SAÑO, JR. vs.

 COMELEC
G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Election Law; Pre­Proclamation Controversies; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the 
Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS: Saño alleged that after the casting and counting of votes, at about midnight
of May 14, 2007, a man was seen carrying a ballot box that was not locked; he then
inserted certain documents in said ballot box, took the aluminum seal, sealed the
box, and then turned it over to the Reception Group. 

During   the   canvassing   at   the   Dulag   Municipal   Hall,   Saño   sought   to   have   the
contested   ERs   excluded   on   the   following   grounds:   massive   fraud,   illegal
proceedings,   and   tampered/falsified   and   obviously   manufactured   returns.   He
alleged   that   timely   oral   objections   were   made,   and   the   written   Petition   for
Exclusion was filed with the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) on May 15,
2007   at   6:50   p.m. together   with   affidavits   prepared   by   his   brother,   Tancredo   A.
Saño, and a certain Peter C. Alicando. Upon the filing of the Petition for Exclusion,
canvass of the contested ERs was deferred.

Saño   further   alleged   that   in   the   morning   of   May   16,   2007,   Lydia   Camposano
(Camposano),   Election   Officer   for   Dulag,   and   Chairperson   of   the   MBOC,   was
overheard   calling   a   certain   "sir"   over   the   telephone   to   ask   for   a   ruling.   The
telephone   conversation   was   video   recorded   by   Wilfredo   O.   Lazar   (Lazar),   who
executed   an   affidavit   attesting   to   said   occurrence. Saño,   through   counsel,   then
verbally moved for the inhibition of Camposano as MBOC Chairman on the ground
of   bias   and   for   prejudgment   of   the   election   results.   Camposano   allegedly
acknowledged   that   she   was   talking   to   her   superior,   Atty.   Jose   Nick   Medros,
Director   III   of   Region   VIII   and   Chairman   of   the   Leyte   Provincial   Board   of
Canvassers, but declined to inhibit herself until she was ordered to do so by her
superiors. The canvassing continued.

At   around   9:00   p.m.   of   May   16,   2007,   Saño   filed   his   written Petition   for
Inhibition together   with   the   affidavit   of   Lazar,   reiterating   his   request   for   the
inhibition of the MBOC Chair. At midnight of May 16, 2007, Camposano inhibited
herself and declared the canvassing temporarily adjourned.

At   around   5:00   p.m.   of   May   17,   2007,   Saño   received   a   copy   of   the   COMELEC
Regional   Office’s   Memorandum   designating   Ferdinand   Serrano   (Serrano)   as   the
Acting Election Officer and MBOC Chairperson. Canvassing resumed at about 6:00
p.m. of May 17, 2007, during which Serrano verbally ruled that the contested ERs
would be opened. Serrano promised that this ruling would be put in writing within
24 hours. Thereafter, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal at 5:00
a.m. of May 18, 2007 covering the contested ERs.

Finally, Saño claimed that instead of suspending the canvass as required by law
and   the   canvassing   rules,   Serrano   proceeded   to   hastily   open   and   canvass   the
contested ERs. Despite the filing of petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, and the fact that
the   exclusion   of   the   contested   ERs   would   materially   affect   the   results   of   the
election, the MBOC neither made a written ruling nor elevated the appeal to the
COMELEC together with the MBOC’s report and records of the case. Instead, the
MBOC proclaimed Que as Municipal Mayor.

ISSUE:  Whether   COMELEC   gravely   abused   its   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or

excess of jurisdiction in ordering the exclusion of the subject returns.

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

A   pre­proclamation   controversy,   as   defined   in Batas   Pambansa (BP)   Blg.   881,

otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, is:

any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers
which   may   be   raised   by   any   candidate   or   by   any   registered   political   party   or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.41

It is settled that a pre­proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it
is the policy of the law that pre­proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so
as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not
look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that
appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. 

Consistent  with  the summary  character  and limited scope of  a  pre­proclamation

controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when
ERs are contested before the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so
as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible. 

Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that
any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the
time the questioned return is submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also
submit his objections in writing simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC
shall consider the written objections and opposition, if any, and summarily rule on
the   petition   for   exclusion.   Any   party   adversely   affected   by   such   ruling   must
immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.

After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested
returns, it shall suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling
has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days.
Upon   receipt   of   the   notice   of   appeal,   the   BOC   will   make   its   report   to   the
COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.

Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where
the ERs appear to have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC
shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns and, if the other copies are
likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given
notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot box and of
the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast,
prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and
direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly.

Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his
objections to the contested ERs.

Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court is bound to rely on
the   findings   and   conclusions   of   the   COMELEC   ­   the   authority   tasked   by   the
Constitution to administer and enforce election laws. 

At any rate, even if we take a second look at the facts, petitioner has still not proven
that the ERs were spurious, falsified, or manufactured. 

Unlike   a   pre­proclamation   controversy,   the   annulment   proceedings   before   the

COMELEC   were   not   summary   in   character; petitioner   had   every   opportunity   to
ventilate his case and substantiate his allegations before the Commission below.
This   notwithstanding,   petitioner   failed   to   present   any   evidence   sufficient   to
overcome the presumption that the contested ERs were valid.

RENO FOODS, INC. vs.
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM) ­ KATIPUNAN 
G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Labor Law; 

FACTS:  Petitioner   Reno   Foods,   Inc.   (Reno   Foods)   is   a   manufacturer   of   canned   meat
products   of   which   Vicente   Khu   is   the   president   and   is   being   sued   in   that   capacity.
Respondent Nenita Capor (Capor) was an employee of Reno Foods until her dismissal.

It is a standard operating procedure of petitioner­company to subject all its employees to
reasonable search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises. The guard on
duty found six Reno canned goods wrapped in nylon leggings inside Capor’s fabric clutch
bag.   The   only  other  contents  of   the  bag  were  money   bills   and   a  small   plastic   medicine
container.

Petitioners   accorded   Capor   several   opportunities   to   explain   her   side,   often   with   the
assistance   of   the   union   officers   of   Nagkakaisang   Lakas   ng   Manggagawa   (NLM)   –
Katipunan. In fact, after petitioners sent a Notice of Termination to Capor, she was given
yet   another   opportunity   for   reconsideration   through   a   labor­management   grievance
conference. Unfortunately, petitioners did not find reason to change its earlier decision to
terminate Capor’s employment with the company.

Petitioners filed a complaint­affidavit against Capor for qualified theft. Finding probable
cause for the crime charged, an Information was filed against.
Meanwhile, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM) – Katipunan filed on behalf
of Capor a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners with the
Head   Arbitration   Office   of   the   National   Labor   Relations   Commission   (NLRC)   for   the
National Capital Region. The complaint prayed that Capor be paid her full backwages as
well as moral and exemplary damages. 

In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Capor alleged that she was unaware that her
clutch bag contained the pilfered canned products. She claimed that petitioners might have
planted the evidence against her so it could avoid payment of her retirement benefits, as
she was set to retire in about a year’s time. 

The   Labor   Arbiter   noted   that   Capor   was   caught   trying   to   sneak   out   six   cans   of   Reno
products without authority from the company. Under Article 232 of the Labor Code, an
employer   may   terminate   the   services   of   an   employee   for   just   cause,   such   as   serious
misconduct.   In   this   case,   the   Labor   Arbiter   found   that   theft   of   company   property   is
tantamount   to   serious   misconduct;   as   such,   Capor   is   not   entitled   to   reinstatement   and
backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages.

Moreover,   the   Labor   Arbiter   ruled   that   consistent   with   prevailing   jurisprudence,   an
employee   who   commits   theft   of   company   property   may   be   validly   terminated   and
consequently, the said employee is not entitled to separation pay.

On   appeal,   the   NLRC   affirmed   the  factual   findings   and   monetary  awards   of   the  Labor
Arbiter   but   added   an   award   of   financial   assistance.   Both   parties   moved   for   a
reconsideration   of   the   NLRC   Decision.   Petitioners   asked   that   the   award   of   financial
assistance   be   deleted,   while   Capor   asked   for   a   finding   of   illegal   dismissal   and   for
reinstatement with full backwages. NLRC denied both motions for reconsideration for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or 
excess of jurisdiction in granting financial assistance to an employee who was validly 
dismissed for theft of company property.

HELD: Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes require
only substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The evidence in this case was reviewed by the
appellate court and two labor tribunals endowed with expertise on the matter – the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC.  They all found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had
been   validly   dismissed   for   dishonesty   or   serious   misconduct.   It   is   settled   that   factual
findings of quasi­judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and finality so long as
these are supported by substantial evidence. In  the instant case, we find  no compelling
reason to doubt the common findings of the three reviewing bodies.

The award of separation pay is not warranted under the law and jurisprudence.

We find no justification for the award of separation pay to Capor. This award is a deviation
from established law and jurisprudence.  

The law is clear. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not
attributable to the employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the
Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer
feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious
misconduct.
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a serious misconduct and denied
the award of separation pay to the erring employee. We see no reason why the same should
not be similarly applied in the case of Capor. She attempted to steal the property of her
long­time employer. For committing such misconduct, she is definitely not entitled to an
award of separation pay.

It is true that there have been instances when the Court awarded financial assistance to
employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity and social justice. The
same, however, has been curbed and rationalized in Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. National Labor Relations Commission. In that case, we recognized the harsh
realities   faced   by   employees   that   forced   them,   despite   their   good   intentions,   to   violate
company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. For
these   instances,   the   award   of   financial   assistance   was   allowed.   But,   in   clear   and
unmistakable language, we also held that the award of financial assistance shall not be
given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some
depravity   in   their   moral   character.   When   the   employee   commits   an   act   of   dishonesty,
depravity,   or   iniquity,   the   grant   of   financial   assistance   is   misplaced   compassion.   It   is
tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement
thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive
to maintain good values and moral conduct.

In   fact,   in   the   recent   case   of   Toyota   Motors   Philippines,   Corp.   Workers   Association
(TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that separation pay shall
not be granted to all employees who are dismissed on any of the four grounds provided in
Article 282 of the Labor Code. Such ruling was reiterated and further explained in Central
Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes: 

To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the
award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on
serious  misconduct   or   willful   disobedience;   gross   and   habitual   neglect   of   duty;   fraud   or
willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his
immediate family – grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of
employees. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or
financial assistance as the constitutional  policy to provide full protection to labor is not
meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the
cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right,
as   here.   In   fine,   we   should   be   more   cautious   in   awarding   financial   assistance   to   the
undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law.

We are not persuaded by Capor’s argument that despite the finding of theft, she should still
be granted separation pay in light of her long years of service with petitioners. We held in
Central   Pangasinan   Electric   Cooperative,   Inc.   v.   National   Labor   Relations
Commission that:

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation
benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case
is not the appropriate instance for generosity x x x. The fact that private respondent served
petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our
view  of  this case,  does  not  call  for  such award of  benefits,  since  his  violation reflects  a
regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of
service   is   to   be   regarded   as   justification   for   moderating   the   penalty   of   dismissal,   such
gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice
and undermining the efforts of labor to clean its ranks of undesirables.
Indeed, length of service and a previously clean employment record cannot simply erase the
gravity   of   the   betrayal   exhibited   by   a   malfeasant   employee. Length   of   service   is   not   a
bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer­
employee   relationship   is   symbiotic   where   both   parties   benefit   from   mutual   loyalty   and
dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness
and   adequate   compensation   as   determined   by   law,   it   is   only   fair   to   expect   a   long­time
employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Thus, it may be
said that betrayal by a long­time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer.
As stated in another case:

x   x   x   The   fact   that   [the   employer]   did   not   suffer   pecuniary   damage   will   not   obliterate
respondent’s   betrayal   of   trust   and   confidence   reposed   by   petitioner.   Neither   would   his
length of service justify his dishonesty or mitigate his liability. His length of service even
aggravates his offense. He should have been more loyal to petitioner company from which
he derived his family bread and butter for seventeen years. 

While   we   sympathize   with   Capor’s   plight,   being   of   retirement   age   and   having   served
petitioners for 39 years, we cannot award any financial assistance in her favor because it is
not only against the law but also a retrogressive public policy. We have already explained
the   folly   of   granting   financial   assistance   in   the   guise   of   compassion   in   the   following
pronouncements:

x   x   x   Certainly,   a   dishonest   employee   cannot   be   rewarded   with   separation   pay   or   any

financial  benefit  after  his  culpability  is   established in two  decisions  by  competent  labor
tribunals, which decisions appear to be well­supported by evidence. To hold otherwise, even
in the name of compassion, would be to send a wrong signal not only that "crime pays" but
also that one can enrich himself at the expense of another in the name of social justice. And
courts as well as quasi­judicial entities will be overrun by petitioners mouthing dubious
pleas for misplaced social justice. Indeed, before there can be an occasion for compassion
and mercy, there must first be justice for all. Otherwise, employees will be encouraged to
steal and misappropriate in the expectation that eventually, in the name of social justice
and   compassion,   they   will   not   be   penalized   but   instead   financially   rewarded.   Verily,   a
contrary holding will merely encourage lawlessness, dishonesty, and duplicity. These are
not the values that society cherishes; these are the habits that it abhors. 

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.
DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Remedial Law; Certiorari; Recall of Writ of Execution

FACTS:  The   Philippine  Government   (through   the  now   defunct   Department   of   General
Services)   and   petitioner   Philippine   National   Bank   (PNB)   entered   into   a   Contract   of
Lease where the former leased in favor of the latter its 21,727­square meter land located at
Numancia St., Binondo, Manila. The contract was effective from August 1, 1978 to July 31,
2003 and renewable for a similar period upon agreement of the parties. It also stipulated
that   except   for   its   subsidiary   corporations,   petitioner   shall   not   directly   or   indirectly
sublease, assign or encumber its leasehold rights in whole or in part on the leased area to
any person or corporation without the prior written approval of the government. 

Respondent DKS International Inc. (DKS) applied for the sublease of a 9,500­square meter
portion of the aforesaid property with petitioner. However, the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) denied petitioner’s request to sublease said portion of the property to DKS. Hence,
the sublease was not implemented.

Prior to DKS’ application for sublease, petitioner signified its intention to renew the lease
for another 25 years to the LMB as the original lease was about to expire. Then Secretary
Heherson Alvarez (Sec. Alvarez) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)   approved   the   recommendation   of   the   LMB   to   renew   the   contract   of   lease   for
another   25   years.   However,   Sec.   Alvarez   ordered   the   recall   of   his   May   6,   2002
Memorandum until such time that the terms and conditions of the lease and the capability
of the sub­lessees are re­evaluated and approved.

Petitioner alleged that during the period recited above, it was in continuous and peaceful
possession   of   the   property   including   the   subject   9,500­square   meter   portion   which   it
operated as a car park until DKS, through force, intimidation, stealth and threat, forcibly
and unlawfully took over possession.

The Operations Officer of Frontliner Security Agency posted at the car park’s main gate a
notice which read, "This place is operated by DKS, No trespassing". From then on, DKS had
possession and control of the car park in violation of  petitioner’s right as lessee of said
premises. 

Hence, petitioner filed a case for forcible entry against DKS and Dy. 

While said case was pending, the DENR came up with a Final Endorsement signed by Sec.
Alvarez,   informing   petitioner’s   president,   Lorenzo   V.   Tan,   of   the   DENR’s   approval   of
petitioner’s   request   for   renewal   of   the   lease   contract.   In   said   endorsement,   the   DENR
endorsed three sub­lessees excluding DKS.

The MeTC ruled in favour of the petitioner. 

RTC­Manila, rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the MeTC and ordering the
issuance of a writ of execution with break open order authorizing this Court’s Sheriff to
break open the gate or any other facility for the ingress [to] and/or egress [from] of the
subject premises and to employ all necessary means to carry out the writ of execution. 

Respondents appealed to the CA by way of Petition for Review.

Meanwhile, before the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order could be implemented,
respondents filed before the RTC an Urgent Motion to Recall Writ and the Command to
Sheriff With Comment alleging that during the previous hearings of the case, they have
proven that petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary   Restraining   Order/Writ   of   Preliminary   Injunction   and   Damages against   the
government,   and   raffled   to   RTC­Pasay   City   (Pasay   case).   Apparently,   the   Final
Endorsement approving petitioner’s request for renewal of lease contract earlier issued by
Sec.   Alvarez   was   withdrawn   by   his   successor,   Sec.   Elisea   G.   Gozun   (Sec.   Gozun),   on
grounds that same was contrary to law and public policy and that the issuance thereof was
without factual and legal bases. Unfortunately for petitioner, its application for TRO was
denied by said court. 
The government, through the LMB, also filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene on
the Incident Involving the Enforcement of the Writ of Execution and to Treat this Motion as
The   Intervention. It   manifested   therein   that   although   it   has   nothing   to   do   with   the
ejectment case, it vehemently objects to the notice of the sheriff, particularly on the matter
of   surrendering   possession   of   the   premises   to   petitioner.   It   pointed   out   that   since   the
government   was  already  in  possession  of   the  premises   following  petitioner’s   loss   of   any
right of possession therein, it will be an abuse of discretion on the part of the court to order
that   the   property   be   taken   from   the   government   and   to   have   the   same   delivered   to
petitioner,   under  the guise  of   enforcing  a  writ  of   execution  in the  ejectment   case.   LMB
likewise sought permission to intervene in the incident involving the enforcement of the
writ.

To these two motions, petitioner filed an Opposition with Manifestation asserting that the
two motions are both pro forma, patently unmeritorious and serve no other purpose but to
unduly delay the implementation of the Writ of Execution and therefore, should be denied.

The RTC did not find merit in LMB’s prayer to intervene in the issue of the implementation
of the writ. In its Order30dated July 14, 2004, it held that (1) the government’s intervention
will unduly delay the mandated immediate execution of the decision in the ejectment case
to the prejudice of petitioner; (2) the government’s rights may still be fully protected in a
separate proceeding (particularly in the Pasay case); and, (3) the intervention preempts the
decision in the Pasay case. The RTC also did not give credence to the claim of LMB that the
government was already in possession of the property subject of the writ of execution saying
that same was a mere general claim. Said court, thus, accordingly denied the two motions
for   lack   of   merit   and   again   ordered   the   Branch   Sheriff   of   the   MeTC   to   immediately
implement the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order it earlier issued.

Hence,   petitioner   filed   a   Petition   for Certiorari before   the   CA   imputing   grave   abuse   of

discretion   amounting   to   lack   of   or   in   excess   of   jurisdiction   on   the   part   of   the   RTC   in
recalling the writ of execution with break open order.

The CA rendered its Decision  denying the petition and affirming in toto the Decision of the
RTC   in  the  forcible  entry  case.   In  said  Decision,   the  CA   declared   that   the  issue   of   the
expiration of the lease and the take over of the property by the government will not prevent
the execution of the decision pending appeal, it being a basic rule that decisions against the
defendants in ejectment cases are immediately executory.

Respondents’ appeal from said Decision was denied by Supreme Court. 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:  Whether CA is correct in its ruling on the issue of ownership and on the basis
thereof granted possession of the disputed property to the government and the stay of the
execution   and   recall   of   the   break   open   order   even   in   the   absence   of   the   required
supersedeas bond.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

It is well to remind petitioner that the sole issue raised before the CA is whether or not the
RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it
recalled the writ of execution with break open order.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power  is  exercised in an  arbitrary or  despotic  manner  by reason  of  passion  or   personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual   refusal   to   perform   the   duty   enjoined   by   or   to   act   at   all   in   contemplation   of
law. Grave   abuse   of   discretion   refers   not   merely   to   palpable   errors   of   jurisdiction   or   to
violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for
various reasons, there has been gross misapprehension of facts. 

We find that the CA correctly took notice of the government’s take­over and repossession of
the subject property, as these are the very same facts which the RTC considered to be the
reasons why the writ of execution with break open order it earlier issued cannot anymore
be   implemented.   Without   discussing   these  issues,   the   CA   would  not   be   able  to   make  a
determination   whether   the   recall   of   the   writ   of   execution   was   proper   under   the
circumstances.   Such   an   assessment   is   imperative   because   the  resolution   of   the   issue   of
whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on it.

This, notwithstanding a review of the record, nevertheless shows that the CA was correct in
holding   that   the   RTC   did   not   commit   grave   abuse   of   discretion   or   act   in   excess   of   its
jurisdiction in issuing the order which recalled the writ of execution with break open order.

It is well to emphasize for purposes of clarity, however, that the portion of the Decision that
has become impossible to implement is only that portion respecting the order to vacate and
surrender   possession   of   the   property.   Conversely,   the   portions   which   provide   for   the
payment   of   reasonable   compensation   and   attorney’s   fees   in   favor   of   petitioner   remain
enforceable.   We   note   that   this   was   perceived   by   the   parties   themselves   but   they
nevertheless agreed that the issue on the monetary award be left to the discretion of the CA

Petitioner next contends that the writ of execution with break open order was abruptly
recalled without respondents complying with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 19, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner stresses that in order to stay the immediate execution of
a judgment in an ejectment case while an appeal is pending, the defendant must perfect his
appeal,   file   a   supersedeas   bond   and   periodically   deposit   the   rentals   which   became   due
during   the   pendency   of   the   appeal.   But   despite   the   failure   of   respondents   to   post   the
required supersedeas bond, the CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance of the writ of
execution with break open order.

In Uy v. Santiago, we held that it is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial
Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with
the requisites provided in Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This can be deduced
from the wordings of the subject provision, to wit:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.­ If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of
the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional
Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted
by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court
to which the action is appealed.

This is not the situation here. Respondents are not staying the execution of the judgment of
the MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court, in fact, had already rendered its
judgment on the appeal. Clearly, the above­quoted provision does not find any application
in the present petition.

Lastly, petitioner prays in the alternative that respondents be ordered to pay the monetary
award as contained in the RTC decision. We cannot, however, grant such relief as again,
this is beyond our competence in this petition. To reiterate, we are only confined here to
reviewing errors of law allegedly committed by the CA in its assailed Decision. Such relief
should have been sought in the appeal from the main case.

PLAZA vs. ATTY. AMAMIO 
A.M. No. P­08­2559, March 19, 2010
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08­2940­P)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Legal Ethics

FACTS: The complainant Ryan S. Plaza (Plaza), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal
Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, alleges that sometime in the first week of July 2007, he
heard that some of the personnel of RTC Branch 26 (Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio,
Clerk   of   Court;   Genoveva   R.   Vasquez,   Legal   Researcher,   and   Floramay
Patalinghug, Court Stenographer), were planning to hold a Sara Lee party in the
Argao Hall of Justice and that upon learning of the plan, he informed the personnel
of the said court about Administrative Circular No. 3­92 prohibiting the use of the
Halls of Justice for residential or commercial purposes.

The complainant adds that even the security guards on duty who recorded the Sara
Lee   event   in   the   logbook   were   later   subjected   to   x   x   x   harassment   by   the
respondents who questioned the guards [as to] why the said event was recorded in
the   logbook.   He   claims   that   Atty.   Amamio   even   reprimanded   the   guards   x   x   x,
castigating the latter for also jotting down in the logbook court personnel who were
not in uniform.

The complainant stresses that holding the party and raffle draw inside the Argao
Hall   of   Justice   was   a   clear   violation   of   Administrative   Circular   3­92   and   had
exposed the properties and records contained within it to risk of damage and loss.

The respondents argue that similar activities had been held before at the Argao
Hall of Justice. They said that during the fiesta of Argao, a stage for beauty pageant
was put up right at the entrance of the Argao Hall of Justice. The contestants and
other participants used the ground floor lobby, the stairs and the second floor lobby
of the said building. The Municipality of Argao also held a Sinulog parade which
culminated in the town plaza. Since the Argao Hall of Justice fronts the town plaza,
some spectators entered the building and went up the second floor to watch the
performance in the plaza. They add that on the ground floor lobby, several persons,
including the barangay tanods, were taking alcoholic beverages.
The respondents also claim that at the Cebu City Hall of Justice, raffle draws were
being   conducted   regularly   and   that   the   latest,   was   sponsored   by   the   very   same
people from Sara Lee. The respondents contend that the prizes to this raffle draw,
which included a multicab, were displayed on the ground floor lobby of the building
for one week.

According to the respondents, these were all taken into consideration when they
decided to grant the request of Mrs. Tecson. They insist that the proposed raffle
draw was a relatively minor event compared to the abovementioned activities.

The   respondents   added   that   since   the   building   which   houses   the   Argao   Hall   of
Justice   has   been   declared   a   cultural   heritage   and   is   the   centerpiece   of   the   said
municipality, then the activity planned by Sara Lee was appropriate in promoting
the town of Argao. Respondents Amamio and Vasquez maintain that it was their
honest belief that the building was not to be used exclusively for court purposes, but
also to be shown to visitors who wanted to visit and see the historical building.

