Kosovo: an ethnic conflict

An interventionist drama unfolds in the Balkans

CONTENTS

DEFINING ETHNIC CONFLICT

THE POSTMODERN CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

Homogeneity and ethnic cleansing
Irredentism – flirting with Independence
Minorities have rights… because the UN says so

THE YEAR KOSOVO BURNT

A policy of scorched earth revisited
International interest and intervention
US national self-interest

THE FUTURE OF A DIVIDED SOCIETY

SOURCES CONSULTED

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DEFINING ETHNIC CONFLICT

A definition of conflict formulised by Lewis Coser almost 50 years ago explains that
this social construct is a struggle where the objective is to simultaneously achieve
one’s goals and neutralise, cause injure to, or simply eliminate one’s opponent
(Horowitz 1985:95). If one had to combine ethnic with conflict, how would this change
the explanation Coser so eloquently provided? Ethnic conflict – where a collective
strives towards goals such as material and political gains by invoking their cultural
identity in order to achieve them (Gurr & Harff 1994:78). However, conflict is
dynamic, and not all struggles will follow similar patterns. Ethnic conflict can take on
many dimensions, and may include or exclude violence; it could even be referred to
as a discrimination eliminator. Some hypotheses on ethnic conflict focus on how
ethnic identities form and develop or change over a period of time; some theorists
look at the availability of and access to resources among ethnic groups (Gurr & Harff
1994:78). The assumption is that it is a collective effort to overpower another
collective, by employing any means necessary.
The occurrence of ethnic conflict is often a symptomatic result of divided societies
(Horowitz 1985:12). Societies exist because of people taking on various roles and
functions, such as workers, consumers, members of a geographical community,
employers and citizens, and the degree of independence, according to Horowitz
(1985:7), is oftentimes smallest in societies that are very divided. When ethnic
conflict as phenomenon does become manifest, the suddenness is not clearly
comprehended (Horowitz 1985:13). As conflict scholars and practitioners we do not
lack data or units of analyses (too many ethnic conflicts have arisen in the past
decade), in fact, we lack explanations that can be applied cross-culturally (Horowitz
1985:xi). Horowitz (1985:15) argues that if we follow the basic human needs theorists
(Burton 1990), and we regard scarce resources as a major reason for division of
groups, we are non the wiser as to why members organise themselves along ethnic
lines and not necessarily along lines such as class or profession. He proposes that
theories and explanations of ethnic conflict should specify the issue that leads groups
to resorting to conflict (Horowitz 1985:15). Horowitz (1985:20) makes a dangerous
claim alluding to ethnic conflicts in the West resembling terrorism, and that ethnic
conflicts in the developing world and the East and Middle East focus on persons and
property that are usually accompanied by mutilations. This type of blanket statement
does more harm to the understanding of ethnic conflict than it does providing
explanations.

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Horowitz (1985:96) does, however, mention that ethnicity is confined too much to the
theories of modernisation and that the process of change is neglected during
research analyses. Alvin Toffler (1983:151) indicated that social and cultural change
rates are accelerated to such an extent that people are shedding parts of their
identities and cultures – the concept of identity as one of the oldest human problems
is changing. Some societies manage to change and transform themselves
technologically and economically more rapidly than others; even different sectors
within the same society change at different rates (Toffler 1970:28). However, the
acceleration of change not only forces one to cope faster, but one is confronted with
more and more situations where one’s previous experiences no longer applies and
psychological implications become explosive (Toffler 1970:41). In order to survive the
individual must become adaptable and he must search for new anchors with which to
ground himself, anchors such as religion, nationhood, community, family or even
profession (Toffler 1970:41). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of its
socialist and communist regimes left the populations of the republics of the former
Yugoslavia without a national identity, and without hope of assimilating with the rest
of Europe. It is the writer’s opinion that the spate of ethnic conflicts over the past
decade should be viewed as a postmodern phenomenon opposed to that as merely a
construct of modernisation.

