred to a nipa hut on the
same lot, while Z, Y’s daughter-in-law, and her family
were advised to relocate but, in the meantime, allowed
to use a portion thereof. Z erected a house thereon
over plaintiffs’ objections and, despite demands,
refused to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property.
Z averred that the complaint stated no cause of action,
considering that X has no standing to question their
possession of the subject property as she had already
donated her portion in favor of Y. Z failed to impugn the
validity of plaintiffs’ ownership over the subject
property. Z appealed. The RTC granted its appeal. X and
Y filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence the filing of petition in the CA. Z filed a motion to
dimiss. The CA granted Z’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Hence the instant petition filed by X alone.
Did the CA err in dismissing outright the petition?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the petition.
Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any
of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment,
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
In this case, both X and Y are co-plaintiffs in the
ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of
interest and cause of action as against respondents.
Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that
the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone
signature of X on the verification attached to the CA
petition constituted substantial compliance with the
rules. Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on
forum shopping are designed to promote and facilitate
the orderly administration of justice; hence, it should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The
requirement of strict compliance with the provisions on
certification against forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the
certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not
prohibit substantial compliance with the rules under
justifiable circumstances as also in this case.
Hence, the CA erred in dismissing the petition.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Abadilla vs Obrero
G.R. No. 210855, December 09, 2015
By: Bulanon, J.
Bar Question:
OB file a complaint for forcible entry against AB. OB
alleged that they are the registered owner of the land
covered by TCT No. 67890 issued on 2007 and asserts
that their ownership actually dates back to 1991. They
also occupied the subject land since that date and built
structures for commercial purposes and declared it for
tax purposes. While AB contended that the subject land
was sold by the petitioners to AB’s father, evidenced
with an unregistered deed of absolute sale.
Rule on who has the right to possess the subject land.
Suggested Answer:
OB has the right to possess the subject land.
A certificate of title is evidence of indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
person whose name appears therein. A title issued
under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes
of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession.
There is preponderance of evidence that OB and his
family were the party in peaceable, quiet possession of
the subject land before the petitioner committed the
complained acts of spoliation. While AB’s claim of
possession was based on the unsubstantiated and
unreliable affidavits.
As between the petitioner's deed of absolute sale and
the respondents' TCT No. 67890, the latter must prevail.
As a holder of the Torrens title over the subject land, OB
is entitled to its possession.
Principle:
A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all
the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily
includes possession.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Penta Realty Corporation vs. Ley Construction and
Development Corporation
G.R. No. 161589, September 24, 2014
By: Capao, H.
Bar Question:
A leased a property to B. Subsequently, they entered
into a contract to sell regarding the leased property,
paid by installments within one year. B stopped paying
the installments. A filed a complaint for ejectment
against B before the MeTC because of B’s failure to pay
the rentals and vacate the premises. The MeTC ruled in
favor of A and found that B's lawful possession of the
property had been, by virtue of the contract of lease,
become unlawful when the B failed to comply with its
obligation to pay the monthly rentals.
Did the MeTC correctly exercise its jurisdiction over the
case?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the MeTC correctly exercised its jurisdiction, having
the exclusive original jurisdiction over accion interdictal.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1,
Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of which there
are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed against a tenant,
and (2) that brought against a vendee or vendor, or
other person unlawfully withholding possession of any
land or building after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied.
In the case at bar, the MeTC correctly exercised its
authority in finding for A as the plaintiff. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in the action, B is in actual
possession and the A's cause of action is the
termination of B's right to continue in possession.
Therefore, the MeTCcorrectly exercised its jurisdiction
over the case.
Topic: Forcible Entry And Unlawful Detainer
Homer C. Javier vs. Susan Lumontad
G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
By: Casanares, A.
Bar Question:
Since Y’s birth, his family has lived in the residential
house erected on the land owned by his father. Upon
his father’s death, Y, together with his mother,
continued their possession over the same. However, Z
gained entry into the subject land and started to build a
building on portion of their land, despite Y’s vigorous
objections and protests. Y filed a forcible entry
complaint against Z before the MTC. Z alleged that she
took possession of the said portion not as an illegal
entrant but as its owner. The MTC dismissed the
complaint however it was reversed by the RTC. On
appeal by Z, CA set aside the RTC ruling that it does not
make a case for forcible entry but another action
cognizable by the RTC, an action for recovery of
possession and ownership.
Is the CA correct in setting aside the ruling of RTC?
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Suggested Answer:
No. In one case, the Court held that in forcible entry,
the complaint must necessarily allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been
deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The plaintiff
must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of
dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the
property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long
as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for
forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint shows that the
required jurisdictional averments, so as to demonstrate
a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been
complied with. It alleges that petitioner, as the original
owner’s was in prior physical possession of the subject
land but was eventually dispossessed of a portion
thereof by respondent who, through force and
intimidation, gained entry into the same and,
thereafter, erected a building thereon.
Furthermore, ejectment cases fall within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts under
Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases
where the issue of possession is closely intertwined
with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to
make an initial determination of ownership for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession. Such
adjudication however is merely provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore,
not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.55
Given that a forcible entry complaint had been properly
filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred in ordering the
remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits
Topic: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
Macapagal vs. People
717 SCRA 425
By: Lucabon, M.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Bar Question:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
on November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount
of P 800,000.00 .Failure to comply Procedural
requirements under Rule 45 is fatal of the Petition.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or
duplicate of the assailed decision, final order or
Judgement. Failure to comply such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Suarez vs.Emboy Jr.
718 SCRA 677
By: Lucabon, M.
The CA granted the Petition for Review filed by Mr. and
Mrs. Felix Emboy ,Jr. And Marilou Emboy-Delantar
(respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the
Regional trial court (RTC), Branch 12, and Municipal trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, of Cebu City, rendered
on February 26, 2008 and September 25, 2006.
The nature of a party of entering a land defines the
determination of the Cause of Action. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Topic: Grave Abuse of Discretion
Marquez vs.Sps. Alindog
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
By: Yapsangco, R.
Bar Queston: In June 1998, Anita Marquez extended a