Respondent Amamio denies the complainant’s allegation that the latter informed
the former about violating Administrative Circular No. 3­92. The said respondent
declares that she need not be informed about the issuance [of said circular] since
she had practically read and studied carefully all circulars that had been issued by
the Supreme Court "not only as a dutiful Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
but as a lawyer herself."

The respondents deny that a party was held, saying that only a raffle draw was
conducted and that only softdrinks and finger foods were served to the participants.
They also claim that there was no danger to the building and the records since the
raffle draw was merely held at the ground floor lobby and that those who attended
the raffle draw were decent people, majority of them being women. Neither was
there any commercial activity or transaction which involved the buying and selling
of goods for profit. According to the respondents, Mrs. Tecson’s primary reason for
requesting the use of the ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice was for her
staff to experience and to imbibe Argao’s rich historical past.

Finally, the three respondents maintain that they had performed their duties to the
best of their abilities, acted with absolute good faith devoid of malice, and had no
intention to prejudice the interests of the Court. They insist that they have never
violated any rule, regulation, or law in the execution of their assigned tasks. 

The matter was indorsed to Judge Maximo A. Perez, RTC of Argao, Cebu, Branch
26, for appropriate action and investigation. 

Judge Perez  recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of substantial
evidence to substantiate the charge. The OCA did not agree with the findings of
Judge   Perez.   On   the   contrary,   the   OCA   found   that   respondents   violated
Administrative Circular No. 3­92 by allowing the holding of a raffle draw in the
lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice.

ISSUE:  Whether the findings of the OCA is correct that the personnel of the said
court violated Administrative Circular No. 3­92 prohibiting the use of the Halls of
Justice for residential or commercial purposes.
HELD: We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

It is undisputed that Sara Lee held a raffle draw at the ground floor lobby of the
Argao Hall of Justice. Ms. Virginia C. Tecson, Sara Lee’s Business Manager, wrote
a  letter  addressed  to  the   Executive   Judge  of   the  RTC,   Branch   26,   Argao,   Cebu,
requesting permission for the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice.
In   their   Compliance, respondents   Amamio   and   Vasquez   admitted   that   they
discussed the said request between themselves, notwithstanding the fact that the
said request was addressed to the Executive Judge. In a letter  dated June 11, 2007,
respondent   Amamio   granted   the   request   of   Sara   Lee.   As   correctly   noted   by   the
OCA, respondent Amamio exceeded her authority in taking it upon herself to grant
the   request   of   Sara   Lee’s   representative,   instead   of   referring   the   letter   to   the
Executive Judge to whom it was addressed anyway. 

Indeed, the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice by the staff of Sara
Lee degraded the honor and dignity of the court and exposed the premises, as well
as the judicial records to danger of loss or damage. In Administrative Circular No.
3­92, we have already reminded all judges and court personnel that "the Halls of
Justice   may   be   used   only   for   purposes   directly   related   to   the   functioning   and
operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use x x x."

A careful reading of the paragraph shows the Court’s categorical statement that the
Halls of Justice are to be used only for court purposes and for no other purpose,
despite  the use of the  word  "may,"  which  the respondents  and the  investigating
judge   argue   as   permissive   and   not   mandatory.   The   mention   of   residential   and
commercial purposes are used as concrete examples since such instances actually
happened x x x and were in fact the subject of administrative cases, and are thus
enumerated, not to exclude other acts (as clearly indicated by the word "least of all"
prior to the enumeration) but rather to illustrate the general prohibition. Thus, the
argument that the raffle draw event was not residential nor commercial (despite the
erudite distinction made by the respondents as to what is commercial and what is
not) deserves scant consideration. 

In   fact,   this   reminder   in   Administrative   Circular   No.   3­92   was   reiterated   in

Administrative   Circular   No.   1­9917 where   we   described   courts   as   "temples   of
justice" and as such, "their dignity and sanctity must, at all times, be preserved and
enhanced." The Court thus exhorted its officials and employees to strive to inspire
public respect for the justice system by, among others, not using "their offices as a
residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions."

On October 23, 2001, the Court also issued A.M. No. 01­9­09­SC, Section 3, Part I of
which provides –

SEC. 3. USE OF HOJ.

SEC.   3.1   The   HOJ shall be   for   the   exclusive   use   of   Judges,   Prosecutors,
Public Attorneys, Probation and Parole Officers and, in the proper cases, the
Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.

SEC. 3.2 The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall
not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.
 SEC.   3.3   Cooking,   except   for   boiling   water   for   coffee   or   similar
beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ.

Finally, we agree with the OCA that the fact the Argao Hall of Justice had been
used   for   similar   activities   does   not   justify   the   holding   of   the   raffle   draw
thereat. Thus:

x x x The Argao Hall of Justice is not meant to be used for festivities, and in fact
should remain closed to the public during such occasions. The contention that there
was no danger to the building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held
at the ground floor lobby and that those who attended the raffle draw were decent
people, majority of whom are women, is untenable. Time and again, the Court has
always   stressed   in   pertinent   issuances   and   decisions   that   courts   are   temples   of
justice, the honor and dignity of which must be upheld and that their use shall not
expose judicial records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is the Court about this
that   it   has   declared   that   the   prohibition   against   the   use   of   Halls   of   Justice   for
purposes other than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate
vicinity including their grounds.

If the building housing the Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical
landmark, all the more reason why activities, such as Sara Lee raffle draw, should
not be held within. At most, the said Hall of Justice could have been made part of a
regular local tour, to be viewed at designated hours, which viewing shall be confined
to certain areas not intrusive to court operations and records. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
WILSON SUAN
G.R. No. 184546, February 22, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Criminal Law; Presumption of innocence of the accused

FACTS: PO2 Labasano and PO1 Gondol conducted a buy­bust operation at Purok 4,
Saray,   Iligan   City.   PO1   Gondol,   who   was   provided   with   two   pieces   of
PHP50.00 bills, acted as the buyer while PO2 Labasano served as back­up. Upon
reaching   the   target   area,   the   two   saw   appellant   sitting   outside   the   house.   PO1
Gondol approached appellant and the latter asked the former if he wanted to buy a
narcotic   substance.   PO1   Gondol   replied   "I   will   buy   "Piso",   meaning   PHP100.00.
After a brief exchange of the money and the stuff, appellant was informed of his
constitutional   rights   and   thereafter   was   arrested.   Appellant   was   brought   to   the
police   headquarters   and   presented   before   the   investigator.   At   the   police
headquarters,   PO2   Labasano   prepared   a   Certificate   of   Inventory.   The   buy­bust
money and the plastic sachet containing the stuff they recovered were turned over
to the evidence custodian as related by PO1 Gondol, and to the Team Leader, as
testified to by PO2 Labasano. Upon request, the plastic sachet was sent to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory for examination. 
Forensic Chemist Carvajal received the written request for laboratory examination
of one sachet containing white crystalline substance submitted to their office. She
conducted   the   test   and   the   result   showed   that   it   contained   methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. She then prepared Chemistry Report No.
D­500­2003 on her finding on the tests.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that while he was sleeping on
a bench beside the road, PO2 Labasano suddenly held his arm and handcuffed him.
PO2 Labasano inserted his hand into appellant’s pocket, frisked him and shabu was
later shown to him. He was brought to Tipanoy for a drug test and detained in jail
for violation of the anti­drugs law.

Giving full faith and credence to the prosecution’s version, the trial court found the
test­buy and buy­bust operation established. The trial court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 

Appellant appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA. Finding no error committed
by   the   trial   court   in   convicting   appellant   of   the   offense   of   illegal   possession   of
dangerous drug, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Undaunted,   appellant   seeks   a   final   recourse   before   this   Court via the   instant

appeal.

In support of his prayer for a reversal of the verdict of his conviction, appellant
contends:   a)   that   the   testimonies   of   the   police   operatives   contained   material
inconsistencies and contradictions as to (i) whether a surveillance was made prior to
the buy­bust operation, (ii) whether there was marked money used in the operation,
and, (iii) the amount of the shabu sold; b) there was no proper identification of the
illegal drug; c) the prosecution witnesses failed to testify on matters regarding the
possession   of   the   illegal   drug;   and,   d)   the   defense   of   alibi   was   not   properly
appreciated.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant is correct in his defenses.

HELD: The appeal is meritorious.

The   inconsistencies   in   the   testimonies   of   the   police   operatives   as   regards   prior

surveillance and use of marked money are immaterial.

While   it   may   be   conceded   that   there   are   a   number   of   inconsistencies   in   the

testimonies of the prosecution’s principal witnesses as alluded to above, they are
not,   in   our   view,   substantial   enough   to   impair   the   veracity   of   the   prosecution’s
evidence that a buy­bust operation resulting in the arrest of appellant, was indeed
conducted.   The   maxim falsus   in   unus,   falsus   in   omnibus does   not   lay   down   a
categorical test of credibility. While witnesses may differ in their recollection of an
incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreements that both or all of
them are not credible and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless.

A prior surveillance much less a lengthy one, is not necessary during an entrapment
as in the case at bench. To be sure, there is no textbook method of conducting buy­
bust   operations.   The   Court   has   left   to   the   discretion   of   police   authorities   the
selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. In this case, the buy­bust
operation  was  set  up   precisely  to  test   the  veracity  of  the  informant’s  tip  and  to
arrest   the   malefactor   if   the   report   proved   to   be   true.   Thus   in   one   case we
emphasized our refusal to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts the police
authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment operations.

The   doubt   cast   by   the   appellant   on   whether   marked   money   was   used   in   the
operation did not in any way shatter the factuality of the transaction. Neither law
nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy­bust
operation. Much less is it required that the money be marked. In fact, not even the
absence or non­presentation of the marked money would weaken the evidence for
the prosecution. The elements necessary to show that the crime had indeed been
committed   are   proof   that   the   illicit   transaction   took   place   coupled   with   the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug. 

It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s findings that are factual in nature and
that   involve   credibility   are   accorded   respect   when   no   glaring   errors;   gross
misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can
be gathered from such findings. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the CA. However, this rule will not apply in
this case. As will be discussed shortly, the courts below overlooked two significant
and substantial facts which if considered, as we do now consider, will affect the
outcome of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARTINEZ 
G.R. No. 158627, March 5, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment

FACTS:  Appellant Maritess Martinez and her daughter, Jenilyn Martinez, conspiring and
confederating   together   and   helping   one   another,   representing   themselves   to   have   the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to the following persons, to wit: Nelson Laplano, Crizaldo Fernandez, Walter Isuan,
Necito Serquina , Dominador Ilasin, Arnulfo Suyat, And Vivencio Martinez, without first
having   secured   the   necessary   license   or   authority   from   the   Department   of   Labor   and
Employment (POEA).

The   cases   were   raffled   to   Branch   3   of   the   RTC   of   Manila.   Thereafter,   warrants   of
arrest were issued against the three accused. However, the same were served only against
appellant and Julius Martinez whereas accused Jenilyn Martinez remains at large.
During   his   arraignment,   Julius   Martinez   pleaded   not   guilty   to   the   charge   of   Illegal
Recruitment.   Meanwhile,   appellant   was   where   she   entered   a   plea   of   not   guilty   to   the
charges of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment in large scale. 

The   following   complainants   were   presented   by   the   prosecution   as   witnesses,   however,

complainants   Walter   Isuan,   Nelson   Laplano,   and   Crizaldo   Fernandez   failed   to   testify
despite being given several opportunities. Thus, on February 14, 1996, the trial court issued
an order provisionally dismissed the case, with the express consent of accused Maritess
Martinez only. 

The trial court acquitted Julius Martinez of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale
while   accused   Maritess   Martinez   is   found   guilty   of   estafa   on   4   counts   and   illegal
recruitment. She is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of from 10 years, 8 months and
21 days to 11 years, 11 months and 10 days of prision mayor for 4 counts of estafa. Further,
she  shall   suffer  an  imprisonment   of   from   5   years,   5  months   and  11   days   to  6  years,   8
months and 20 days of prision correccional for illegal recruitment.

Appellant appealed to the CA arguing that no evidence was presented to show that she
falsely represented herself as having the capacity to send complainants as factory workers
in South Korea. 

The CA denied the appeal for lack of merit. It found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment
in   large   scale   for   having   "committed   acts   of   recruitment   such   as   making   promises   of
profitable overseas employment to complainants" and of "collecting from the complainants
payment for their passports, placement fees and other sundry expenses". It likewise found
that appellant "did not have the authority to recruit workers for overseas employment". The
appellate court disregarded appellant’s argument that she merely assisted complainants in
their applications with JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. The CA likewise 

Hence, this appeal filed by appellant.

ISSUE: Whether appellant is not guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.

HELD:  The appeal lacks merit.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" viz:

(b)   "Recruitment   and   placement"   refers   to   any   act   of   canvassing,   enlisting,   contracting,
transporting,   utilizing,   hiring,   or   procuring   workers,   and   includes   referrals,   contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment   to   two   or   more   persons   shall   be   deemed   engaged   in   recruitment   and
placement.

In this case, all the four complainants  unanimously declared that appellant offered and
promised them employment abroad. They also testified that they gave various amounts to
appellant as payment for placement and processing fees. Notwithstanding said promises
and payments, they were not able to leave for abroad to work. These testimonies, as well as
the  documentary  evidence  they  submitted  consisting  of   the  receipts  issued  them  by  the
appellant, all prove that the latter was engaged in recruitment and placement activities.

Even   conceding   that   appellant   merely   referred   the   complainants   to   JH   Imperial

Organization   Placement   Corp.,   the   same   still   constituted   an   act   of   recruitment.   As
explicitly   enumerated   in   Article   13(b)   of   the   Labor   Code,   "recruitment   and   placement"
includes the act of making referrals, whether for profit or not. Thus, the CA correctly held
that:

x x x Even if [appellant] did no more that "suggest" to complainants where they could apply
for overseas employment, her act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code (People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38). Referral is the act of passing along or
forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant
for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. (People v. Goce, 247
SCRA 780). 

Having already established that appellant was engaged in "recruitment and placement,"
the issue that must be resolved next is whether such activities may be considered illegal
and whether the acts were committed in large scale.

Article 38 of the Labor Code defines "illegal recruitment" as:

ART.   38.   ILLEGAL   RECRUITMENT.   –   (a)   Any   recruitment   activities,   including   the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non­
licensees   or   non­holders   of   authority46 shall   be   deemed   illegal   and   punishable   under
Article 39 of this Code. x x x

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or   more   persons   conspiring   and/or   confederating   with   one   another   in   carrying   out   any
unlawful   or   illegal   transaction,   enterprise   or   scheme   defined   under   the   first   paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.

In   the   instant   case,   the   prosecution   satisfactorily   established   that   appellant   was   not   a
licensee or holder of authority to deploy workers abroad. By this fact alone, she is deemed to
have engaged in illegal recruitment and the same was committed in large scale because it
was carried out against the four complainants.

The fact that JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. was a holder of a valid license to
deploy workers abroad did not serve to benefit herein appellant. There was no evidence at
all that said recruitment agency authorized herein appellant to act as its agent. As aptly
noted by the appellate court:

From the testimonies of the complainants, it is clearly shown that [appellant] did more
than just make referrals. It was [appellant] whom they approached regarding their plans of
working  overseas.  It  was  [appellant]  who collected the fees  and  receipts  [therefor]  were
issued   in   her   name.   It   was   x   x   x   [appellant]   from   whom   they   learned   what   papers   or
documents to submit. Despite the denial, [appellant], nevertheless, failed to explain why
recruitment activities were done in her residence. Likewise, she failed to present Milagros
Lopez,   one   of   the   staff   of   Imperial,   to   whom   she   allegedly   turned   over   the   money   she
collected from the complainants or any officer from the recruitment agency to prove that
she was merely a conduit thereof. x x x

The three elements of the crime of illegal recruitment, to wit: a) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning
of   "recruitment   and   placement"   under   Article   13(b)   of   the   Labor   Code,   or   any   of   the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of RA
8042); and c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually
or as a group, are present in the instant case. Consequently, we rule that the trial court and
the CA correctly found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HILARIO ESCOTON 
G.R. No. 183577, February 1, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Criminal Law; Rape; Weight of testimony of rape victims

FACTS:  That on or about the 12th day of May, 2001, in   the Province of Leyte,

Philippines,   the   above­named   accused,   with   deliberate   intent   and   with   lewd
designs, taking advantage of the minority, as well as relationship of the accused
with the victim, and by use of force and intimidation being armed with a sickle
(garab)   did   then   and   there   willfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously   have   carnal
knowledge for five (5) times in the same evening of May 12, 2001, with one "AAA", a
10­year­old, a niece of the accused, against her will to her damage and prejudice.

The appellant is the uncle of "AAA", being the brother of her mother. On May 12,
2001, at around 7 o’clock in the evening, "AAA" and her brother were asleep in the
house of their maternal grandmother with whom they were residing. The appellant
woke up "AAA" and told her to follow him to his house which was about 500 meters
away. "AAA’s" brother also woke up and accompanied her. Their grandmother did
not   give   them   permission   to   leave,   but   they   still   proceeded   towards   their
destination.

Upon arrival, the appellant undressed himself and removed the lower garments of
"AAA". He made her lie down on the bamboo floor then inserted his penis into her
vagina   despite   her   pleas   to   discontinue   his   hideous   act.   "AAA"   felt   pain   as   the
appellant had sex with her. The appellant raped "AAA" for five times during the
night while her brother lay silently beside her.

When daylight came, the appellant ordered "AAA" and her brother to fetch drinking
water.   However,   instead   of   heeding   appellant’s   order,   they   went   home   to   their
grandmother   to   whom   "AAA"   tearfully   narrated   her   ordeal.   Upon   advice   of   a
relative, they reported the incident to the police and "AAA" submitted herself to a
physical examination in a hospital. Although the doctors who performed the medical
examination   on   "AAA"   the   day   after   she   was   raped   could   no   longer   be   located
during   the   trial,   the   Records   Officer   affirmed   the   authenticity   of   the   document
containing the results of said examination and the signatures of doctors appearing
thereon. 
The RTC found the accused guilty and charged the crime of multiple rape charged 
under the information and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death and 
ordered to pay civil indemnity to "AAA". 

The defense of the accused. The appellant presented a totally different version of
the incident. He testified that on May 12, 2001, at around 7 o’clock in the evening,
he   was   on   his   way   home   after   consuming tuba.   He   passed   by   the   house   of   his
mother and noticed her in the balcony having a conversation with his aunt Clarita
and   her   husband.   He   was   then   requested   to   fetch   "AAA",   who   was   watching
television in the house of another relative. The appellant obeyed and after finding
"AAA" told her to go home. However, "AAA" got angry, cursed him and insisted on
watching  the television. Irked by "AAA’s"  behavior, appellant pushed her, which
made her fall from the stairs until she landed on the ground. It was only after this
incident that "AAA" went home.

When the appellant returned to his mother’s house, his mother and his aunt Clarita
were enraged and hurled invectives at him. He cursed them in return. His mother
warned that he would be sent to prison for repeatedly beating up "AAA". He replied
that the meager amount paid to him by his aunt Clarita and her husband whenever
they hired him to work in their farm was demeaning to his person. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the house of his uncle and slept on the balcony where he awoke at 6
o’clock the next morning.

The appellant asserted that his aunt Clarita initiated this case after he challenged
her   and   her   husband   to   a   fight.   He   also   claimed   that   "AAA"   concocted   false
accusation against him because he used to beat her with a whip and push her head
to the ground as punishment for her stubbornness.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is correct in his defense.

HELD:  We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted based solely on
the   testimony   of   the   victim,   provided   that   such   testimony   is   credible,   natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In
this regard, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the
victim, having personally heard her and observed her deportment and manner of
testifying   during   the   trial.   In   the   absence   of   any   showing   that   the   trial   court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor or circumstances of weight
that would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, the trial
court’s   assessment   of   credibility   deserves   the   appellate   court’s   highest
respect. Here, the appellant fails to persuade us to depart from this principle and to
apply the exception.

The testimony of rape victims are given full weight and credence, considering that
no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an   examination   of   her   private   parts,   and   thereafter   pervert   herself   by   being
subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to seek
justice for the wrong done to her. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years
who is not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime
so serious as rape if what she claims is false. Considering that the victim in this
case underwent a harrowing experience and exposed herself to the rigors of public
trial, it is unlikely that she would concoct false accusations against the appellant,
who is her uncle.

It   should   be   noted   that   "AAA"   immediately   informed   her   grandmother   of   the

incident. Upon the advise of a relative they proceeded to the police station to file a
complaint against the appellant. Thereafter, they proceeded to the hospital for a
medical examination. "AAA’s" act of immediately reporting the commission of the
rape strengthens her credibility. Her spontaneous revelation of the assault on her
and her unrelenting determination to have the appellant arrested and prosecuted of
rape lend credence to her claim that she was indeed raped.

The   factual   question   raised   by   the   appellant   fails   to   impress.   It   is   an

inconsequential matter that does not bear upon the elements of the crime of rape.
The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the
crime   has   been   sufficiently   proven.   For   a   discrepancy   or   inconsistency   in   the
testimony   of   a   witness   to   serve   as   a   basis   for   acquittal,   it   must   refer   to   the
significant   facts   indispensable   to   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the   appellant   for   the
crime charged. As the inconsistencies alleged by the appellant had nothing to do
with   the   elements   of   the   crime   of   rape,   they   cannot   be   used   as   ground   for   his
acquittal. 

Further, victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the
manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, an errorless recollection of a
harrowing   experience   cannot   be   expected   of   a   witness,   especially   when   she   is
recounting   details   from   an   experience   as   humiliating   and   painful   as   rape.
Furthermore, rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act
the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation. 

In   this   case,   minor   inconsistencies   are   expected   because   (1)   "AAA"   was   a   child
witness, (2) she was made to testify on a painful and humiliating incident, (3) she
was sexually assaulted several times, and (4) she was made to recount details and
events that happened two years before she testified.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NOQUE 
G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Criminal Law; Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002); Mere possession of a regulated drug

FACTS:  In   the   evening   of   January   30,   2001,   a   confidential   informant   of   Senior   Police
Officer   4   (SPO4)   Norberto   Murillo,   went   to   Police   Station   No.   4   of   the   Western   Police
District   (WPD)   to   tip   off   on   the   drug   trafficking   activities   of   the   appellant   in   Malate,
Manila. SP04 Murillo immediately directed Police Officers (POs) Christian Balais (Balais)
and Dionisio Borca (Borca) to conduct surveillance in the area mentioned by the informant.
The surveillance confirmed appellant’s illegal operations being conducted at No. 630 San
Andres Street, Malate, Manila. 

The buy­bust team, together with the informant, proceeded to the aforementioned address
and upon arrival thereat, positioned themselves outside the appellant’s house. PO1 Balais
and the informant thereafter called out the appellant, who welcomed the two and brought
them to his bedroom. The informant asked the appellant if he had PHP1,000.00 worth of
methamphetamine   hydrochloride   or   "shabu"   then   pointed   to   PO1   Balais   as   the   actual
buyer. When PO1 Balais handed the marked money to the appellant, the latter brought out
from under a table a "pranela" bag from which he took two plastic sachets containing white
crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. The informant slipped out of the house as the
pre­arranged signal to the buy­bust team that the sale had been consummated.

After seeing the informant leave, the team entered appellant’s house. SPO4 Murillo frisked
the appellant and recovered the buy­bust money. He also confiscated the "pranela" bag that
contained a large quantity of crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. The two persons
who were in a "pot session" with the appellant at the time of the raid were likewise arrested
and brought to the WPD Station No. 9 for investigation.

The seized articles were taken to the police station and submitted to the crime laboratory
for examination to determine the chemical composition of the crystalline substance. Police
Inspector   (P/Insp.)   and   Forensic   Chemical   Officer   Miladenia   Tapan   examined   one   self­
sealing transparent plastic bag with markings "JNG" containing 679.215 grams of white
crystalline granules; and two heat­sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white
crystalline   substance,   pre­marked   "JNG­1"   weighing   2.779   grams   and   "JNG­2"weighing
2.729   grams.   The   qualitative   examinations   yielded   positive   results   for   ephedrine,   a
regulated drug.

Version of the Defense

The appellant gave a different version of the events that transpired. He testified that he
was  in   his  house   in   the  evening  of   January   23,   2001   when   six   policemen   led   by   SPO4
Murillo   entered   and   arrested   an   unidentified   occupant   of   the   room   next   to   his.   The
arresting  team   returned  after 30  minutes  and   apprehended  another  person.  When  they
came back the third time, they took him with them to WPD Station No. 9 where his wallet,
belt  and  shoes  were taken.  While  under   detention,  SPO4  Murillo  ordered  him  to admit
selling illegal substances but he refused. He was released on January 26, 2001 only to be
rearrested at around 9 o’clock in the evening on January 30, 2001 when SPO4 Murillo and
his team returned to his house and took him at gunpoint to the police station where he was
detained   for   24   hours.   Police   officers   presented   him   later   to   Mayor   Lito   Atienza   and
General Avelino Razon for a press conference.

