Bhutan’s democratic journey -

lessons from other young democracies

Renata Dessallien

www.bhutancmd.org.bt
 Bhutan’s democratic journey -
lessons from other young democracies
Renata Dessallien*

Abstract:

Nearly ten years into the 21st century, persistent democratic infirmities and setbacks
around the world have led many scholars to conclude that the global journey
toward democracy has stalled. Drawing on examples from developing countries,
this paper explores aspects of this phenomena, probing how young democracies
are often distorted by traditional power structures and predatory elites, disoriented
by externally driven development paradigms, and weakened by corruption. It
suggests a few key factors for overcoming these impediments to democratic
consolidation, including robust democratic framework conditions, constructive
political engagement through deliberative processes, and vibrant, influential actors
in the public space.

Whereas many developing countries made their democratic transitions under less
than ideal circumstances, often in the aftermath of war or colonial rule, Bhutan’s
transition occurred during a period of peace, good governance and prosperity.
These conditions offer a unique opportunity for the country to avoid the worst
ailments and trappings of other young democracies. Not only would this save the
country decades of disappointment and frustration, this paper intimates that a
small country in a sensitive, geopolitical location may not have the luxury of making
all the same mistakes as others. The paper suggests that focusing on delivering
democratic outcomes, strengthening framework conditions and democratic
culture, and leveraging the country’s leadership, including the monarchy, would be
central to this endeavour.
This paper offers a practitioner’s perspective, informed by the author’s 25 years of
experience in developing countries in Africa and Asia.
* The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the United Nations or any United Nations official.

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 The democratic journey --
some thoughts for Bhutan

Introduction

Democracy’s lustre has dimmed in recent years, both in the south and the north.
The flurry of democratization in the last part of the 20th Century evoked prospects
for a democratic golden age. But too often elected governments deviated from the
basic precepts of democratic rule. Sometimes they strayed so far that democracy
became unrecognisable. Recent books such as “Wars, Guns, and Votes”1 describe
some of the brazen tactics employed in the name of democracy. In Kenya, for
example, large numbers of tribal people were forcibly displaced prior to the 1992
and 1997 elections to disenfranchise them.2 And in the lead up to the 2008 elections
in Nicaragua, the incumbent party tilted the playing field to its advantage by
disqualifying two opposition parties, refusing accreditation to election observers,
and withholding voter identity cards for people supporting the opposition.3

Although democratic transition was supposed to usher in an era of good governance

and people’s emancipation, many societies got something very different.

What many (or most) citizens actually experienced was a mix of

distressed governance: abusive police forces, domineering local
oligarchies, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt
and inaccessible judiciaries, and venal, ruling elites contemptuous
of the rule of law and accountable to no one but themselves. As a
result, people -- especially in the bottom strata of society, which in
many new democracies comprised the majority -- were citizens only
in name. There were few meaningful channels of participation and
voice open to them. There were elections, but they were contests
between corrupt, clientelistic parties that served popular interests
only in name. There were parliaments and local governments, but
they did not represent or respond to broad constituencies. There
was a constitution, but not constitutionalism -- a commitment to
the principles and restraints in that hallowed charter. There was
1 Collier, Paul (2009): Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York:
HarperCollins Publishers.
2 Ibid, pp. 33-34
3 “How to steal an election”, The Economist, 13 November 2008

4
 democracy in a formal sense, but people were still not politically
free … there is good reason to question whether such a shallow
rendition of democracy can legitimately be termed anything more
than a competitive authoritarian regime.4

Faced with such examples of democracy’s susceptibility to deformation, it is clear

how complex, vulnerable and fragile the system is. While democracy is undoubtedly
the least worst form of government, it is also the least easy. To work well it must
be well calibrated to specific country contexts. It must be steered by decision-
makers who place national interests above individual and group pursuits. It must
be carefully scrutinized by the society, who must actively engage with the system
to keep it true to purpose. Otherwise, democracy tends to veer off course and
malfunction. It becomes a front for other forms of governance. It becomes a
Trojan horse.

Unlike many developing countries, Bhutan’s democratic transition occurred during

a period of peace, prosperity and enlightened thinking. It was introduced against
a backdrop of good governance that had been established over years of careful
grooming by the 4th King. It was phased in gradually, grounded with the early
decentralisation decisions of 1981 and 1991,5 giving the country time to prepare
itself, to study the experiences of other nations, and to design a system tailored to its
specific context. Yet despite these favourable conditions and careful preparations,
the transition to full fledged democracy represents a significant adjustment for
Bhutanese society. The system is very young and fragile in many ways, and it has
introduced tensions and compulsions that must be carefully managed. Decisions
taken now will determine the path dependency of Bhutan’s democracy for decades
to come.

Bhutan is therefore at an important conjuncture in her history. She has a unique

opportunity to steer clear of the most costly mistakes made by others that could
save years of struggle and frustration. She can establish, right from the start, a well
functioning, high quality democracy that reaps good harvests for the Bhutanese
people, maintaining the country’s stable development path. Indeed, as a small
nation in a sensitive geopolitical zone, Bhutan may not have the same space to
repeat all the same mistakes of other young democracies. But to avoid democracy’s

4 Diamond, Larry (2008): The spirit of democracy: the struggle to build free societies throughout the
world, Times Books/Henry Holt and Company, p. 295
5 In 1981, important administrative functions were decentralised from the central level to the district
or Dzongkhag level, and in 1991 functions were further decentralised to the block or Geog level.

5
common trappings will not be easy, nor will it occur without concerted effort and
creative thinking.

This paper reviews some frequent causes for democratic malfunction in developing
countries, probing the effects of traditional power structures and predatory elites,
the influence of externally driven development paradigms, and the impact of
high levels of corruption on democratic politics. It highlights the importance of
strong democratic framework conditions, and constructive political engagement
by citizens, parties and influential groups in the public space. And it offers some
thoughts on Bhutan’s democratic journey, including the importance of GNH
in crafting a quality democracy, of developing Constitutional trumping powers
and inculcating a strong democratic culture. The paper concludes with that vital
ingredient of good governance -- leadership, and reflects on the role of the King
in guiding Bhutan’s democratic process until it settles into an enduring positive
trajectory.

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 PART ONE

1.0 Common causes of democratic malfunction

To understand how and why democracy deviates from its expected course requires
that we go behind the scenes. What you see is often not what you get. On the
surface, there may appear to be a fine democratic system design, complete with all
the laws, regulatory features and institutional set up for proper functioning. But
beneath the surface, there may lay an operative system that has little to do with
democracy beside elections.

For example, a country may possess a formal justice system ostensibly designed
to protect the constitutional order and ensure justice for all citizens. However, the
actual functioning of the system may differ substantially from what it purports
to be. It may be heavily influenced by the ruling class. In extreme cases, it may
function primarily to ensure their impunity, while ignoring or impeding the majority
of citizens’ access to justice.

Let us take a specific example. In many fledgling democracies, if a powerful

politician commits a grave crime and someone has the courage to blow the whistle
and lodge a case, it may be accepted in court. The politician, in addition to ensuring
that the whistleblower never forgets his grave mistake, will hire a high-powered
defence lawyer whose training and experience likely far exceeds that of state
prosecutors. Given the lawyer’s skills, possible legal ambiguities and loopholes,
and judges’ susceptibility to threats and coercion, it may not be difficult for the
accused to secure bail, upon which he can immediately begin interfering with
witnesses and evidence. If the case is not quashed on grounds of being ‘politically
motivated’ (a favourite tactic), it may not be difficult to find a politically biased
judicial bench to secure the desired verdict, for a fee or favour. Impunity is thus
effectively purchased, in the name of democracy and rule of law. Beneath the
formal judiciary, another system is at work with completely different aims.

This kind of subterranean, parallel governance can exist across all parts of the state
apparatus. The state anti-corruption bureau may effectively be a front for harassing
those out of political favour. The public service commission and establishment
ministry may be fronts for ensuring that ruling party loyalists get hired, promoted
and transferred into coveted positions, while affiliates of the opposition get

7
sidelined or laid-off work. The state land registry office may be a thin disguise for
a system to allocate state land to the ruling elite. The elections authority may be a
front for keeping the ruling party in power.

Understanding how democracy is undermined is the first step toward deepening

it. The following sections look at some channels through which democracy is
deformed and defiled. They are by no means the only vectors of democratic
distortion, but they are relatively common in developing countries.

Traditional power structures

Common causes of democratic Predatory elites
malfunction Externally driven development paradigms
Corruption

1.1 Traditional power structures

When societies transition to democracy, they do not suddenly abandon their age
old practices; they take their social hierarchies, power structures and networks with
them, in some form or another. In countries where poverty is widespread and the
state is unable to provide basic services to many of its people, affiliation with a
group is usually the most effective means of securing protection and acquiring
opportunities. Groups form around traditional leaders, religious personalities
and institutions, local patrons, people who are well established and know how to
work the system, etc. They provide protection and assistance to members, often in
return for services.

When democracy is superimposed on traditional societies, and leaders --

particularly those who function as patrons -- enter into public office, they remain
committed to their social networks and practices. For example, an elected official
or civil servant may know full well that the recruitment of staff or the award of a
tendered government contract must follow a stipulated formal process to ensure
value for money, yet strong social obligations may exert untenable pressure to
favour a particular candidate or bidder. Over time, these social networks may shed
some of their traditional characteristics for political opportunism, but the same
ties of dependency and reciprocal obligation often persist.

In a study of patron-client relationships in Ghana, it was found that politicians

8
maintained their network of clients through favours such as “attending to
individuals’ schools fees, electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses;
or distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture, or even handing out ‘chop-
money’ (small cash sums) to constituents.”6 The patron-politician’s incentive to
guarantee his incumbency is the main incentive for this form of redistribution,
often relying on resources extracted through his political position. It was also
found that power structures of this kind tended to turn election campaigns into
“harvesting seasons” for voters, who saw in an election a chance, or even a right, to
“reap the fruits from the parliamentary tree.”7 While the particular expression of
such patron-client networks varies between cultures and places, similar examples
have been found in countries across the democratizing and developing world.8

Political parties are thus often the conduit for traditional, non-democratic social
traits that mutate into politically expedient practices. They mirror the basic
characteristics of their societies and improvise around them. This explains why
parties operating in societies marked by feudal, patron-client relations, or by ethnic
or religious cleavages, often exhibit these traits. Since kinship and traditional power
relations are so vital for survival in many societies, party politics often becomes
both highly intense and highly personalised. Deep dependency syndromes develop.
Personality cults emerge. Parties become dominated by families and run as fiefdoms.
Heredity becomes an acceptable form of leadership succession. Hybrid systems
emerge, based on competing logics -- formal and traditional. The bigger a society’s
unmet socioeconomic needs and the stronger its social ties and relationships, the
more difficult it seems to be to remain within the formal democratic framework.

It should not be surprising that when democracy is introduced to societies that

operate along non-democratic lines, it takes on the characteristics of its host.
What is surprising, however, is that those who study and promote democratic
governance have taken so long to acknowledge the hybrid systems that emerge and
the extent of their deviation from basic democratic principles.

6 Lindberg, Staffan (2005): “‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism
rather than Counteract it?”. Democratization, vol 10/2, pp. 121-140
7 Ibid, p. 127
8 Khan, Mushtaq (2005): “Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for
Democracy in Developing Countries”, Democratization, vol. 12/5, pp. 704-724

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1.2 Predatory elites

Predatory elites in young democracies often trace their antecedents to traditional

power structures. When a country produces a ruling class of predatory elite, they
often become the prime distorter of democratic governance. In some developing
countries, they operate virtually unrestrained. Once in power, they pass laws,
policies and decisions designed to enable their own relentless pursuit of rents and
their compulsions to maintain power. After spreading their influence across all
branches of government, they feed on the state and exploit the weak. Corruption
becomes a way of life. In extreme cases, the entire government apparatus can be
distorted beyond recognition.