THE POSTMODERN CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

There has been much speculation about whether the conflicts in former Yugoslavia
are ethnic or religious in nature – in 1991 there was the war in Croatia, in 1992
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1998 Kosovo in Serbia, and in 2000 the former Yugoslav
republic of Macedonia (Wiberg 1996:1). The identification of an individual or group
relates to marketplace, workplace, guilds, unions, classes, and many more
dimensions; religion, culture and language also define reality. Wiberg (1996:2)
explains that in an identity budget these dimensions are either natural or given, and
that identity refers to what makes one unique, as well as that which makes one
belong to various kinds of communities (Wiberg 1996:2). Wiberg (1996:2) also
considers concepts of family, clan and faction to be mythical conceptions of
nationhood or kinship, and these mythical conceptions are descendants of some
common patriarch of many many years ago (Wiberg 1996:2, Horowitz 1985:52). Gurr
and Harff (1994:30) are of the opinion that identity is based on shared traits among a
group, a common homeland and culture, the myth of a common origin, shared
religions, similar language(s), and a shared history of violent conflict with out groups.

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Then, of course, there is a sense of belonging and visible racial characteristics as
indicators of identity (Gurr & Harff 1994:87-89).
Best and Kellner (1991:205) do not dispute any of the abovementioned dimensions
of identity; however, they place the concept of identity within the postmodern
framework of politics. They indicate that the political upheavals of the 1960s
challenged the Marxist idea of class struggle by the emergence of multiple
mechanisms of power and domination that could not be explained by reductionism
theories of class and exploitation (Best & Kellner 1991:205). New movements such
as those of environmental, feminist, sexual liberation, black power, peace and
community action groups attempted to oppose specific forms of oppression.
The struggles of the 1960s generated specific concerns in the 1980s with distinctive
emphases on the politics of gender, race and ethnicity, and these positions where
associated with the rubric of postmodern politics or politics of identity; consequently,
marginalised groups and individuals were drawn to postmodern theory (Best &
Kellner 1991:205).
Politics of identity resulted in the building of new political groupings which mobilises
by achieving commitment based on the construction of political and cultural identities
that have a common struggle (Best & Kellner 1991:205). The organisation around
cultural identities poses a problem for postmodernists in that they oppose the blatant
reduction of identity to the categories of homogenous or heterogeneous. Best and
Kellner (1991:206) argue that there are many forces that constitute an identity,
especially one’s political identity. However, there are those theorists that feel that
marginality and multiplicity of the identity is not adequate enough as explanation, and
Foucault and Deleuze equate identity with social normalisation and yet another form
of repression (Best & Kellner 1991:206-207). Gurr and Harff (1994:15) contract an
even more complex assertion with their distinction of ethnonationalists and
ethnoclasses as categories of identity. They regard the former as indigenous peoples
seeking autonomy, and the latter as communal contenders seeking greater political
access or participation. The implication of ethnonationalist movements is that a group
often straddles established international boundaries, and is not confined to a country.
The Albanian history spanning many centuries tells a story of Albanians scattered all
over Europe, especially the Balkan countries (www.geocities.com). The reference to
ethnic Albanians bandied around today is very much a construct employed by the
media to refer to those ethnonationalists that fall outside of the Albanian borders. The
Albanian conflict discourse is problematic in that, even though language and religion
are common among so-called ethnic Albanians, their nationalist identity is not specific
to the Albania of today. The country known as Albania has had its borders drawn and

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redrawn on so many occasions and after several incidences of war. Kosova (as it is
know to its population), for example, may have been a province of a former Albania,
but it has also been part of the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro,
Serbia, the former Yugoslavia, and Serbia again. That there may be some
mythological idea of a homeland cannot be disputed, but that there is a new identity
that pertains only to Kosova is more accurate.
The dilemma with this new identity is that several political, economical and
ideological differences, and religions and languages are associated with Kosova. The
subsequent loyalties to new liberated groupings, as well as a lack of structure (after
the fall of the Soviet Union) lead to each grouping having its own vision for an
independent Kosova. Serbia has its own reason for wanting Kosova part of its nation,
not only because it has been part of it for so long, and because of the loyal Kosovar
Serbs, but also the economic implications if this province were to become
independent.