The   trial   court   convicted   the   appellant   of   both   charges.   It   declared   that   the   evidence
adduced by the prosecution established with moral certainty his guilt for committing the
crimes in the manner narrated in the Informations. The testimonies of police officers that
they caught appellant in flagrante delicto of selling and possessing a dangerous drug are
clear and positive evidence that deserve more evidentiary weight than appellant’s defenses
of   denial   and   frame­up,   which   are   mere   negative   and   self­serving   assertions
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also ruled that it cannot
deviate from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the
police officers since no ill motives were ascribed to them that would entice them to testify
falsely against the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty of illegal sale of a dangerous drug.
HELD: The prosecution successfully proved that appellant violated Section 15, Article III of
RA   6425.   The   prosecution’s   evidence   established   the   concurrence   of   the   elements   of   an
illegal sale of a dangerous drug, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 

In   the   instant   case,   the   police   officers   conducted   a   buy­bust   operation   after   receiving
confirmed   surveillance   reports   that   the   appellant   was   engaged   in   the   illicit   sale   of
dangerous drugs at No. 630 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. PO1 Balais, the designated
poseur­buyer of the buy­bust team, personally identified the appellant as the person who
volunteered   to   sell   to   him   ₱1,000.00   worth   of   white   crystalline   substance   alleged   to
be shabu. The police officer received this illegal merchandise after giving the appellant the
marked  money  as  payment.  Undoubtedly,   the  appellant   is  guilty  of  selling  a dangerous
drug.

The prosecution was also successful in proving that appellant violated Section 16, Article
III of RA 6425. It adduced evidence that established the presence of the elements of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug. It showed that (1) the appellant was in possession of an
item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not
authorized   by   law,   and   (3)   the   appellant   was   freely   and   consciously   aware   of   being   in
possession of the drug. 

The   police  buy­bust   team   apprehended   the   appellant   for   the   sale  of   a  white  crystalline
substance then proceeded to search the premises. They found a large quantity of the same
substance inside the bag that contained the two sachets of the regulated drug sold to PO1
Balais. Appellant did not offer any explanation why he is in custody of the said substance.
Neither did the appellant present any authorization to possess the same. "Mere possession
of   a   regulated   drug per   se constitutes   prima   facie   evidence   of   knowledge   or   animus
possidendi   sufficient   to   convict   an   accused   absent   a   satisfactory   explanation   of   such
possession   –   the   onus   probandi   is   shifted   to   the   accused,   to   explain   the   absence   of
knowledge or animus possidendi." With the burden of evidence shifted to the appellant, it
was   his   duty   to   explain   his   innocence   on   the   regulated   drug   seized   from   his   person.
However, as already mentioned, he did not offer any excuse or explanation regarding his
possession thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BUSTAMANTE 
G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics:   Criminal   Law;   Presumption   of   Innocence;   Republic   Act   (RA)   No.   9165   (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
FACTS: A Police Officer of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police
Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside
Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, two other police officers went immediately to the Starlight Hotel
to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, they approached
the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the
alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The   lady   clerk   informed   the   police   officers   that   the   roomboy   of   the   hotel   was   about   to
deliver   a   softdrink   to   Room   5   and   they   could   follow   him   if   they   [so   wish].   Thus,   they
followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a
woman,   later   identified   as   Mylene,   opened   the   door   wide   enough   to   enable   the   police
officers to look inside.

They saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing "shabu" while Joseph Canlas was on
the floor assisting petitioner sniffing "shabu". At this juncture, they arrested petitioner and
Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters
and plastic sachets.

Police officer  A  frisked  petitioner and   recovered  from   him   one  plastic   sachet   containing
"shabu".

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, both officers brought
them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty
while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The   Philippine   National   Police   (PNP)   laboratory   conducted   an   examination   on   the

specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for "shabu".

Cacao  professed  his innocence  and  presented  his   defense  stating  that  policemen  barged
inside the room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the
police.   He   was   later   bodily   searched   but   nothing   was   found   in   him   except   his   wallet
containing a cash of about PHP7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioner’s
wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City. The PHP7,000.00 was never seen again.

As petitioner was made to sit on the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet
on the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police
pointing   to   it.   The   same   police   then   explained   that   the   plastic   sachet   belongs   to   the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.

Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the
other police did to Canlas. 

The   trial   court   rendered   its   judgment   finding   Cacao   guilty   of   illegal   possession   of
methamphetamine   hydrochloride   weighing   1.3987   grams   and   is   therefore   sentenced   to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fifteen (15) years and to pay the fine of PHP400,000.00.

The   sachets   of   shabu   confiscated   from   the   accused   are   all   confiscated   in   favor   of   the
Government, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate   court   rendered   judgment   affirming   Cacao’s   conviction.   It   held   that   the
circumstances   obtaining   in   this   case   validly   cloaked   the   arresting   officers   with   the
authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may be used as
proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the
police officers compelled Cacao to admit a crime.

ISSUE:  Whether the lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of
innocence of the petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.

HELD:  Petitioner’s defenses of denial and frame­up are concededly inherently weak and
commonly used in drug­related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed
to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by
the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of
the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the
superior   and   immutable   rule   that   the   guilt   of   the   accused   must   be   proved   beyond
reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until
proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by
itself   override   the   constitutional   right   of   the   accused   to   be   presumed   innocent   unless
overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS
G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics:  Remedial   Law   ­   Jurisdiction;   Political   Law;   Public   International   Law;   Warsaw
Convention

FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
She alleged that she took respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome,
Italy.   Once   on   board,   she   allegedly   requested   Julian   Halliday   (Halliday),   one   of   the
respondent’s   flight   attendants,   to   assist   her   in   placing   her   hand­carried   luggage   in   the
overhead   bin.   However,   Halliday   allegedly   refused   to   help   and   assist   her,   and   even
sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have
a broken back!"

Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another
flight   attendant,   Nickolas   Kerrigan   (Kerrigan),   singled   her   out   from   among   all   the
passengers   in   the   business   class   section   to   lecture   on   plane   safety.   Allegedly,   Kerrigan
made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of
lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of  the plane.  Affronted,  petitioner assured
Kerrigan   that   she   knew   the   plane’s   safety   regulations   being   a   frequent   traveler.
Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the
petitioner and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude."
Upon   arrival   in   Rome,   petitioner   complained   to   respondent’s   ground   manager   and
demanded   an  apology.   However,  the  latter   declared  that  the  flight   stewards   were  "only
doing their job."

Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay
₱5  million as moral damages,  ₱2 million as nominal damages,  ₱1 million as exemplary
damages, ₱300,000.00 as attorney’s fees, ₱200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the
suit.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through
Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro­Philippine Airline Services, Inc. 

Respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
grounds   of   lack   of   jurisdiction   over   the   case   and   over   the   person   of   the   respondent.
Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article
28(1) of which provides:

An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court
of  domicile  of  the  carrier  or  his  principal  place of  business,  or  where he  has  a place of
business through which the contract has  been made, or before  the court of the place of
destination.

Thus,   since   a)   respondent   is   domiciled   in   London;   b)   respondent’s   principal   place   of

business   is   in   London;   c)   petitioner   bought   her   ticket   in   Italy   (through   Jeepney   Travel
S.A.S, in Rome); and d) Rome, Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then it follows that
the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome,
Italy.

Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro­Philippine
Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.

The trial court issued an Order requiring herein petitioner to file her Comment/Opposition
on the Motion to Dismiss within 10 days from notice thereof, and for respondent to file a
Reply thereon. Petitioner alleged that upon verification with the Securities and Exchange
Commission,   she   found   out   that   the   resident   agent   of   respondent   in   the   Philippines   is
Alonzo Q. Ancheta. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Pending Incident and
Opposition   to   Motion   to   Dismiss.   The   RTC   granted   respondent’s   Motion   to   Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence this case.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from
the   tortious   conduct   committed   by   airline   personnel   of   respondent   in   violation   of   the
provisions   of   the   Civil   Code   on   Human   Relations.   Since   her   cause   of   action   was   not
predicated on the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue
this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

Respondent’s Arguments

In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioner’s claim for damages fell within the ambit
of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the
courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
ISSUE:  Whether   Philippine   courts   have   jurisdiction   over   a   tortious   conduct   committed
against a Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling
beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country; and thus is outside the ambit of the
Warsaw convention.

HELD: The petition is without merit.

The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.

It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, we held that:

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to  International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the
Senate,   through   its   Resolution   No.   19,   on   May   16,   1950.   The   Philippine   instrument   of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited
with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the
Philippines   on  February   9,   1951.   On  September   23,   1955,   President   Ramon   Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, "to the end that the
same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the
Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The   Convention   is   thus   a   treaty   commitment   voluntarily   assumed   by   the   Philippine

government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. 

The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the
Warsaw Convention.

Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods
performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft
performed by an air transport undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means
any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of
departure   and   the   place   of   destination,   whether   or   not   there   be   a   break   in   the
carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if
there   is   an   agreed   stopping   place   within   a   territory   subject   to   the   sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a
party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between
territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same
High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this
Convention. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are
situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an
"international   carriage".   The   High   Contracting   Parties   referred   to   herein   were   the
signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it. 
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her
place   of   destination   was   Rome,   Italy. Both   the   United   Kingdom and   Italy signed   and
ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an
"international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.

Under   Article   28(1)   of   the   Warsaw   Convention,   the   plaintiff   may   bring   the   action   for
damages before –

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been
made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London,
United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and
second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in
the  United  Kingdom.   In the  passenger   ticket   and  baggage  check  presented by  both  the
petitioner   and   respondent,   it   appears   that   the   ticket   was   issued   in   Rome,   Italy.
Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her
case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver
that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing
presented   in   the   said   passenger   ticket   and   baggage   check.   Accordingly,   petitioner   may
bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati
correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.

GUBAT vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Remedial Law; Summary Judgment; Certiorari; Rule 65

FACTS: A lawyer asserts his right to his contingent fees after his clients, allegedly behind
his back, had entered into an out­of­court settlement with the National Power Corporation
(NPC). The trial court granted his claim by way of summary judgment. However, this was
reversed   by   the   Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   because   the   counsel   was   allegedly   enforcing   a
decision that was already vacated. In this petition, petitioner Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat
(Atty. Gubat) attempts to persuade the Supreme Court that the compensation due him is
independent of the vacated decision, his entitlement thereto being based on another reason:
the bad faith of his clients and of the respondent NPC. 

Plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat separately filed civil suits for
damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur in Marawi City
(RTC),   who   were   represented   by   Atty.   Linang   Mandangan   (Atty.   Mandangan)   and
petitioner   herein,   whose   services   were   engaged   at   an   agreed   attorney’s   fees   of
PHP30,000.00 for each case and PHP600.00 for every appearance. 

During the course of the proceedings, the three complaints were consolidated because the
plaintiffs’   causes   of   action   are   similar.   They   all   arose   from   NPC’s   refusal   to   pay   the
amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements on their respective
lands   which   were   destroyed   when   the   NPC   constructed   the   Marawi­Malabang
Transmission Line. On the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel
failed to appear. Consequently, respondent was declared in default.

NPC appealed to the CA. During the pendency of the appeal, Atty. Gubat filed an Entry
and Notice of Charging Lien to impose his attorney’s lien of PHP30,000.00 and appearance
fees of PHP2,000.00 on each of the three civil cases he handled, totalling PHP96,000.00.
NPC moved to dismiss its appeal alleging that the parties had arrived at a settlement. The
CA annulled and set aside the Order of Default and remanded it to the RTC for new trial.
After the cases were remanded to the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on his attorney’s fees. He claimed that the plaintiffs and the NPC deliberately
did not inform him about the execution of the compromise agreement, and that said parties
connived with each other in entering into the compromise agreement in order to unjustly
deprive him of his attorney’s fees. Petitioner thus prayed that a partial summary judgment
be rendered on his attorney’s fees and that NPC be ordered to pay him directly his lawful
attorney’s fees. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. It found
that   the   parties   to   the   compromise   agreement   connived   to   petitioner’s   prejudice   which
amounts to a violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

NPC maintained that it acted in good faith in the execution of the compromise settlement.
On   the   other   hand,   petitioner   claimed   that   he   was   not   informed   of   the   compromise
agreement or furnished a copy of NPC’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Petitioner also alleged
that   NPC’s   remedy   should   have   been   an   ordinary   appeal   and   not   a   petition
for certiorari because the compromise agreement had settled the civil suits. Thus, when the
trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on his fees, it was a final
disposition of the entire case. He also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which
cannot   be   a   subject   of   a certiorari petition.   He   also   insisted   that   NPC’s   petition   was
defective for lack of a board resolution authorizing Special Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty.
Doromal) of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to sign on NPC’s behalf.

Petitioner insists on the propriety of the trial court’s order of summary judgment on his
attorney’s fees. At the same time, he imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess  of   jurisdiction  on  the  CA   for   entertaining  respondent’s   Petition  for Certiorari. He
maintains that the petition should have been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode
of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the case should have been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode
of appeal.

HELD: Petitioner’s resort to Rule 65 is not proper.

At the outset, the petition should have been dismissed outright because petitioner
resorted   to   the   wrong   mode   of   appeal   by   filing   the   instant   petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule explicitly provides that a
petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 

In this case, the remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is not only available but also the proper mode of appeal. For all intents and
purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule
65 as a substitute for a lost appeal. At any rate, even if we treat the instant petition
as one filed under Rule 45, the same should still be denied for failure on the part of
the  petitioner to show  that   the CA  committed  a  reversible error  warranting  the
exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Petitioner’s   resort   to   summary   judgment   is   not   proper;   he   is   not   entitled   to   an

immediate relief as a matter of law, for the existence of bad faith is a genuine issue
of fact to be tried.

A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as
to  the   amount   of  damages,   the  pleadings,  affidavits,   depositions   and  admissions
show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid drawn
out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear undisputed to the mind
of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by
affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. For a full­blown trial
to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed
is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. "Genuine issue" means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious or contrived. 

Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that the parties
intentionally   did   not   inform   him   of   the   settlement.   He   alleged   that   he   never
received   a   copy   of   NPC’s   Motion   to   Withdraw   Appeal   before   the   CA   and   that
instead, it was another lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of
the motion. When he confronted his  clients, he was allegedly told that the NPC
deceived them into believing that what they received was only a partial payment
exclusive of the attorney’s  fees. NPC contested these averments. It claimed good
faith in the execution of the compromise agreement. It stressed that the attorney’s
fees   were   already   deemed   included   in   the   monetary   consideration   given   to   the
plaintiffs for the compromise.

The   above   averments   clearly   pose   factual   issues   which   make   the   rendition   of
summary   judgment   not   proper.   Bad   faith   imports   a   dishonest   purpose   or   some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is synonymous with fraud, in that
it   involves   a   design   to   mislead   or   deceive   another. The   trial   court   should   have
exercised prudence by requiring the presentation of evidence in a formal trial to
determine the veracity of the parties’ respective assertions. Whether NPC and the
plaintiffs connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary.
Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence,
and this necessitates an examination of the evidence of all the parties. As certain
facts pleaded were being contested by the opposing parties, such would not warrant
a rendition of summary judgment.
DOROMAL vs. BIRON, 613 SCRA 160
G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Pre­Proclamation Controversy; SPECIAL 
CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS:  Petitioner   Rose   Marie   D.   Doromal   (Doromal)   and   private   respondent

Hernan G. Biron (Biron) were the vice mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo in the May 14, 2007 elections. During  the canvassing of votes,
Biron   orally   objected   to   the   inclusion   of   25 election   returns.   Biron   anchored   his
objections to the inclusion of the 21 returns on the alleged missing taras in Copy 4 of
the contested returns, which he obtained as the standard bearer of LAKAS­CMD,
the recognized dominant majority party in said elections. As regards the remaining
four contested returns, Biron opposed their inclusion allegedly because there was a
discrepancy between the number of votes stated in the said returns and those stated
in the certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). 

MBC denied the petitions for exclusion. It also held that the copy of the election
return   of   the   MBC   was   complete   with   no   material   defect   and   duly   signed   and
thumbmarked by the BEIs. 

Aggrieved, Biron appealed to the COMELEC. Pending the resolution of the appeal,
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate was ordered suspended.
COMELEC   Second   Division,   voting   2­1,   issued   a   Resolution   partially   granting
Biron’s appeal. It ordered the exclusion of the 11 election returns (subject returns)
because the same were allegedly tampered or falsified. It held that eight of the 11
subject returns showed that the taras were either closed on the third or fourth vote,
instead   of   on   the   fifth   vote,   resulting   in   a   discrepancy   between   the   number
of tarasvis­à­vis the written figures and words in the said returns.

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) registered a dissent.
He reasoned that the missing taras did not, by themselves, conclusively establish
that the subject returns were altered or tampered. 

COMELEC En  Banc affirmed the ruling   of the Second  Division.  It  held  that   the

Second Division properly appreciated the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers given
the serious allegations of irregularities that attended the tallying of votes; that the
use   of   the   certificate   of   votes   to   establish   tampering   in   the   subject   returns   was
proper in a pre­proclamation controversy; and that an examination of the records of
this  case supported the Second Division’s  findings  that  the subject  returns   were
tampered or falsified.

ISSUE:  Whether   COMELEC  gravely   abused  its   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or

excess of jurisdiction in ordering the exclusion of the subject returns.

HELD: 

The petition is meritorious.

An   act   done   contrary   to   the   Constitution,   the   law   or   jurisprudence;   or   executed

whimsically,   capriciously   or   arbitrarily   out   of   malice,   ill   will   or   personal   bias
constitutes   grave   abuse   of   discretion. In   the   instant   case,   we   find   that   the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ordering the exclusion of the subject returns. The ruling contravenes clear legal
provisions   as   well   as   long   standing   jurisprudence   on   the   admissibility   of   the
certificate of votes and the appreciation of election returns. Lamentably, the refusal
of the COMELEC to heed this Court’s repeated pronouncements has again led to
the disenfranchisement of voters in this case. The writ, therefore, lies to correct this
grossly abusive exercise of discretion.

We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns to be fatally
flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election returns must
be  upheld.   A  conclusion  that   an  election   return   is   obviously  manufactured  or   false  and
consequently   should   be   disregarded   in   the   canvass   must   be   approached   with   extreme
caution and only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible explanation,
one   which   is   acceptable   to   a   reasonable   man   in   the   light   of   experience   and   of   the
probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which results in
disenfranchisement   of   those   who   exercised   their   right   of   suffrage.   As   will   be   discussed
shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELEC’s findings that the subject returns
were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring “extreme caution” before rejecting
election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the subject
returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.   At   the   outset,   we   find   that   the   COMELEC   placed   undue   reliance   on   the
affidavits   of   Biron’s   poll   watchers   to   establish   the   irregularities   and   fraud   allegedly
committed during the counting of votes. These affidavits are evidently self­serving. Thus,
we have ruled that reliance should not be placed on affidavits of this nature for purposes of
setting aside the validity of election returns.

DELOS REYES vs.
JUDGE DANILO S. CRUZ
A.M. No. RTJ­08­2152               January 18, 2010
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08­2846­RTJ)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Topics: Legal Ethics

FACTS:  The   instant   administrative   case   stemmed   from   a   letter­complaint   filed   by

complainant Luminza Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) against respondents Judge Danilo S. Cruz
(Judge Cruz) and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundran (Clerk of Court Gundran), both of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, for dereliction of duty. Specifically, Judge Cruz is
charged   with   delay   in   the   disposition   of   LRC   Case   No.   R­57401 while   Clerk   of   Court
Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the records of said case.

In her letter­complaint, complainant alleged that she is the defendant in LRC Case No. R­
5740 pending before Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. She claimed that
Judge Cruz issued an Order giving the parties 15 days within which to file their respective
memorandum after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The parties
complied; hence, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

However, it was only more than three years since the case was submitted for resolution,
that   a   decision   in   the   said   case   was   rendered.   Consequently,   complainant   argued   that
Judge Cruz incurred delay in disposing the case thus should be held administratively liable
therefor.

Complainant also alleged that after receipt of the adverse decision, she timely filed a notice
of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal and docket fees. However, despite the lapse of
more   than   six   months   from   the   time   the   appeal   was   filed,   respondent   Clerk   of   Court
Gundran still failed to transmit the records to the appellate court in violation of Section 10,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

On April 11, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño required Judge Cruz and
Clerk   of   Court   Gundran   to   file   their   respective   comment   on   the   complaint.   Both
respondents complied.

In his Comment, Judge Cruz did not deny that he incurred delay in the disposition of LRC
Case No. R­5740. Instead, he begged the indulgence of the Court and claimed that he was
indisposed   since   the   latter   part   of   2004.   He   narrated   that   in   January   2005,   he   was
diagnosed of diabetes; on November 3, 2005, the cataract on his left eye was removed while
that on his right eye was extracted on April 4, 2006; and on October 26­28, 2007, he was
hospitalized   due   to   heart   complications.   Judge   Cruz   also   explained   that   the   delay   was
partly due to heavy pressure of work.

On the other hand, Clerk of Court Gundran denied being remiss in his duties. He claimed
that in October 2007, he already instructed the clerk­in­charge to complete the records of
the case and to prepare the transmittal letter. Apparently, the clerk­in­charge encountered
some difficulty in completing the records. He signed the transmittal letter on February 28,
2008 only to discover that Judge Cruz has not yet issued an order giving due course to the
appeal. The records were eventually transmitted on March 28, 2008, or on the same day the
order giving due course to the appeal was issued by Judge Cruz. Clerk of Court Gundran
also   claimed   that   he   found   it   difficult   to   personally   examine   if   the   records   have   been
completed and transmitted on time due to the heavy court docket and the numerous reports
that needed to be prepared and submitted. Finally, he insisted that there was no deliberate
intention to delay the transmittal of the records or to cause damage to the complainant.

The   Office   of   the   Court   Administrator,   it   stated   that   evidently,   there   were   two   delays
incurred in this case and submitted a recommendation that the case be re­docketed as a
regular administrative matter.
ISSUE: Whether the Judge did not incur delay in the disposition of the case and the
Clerk of Court is remiss in his duties.

HELD: We find both respondents to be remiss in their duties.

As regards Judge Cruz, we find him grossly inefficient in failing to decide LRC Case
No. R­5740 within 90 days from the time it was submitted for decision. He should be
mindful that failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed
by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to the
speedy   disposition   of   their   cases. Article   VIII,   Section   15(1)   of   the   Constitution
succinctly provides that:

SEC. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must
be decided or resolved within twenty­four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

As such, lower courts are given a period of 90 days only within which to decide or
resolve   a   case   from   the   time   it   is   submitted   for   decision. In   this   case,   it   is
undisputed that LRC Case No. R­5740 was submitted for decision on April 9, 2004
but   the   decision   was   rendered   only   on   July   30,   2007   or   more   than   three   years
beyond the 90­day reglementary period.

Granting   that   his   illness   hindered  the  efficient   performance  of  his  functions,   all
respondent judge had to do was to request for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. Judge Cruz, however, made no such request. In a similar case, we
held that:

Indeed, Judge Ubiadas’ illness could have adversely affected the performance of his
duties. Despite having just been subjected to a triple by­pass operation, he knew
fully well that he still had to act as the judge of four (4) RTC branches for two (2)
months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered him in the discharge of his
duties,   Judge   Ubiadas   could   have   requested   this   Court   for   additional   time   to
decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His illness cannot be an excuse for his
failure   to   render   decisions   or   resolutions   within   the   constitutionally   prescribed
period, considering that he could have requested an extension or other relief from
this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon him to dispose the cases assigned to
him without undue delay.

This Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer justice
without   undue   delay,   for   justice   delayed   is   justice   denied.   The   present   clogged
dockets in all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless every magistrate
earnestly,   painstakingly   and   faithfully   complies   with   the   mandate   of   the   law.
Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice which, in turn,
brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of
the public in the judiciary. 

We also find unacceptable Judge Cruz’s justification that the delay was partly due
to  heavy   pressure  of  work.   Precisely,  a   judge  is   mandated  to  resolve  cases  with
dispatch.  Section 5, Canon 6  of the New Code  of  Judicial  Conduct6 categorically
exhorts all judges to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions,   efficiently,   fairly   and   with   reasonable   promptness".   In   Report   on   the
Judicial   Audit   Conducted   in   the   MTCC,   Branch   2,   Cagayan   de   Oro   City,7 we
declared that:

We are not unmindful of the burden of heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of
every trial judge. But that cannot excuse them from doing their mandated duty to
resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads
should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which
to   decide   their   cases   if   they   think   they   cannot   comply   with   their   judicial   duty.
Hence, under the circumstances, all that said judge needed to do was request for an
extension  of time  since  this   Court  has, almost  invariably,  been considerate with
regard  to such requests. x x x A heavy caseload may excuse a judge’s  failure to
decide   cases   within   the   reglementary   period   but   not   their   failure   to   request   an
extension of time within which to decide the case on time.