Politicians bribe electoral officials, beat up opposition campaigners,

and assassinate opposing candidates. Presidents silence criticism and
eliminate their opponents by legal manipulation, arrest, or murder.
Ministers worry first about the monies they can collect and only
second about whether the contracts they are signing have any value
for the public. Legislators collect graft to vote for bills and to make
or break governing coalitions… Police extort rather than defend the
public, and the line between the police and the criminals is a thin one,
when it exists.9

In countries suffering from elite predation, political parties are usually the locus of
power and their organising force. They tend to be hierarchical and authoritarian.
Motivated by the thirst for power and resources, their behaviour can resemble
that of mafia groups, complete with networks of armed thugs and threateners.
The opposition is perceived as the arch enemy, along with anyone who dares
question their ways. The people are peons to be used to achieve their aims. Because
they operate in countries where the masses are generally poor, vulnerable and
uneducated, dependency syndromes develop. Constituents come to view their
parties and their representatives as agents for material and other benefits, and
parties view public office as business ventures. Not all the fruits of rent seeking
disappear into party and party representative pockets; some is redistributed to
political dependents whose services are required. Come election time, there is
often generous redistribution, with the knowledge that public office will enable its
recuperation manifold.
9 Diamond, Larry (2008): The Spirit of Democracy and the Struggle to Build free Societies
throughout the World, New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Company, p. 295

10
 “The predatory society is the inverse of the civic community. First,
there is no real community, no shared commitment to any common
vision of the public good, and no respect for law. Behavior is
cynical and opportunistic. Those who capture political power seek
to monopolize it and the rents that flow from it. Thus, if there are
competitive elections, these become a bloody zero-sum struggle
where everything is at stake and no one can afford to loose. People
ally with one another in the quest for power and privilege, but not
as equals. Rather, relations are steeply hierarchical. Ordinary people
are not truly citizens but rather clients of powerful patrons, who
themselves serve as clients to more powerful patrons. Blatant
inequalities in power and status cumulate into vertical chains of
dependency and exploitation, secured by patronage and coercion. In
a predatory society, officials feed on the state and the powerful prey
on the weak. The rich extract the wealth from the poor and deprive
them of public goods.”10

Political parties and their networks thus enable predatory elite to operate a complex
system of exploitation, underneath a façade of democracy. Democratic systems
are carefully rewired behind the scenes to meet their ends. They ensure their
people are in strategic decision-making positions to expedite their work. They are
adept at neutralising institutional oversight of their activities. The most efficient
way of accomplishing this is through appointments to oversight bodies. In some
countries, the president or prime minister is endowed with enormous discretionary
powers of appointment. In such cases, there is no need for excessive pretence --
political allies or compliant personalities are openly selected to head the judiciary,
the anti-corruption body, the audit authority, the election commission, the national
human rights commission, etc. In other countries, selection procedures involve a
number of administrative and elected figures. This may require some ingenuity
to fix, but arrangements can usually be found. In countries where term durations
were purposefully made lengthy or designed to straddle political governments
to avoid tampering, even this can be fixed. In the event an independent-minded
leader accidentally emerges at the helm of such institutions, the ruling elite can
usually make life so difficult for him or her that they eventually have no option
but to resign. And if the system proves to be truly fool proof, it can always be
suspended on some pretence.

10 Ibid, p. 298

11
To prevent society from objecting to their behaviour, elite predators employ several
effective tactics. First, they make it difficult or costly to expose their illegal activities
through threats and harassment. Secondly, they hide their misdeeds behind the
democratic façade, emitting thick smokescreens of democratic rhetoric to confuse
their ‘assailants’. Third, they infiltrate the private sector and civil society to create
friends and foes of them, and drive wedges between groups that might otherwise
try to unite against them. Fourth, when they exaggerate beyond a society’s tolerance
level and people protest, they create diversions -- inciting ethnic tensions, conjuring
up national conspiracies, fabricating malicious and threatening foreign intent and
other forms of fear mongering that justifies clampdowns on human liberties.

The above description may seem exaggerated, but it exists today to greater or lesser
degrees in many young, struggling democracies. In fact, these are not democracies
at all; they are predatory systems that subject themselves periodically, sometimes
even regularly, to elections (during which rigging and coercion abound). Extricating
societies from the grips of predatory elite is one of the greatest challenges for
rescuing democracy. When democracy reaches such desperate straights, it must be
rescued first before it can be deepened.

1.3 Externally driven development paradigms

It is becoming increasingly evident that neo-liberal economic policies and

externally driven development paradigms of the last twenty years have not always
contributed to the consolidation of democracy and good governance in developing
countries. In fact, an increasing body of literature argues that they have often had
a negative impact by reducing the space for public policy debate and distorting, in
some cases completely undermining, domestic accountabilities.11 Countries trying
to build or consolidate democracy should therefore pay attention to the impact of
development policies on democracy and good governance.

In this section we look at two ways in which dominant economic development

models have undermined democracy. First, we study how it can negatively influence
society’s general frame of reference, shaping a peoples’ image of themselves and
the rest of the world, and therefore influencing how they behave as citizens and
engage politically. Second, at the level of development policy packages, we look at
how tough economic reform initiatives trigger reactions from the ruling elite that
can negatively affect political choices.

11 Lekvall, Anna: “Democracy and aid: the missing links”, Open Democracy, 13 May 2009

12
Homo economicus and America’s model of progress

This section examines what can happen to countries that have made the transition
to multi-party democracy when liberal economic forces are taken to extremes. The
United States is used by way of example.

America’s predominant frame of reference today is economic. This was not

always the case. For two hundred years prior to the late 1980s, Western politics
including that of the US was marked by a social struggle between the political left
and the right. And economic strategies were driven largely by social issues and
convictions. This came to an abrupt halt with the demise of the Soviet Union
in 1989. Thereafter, both the left and the right lost some of their bearings and
a new dominant narrative emerged that was essentially economy-centric. Instead
of seeing the world through the lens of class struggle, revolutions and progress,
the new dominant discourse evoked an economic world view -- global capitalism,
market optimization, economic competition, growth, productivity.12

Many countries were part of this transformation, but the US came to epitomise the
new narrative. It has been termed “supercapitalism”13 and “superdevelopment”14
by some. In this new era, firms and financiers, or “Wal-Marts and Wall Streets,”15
became the dominate players. Through professional lobby networks, they rolled
back regulatory mechanisms, pushed the privatisation of services long considered
government functions (health care, schools, airports, post, even prisons and army
functions), and at the same time secured extraordinary advantages for themselves
through tax breaks, subsidies, protectionist policies, etc.

The new American growth model resulted in immense opportunities for some
and enormous fortunes for a few. It succeeded in sustaining growth, expanding
consumer choice, it brought down prices and spurred remarkable technological
innovation that changed the way we live. But it also drove down wages, wiped
out jobs, bankrupted companies, devastated many communities and caused untold
environmental harm. While the economy expanded and investment values sky

12 Kotz, David (2003): “Neoliberalism and the U.S. Economic expansion in the ‘90s”, Monthly
Review, vol. 54/11 (April), pp. 15-33
13 Reich, Robert B (2007): Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and
Everyday Life, New York: Vintage Books
14 Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1995): Democracy on Trial, New York: Basic Books, p. 13
15 Reich, Robert B (2007): Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and
Everyday Life, New York: Vintage Books, pp.12-14

13
rocketed (prior to the 2008 financial meltdown), many vital social concerns and
social responses fell by the wayside.16 And as the society focused on trying to get
ahead economically, it seemed to loose interest in the public interest. Notions of
the common good came to be viewed as almost old fashioned. The public space
contracted.17

By trumping private advantage over public interest, and by reducing and

discrediting the role of the state, America’s economic view of itself and the world
neglected that part of the human experience that represents the collectivity, the
shared purpose, interests bigger than the individual. According to Robert Reich,
Americans’ interests as “investors” and “consumers” triumphed over their
capacity to act as “citizens”. This led to a form of hyper-individualism at odds with
fundamental values of democracy. It threatened the quality of social engagement
and society’s ability to perform its democratic responsibilities. The consequences
of this were serious.18

The current chapter in American history teaches us that unless the basic elements
of a country’s self identity and purpose remain complementary to democratic
values, they can end up eroding the institutions that support and magnify those
values, undermining the quality of democracy. Developing countries should take
heed. Unfortunately, many have instead charged headlong in the same directions at
break neck speed. This created a peculiar situation: the emergence of a super-rich
developing country elite that may share more in common with their American and
other OECD country counterparts than with their own countrymen. Given their
relatively weak democratic culture to begin with, these countries are even more
vulnerable than the United States to the distorting effects of super-capitalism.

Political response to tough economic reform -- developing countries

America’s dominant economic narrative began to be promoted by the international

community in developing countries during the 1980s. A set of economic policy
16 The Gini index, the most commonly used measure of income inequality, increased from 39.7 in 1967
to 46.9 in 2001, and data from the US Census Bureau shows that the share of pre-tax household
income held by the top 1 percent in 2005 stood at its highest since the 1920s, an era of great income
disparities (US Census Bureau. (2005). “Historical Income Tables - Income Equality.” (http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p60no231_tablea3.pdf. Retrieved 2009-10-03; Johnston,
David, “Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows”. New York Times, 29 March 2007
17 Putnam, Robert D. (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,
New York: Simon & Schuster
18 Ibid

14
prescriptions, known as the “Washington Consensus,” took shape with two
main prongs (a) structural adjustment -- designed to divest the public sector of
productive activities, to maintain low savings rates and to finance investment
through foreign capital, and to promote export-led growth, and; (b) stabilization
-- to keep inflation low, through containment of public spending and tax reform.
These packages were conceived to help developing countries tackle their very real
and nagging problems of low productivity, high inflation, large trade imbalances
and high public deficits.

Implicit in the policy package were three big assumptions. First, it was assumed
that most developing countries could be treated the same way -- they could be
cured of their various economic ailments with the same medicine. Secondly, it
assumed that developing countries had to pass through the same path or trajectory
as had developed countries -- they had to start with low-end exports and work their
way up. Trade liberalisation was therefore a central feature of the policy package.
Thirdly, it was assumed that market forces could handle most of what was needed
to achieve development and that the role of government was mainly regulatory,
plus the provision of some basic services. Governments were therefore put on
belt-tightening regimes. And the era of country-specific national development
strategies and planning was over.

By the late 1990s, when country after country failed to achieve the desired results
of stabilization and structural adjustment and when public protests and bad
press reached embarrassing levels, the international community had to pause
and think again. It abandoned the Washington Consensus nomenclature and
adopted ‘poverty reduction’ as its new clarion call. But it made this change without
fundamentally rethinking many of its basic economic assumptions and policy
prescriptions. The packaging became softer, governments were asked to lead the
processes, but the policies remained largely the same. It is now nearly three decades
that many developing countries have operated within this policy framework. In
many cases, this corresponds with the period in which many of them transitioned
to democratic government. What influence did the neo-liberal economic model
have on the shape and quality of democracy in these countries?