loan in the amount of P500,000 to a certain Gutierrez.
As security therefore, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
Estate Mortgage over the subject parcel of land, which
was duly annotated.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan
obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the subject property. At the public auction sale held on
January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder.
Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property
within the prescribed period therefor, title was
consolidated in the name of Spouses Marquez with an
annotation of adverse claim in the names of Spouses
Alindog. Said adverse annotation was copied from an
earlier annotation made only after the subject
property’s mortgage to Spouses Marquez.
On March 21, 2000, Spouses Alindog filed a civil case for
annulment of real estate mortgage and certificate of
sale on the ground that they purchased the subject
property from Gutierrez way back in September 1989
but was unable to secure a certificate of title in their
names due to deception of a certain Gonzales.
Eventually, they found out that the property had
already been mortgaged to Sps. Marquez
Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession claiming that the same
is ministerial on the court’s part following the
consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the
subject property. RTC granted the same. Spouses
Alindog sought the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction. RTC issued a 72-hour TRO but
did not extent it to a full 20-day TRO.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
Spouses Marquez based on initial evidence that Spouses
Alindog appeared to have a right to be protected. CA
found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part
when it issued the injunctive writ.
Whether or not RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the injunctive writ which
enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Suggested Answer:
Yes, It is a settled rule that the buyer in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. However, Section 33, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court provides that the possession of
the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser
in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is
actually holding the property by adverse title or right.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Spouses Marquez, who had
already consolidated their title over the extrajudicially
foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature. The
general rule as herein stated – and not the exception
found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules – should
apply since Spouses Alindog hinged their claim over the
subject property on their purported purchase of the
same from its previous owner, i.e., Spouses Gutierrez
(with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor).
Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that
Spouses Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez)
successors-in-interest who do not have a right superior
to them.
Topic: Certiorari
Ayungo vs. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation
G.R. No. 203161 February 26, 2014
By: Yapsangco, R.
Bar Question:
Petitioner claimed that he is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits since his employment aggravated his
Hypertension and CAD and despite the disclosure in his
PEME that he had Diabetes Mellitus, Beamko and Eagle
Maritime assumed the risk of liability arising from his
weakened medical condition. Respondent contended
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
that the illnesses were not work-related under 2000
POEA-SEC. LA rendered in favor of the Petitioner. NLRC
affirmed. On appeal, CA set aside NLRC ruling as Ayunco
failed to show the causal connection between his illness
and the work for which he was contracted. Hence, this
petition
Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondents’
petition for certiorari, thereby setting aside the NLRC’s
decision holding that Ayungo was entitled to disability
benefits.
Suggested Answer:
No, to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that
the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious
and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion
may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not
supported by substantial evidence. This requirement is
clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "[i]n cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds
that the CA correctly granted respondents’ certiorari
petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it held that Ayungo was entitled to disability
benefits notwithstanding the latter’s failure to establish
his claim through substantial evidence. n this case, the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LA’s
findings that Ayungo is entitled to disability benefits on
the ground that Beamko and Eagle Maritime assumed
the risk of liability of his weakened condition.
In sum, the CA rightfully granted respondents' certiorari
petition as the NLRC findings and the conclusions
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
reached thereby are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion considering that Ayungo's claim for disability
benefits remains unsupported by substantial evidence
and is even anathema to the provisions of the 2000
POEA-SEC.
Topic: Certiorari
Naval vs. Comelec
729 SCRA 299,
By: Magallon, S.
Bar Question:
X was elected and served as member of a sanggunian,
Second District, of Province A twice. Congress passed a
law reapportioning A’s districts. X was again elected and
served as a member of the sanggunian, now Third
District, of the same province but with slightly less
number of constituents than the previous District. X ran
again for the same position. Y, a candidate for
sanggunian, Third District of A, sought to cancel X’s
certificate of candidacy because X violated the three-
term limit rule. Comelec resolved the issue in Y’s favor.
X filed a petition for Certiorari against Comelec under
Rule 64.
Will the petition lie?
Suggested Answer:
No. The petition of certiorari will not issue.
Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution states that the
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive years. Jurisprudence also
dictates that a petition for certiorari against actions of
the Comelec is confined only to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process because the Comelec
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018
is presumed to be the most competent in matters
falling within its domain.
In the case at bar, X clearly violated the three-term limit
rule when he ran for the same position with the same
constituents (albeit with slightly fewer number of
constituents) for a fourth time. Comelec’s decision
upheld the constitution and was not made to patently
and substantially deny X due process.
Thus, petition for certiorari will not lie.
Topic: Ejectment
Dela Cruz vs. Capco
719 SCRA 291,
By: Magallon,S.
Bar Question:
X owned a piece of land. Y occupied X’s property out of
X’s tolerance. X later on sold the property to Z. Z
demanded that Y vacate the property, but he refused.
Thus, Z filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Y
asserted that the complaint was defective for failing to
allege the exact metes and bounds of the property.
Who has the better right to possess the property?
Suggested Answer:
Z does. The only issue in an ejectment case is the
physical possession of real property―possession de fact
and not possession de jure. But where the parties to an
ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property.
But adjudication of the issue on ownership is only
provisional.
In this case, Z proved by preponderance of evidence
that he was the likely owner of the piece of land.
Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta
Thus, Z is the rightful possessor as one of the attributes
of ownership.
Topic: Certiorari
Silvero vs Silvero
GR No. 186589, Jul 18, 2014
By: Viagedor, J.
Bar Question:
Z died without leaving a will. She was survived by her
legal heirs, namely: X (husband), Y, (son) A (son), B
(son), C (son), D (daughter), and E (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate was filed by X.
However, X was removed as administrator and in his
instead, Y, was designated as the new administrator. X
filed a Petition for Certiorari and the CA granted X's
application and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Y
filed a petition for Certiorari before the SC under Rule
65 contending that CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution and in granting
injunctive relief against him.
However, Y defied CA’s resolution and thus, prompting
Y to file a petition for indirect contempt but it was
denied.
Whether the CA committed error in dismissing X’s
indirect contempt petition on the ground of pendency
of special civil action filed by Y.
Suggested Answer:
Yes.
The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
instituted in relation to a pending case does not stay the
proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this
clear: The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
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 UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS SCHOOL OF LAW S.Y 2017 - 2018