We have always extended a sympathetic attitude towards judges. In fact, in recent
years,   we   have   exerted   efforts   towards   improving   their   condition.   In   return,   we
expect them to likewise exert efforts towards improving the image of the judiciary.
It   must   be   emphasized   that   the   "honor   and   integrity   of   the   judicial   system   is
measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by
the   expediency   with   which   disputes   are   resolved".8 At   this   juncture,   we   remind
respondent judge that:

Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives litigants of their right to speedy
disposition   of   their   cases,   but   also   tarnishes   the   image   of   the   judiciary.
Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering decisions and taking
appropriate actions on the cases before them not only causes great injustice to the
parties  involved  but  also invites  suspicion of ulterior motives  on the part  of the
judge, in addition to the fact that it erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. 

As regards respondent Clerk of Court Gundran, we find him guilty of simple neglect
of duty for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. R­5740. Section
10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 10. Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal. – Within
thirty (30) days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance with the preceding
section, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court:

(a) To verify the correctness of the original records or the record on appeal, as
the case may be, and to make a certification of its correctness;1avvphi1

(b) To verify the completeness of the records that will be transmitted to the
appellate court;

(c) If found to be incomplete, to take such measures as may be required to
complete   the   records,   availing   of   the   authority   that   he   or   the   court   may
exercise for this purpose; and

(d) To transmit the records to the appellate court.
If   the   efforts   to   complete   the   records   fail,   he   shall   indicate   in   his   letter   of
transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted
to the appellate court, the reasons for their non­transmittal, and the steps taken or
that could be taken to have them available.

The clerk of court shall furnish the parties with copies of his letter of transmittal of
the records [to] the appellate court.

We stress that clerks of court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate
administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.
Their duty is, inter alia, to assist in the management of the calendar of the court
and in all matters that do not involve discretion or judgment properly belonging to
the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the court, as their office is the
hub   of   adjudicative   and   administrative   orders,   processes   and   concerns.   As   such,
they are required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity, they cannot be
permitted to slacken on their jobs. 

DE GUZMANvs. GONZALEZ III, 616 SCRA 546
G.R. No. 158104, March 26, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the 
Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS:Petitioner   Angelita   de   Guzman,   the   Municipal   Treasurer   of   Claveria,   Cagayan,

was audited of her cash and accounts covering the period from January 26, 1999 to May 25,
2000. Per affidavit of State Auditor II Erlinda F. Langcay, the audit examination revealed a
shortage in the aggregate amount of  ₱368,049.42. The audit team demanded petitioner to
produce the missing funds and submit her written explanation about the occurrence of the
shortage within 72 hours. The letter was received on November 13, 2000 but no compliance
was made. Consequently, petitioner was indicted for malversation of public funds before the
Regional   Trial   Court   of   Sanchez,   Mira,   Cagayan   based   on   the   Resolution of   the
Ombudsman on November 27, 2001.

Alleging that she was not able to participate during the preliminary investigation as she
was then out of the country, petitioner moved 5 for and was granted a reinvestigation by the
court on May 29, 2002. As ordered, petitioner submitted her counter­affidavit, those of her
witnesses and other controverting evidence.After the reinvestigation, Prosecutor Bayag, Jr.
submitted his Report dated November 15, 2002 recommending the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause.

ISSUE:  Whether  there was  no sufficient   evidence  to  establish  probable cause  since the

audit examination was not completely terminated in view of the non­accomplishment of the
certification of cashbook examination.
HELD:

We find the matters raised by petitioner in her argumentation to be mainly questions of
fact which are not proper in a petition of this nature. Petitioner is basically questioning the
assessment and evaluation made by the Office of the Ombudsman of the pieces of evidence
submitted at the reinvestigation. The Office of the Ombudsman found that the evidence on
hand is sufficient to justify a probable cause to indict petitioner. Relying on the Report of
Prosecutor   Bayag,   Jr.,   petitioner   contended   otherwise.   At   this   juncture,   it   is   worth
emphasizing   that   where   what   is   being   questioned   is   the   sufficiency   of   evidence,   it   is   a
question   of   fact.   A   petition   for certiorari under   Rule   65   does   not   include   review   of   the
correctness of a board or tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence but is confined to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

The allegations of petitioner are also defenses that must be presented as evidence in the
hearing   of   the   criminal   case.   They   are   essentially   evidentiary   matters   that   negate
misappropriation which require an examination of the parties’ evidence. As such, they are
inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before us inasmuch as they do not
affect   the   jurisdiction   of   the   public   respondents.   In   petitions   for certiorari,   evidentiary
matters or matters of fact raised in the court below are not proper grounds nor may such be
ruled upon in the proceedings.

DE GUZMAN vs. GONZALES III
G.R. No. 158104, March 26, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Ombudsman

FACTS:  Petitioner   Angelita   de   Guzman,   in   her   official   capacity   as   the   Municipal

Treasurer  of  Claveria,  Cagayan,   was  audited  of  her  cash and  accounts  where  the  audit
examination   revealed   a   shortage   in   the   aggregate   amount   of   PHP368,049.42.   They
demanded   petitioner   to   produce   the   missing   funds   and   submit   her   written   explanation
about the occurrence of the shortage within 72 hours. Consequently, petitioner was indicted
for malversation of public funds before the Regional Trial Court.

Alleging that she was not able to participate during the preliminary investigation as she
was then out of the country, petitioner moved for and was granted a reinvestigation by the
court. 

After the reinvestigation, the Prosecutor submitted his Report recommending the dismissal
of the case for insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause. The Prosecutor find
the   prima   facie   presumption   of   misappropriation   of   public   funds   having   been   fully
controverted and contradicted by the accused’s evidence which warrant her exoneration and
dismissal of the instant case. 
Upon review of the Report of the Prosecutor, the Graft Investigation Officer recommended
disapproval of the Report and, instead, to proceed with the prosecution of the case. The
latter anchored her findings of probable cause on the following circumstances:

Firstly, the non­accomplishment by the auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) of the
certification   on   the  petitioner’s   cash   book   leaving   the  same   open,   would  not   negate   the
existence of shortage of the amount of PHP368,049.42. The certification is a mere formal
requirement of the audit. It does not refer to a substantive aspect of the audit. Thus, even
granting   that   the   certification   has   not   been   accomplished   by   the   COA   auditors,   it   is
immaterial as far as the finding of shortage is concerned.

Secondly, the petitioner was given sufficient time by the COA to comment or respond to its
findings.   She   received   a   demand   letter   from   COA   but   failed   to   comply   with   the   said
directive. Instead, she transmitted to the COA a total of 10 deposit slips showing that the
total amount of PHP368,049.42 was credited to the account of the Municipality of Claveria.
This was a clear case of restitution of funds. As held in several cases, restitution of funds is
a mere mitigating circumstance. It does not obliterate the criminal liability of the accused
for malversation of public funds.

Thirdly, there is prima facie presumption of misappropriation of funds by the petitioner
because she failed to have duly forthcoming the amount of PHP368,049.42 with which she
is chargeable. This presumption was not overturned by the evidence of the petitioner. Thus,
the presumption that the petitioner used the money for her personal use and benefit was
not duly controverted.

The   Officer­in  Charge   of   the   Office  of   the  Deputy   Ombudsman   for   Luzon   approved   the
recommendation of the Graft Investigation Officer.

Petitioner   filed   a   Motion   for   Reconsideration   but   the   Graft   Investigation   Officer
recommended   its   denial.   Officer­in   Charge   of   the   Office   of   the   Deputy   Ombudsman   for
Luzon   approved   the   recommendation.   Petitioner   then   filed   the   instant   petition   for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Graft Investigation Officer and the Officer­in Charge of the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon   committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction when they recommended the continuation of the prosecution of
the case against petitioner despite findings of the reinvestigating prosecutor that there was
no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause as the audit is not yet complete and/or
terminated.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

Parenthetically, we find the matters raised by petitioner in her argumentation to be mainly
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition of this nature. Petitioner is basically
questioning the assessment and evaluation made by the Office of the Ombudsman of the
pieces of evidence submitted at the reinvestigation. The Office of the Ombudsman found
that the evidence on hand is sufficient to justify a probable cause to indict petitioner. At
this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that where what is being questioned is the sufficiency
of evidence, it is a question of fact. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not include
review of the correctness of a board or tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence but is confined
to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 

Moreover, the allegations of petitioner are also defenses that must be presented as evidence
in the hearing of the criminal case. They are essentially evidentiary matters that negate
misappropriation which require an examination of the parties’ evidence. As such, they are
inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before us inasmuch as they do not
affect   the   jurisdiction   of   the   public   respondents.   In   petitions   for   certiorari,   evidentiary
matters or matters of fact raised in the court below are not proper grounds nor may such be
ruled upon in the proceedings. 

Granting that we dispense with the technicalities and regard the submissions of petitioner
as   matters   tendering   an   issue   of   law,   we   still   find   no   reason   to   reverse   the   finding   of
probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) confer on
the   Office  of   the  Ombudsman   the  power   to   investigate  and   prosecute   on   its   own  or   on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust or improper. Sections 12 and
13, Article XI of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on   complaints   filed   in   any   form   or   manner   against   public   officials   or   employees   of   the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government­
owned or controlled corporation and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and results thereof.

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, function
and duties:

(1.) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any   public   official,   employee,   officer   or   agency,   when   such   act   or   omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties­ The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

To recapitulate, the discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with
the   Ombudsman.   Unless   grave   abuse   of   discretion   amounting   to   lack   or   excess   of
jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled for as a policy of non­interference by the
courts in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.

CORRAL vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190156, February 12, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Election Law; Election Protest

FACTS:  Petitioner Leonor Dangan­Corral (Corral) and private respondent Ernesto Enero
Fernandez (Fernandez) were candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of El
Nido, Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was eventually proclaimed the
winner   with   5,113   votes   as   against   Fernandez's   3,807.   The   latter,   thereafter,   filed   an
election protest docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 1870 which was raffled to Branch
95 of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the two resolutions of the Comelec
dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari and denying  her motion for reconsideration,
respectively.  The  Comelec found  that  the  RTC  substantially  complied  with the rules  on
execution pending appeal and did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting  to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner contends that the RTC Decision sought to be executed pending appeal violates
the mandatory required form of decisions in election cases and thus should not be executed.
She further contends that the determination of whether the victory of the protestant was
clearly established should be made from the entire decision and not, as what the Comelec
did, merely from the dispositive portion. She insists that the RTC Decision readily shows
the inconclusive, defective and infirmed nature of protestant's alleged victory. Petitioner
also posits that there was no valid or good reason given for granting the execution pending
appeal. She also contends that the Comelec refused to apply the new rules on protest cases
and is thus guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Private Respondent's Arguments

On  the other  hand,   Fernandez  contends   that  the  Decision  of   the RTC  is  well   grounded
based   on   the   evidence   presented   and   it   clearly  establishes   his   victory  over   Corral   by  a
margin   of   465   votes.   Fernandez   also   contends   that   there   are   good   reasons   to   allow
execution pending appeal, like giving substance to the voice of the people of El Nido. Hence,
he maintains that the decision may properly be the subject of a writ of execution pending
appeal.

ISSUE:  Whether the  allowance of  execution pending appeal  of a decision of  RTC in an

election protest case constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the said RTC decision does not contain the specific matters required by
the Rules of Procedure in election contests.

HELD: 

There are clear cut requirements on when RTC decisions may be executed pending appeal. 
Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests states:

Sec. 11. Execution pending appeal. ­ On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse   party,   the   court,   while   still   in   possession   of   the   original   records,   may,   at   its
discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of
the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
 (a) There must be a motion  by  the prevailing  party with  three­day  notice  to the adverse
party.   Execution   pending   appeal   shall   not   issue   without   prior   notice   and   hearing.   There
must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must
state   the   good   or   special   reasons   justifying   the   execution   pending   appeal.   Such
reasons must:

(1)   constitute   superior   circumstances   demanding   urgency   that   will   outweigh   the
injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal;
and

(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the
protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.

(b) If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty
working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or
status quo order from the Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections. The corresponding
writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is
issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed. (Emphasis
supplied)

A valid exercise of discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it must be
manifest   in  the  decision sought   to be  executed  that  the  defeat  of  the  protestee  and  the
victory of the protestant have been clearly established. 7 The Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests now embody this doctrine, which the Comelec has in the past 8 given value to and
used in resolving cases before it, and which has formed part of our jurisprudence.

In the present case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee were not
clearly established in the Decision because of the RTC’s failure to conform to the prescribed
form of the Decision. Because of said infirmity, there is no certainty, it not being mentioned
in   the  Decision,   on   whether  the  ballots   of   those   who  voted   through   assistors   were  also
invalidated or not, in conjunction with the lack of a specific number of ballots invalidated
for being written by one person. The ballots of those who voted through assistors, if any,
could validly be written by one person. It being unclear from the Decision whether these
ballots, if any, were invalidated, it follows that the victory of the protestant and defeat of
the protestee are unclear and not manifest therein. Consequently, to allow the execution of
such a grossly infirm RTC Decision in disregard of established jurisprudence and clear and
straightforward rules is arbitrary and whimsical and constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 

CITY OF ILOILO vs.
HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS­BESANA
G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Just Compensation

FACTS:  Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent and
Southern   Negros   Development   Bank,   the   latter   as   mortgagee,   alleging   that   the   subject
property was declared for tax purposes. 
The complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in Javellana’s name to
be used as a school site for Lapaz High School.

Respondent admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the petitioner’s avowed
public   purpose   of   the   sought­for   expropriation,   since   the   City   of   Iloilo   already   had   an
existing school site for Lapaz High School.

The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for issuance of writ of possession and authorized
the petitioner to take immediate possession. Sixteen years later, when respondent filed an
action to withdraw the sum allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no
such deposit was ever made. Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as
well as interest. Petitioner claims that the computation should be made as of September 18,
1981, the date when the expropriation complaint was filed.

ISSUE:  First,   does  an   order  of   expropriation  become  final?   Second,   what   is   the  correct
reckoning point for the determination of just compensation?

HELD: In a long line of cases, we have constantly affirmed that: Just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
property,   the   just   compensation   is   to   be   ascertained   as   of   the   time   of   the   filing   of   the
complaint.

When   the   taking   of   the   property   sought   to   be   expropriated   coincides   with   the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date   of   the   filing   of   the   complaint. Even   under   Sec.   4,   Rule   67   of   the   1964   Rules   of
Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to
be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to
depart   from   the   general   rule   that   the   point   of   reference   for   assessing   the   value   of   the
Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.

JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics:   Criminal   Law;   Presumption   of   Innocence;   Republic   Act   (RA)   No.   9165   (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

FACTS: A Police Officer of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police
Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside
Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, two other police officers went immediately to the Starlight Hotel
to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, they approached
the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the
alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The   lady   clerk   informed   the   police   officers   that   the   roomboy   of   the   hotel   was   about   to
deliver   a   softdrink   to   Room   5   and   they   could   follow   him   if   they   [so   wish].   Thus,   they
followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a
woman,   later   identified   as   Mylene,   opened   the   door   wide   enough   to   enable   the   police
officers to look inside.

They saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing "shabu" while Joseph Canlas was on
the floor assisting petitioner sniffing "shabu". At this juncture, they arrested petitioner and
Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters
and plastic sachets.

Police officer  A  frisked  petitioner and   recovered  from   him   one  plastic   sachet   containing
"shabu".

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, both officers brought
them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty
while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The   Philippine   National   Police   (PNP)   laboratory   conducted   an   examination   on   the

specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for "shabu".

Cacao  professed  his innocence  and  presented  his   defense  stating  that  policemen  barged
inside the room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the
police.   He   was   later   bodily   searched   but   nothing   was   found   in   him   except   his   wallet
containing a cash of about PHP7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioner’s
wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City. The PHP7,000.00 was never seen again.

As petitioner was made to sit on the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet
on the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police
pointing   to   it.   The   same   police   then   explained   that   the   plastic   sachet   belongs   to   the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.

Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the
other police did to Canlas. 

The   trial   court   rendered   its   judgment   finding   Cacao   guilty   of   illegal   possession   of
methamphetamine   hydrochloride   weighing   1.3987   grams   and   is   therefore   sentenced   to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fifteen (15) years and to pay the fine of PHP400,000.00.

The   sachets   of   shabu   confiscated   from   the   accused   are   all   confiscated   in   favor   of   the
Government, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate   court   rendered   judgment   affirming   Cacao’s   conviction.   It   held   that   the
circumstances   obtaining   in   this   case   validly   cloaked   the   arresting   officers   with   the
authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may be used as
proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the
police officers compelled Cacao to admit a crime.
ISSUE:  Whether the lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of
innocence of the petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.

HELD:  Petitioner’s defenses of denial and frame­up are concededly inherently weak and
commonly used in drug­related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed
to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by
the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of
the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the
superior   and   immutable   rule   that   the   guilt   of   the   accused   must   be   proved   beyond
reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until
proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by
itself   override   the   constitutional   right   of   the   accused   to   be   presumed   innocent   unless
overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

BIENVENIDO T. BUADA, et al vs.
CEMENT CENTER, INC.
G.R. No. 180374, January 22, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Civil Law; Contracts; Tenancy Rights

FACTS: Petitioners Bienvenido T. Buada, Isaias B. Quinto, Nemesio Bautista, Orlando T.
Bautista, Freddie R. Bautista, Carlito O. Buada, Gerardo O. Buada, Armando M. Oliva,
Rogelio F. Rapajon, and Eugenio F. Flores were tenant­farmers cultivating three parcels of
agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center, Inc. 

Respondent   filed   a   Complaint for   Confirmation   of   Voluntary   Surrender   and   Damages

against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region 1
in   Urdaneta   City,   Pangasinan.   It   claimed   petitioners   entered   into   a   Compromise
Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of the sum of
PHP3,000.00 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite
respondent’s repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings. In their
Answer Petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained
through   fraud,   deceit,   and   misrepresentation.   Petitioners   also   claimed   that   respondent
promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But,
should the application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and
could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Regional Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of the tenant­farmers. DARAB found that
respondent   failed   to  prove   that   petitioners   voluntarily  surrendered  their   tenancy   rights
over the subject landholdings. It held that since the application for conversion was denied,
then the Compromise Agreement is not a perfected obligation; it is as if the petitioners’
voluntary surrender never existed. On appeal, the CA reversed the DARAB ruling.

ISSUE: Whether respondents are bonafide tenants of the subject landholdings.

HELD:  Well­settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding with, and are
not reviewable by us unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. One of
the  exceptions  is  when  the  findings   of   fact   of   the  CA   are  contrary  to  those  of   the  trial
court or quasi­judicial agency. In this case, the findings of fact of the CA and the DARAB
are conflicting, thus we are compelled to take a look at the factual milieu of this case

It is the policy of the State to promote the Security of Tenure of Farmers over their 
leasehold.

Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 (1963), otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
declares it  to  be  the policy  of  the  State  to  make  small  farmers  more independent,  self­
reliant   and   responsible   citizens,   and   a   source   of   genuine   strength   in   our   democratic
society.14 Towards this end, the same law guarantees the security of tenure of farmers with
respect to the land they cultivate, thus:

Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation ­ The agricultural leasehold relation
once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on
the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. x x x

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require
any court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. To protect the
tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated by law, must be
convincingly   and   sufficiently   proved   by   competent   evidence.   The   tenant's   intention   to
surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
Otherwise,   the   right   of   a   tenant   farmer   to   security   of   tenure   becomes   an   illusory
one. Moreover, RA 3844 provides that the voluntary surrender of the landholding by an
agricultural   lessee   should   be   due   to   circumstances   more   advantageous   to   him   and   his
family. 

The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the "voluntary surrender" contemplated by
law.

ARENO JR. vs. SKYCABLE PCC­BAGUIO
G.R. No. 180302, February 5, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Labor Law; Management Prerogative; Disciplinary actions

FACTS:  Petitioner Jimmy Areno Jr. was employed as a cable technician by respondent
Skycable   PCC­Baguio.   The   accounting   clerk   of   respondent,   Hyacinth   Soriano   (Soriano),
sent to the human resource manager a letter­complaint against petitioner alleging that on
two separate occasions, the latter spread false rumors about her (the first in the middle of
2001 and the second on December 22, 2001). On January 27, 2002, she was again insulted
by petitioner when the latter approached her and said that she was seen going out with
Aldrin Estrada, their field service supervisor, at Central Park, Baguio City. During that
incident,  petitioner uttered, "Ikaw  lang ang nakakaalam  ng totoo" with malicious intent
and   in   a   provocative   manner.   Soriano   averred   that   petitioner’s   unscrupulous   behavior
constituted serious and grave offense in violation of the company’s Code of Discipline.

On   the   same   day,   respondent   issued   a   Memorandum requiring   petitioner   to   submit   an

explanation   within   76   hours   from   notice   thereof.   Petitioner   submitted   his   written
explanation7 dated   January   23,   2002   denying   all   the   allegations   in   Soriano’s   letter­
complaint and further denying having uttered the statement imputed on him, explaining
thus:

2. That on the 7th of January, 2002 at SkyCable office, I greeted her ‘HELLO,
HYA’.  I   thought  she  didn’t  hear  me  greet  her  so  I   continued  saying ‘NAKITA
NAMIN KAYO AH…SA CENTRAL PARK.’ With that she answered, ‘KASAMA
KO   SI   EMMAN.’ Then   I   added, ‘BA’T   NANDOON   YUNG   114?’ Then   she
reacted ‘TSISMOSO KA KASI!’ In that instance, I didn’t intend to insult her as
she was saying because I never really implied anything with my statement nor
delivered it with malicious intent. So I ended by saying, ‘BA’T DI MO SABIHIN
YUNG PROBLEMA MO SA AKIN? IKAW LANG ANG NAKAKAALAM NIYAN
E!’ In this statement, I was asking her to tell me frankly the reasons why she’s
mad at me. I want to stress that I never delivered the statement in a provocative
manner. 

An   administrative   investigation   was   accordingly   conducted   wherein   the   investigating

committee found  petitioner  guilty  of  having  made  malicious   statements  against   Soriano
during their conversation, which is categorized as an offense under the Company Code of
Discipline. Consequently, petitioner was suspended for three days without pay.

Petitioner again wrote to respondent, this time requesting for further investigation on his
alleged act of spreading rumors against Soriano in order for him to confront his accuser and
present   his   witnesses   with   the   assistance   of   counsel.   Respondent   denied   the   request
reiterating   that   there   has   been   substantial   compliance   with   due   process   and   that   a
reinvestigation is moot because the suspension was already served.

Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against respondent
assailing   the   legality   of   his   suspension   and   eventual   dismissal.   He   claimed   that   his
suspension and dismissal were effected without any basis, and that he was denied his right
to due process.

The Labor  Arbiter dismissed  petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor  Arbiter

ruled that the act of petitioner in spreading rumors or intriguing against the honor of a co­
employee was persistent and characterized by willful and wrongful intents. It thus held
that the order suspending petitioner is a legitimate exercise of management prerogative
and   that   the   deliberate   refusal   of   petitioner   to   comply   therewith   constitutes   willful
disobedience.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which found his suspension and dismissal illegal. It held
that the testimonies given during the administrative investigation and used as basis for
petitioner’s suspension are hearsay. The NLRC likewise held that petitioner was deprived
of his basic right to due process when he was not allowed to confront his accuser despite his
repeated requests.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. Petitioner, for his part, filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration with respect to the limited award of backwages and to claim payment of
attorney’s fees and damages as well.

The   NLRC reconsidered  its  earlier  Decision   and  reinstated  the  Labor   Arbiter’s   Decision
dismissing   the   complaint.   In   reversing   itself,   the   NLRC   opined   that   as   shown   by   the
transcripts of the investigation, the testimony of Soriano was not, after all, hearsay. The
NLRC   also   considered  the   Memorandum   which   placed  petitioner   under   deactivation   for
three months due to an offense he earlier committed. While under said deactivation period,
the   commission   of   any   further   infraction   warrants   the   imposition   of   the   penalty   of
suspension. Finally, the NLRC struck down petitioner’s claim that he has no knowledge of
the   suspension   order   since   this   was   never   raised   before   the   Labor   Arbiter   but   only   on
appeal.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the findings of the
NLRC, ruling that the suspension of petitioner was not predicated on hearsay evidence;
that petitioner was not deprived of due process both at the company level and during the
proceedings held before the NLRC; and that petitioner’s failure to comply with respondent’s
suspension order, despite notice thereof, is a case of willful disobedience of a lawful order
which is a valid ground for dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was legally terminated  and deprived of due process both at the
company level and during the proceedings held before the NLRC.