This is a difficult question to answer because of attribution problems. Furthermore,

the differences in initial circumstances and the disparate ways in which countries
assimilated both economic policy prescriptions and democracy led to a plurality

15
of experience, some positive and some negative. In addition, country studies are
often hampered by narrow compartmentalism and ideological blinkers. There are
numerous reports on the economies of almost all countries, and many on political
governance, but they are separate, parallel enquiries. Very little analysis exists on
how one impacts the other. Until such a body of work emerges, we can only hazard
general observations.19

Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1989) provides some insights in his book Democracy
Realized. He gives a vivid description of what happens to democracy when one
tries to force neo liberal policies onto a society marked by strong hierarchies
and divisions, high concentrations of wealth, power and income, and a business
community dependent on collusive relationships with politicians and bureaucrats,
such as his native Brazil. First, he notes the policies threaten the interests of
the propertied class and business elite, through the withdrawal of subsidies, the
exposure to foreign competition, and the application of anti-trust norms. Under
these circumstances, the business elite is likely to “fiercely resist the assault upon
their privileges even as they reaffirm their devotion to liberal principles.”20 This
often results in selective interpretation of the neo-liberal project. It tends to
be implemented only partially and with numerous concessions to the elite. The
consequence of this is to turn the economic project from one designed to open
new avenues for growth into one designed to realign and reinvent the elite. An
elaborate bargaining between policy makers and the elite forms the backdrop for
this, in which policy measures are sweetened for elite consumption. For example,
greater foreign competition can be made more palatable by providing opportunities
for the elite to benefit from subsidized privatization of state owned industries.21

The type of politics preferred by this type of selective neo-liberalism is “relative

democracy; democracy but not too much.”22 Too much democracy in these
circumstances can lead to mass movements. Popular leaders may incite the
excluded majority of people. “Not too much democracy is both the antidote and
the prophylactic that the defenders of selective neo-liberalism administer against
this danger.”23 The methods employed for this include changes to constitutional
rules, electoral arrangements and media ownership that keep people at low levels
19 Lekvall, Anna: “Democracy and aid: the missing links”, Open Democracy, 13 May 2009
20 Unger, Roberto Mangabeira (1998): Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative, London:
Verso, p. 68
21 Ibid, pp. 67-70
22 Ibid, p. 68
23 Ibid, p. 69

16
of political engagement and activism. For example, private media licences can be
granted to selected persons in exchange for political backing, etc. When democracy
become subservient to a selective neo-liberal project and when the latter is
successful at keeping down mass protest, it does so “at the cost of putting the neo-
liberal project at odds with the collective interest in the deepening of democracy.”24

In conclusion, although no one ever promised that structural adjustment and

stabilization policies would enhance democracy, there were expectations that these
economic and financial sector reforms might open up development opportunities
to a broader array of stakeholders, beyond the ruling elite. This prospect raised
hopes for gradual development of a middle class in poor countries that would be
able to demand better governance and their piece of the redistribution pie. But often
the policies employed were neither able to accomplish their economic objectives
(as they were either misplaced to begin with or got distorted in implementation, or
they were not implemented at all), nor were they able to meet vaguely associated
political expectations. Even when they were implemented reasonably well, and
when growth succeeded in creating new beneficiaries, this generally did not alter
the political dynamics as the new comers were usually co-opted by ruling elite. The
elite class expanded in size, but this did not enable a middle class to consolidate
or to emerge in the first place, nor did it bring about significant changes to the
majority of people. More often than not, neoliberal economic reforms caused
political backlash that led to democratic contraction.

This assault on democracy through the suppression of social mobilisation, in

some cases provoked wide electoral swings, often between economic orthodoxy
and populism (e.g. in many Latin American countries). People may have been
disempowered from expressing themselves in the face of unpopular policies, but
they were harder to control on election-day. Pent-up frustrations translated into
huge vote swings from one election to the next. While these dramatic electoral
swings provided a fleeting outlet for people’s frustrations, they were largely self-
defeating, as the answers to society’s socioeconomic ailments often lay in some
policy middle ground.

1.4 Corruption

Another common factor that leads to democratic distortions and malfunction

emanates from the human frailty of those in public office. All human beings have

24 Ibid, p. 69

17
personal and group interests, but public office requires that they be contained in the
broader interests of society and the nation. The higher the position, the greater the
responsibility to public and national interests. Even political party representatives,
whose job it is to work for the interest of their party and their constituency, are
required to place the broader interests of society and the nation first. Otherwise
politics degenerates into a battleground.

Public interests are subverted for private gain through misuse of public funds
and authority. This occurs in all governments and no level is immune, neither
lowest nor highest. In many developing countries, citizens are regularly pressured
for bribes to receive public services. This varies from paying low-level bureaucrats
to speed up the processing of applications, to paying police officers to record
crimes, to paying doctors at public hospitals to receive care. In India, it is estimated
that citizens paid the equivalent of $4.8 billion in bribes in 2004 to receive public
services.25

At the other end of the power spectrum another scale of corruption is practiced.
Examples include the awarding of large government contracts to electoral
campaign contributors, paying judges in the higher judiciary to influence rulings
in favour party affiliates charged with serious crimes, and formulation of laws and
regulations to allow particular companies to monopolize certain markets.

Corruption comes with tremendous costs to society. Studies show that a one-
unit decrease in the Corruption Perception Index, an internationally recognised
measurement of corruption, leads to a decrease of annual GDP per capita growth
rate by between 0.9 and 1.7 percent.26 The World Bank estimated in 2000 that
if Bangladesh could reduce its corruption level to those prevailing in countries
with the highest reputation for honest dealing, it could add between 2.1 and 2.9
percent to its annual per capita GDP growth.27 It has also been estimated that
about 15 percent of Pakistan’s development budget for infrastructure of 2007/08
was wasted through corruption, valued between USD 1.6 and 2.5 billion.28

25 Transparency International Bangladesh (2007): National Household Survey; Centre for Media
Studies (2005): India Corruption Study
26 Anoruo, Emmanuel & Habtu Braha (2005): “Corruption and Economic Growth: The African
Experience”. Retrieved 2009-09-15 from www.jsd-africa.com/.../Arc_Corruption%20and%20
Economic%20Growth.pdf; Podobnik, Boris et al (2008): “Influence of corruption on economic
growth rate and foreign Investment”. Retrieved 2009-09-15 from arxiv.org/abs/0710.1995
27 The World Bank Bangladesh (2000): Corruption in Bangladesh: Costs and Cures
28 The World Bank (2007): Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assessment (PIICA)

18
Corruption not only weakens economic growth and retards human development, it
undermines public goods such as security and the environment. In many countries,
degradation of the environment is a direct result of the misuse of public authority,
e.g. through the granting of logging permits that exceed quotas, tweaking pollution
controls or not enforcing standards for disposal of hazardous materials and
substances. Those most affected by such malpractice tend to be the poor whose
livelihoods depend on land and water, and who have no way of countering the
powerful interests of large companies, factory owners and landowners.

Finally, the misuse of public funds and authority is contagious. Once national
leaders indulge in it, they send the signal to society at large that it is alright for
everyone to follow suit. And once a critical mass indulge in it, it becomes harder
for individuals who want to resist. Ultimately it has a corrosive effect on the
public’s trust in institutions and in the rule of law. Through frequent exposure to
corruption by public officials and representatives, citizens grow disillusioned with
the commitment of the state to respond to their needs. Over time this can lead to
the evaporation of social capital and disillusionment with democracy itself.

PART TWO

2.0 Key factors for democratic consolidation

The preceding section looked briefly at four factors that can breed democratic
malfunctions -- traditional power structures, predatory elite, certain economic
development paradigms and policy reform packages in particular circumstances,
and susceptibility to misuse of public authority and resources. These are by no
means the only forces and factors that distort the democratic process, but they
are common to many developing countries. When faced with them, how can a
struggling democracy be strengthened and deepened? How can it be made more
responsive to, and meaningful for, average citizens?

A quick glance through the history of democratic thought reveals the recurrent
preoccupation with the possibility of an elected few who fail to check their own
excesses. Indeed, many democracies have suffered from excess freedom at the top,
unleashing a plethora of democratic ailments. This concern led to the design of
robust democratic framework conditions that spell out the vision and character of

19
the state, how it should function, and the penalties for violating the rules of the
game. Collectively, these framework conditions constitute the embankments within
which the political process flows.29

No system is foolproof, however, and even the most perfect democratic framework
is vulnerable to distorting forces and human frailty. To contain these forces, the
democratic system depends on vibrant, influential actors in the public space
that hold their governments accountable. They are the ultimate referees of the
democratic process. They must flash the penalty cards when players breach the
rules. To perform this crucial role, they must be strong, organised, knowledgeable,
alert and engaged.

When either the framework conditions are flawed or weak and/or the citizenry is
unable to play its vital role as referee, democracy can go array. The political flow
can seep over the embankments, spilling into adjacent fields and towns destroying
crops and homes. It can displace people and cause socioeconomic havoc. It can
provoke discord and violence. It can altogether change the course of the river’s
flow.

The following section looks at democracy’s embankments, the political flow, and
the referees of the political game.

Robust democratic framework conditions

Key factors for democratic The power of institutions
consolidation Constructive political party engagement
Vibrant public space

2.1 Robust democratic framework conditions

Democracy’s framework conditions are sometimes interpreted as both the

conditions set within the framework, as well as the broader conditions for the
framework to function well.30 This paper takes the former interpretation, focusing
on the constitution, laws, regulations and institutions that define the state polity
and orient the political process. The latter view encompasses external factors such
as levels of education, interpersonal trust, social mobilisation, and even economic
well being, etc., all of which buttress the sustainability of the framework. These

29 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript]

30 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript]

20
external conditions are covered under section 2.3 below entitled “The Public
Space.”

The framework conditions for democracy begin with its vision and design. They
describe the values and norms to which the state subscribes, both in aspirational
and prescriptive terms. They also outline the system of governance, set the roles
and functions of state organs, frame the rules of the game and the punitive
measures for violation, and prescribe the relationships between institutions.

While all democratic systems share common basic features, framework conditions
must be crafted to specific country conditions and character. There are many roads
to democracy and each country must find its own way. Underlying social structures
and practices must be taken into account. If they are synchronistic with democratic
practice, they can be nurtured and built upon. If they compete with central tenants
of democratic principle, incentives must be built to adapt them.

The national vision is derived from the constitution, from the political process,
from the administration and from the culture. Often, those parts of the framework
conditions that reflect the national vision get overlooked or taken for granted, while
the more structural and systemic elements receive the lion’s share of attention.
But the vision is vitally important, especially for countries in transition and those
attempting a development strategy that departs from global conventional wisdoms.
It is the national vision that sustains the focus of the people and the government
on the aims to be achieved, on society’s desired outcomes and goals. It should be
the object of special focus and institutional support. If not, the special character
of a nation gradually succumbs to the gravitational field of dominant regional or
global narratives that may not be compatible with the national context.

The structure of the polity and character of the system -- unitary or federal,
presidential or prime ministerial, the composition and functioning of chambers
of representatives, the tiers of government and their respective functions, the role
of independent bodies, appointments to constitutional posts, the organisation
of elections, the administration of justice, the composition and functioning of
oversight bodies – all constitute the architecture of a nation’s framework conditions.

In addition to establishing the vision and structure of the polity, framework

conditions must also serve to guide the resolution of disputes and conflict. This

21
often comes back to the national constitution, which must meet two prerequisites.
First, it must be clear, limiting ambiguity and the scope for multiple interpretations.31
Secondly, it must acquire trumping powers, enabling it to effectively constrain
the behaviour of the ruling class. This can only be achieved through threats of
penalties and sanctions, and their application. Until the constitution develops these
powers, until the logic of democracy becomes the overriding logic in a society, the
constitutional order and the laws and institutions emanating from it, remain fragile.

Because of this fragility, the process of adjusting framework conditions to fit the
evolving needs of a country is a delicate one. On the one hand, it is important that
the framework become a solid reference base for government and society. It must
command respect. It cannot be taken lightly, or changed on a whim. On the other
hand, as it is tested over time and as major disjunction between people’s aspiration
and political possibilities emerge, amendments become inevitable. Otherwise,
the constitution looses its relevance and ability to effectively resolve conflicts.
Navigating between these two poles is a challenge that all young democracies face.

Changing a national constitution can place a country in a position of vulnerability.

When the constitution and other major elements of the legislative and regulatory
framework are amended, it can entail unforeseen changes to the relative balance
of powers between institutions. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, changes to the
constitution and the electoral law in the 1990s, which included a reduction of
the number of seats in parliament from 350 to 105, ostensibly designed as a cost-
saving measure, facilitated executive control of the legislature by trebling the size
of the single-member constituencies and thereby reducing the ability of smaller
parties to win seats in parliament. This, at the same time, increased ethnic Kyrgyz
majority control of ethnic minorities, such as the substantial Uzbek, Russian, and
German minorities.32

This brings us to the issue of the spirit of the constitution and, by extension, the
spirit of the full framework conditions. If we accept that democracy’s framework
conditions have both a durable dimension and yet require adjustments at crucial
junctures of a nation’s history, then political discourse must be continually engaged
with issues of constitutional morality. It is in this discourse that the dimension

31 Countries with brief Constitutions open to interpretation, or those with no formal Constitution at
all, can of course perform well if they have developed strong constitutional traditions. But most
developing countries do not meet these criteria.
32 International IDEA (2008): Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook,
Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 55-56.

