Republic of the Philippines not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement.
The
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005
ELENA P. DYCAICO, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Elena P. Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated April 15, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the
Social Security Commission (SSC), denying the petitioner’s claim for survivor’s pension
accruing from the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System
(SSS) member-pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate
court’s Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The case arose from the following undisputed facts:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-
employed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and
their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension
from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June
19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on
January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivor’s pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under
Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law 2 she could
said proviso reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. –
…
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …
Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the –
Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5,
1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on
June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract with the
deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date;
hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you do not
conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Security Commission to
determine your benefit eligibility.3
On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her
survivor’s pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their
children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein
that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate
relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivor’s pension. The SSS is legally bound
to respect Bonifacio’s designation of them as his
beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice.
On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the
petitioner’s claim. The SSC refuted the petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries
need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of "primary beneficiaries"
and "dependents" in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said
provision, "primary beneficiaries" are "[t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries,
the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children …"
Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines "dependents" as the
following: "(1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2)
[t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3)
[t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member." Based on the foregoing,
according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivor’s pension in
one’s capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with
and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.
Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to
survivor’s pension are those who qualify as
such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who
was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not
be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacio’s designation
of the petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only
on moral considerations but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not
entitled to claim the survivor’s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSC’s February 6,
2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, dated April 15, 2003, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by
the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of
Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of
his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that
Bonifacio’s children with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries
because they have all reached twenty-one (21) years of age. The decretal portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed 06 February
2002 Resolution of respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution
dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petitioner’s
recourse to this Court.
The petitioner points out that the term "primary beneficiaries" as used in Section 12-B(d)
of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of
whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not,
he or she is entitled to the survivor’s pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC
on the definitions of "primary beneficiaries" and "dependents" in Section 8 of Rep. Act
No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because these definitions cannot modify Section 12-
B(d) thereof.
The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few
months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their relationship and
had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social
legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She
cites the Court’s pronouncement that "the sympathy of the law on social security is
toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost
liberality in their favor."5
The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 should be
read in conjunction with the definition of the terms "dependents" and "primary
beneficiaries" in Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of
Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivor’s
pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio
of the petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form RS-1 is void.
According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that "should
there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the benefit accruing from the death of a
member should go to his designated common-law spouse" and that "to rule otherwise
would be to condone the designation of common-law spouses as beneficiaries, a clear
case of circumventing the SS Law and a violation of public policy and morals." 6 Finally, the
SSS is of the opinion that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence,
there is no room for its interpretation, only for application.
In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the Office
of the Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not
the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court
believes that this issue is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the
merits of the petition.
In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso "as of the date
of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of
qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship pension. It asserts that
this classification of beneficiaries is based on valid and substantial distinctions that are
germane to the legislative purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement
stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualify for the
survivorship pension upon the latter’s death. It further alleges that there is no violation of
the due process clause as the petitioner was given her day in court and was able to
present her side.
The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the
legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred
(his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within
the contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statute’s intent is to give
survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the
deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and
cannot be subject of change by the SSS.
The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso "as of the
date of his retirement" merely marks the period when the primary beneficiary must be so
to be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the
classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the
condition as to the period for entitlement, i.e., as of the date of the member’s retirement,
is relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the benefits and it applies to all
those similarly situated. The Solicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does
not offend the due process clause because claimants are given the opportunity to file
their claims and to prove their case before the Commission.
For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. –
… qualified for their pension.
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …
Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the "primary beneficiaries" are:
1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.
Further, the "dependent spouse" and "dependent children" are qualified under paragraph
(e) of the same section as follows:
1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if
over twenty-one years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
The SSS denied the petitioner’s application for survivor’s pension on the sole ground that
she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio "as of the date of his retirement;" hence, she
could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282.
The Court holds that the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for
it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,8 the Court
invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 11469 which stated that "the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner
is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension." In the
said case, the Court characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the
pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent
spouse’s claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to
the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due
process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also held to
infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses who
contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years before they
For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement"
in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause
As illustrated by the petitioner’s case, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries"
results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two
groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted prior to the latter’s retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted after the latter’s retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective
marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The
distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The
petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to
Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do
not qualify as "primary beneficiaries" under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and,
therefore, are not entitled to survivor’s pension under the same provision by reason of
the subject proviso.
It is noted that the eligibility of "dependent children" who are biological offsprings of a
retired SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso "as of the date of his
retirement." A biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled
to survivor’s pension upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as the said child is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if
over twenty-one (21) years of age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered "primary
beneficiaries" under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by the proviso "as of
the date of his retirement" in the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally
adopted child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2) 10 thereof is considered a
primary beneficiary of a retired SSS member upon the latter’s death only if the said child
had been legally adopted prior to the member’s retirement. One who was legally adopted
by the SSS member after his or her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary
for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282.
In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse who
claims to have been unjustly deprived of her survivor’s pension under Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant
classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision.
As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e.,
her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly
situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso "as of the date of his
retirement" disqualifies them from being considered "primary beneficiaries" for the
purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension.
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. 11 With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in
particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it "is permeated with provisions
that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in
this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme
of government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of
competing policies and interests."12
However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to
entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. 13
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in
inserting the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" to qualify the term "primary
beneficiaries" in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Court’s mind, however, it reflects
congressional concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for
the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to
prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to
claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and
determining their entitlement to survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration
of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the
law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden."14 The nexus of the classification to the
policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent
spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective.
For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in
contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite "duration-of-
relationship" or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for
entitlement to survivor’s pension. For example, in the United States, a provision in their
social security law which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and
stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage
earner for less than nine months prior to his death, was declared valid.15 Thus, nine
months is recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to
consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to
survivorship pension.
In contrast, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act
No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivor’s pension all those
dependent spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted
after the latter’s retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is
observed that, in certain instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty
(60)
years old.16 A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last
for more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In
such a case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for
the purpose of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of
the other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivor’s
pension because he or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the
SSS member following Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective
marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latter’s retirement for
the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension does not rest on real and substantial
distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso "as of
the date of his retirement," which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latter’s
retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham
relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing
upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the
legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law "to
provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden."17
The proviso infringes the due process clause
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,18 the Court
characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that
"[i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is
that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part
of the terms of employment."19 Thus, it was ruled that, "where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected
by the due process clause" and "[r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law."20Further, since
pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship
pension, "a widow’s right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also
part of the husband’s contractual compensation." 21
Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits
under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 22 covering
government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected
property interest in their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private
sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the mandatory contributions of both
the employers23 and the employees24 to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latter’s
compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio,
who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 25 are not mere
gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and employee
contributions.26 Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to
survivor’s pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving spouse’s
right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may
be, is also part of the latter’s contractual compensation.
The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs
afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s
retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such
surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to
SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement, the proviso "as of the date of
his retirement" qualifying the term "primary beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement
to survivor’s pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the
retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the
benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the
said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the
illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional
because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United
States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an "irrebuttable presumption" and
statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored
under the due process clause. 27
In the petitioner’s case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got
married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This
claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact,
during that time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the
petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacio’s bona
fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his
primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a
property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be
heard. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present
evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as
his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s pension accruing upon his
death.28 Hence, the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) which
deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS
members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.
Conclusion
deserves to receive forthwith the survivor’s pension accruing upon the death of her
husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resolution
dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the
claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor’s pension on the basis of this invalid
proviso.
SO ORDERED.

Even as the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the
enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension
is not substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under
Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:

(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and

(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent
children as follows:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.

Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the
proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule
is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.29 However, the question of the constitutionality of the
proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly,
the Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to
pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render
substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now,