HELD:  The decision to suspend petitioner was rendered after investigation and a finding
by respondent that petitioner has indeed made malicious statements against a co­employee.
The suspension was imposed due to a repeated infraction within a deactivation period set
by   the   company   relating   to   a   previous   similar   offense   committed.   It   is   axiomatic   that
appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management imposition. 36 What
should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business and to provide certain
disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to assure that the same would be
complied with.37 Respondent then acted within its rights as an employer when it decided to
exercise its management prerogative to impose disciplinary measure on its erring employee.

Petitioner was validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience in refusing to comply
with the suspension order.

The CA refused to give credence to petitioner’s assertion of having no knowledge of the
suspension because he refused to receive the suspension order preferring that it be sent by
registered   mail.   The   appellate   court   affirmed   the   factual   finding   of   the   NLRC   that
petitioner was definitely aware of his suspension but only feigned ignorance of the same. As
a rule, we refrain from reviewing factual assessments of agencies exercising adjudicative
functions.   Factual   findings   of   administrative   agencies   that   are   affirmed   by   the   CA   are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court so long as these findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 

ALIVIADO et al vs.
PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC., and PROMM­GEM INC.
G.R. No. 160506, March 9, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Topics: Labor Law; "labor­only" contracting

Labor laws expressly prohibit "labor­only" contracting. To prevent its circumvention, the
Labor Code establishes an employer­employee relationship between the employer and the
employees of the ‘labor­only’ contractor.

The instant petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution denying   the   motions   for   reconsideration   separately   filed   by   petitioners   and
respondent Procter & Gamble Phils. Inc. (P&G). The appellate court affirmed the Decision
of   the   National   Labor   Relations   Commission   (NLRC),   which   in   turn   affirmed   the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter. All these decisions found Promm­Gem, Inc. (Promm­Gem)
and Sales and Promotions Services (SAPS) to be legitimate independent contractors and the
employers of the petitioners.

FACTS:  Petitioners   (80   persons)   worked   as   merchandisers   of   P&G   from   various   dates,
allegedly starting as early as 1982 or as late as June 1991, to either May 5, 1992 or March
11, 1993.

They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm­Gem or SAPS for
periods   of   more   or   less   five   months   at   a   time. They   were   assigned   at   different   outlets,
supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their
wages from Promm­Gem or SAPS. 

SAPS and Promm­Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons
such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day­off without prior notice. 

P&G is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and
health   products,   which   it   sells   on   a   wholesale   basis   to   various   supermarkets   and
distributors. To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered
into   contracts   with   Promm­Gem   and   SAPS   for   the   promotion   and   merchandising   of   its
products. 

In   December  1991,   petitioners  filed   a   complaint against   P&G   for   regularization,   service

incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amended to
include the matter of their subsequent dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no
employer­employee relationship between petitioners and P&G. He found that the selection
and engagement of the petitioners, the payment of their wages, the power of dismissal and
control with respect to the means and methods by which their work was accomplished, were
all done and exercised by Promm­Gem/SAPS. He further found that Promm­Gem and SAPS
were legitimate independent job contractors. 

Appealing to the NLRC, petitioners disputed the Labor Arbiter’s findings. 

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied. 

Petitioners   then   filed   a   petition   for certiorari with   the   CA,   alleging   grave   abuse   of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. However, said petition was also denied by the CA. 
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was also denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:  Whether the petitioners were able to prove and establish that respondent Procter
&   Gamble   Phils.,   Inc.   is   their   employer   and   that   they   were   illegally   dismissed   by   the
former.

HELD: The petition has merit.

As   a   rule,   the   Court   refrains   from   reviewing   factual   assessments   of   lower   courts   and
agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the
Court is constrained to wade into factual matters when there is insufficient or insubstantial
evidence   on   record   to   support   those   factual   findings;   or   when   too   much   is   concluded,
inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.23 In the present
case, we find the need to review the records to ascertain the facts.

In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners, it is necessary
to first determine whether Promm­Gem and SAPS are labor­only contractors or legitimate
job contractors.

The pertinent Labor Code provision on the matter states:

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. – Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor
and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance   with   this   Code,   the   employer   shall   be   jointly   and   severally   liable   with   his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under
the   contract,   in   the   same   manner   and   extent   that   he   is   liable   to   employees   directly
employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting
out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or
restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor­only contracting and job
contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who
among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to
prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.

There is "labor­only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does
not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing   activities   which   are   directly   related   to   the   principal   business   of   such
employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent
of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as
if the latter were directly employed by him. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Rule VIII­A, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No. 18­02, distinguishes between legitimate and labor­only contracting:

x x x x
Section 3. Trilateral Relationship in Contracting Arrangements. In legitimate contracting,
there exists a trilateral relationship under which there is a contract for a specific job, work
or   service   between   the   principal   and   the   contractor   or   subcontractor,   and   a   contract   of
employment   between   the   contractor   or   subcontractor   and   its   workers.   Hence,   there   are
three parties involved in these arrangements, the principal which decides to farm out a job
or service to a contractor or subcontractor, the contractor or subcontractor which has the
capacity to independently undertake the performance of the job, work or service, and the
contractual   workers  engaged   by  the  contractor   or   subcontractor   to  accomplish   the  job[,]
work or service.

x x x x

Section   5.   Prohibition   against   labor­only   contracting. Labor­only   contracting is   hereby

declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor­only contracting shall refer to an arrangement
where   the   contractor   or   subcontractor   merely   recruits,   supplies   or   places   workers   to
perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or
placed   by   such   contractor   or   subcontractor   are   performing   activities   which   are   directly
related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) [T]he contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of
the contractual employee.

The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (c) of
the Labor Code, as amended.

"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in
the case of  corporations, tools,  equipment,  implements,  machineries  and work premises,
actually   and   directly   used   by   the   contractor   or   subcontractor   in   the   performance   or
completion of the job, work or service contracted out.

The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of
the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but
also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly,   the   law   and   its   implementing   rules   allow   contracting   arrangements   for   the
performance of specific jobs, works or services. Indeed, it is management  prerogative to
farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in
nature.   However,   in   order   for   such   outsourcing   to   be   valid,   it   must   be   made   to
anindependent   contractor because   the   current   labor   rules   expressly   prohibit   labor­only
contracting.

To emphasize, there is labor­only contracting when the contractor or sub­contractor merely
recruits,   supplies   or   places   workers   to   perform   a   job,   work   or   service   for   a
principal and any of the following elements are present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or
placed   by   such   contractor   or   subcontractor   are   performing   activities   which   are   directly
related to the main business of the principal; or
ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of
the contractualemployee. (Underscoring supplied)

In the instant case, the financial statements of Promm­Gem show that it has authorized
capital   stock   of  ₱1   million   and   a   paid­in   capital,   or   capital   available   for   operations,   of
₱500,000.00 as of 1990. It also has long term assets worth ₱432,895.28 and current assets
of  ₱719,042.32. Promm­Gem has also proven that it maintained its own warehouse and
office   space   with   a   floor   area   of   870   square   meters. It   also   had   under   its   name   three
registered vehicles which were used for its promotional/merchandising business. Promm­
Gem also has other clients aside from P&G. Under the circumstances, we find that Promm­
Gem has substantial investment which relates to the work to be performed. These factors
negate the existence of the element specified in Section 5(i) of DOLE Department Order No.
18­02.

The   records   also   show   that   Promm­Gem   supplied   its   complainant­workers   with   the
relevant   materials,   such   as   markers,   tapes,   liners   and   cutters,   necessary   for   them   to
perform   their   work.   Promm­Gem   also   issued   uniforms   to   them.   It   is   also   relevant   to
mention  that   Promm­Gem   already   considered  the   complainants   working   under   it   as   its
regular,   not   merely   contractual   or   project,   employees. This   circumstance   negates   the
existence of element (ii) as stated in Section 5 of DOLE Department Order No. 18­02, which
speaks of contractual employees. This, furthermore, negates – on the part of Promm­Gem –
bad faith and intent to circumvent labor laws which factors have often been tipping points
that lead the Court  to strike down the employment practice or agreement concerned as
contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order. 

Under the circumstances, Promm­Gem cannot be considered as a labor­only contractor. We
find that it is a legitimate independent contractor.

Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al..

G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ,
and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit

organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against
Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is
not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both
the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the
case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting
consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within
the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or
has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used
as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states
as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms
are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Dannie M. Pantoja vs. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation

G.R. No. 163554 April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent employed petitioner as a utility man on March 15, 1987. Petitioner was
eventually assigned at respondent's Paper Mill No. 4, the section which manufactures
the company's industrial paper products, as a back tender in charge of the proper
operation of the sections machineries. In a Notice of Transfer dated March 27, 1999,
respondent informed petitioner of its reorganization plan and offered him a position at
Paper Mill No. 5 under the same terms and conditions of employment in anticipation of
the eventual closure and permanent shutdown of Paper Mill No. 4 effective May 5,
1999.The closure and concomitant reorganization is in line with respondents decision to
streamline and phase out the company's industrial paper manufacturing operations due
to financial difficulties brought about by the low volume of sales and orders for
industrial paper products. However, petitioner rejected respondents offer for his
transfer. Thus, a notice of termination of employment effective May 5, 1999 was sent to
petitioner as his position was declared redundant by the closure of Paper Mill No. 4. He
then received his separation pay and thereafter executed a release and quitclaim in
favor of respondent. On April 5, 1999, respondent informed the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) of its reorganization and partial closure by submitting with
the said office an Establishment Termination Report together with the list of 31
terminated employees. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent assailing his termination as without any valid cause. He averred that the
alleged redundancy never occurred as there was no permanent shutdown of Paper Mill
No. 4 due to its continuous operation since his termination.A co-employee, Nestor
Agtang, confirmed this fact and further attested that several contractual workers were
employed to operate Paper Mill No. 4. Petitioner also presented in evidence documents
pertaining to the actual and continuous operation of Paper Mill No. 4 such as the Paper
Mill Personnel Schedule for July 2-8, 2000 and 23-29, 2000 and Paper Machine No. 4
Production Report and Operating Data dated April 28, 2000 and May 18, 2000. In its
defense, respondent refuted petitioners claim of illegal dismissal.It argued that
petitioner has voluntarily separated himself from service by opting to avail of the
separation benefits of the company instead of accepting reassignment/transfer to
another position of equal rank and pay. According to respondent, petitioners discussion
on the alleged resumption of operation of Paper Mill No. 4 is rendered moot by the fact
of petitioner's voluntary separation.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of
merit.Upon appeal by petitioner, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision by
finding petitioners separation from employment illegal.Aggrieved, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed the NLRC's Decision and reinstated
the Labor Arbiters Decision dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal.

HELD:

Respondent presented evidence of the low volume of sales and orders for the
production of industrial paper in 1999 which inevitably resulted to the company's
decision to streamline its operations. This fact was corroborated by respondents VP-
Tissue Manufacturing Director and was not disputed by petitioner. Exercising its
management prerogative and sound business judgment, respondent decided to cut
down on operational costs by shutting down one of its paper mill. The determination of
the need to phase out a particular department and consequent reduction of personnel
and reorganization as a labor and cost saving device is a recognized management
prerogative which the courts will not generally interfere with. In this case, the
abolishment of Paper Mill No. 4 was undoubtedly a business judgment arrived at in the
face of the low demand for the production of industrial paper at the time. Despite an
apparent reason to implement a retrenchment program as a cost-cutting measure,
respondent, however, did not outrightly dismiss the workers affected by the closure of
Paper Mill No. 4 but gave them an option to be transferred to posts of equal rank and
pay. As can be seen, retrenchment was utilized by respondent only as an available
option in case the affected employee would not want to be transferred. Respondent did
not proceed directly to retrench. This is an indication of good faith on respondents part
as it exhausted other possible measures other than retrenchment. Besides, the
employers prerogative to bring down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised
essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic means have been tried and
found wanting. Giving the workers an option to be transferred without any diminution
in rank and pay specifically belie petitioners allegation that the alleged streamlining
scheme was implemented as a ploy to ease out employees, thus, the absence of bad
faith. Apparently, respondent implemented its streamlining or reorganization plan with
good faith, not in an arbitrary manner and without prejudicing the tenurial rights of its
employees.

Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 167237 April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Allegedly, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante obtained from him
a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract by
way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and a Promissory Note
payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to
petitioner post-dated checks to secure payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the above
mentioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), and which
property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda
G. Diaz, as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. On the basis of said waiver,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at
the back of the TCT.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante
were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still
failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract
against the Diazes and Comandante. At the Pangans’ end, they alleged that they
acquired the subject property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of
P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the latter’s daughter
Comandante. However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being
informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioner’s adverse
claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the subject
property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioner’s adverse claim is anchored cannot be
the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void
under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the
parents are still living valid?

RULING:

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For
the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at
the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right

which is purely hereditary in nature.[38]

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to
either of her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still
living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering
that the property subject matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the
properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such
expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioner’s favor. The Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that
same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being
violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

Trinidad Go, et al. vs. Vicente Velez Chavez, etc.

G.R. No. 182341 April 23, 2010

Facts:

The CTA rendered a Decision upholding the assessment issued against petitioner in the
amount of P11,905,696.32, representing deficiency VAT for the year 1998, inclusive of
25% surcharge and 20% deficiency interest, plus 20% delinquency interest from
February 25, 2002 until full payment, pursuant to Sections 248 and 249(B) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC). The CTA ruled that pawnshops are
subject to VAT under Section 108(A) of the NIRC as they are engaged in the sale of
services for a fee, remuneration or consideration.

Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review but it was dismissed
by the CA for lack of jurisdiction in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282).

Realizing its error, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc. The
petition, however, was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

Issues: (1) Whether the Honorable court of Tax Appeal en banc should have given due
course to the petition for review and not strictly applied the technical rules of procedure
to the detriment of justice; (2) Whether or not petitioner is subject to the 10% VAT.

Held: (1) The petition is meritorious. Jurisdiction to review decisions or resolutions

issued by the Divisions of the CTA is no longer with the CA but with the CTA En Banc.
This rule is embodied in Section 11 of RA 9282.

In the instant case, we are constrained to disregard procedural rules because we cannot
in conscience allow the government to collect deficiency VAT from petitioner
considering that the government has no right at all to collect or to receive the same.
Besides, dismissing this case on a mere technicality would lead to the unjust enrichment
of the government at the expense of petitioner, which we cannot permit. Technicalities
should never be used as a shield to perpetrate or commit an injustice.
(2) Petitioner disputes the assessment made by the BIR for VAT deficiency in the
amount of P11,905,696.32 for taxable year 1998 on the ground that pawnshops are not
included in the coverage of VAT.

We agree. x x x Since petitioner is a non-bank financial intermediary, it is subject to 10%

VAT for the tax years 1996 to 2002; however, with the levy, assessment and collection of
VAT from non-bank financial intermediaries being specifically deferred by law, then
petitioner is not liable for VAT during these tax years. But with the full implementation
of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries starting January 1, 2003,
petitioner is liable for 10% VAT for said tax year. And beginning 2004 up to the present,
by virtue of R.A. No. 9238, petitioner is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to
percentage tax on gross receipts from 0% to 5%, as the case may be.

Guided by the foregoing, petitioner is not liable for VAT for the year 1998.
Consequently, the VAT deficiency assessment issued by the BIR against petitioner has
no legal basis and must therefore be cancelled. In the same vein, the imposition of
surcharge and interest must be deleted.

Roño Seguritan y Jara vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172896 April 19, 2010

Facts: November 25,1995: Roño Seguritan y Jara alias Ranio was having a drinking
session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (51 year old farmer), Melchor Panis and
Baltazar Panis, in the house of Manuel dela Cruz. Ranio was seated beside Lucrecio as
he claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops which bun
the heated argument. As Lucrecio was about to stand up, he punched him twice hitting
him in the right and left temple causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a
hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove causing him to fall face-up
to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio rode a tricycle home. His wife noticed blood on his forehead so he explained
that he was stoned.

November 25,1995 9pm: Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has
darkened and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth as he slept. They tried to
revive Lucrecio but failed.

December 4, 1995: Lucrecio’s wife learned of the incident and requested the assistance
of the NBI. NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecio’s cause of
death was traumatic head injury

October 1, 1996: He was charged with Homicide.

Ranio presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration Officer of Gonzaga, Cagayan,
and Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan, to prove
that Lucrecio died of a heart attack

RTC: homicide
CA: Affirmed

Ranio argued that he should be liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio

ISSUE:

W/N Ranio is guilty of homicide even if there is no intent

HELD:

YES. petition is DENIED. AFFIRMED penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor
as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum with
MODIFICATION that petitioner is further ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just
physical injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

Unlawful act - punching Lucrecio He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused.

Romeo Basay, et al. vs. Hacienda Consolation, et al.

G.R. No. 175532 April 19, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents hired petitioners Romeo Basay in 1967 and Julian Literal in 1984, as tractor
operators, and petitioner Julian Abueva in 1989, as laborer, in the hacienda devoted for
sugar cane plantation.

On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary
claims against respondents. They alleged that sometime in July 2001, respondents
verbally informed them to stop working. Thereafter, they were not given work
assignments despite their status as regular employees. They alleged that their
termination was done in violation of their right to substantive and procedural due
process. Petitioners also claimed violation of Minimum Wage Law and non-payment of
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, five days service incentive leave
pay, separation pay and 13th month pay. They also prayed for damages and attorneys
fees.

Respondents denied petitioners allegations. As regards Abueva, respondents averred

that he is not an employee but a mere contractor in the hacienda. According to
respondents, Abueva hired other men to perform weeding jobs and even entered into
contract with neighboring haciendas for similar jobs. Respondents alleged that Abuevas
name does not appear in the payroll, thus indicating that he is not an employee. As
such, there can be no dismissal to speak of, much less an illegal dismissal.

With regard to petitioners Literal and Basay, respondents admitted that both are regular
employees, each receiving P130.00 per days work as evidenced by a Master Voucher.
However, respondents denied having illegally dismissed them and asserted that they
abandoned their jobs.

Respondents alleged that Literal was facing charges of misconduct, insubordination,

damaging and taking advantage of hacienda property, and unauthorized cultivation of
a portion of the hacienda. Literal was ordered to explain; instead of complying, Literal
did not anymore report for work. Instead, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Respondents asserted that they sent a representative to convince petitioners to return

but to no avail. Respondents maintained that they have been religiously giving 13th
month pay to their employees as evidenced by a voucher corresponding to year 2000.

The Labor Arbiter exonerated respondents from the charge of illegal dismissal as
petitioners were the ones who did not report for work despite respondents call. The
Labor Arbiter, however, awarded petitioners claim of 13th month pay and salary
differentials.

Both parties sought recourse to the NLRC. Petitioners filed a Partial Appeal to the
Decision declaring respondents not guilty of illegal dismissal. They argued that there
was no proof of clear and deliberate intent to abandon their work. On the contrary, their
filing of an illegal dismissal case negates the intention to abandon. Petitioners likewise
alleged that respondents failed to observe procedural due process.

Respondents, for their part, filed a Memorandum on Appeal with respect to the award
of salary differentials and 13th month pay to petitioners. Respondents averred that the
Labor Arbiter erred in finding that petitioners are entitled to receive a minimum wage
ofP145.00/day instead of P130.00/day which is the minimum wage rate for sugarcane
workers in Negros Oriental per Wage Order No. ROVII-07. Respondents likewise
presented vouchers to prove payment of 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999.

The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modification that complainants Julian
Literal and Romeo Basay are not entitled to their claims for salary differentials and 13th
month pay for lack of legal basis. However, respondents are ordered to pay
complainants Julian Literal and Romeo Basay proportionate 13th month pay computed
from January 1, 2001 to August 29, 2001.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the NLRC. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed and are entitled to their money claims.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is partially sustained.

We are not persuaded by petitioners contention that nothing was presented to establish
their intention of abandoning their work, or that the fact that they filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal negates the theory of abandonment.

It bears emphasizing that this case does not involve termination of employment on the
ground of abandonment. As earlier discussed, there is no evidence showing that
petitioners were actually dismissed. Petitioners filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal, irrespective of whether reinstatement or separation pay was prayed for,
could not by itself be the sole consideration in determining whether they have been
illegally dismissed. All circumstances surrounding the alleged termination should also
be taken into account.

In Abad v. Roselle Cinema, G.R. No. 141371, March 24, 2006 we ruled that the
substantial evidence proffered by the employer that it had not terminated the employee
should not be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. We held that such
non sequitur reasoning cannot take the place of the evidence of both the employer and
the employee.

Given that there was no dismissal to speak of, there can be no question as to the legality
or illegality thereof.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion
by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Kudos Metal Corporation

G.R. No. 178087 May 5, 2010

FACTS:

CIR assessed Kudos Metal Corporation for taxable year 1998. A Waiver of the Statute of
Limitations was executed on December 2001. The CTA issued a Resolution canceling
the assessment notices issued against Petitioner for having been issued beyond the
prescriptive period as the waiver purportedly failed to (a) have the valid officer execute
the same (i.e., only the Assistant Commissioner signed it and not the CIR); (b) the date
of acceptance was not indicated; (c) the fact of receipt by the taxpayer was not indicated
in the original copy.

ISSUE:

Has the CIR’s right to assess prescribed?

HELD:

YES. The requirements for a valid waiver as laid down in RMO 20-90 and RDAO No. 5-
01 are mandatory to give effect to Section 222 of the Tax Code. Specifically, the flaws in
the waiver executed by Kudos Metal were as follows: (a) there was no notarized written
authority in favor of the signatory for the company; (b) there is no stated date of
acceptance by the Commissioner or his representative; and (c) the fact of the receipt of
the copy was not indicated in the original waivers.

Neither can it be said that by merely executing the waiver the taxpayer is already
estopped from disputing an action by the CIR beyond the statutory 3-year period since
the exception under the Suyoc case (i.e., when the delays were due to taxpayer’s acts)
does not apply.

Note: Requisites of a valid waiver: (i) acceptance date; (ii) expiry date; (iii) signed by
authorized officer of taxpayer and BIR; (iv) notarized; (v) fact of receipt must be
indicated in the copies

Hiers of Mario Pacres vs. Heirs of Cecilia Ygoña

G.R. No. 174719 May 5, 2010

Facts: Pastor is the original owner of Lot No. 9 located at Kinasang-an, Pardo,
Cebu City who left it intestate to his heirs Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco,
Mario (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest) and Veñaranda (herein petitioner).
Petitioners admitted that at the time of Pastor’s death, his heirs were already
occupying the said lot. The front portion was occupied by the co-owned Pacres
ancestral home, and beside it stood Rodrigo’s hut. Mario’s house stood at the back
of the ancestral house. The heirs leased the ground floor of the [ancestral home]
including the area occupied by the house to respondent Ramirez, who
immediately took possession thereof. Subsequently, four of the Pacres siblings
(namely, Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia and Margarita) sold their shares in the
ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez. With the sale,
respondent Ramirez’s possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership with
petitioners Mario and Veñaranda, who did not sell their shares in the house and lot.
Rodrigo, Francisco, Margarita and Simplicia sold their remaining shares in Lot
No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoña (Ygoña). Ygona later filed a petition to survey and
segregate the portions she bought to which Mario objected on the ground that he
wanted to exercise his right as co-owner to redeem his siblings’ shares. Vendee
Rodrigo also opposed on the ground that he wanted to annul the sale for failure of
consideration. On the other hand, Margarita and the widow of Francisco both
manifested their assent to Ygoña’s petition. Because of this, the court issued a
writ of possession respecting Margarita’s and Francisco’s shares in favor of Ygoña. It
is by authority of this writ that Ygoña built her house the said lot. The RTC dismissed
the petition and the complaint for legal redemption, filed by Mario and Veñaranda, was
dismissed on the ground of improper exercise of the right. This was affirmed by the CA
ruling that Ygoña built her house on Lot No. 9 in good faith and it would be
unjust to require her to remove her house thereon. Subsequently, the Republic,
through the DPWH, expropriated the front portion of Lot No. 9 for the expansion
of the Cebu south road. This was filed in the RTC of Cebu City. And as
occupant of the expropriated portion, Ygoña moved to withdraw her corresponding
share in the expropriation payment. Petitioners opposed to this. However, the
said motion of Ygoña remains unresolved. So Mario, filed an ejectment suit against
Ramirez’ successor-in-interest Vicentuan. Mario claimed sole ownership of the lot
occupied by Ramirez/Vicentuan by virtue of the oral partition. The court
dismissed Mario’s assertion that his siblings sold the rear lots to Ramirez. It held
that Ramirez has a right to continue occupying the property he bought. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.
Unsatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA which only sustained the ruling of the
RTC insofar as it dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of evidence. It held
that the oral partition was not valid because the heirs did not ratify it by taking
possession of their shares in accordance with their oral agreement. Hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether the issue of ownership regarding the front portion of Lot No. 9 and
entitlement to the expropriation payment may be resolved in this action.