22
of ‘spirit’ is embedded, in thinking about and debating constitutional morality.
There are two dimensions to this. The first relates to imagining what the founding
persons meant with respect to that “spirit” -- what lay behind their vision of
the new republic’s identity, norms, values and principles, what underlay their
conception of the future structure of the polity. The second dimension relates to
contemporary constitutional concerns and discussions drawing on good practice
from around the world. India’s invention of a “basic structure of the constitution,”
for example, illustrates an imaginative attempt to cordon off fundamental
elements, protecting them from tampering, to conserve the constitutional spirit.
Both aspects of “spirit” are important in determining constitutional morality. And
both the face value content and the essence or spirit of the framework conditions
are important in any effort to deepen democracy. “Spirit, as constitutional morality,
serves as a check on political behaviour as does ‘framework’ when seen as laws,
etc. So framework conditions are both structure and spirit.”33 Efforts to improve
the quality of democracy must occur at both levels, by tightening the laws and
introducing institutional innovation, and by generating robust public engagement
in measuring political behaviours by their constitutional morality.

Because the spirit of the constitution must be kept alive through vigorous,
continual public debate and because all laws, regulations and public policies have
direct bearing on the lives of citizens, it is vitally important that the population
engage with the process of their formulation and amendment. Creating the space
for this is fundamental for deepening democracy.

The power of institutions

Institutions are both part and parcel of the framework conditions and the main
conduit through which that framework is operationalised. They enshrine and
promote the values, principles and directives of the constitutional order and
ensure that laws, policies and decisions translate into action. Through institutions,
the multiple and varied claims and needs of the citizenry are channelled, vetted
and solutions found as to whether and how they can be met. They are both the
lubricating interface between the law makers and law enforcers, as well as between
the rulers and the ruled. They enable arbitration between conflicting claims of
society. They set the incentives for human interaction. They matter enormously.

33 de Souza, Peter, email to the author, 4 October 2009

23
How institutions of the state, the private productive and service sectors, and civil
society work together, and how citizens interface with them, determines to a large
extent the direction and effectiveness of the state. Each set of institutions has its
specific roles and responsibilities and the democratic system reserves special status
and autonomy to some. This section looks at formal state institutions.

A primary function of the state institutional framework is to make the national

vision a palpable, living and breathing force. One of the big errors of many
developing countries in the last several decades has been to neglect this critical
function. As domestic economic policies became increasing influenced by externally
driven policy packages and as Western models of democracy were replicated
without adequate adaptation to national circumstances, many countries lost their
unique, individual paths and drifted into foreign orbits. This has weakened and
compromised them.

In addition to sustaining and pursuing the national vision, state institutions of a

democratic polity must ensure vertical and horizontal accountabilities designed to keep
the system in check. Vertical accountabilities are engendered through credible
electoral processes and sincere representation at national and subnational levels,
as well as through mechanisms that reach out to include the public such as public
hearings, citizens’ charters, citizens’ report cards, audits, etc. Such accountability can
also be enhanced by obligations imposed on the state, such as right to information
laws, public disclosure requirements, etc. Civil society, including media, can play a
vital role here.

Expanding the political space through political representation at sub-national tiers

of government creates opportunities for greater vertical, as well as horizontal
institutional accountability. While some countries prefer to keep these elections
party-less, others contend that local politics is the best grooming for national
representation and therefore should be open to political parties. Even when parties
are barred from subnational elections, they are usually active informally. Beyond
the issue of parties, local elected governments provide many of the opportunities
of parliament at subnational levels. Because they broaden a nation’s political space
and spread the decision making base, elected local governments are often resisted
by parliaments and the central administration. They are often not given either the
authority or the resources to perform meaningfully. The stifling of local democracy
can impede the flourishing of national democracy.

24
Horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances across the state institutional
apparatus. Keeping the judiciary independent is probably the single most important
institutional building block toward making democracy functional. Firstly, it is the
final authority and decision maker on legal matters and, secondly, by ring fencing it
from the influence of the ruling class, it can enable other positive reforms to take
hold across state bodies. Beyond the judiciary, horizontal accountability networks
include institutions such as the public audit authority, the election commission,
the anti-corruption authority, parliamentary committees, national human rights
commissions, ombudsmen, police commissions, economic regulatory institutions,
etc. While each of these bodies has specialised functions, they also oversee other
government bodies. Together, they perform their oversight function best in an
overlapping, interlocking manner. That way, if one institution falters or fails,
another can step in to take up the slack. “Effective horizontal accountability is not
the produce of isolated agencies but of networks of agencies.”34

Oversight of political parties is a particularly important institutional function of

the state, usually entrusted to the elections authority, but also to some extent to the
judiciary, the audit authority, the police, the national board of revenue, the anti-
corruption commission, etc. As parties are the agents whose misbehaviour most
seriously affects the quality of democracy, ensuring they conform to accepted
norms and practices is critical. This can be done in a variety of ways. For example,
the electoral law on party registration can stipulate criteria to enhance political
accountability -- candidate qualification criteria (such as educational achievement,
servicing of debts, payment of utility bills, etc.), mandatory public disclosures
from candidates (including income, assets, criminal records, etc.), guidelines on
party constitutions (e.g. to be in line with the national constitution, regular election
of party committee leadership at all tiers, gender representation targets, etc.), limits
on campaign spending, submission of campaign spending reports, submission
of annual audited accounts, etc. Empowering the elections authority to disqualify
candidates for violation of electoral law during campaigns and placing tight time
limits on the courts for resolving cases of electoral misconduct can also help keep
parties accountable, provided the election commission is politically impartial.

Getting the institutional framework right, including its vertical and horizontal
accountabilities, is no easy feat. Independence may exist, but on paper alone.
Power may be effectively concentrated in one branch. Oversight institutions may
34 O’Donnell, Guillermo (1998): “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, Journal of
Democracy, vol. 9/3, p. 39.

25
collude with those they are supposed to police, or they may be rendered toothless.
A flawed or suboptimal institutional framework creates networks of beneficiaries
that resist change. “The choice of a configuration of institutions, in the early life
of a nation, sets the polity along a certain path from which it is reluctant and costly
to exit. It gets set along a certain path dependency. This means that the polity
finds that it gets increasing returns by remaining along the chosen path. To get out
of this path entails a big effort and huge costs that, in normal times, the polity is
unwilling to pay.”35

Breaking free of this path dependency is not only about conceiving the right
technical fixes. Every institutional configuration has stakeholders who benefit
from the status quo and jealously guard it. What is usually required is a broad-based
momentum for change. Fukuyama (2004) in his study of statebuilding notes that
“the majority of cases of successful state building and institutional reform have
occurred when a society has generated strong domestic demand for institutions and
then created them... Insufficient domestic demand for institutions or institutional
reform is the single most important obstacle to institutional development in poor
countries.”36

2.2 Constructive political engagement: the importance of political parties

Historically, political parties evolved as part and parcel of the landscape of civil
society organisations. As they play such a special role in democracy and because,
when elected, their reach extends beyond the public space into power centres of
the state, they deserve special consideration.

The classic functions of political parties are to forge coherent policy agendas from
a vast range of societal concerns and competing claims, to raise public political
awareness, to pass legislation, to oversee government, and to represent the
electorate. Behind these functions lies an elaborate system that enables a political
government, amidst multiple competing public expectations, needs and priorities,
to chart a way forward with public support.

Political governance is fundamentally different from administrative governance.

Administrative governance is top-down, often expert-driven, and guided by
35 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript], p. 14.
36 Fukuyama, Francis (2004): State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 35.

26
rational planning and execution. Administrative governance assumes that most of
society’s collective endeavours can be analysed, planned and managed logically.
It can be autocratic or oligarchic or even polyarchic. The former Soviet Union
operated under a system of polyarchic administrative governance. The strengths
of administrative governance lie in its orderliness, its predictability and, when
implemented well, its efficiency and effectiveness. At some periods in a country’s
history, administrative governance may be beneficial and necessary, such as in the
formative stages of state building or during periods of crisis or instability.

But administrative governance has its limits. Even if it is not usurped by powerful
elite, it usually decides priorities and makes plans for people, rather than with them.
Its data gathering, problem analysis and strategy formulation may be flawless, but
because people are less than fully involved, they may not feel ownership of the
resulting public decisions. This can lead to tensions, discontent and flash points.
This is where political governance has the upper hand and where political parties
play such a vital role. They generally have much greater reach and closer contacts
with people than do administrative systems, enabling their decisions to resonate
more broadly, thus producing wider results with greater sustainability.

Peter Ronald de Souza provides an eloquent description of the unique resources

that political parties can bring to society:

Plural societies have inherent to them multiple contestations. These

take place all the time and while some are minor, they have the
potential of growing in magnitude and at times of even spilling over.
These contestations may be over interests, beliefs and perceptions.
Politics provides the site for these contesting positions to enter into
negotiation. In that way, politics often encourages accommodation.
Politics, in addition, provides multiple sites for accommodation.
These could be at the national level or at the local level, within
formal institutions of state and also within civil society. As a
result tensions within a polity get dispersed polity-wide and do not
accumulate to destabilize the polity. In a plural polity, which all large
polities are, such tensions get counter balanced, with demands in one
area having to find space for articulation alongside demands from
another area. This blunts the sharp edges of the demands producing
a more pragmatic mindset. If we were for a moment to overlook

27
 the pejorative inflexion to the phrase ‘playing politics’, then playing
politics is a complex game and those who do so successfully have
acquired distinct skills of negotiation and compromise. Politics breeds
entrepreneurs who can deal with such contestations. They serve as
intermediaries between citizen and state. Suspend politics and you
remove these intermediaries leaving a void that cannot be filled by
the administrative system. Tensions thus begin to accumulate. The
main home for such entrepreneurs is the political party. It enables
articulation and aggregation of interests, encourages the creation of
wider coalitions to achieve electoral success, is the main agent for
recruitment and training of leaders in governance and, most of all,
helps the state build support for itself.37

Political parties engage with society and with other parties across multiple fora, but
they interact formally in parliament where they perform their legislative, oversight
and representative functions. The parliament or national assembly is the formal
locus of political deliberation in a democracy. Democratic deliberation entails
the exchange of views and the understanding of other political perspectives. It
involves the search for common ground, common interests as opposed to narrow
party or ideological positions, and requires give and take. It is both educative and
creative. Through democratic deliberation, the various perspectives, claims and
needs surrounding important public issues are reviewed, explored and consensus
built around appropriate laws/policies to address them.

Because of the centrality of parliament in a democracy, the quality of its democratic

deliberations is not only important for law making, it also has multiplier effects
across society. A parliament whose political representatives engage constructively
in informed debates, whose majority members accord due consideration for,
and accommodation of, the views of other members, who respect the accepted
procedures and adopt behaviours befitting the decorum of the institution, sets a
good example for society to emulate across numerous other deliberative fora.

The role of the speaker is determinant in establishing a conducive environment

for constructive debate. Party whips and individual members can play a supportive
role behind the scenes in the search for common ground. The rules of procedure
and conventions vis-à-vis the opposition are also determining (e.g. allocated time

37 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript], pp. 12-
13

28
for the opposition to question the PM, nomination of opposition members to a
deputy speaker position and to chair important committees, etc.). While political
competition is an essential part of the political process and parliamentary sessions
may get rowdy at times, if raw competition can be subjugation to constructive,
high quality inter-party deliberation, in the pursuit of decisions that benefit society
at large, democracy can deliver on people’s expectations.

Having appreciated the value of political parties in constitutional democracy

and the importance of inter-party deliberation, we must also probe why parties
sometimes misbehave. Parties are programmed to compete and to prevail in
the political game. They are in constant competition with other parties and are
continually sizing up situations with reference to how the public perceives them,
the actions and reactions of rival parties and other groups, and the responses of
those parties with whom they enjoy alliances. If democratic framework conditions
are not strong, parties will be tempted to breach their parameters and indulge in
extra legal means of achieving their aims. Often this involves informal means.