Homogeneity and ethnic cleansing

The Serbian history dictates an autocratic measure of rule, and Wiberg (1996:3)
contends that autocratic rulers, such as Milosevic, indicted for war crimes pertaining
to Kosovo in the former republic of Yugoslavia (Rozen 1999:2), are better suited to
homogenous states, and that present homogenous states often have a history of
ethnocide, mass expulsion and even genocide.
Serbia, more specifically Kosovo, is not, and will probably never again be
homogenous. In fact, in the postmodern times we live in, homogenous states (if they
do not currently exist) can only become homogenous by implementing policies of
ethnic cleansing. After the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, the only structures
known to these rulers were no longer relevant to the capitalist world surviving on the
dynamics of globalism. It is logical that they will enforce practices and policies such
as ethnic cleansing that make sense to them; that will ensure their power balance.
The citizens of these countries are introduced to the media propagating globalism
and the possibilities the world can present. Severe incongruities develop and ideas of
independence begin to emerge among communities that could possibly sustain
themselves.
Ethnological movements in Eastern Europe became increasingly visible during the
1980s following economic crises (Wiberg 1996:8), and as with the labour movement
in South Africa, this placed internal pressure on the regimes that contributed to the
collapse of certain power structures. However, with the State collapsing, many

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employed in state organisations had to tow the unemployment line. The high
unemployment rates and an absence of democratic traditions cause great strain for a
nation where violence is the only known means of dealing with dissonance. Wiberg
(1996:10) asserts that statistics of violence indicate that inward state and nation
ideologies account for most violent conflict in countries, and that greater
heterogeneous countries have a higher risk of civil strife. What the predominant
group may regard as law and order may be considered as intentional discrimination
by others, and what may be seen as peaceful assimilation may seem like planned
ethnocide (Wiberg 1996:14, Horowitz 1985:5, 35 & 197). However, Gurr and Harff
(1996:85) remind that the more democratic a heterogeneous country is, the more
likely ethnopolitical groups will be to voice their opposition nonviolently. The sense of
a collective identity within one or more party might lead to conflict, as might the fact
that one or more social group feel that they have a legitimate grievance (Kriesberg
2000:4). Gurr and Harff (1994:79-80) identify five internal factors that make
ethnocides or genocides likely:
 Persisting cleavages that exist among ethnic groups
 Elites have a history of repression in order to maintain power
 Elites use their power to reward groups differentially for their loyalty
 The society has recently experienced a political upheaval; and
 Exclusionist ideologies define target groups as expendable.

Every abovementioned factor applies to Kosovo and the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. The assistance and instigation by Milosevic during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina provided enough evidence for Muslim Kosovars and Albanian Slavs in
Kosovo that they cannot expect equal treatment from Milosevic and his government.
Their mobilisation as a collective with the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation
Army was a proactive movement that could not wait for another Bosnia, and they
began their campaign for independence, violently. The greater the discrimination a
group is subjected to, the faster it will organise for action or independence (Gurr &
Harff 1994:83-84).

Irredentism – flirting with Independence…

Irredentism is a movement that attempts to retrieve ethnic kinsmen and their territory
across borders, and the plight of the Kurdish people scattered over four countries
comes to mind (Horowitz 1985:281, Gurr & Harff 1994:30-43). In heterogeneous