Ruling: Yes. The parties did not provide the Court with the pleadings filed in the
expropriation case, which makes it impossible to know the extent of the issues already
submitted by the parties in the expropriation case and thereby assess whether there
was forum-shopping. Nonetheless, it is correct that the issue of ownership should be
litigated in the expropriation court. The court hearing the expropriation case is
empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned
property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case.
This is due to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for
the expropriation payment. Petitioners’ objection regarding respondents’ claim
over the expropriation payment should have been brought up in the expropriation
court as opposition to respondent’s motion. While we do not know if such objection
was already made, the point is that the proper venue for such issue is the
expropriation court, and not here where a different cause of action (specific
performance) is being litigated. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. CA and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

G.R. No. 168062 June 29, 2010

FACTS: This case was a case of ejectment. Victorias Milling Corporation, Inc. (VMCI)
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of E.B.
Magalona-Manapla on March 4, 2004. Six days after, the sheriff summoned the human
relations department head of IPI, Danilo Magsalang. On March 19, 2004, IPI answered
with express reservation stating that the said Answer should not be construed as a
waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the IPI for non-service of summons
on the proper person and filed an Omnibus Motion for Hearing of Affirmative Defenses
raised in the Answer. It further filed a motion for suspension of proceedings. The
MCTC ruled denied the motion for suspension of proceedings and denied the motion
for reconsideration. IPI filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)-
Cebu City, questioning the MCTC’s jurisdiction in summoning Magsalang. The Cebu
City CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction to the MCTC and gave the parties
twenty days after receiving the resolution to simultaneously file their memoranda
amplifying their positions and supporting their arguments with pertinent jurisprudence
on the matter. VMCI filed a petition for certiorari, hence this case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Cebu City CA gravely abused its discretion by ordering the
issuance of the writ of injunction, failing to dismiss outright the petition of certiorari
and prohibition by the IPI and blatantly disregarding of the court hierarchy

HELD: Rule 70, Section 13 (7) of the Rules of Court prohibits a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court on forced
entry or unlawful detainer cases. The Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of
exception, permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a concept in Statutory Construction
which provides that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others.
In the case at bar, continuing the proceedings with the MCTC was more in accord with
justice, the purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure and the proper administration
of justice. The Cebu City-CA should have indeed dismissed outright the petition for
certiorari filed by IPI. The petition was granted and the resolutions and the writ of
injunction issued by the said CA were nullified and set aside. A dismissal of the petition
for certiorari filed by the IPI in the Cebu City-CA was also ordered.

People of the Philippines vs. Rene Baron y Tangarocan

Facts:
At about 9 o’clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, the accused Rene Baron, Rey Villatima, and alias
“Dedong” bargo, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident
premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order
to rob, steal and take away the latter’s sidecar and motorcycle, wallet, and wristwatch;
and inflicted multiple stabbed wounds which directly caused the victim’s death.

Appellant, Rene Baron, denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June
28, 1995, at around 7 o’clock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his
family and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home where he
chanced upon the deceased and his two passengers who insisted that he came along for
the trip. During said trip, the two passengers announced a hold-up and thereafter tied
the driver’s hands and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields while Baron stayed in
the tricycle. Baron was then accompanied by the two passengers back to his house
where he and his wife were threatened at gunpoint not to report the incident to the
authorities.

On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty as charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of
irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the
same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances
were lacking.

Issue:

Is the appellant entitled to the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or

uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury?

Held:

No. The appellant’s attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To
avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is
insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for
the accused to escape.

The Court found nothing in the records to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he
was under duress from his co-accused in participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence
was to the contrary. Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim towards the sugarcane
field and left the appellant inside the tricycle that was parked by the roadside. While all
alone, he had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real,
imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to wait for his co-accused to return
and even rode with them to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the victim’s
motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused
for more than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never
tried to escape or at least request for assistance from the people around him. From the
series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion was
the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away
the motorcycle.

Southeastern Shipping, Southeastern Shipping Group, Ltd. vs. Federico U. Navarra,

Jr.

FACTS:

Petitioner Southeastern Shipping, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner

Southeastern Shipping Group, Ltd., hired Federico to work on board the vessel "George
McLeod." Federico signed 10 successive separate employment contracts of varying
durations covering the period from October 5, 1995 to March 30, 1998. His latest
contract was approved by the POEA on January 21, 1998 for 56 days extendible for
another 56 days. On March 6, 1998, Federico, while on board the vessel, complained of
having a sore throat and on and off fever with chills. He also developed a soft mass on
the left side of his neck. On March 30, 1998, Federico arrived back in the Philippines and
the specimen excised from his neck lymph node was found negative for malignancy.
However, on June 4, 1998, he was diagnosed at the PGH to be suffering from Hodgkin's
Disease. On September 6, 1999, Federico filed a complaint against petitioners with the
arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming entitlement to disability benefits, loss of
earning capacity, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. During the
pendency of the case, on April 29, 2000, Federico died. His widow, Evelyn, substituted
him as party complainant on her own behalf and in behalf of their three children. The
claim for disability benefits was then converted into a claim for death benefits. The LA
dismissed the complaint which was reversed by NLRC and CA hence the said petition
for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for the death of the respondent as such
death was during the term of his employment contract.

HELD: Petitioners are not liable to pay to respondents death compensation benefits

LABOR LAW: death compensation benefits

Petitioners are not liable to pay to respondents death compensation benefits for lack of
showing that Federicos disease was brought about by his stint on board petitioners
vessels and also considering that his death occurred after the effectivity of his contract.
The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer there may be cases where the circumstances warrant
favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted
as to result in an injustice to the employer. The death of a seaman during the term of
employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits,
but if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his
beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits. Federico did not die while he was
under the employ of petitioners. His contract of employment ceased when he arrived in
the Philippines on March 30, 1998, whereas he died on April 29, 2000. Thus, his
beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits under the Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. CA's decision holding that the claim for death benefits
has not yet prescribed is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioners are not
liable to pay to respondents death compensation benefits

July, August, September

Urieta v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 164402

Facts:

Aguilar filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages alleging that in 1997
her husband Ignacio was issued a Torrens Title over a parcel of land. Prior thereto, or in
1968, Ignacio allowed Anastacia to construct a house on the southern portion of the land
and to stay therein temporarily.

In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition the parcel of land. They asked
Elderlina, who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate
the land but the former did not heed her demand.

Aguilar filed a case for accion publiciana against Elderlina. In her answer, Elderlina did
not dispute that Ignacio had the title to the land. However, she asserted that in 1973,
Ignacio sold to her mother Anastacia the southern portion of the land shown by the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan.

Held:

The objective of accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.

However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This
decision, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The decision of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The decision in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.

The ruling in this case was limited only to the issue of determining who between the
parties had a better right to possession. The decision was not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, the ruling was not a bar for the
parties to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership where the
validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of OCT No. P-9354 could be properly threshed
out.
Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan and
Violeta J. Josef, Respondents,

G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010

Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, Respondent, G.R. No.
175705; 5 July 2010

Facts:

Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Licensure Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam,
she wrote to the Board of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-
corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since these showed only shaded marks,
she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the
Board for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an
explanation of the grading system (collectively, theExamination Papers). Her request
was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations

Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional

Regulation Commission (PRC)

Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and
reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made only on grounds of
mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) the Board
was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by
Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later
informed her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the
grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents that
would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her
answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later
amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the documents requested,
not recorrection of her exam, deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance of a
certificate of registration as CPA.

Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA.
Consequently, the RTC denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot.
She amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to
access to the documents she had requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in
the October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC. The RTC considered
the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC
reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA
examination did not render the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to
issue to her a certificate of registration as Certified Public Accountant” was deleted
from the original petition. As regards whether she had the constitutional right to have
access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties first adduce
evidence, and to have PRC air its side of thecase. The RTC also ordered the PRC to
preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer
keysfor the October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam.

When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of
the case because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998

CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994,
constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and access to government
documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she
merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory
function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination
questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention.

Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-
correction of her examination; (2) Whether or

not petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies; (3) Whether or not the case
was mooted by petitioner’s passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4)
Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the Examination

Papers.

Held: (1) Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot
be compelled by mandamus. In Agustin Ramos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February
2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing
therein petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and
the Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their ratings, the Supreme Court
held that “(t)he function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the
examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x
is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one,
hence, not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus.”

For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and
certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And
despitepetitioner’s assertion that she did not demand re-correction, the most cursory
perusal of her Second Amended Petition and herprayer that respondents “make the
appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belied this claim.

(2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’srefusal to release
the Examination Papers should have been

through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 223, the
PRC has the power to review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional Boards, including the
results of their licensure examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on
administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
PRC within 30 days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this power is
not limited to administrative investigations but encompassesrequests for documents.
And since the PRC itself issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned
bypetitioner, it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of
expertise.

One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is thewell-entrenched

doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy
of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within
thecompetence of other departments. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a question
of law is involved.

Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access to the

Examination Papers was one such question of law which cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer.

(3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.

In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his
or her right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since
every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship,
petitioner’s belated passing of the CPA Board Exams did not automatically mean that
her interest in the Examination Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the
constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case
would be repeated, warranted review.

(4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is
limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law” (Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the
State’spolicy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and
is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public interest”
and “public concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the
final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board examinations such as the
CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the
examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted
into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations
could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple
choice exams that require that the questions and

answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been
given an opportunity to explain the reasons

behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination
Papers confidential.

In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board
examination administered by the PRC, and

in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand
the case to the RTC for further proceedings

VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO

Facts

On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land
consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was devoted to
mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice and her
three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each receiving 7 hectares,
except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.

Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter dated January 16, 1995 informing
him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible.

On April 23, 1996, the PARAD rendered a Decision[10] in favor of Vicente. It opined
that since Vicente was performing functions more than just a mere caretaker and was
even allowed to live in subject landholding with his family, he is therefore a tenant.

Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Review[13] under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. They contended, among others, that the essential elements of
tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant controversy. They claimed that their
property is not an agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area, thereafter CA
rendered a Decision in their favor.

Issues

I. WHETHER THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER ARE QUESTIONS

OF LAW WHICH CAN BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

II. WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF THE PARAD AND THE DARAB THAT
VICENTE IS A BONA FIDETENANT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. [18]

HELD:
 1. The case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual
issues.

SC ruled in favour of Vicente. The determination of whether a person is an

agricultural tenant is basically a question of fact. And, as a general rule, questions of
fact are not proper in a petition filed under Rule 45. But since the findings of facts of
the DARAB and the CA contradict each other, it is crucial to go through the
evidence and documents on record as a matter of exception to the rule.

2. The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not
supported by substantial evidence.

Vicente posits that the CA erred in substituting its own findings with the
unanimous findings of the PARAD and the DARAB. He asserts that factual
findings of administrative agencies are entitled to great respect and even finality
since they have acquired expertise on the field for which they were created. The
only requirement is that said findings must be supported by substantial
evidence. Vicente believes that the findings of the agrarian tribunals are
supported by substantial evidence since he did not observe regular working
hours, handles all phases of farm works, and lives in an old building located at
the middle of the plantation.

The instant petition was DENIED. The assailed October 12, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74465 declaring petitioner Vicente Adriano
not a tenant of the respondents and thus not entitled to security of tenure under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and the May 4, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

AMELIA B. HEBRON v. Franco L. Loyola, et. al

Facts:

This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of
land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with
an area of 17,688 square meters, was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to
Januario Loyola.Lot No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by
Januario Loyola, the husband of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven
children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion,
all surnamed Loyola.

The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All
the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject
properties during Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on
September 15, 1969, administration of the subject properties was assumed by her
daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the
shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties
was formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only one still living
among the children of Januario and Remigia. The rest were survived and represented
by their respective descendants and children

On June 22, 1999, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision granting the partition
sought. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

Petitioner, the defendant in the case before the RTC, appealed the Decision to the CA.
The CA found the petitioner entitled to participate in the partition of the subject
properties. It stated that petitioner's inadvertent exclusion from the partition of the
subject properties arose from the trial court's use of the phrase "seven (7) sets of
plaintiffs" in the dispositive portion of the appealed Decision instead of the more
accurate "seven (7) sets of heirs."

The CA however, like the trial court, found that petitioner was not able to prove the
existence of the waiver or assignment of their shares by Candida and the heirs of
Conrado.

Issue

WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING

OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS SHIFTED TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AMELIA B. HEBRON AND THAT THE LATTER FAILED
TO SUBSTANTIATE HER CLAIM WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

HELD:

The petition has no merit. The petitioner has been able to prove the said fact is
undoubtedly a question of fact, not of law. It involves the weighing and calibration of
the evidence presented. In the absence of any of the exceptions that call for the Court to
do so, the Court will not disturb the factual findings of the RTC that were affirmed by
the CA in the present case.

Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its
conclusion that Victorina had no capacity to relinquish her children's shares in the
inherited properties was, nevertheless, correct.

A preponderance of evidence on the fact in issue of relinquishment of shares, then

Candida and the heirs of Conrado, as admitted heirs of Remigia and Januario, are
entitled to their shares in the two subject properties.

The passage of six years before the respondents asked for partition through the court is
not unreasonable. SC find respondents not guilty of laches.

SALVADOR V. REBELLION v.. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 175700. July
05, 2010.

FACTS:
When two policemen saw Salvador Rebellon and another person exchanging
something, the officers introduced themselves and when asked what he was holding,
petitioner handed three strips of aluminum foil. Upon search, the officers found a
sachet of shabu.

The RTC found him guilty of possession of illegal drugs which the CA affirmed.
Petitioner that the shabu found during search is inadmissible as the arrest was not
valid.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.

RULING:

The SC ruled in the affirmative. But the SC made it clear the even if the warrant was not
valid, it would still prevail because petitioner did not file a motion to quash regarding
this before entering his plea.

In answering the petitioner's issue, the Sc rules that the arrest was valid and it was an
arrest in flagrante delicto. After the suspicion of the officers was aroused, they
introduced themselves and from a distance of the officers saw a sachet with white
crystalline substance which they confiscated. Consequently, the results of the attendant
search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense
charged.

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 175730

Facts:

On July 23, 1987, the Republic (through PCGG) filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against
petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini), spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos (Marcos
spouses) and Rodolfo B. Jacob (Jacob). Summons for Disini was unserved on the ground
that petitioner did not live at the given address, which was No. 92 Kennedy St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The occupants of said address were the Roman
family. Republic exhausted all efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner Disini.
Failing to do so, the Republic resorted to service of summons by publication.

Issue:

Whether or not service of summons by publication acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner?

Ruling:

It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief, voluntary appearance or
submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection
regarding lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Jurisprudence holds that
an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant
files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the
case.
G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

Municipality of Tiwi vs Antonio Betito

Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:

On June 4, 1990, this court issued a decision finding National Power Corporation liable
for unpaid real estate taxes on its properties in Albay. This properties consisted
geothermal plants in Tiwi and in Daraga. Previously, these properties were sold in an
auction, of which the Province of Albay acquired ownership.

Later, NPC and Albay entered into a MOA where Albay agreed to settle its tax
liabilities and NPC will make an initial payment upon signing of the agreement, and the
rest will be paid in a monthly instalment.

Then on August 3, 1992, then mayor Corral of Tiwi requested Governor Salalima to
remit the rightful taxes shares of Tiwi. Salalima replied that the request cannot be
granted as the initial payment was only an earnest money and that the total amount to
be collected was still being validated.

RTC: The trial court held that petitioners’ answer to the complaint failed to tender an
issue, thus, partial judgment on the pleadings is proper. It noted that petitioners did
not specifically deny under oath the actionable documents in this case, particularly, the
Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92. Consequently, the genuineness
and due execution of these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to Section 8, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject
contract was deemed established.

CA: The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the genuineness and due
execution of the Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92 was impliedly
admitted by petitioners because of their failure to make a verified specific denial
thereof. Further, the answer filed by the petitioners admitted the material averments of
the complaint concerning Tiwi’s liability under the subject contract and its receipt from
the NPC of a total of P146,579,661.84 as realty taxes. Petitioners cannot claim that the
subject contract required ratification because this is not a requisite for the enforceability
of a contract against a local government unit under the express terms of the contract
and the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC). Also, petitioners are estopped
from questioning the enforceability of the contract after having collected and enjoyed
the benefits derived therefrom.

Issues:

(1) The amount of award of attorney’s fees to respondent is unreasonable,

unconscionable and without any proof of the extent, nature and “result of his legal
service” as required by the purported “contract of legal services” and pursuant to
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

(2) The application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment
is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case at bar.
(3) The purported “contract of legal services” exceeded the authority of the late Mayor
Corral and should have been ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to be
enforceable.

Held:

The petition is meritorious. Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to
the complaint tenders several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits
the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the
judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as
are admitted in the pleadings .

In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and
petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively,
with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence
for resolution. The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that
petitioners’ answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without
basis. For this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of
justice and in order to expedite the disposition of this case which was filed with the trial
court way back in 1999, we shall settle the issues that can be resolved based on the
pleadings and remand only those issues that require a trial on merits as hereunder
discussed.

The foregoing considerations cannot be brushed aside for it would be iniquitous for
Tiwi to compensate respondent for legal services which he did not render; or which has
no reasonable connection to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the subject realty taxes; or
whose weight or value has not been properly appraised in view of respondent’s
admission in his Complaint that the opinion issued by then Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel Antonio T. Carpio (in which respondent had no clear participation) was
instrumental to the recovery of the subject realty taxes.

SPS. FEDERICO VALENZUELA and LUZ BUENA-VALENZUELA v. SPS. JOSE MANO,

JR. and ROSANNA REYES-MANO

Facts

Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela (Andres) who was
the owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 938 square meters, more or less,
located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The property was declared in the name of Andres
under Declaration of Real Property No. 7187

Andres died on October 10, 1959, and the possession of said property was transferred to
Federico. On August 5, 1980, a document denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at
Pagpaparaya o Pagkakaloob was executed by the heirs of Andres who waived all their rights to
the property in favor of Federico.

On February 7, 1991, a Deed of Conditional Sale was executed between Feliciano Geronimo
(Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose Mano, Jr. (Jose), wherein the former agreed to sell to the
latter a 2,056-square meter parcel of land located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The
corresponding Deed of Sale was subsequently executed in March 1991.

On March 4, 1992,[10] Jose applied for a Free Patent and on April 10, 1992, Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-351[11] was issued in his name. This time, the property was indicated as
covering an area of 2,739 square meters.

Sometime in 1997, Federico declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 97-19005-
01105[12] the property covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 7187 in the name of Andres.

Subsequently, Jose sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-351 to Roberto S.
Balingcongan (Balingcongan). On January 8, 1998, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
112865[13] was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2,292 square meters. On the same
date, TCT No. T-112864[14] was also issued in the name of Jose covering 447 square meters.

Federico transferred his residence to Malabon and so he left the care of the property to his
nephew, Vicente Joson (Vicente). Sometime in 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct a
perimeter fence on his property but he was prevented by Jose, claiming that the 447 square
meters was his property as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864. On the other hand, Federico is
claiming it as part of the property he inherited from his father, Andres.

The petitioners lodged a Complaint for Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance, Damages
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The case was set for pre-trial conference[16] on March 27,
2000. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The trial court found that the preponderance of evidence showed that the disputed area of 447
square meters rightfully belongs to Federico. This was a part of Lot No. 1306 originally owned
and possessed by Andres as identified and described in the Declaration of Real Property No.
7187.

CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the complaint. According to the
CA, respondents satisfactorily proved their ownership over the disputed property. The Free
Patent No. 031418-92-463 and the TCT No. T-112864, as well as the tax declaration offered in
evidence by respondents are more convincing than the evidence presented by the
petitioners. Also, petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the fact of fraud
allegedly committed by Jose in obtaining title to the disputed property.

Issues

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it declared that petitioners were
unable to prove ownership of the disputed portion notwithstanding evidence
introduced and admitted.

HELD:
SC finds that there is preponderance of evidence that Federico is the owner of the disputed
property and Jose committed fraud in obtaining the title to the disputed property. Moreso,
Petitioners are entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.

Having ruled that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property then he
should be liable for both moral and exemplary damages. Likewise, since petitioners were
compelled to litigate to protect their rights and having proved that Jose acted in bad faith,
attorneys fees should likewise be awarded.

The instant petition for review on certiorari was granted. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83577 dated January 16, 2006 and its May 3, 2006 Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch
14 in Civil Case No. 1065-M-99 dated March 10, 2004 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY CORPORATION and LAMBERT LIM,

Petitioners, vs.HELEN BINAMIRA, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Factual Antecedents

On September 14, 1998, Helen received a letter from Lim terminating her employment
effective that same day. Lim cited business losses necessitating retrenchment as the
reason for the termination.

Helen thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners docketed as NLRC RAB-
VII CASE NO. 01-0003-99-B.6 In her Position Paper Helen alleged that she was
dismissed without cause and the benefit of due process. She claimed that she was a
mere casualty of the war of attrition between Lim and the Binamira family. Moreover,
she claimed that there was no proof that the company was suffering from business
losses.

In their Position Paper, petitioners asserted that they had no choice but to retrench
respondent due to economic reverses. The corporation suffered a marked decline in
profits as well as substantial and persistent increase in losses. In its Statement of Income
and Expenses, its gross income for 1998 dropped from ₱1million to ₱665,000.00.

On November 26, 1999, Labor Arbiter Geoffrey P. Villahermosa rendered a Decision9

which held that Helen was not illegally dismissed but was validly retrenched.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
observed that for retrenchment to be valid, a written notice shall be given to the
employee and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month
prior to the intended date thereof. Since none was given in this case, then the
retrenchment of Helen was not valid. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.13 On July 30, 2003, the NLRC set aside
its Decision dated September 27, 2002 and entered a new one, the Decision of November
[sic] 27, 2002 is hereby SET ASIDE and a New One Entered declaring as valid the
redundancy of the position of the complainant.

On petition for certiorari,16 the CA found that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
failed to consider substantial evidence showing that the exercise of management
prerogative, in this instance, was done in bad faith and in violation of the employee’s
right to due process. The CA ruled that there was no redundancy because the position
of vault custodian is a requisite, necessary and desirable position in the pawnshop
business. There was likewise no retrenchment because none of the conditions for
retrenchment is present in this case.

I.

Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy of

certiorari, the findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
dismissal of respondent was with valid and legal basis.

II.

Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy of

certiorari, the unanimous findings of fact of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
the dismissal of respondent was not attended by bad faith or fraud.

III.

Whether the CA erred in reversing, through the extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari, the
findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based merely on the
allegations and evidences made and submitted by the former counsel, adviser and
business partner of petitioners.19

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

The CA correctly reviewed the factual findings of the labor tribunals.

SC find that the CA rightfully reviewed the correctness of the labor tribunals’ factual
findings not only because of the foregoing inadequacies, but also because the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings. Considering the diverse
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, it behooved upon the CA in the exercise of
its certiorari jurisdiction to determine which findings are more in conformity with the
evidentiary facts.

There was no valid dismissal based on retrenchment.

No written notices were served on the employee and the DOLE prior to the
implementation of the retrenchment. Helen received her notice only on September 14,
1998, the day when her termination would supposedly take effect. This is in clear
violation of the Labor Code provision which requires notice at least one month prior to
the intended date of termination.

There was no valid dismissal based on redundancy.

In this case, there is no proof that the essential requisites for a valid redundancy
program as a ground for the termination of the employment of respondent are present.
There was no showing that the function of respondent is superfluous or that the
business was suffering from a serious downturn that would warrant redundancy
considering that such serious business downturn was the ground cited by petitioners in
the termination letter sent to respondent.26

In fine, Helen’s dismissal is illegal for lack of just or authorized cause and failure to
observe due process of law.

Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation is solely liable for the illegal dismissal
of respondent.

In the present case, malice or bad faith on the part of Lim as a corporate officer was not
sufficiently proven to justify a ruling holding him solidarily liable with the corporation.
The lack of authorized or just cause to terminate one’s employment and the failure to
observe due process do not ipso facto mean that the corporate officer acted with malice
or bad faith. There must be independent proof of malice or bad faith which is lacking in
the present case.

There is no violation of attorney-client relationship.

This issue was never raised before the labor tribunals and was raised for the first time
only on appeal. Moreover, records show that although petitioners previously employed
Atty. Binamira to manage several businesses, there is no showing that they likewise
engaged his professional services as a lawyer. Likewise, at the time the instant
complaint was filed, Atty. Binamira was no longer under the employ of petitioners.

Respondent is entitled to the following relief under the law.

In this case, Helen is entitled to her full backwages from the time she was illegally
dismissed on September 14, 1998. Considering the strained relations between the
parties, reinstatement is no longer feasible. Consequently, Helen is also entitled to
receive separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service.

A dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to
entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary
damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his
employee without authorized cause and due process.

VIRGINIA D. BAUTISTA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DBP

Facts

Proceedings before the Development Bank of the Philippines

In a letter[9] dated March 23, 1993, petitioner protested her appointment as BEO II
before the Head of the Personnel Administration Department of the DBP because it
allegedly amounted to a demotion.