Informal systems exist to some extent in all forms of government, in both

developed and developing countries. Some elements can be beneficial. For
example, the practice of informal consultations prior to naming important
government appointments may not be required by law, but may be practiced in
order to ensure the decision is well founded, well accepted and therefore durable.
However, informal governance practices can also be harmful. As described in
Part One, when political parties are viewed as business opportunities and when
constituencies depend on their parties for direct socioeconomic benefits, negative
forms of informal governance can undermine the democratic framework and
erode state institutions.

If political parties are not kept in check, their indulgence in dubious informal
governance may spread across the length and breadth of the formal governance
system. Parties may coerce, bribe, or otherwise illegally influence the decisions
of all three branches of government. In two-party systems where competition is
particularly fierce, the parties’ compulsions to vie for political allegiance between
and across state and non-state institutions may end up politicising virtually all
branches of government, civil society and the private sector. The entire society
may end up divided, pitted one side against the other. In Bangladesh, it is well
known which major business conglomerates, public associations, media houses

29
and NGOs “belong” to which political alliance. Even national artists have been
divided into political camps.

Breaking free of these parallel, informal systems, driven by political parties’

misdirected compulsions, is exceedingly difficult. Elements of the problem that
could be remedied through changes to the framework conditions are usually not
an option, because political elites do not willingly submit themselves to limits on
their powers. When public opinion requires them to convey support for positive
change in their rhetoric, they may still tenaciously resist it in their actions. If public
opinion is strong enough, they may even agree to formal changes to protect their
public image. However, as soon as people are looking in the other direction, they
are likely to pull out their informal governance toolbox to unwind or neutralise
the potential positive impact of such change. In countries where accountability
systems are weak and public access to information is limited, there are virtually no
limits to politically driven informal governance. This is where politics meets the
underworld.

When political parties misbehave, when the embankments are breached and the
flood waters inundate surrounding crops and communities, the solutions usually
cannot come from within political parties. Vested interests are too entrenched.
Pro-reform elements within parties usually find themselves sidelined, threatened,
expulsed, or in worst case scenarios assassinated. Even in those rare instances
when top party leadership tries to bring the behaviour of party cadres in line with
democratic framework norms, they can be stymied by those who benefit from
the status quo. Reforming democracies with widespread, entrenched ailments can
usually only occur when a critical mass of civil society unites in protest.38

2.3 Vibrant, influential actors in the public space

Democracies require a supportive, dynamic public space to function well. This

means informed and engaged citizens, and a vibrant and dense network of non-
state, civil society associations, including an independent and pluralistic media.

Citizens become informed and engaged by participating in political processes

(debates on legislative and public policy issues, voting, participating in political
awareness raising initiatives, etc.). Through these means, citizens become

38 While military interventions can effectively arrest the slide into political chaos, they are generally
not good at creating durable political solutions.

30
knowledgeable about political issues and processes, express their views and explore
other viewpoints, and hold public officials and institutions to account. Engaged
citizenry often emerges in response to perceived or real injustices by the state, but
it can also be promoted through civic education, awareness raising, role models,
appeals to people’s responsibilities as citizens, etc.

In many developing countries, people are too poor or preoccupied with daily
subsistence struggles to be able to invest time in political affairs. Or they do not have
access to information and feel powerless to change things. This evokes a body of
literature that emerged in the 1990s arguing that minimum thresholds of personal
income and/or education were necessary in order for democracy to succeed. While
the preconditions arguments were compelling, conventional wisdom has moved
on, using examples such as India, Costa Rica, Ghana, etc., where average income
and education levels are low, yet democracy is consolidating. Many people resonate
with Amartya Sen’s observation that “A country does not have to be deemed fit
for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy.”39 Be that as it may,
since the majority of countries in the world today have already transitioned to
democracy, a more germane issue may be the power of ideas that democracy
plants in the minds of the masses, regardless of their education or income.

One of democracy’s greatest assets lies in the seeds of possibilities it evokes in

citizens’ imaginations. Despite its foils and fumbles, democracy kindles hope in
people’s hearts and makes them believe in a better future. Change we can. Democracy
enables people to envision that their masters of today need not be their masters
of tomorrow. The idea of change in the minds of the masses may take decades
to reap democratic dividends, but when it does real change becomes inevitable.
Cultivating faith in those possibilities is therefore one of the keys for deepening
and sustaining democracy. That is why the findings of opinion polls on people’s
faith in democracy matter. When people’s faith in democracy dwindles, democracy
is in trouble.

Civil society includes individual citizens and the multitude of community and
associational life that citizens construct outside formal state structures. This
encompasses everything from village and neighbourhood groups, religious bodies,
trade unions, voluntary associations, non-profit organisations and charity services.
Parent-teacher associations, self-help groups, community policing, professional

39 Sen, Amartya (1999): “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10/3 (July),
p. 4.

31
associations such as doctors’ associations, cultural and sports organisations, media,
human rights groups, universities and think tanks are all examples. Membership
in these groups overlap, knitting society together in a web of interconnecting
networks, forging understandings, interdependence, trust and a sense of civic
responsibility. The more dense the public space, the more a society communicates
within itself, the more problems it can solve together, the more it engages individual
members with bigger societal preoccupations.40

Not all CSO groups are necessarily helpful for the consolidation of democracy.
Some may cherish values at odds with democratic precepts. As described in Part
One, certain traditional groups may operate along lines that undermine democratic
principles. It is, therefore, not only the vitality and density of social groupings that
is important, but also their democratic disposition. This includes “a preparedness
to work with others different from oneself toward shared ends; a combination
of strong convictions with a readiness to compromise in the recognition that one
can’t always get everything one wants; and a sense of… commitment to civic goods
that are not the possession of one person or of one small group alone.”41

Of special relevance to democracy are those CSOs that monitor and challenge
governments, political parties, parliaments, independent state bodies, local
governments, etc. As most countries’ democratic framework conditions have
proven inadequate to contain the excesses of elected leaders, a rich array of civil
society oversight/watchdog organisations emerged to address these gaps. “These
extra-parliamentary power-monitoring institutions include -- to mention at random
just a few -- public integrity commissions, judicial activism, local courts, workplace
tribunals, consensus conferences, parliaments for minorities, public interest
litigation, citizens’ juries, citizens’ assemblies, independent public inquiries, think-
tanks, experts’ reports, participatory budgeting, vigils, ‘blogging’ and other novel
forms of media scrutiny.”42 Such groups have proliferated so rapidly in recent
years that some political scientists, like John Keane, contend they represent a new,
post-representational form of democracy.43

40 Putnam, Robert (2001): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New
York: Simon & Schuster
41 Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1995): Democracy on Trial, New York: Basic Books, p. 2
42 Keane, John (2009): The Life and Death of Democracy, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, p.
xxvii
43 Ibid

32
Larry Diamond’s analysis of why democracy in India has sustained
and developed for over six decades since the country’s independence
highlights the country’s vibrant civil society and its democratic
dispositions. He notes firstly that Indians value and believe in democracy
-- opinion polls show that the majority of Indians are convinced that democracy
is the best form of governance and share a common commitment to it. Second,
they maintain a healthy suspicion of authority which makes them watchful of
their politicians and their government (the referee function). Thirdly, the diversity
of India has nurtured a culture of accommodation, tolerance, cooperation and
collective bargaining, necessary for the inclusion of diverse views and needs.
Fourthly, Indian society is generally pragmatic, so while they may strike a hard
bargain, they also value the necessity for compromise and concession. And fifthly,
rule of law has managed to take root and grow.44

The role of media within civil society plays a vital role for democratic governance.
It can apply accountability and transparency pressure on state institutions (and
non-state actors) by revealing information on their performance, their misdeeds or
lack of action, and the public’s opinion of them. It can raise awareness on public
issues, through articles and discussions, helping to forge informed public opinions.
And it can expand people’s perspectives on problems and alternative solutions,
broadening the common ground for political compromise and consensus building.

In nurturing the development of an independent, vibrant media, there are risks.

Inexperienced journalists can get carried away by their freedoms and confuse
personal slander for critique on performance. They may be a little “creative”,
approximative, or partial in the news they report. And they may be politically
biased. In fact, as politicians realise the power of the media, they try to influence
it. They purchase media houses, so as to shape the news to their liking.45 Because
of this, governments are often tempted to control or at least influence the media.
This is a big mistake. Firstly, it usually backfires against the government, which can
find itself under fierce media attack. Secondly, if it does manage to control the
media, it destroys a vital part of the democratic system. This not only has domestic
implications, it can also influence the country’s foreign image and relations.

44 Diamond, pp. 155-156

45 In some South Asian countries, ownership of private media is overwhelmingly dominated by
political party members or their affiliates.

33
When media manages to successfully perform a watchdog function, it is often
threatened and mistreated, sometimes directly by governments and political parties
and sometimes through proxies. The number of journalists subject to harassment,
violence and incarceration is an indicator of a country’s democratic performance.
In 2009, 76 journalists worldwide were killed on the job, 573 were arrested and 33
were kidnapped.

Equally harmful to democracy is the gradual trivialization and marketization of

news media. Whereas two decades ago, a good section of news media outlets were
driven by a mission to find and report the “truth”, this professional calling has
been eclipsed by media’s business preoccupations with entertainment and selling
commercial products. The impact of this on the development of informed and
engaged citizenry and civil society, and their ability to resist and protest the misuse
of power, is serious.

This section has attempted to outline how citizens and civil society can influence
their political governments in a democracy, but it does neither explain how a
country in democratic transition develops a conducive public space to begin with,
nor how a society’s demand for good politics can be enhanced or increased.

While there is much that is still unexplained, it is clear that demand for positive
change must come from within societies. Exogenously generated change is usually
distorted by self-interest, ill-conceived and unsuccessful. Draconian international
interventionism has a very bad track record. And the results of urgings by the
international community for improvements in the quality of governance in
developing countries are not encouraging, even when accompanied by carrots and
sticks. Sometimes, exogenous shocks, such as international price spikes, regional
or global recession, severe natural disasters, war, etc., can have spill over effects
on a country, creating crises that in turn foster internal demand for change. But
even these externally provoked demands for reform from within are often only
temporary in nature.

Sometimes demand for functional institutions and good governance develops as

new groups, new class interests or business needs emerge. This can be triggered by
overall socioeconomic development, by piercing into lucrative new export markets
(e.g. the ready made garment industry in Bangladesh and its transformation of
poor women into an organised workforce with a voice), by emerging business

34
interests, by initiatives to empower underprivileged groups -- women, lower castes,
ethnic minorities, and by raising education levels. These are, of course, mostly
long-term processes.

Sometimes the demand can emerge from an escalation of internal tensions or

conflicts between groups. To avert a full blown crisis, the ruling class may agree
to modifications of the status quo. Sometimes the demand can be triggered
by technological innovation. New media and information technology have
revolutionized politics and civil society around the world. And sometimes, the
pressure of good practice in a neighbouring country may have ripple effects at
home. The passage of the right to information act in India in 2005 gave impetus to
those promoting it in Bangladesh, where a similar act was passed in 2009.

As civil society increases its demand for functional democratic institutions, it

should be expected that the ruling elite will attempt to neutralise change. Building a
civil society capable of standing up to the powers that be and protecting the quality
of democracy is a long and arduous process. Democratic theory has no answer to
the question of who guarantees the guarantors of democracy when they cannot
yet perform their role adequately.

35
 PART THREE

3.0 Bhutan’s democratic challenge

Bhutan -- last of the small Himalayan Buddhist Kingdoms, land of snow capped
peaks and pristine nature, of ancient culture and hidden spiritual treasures. How
relevant is the sorry state of democracy in many developing countries to the
world’s youngest democracy?

Bhutan started her democratic journey with several important advantages that
most other developing countries lacked: peace and stability, good governance, great
public leadership, and a carefully crafted constitution. The country’s transition to
democracy was gradual, beginning more than 20 years ago with the build-up of
local governance and culminating in multi-party elections in 2008. The introduction
of political parties was nevertheless a major structural change and has not come
without some stress and strain. While these can certainly be attributed to growing
pains, the Bhutanese must be careful as democratic growing pains have a bad habit
of becoming chronic pains.