injunction for the preservation of the rights of the Suggested Answer:

parties pending such proceedings.
The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding
in the case. This is because "an original action for
certiorari is an independent action and is neither a
continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the
judgment complained of.
No.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title
or ownership because between a case for forcible entry
and an accionreinvindicatoria, there is no identity of
causes of action. Such determination does not bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land; neither it is
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession.

Topic: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Ocampo vs Heirs or Bernardino Dionisio
G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014
By: Bautista, Sheryl Yu
Bar Question:
Bernardino Dionisio (Dionisio) filed a complaint5 for
forcible entry with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cardona, Rizal against Mario Ocampo (Mario) and Felix
Ocampo (Felix). Dionisio sought to recover the
possession of a portion of his property situated in Dalig,
Cardona, Rizal, alleging that Mario and Felix built a
piggery thereon without his consent. Mario denied
Dionisio’s allegation, claiming that the disputed parcel
of land is owned by his wife, Carmelita Ocampo who
inherited the same from her father. Mario further
claimed that they have been in possession of the said
parcel of land since 1969.
A forcible entry case only involves the issue of
possession over the subject property while the recovery
of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the
subject property and the right to possess the same.
The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only
as to the MTC’s determination that the petitioners are
not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed
to prove their prior physical possession; it is not
conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property.
Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land."

Dionisio died subsequently. The heirs of Dionisio

(respondents), filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with the MTC. They averred that Dionisio
thereafter took possession of the subject property and
was able to obtain a free patent covering the subject
property.

The MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that

Dionisio failed to establish prior possession of the parcel
of land.

Is the judgment in the forcible entry case barred the

action for the recovery of possession of the parcel land.

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Provisional Remedies – Special Civil Action,
Compiled by the Class of Atty. Abraham Acosta