Proceedings before the Department of Budget and Management

Petitioners complaint was referred to the DBM, which found the same to be lacking in
merit.

Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

On April 16, 2007, the CSC rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint for
lack of merit. The CSC ruled that the appointment of petitioner to the position of BEO II
was done pursuant to a valid reorganization. Moreover, petitioner only raised her claim
to the contested position on September 26, 1996 or more than seven years from the time
of her appointment. She is, thus, deemed to have slept on her rights under the equitable
doctrine of laches.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On the issue of demotion, the CA upheld the findings of the CSC that the appointment
of petitioner to BEO II did not constitute a demotion because this was done in good
faith and pursuant to a valid reorganization. It ruled that the DBP undertook the
matching of positions in order to conform to the GFIs Index of Occupational Services
based on the employees nature of function, hierarchy of jobs, and existing salary range.
Petitioners duties and responsibilities as Account Officer with SG-20 and as BEO II with
SG-24 are practically the same as shown by her BC-CSC Form 1 (Position Description
Form). Rather than lowering her rank and salary, petitioners appointment as BEO II
had, in fact, resulted to an increase thereof from SG-20 to SG-24, thus, negating
petitioners claim of demotion.

Issues

1. The CA erred in holding that petitioners appointment from Account Officer to BEO
II did not result in a demotion in rank and salary, and

2. The CA erred in holding that DBPs reorganization was valid and done in good
faith.[17]

HELD:

SC affirmed the findings of the CA and DENY the petition. There was no demotion
when petitioner was appointed as BEO II.

There was no demotion because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to

the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase in her rank and salary.

Petitioners contention is untenable and misleading. The records show that prior to her
appointment as BEO II, petitioner occupied the position of Account Officer with SG-20
and not Account Officer with SG-25.

As correctly found by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that the position of Account
Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP prior to its reorganization and the position of
Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services are the
same.

Petitioner did not assail the alleged reduction in the scope of her duties and
responsibilities.
The reorganization of the DBP was made in good faith. There is, thus, no evidence to
suggest that DBP acted in bad faith. Given that these findings are supported by
substantial evidence, SC adhere to the settled principle that the findings of an
administrative body, when supported by substantial evidence, are accorded not only
respect but also finality by this Court.

G.R. No. 165554 : July 26, 2010LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO,Petitioner ,vs.
HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-
PRINCIPE,Respondents.

FACTS:

The present petition began with a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages filed
onDecember 13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman, represented by
Cresencia deGuzman-Principe, against petitioners Lauro Pasco and Lazaro Pasco. The
case was filed before theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, and docketed
as Civil Case No. MM-3191.In their Complaint, herein respondents alleged that on
February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan inthe amount of ₱140,000.00 from
Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners’ loan, Lauro executed a chattel
mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death, her heirs sought
tocollect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands, petitioners
refused to either paythe balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the
respondents. Thus, respondents wereconstrained to file the collection case to compel the
petitioners to pay the principal amount of ₱140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of
5% monthly interest from February 7, 1995, 25% attorney’sfees, exemplary damages and
expenses of litigation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case at hand.

(2)WON petitioners correctly resorted to the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

(3) WON the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing their Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition when the matter under consideration was merely the propriety of the grant
of the preliminary injunction.

(4) WON the Special Power of Attorney did not validly authorize Cresencia to enter
into theCompromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs.

RULING:

(1)Yes. It is beyond dispute that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas
Pambansa(BP)Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, fixes the MTC’s
jurisdiction over caseswhere “the demand does not exceed two hundred thousand
pesos ₱200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs. Thus, respondents’initiatory complaint, covering the
principal amount of ₱140,000.00 , falls squarely within the MTC’s jurisdiction.
(2)Yes. The Court of Appeals held that the proper remedy from the MTC’s Order
approving the Compromise Agreement was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under
Rule 38 and not aPetition for Certiorari under Rule 65. We recall that petitioners filed a
verified Motion to SetAside Decision on May 2,2002 which was denied by the MTC on
June 28, 2002. This Order of denial was properly the subject of a petition for certiorari,
pursuant to Rule 411, Section 1 of theRules of Court.

(3) No. since the RTC found at the preliminary injunction phase that petitioners were
not entitled to an injunction, that petitioners’ arguments were insufficient to support the
relief sought, and that the MTC’s approval of the Compromise Agreement was not
done in a capricous, whimsical,or arbitrary manner, the RTC was not required to
engage in unnecessary duplication of proceedings. As such, it rightly dismissed the
petition. Indeed, Rule 65, Section 8 is explicit inthat the court “may dismiss the petition
if it finds the same to be patently without merit,prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that
the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial torequire consideration.

(4)No. it is undisputed that Cresencia’s co -heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney,

dated April6, 1999, designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her
to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate.
Consequently, Cresencia enteredinto the subject Compromise Agreement in order to
collect the overdue loan obtained by Pascofrom Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was
merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of herco-heirs pursuant to the Special
Power of Attorney given to her.

New Puerto Commercial and Richard Lim v. Rodel Lopez and Felix Gavan

Facts

On November 3, 2000, respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of monetary benefits against petitioners with the Regional Office of the Department
of Labor and Employment in Puerto Princesa City.

On November 20, 2000, a conciliation conference was held but the parties failed to reach
an amicable settlement. As a result, the complaint was endorsed for compulsory arbitration at
the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on February 13, 2001.

On November 28, 2000, petitioners sent respondents notices to explain why they should
not be dismissed for gross misconduct based on (1) the alleged misappropriation of their sales
collections, and (2) their absence without leave for more than a month. The notice also required
respondents to appear before petitioners lawyer on December 2, 2000 to give their side with
regard to the foregoing charges. Respondents refused to attend said hearing.

On December 6, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for three counts of estafa before the
prosecutors office against respondents in connection with the alleged misappropriation of sales
collections.
 On August 29, 2002, Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr. rendered a
Decision[5] dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal but ordering petitioners to pay
respondents proportionate 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there is substantial
evidence tending to establish that respondents committed the misappropriation of their sales
collections from the rolling store business.

The NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that respondents act of misappropriating
company funds constitutes gross misconduct resulting in loss of confidence. It noted that
respondents never denied that (1) they failed to surrender their collections to petitioners, and
(2) they stopped reporting for work during the last week of October 2000.

The appellate court held that it was bound by the factual findings of the NLRC because a
petition for certiorari is limited to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, the failure of respondents to report for work and their misappropriation of
company funds have become settled. These acts constitute grave misconduct which is a valid
cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

Issues
Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in construing that the investigation held by
petitioners is an afterthought; and

Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the sum of P30,000.00 each to the
respondents as nominal damages.[12]

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. When the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied, the
award of nominal damages is improper.

Indeed, appellate courts accord the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence. [18]The Court does
not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of
evidence lies or what evidence is credible. It is not for the Court to re-examine conflicting
evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field.[19]

SC find that the appellate court misapprehended the import of these factual
findings. For if it was duly established, as affirmed by the appellate court itself, that
respondents failed to report for work starting from October 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and
October 28, 2000 for respondent Gavan,[20] then at the time of the filing of the complaint with
the labor office on November 3, 2000, respondents were not yet dismissed from
employment. Prior to this point in time, there was, thus, no necessity to comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing.

The mere fact that the notices were sent to respondents after the filing of the labor
complaint does not, by itself, establish that the same was a mere afterthought.
 As can be seen, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded
that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because
petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted the
results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint. For this reason, there
was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing even if the notices
were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus, the award of
nominal damages by the appellate court is improper.

LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts

On June 6, 1982, an Information 4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion.

The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for
direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private
individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter,
she engaged in a fight with Lydia. 8 Likewise, Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the
authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son. The
appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion
since there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of
the incident.10 However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical
injuries, thus:

Issues

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight
Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted
of Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.12

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for
appellate review.

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public
order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. 14

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional
duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).

UST, et. al vs. Danes B. Sanchez G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010

A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against

the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the
Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their
alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR).

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with
a Bachelors Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for
graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. Respondent sought to secure a copy of
his ToR with the UST Registrars Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a
Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the respondent
to secure a copy of his ToR, and submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment,
UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the nursing
board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The
respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release
respondents ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been
enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. They claimed that the
respondents graduation, attendance in classes, and taking/passing of examinations
were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the
second semester of school year 2000-2001.

Petitioners then filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent
sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
through a letter-complaint. Petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction
to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies.

Issues:

1) The CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school

matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondents demand for the release of his
ToR. Thus, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
 2) Since respondent sought recourse with both the CHED and the RTC,
respondent violated the rule against forum-shopping; and

3) The Complaint failed to state a cause of action, since respondent admitted that
he was not enrolled in UST in the last three semesters prior to graduation.

Held:

1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy

before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must
be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is
brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for
dismissal of the action.

In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that
recourse to the CHED is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought
by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which
is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as
in the present case. Petitioners liability if any for damages will have to be decided by
the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation
of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed
with. The Supreme Court held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology

x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on

the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of
.Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x neither [are they] part of the judicial
system, [or] deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power
to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.

In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for
this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However,
petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher
Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of
judicial or quasi-judicial power.

2. Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a

party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when
he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the
gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Here, there can
be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial power, and
cannot make any disposition of the case whether favorable or otherwise.

3. Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made
on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. To clarify
the essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained that
the test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action,
is whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Stated otherwise, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to
be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that petitioners unjustifiably
refused to release respondents ToR despite his having obtained a degree from UST; that
petitioners claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue; that as a result of
petitioners unlawful actions, respondent has not been able to take the nursing board
exams since 2002; that petitioners actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and
that petitioners should be ordered to release respondents ToR and held liable for
P400,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees and costs of suit, and P15,000.00 as actual damages. Clearly, assuming
that the facts alleged in the Complaint are true, the RTC would be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint.

METROPOLITAN BANK v. ROGELIO REYNADO

Facts

On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with

Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and
increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.

On February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement[7] whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the
total amount of P50,990,976.27[8] as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same
in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997,
covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance
and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001." [9]

Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution [10] dated
July 10, 1997 found petitioner's evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for
estafa.

On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that: there is no estafa in
the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the
P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited with
Metrobank were dishonored.

On October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Citing jurisprudence[19] wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the
filing of the criminal information in court.

Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment [23] of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) where the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public
respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing the complaint.
It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa neither
does restitution negate the offense already committed. [24]
Issues
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish
criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear
criminally liable for the offense charged.

HELD:

SC find the petition highly meritorious.

Novation not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for
estafa not affected by compromise or novation of contract.

Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.

Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement

entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes
merely the civil aspect of the latter's liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal
liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner
Metrobank. x x x[40]

Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal
liability.

In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement.
The intention of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous
or in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either
of the parties.

Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor;

judicial review allowed where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion.

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. [42]
The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor.

The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite
the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the
investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter's finding and proceeded with
the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of
the concept of probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with
grave abuse.[55] The present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the
facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

G.R. No. 171115/ August 9, 2010

NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN (NLMK-OLALIA-
KMU) and HELEN VALENZUELA v. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION,
Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Helen Valenzuela was a production associate in respondent Keihin

Philippines Corporation.It is a standard operating procedure of Keihin to subject all its
employees to reasonable search before they leave the company premises.

On September 5, 2003, while Helen was about to leave the company premises, she saw a
packing tape near her work area and placed it inside her bag because it would be useful
in her transfer of residence. When the lady guard on duty inspected Helen’s bag, she
found the packing tape inside her bag. The guard confiscated it and submitted an
incident report dated September 5, 2003 to the Guard-in-Charge, who, in turn,
submitted a memorandum6 regarding the incident to the Human Resources and
Administration Department on the same date.

On September 6, 2003, respondent company issued a show cause notice to Helen

accusing her of violating F.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct, which says, “Any act
constituting theft or robbery, or any attempt to commit theft or robbery, of any
company property or other associate’s property. Penalty: D (dismissal).”

Helen, in her explanation, admitted the offense and even manifested that she would
accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. She, however, did not reckon
that respondent company would terminate her services for her admitted offense.

On September 26, 2003, Helen received a notice of disciplinary action informing her that
Keihin has decided to terminate her services.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in taking the packing tape for her own personal use, Helen
committed serious misconduct, which is a just cause for her dismissal from service.

RULING:

SC held that Helen is guilty of serious misconduct in her act of taking the packing tape.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination.

In the case at bar, Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she could use it for
her own personal purposes. When Helen was asked to explain in writing why she took
the tape, she stated, “Kumuha po ako ng isang packing tape na gagamitin ko sa
paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong lilipatang bahay.” In other words, by her own
admission, there was intent on her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring
home the packing tape in question.

Helen was not even on her second year of service with Keihin when the incident of theft
occurred. And further, respondent company was dealing with several cases of theft,
vandalism, and loss of company and employees’ property when the incident involving
Helen transpired, which could not hold the punishment too harsh for the committed
misconduct.

Heirs of Medrano vs. de Vera

Facts: This case concerns a 463-square meter parcel of land in the name of Flaviana De Gracia
(Flaviana). In 1980, Flaviana died intestate, leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo
(Hilaria) and Elena Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as her compulsory heirs. Hilaria and Elena, by
virtue of a private document waived all their hereditary rights to Flavianas land in favor of
Francisca Medrano (Medrano). It stated that the waiver was done in favor of Medrano in
consideration of the expenses that she incurred for Flavianas medication, hospitalization, wake
and burial. some of their children affirmed the contents of the private document executed by
their deceased mothers. To that end, they executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private
Document and Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano. Due to the refusal of the other
children to sign a similar renunciation, Medrano filed a Complaint in 2001 for quieting of title,
reconveyance, reformation of instrument, and/or partition with damages against Pelagia,
Faustina, Jesus, Veneranda Paguyo-Abrenica, Emilio a.k.a. Antonio Alvarado, Francisca and
Estrellita before RTC Pangasinan. Summons upon the original complaint was duly served
upon Pelagia and Estrellita. Medrano filed an Amended Complaint impleading the widow
and children of Antonio Alvarado, in view of his death but summons upon the amended
complaint was served upon the other defendants but no longer served upon Pelagia and
Estrellita. Respondent Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer with Counterclaim and
presented himself as the real party-in-interest and maintained that the private documents was
executed by the defendants predecessors in favor of Medrano was null and void for want of
consideration. Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D.
De Vera and to Declare Defendants in Default.

She argued that respondent De Vera had no personality to answer the complaint since he was
not authorized by the named defendants to answer in their behalf.

RTC – the admission of De Veras Answer with Counterclaim is proper. In the same Order, the
court declared the named defendants in default for not answering the complaint despite valid
service of summons.

RTC - It ruled that ownership over the titled property has vested in petitioners by virtue of
good faith possession for more than 10 years;

CA – ruled in favor of de Vera. It that the trial court should have exercised its authority to
order the substitution of the original defendants instead of requiring De Vera to file a pleading-
in-intervention. De Veras failure to file the necessary pleading-in-intervention was a technical
defect that could have been easily cured. This is allowed under Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules
of Court. Since a

ISSUES:

Whether De Vera could participate in Civil Case No. U-7316without filing a motion to
intervene

Whether De Vera is bound by the judgment against his transferors

HELD:

SC sustain the CAs ruling that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow
De Vera to participate in the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.

The trial courts approach is seriously flawed because De Veras interest is not independent of or
severable from the interest of the named defendants.

We note that under Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is upon
motion, and De Vera did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. However, this
technical flaw may be disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already admitted his
answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte presentation of evidence was
allowed by the court. Because De Veras answer had already been admitted, the court should
not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence.

SC are not persuaded by petitioners insistence that De Vera could not have participated in the
case because he did not file a motion to intervene. The purpose of intervention is to enable a
stranger to an action to become a party in order for him to protect his interest and for the court
to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than
on due process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate in the case and he
will not be bound by the judgment.

In this case, De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente lite. As mentioned,
a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment when the
transfer of interest is perfected.[49] His participation in the case should have been allowed by
due process considerations.[50]

SC adopt with approval the appellate courts observation that De Veras failure to file a
pleading-in-intervention will not change the long foregone violation of his right to due
process. The ex parte presentation of evidence had already been terminated when the trial
court required De Vera to file his pleading-in-intervention. Even if he complied with the order
to file a pleading-in-intervention, the damage had already been done. The precipitate course of
action taken by the trial court rendered compliance with its order moot.
Given the Courts finding that the ex parte presentation of evidence constituted a violation of
due process rights, the trial courts judgment by default cannot bind De Vera. A void judgment
cannot attain finality and its execution has no basis in law. The case should be remanded to the
trial court for trial based on De Veras answer and with his participation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EFREN ALFONSO,

FACTS:
Appelant Efren Alfonso was charged of two counts of rape for allegedly sexually
molesting his two daughters AAA and BBB, 3 years old and 5 years old respectively. On
the night of April 7, 2002, while CCC, the mother of the victims, was away with two of
her sons to have one of them treated by a quack doctor in nearby municipality. Efren
molested AAA by inserting his forefinger in her vagina and thereafter sexually
assaulted BBB by having carnal knowledge with her. CCC came home the next day with
her daughters crying and in a state of shock. She brought them to the hospital for a
medical examination and upon being asked what happened, they told her that their
father had sexually molested them while she was away. Days later, she filed a rape case
before the regional trial court against her husband. During trial, the two minor victims
testified and positively identified their father as the perpetrator and corroborated
each other’s statement against their father.

The results of the medical examination and the statement of the examining physician
was also presented as evidence in court. Appellant avers that it was his step-son who
raped the victims and not him. Moreover, he alleges that his wife was only coaching her
daughters to testify against him so that his step-son will evade the case. The RTC did
not find credence on the testimony of Efren and placed more weight on the testimonies
of the minor victims as supported by the results of the medical examination conducted
by the physician witness following the date of the discovery of the crime. The RTC
found Efren guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape by Sexual Assault
and Statutory Rape, both with the qualifying circumstances under number 1 of Article
266-B of Republic Act 8353 that the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent and under number 5 thereof that the victim is a child below seven years old as
charged in the Information; and to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years,4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and the penalty of death, respectively. The Court of Appeals dismissed their
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications as to the amount of
indemnity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts erred in giving full credence to the statements of the
two minor victims and for disregarding his defense that the allegations were fabricated
by his wife.

RULING:

The court held that it is highly improbable that the allegations were fabricated by his
wife. It would be unlikely for a mother to coach her daughters to testify falsely against
their father and allow them to go through the rigors of a public trial just to have her
husband convicted for a crime he did not commit. Moreover, despite their young age,
the court finds the minor victims competent witnesses considering the manner they
testify, and the way they perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, and appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court. The victims both testified in
a straightforward and credible manner despite the rigid cross- examination by the
appellant’scounsel they remained steadfast throughout her narration and positively
identified their father as the perpetrator of the crime. The court found it unusual that
the appellant did nothing at all upon learning of the sexual molestations suffered by his
daughters which were allegedly committed by his step-son hence the court disregards
the insinuation by the appellant that it was his step-son who did the crime.

G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.

ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO,

OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO
and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

Facts:

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural lands
of Lantap Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and the
Murong Property located at Brgy. Murong of the same town which were subsequently
foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) due to their failure to pay
the loans in the said bank. But a Deed of Sale was made on Feb. 26, 1985covering "TCT
No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property) without description as to the location
of the subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or Brgy.Lantap.
TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property and TCT
No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap Property in favor of RBBI.
However, both TCTsdid not specifically state its location whether it is in Barangay
Lantap or Barangay Murong.

RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez
and DelaCruz covered by TCT No. T-62836 (corresponds to Lantap Property) but
described being located in Brgy. Murong.DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the purchase price to
RBBI.

Nemi Fernandez, husband of ElenitaEspejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property while
Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz were the tenants of the Murong Property. No
evidence that Espejos took possession of Murong Property nor demanded lease rentals
from petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale
indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong Property) was the subject of
theirbuy-back transaction.RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on
the Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARAB’s decision because in using the Best
Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as
to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale.
Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096
– the Murong property – then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay
Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error.

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 163320 with the Supreme Court but was denied. CA’s decision becomes final
and executory. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed in the SC by Marquez and
Dela Cruz.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the said petition is proper when it raises factual issues.

2. Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject of the contracts.

3. Whether or not Parol Evidence Rule can be applied in this case.

Ruling:

1. The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the CA’s
rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best
Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question
that is within the Court’s authority to review.Besides, even if it were a factual
question,we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the
appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of
the Best Evidence Rule.

2. The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original
is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this case because there
is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents for it is admitted by the parties
that the Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’
VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject.The real issue is whether the admitted
contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the
parties.

There’s an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the
instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the
ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.

3. The CA refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected
any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting
partiesin which itwould appear that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence
Rule instead, which provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.It excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by
which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid
agreement or instrument.

But even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at
bar.First,respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and
petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically
provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their
successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in
question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in
the instrument.

Second, the instant casefalls under theexceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule because
there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; and the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9.

It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent
of the parties which necessitates an examination of the parties’ respective parol
evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties.
It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the
respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the
petitioners.

Although the CA’s decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI
with the dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of
petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision
against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and declared thatthe Deed of Sale
between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836,
while the VLTs and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong property under TCT
No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this decision.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SMART COMMUNICATION,

INC.- Tax Refund

FACTS:

Smart entered into an Agreement with Prism, a nonresident foreign corporation

domiciled in Malaysia, whereby Prism will provide programming and consultancy
services to Smart. Thinking that the payments to Prism were royalties, Smart withheld
25% under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty. Smart then filed a refund with the BIR alleging
that the payments were not subject to Philippine withholding taxes given that they
constituted business profits paid to an entity without a permanent establishment in the
Philippines.

ISSUE:

Does Smart have the right to file the claim for refund?

HELD:

YES. The Court reiterated the ruling in Procter & Gamble stating that a person “liable
for tax” has sufficient legal interest to bring a suit for refund of taxes he believes were
illegally collected from him. Since the withholding agent is an agent of the beneficial
owner of the payments (i.e., nonresident), the authority as agent is held to include the
filing of a claim for refund. The Silkair case was held inapplicable as it involved excise
taxes and not withholding taxes.

Smart was granted a refund given that only a portion of its payments represented
royalties since it is only that portion over which Prism maintained intellectual property
rights and the rest involved full transfer of proprietary rights to Smart and were thus
treated as business profits of Prism.

People of the Philippines, Appellee vs. Saturnino Villanueva

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted with 3 counts of qualified rape both in the trial court and the
Court of Appeals and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay
damages worth P 75,000.00as civil indemnity, P 75,000.00 as moral damages and P
25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count. The victim, AAA is appellant’s
daughter and is allegedly is a minor. The crime was committed in three separate
occasions. During the trial, the prosecution presented their witness who identified the
appellant as her rapist.AAA’s birth certificate proving she was under the age of 12 years
old and the medical certificate were marked as Exhibit during the pre-trial but was not
formally offer as evidence. The appellant contested that the documentary evidence used
to convict him should not be subjected for the appreciation of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s contention that the documentary evidence should not be
admitted in court for the failure to formally offer it in court

RULING:
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court agree with the appellant that both
the medical certificate and birth certificate of AAA though marked as exhibits during
the pre-trial should not have been considered by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals because they are not formally offered in evidence. Rule 132 Section 34 of the

Rules of Court explicitly provide that: “The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.”

The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that it has already been offered as part of evidence. It must be emphasized
that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. However
it must also be considered that appellant can still be convicted without a medical
certificate. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim provided that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. The trial court is bound to consider only
the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered.

The court find appellant GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and accordingly
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim the
amountd of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as
exemplary damages to each count

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913, 08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla,
Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as
guidance counselor. In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to
RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for
the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for
Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.
They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and
premature. They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set
by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required
under the law. In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the
Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate
them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher
who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed
evident bad faith.

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. Thus, petitioner was ordered
to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage
for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the
petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor
Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without
just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC. It further held that the
Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have
not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.
The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have
been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents. However,
as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be
merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was

effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.

2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September

2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the
CA. It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has
provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply,
petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law. In
so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned,
being dismissed on March 2000 was premature. However, Saile is not qualified
to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end. Petitioner’s
intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in
jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to
 the deadline set by law. The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause
to the school’d operation is only trivial.