Governance is not golf: that we are a democracy does not entitle

us to a handicap. The virtues and benefits that come with being a
democracy are to be an additionality. They cannot be a substitute
for other ingredients of national strength. The world is not going to
slow down, our adversaries are not going to dilute the power they are
acquiring out of compassion for the fact that we are a democracy.46

If Bhutan does not make careful decisions at this early phase of her democratic
journey, she may succumb to the same unfortunate path dependencies that caused
other countries great frustration, unrest, and many decades of lost progress. Can
a small country in a sensitive geopolitical position afford making all the same
mistakes as others? Some errors are inevitable, of course. To err is human. But big
mistakes at this stage, during which the new system is taking shape and its trajectory
established, could have serious consequences if not quickly corrected. Bhutan’s
first political governments thus have a twofold responsibility -- to govern well
during their tenure and to establish healthy and constructive political conventions
46 Shourie, Arun (2004): “When spirit is willing, flesh has a way”, Fourth M.N. Srinivas Memorial
Lecture delivered at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, retrieved 2009-11-18
from http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/40417/

36
that will set the standards for the political process in the decades to come.

This section draws on the lessons of democratic transition from other developing
countries of relevance to Bhutan. It stresses the importance of a strong national
vision and development strategy, well grounded in the country’s specificity and
conducive to democratic values and processes. GNH is examined in this context.
The section goes on to explore Bhutan’s framework conditions and areas of
potential vulnerability, avenues for strengthening democratic culture, including
overcoming public scepticism toward democracy, establishing healthy inter-party
relations, and encouraging citizens and civil society to proactively engage. Finally,
the topic of democratic leadership is broached, including some thoughts on the
special role of the King.

The importance of democratic “ends”

National specificity, vision and strategy
Bhutan’s democratic journey Framework conditions
Strengthening democratic culture
Leadership -- the heart of the matter

3.1 The importance of democratic “ends”

In a country that quietly took the wide-spread notion of economic growth as the
principle object of human progress and turned it on its head,47 any discussion of
democracy must be preceded by clearing the air with respect to means and ends. As
Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley has emphasised, it is when we confuse ends with means
that we end up pursuing the wrong goal.

Should we think of democracy as a “means” or an “end”, or both? To answer this

question, it may be helpful to break down democratic governance into component
parts. What is known as procedural democracy -- the casting of votes by citizens
to elect leadership, the practice of public consultation, debate and deliberation
of views, the function of representation, etc., these elements may be considered
means toward certain desired governance outcomes or ends. In its procedural
aspects, therefore, democracy may be viewed as a set of means to attain higher

47 In 1979, His Majesty the Forth King was asked by journalists about Bhutan’s development and he
told them that Gross National Happiness was more important than Gross National Product. This
simple turn of phrase has had profound impact not only on Bhutan and its development paradigm,
but on many other countries around the world.

37
level aims. This aspect of democracy, especially elections, currently receives most
of our attention.

But is that all there is to democracy? What is it about democracy that inspires so
many millions of peoples around the world to fight so passionately for democratic
rule, to the point that many are willing to place themselves at great personal risk for
its achievement? Why does democracy evoke such aspirational yearnings? Certainly
it is not democracy’s procedural elements alone. Above and beyond its systems and
processes, democracy seems to correspond to some intrinsic values that resonate
deep in the human spirit. It seems, at least conceptually, to fulfil some fundamental
human needs -- the need for freedom from subjugation, the need to participate in
decisions that impact oneself and one’s family/community, the need to be treated
fairly and equally be the state. Viewed from this perspective, democracy may also
be considered an “end” in itself.

And there are some who contend that democracy, at least some parts of it, are
at the same time both means and ends. People’s participation, for example, is
concurrently a means and an end in itself, argues Amartya Sen.48

We know quite a lot about democratic procedures or “means”, and indeed

spend inordinate time and energy on some of them. We also know a lot about
democratic “ends” -- philosophers have thought deeply about human freedoms
and the equality of man for centuries. But somehow the practice of democracy too
often brushes aside the latter or accords it secondary status. How can democratic
practice be adjusted to take greater heed of the intrinsic “ends” it is supposed to
achieve? How can democratic “ends” be repositioned to their rightful place at the
top of the hierarchy of preoccupations?

Few countries are better placed to do this than Bhutan. Just as Bhutan trail blazed a
new set of measures of human progress that place “ends” first,49 so she can break
new ground for democratic governance, endowing it with deeper meaning. This
could contribute immensely to a much needed general shift in global perspective,
creating incentives for better democratic performance.

48 Sen, Amartya (1999): “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10/3 (July),
p. 10
49 Gross National Happiness (GNH) Index, http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/gnhIndex/
intruductionGNH.aspx

38
Such a democratic framework would require us to revisit our current crude
taxonomy of countries that legitimizes any government established through multi-
party elections as “democratic”, no matter if the winning party or coalition is
fundamentally authoritarian or even predatory in nature, operating above the law,
using coercive and criminal tactics, etc. Clearly, we need a new classification, indeed
a new vocabulary, that allows us to go beyond the surface of multi-party elections
to describe the real forms of governance at work beneath the democratic façade.
Only by putting the intrinsic values of democracy at the apex of our conceptual
construct, can we hope to realize the deeper purpose of democracy to which we
aspire.

Bhutan owes it to itself and to the world to develop a deeper approach to democracy,
one that places democratic “ends” if not above, then at least on equal footing as
“means”; one that inspires a new, normative democratic discourse. The seeds of
such an approach are embedded in the GNH concept and its Index variables in the
form of measures of social and institutional trust, freedoms, community vitality,
human security, etc. They may need to be further refined, and they need careful
monitoring and analysis, particularly with respect to policy implications, so that
democracy develops depth and meaning for average Bhutanese. “Democracy’s real
product is trust”50 -- trust in one’s neighbours, in public institutions, in public
representatives. This dimension of the GNH Index is of paramount importance
to monitor as it will reflect the general health of the country’s democracy. To
ascertain this and to create positive incentives for preserving and enhancing trust,
public opinion polls on people’s trust in various branches of government and
political parties could be considered, as well as general levels of trust in neighbours,
community organisations, and civil society groups, etc.

In concluding this section, it may be important to remember that many promoters

and practitioners of democracy do not have time for normative enquiry or
conceptual niceties. Some believe that democracy’s higher purpose is mere rhetoric;
that democracy’s real merits lie in its ability to contain the coercive powers of the
state and release pent up societal “steam” -- enabling multiple, competing claims
to work themselves out through a legitimized process. They are less bothered that
democratic processes are driven by the narrow strategic calculus of competing
political parties, rather than by principles of the public good. This paper argues
50 Barber, Benjamin (2008): A Credit Deficit or a Democratic Deficit? The Huffington Post blog
[internet], 27 October 2008 [cited 31 January 2010], available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
benjamin-r-barber/a-credit-deficit-or-a-dem_b_138146.html

39
that while democracy certainly possesses pragmatic merits, it is ultimately not
sustainable unless it also delivers on people’s aspirations for better living conditions
and social justice, and for this to occur it must be guided by principles. It is therefore
in the interest of both the demos and the democratic system itself, to focus more on
values and principles, and on what democracies actually deliver to people at large
-- on democratic “ends”.

Finally, even those who firmly believe in democratic ends have a hard time aligning
their words with their deeds. Western nations are strong in espousing the importance
of democratic freedoms and other “ends”, but find themselves pouring the lion’s
share of their democracy building support to developing countries into “means”.51
All the more reason for a country like Bhutan to focus on what exactly it wants its
democracy to achieve.

3.2 National specificity, vision and strategy

Part One of this paper argues that democratic transition and consolidation
cannot be understood in isolation from a country’s defining characteristics and
its vision of human progress. Bhutan’s basic characteristics include its physical
size and geopolitical location; its value systems including spiritual, cultural and
environmental heritage; the evolving system of governance, including the centrality
of the monarchy and the emergence of political governance; the structure of the
economy; the population including its size, age pyramid, educational levels, civic
awareness, ethnic composition and dynamics; the fledgling civil society, etc.

From these characteristics, Bhutan developed its own vision of development

that gradually began orbiting around the concept of Gross National Happiness
(GNH). It emphasizes balance between individual and collective wellbeing,
between man and nature, between the temporal and the spiritual, between rights
and responsibilities. In this vision, for example, forest cover is valued not only for
its economic utility, but also for nature’s own intrinsic value.

It was within this context that Bhutan’s democratic framework conditions were
51 A recent study of EU support for democratic governance in developing countries found that while
people across all regions expected democratic systems to produce societal changes in the form of
social cohesion, equality, social stability/security, ability of governments to deliver, “the EU applies
a narrow understanding of democracy, failing to link procedural democracy to delivery aspects of
democracy.” Reference “Democracy in Development: Global consultations on the EU’s role in
democracy building”, IDEA (2009), pg. 23

40
conceived, and subsequently crowned by the national Constitution in 2004.
The Constitution evokes the basic elements of Bhutan’s national character and
aspirations, and outlines its democratic system. The articles on spiritual heritage,
culture, environment, human rights and responsibilities, and principles of state
policy are both aspirational and normative, conveying the desired character of the
country. They have direct bearing on governance.

Vital elements of this national vision are at odds with dominant global currents
and are therefore vulnerable. As global forces entered the country, particularly
since the 1980s, tensions emerged that impacted the development trajectory and,
hence, governance. Today, there is a growing tension between GNH and the
country’s susceptibility to (and in some quarters preference for) individualistic and
consumerist lifestyles advertised by free-market economies. There are those who
wish to resist the pressures to conform to the global market-based ethos so as to
preserve the country’s values and lifestyle, and there are those who want the country
to embrace the global models of development. As the latter view is buttressed by
international mass media and dominant global thinking, its proponents have an
advantage. This tension is evident in Bhutan’s WTO accession process. While the
forces behind GNH in Bhutan are strong and gaining international recognition,52
no national development strategy in the world offers a good model for balancing
GNH values with the forces that drive 21st Century modernity.

How the GNH vision unfolds in Bhutan and what direction the country’s
development path takes will have profound influence on the character of the
country’s democracy. A more GNH focused development path, with its emphasis
on socio-economic equity and concern for all sentient beings, would definitely
enhance the quality and depth of democracy. A more neo-liberal, free-market
development path would undoubtedly lead to the pursuit of a Western-centric
form of democracy. This would leave Bhutan open to the deceptions and struggles
witnessed by other countries that have abandoned their roots, described in Part
One of this paper. And it would almost certainly destroy certain natural, indigenous
traits within Bhutanese society that could otherwise reinforce meaningful
democratization.

52 The GNH Conferences since 2001 illustrate a growing resonance across countries, North and
South. For example, President Sarkozy’s recent Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance makes direct reference to Bhutan’s work on GNH, and its proposed index is very
similar to Bhutan’s.

41
A GNH anchored development strategy would not only promote smoother,
deeper democratisation by cultivating a conducive environment for civil liberties
and political equality, it would also influence the choice of certain democratic
procedures. For example, it would help inform whether political parties should
be active during local elections -- whether this would enhance or undermine
community vitality (a component of the GNH Index). It would also, for example,
inform the choice of electoral systems. Bhutan selected the single constituency,
first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system because of its simplicity and the direct
representational link it establishes between the elected and his/her electoral
constituency. But FPTP also happens to be the most politically divisive electoral
system. Already political party rifts have emerged in Bhutan. This should be of
concern because these social cleavages can grow and fester. They concurrently
detract from the goal of GNH and the consolidation of democracy.