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states irredentism is bound to become a divisive ethnic issue (Horowitz 1985:282),
and the history of the Balkans reveal that all the states were born in the 19 th century
as irredentist nations believing in some imagined community (Hagen 1999:53). As
mentioned earlier, the concept of kinship and a claim to a homeland are mythological
conceptions, but real to those who mobilise in an effort to achieve them. In a time
where identity is a complex construct, continuously changing and adapting to
evolving conditions and situations, one at least has the myth to cling to - to fight for a
blood conflict that has lasted for a long period of time. Ethnopolitical leaders often set
goals of independence, rather than limited autonomy or separatism – which the
Kosovars have had since 1974 (www.geocities.com, Gurr & Harff 1994: 103,
Horowitz 1985:230-267). Revolution rather than reform is the zero-sum objective of
irredentism. The hope of a group arming for revolution could be that they are
counting on the oppressing state to determine that the cost of war is much higher
than conceding to liberating the irredentists.
The use of military and/or police force is often employed to contain ethnic rioting or
rebellion (Horowitz 1985:443) as in Kosovo when the Yugoslav army and the Serbian
police, together with roving gangs of paramilitaries employed violence and terror in a
campaign known as Operation Horseshoe (Rozen 1999:3). Another method with
which desired subordination of the ethnic group is achieved is often by depriving
members of the group of their citizenship (Horowitz 1985:198). Albanian Kosovars
had their identification documents, birth certificates and all legal documents burnt by
Serb police forces in order to make it more difficult for refugees to return
(http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). However, the Kosovo Liberation Army and
Albanian Kosovars never had the opportunity to express a desire to separate from
Serbia in order to assimilate with other Albanians or Albania. They did not intend
expelling Kosovar Serbs – they wanted independence with a nationalist government
of their own providing equal opportunities to the 90% of Albanians in Kosova
(http://geography.about.com). The repercussion of such a success may result in
other irredentas in Montenegro and Macedonia (which happened in 2000) where
Albanians increasingly begin to envisage the mythical land of birth.

Minorities have rights… because the UN says so

In Serbia, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia where the rights of minorities are not
upheld, Albanian Kosovars are one of several minorities, whereas in Kosova they are
the majority. The issue of minorities and their rights are illuminated by the fact that

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one can vote at the age of 16 if one is employed; 18 if one is not
(http://geography.about.com). If employment is secured for Serbs then the Serbian
population has a higher rate of suffrage, which ensures Serbian political domination.
Central to concepts such as democracy and participatory governance is the right to
vote and choose those who govern (De Varennes 1999:1), but if democracy is not
part of a state’s history, and neither is participation in public life, one can hardly
expect that minorities will have a recognised voice. Only 40 seats constitute the
Chamber of Republics – 20 for Serbia and 20 for Montenegro, which is an additional
political problem for minorities such as Kosovars because Serbia’s population is
almost 14 times larger than that of Montenegro, yet they have an equal
representation (http://geography.about.com). Serbia’s ethnic composition after 1991
and before 1998 indicates that 62.6% were Serbian, 5% were Montenegrin
(remembering that Montenegro forms part of the new Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia), 15.9% were other (including Hungarians) with Albanians comprising
16.5% - most of whom were in Kosova (www.m-w.com). The religious affiliation is
divided among the majority of orthodox Serbs, 19% Muslim, 4% Catholic, 1%
Protestant, and 11% other (http://geography.about.com).
The UN Declaration of Minorities stipulate that states have obligations to not only
prevent discrimination, but to create favourable conditions to enable persons
belonging to minorities to express their so-called identity and develop their culture,
language, religion and traditions (De Varennes, 1999:2, Gurr & Harff 1994:3-5). The
Declaration also refers to the right of ethnic groups to maintain cross-border contacts
with ethnic counterparts in other jurisdictions (De Varennes, 1999:2). The provention
of protracted social conflicts are more effective than resolving the conflicts, and
therefore it makes sense to spend time and effort in providing a voice to all (Anstey
1999:150). However, it is problematic if a state does not recognise the UN
conventions and declarations, or the ethnic group for that matter. The Serbian
government severely restricted the activities of Albanians and Hungarian minorities
before the violence erupted in 1998 (Gurr & Harff 1994:2). Horowitz (1985:185)
asserts that as with individual self-esteem, collective self-esteem is achieved to a
large extent by social recognition; and social recognition is conferred by political
affirmation.
Neil Smelser postulated in 1962 with his value-added perspective that certain social
conditions must be present for collective behaviour or social movement to arise
(Popenoe et al 1998:451). He focused on structural conduciveness, relative
deprivation and generalized beliefs that provide the right platform for conflict, and,
then, the manifestation of said conflict with the advent of a precipitating event, the

