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DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC,
filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against
respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and
corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract -
unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of
documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation -
influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of
requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f)
engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the
owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is
only P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of
pesos to Cocochem.[1]
On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied. The
Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding that the present controversy involved breach
of contract as he also took into account the circumstance that petitioner had already
filed a collection case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila-Br. 15, docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the filing of the motion for
reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days
from notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998.[3] miso
Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in dismissing his
complaint. He submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) v. PCGG[4] and Republic v. Sandiganbayan[5] have declared that the
coconut levy funds are public funds then, conformably with Quimpo v.
Tanodbayan,[6] corporations formed and organized from those funds or whose controlling
stocks are from those funds should be regarded as government owned and/or
controlled corporations. As in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest
of the companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIIF
as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary,[7] it follows that they are
government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner asserts that
respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. Sdaadsc
Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his complaint refers to a
breach of contract is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible amounting to a total
disregard of its main point, i. e., whether private respondents violated The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act when they entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime
Corporation which was grossly disadvantageous to the government in general and to
the CIIF in particular. Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out
of time. Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its rules
in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a matter of days and he,
a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed the complaint.Rtcspped
Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and are
existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private individuals
and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that they are not public officers as
defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are private executives
appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a
learned counsel. They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly
filed a case for collection of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved the
recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint because he
sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal indictment of private
respondents. spped
The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21 October
of that year, P. D. No. 961[12] was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P.
D. No. 1468[13] by inserting a new provision authorizing the use of the balance of the
Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition of "shares of stocks in
corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment and operation
of industries x x x commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating
to coconut and other palm oil indust(ries)."[14] From this fund thus created, or the CIIF,
shares of stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were
purchased. miso
We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the State's
police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper management thereof were
certainly the concern of the Government. These funds have a public character and are
clearly affected with public interest.
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF
companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete
without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation"
contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely,
first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and,
third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock. Sclaw
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were
organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of
LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of
UNITED COCONUT.[15] Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL
removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation.
Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we
go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED
COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the
CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the
scope of its jurisdiction. Sclex
With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised
by petitioner.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[2]
Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II David B. Corpuz approved by Director Angel C. Mayoralgo, Assistant
ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto; Rollo, p. 22.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[4]
G.R. No. 75713, 2 October 1989, 178 SCRA 236.
[5]
G.R. No. 96073, 16 February 1993, En Banc Resolution.
[6]
G.R. No. 72553, 2 December 1986, 146 SCRA 137.
[7]
Annexes "k," "L" to "L-1," and "M" to "M-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 80-84.
[8]
Effective 19 June 1971.
[9]
Effective 20 August 1973.
[10]
Effective 14 November 1974.
[11]
Effective 2 October 1981.
[12]
Coconut Industry Code.
[13]
Revised Coconut Industry Code.
[14]
Sec. 9, PD No. 1468.
[15]
See Note 7.
[16]
G.R. No. 134171, 18 November 1998, 298 SCRA 736.
MANUEL LEYSON, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANG.R. NO. 134990 (2000)Facts:D committed a breach
in his contract with P. P charged D with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Ombusdman. P also filed a collection case before the RTC against D. Issue:Whether P committed forum-
shopping Held:No. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent
that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i.e., violation of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is
collection of a sum of money plus damages.
Source:http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1756771-
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