Clearly, one of the best strategies for deepening democracy in Bhutan is to further
anchor GNH, enabling it to become the state’s social contract, inspiring the
overall development and political processes. In this way, its attributes can infuse
the character of Bhutan’s democratic governance. Some work toward this end
has been done at the conceptual and policy levels, mainly through the work of
the Centre for Bhutan Studies and the establishment of the GNH Commission,
but much more is required. The GNH Survey of 2007 ascertained people’s
perceptions of their happiness, leading to the GNH Index. And the GNH
Commission is charged with analysing state policies, plans and programmes for
their GNH implications. But this is an extremely difficult task since there is no
clear methodology for determining what policies are or are not GNH enhancing. It
is compounded by the fact that virtually all international development conceptual
frameworks are singularly unhelpful and, in fact, influence the decision making
process away from GNH. They lead toward excessive individualism, consumerism,
materialism, driven by the pursuit of profit maximization and economic growth,
often at virtually any cost -- most are socially and environmentally unsustainable.
The fact that despite the interesting spatial considerations of the country’s GNH
Strategy its central preoccupation is economic growth, illustrates just how hard it is
for analysts to break away from global conventional wisdom. The GNH Strategy is
in fact a growth strategy with a GNH label. Its analysis and conclusions may all be
perfectly valid from an economic growth perspective, and it may actually outline a
sound, GNH-enhancing growth strategy. But then it should be labelled as such; it
should not be accorded the overarching title of GNH Strategy. Such mis-labelling

42
is misleading and dangerous for GNH.

Enhancing national capacity for GNH policy and programme analysis is important,
but it is not enough. Social contracts are two-way streets. GNH policy making
needs to be complemented by public understanding of, and engagement with, the
GNH concept. Today, most Bhutanese have only a vague notion of GNH. Some
people feel that GNH is a nice idea, but relegate it to the intellectuals. Some people
think it is pie in the sky. Some fear it may become a means of state control and
a threat to individual freedoms. A recent opinion piece in the Kuensel53 warned
that GNH could become an instrument for state authoritarianism. These voices
need to be heard and discussed. Bhutan’s current transition from administrative to
political governance will take time and frictions between the two modus operandi will
inevitably emerge in which GNH may become entangled. The more the Bhutanese
public engages with the concept, making it their own, the less likely it is to be
misused or to smack of paternalism. A bottom-up GNH track is therefore vitally
important at this time. Fortunately, the Ministry of Education has begun a process
to weave GNH into the school curriculum, to raise general awareness. While an
excellent initiative, this needs to be complemented by a proliferation of public
GNH discussions and exchanges among different groups, particularly among
youth.

At a moment in history when the limits of the “invisible hand” have become so
painfully apparent and the crisis in global leadership so pervasive, it would be a
great pity if Bhutan were to dilute its identify and erode its inherent strengths by
going with the global flow. As Dasho Karma Ura aptly put it “the invisible hand
is invisible because it does not exist.”54 GNH can help Bhutan remind itself of its
inherent values and beliefs, the absence of which have led so many other countries
astray. It can help maintain Bhutan’s distinct identity and qualities, so essential
for her continued strength as a nation. It would be a bitter irony if, just as the
world is poised to accept the folly of some of growth-centric illusions in favour of
more sustainable GNH-like pursuits, Bhutan were to dilute its own commitment
to GNH.

53 Kuensel editorial (2009): “Dissecting GNH”, Kuensel, 20 October.

54 In his concluding remarks to participants at the Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, Paro,
Bhutan 12-14 October 2009.

43
3.3 Framework conditions

In addition to a strong national vision and strategic abilities to chart the country’s
development pathway on its own terms, conducive democratic framework
conditions also require robust legislative and institutional provisions of governance.
While many of the institutions that underpin Bhutan’s democracy are already in
place and have been for some time, the new political process has only recently been
introduced and therefore the whole system merits careful monitoring. While there
are many dimensions to this, I wish to highlight two areas of competing logic and
possible tension.

First, there is the balancing act between the need to test and adjust the new
systems, and the need to infuse the Constitution and its supporting structures with
trumping powers. Second, there is the need to keep a close eye on possible gaps
between the provisions of the law, the spirit of the law, and the application of the
law. Behind both these areas lies the paramount issue of rule of law.

At the heart of establishing rule of law lies the process of developing the
Constitution’s trumping powers. In Bhutan, the Constitution is young and as
the nation tests its provisions, it is inevitable that areas will emerge where some
modification may be desirable. The fundamental design of the Constitution should
not be touched, but some elements may need fine-tuning. However, amending
the Constitution at this early phase of its existence could undermine its ability to
consolidate trumping powers. Furthermore, differentiating between the genuine
need for fine-tuning and the impulses of political forces may not always be easy.
This challenge of knowing when and how much to amend the Constitution will
confront the country and clear principles and parameters will need to be set for
it, with political and public consultation and endorsement forming an important
element to ensure broad support. Consideration of India’s “basic structure”55
doctrine may be helpful in this regard. For the time being, however, it would be
unwise to touch the Constitution, both in order to enable its gravitas to settle,
and because constitutional change under an overwhelmingly majoritarian National
Assembly is potentially dangerous.

When a Constitution lacks trumping powers, rule of law can easily be circumvented
by those in power, and serious gaps can form between the law, its spirit, and its

55 A.G. Noorani, Frontline, Chennai: Behind the “basic structure” doctrine: Volume 18-Issue 09,
Apri.28-May 11, 2001

44
application. In some instances disrespect for the law is so rampant that all pretence
is dispensed with, and impunity is flaunted. In other instances, a façade of rule
of law is deemed necessary for public consumption, but the law is breached
surreptitiously. Rule of law can only be established through institutions. In countries
that began their democratic adventure with weak public institutions, building
their capacities has been a focus of international assistance for many decades.
But experience shows that such endeavours can take an exceedingly long time to
reap meaningful results, and beyond a certain critical point when political forces
begin to see their influence and benefits curtailed by it, progress can be virtually
impossible. Countries that managed to develop reasonably strong institutions
before the introduction of democracy, like Bhutan, are clearly at an advantage.
But they are not risk free. When political forces are driven by mal-intent, they can
usually find ways of circumventing even the most robust institutional framework.

To be on the safe side, Bhutan should anticipate that at some point its political
forces may try altering and weakening the country’s legal/institutional framework
with ignoble purpose. A common method employed in other countries is to
gradually politicise the organs of the state -- the civil service, the judiciary, the
police, the armed forces, etc. Excessive politicisation leads to de-professionalisation
and de-capacitation of institutions, making it easier to divert them from their
fundamental purpose of public service. The main conduit for this is through
appointments, promotions and transfers. Bhutan would do well to ensure it is well
guarded against this risk. Appointments to key positions, such as Constitutional
bodies and independent institutions, should be carefully monitored for their
political neutrality, their professional calibre and their integrity. The appointment
commissions prescribed in the Constitution were designed to do this; however,
similarly designed entities in other countries have not been able to hold up under
political pressures. Bhutan could heed their experiences. Civil society watchdog
groups could assist by keeping a close eye on these processes and advocating for
the substance and spirit of the Constitution to be upheld, assuming these groups
themselves are politically neutral. Ensuring the law specifies minimum professional
qualifications for vitally important positions, such as judges, is advisable.

3.4 Strengthening democratic culture

Democracy works best when bolstered by a democratic culture. This is a broad

subject and can be interpreted in different ways. I wish to highlight three important

45
elements of relevance to Bhutan -- the interface between citizens and their
government, the role of civil society, and the relationship between political parties.

Interface between citizens and their government

Time and again we see the spectacle of elected leaders invoking “the people” when
in fact “the people” are the furthest thing from their mind. Apart from voting,
what are the means and ways through which people influence their governments
that are supposed to be of them, by them and for them? The practice of public
consultation, public deliberation, public polling, public hearings, etc., are present
in most democracies in one form or another. But it is possible to have all these and
still have almost no responsiveness by the elected to the electorate. How can these
and other opportunities for citizens to influence their government develop depth
and meaning in Bhutan?

One of the biggest constraints to building democratic culture in Bhutan is

the dearth of people who truly believe that democracy is the best system of
governance for them. People’s scepticism and apprehensions are understandable,
given the exceptional quality of governance under Bhutan’s recent monarchs to
which they became accustomed. But they will need to embrace the new system
whole heartedly in order for it to function well. A major effort is thus needed to
help the Bhutanese public appreciate the merits of democracy and shape it to
their aspirations, and the best people to do this are the politicians. Rhetoric alone,
however, will not suffice. Politicians will have to back up their words with hard
evidence of the merits of the new system. This will require not only delivering
on electoral promises, but also ensuring that the democratic process is collegial,
peaceful, inclusive, responsive, effective, transparent and accountable. Practicing
intra-party democracy (e.g. regular and transparent elections at all tiers of the party
apparatus) would also help convince the public that politicians practice what they
preach. If successful democracy depends on people’s belief in it, then elected
leaders should feel a vested interest in building people’s faith in the system. If they
act accordingly with sincerity, people’s scepticism can be transformed from an
obstacle into an asset for deepening democracy.

In the quest for healthy interface between the electors and the elected, Bhutan
has an advantage that many other young democracies lack -- its size. Despite the
country’s rugged terrain, its small population makes direct democracy a feasible

46
proposition. While some quarters may wish to delay this practice in Bhutan until the
general public becomes more politically aware, this may be a mistake. What better
way to help expand the public’s political awareness than by starting the practice
of organised consultations with them, including referenda when necessary, at this
early phase? This may also be the best way of building the public’s confidence in
democracy.

Importance of civil society

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have a vital role to play in building people’s
understanding of democracy, facilitating the exchange of ideas to enrich the
public decision-making process, and keeping government in check. In Bhutan, a
wealth of local level, indigenous civil society groups exist to manage collective
concerns -- water sharing, community infrastructure, social assistance, etc. At the
national level, CSOs are emerging very gradually around social, developmental or
environmental concerns. Apart from the media, the Centre for Bhutan Studies and
Media and Democracy, there are no CSOs that yet engage directly on issues of
democratic governance. This may be partly because the topic is so new, perhaps
partly because the CSO Authority is still being set-up and people may not be clear
about registration issues, and partly because the law stipulates that CSOs should
remain politically neutral and there may be some confusion between this and the
expression of personal opinions on the political process.

For Bhutan’s democratic culture to develop, it would be important to encourage the

development of CSOs that question and challenge decisions and directions taken
by the government, as well as to monitor the overall workings of the democratic
process. Media has a vital role to play here, as do think-thanks and democracy
watchdog organisations. This web of institutions is what John Keane refers to in
his concept of ‘monitoring democracy’.56 How to promote this type of CSO in a
young democracy, while ensuring that they are not captured by political parties,
will be a challenge. Keeping the ownership of CSOs out of the hands of political
parties and their affiliates is important, as stipulated in the CSO Act. But the Act
alone will not suffice to keep them politically neutral.

The independent media constitutes a special category of CSO. In some countries

where the main opposition party is unable or unwilling to play its role, the media
actually ends up performing political opposition function -- holding government

56 Keane, John (2009): The Life and Death of Democracy, New York: W. W. Norton & Company

47
to account. The independent media in Bhutan has started trying to do this. But
to enhance its effectiveness it needs both greater access to public information,
and high reporting standards. The first could be addressed through a Right to
Information Act, such as that of India which has proven catalytic. The second
could start with a code of conduct for reporters and reporting. Government should
resist the urge to regulate the reporting standards of the media as this will be
perceived as infringement on their freedom. Such a media code of conduct should
be developed and policed by the media itself. Finally, as one of the greatest modern
threats to independent, quality media reporting comes from the commercial
pursuits of media owners, safeguards need to be developed against this. Unless and
until the media of Bhutan can work out innovative funding mechanisms that allow
it independence not only from government but also from big business and the
business bottom-line, it will loose its ability to serve the pubic interest. This would
have a very negative impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Several
thoughtful papers on this topic have been discussed at GNH Conferences57. Given
the small context of Bhutan, Government assistance in setting up such funding
is required. As it is this same media that often lashes out at public figures and
decision’s, Government’s willingness to help establish funding mechanisms for
independent public media is a good indicator of its commitment to that vital but
messy democratic ingredient -- freedom of speech.