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emergence of leadership and counter or preventative social control (Popenoe et al
1998:452). Pruitt and Rubin (1986:105-108) build on this postulate by pinpointing
structural changes within the group that contributes to escalation of conflict situation.
They identify group polarization and contentious group goals, the importance of
solidarity, and the development of runaway norms that encourage and maintain
consistent cohesiveness. The emergence of militant leadership and/or struggle
groups can often be a consequence of and source for further escalation as is
confirmed with the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the People’s
Movement for Kosovo.
The writer is of the opinion that the political limitations imposed on the ethnic
minorities in Serbia contributed to the hasty intervention by international military
forces notwithstanding the spillover effect into other countries. The assumption that
the Albanians were merely protecting themselves may have been a superficial
analysis of the situation, and may have lead to the exacerbation of the aggression of
Serbs on Albanian Kosovars.

THE YEAR KOSOVO BURNT

On 27 May 1999 the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia announced that
it had indicted Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and four other prominent
Serbian leaders (www.kosovo.mod.uk). The indicted leaders were accused of crimes
against humanity and violation of the laws and customs of war due to the murder,
persecution and mass deportation of Albanian Kosovars. The day of the indictments
came one day short of a year after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council condemned the situation and the continuing violence in Kosovo, and it
followed two months after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) began air
strikes on Serbia (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo.htm).
So what was NATO doing bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
why was a special tribunal established to indict leaders and to deal with
atrocities that occurred in said country?
Early in 1998 large-scale fighting erupted in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo
leaving 300 000 people displaced (www.kosovo.mod.uk). The main reason
provided for the conflict was the long developing spiral of repression and resistance
between the Serbian Government and the Kosovar campaign for self-governance
(www.incore.ulst.ac.uk). The politics of paranoia, the development of a military
organisation in 1997 and the emergence of leadership led to Albanian Kosovars
taking action (Fromkin 1998:146). Fromkin (1998:146) is of the opinion that it was

9
mutual fear more than mutual hatred that drove belligerents on both sides to torture,
mutilation, rape and massacre. There is also an assertion that architects of
postmodern war engage paramilitaries, guerillas and militias to tear up states
(Fromkin 1998:147). Milosevic had such assistance in the Tigers, led by Zeljko
Raznativic (also known as Arkan), and Vojislav Seselj’s Chetniks (Judah 1998), and
the Kosovo Liberation Army (armed by Albania) used a blend of terrorist and
extremist guerilla tactics (Djilas 1998:130, Hagen 1999:59-60).
Aleksa Djilas (1998:124) contends that Kosovo has been part of Serbia since
medieval times, and that a demand for self-governance is illegitimate since it has
never had recognised boundaries; it briefly had self-rule in 1945, but became the
province it is today in 1963 (1998:125). He also raises the question of identity by
confirming that Albanians in Kosovo are no different from those any where else in the
Balkans, they happen to live in Kosovo; he claims that the Kosovar identity is an
artificial construct (Djilas 1998:125). Albanians are a minority in Serbia and not a
nation, which might have given them the right to self-determination. Djilas does
recognise that there are identity differences between Serbs and Albanians in that
they have different languages and religion, but not exclusively (1998:126). An
interesting factoid is that Albanian Kosovars have harmed their own struggle by their
systemic boycott of elections in Serbia; their abstention stinted the development of
democracy in Serbia (Djilas 1998:127). Then Milosovic retaliated with dismissing
thousands of Albanians from state enterprises, the educational system, the police
and the judiciary; Kosovo responded with creating parallel systems and avoided
conscription and payment of taxes (Djilas 1998:127, Hagen 1999:58). The impact of
these decisions did not bode well with the Serbian government considering that the
Muslim Albanians had the highest birth rate in Serbia, overpopulating a province
without contributing to the economy of Serbia (Djilas 1998:130). The concern for
Albanians was the recent ethnic cleansing campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as the memories of the Balkan War of 1912 when Serbia
conquered annexing Kosovo and expelled many Muslim Albanians because of their
being favoured during the all-ready fallen Ottoman Empire (Hagen 1999:57).
The Serbian government were at fault for not resolving or even addressing the
unresolved conflicts over the establishment of new political boundaries after the
collapse of the communist federation of Yugoslavia (Hagen 1999:63). Hagen touches
on an important point with this accusation because a political boundary compared to
a nationalist boundary ties in with postmodern movements and explains why
separatism and irredentism does not fully explain Kosovo’s demand for self-
determination.