2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March
2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and
Montederamos. The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could
not timely comply with the requirements set by law.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. BARTOLOME PUZON,

JR.,RESPONDENT.DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Factual Antecedents:

Respondent Bartolome V. Puzon, Jr., (Puzon) owner of Bartenmyk Enterprises, was

adealer of beer products of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for Parañaque
City. Puzonpurchased SMC products on credit. SMC required him to issue postdated
checks equivalent tothe value of the products purchased on credit as a security and said
checks are to be returned toPuzon when the transactions covered by these checks were
paid or settled in full.Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check Nos. 27904 (for
P309,500.00) and 27903 (forP11,510,827.00) to cover the said transaction of Puzon to
SMC was issued. BPI Check No.27903 was allegedly stolen by Puzon when he together
with his accountant visited SMC officefor reconciliation of their accounts.SMC sent a
letter to Puzon on March 6, 2001 demanding the return of the said checks.
Puzonignored the demand hence SMC filed a complaint against him for theft with the
City Prosecutor'sOffice of Parañaque City. The prosecutor found lack of evidence for
the commission of the crime which wasaffirmed by the RTC. Petition for certiorari with
the CA was also denied which states thatthepostdated checks were issued by Puzon
merely as a security for the payment of his purchases andthat these were not intended
to be encashed. It thus concluded that SMC did not acquireownership of the checks as it
was duty bound to return the same checks to Puzon after thetransactions covering them
were settled. The CA agreed with the prosecutor that there was notheft, considering
that a person cannot be charged with theft for taking personal property thatbelongs to
him.

Issues:

WHETHER or not the postdated checks issued by Puzon transferred ownership

topetitioner making him liable for theft?

RULING:

No, the check still belongs to Puzon, hence not liable of theft. Negotiable Instruments
Law provides: Sec. 12. Antedated and post dated- The instrument is not invalid for the
reason only that it is antedated or postdated, provided this is not done for an illegal or
fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires
the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (Underscoring supplied.)Note however that
delivery as the term is used in the aforementioned provision means that the party
delivering did so for the purpose of giving effect thereto. Otherwise, it cannot be said
that there has been delivery of the negotiable instrument. Once there is delivery, the
person to whom the instrument is delivered gets the title to the instrument completely
and irrevocably. If the subject check was given by Puzon to SMC in payment of the
obligation, the purpose of giving effect to the instrument is evident thus title to or
ownership of the check was transferred upon delivery.

LBP vs Enrique Livioco

GR No 170685, September 22, 2010

Facts:

Livioco was the owner of a 30.6329 hectares sugarland. Sometime in 1987 to 1988 he
offered his sugarland to the DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P 30.00 per square
meter, for a total of P 9,189,870.00. The voluntary offer-to-sell form he submitted to the
DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivision and to an
international paper mill.

LBP valuated the 26 hectares of such land for P 827,943.48 at P 3.21 per square meter.
Livioco was promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim
proceeds have been kept in trust pending his submission of the requirements. LBP did
not act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies. Thereafter the LBP
issued a certification to the ROD that it has earmarked the just compensation for
Livioco's 26 hectares.

After 2 years, Livioco then requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the
ground that its value had already increased from the time it was first offered for sale.
The DAR denied the request for the sale was already perfected. DAR proceeded to take
possession of the property and awarded CLOA's to 26 qualified beneficiaries. Livioco
then filed a complaint to cancel the CLOA's and to recover his property and a petition
for reconveyance which all led to futility.

Finally, Livioco filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation

contending that between 1900 and 2000, his property has become predominantly
residential, hence he should be paid his property's value as such. LBP in its answer
averred that they are justified in the P 3.21 per square meter valuation of the property
on the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA 6657 and DAR AO 3,
LBP objected that his property should be valued as a residential land for the same was
acquired for agricultural purposes, and not for its potential conversion to other use.

In the RTC, the decision rendered was that Livioco was able to prove the higher
valuation of his property, hence, the valuation should be P 700.00 per square meter for
the 24.2088 hectares of land and LBP cannot substantiate support its P 3.21 valuation by
documentary evidences. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

What is the just compensation of Livioco's property?

Ruling:
The court ruled that, for purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.
As to the character of the property it refers to its actual use at the time of the taking and
not its potential uses. Therefore the property's character is agricultural; As to the price
of the land Sec. 17 of RA 6657 should be considered. The evidence presented by Livioco
was irrelevent to the factors under Sec. 17 of Ra 6657.

Hence, both parties failed to adduce evidence of the property's value and an
agricultural land at the time of the taking and is remanded to RTC for determination of
just compensation.

G.R. No. 184823

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, vs. Aichi Forging Company Of Asia, Inc.

Facts

Respondent Aichi filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002, with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center. On even date, respondent filed a Petition for
Review with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The CTA partially
granted the petition. In a Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued that the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections
112 and 229 of the NIRC and a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition
precedent” before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA En Banc affirmed the division
ruling.

Issue

Whether the respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were
filed within the two-year prescriptive period as provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC

Held

NO. The two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s
administrative claim was timely filed. The filing of the judicial claim was premature.
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, [the Supreme
Court is] constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been
filed in violation of Section 112(D). Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the
CIR has “120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in
support of the application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny the
claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an
appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However,
if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit,
the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on
September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or
the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim
with the CTA premature. The premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit
of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was
acquired by the CTA.

G.R. No. 177127. October 11, 2010

JRA Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Doctrine:
– The absence of the word “zero rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT.

– Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case
has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the
same issue in the same manner.

Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized
input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for
credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was
constrained to file a petition before the CTA.

The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word “zero-rated” on the
invoices/receipts.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the invoices/receipts is
fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales

Held:
Yes. The absence of the word “zero rated” on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic
Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business
Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No.
178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the claim for tax credit/refund was
denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which
requires the word “zero rated” to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-
rated sales.

From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the word
“zero-rated” on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from
falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If,
absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be
refunding money it did not collect.
G.R. No. 184952. October 11, 2010

People of the Philippines vs. Marianito Gonzaga y Jomaya

Facts:

Appellant Marianito Gonzaga y Jomaya was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972," before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The
accused allegedly sell, deliver and distribute two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu) to a Police
Poseur-Buyer in exchange for P170, 000.00.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) finds that the prosecution duly established the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

Issue:

The Regional Trial Court as well as the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in convicting
the accused

Held:

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and, (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. In the
case at bench, the prosecution was able to prove all the essential elements of illegal sale
of shabu. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the person
who sold the shabu presented in court. SPO2 Male, the poseur-buyer, testified that he
bought the shabu from appellant during a legitimate buy-bust operation.

While it appears that the buy-bust team failed to comply strictly with the procedure
outlined above, the same does not overturn the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty. A violation of the regulation is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the
prosecution of the criminal case since the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a
prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established
and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the arresting officers inability to
conform to the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in all respects the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 161431. October 13, 2010

Calibre Traders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer
Philippines, Inc.

Facts:

Calibre was one of Bayer’s distributors/dealers in Pangasinan and Tarlac. The

distributorship agreement was supposed to be effective from June 1989 to June 1991.
However, Bayer stopped delivering stocks to Calibre on July 1989 after the latter failed
to settle its unpaid accounts.

Bayer and Calibre tried to reach a settlement agreement but Mario Sebastian expressed
discontent in Bayer’s refusal to credit his claims in full and underscored the alleged
inaction of Bayer in reconciling Calibre's accounts. Calibre filed a suit for damages
before the Pasig RTC.

Bayer filed an answer with Counterclaim, denying its alleged wanton appointment of
other distributors and that Calibre filed the damage suit to avoid paying its overdue
accounts. Bayer also moved that the Sebastians be impleaded as co-defendants,
considering that they bound themselves as solidary debtors under the
distributorship/dealership agreement.

The trial court rendered judgment favoring Calibre. The CA reversed the trial courts
factual findings

Issue:

Whether or not Calibres is entitled to an award of damages and the propriety of

granting relief to Bayerphils counterclaim

Held:

No form of damages can be awarded to Calibre for it miserably failed to prove its right
to the reliefs it sought. This Court agrees with the CAs conclusion that there is no
adequate proof that Bayerphil was guilty of abusing its rights. Good faith is presumed
and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same. In civil
cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. This is where Calibre failed.

The trial court was incorrect in dismissing Bayerphils counterclaim for non-payment of
docket fees. It is a settled doctrine that although the payment of the prescribed docket
fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment should not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive period. The trial court should have instead directed Bayerphil to pay the
required docket fees within a reasonable time.

Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and respondent Bayer
Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay the prescribed docket fees with
the Regional Trial Court.

G.R. No. 164757. October 18, 2010

Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc.

Facts:

Respondent Euro-Med Laboratories Philippines, Inc. (Euro-Med) filed a Complaint for

Sum of Money to recover from petitioner Cebu Metro the amount of P120,219.88 with
interest as payment for the various intravenous fluids products which the latter
purchased from the former on several occasions, as well as liquidated damages and
attorney’s fees.

The RTC ruled in favor of Euro-Med. Cebu Metro filed petition before the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping attached thereto was signed by one Carmel T. Albao (Albao), Manager of
Cebu Metro, without any accompanying Secretary’s Certificate/Board Resolution
authorizing her to execute said verification and certification and to represent Cebu
Metro in the petition, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether the resolution of the board of directors of Petitioner Corporation authorizing

Carmel T. Albao to represent the former in the court hearings also includes the
authority to verify and to issue a certificate of non-forum shopping until the case is
finally terminated

Held:

The petition is GRANTED. Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the
authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping even without
the submission of a written authority from the board. As the corporations President and
Manager, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations
in the petition. In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of the corporations business
and her usual duties in the absence of any contrary provision in the corporations
charter or by-laws.

It is worthy to emphasize that the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is

frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather they must ensure that all litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free
from the constraint of technicalities.
G.R. No. 170073. October 18, 2010

Spouses Ramy and Zenaida Pudadera vs. Ireneo Magallanes and the late Daisy
Teresa cortel Magallanes, substituted by her children, Nelly M. Marquez, et al.

Facts:

Belen Consing Lazaro (Lazaro), the absolute owner of a parcel of land Lot 11-E, sold a
400 sq. m. portion of Lot 11-E to Daisy Teresa Cortel Magallanes (Magallanes) under a
Contract To Sale payable in two years. Upon full payment of the monthly installments,
Lazaro executed a Deed of Definite Sale in favor of Magallanes. The other portions of
Lot 11-E were, likewise, sold by Lazaro to several buyers. The latter executed a Partition
Agreement but refused to turn over the mother title, TCT No. T-51250, of Lot11-E to the
aforesaid buyers, thus, preventing them from titling in their names the subdivided
portions thereof. Consequently, Magallanes, along with the other buyers, filed an
adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Ilolilo City. Thereafter, Magallanes and
Gonzales filed a motion to surrender title. Sometime thereafter Magallanes caused the
construction of two houses of strong materials on the subject lot. On April 20, 1990,
petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against Magallanes with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Iloilo City, the trial court dismissed the action. It held that Magallanes
was first in possession of the subject lot by virtue of the Deed of Definite Sale between
Lazaro and Magallanes. After the aforesaid sale, Magallanes filled the lot with soil; put
up a fence; and built a small hut thereon. On the other hand, the trial court found that
when petitioner Ramy Pudadera bought the subject lot from Spouses Natividad, the
former had notice that someone else was already in possession of the subject lot.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in CA affirming the decision of the trial
court applying the principle of innocent purchasers for value and in good faith

Held:

The notice of lis pendens cannot be made the basis for holding that respondents are
buyers in bad faith. At the time of the sale of the subject lot by Spouses Natividad to
petitioners, the civil case filed by Magallanes against Spouses Natividad had long been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the said order of dismissal had become final and
executory.

This notwithstanding, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith since

despite being aware of a flaw in the title of Spouses Natividad prior to the sale of the
subject lot, they did not take steps to ascertain the status of the subject lot but instead
proceeded with the purchase of the same.

Thus, in case of a double sale of immovables, ownership shall belong to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the
buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The issuance of the certificate of title in the
names of respondents, heirs of Daisy Teresa Cortel Magallanes is cancelled, and (2) The
award of attorneys fees in favor of respondents is DELETED.

G.R. No. 173021. October 20, 2010

Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e

Facts:

While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming
ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. According
to respondent Margarita, her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be
traced back from 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-ap’s death, the heirs of
the latter then executed a Deed of Quitclaim on 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert
Semon (Margaritas father). Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together
with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-
Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. When
Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among
themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. Since then, Margarita
allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and improved the property
together with her husband while, tolerating her first cousins occupation of portions of
the same lot.

Then, Petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the
subject property and selling portions thereof. Margarita filed a complaint for recovery
of ownership, possession, re-conveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot
No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The trial court found that it
preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of ownership
over the subject property.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision; whether
petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription; Whether the trial court
has jurisdiction to decide the case

Held:

Respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides
with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. Thus, the Court is inclined
to believe the respondents version, as both the trial and appellate courts have
concluded, since the latter’s version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.

Petitioners having made an admission that they had occupied the property by tolerance
of the owner thereof, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by
prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in
order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no
matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

Furthermore, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription.

The petitioners are barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time
in the CA. The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending
before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. Given that a registration
proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis
pendentiaon a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. The petition is denied
for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 179044. December 6, 2010

People of the Philippines vs. Rodriguez Lucero y Paw-as alias "Kikit"

Facts:

Appellant was charged with the crime of murder. With the use of a bolo, the latter
allegedly hit the head of one Edgar Aydaon, a Barangay Kagawad. Based on combined
testimonies of the witnesses Leonito Maceda (Maceda), Rafael Ampis and SPO1 Daniel
Barrios, Maceda went out of his house to get kasla, a medicinal herb for his sick
child. After getting the herb, he went to a waiting shed located about 10 meters away
from his house as he saw a certain Linda Basalo (Basalo) thereat waiting for a
ride. While at the waiting shed, the victim Edgar Aydaon passed by. But after a while,
the victim returned and helped Basalo load the vegetables in the jeepney. After the
jeepney left, appellant arrived and called out the victim. Appellant pleaded that he be
allowed by the victim to go with him as he (appellant) was allegedly being pursued by
a certain Pandeta. The victim acceded to the request and even invited appellant to sleep
in his house. However, after walking a distance of about 10 meters, appellant suddenly
hacked the victim at the left side of his head causing the victim to fall to the ground. In
spite of the fact that the victim was already lying on the ground, appellant further
stabbed him on his waist. Thereafter, appellant left the premises.

The trial court found appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not Maceda is a credible witness

Held:

Yes. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to
the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the
CA, as in this case. Besides, upon our review of the records of this case, we find that
both the trial court and the CA did not overlook or misunderstand any substance or fact
which would have materially affected the outcome of this case. Moreover, the alleged
inconsistencies referred to by the defense indeed refer to minor details which are very
inconsequential to the outcome of the case. Pertinently, the absence of such improper
motive on the part of the witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that his testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit. Indeed, there is no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
trial court.

Finally, we agree with both the trial court and the CA that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. Records show that appellant lulled the victim into believing
that he was being pursued by somebody. Believing in the tale being spun by the
appellant, the victim even offered appellant the security and protection of his
house. However, appellant reciprocated the victims trust and hospitality by suddenly
hacking him on the head and stabbing him on the waist. The settled rule is that
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and
unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an
unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.

G.R. No. 183709. December 6, 2010

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel "Awil" Pojo

Facts:

The accused-appellant was indicted before the R TC for the crime of rape.

The prosecution claimed that the victim AAA, then 7 years old, was left with her
younger brother, EEE, at their family's residence in Capoocan, Leyte by their mother,
CCC. With them in the house was the accused-appellant, a septuagenarian whom AAA
treated as a close relative, befog a godfather of CCC.

Later, AAA followed the order of the accused-appellant to fetch water from a river. It
turned out, however, that the accused-appellant followed AAA to the river. There, he
pushed the young girl into the water, and then ordered her to get up and to lie down on
a rock. After AAA followed the orders of the accused-appellant, the latter undressed the
young girl, removed his shorts and then went on top of AAA. After the accused-
appellant had consummated his dastardly act, he directed AAA to stand up and to
hand over her underwear, which the accused-appellant threw into the river. He
threatened to kill his victim should she report the incident to anyone. He ordered AAA
to put on her clothes, and then followed the child on her way home.

One evening, CCC discovered that AAA was raped after her son EEE mentioned that
AAA was already menstruating. Believing that AAA was still too young to menstruate,
CCC checked on AAA and upon finding blood on her daughter's shorts, undressed
AAA and examined the child's genitals. AAA then confided to her mother that she was
raped by the accused-appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of rape

Held:

The accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of rape, after the
prosecution established the elements of the crime under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,22 which states:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When and how committed. Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The testimony in court of AAA, as corroborated by the testimonies of the other

prosecution witnesses and supported by the records of the case, sufficiently established
the fact of carnal knowledge by the accused-appellant of the offended party. The Court
further considers the fact that the medical report presented by the prosecution and
identified during the trial by the doctor who personally examined AAA, Dr.
Hernandez, supported the young girl's claim that she was sexually abused.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding accused-appellant Briccio Baculanta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 168840. December 8, 2010

Enrique Miguel L. Lacson vs. MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc.

Facts:

Respondent alleged that petitioner, as its former president who managed Hacienda San
Benito, milled the sugar cane produce of the hacienda under his own name and against
the instruction of the Board of Directors. However, the parties were able to arrive at an
Amicable Settlement. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Modification of the
Judgment by Compromise, believing that there was a need of proportionately reducing
the amount covered by the promissory note which he would execute in favor of
respondent.

Before the CA, petitioner averred that the trial court failed to rule on his motion, made
in open court, to be allowed to present evidence in support of his motion for partial
modification.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied of his right to due process when he was
deprived of his right to present evidence in support of his motion for partial
modification of the judgment by compromise; Whether or not the non-disclosure by
respondent of the impending installation of the carp farmer-beneficiaries and its
subsequent (inaction) constituted vices of consent or fraudulent acts.

Held:

No. Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have
ones day in court. There is no denial of due process where a party has been given an
opportunity to be heard and to present his case. Here, petitioner alleges that the trial
court conducted a hearing on his Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by
Compromise. Clearly, he was given the opportunity to be heard thereon. The failure of
the lower court to rule on his oral motion to present evidence during said hearing is not
denial of due process. The fact is that the trial court heard his motion for partial
modification and his failure to present further evidence to support the same cannot be
equated with lack of due process.

The second issue involves a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari. A question of fact x x x exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Here, the
ultimate question to be answered is: Is petitioners consent to the execution of the
amicable settlement vitiated.

G.R. No. 168325. December 13, 2010

Roberto D. Tuazon Vs. Lourdes Q. Del Rosario-Suarez, et al.

Facts:
Respondent Lourdes Q. Del Rosario-Suarez was the owner of a parcel of land.
Petitioner Roberto D. Tuazon and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease over the parcel
of land for a period of three years. During the effectivity of the lease, Lourdes sent a
letter to Roberto where she offered to sell to the latter subject parcel of land. She gave
him two years from January 2, 1995 to decide on the said offer. On June 19, 1997, or
more than four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, Lourdes sold
subject parcel of land to her only child, Catalina Suarez-De Leon, her son-in-law
Wilfredo De Leon, and her two grandsons, Miguel Luis S. De Leon and Rommel S. De
Leon as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties. The new owners
through their attorney-in-fact, Guillerma S. Silva, notified Roberto to vacate the
premises. Roberto refused hence, the De Leons filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer
before the MeTC against him. The MeTC rendered a Decision ordering Roberto to
vacate the property for non-payment of rentals and expiration of the contract. While the
ejectment case was on appeal, Roberto filed with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment
of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Damages and Application for Preliminary
Injunction against Lourdes and the De Leons. On November 13, 2000, Roberto filed a
Notice of Lis Pendens with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a
Decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Lourdes in favor of the De Leons
as valid and binding. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Lourdes violated Robertos right to buy the subject property under the
principle of right of first refusal by not giving him notice and the opportunity to buy the
property under the same terms and conditions.

Held:

Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

CIVIL LAW: contract of a right of first refusal v. option contract

An option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first refusal in that in
the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined
price. Lacking these two essential requisites, what is involved is only a right of first
refusal.

It is clear from the provision of Article 1324 that there is a great difference between the
effect of an option which is without a consideration from one which is founded upon a
consideration. If the option is without any consideration, the offeror may withdraw his
offer by communicating such withdrawal to the offeree at any time before acceptance; if
it is founded upon a consideration, the offeror cannot withdraw his offer before the
lapse of the period agreed upon. The second paragraph of Article 1479 declares that an
accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from
the price.

In this case, it is undisputed that Roberto did not accept the terms stated in the letter of
Lourdes as he negotiated for a much lower price. Roberto’s act of negotiating for a
much lower price was a counter-offer and is therefore not an acceptance of the offer of
Lourdes. Article 1319 of the Civil Code provides: Consent is manifested by the meeting
of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A Qualified Acceptance
constitutes a counter-offer.

The counter-offer of Roberto for a much lower price was not accepted by Lourdes.
There is therefore no contract that was perfected between them with regard to the sale
of subject property. Roberto, thus, does not have any right to demand that the property
be sold to him at the price for which it was sold to the De Leons neither does he have
the right to demand that said sale to the De Leons be annulled.

Moreover, even if the offer of Lourdes was accepted by Roberto, still the former is not
bound thereby because of the absence of a consideration distinct and separate from the
price. The argument of Roberto that the separate consideration was the liberality on the
part of Lourdes cannot stand. A perusal of the letter-offer of Lourdes would show that
what drove her to offer the property to Roberto was her immediate need for funds as
she was already very old. Offering the property to Roberto was not an act of liberality
on the part of Lourdes but was a simple matter of convenience and practicality as he
was the one most likely to buy the property at that time as he was then leasing the
same.

The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

G.R. No. 174251. December 15, 2010

Raul Palomata Vs. Nestor Colmenares, et al.

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land along the Camambugan Creek in Balasan, Iloilo on
which stand petitioner Raul Palomata's house and talyer. Letecia Colmenares claiming
ownership over the said land, filed a criminal complaint for squatting against Raul in
1981. However, for reasons undisclosed by the records, the case was eventually
dismissed. In order to prevent further ejectment from the subject property, Raul,
together with his father Alipio, filed a complaint in 1984 before the RTC, sitting as a
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), for maintenance and damages against Letecia, her
son Nestor Colmenares, and Teresa Gurrea. The complaint alleged that Alipio Palomata
(Alipio) was the bona fide agricultural lessee of Letecia. After the issuance of
Presidential Decree No. 27, an approximate two-hectare portion of Colmenares
landholding was awarded to Alipio, who was issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)
No. 10055.Raul contended that the subject property occupied by his house and talyer
was part of Alipio's farm lot. Thus, Raul and Alipio prayed to be maintained in the
subject property and that the Colmenareses be ordered to refrain from ejecting the
Palomatas from the subject property.

The Colmenareses admitted that Alipio was their agricultural lessee but denied any
knowledge of the survey which led to the issuance of the CLT in Alipios favor.The
Colmenareses countered that the property claimed by Raul is within their subdivision,
not within the agricultural land tenanted by Alipio. They prayed that the subject
property be excluded from Alipios land transfer certificate. Should the property be
included in Alipios CLT, they prayed that the same be declared null and void because
they were not informed of the survey conducted by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). The trial court ruled in favor of the Colmenareses. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTCs decision.

Issue:
Did the trial and appellate courts err in the appreciation of facts when they ruled that
the subject property belongs to respondents?

Held:

In their complaint, the Palomatas recognized the Colmenareses as the owners of the
subject property, but the Palomatas claimed entitlement to the subject property by
virtue of Alipios CLT which awarded a farm lot to Alipio. But the said CLT did not
indicate the metes and bounds of the awarded farm lot; it only stated that the farm lot
awarded to Alipio consisted of two hectares. Hence, it became necessary to prove,
beyond the CLT, that the subject property is actually included in Alipio's farm lot. The
Palomatas, however, failed to discharge this burden. On the contrary, what appeared
during the trial was that the subject property was actually not included in Alipio's farm
lot.

Instead of helping the Palomatas cause, the trial court found the stated southern
boundary of the farm lot (the Camambugan Creek) as evidence that the subject
property was not included therein. The ocular inspection revealed that the subject
property lies on the other side of the Camambugan Creek, physically separate from
Alipios farm lot. The trial court thus concluded that the subject property is not part of
the farm lot, which conclusion is not unwarranted. The declaration that the farm lot is
bounded on the south by the Camambugan Creek reveals Alipios admission and
understanding that his farm lot extends up to the creek only, and not across. Since the
subject property is across the creek, it is but fair to conclude that it is not part of the
farm lot. This is particularly significant considering that the Palomatas failed to offer
any contrary explanation and considering that the tax declaration was their very own
evidence.

The other pieces of evidence offered by the Palomatas to prove that the subject property
was within Alipios farm lot were the two investigation reports of the DAR. The
Palomatas were relying on the fact that it was stated therein that the Bureau of Lands
surveyed the land and found that the subject property lies within Alipios farm lot.
However, the findings of the two reports were disavowed on the witness stand by the
officials who participated therein.

In sum, the CLT, tax declaration and investigation reports offered by the Palomatas as
evidence of their right to the subject property are, at best, inconclusive and insufficient
to prove their claim that the subject property is included in Alipios farm lot. In fact, they
even prove quite the opposite: that the subject property is actually not included in the
farm lot.