The relationship between political parties

Another defining ingredient of democratic culture is the quality of relationships

between political parties. Design features of the democratic system influence
these relationships and the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system tends to
produce two major political parties with high degrees of competitiveness. In some
developing countries this electoral system has degenerated into a ‘winner takes
all’ zero-sum game that has made it almost impossible to develop any meaningful
form of political dialogue between opposing parties. In worst case scenarios this
has dragged the political process down into the realms of hatred and violence, as
described in Part One of this paper. This phenomenon is exacerbated manifold
in situations of landslide electoral victories, such as in Bhutan. Developing a
democratic culture of constructive inter-party dialogue and deliberation under
these circumstances is exceedingly difficult. Bhutan may wish to consider other
electoral systems that could produce less conflictual political party relations. An

57 Kinley Dorji & Siok Sian Pek: The Bhutanese Media: In the Service of the Public, presented at the
Second International Conference on Gross National Happiness, 2007

48
interesting proposal to this effect -- the Majority Judgement system -- was made
at the Asian Conference on Deepening Democracy, held in Paro in 2009.58 In
the meantime, if Bhutan’s majority and opposition parties do not consciously
guard themselves against the risk of confrontational politics, their relationship
will almost inevitably slide into acrimonious and conflictual territory. This will
not inspire people’s confidence in democracy. Given the majority party’s massive
advantage in the National Assembly, it is behoven on it to be generous toward,
and accommodating of, the opposition. Each big-hearted effort to constructively
engage with the opposition will be another step toward consolidating democratic
culture.

An instrument the Government may wish to explore in this context is the use of
political party codes of conduct. Such a code exists for election periods and there
is a general code of conduct within the National Assembly Act.59 However, it may
be necessary to add greater specificity to the latter to ensure adequate space for the
opposition party to engage. For example, the Speaker may be required to entertain
motions of a certain gravitas submitted to him by the opposition for plenary
discussion, or the PM’s question periods may be required to grant preference to the
opposition’s queries, or a certain proportion of the chairs of National Assembly
sub-committees may be reserved for opposition members, etc.

Codes of conduct, monitored by the appropriate oversight bodies and by civil

society organisations, can help encourage constructive political party behaviour.
But such codes cannot fundamentally change the nature of inter-party relations.
Only statesman-like leadership from within the main parties can do that. Regular
consultations between the leaders of the majority and opposition parties, initiated
by either side but particularly by the former, on issues of national importance, are
a good gauge of constructive engagement.

Only when relations between the main political parties are collegial and constructive
can the full dividends of democratic deliberation emerge. And only when parties
engage in the negotiations, deliberations, give-and-take that define deliberation,
can democracy be prevented from degenerating into a tyranny of the majority.
Without democratic deliberation there can be no meaningful democracy. And
without constructive inter-party dialogue there is no real democratic deliberation

58 Michel Balinski (2009): The Majority Judgement: A New Mechanism for Electing and Ranking,
unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, 12-14 October
2009, Paro, Bhutan.
59 Article 124 of the National Assembly Act also accords preferential treatment to the opposition.

49
where it matters most.

3.5 Leadership -- the heart of the matter

His Majesty the Fourth King once said that shortly after acceding the Throne
he realised the decisions he made for the good for the nation would usually not
be good for himself personally, while decisions that might be good for himself
personally would usually not be good for the nation. He had to make a choice.
The record of his words and deeds during his 34 year reign makes it abundantly
clear what choice he consistently made. He placed the greater good above his
personal consideration. And his only compulsion was his conscience. That is what
we expect from public leaders. That is true public service. That is the calibre of
leadership that most Bhutanese want, and the standard against which they will
judge their democratic system.

Democratic literature is thin on leadership because democracy is supposed to have

looked after this preoccupation through the electoral process. What literature there
is on the subject tends to focuses either on the qualities of good public leaders
or on the checks and balances required to keep public leaders on the straight and
narrow. Almost nothing exists on how to get great leaders, endowed with the ethos
of public service, elected in the first place. This is curious, since it is so obvious
that no matter how perfect the democratic system may appear on paper, no matter
how robust the legal and institutional framework, it can all be undermined, overtly
or covertly, by ill-intentioned leaders. It is also curious because the types of leaders
that the democratic system tends to produce around the world are those with
charismatic qualities capable of pushing society’s populist buttons to trigger knee-
jerk electoral responses -- very different from the leadership qualities required
to help democracy produce good governance, enabling people to realise their
collective and individual freedoms, capabilities and equalities.

Bhutan has a big head start over other countries when it comes to leadership. The
country has been blessed with great rulers under the Wangchuck dynasty and His
Majesty the Fifth King clearly continues this legacy. The new political government
inherited some of that legacy, as virtually all its members were groomed under the
Fourth King. Because of this, there is an expectation that they deliver on more
than the day-to-day running of government. In line with the far-sighted leadership
of the King, they must also anticipate the future. They must review their current

50
decisions and actions not only with respect to their immediate impact, but also in
light of the conventions, practices and standards of political governance they will
establish for the country, and in whose tracks future governments will follow. And
they must pave they way for the next generation of leaders. While a few young
leaders have emerged or seem to be emerging, they need assistance. It is behoven
on the current leadership to groom the country’s future leaders in the same
enlightened spirit that they themselves were groomed. This is an important task
for Members of Parliament, leaders of other Constitutional bodies, government
institutions, and political parties.

What about the King? What is his role in protecting the quality of Bhutan’s leadership
and ensuring the emergence of the next generation of fine leaders, particularly
those who will pass through the electoral process? Apart from continuing to lead
by example, his most powerful instrument, the King is constitutionally endowed
with important functions as Head of State and is required to grant royal assent for
various aspects of governance that have direct bearing on the country’s leadership.
For example, he must endorse appointments like that of the Chief Justice and the
Drangpons. For some posts he makes the selection from the recommendations of
pre-defined selection commissions or the Prime Minister. But the mere fact of his
involvement imbibes the process with his moral authority. This is a great safeguard
for the country.

In addition, the King may award titles, decorations and other recognitions through
which he draws public attention to the desired calibre and quality of public
leadership. He may direct some of these recognitions to outstanding contributions
by youth, to inspire and encourage them for public service. In his speaking
engagements, the King also emphasizes the qualities of great leadership, and
inspires the next generation to lead with the same selfless and dedicated spirit that
guides him.

In addition to encouraging the emergence of great future leaders, the King also
influences current public leaders. He is, for example, endowed by law with the
discretion to addresses or send messages to Parliament when he deems fit, refer
questions of law to the Supreme Court, return Bills to Parliament, and he may
command a National Referendum, etc. Naturally, with the recent introduction of
political party democracy and the need for the new system to take root, the King
is reticent to intervene unless absolutely necessary.

51
The King may also need to compensate for the lack of familiarisation of the people
with their new system of governance. As mentioned earlier, despite the check
and balances within the system, it is the people who are the final guarantors of
democracy. When they are unable to provide the required oversight and influence,
the system can quickly mutate into devious impersonations of the real thing. So,
until the Bhutanese general public develops strong, organised groups and outspoken
eminent persons whose views hold sway over public opinion and government,
some of these responsibilities inevitably fall on the shoulders of the King, as final
protector of the state and guardian of the people. Given this situation, the King
may wish to engage in activities to expand people’s understanding of their roles
and functions in the new system, and develop their capacities to perform them
well.

Clearly, the King has vital contributions in shaping the country’s current and
future leadership and the quality of democracy. He is leading by example. He is
introducing and shaping the new role of the monarchy under a constitutional
democracy. He is working to infuse the new system with the ethos of public service
that characterised past governments in Bhutan. And while it will remain one of his
most fundamental responsibilities to represent his people’s collective aspirations
and needs, he is having to assume some of his people’s democratic responsibilities,
until they develop these capacities themselves. All these are in addition to the other
vital functions of the monarchy.

The role of the King in Bhutan’s young democracy will perhaps never be as
important as it is today. His legacy is noble, his influence immense, and his reach
extensive as he must support parts of the democratic system that have yet to
find their feet. Precisely because of this influence, and because the system needs
to avoid over reliance on the monarch to develop its own strength, the King is
treading very carefully. Those who advise the King must do so with equal care and,
like their King, remain totally and utterly above the political fray.

Concluding thoughts

Bhutan has crossed a major threshold on its democratic journey. Before it lies a
long road with many forks and hairpin turns that will require great presence of
mind and navigational skill for the ride to be smooth. The need for stability and
continuity must be balanced with the need for greater freedoms and inevitable
change. The logic and flavour of democracy must be informed by the wisdom of

52
GNH. The introduction of political governance must be balanced with the legacy
of hierarchical, administrative governance.

Many other young democracies faced similar challenges in the past, and while
each situation is unique, broad trends can be drawn from their experience. This
paper outlines some of devastating impact of wrong decisions, highlighting how
easy it is for the democratic system to be overpowered by non-democratic power
structures and predatory elite, as well as by externally driven global forces. It
describes how democracy has been frequently drained of its soul and paraded
like the Emperor’s New Clothes, as in the well-known fairy tale. It examines some
of the building blocks for consolidating democracy that ultimately make it easier
for the right decisions to be made. And it stresses how very difficult it is to build
these blocks, as their construction inevitably requires the ruling class to submit to
curtailment of its power and authority. This requires leadership of a calibre that
most democracies are not wont to produce, and in the absence of which young,
struggling democracies often get caught in a Catch-22 situation. They can linger in
this democratic limbo for decades -- during which people are forced to swallow a
sorry substitute for meaningful democracy, while their leaders play the system for
personal gain.

Bhutan has a precious opportunity to avoid this dismal scenario. The country’s
legacy of great leadership and good governance gives it a distinct advantage. But
this window of opportunity is time-bound; it will not exist in a few years time,
at least not to the same degree. By then the pattern of political behaviours and
conventions of the new system will have been largely set into a path dependency that
will characterize the country’s future governments. Using the current opportunity
well is therefore the single most important task of the current government and
people of Bhutan.

Many of Bhutan’s inherent characteristics and its legacy of good governance

could help guide and shape the country’s democracy positively. As the quality of
democracy is inextricably linked to the quality of a country’s values and vision,
an obvious starting place is GNH. The GNH concept is inherently democracy-
friendly -- it could help Bhutan deepen its democratic experience right from the
start. But while GNH is gathering some steam internationally, it finds itself at risk at
home. The economic-centric forces that have blinded the international community
to other essential elements of human well-being have entered Bhutan and are hard
at work. The economic bias of the country’s mis-labled GNH strategy is but one

53
reflection of this. If Bhutan is to leverage its strengths to deepen its democracy
right from the start, it needs to enable GNH to shape the country’s new system of
governance by firmly anchoring it both in government decision-making and in the
minds and hearts of the general public.

The overriding lesson from other young democracies is that democratic “ends”
must be valued on the same footing, if not higher, than democratic “means.” The
sign of a good democracy is much more than a good election; it is what happens
in between elections. Four main areas emerge from this observation. First, strong
democratic framework conditions are required for democracy to deliver on
people’s expectations. Rule of law, constitutionalism and the trumping powers
of the Constitution are key to this, both in their aspect as rules and as morality.
Second, keeping the appointments and promotions to high state offices free from
political bias and of the highest standards of professionalism and integrity are
vital. In this way the process of state building can resist misguided forces that
sometimes infiltrate the democratic process and try to drive it in unhealthy
directions. Third, developing the attributes of a conducive democratic culture is a
priority. This includes maintaining constructive and collegial inter-party relations,
raising citizens’ awareness of and confidence in democracy, engaging citizens and
civil society with democratic processes, and strengthening the ability of the media
to play its vital democratic oversight functions.

Finally, although the literature on democracy has neglected the fundamental issue
of leadership, nothing is more important. While Bhutan currently has a significant
leadership advantage over other countries, care must be taken to maintain the
standard and groom the country’s next generation of public leaders. In addition to
his many other vital functions, the King has an important role to play in inspiring
and encouraging both Bhutan’s present and future leaders, political and non-
political, to maintain the high standards of public service to which the people have
became accustomed.

As political parties, state institutions and the people of Bhutan unpackage their
new system of governance and test it, the King’s role is key in many other areas as
well. How he decides to perform his vital functions, whether directly or indirectly,
quietly or more publicly, only he can decide. But there is no question that the shape
and quality of Bhutan’s democratic trajectory depends very much on his guidance.

-x-x-x-

54
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