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A policy of scorched earth revisited

Apart from destroying all legal documents of Albanian Kosovars, activities of all the
military forces managed to displace almost 860 000 people (including Serbs) by mid-
June 1999 (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). A senior local government
official in northern Albania – where refugees fled to at a rate of 4000 per hour for
days on end – said that the Serbs were scientifically expelling Kosovo Albanians from
their homes (http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk). The same methodology was employed
during the South African War at the turn of the previous century, but then it was called
a policy of scorched earth. The basic tenet of this method is the mass burning and
bombing of homes, institutions and villages inhabited by or belonging to Albanian
Kosovars. Villagers refusing to leave, or unable to leave, were executed which
resulted in a high number of mass graves all over Kosovo.
In the region of Vucitrn north of Kosovo 27 villages were under attack for two weeks
driving 20 000 people from their homes (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm).
On 13 March 1999 three explosive devices were detonated north of Kosova in
Mitrovice and Podujevo markets (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). It is no
coincidence that the atrocities in the northern areas were particularly devastating with
many vacated buildings revealing instruments of torture; it is nearest to the Serbian
boundary. Albanian television news reported that Serb paramilitary forces burnt alive
a number of disabled Albanian Kosovars in their homes in the villages of Sec and
Lubove in western Kosovo, and UCK Kosovapress reported that 150 Kosovo
Albanians were massacred in Lubenish west of Kosovo before burning the homes in
the area (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). Refugees in Montenegro,
Macedonia and Albania reported that Albanian men were being used as slave labour
to dig trenches for attacks and mass graves, and to provide blood for the injured Serb
forces (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). And when NATO started their
bombing, Serb forces kept women, children and young men as human shields, and
as the NATO-deployed K-For (Kosovo Peacekeeping Force) started to reclaim
Kosovo villages after the NATO attacks, Serb police and paramilitaries pillaged and
extorted literally to the last minute (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). One
would want to imagine that it is the immense number of atrocities that brought the
plight of the Kosovars to the international arena’s attention. In all likelihood it was
international interests that prompted NATO to act – after all, Hungary had just
become the latest member of NATO, and with minority Hungarians caught in the
middle…

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International interest and intervention

Edward Luttwak (1999:44) expresses his concern about transformative campaigns

imposed by international bodies on never-ending ethnic conflicts because the options
of decisive victory for one or exhaustion for all are blocked by international
intervention. Theoretically, the best approach for de-escalating conflict would be by
removing the enemy images of the opposition, by promoting tolerance and allowing a
period for mourning (Gottstein 1996:23-24). Efforts should be made to rise above the
traditional explanations of power relationships and assimilating all the relevant
explanations into the problem-solving process where options can lead to outcomes
(Burton 1987:46). Track I or II diplomacy could be employed with the commencement
of a cease fire, then again cease fires permit opponents to regroup, attain more
resources and attack anew (Burton & Dukes 1990:121, Luttwak 1999:36). However,
in the case of Kosovo, Exercise Cooperative Assembly took place in Albania on 17-
22 August 1998 and Exercise Cooperative Best Effort took place in Macedonia
between 10-18 September 1998, both aiming at improving peacekeeping, peace
support and humanitarian assistance skills at troop level – objective: to foster
relations between NATO and partner nations (Albania and Macedonia only serving as
objects in a public relations exercise)
(http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo.htm). There was some diplomatic effort
backed by the threat of NATO after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1203
on 24 October 1998 demanding that all parties in Kosovo comply with it
(http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo.htm).
On 6 February 1999 talks began on the Rambouillet Accords signed only by the
Kosovo delegation on 12 March 1999
(http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo.htm). NATO presented the delegations
from Yugoslavia and Kosovo with a detailed plan for political autonomy in Kosovo
under NATO auspices, demanding agreement and threatening military reprisals if
either refused (Mandelbaum 1999: 4). When conflicting parties have come to the
point where neither party is against an agreement to end the immediate conflict, it is
vital that the parties or mediator have some guideline as to what the parties have in
common. This implies that through the processes of negotiation and mediation (one
of these or both) focus must be directed at areas of agreement and not disagreement
(Anstey 1999:167) and a third party should not be making demands or presenting
ultimatums. Both parties agreed to a democratic, self-governing Kosovo, but the
Yugoslav delegation did not want to accept the presence of any international troops

