Bar by prior judgment vs.

conclusiveness of judgment (c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its faceto have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

G.R. No. 191101 October 1, 2014

This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
former judgmentand (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 In Judge Abelita III
SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. P/Supt. Doria, et al.,19 the Court explained the two aspects of res
vs. judicata, thus:

HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO, represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO,

Respondents. There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
" x x x. second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
Rules of Court, which involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
pertinently provides that:

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.— The effect of a judgment or
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter
xxxx in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
(b) In other cases, the judgment orfinal order is, with respect to the matter
merits is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.20
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
For res judicataunder the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the
following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must bea judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.21
The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated
September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court
which has jurisdiction over the subjectproperty and the parties, had long
become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits.
However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of
parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery
of possession case, there is no identity of causes of action.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only
involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the
recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject
property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of
ownership.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in
fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can
prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession
even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior
physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property.22
Thus, even the MTC, in its Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible
entry case, stressed that its determination is only limited to the issue of who
has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the
ownership of the same.23
On the other hand, the recovery of possession case is actually an accion
reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an
element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondents
in the recoveryof possession case shows that the respondents, as
successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting ownership of the subject
property and are seeking the recovery of possession thereof.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for
forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action.24 Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.
The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s
determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the
respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not
conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered
in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to
the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land."
x x x."
 Suarez v. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944 (March 12,
2014) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership > Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property >
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Facts:
A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and
Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy,
who were claiming that they inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy,
who inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2
and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that
Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently
show a statement of facts to determine the class of case and remedies
available to the parties. When the complaint fails to state the facts
constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria.
In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly
allege and prove how Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon
it. She was also silent about the details on who specifically permitted
Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.

In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the
requiring them to vacate the lot and informed them that she had already CA did not commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.
purchased the lot from the former's relatives. Felix and Marilou did not
heed the demand so Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint
against unlawful detainer against them.

Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as
to when and how possession by tolerance of them began.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.

Held:

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be

alleged:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with

or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
- September 29, 2012
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City
of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to
form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area
shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set
aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the
same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to
Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to
analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel
the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land
to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always
been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous
donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair
advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be
filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City
of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude
matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.
Monday, July 22, 2013
Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata
Abobon
Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon
G.R. No. 172331, August 24, 2011
FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner claiming that they were the registered owners of that parcel of
unirrigatedriceland which they inherited from their father and covered by
transfer certificate of title (TCT). That they had allowed their first cousin, the
free use of the land out of benevolence and that they now immediately
needed the parcel of land for their own use and had accordingly demanded
that petitioner should vacate and return it to them but he had refused.
ISSUE:
Who is the true owner of the land in question.
HELD:
A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that
a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The
certificate of tile thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;
hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrens system
may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the
certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title,
which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of
indefeasibility finds no application. The respondents had the preferential
right to the possession of the land in question. Their having preferential right
conformed to the age- old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name
is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the title. He may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
GERMAN
MANAGEMENT &
SERVICES, INC. V
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are
owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
(the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed
a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management
Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the
proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied
by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of
Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last
twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they
already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual
possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and
bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because
they were deprived of their property without due process of law by
trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated
in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision.
Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this
appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry
case against petitioner?
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private
respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they
were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible
entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible
entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to
an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed
that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the
petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid
claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of
―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition
of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he
has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of
self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not
applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of
actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in
fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents
with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a
person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means
to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In
no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that
he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver
the thing.‖
CAISIP v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who
cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico
situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The
overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the
same is Roxas y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the
spouses Gloria and Marcelino for forcible entry which orders them to
vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried out June 6,
1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was
seen by Felix Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade
her to stop what she was doing and to leave the premises. When Gloria
refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to help him
shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and
leave so the two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and
dragged her away (they also tried to threaten her by drawing their guns :).
As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Gloria’s neighbours
caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria
was later turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.
A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave
Coercion (Petitioners also filed grave coercion and unjust vexation
against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at her- just in case sir
asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self
help.) The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this
appeal.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense? [More relevant
issue to property:]
2) Whether or not the petitioners liable for Grave Coercion? [Main Issue-
this case is really a criminal case]
RULING:
1. NO, Art 429 cannot be used as a defense of the petitioner to justify
their action.
The order to vacate was until June 26 (or 20 days from the execution of
the decision.) On June 17, the spouses REMAINED in possession of the
said lot. At the very least the owner of the hacienda is just a co-possessor
of the land, thus the spouses still had rights over it.
Although the spouses were ordered to vacate the land, it doesn’t
necessarily mean that they don’t have rights to the land (they still have
right to necessary expenses they used to till the land)
What petitioner did was not ―repel or prevent in actual or threatened x x
x physical invasion or usurpation.‖ They EXPELLED Gloria from a
property which they were still in possession of. (more detailed
enumeration of reason in page 23)
2. YES, they are guilty! Caisip is guilty of grave coercion as a co-
conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction
> By trying to stop her the first time showed that he intended to stop her
> By calling the police and not stopping them when they were already
dragging Gloria and threatening her by drawing their guns.
Aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength and disregard of
sex were appreciated in the case of Caisip and an additional aggravating:
taking advantage of position as a members of the local police force were
appreciated on the two police officers’ case
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory
No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987] mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
unconstitutional.

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of
this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
unconstitutional.
respondent San Antonio Development Corporation
(San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
registered under,claimed that the lands were expropriated
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
to the government without them reaching the agreement
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under
as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination.
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
to determine the just compensation. It was later found out
principle or one of the factors in determining just
that the payment of the government to San Antonio would
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
judgment as to what amount should beawarded and how
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market
compensation is a judicial function. The executive
value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
department or the legislature may make the initial
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
determination but when a party claims a violation of the
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may
were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from
own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.
further hearing the case.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
justness of the decreed compensation.