12
in Kosovo (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/natokosovo.htm). The promised NATO
bombing started on 24 March 1999 (http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/atrocities.htm). The
air assault forced the Serb military to withdraw from Kosovo on 20 June 1999 and the
K-For, led by General Klaus Reinhardt, was officially deployed to rebuild the civil
society in a land devastated by war (Mandelbaum 1999:2,
http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk).
There may have been some international interest with Hungary becoming a NATO
member, with the UN feeling obliged to intervene as refugees became a burden for
neighbouring countries, and the older NATO member, Greece, fearing spillover.
However, interests seemed to mount as pending military intervention became likely,
and even during the attacks. The fact that communist countries, China and Russia
(also the two countries aiming nuclear weapons at the US) would not give consent for
a military intervention (Mandelbaum 1999:2,7) led to the US foisting their might on
France and Britain, sidelining the Security Council’s permission. Article 14 of the
1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention prohibits attacks on objects that are
indispensable to the future survival of a civilian population (Mandelbaum 1999:6).
NATO managed to destroy a great deal of Serbian infrastructure, including electrical
grids, water facilities and state buildings (Mandelbaum 1999:6), and then the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade. Before the military intervention 2500 people had died in
Kosovo and after 11 weeks of bombardment by NATO 10 000 people had died –
before bombing approximately 230 000 people were displaced, and after, 860 000
were displaced (Mandelbaum 1999:3). Somehow NATO managed to evict Serbia
from Kosovo, but they also managed to exacerbate the violence. Luttwak (1999:38)
asserts that the very presence of UN aid and NATO personnel inhibits the normal
remedy of threatened civilians, which is to flee from the combat zone. NATO never
achieved what it set out to do: to protect Albanian Kosovars (Mandelbaum 1999:5).

US national self-interest

After the attacks it became public knowledge that NATO wanted an exercise,
involving 80 aircraft, that would demonstrate their capability and power in the region
and the world; and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, one can
understand why NATO desired a so-called test run. Ian Mitchell (2000) from the
Department of International Politics at the University of Wales accuses the US and its
British cheerleader of pursuing national self-interest by pretending to protect the
citizens of Kosovo. He also blames the media for simplifying the conflict in Kosovo,

13
and, together with the NATO forces, choosing a side in the conflict instead of
attempting to report accurately.
Since the Cold War the US has propagated a foreign policy of global engagement
that would provide international security and promote free markets and democracy in
the international community (Mead 2000:1). The American interest between
promoting democracy and human rights sometimes conflicts with interests of
promoting stability in a country with an authoritarian ruler (Mead 2000:1). Considering
that the Democrats were in power at the time explains the hasty and careless military
intervention in Kosovo – the promotion of democracy and attainment of human rights
must be achieved at all costs (Mead 2000:2), even if that means destroying more
lives and economies in the process.
The US relationship with the UN has been strained on an on-and-off basis, yet it
serves as platform for the superpower. The US has provided assurance that it would
act in an effort to keep civil wars and ethnic conflicts from destabilising regional
security (Wedgwood 2000:1). Again, there is the clearly defined objective of calling a
nation to order in order to stabilise member countries; not to save the human lives
suffering in the midst of the conflict, but the ones it might impact on. The economic
implications for the US and its trade partners are entrenched in US foreign policy,
and instability in Yugoslavia impedes on this US value due to main transport lines
between Turkey and Greece, and the Western European countries being affected. As
mentioned before, the concerns of Greece and Hungary, even Germany were
heeded, not those of Yugoslavia. And consequently, the US felt righteous in
protecting the Kosovar Albanians without a UN resolution or permission from the
Security Council. If the US is so concerned about the welfare of the international
community, why did it only act when North Atlantic countries became involved in
ethnic conflict? Where was the US military intervention in Rwanda?

THE FUTURE OF A DIVIDED SOCIETY

The unsatisfactory intervention in Kosovo has attracted a wide range of humanitarian

programmes and aid projects specifically focusing on people and nations that have
survived ethnic conflict by ways of displacement, death, rape, torture and loss of
family and identity (Robinson et al 1999:24-27). These programmes and projects look
at mediation and other forms of intervention that could inform conflict scholars and
practitioners on divided societies and with specific knowledge about each situation
and its nature (Robinson et al 1999:24-27). Conflict is caused and driven by a
combination of needs, values and political forces, and to comprehend this is essential

14
in recreating a social fabric that can sustain an end to protracted conflict (Robinson
et al 1999:24-27).
The lack and failure of diplomacy before and especially during Rambouillet highlights
the reality that the world, in particular the US, is not utilising the existence of effective
alternatives to intervention. By imposing conditional independence on a province,
and bombing the state that is preventing the conditional independence is not
conducive to tolerance and thoughts of peace once the conflict is over. Resentment
only deepens. The notion of good versus evil, bandied around in contexts of
terrorism, does not apply to protracted ethnic conflicts. The parties will invariably
have to share a future society, and some way of co-existing must be found to
entrench peaceful cooperation.
Special attention should now be paid to political participation and the right to
participate in decisions that will affect the minorities in Yugoslavia in national and
provincial levels, as well as the right to vote, and then to exercise this right. Effective
participation can serve as internal dispute or conflict resolution. The fact that 800 000
displaced Kosovars returned home by the end of 1999 is an achievement for K-For
and indicates some hope of settlement (http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk). Apart from
the political future, attention should be paid to the economic future of, not only
Kosovo and Yugoslavia, but also the Balkan region. The economic effects of the
Kosovo conflict interrupted progress and reform that was crucial after the collapse of
communism (Steil & Woodward 1999: 95). Without growth rates, employment
opportunities and improved social welfare, the region could settle into a stalemate or
become dependent on foreign aid for survival (Steil & Woodward 1999: 95-96).
There is a dangerous myth among war-torn countries that international foreign
investment follows international aid, but Bosnia and Herzegovina indicates that this is
a false assumption (Steil & Woodward 1999: 96). The humanitarian aid provided to
Kosovo should transfer skills that would encourage economic independence whilst
political independence is sought. A saving grace could be the Europeanisation of
Yugoslavia by extending cross-border monetary, trade and investments
arrangements, and by accepting the Euro as currency (Steil & Woodward 1999: 97-
99). This in turn would foster relations with neighbouring countries that could have a
positive effect on internal ethnic relations, tolerance and acceptance.
Kosovo is still under temporary UN administration and is still a province in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been
providing technical assistance in order to support Kosovo in its effort to rebuild its
economy (Corker et al 2001:v). The IMF has been establishing taxation and
budgetary institutions, a payments and banking system, and a statistical framework

15
in Kosovo (Corker et al 2001:v). Currently, the per capita Gross Domestic Product in
Kosovo is only half the level in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania, but the income
level is much higher due to sizable humanitarian aid (Corker et al 2001:5). The IMF is
focusing on reducing import taxes and improving border administration, and
emphasising a lean public sector without pay increases for the foreseeable future
(something the South African Government is attempting) in order not to undermine
the competitiveness Kosovo is striving for (Corker et al 2001:15).
It would seem that the UN is making doubly sure that Kosovo and the region is
politically and economically stabilised after the disaster of the NATO military
intervention. One would only hope that as much attention is paid to the psychological
and social welfare of the people of Kosovo – Serbs and Albanians alike. The
devastation of an ethnic war can become cause for future blood feuds, and in order
to rehabilitate a divided nation, this concern must be addressed. Kosovo will in future
always serve as an example where intervention went horribly wrong because the
interests of the world were put before those of the warring nation. That miscalculated
intervention will never happen again is optimistic, especially in light of the current
NATO and US bombings of Afghanistan.

16
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