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Energy Big Data Analytics and Security:
Challenges and Opportunities
Jiankun Hu, Member, IEEE, and Athanasios V. Vasilakos, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— The limited available fossil fuels and the call for
sustainable environment have brought about new technologies for
the high efficiency in the use of fossil fuels and introduction of
renewable energy. Smart grid is an emerging technology that can
fulfill such demands by incorporating advanced information and
communications technology (ICT). The pervasive deployment of
the advanced ICT, especially the smart metering, will generate big
energy data in terms of volume, velocity, and variety. The
generated big data can bring huge benefits to the better energy
planning, efficient energy generation and distribution. As such
data involve end users’ privacy and secure operation of the critical
infrastructure, there will be new security issues. This paper is to
survey and discuss new findings and developments in the existing
big energy data analytics and security. Several taxonomies have
been proposed to express the intriguing relationships of various
variables in the field.
Index Terms—Energy, big data, analytics, cyber security, smart
grid, anomaly detection, SCOPF
I. INTRODUCTION
F OSSIL fuel reserves are finite and it is predicted that the
known oil reserves will be exhausted by 2050 [1] .
Renewable energy such as wind energy and solar energy can
provide a solution to both energy shortage and sustainable
environment. Smart and efficient energy usage will also be
effective in energy saving and reducing carbon emissions. The
emerging smart grid (SG) technology provides an effective
means in incorporating various renewable energy sources into
the existing energy system and also making smart energy a
reality. It is considered as a technological paradigm shift.
In a smart grid, networking, intelligent communications
technology and information processing functions are immersed
into every facet of the energy system ranging from power
generation, power transmission, power distribution and
consumer appliances [2-4]. A large-scale smart grid can consist
of thousands of microgrids that are operating in both
interconnected and isolated modes [2]. Smart metering is an
integral component of a smart grid where smart meters are
being installed in homes and other parts of the system in a large
scale. Reports indicate that the global smart meter installation
numbers will triple from 10.3 million in 2011 to 29.9 million by
2017 [4]. There are many potential advantages to be derived
J. Hu, is with University of New South Wales Canberra, Australia. (e-mail:
J.Hu@adfa.edu.au).
1
from smart grid data [4]: automated and real-time monitoring
users’ energy consumption, automated processing of billing,
detection of energy losses (possible fault and/or fraud), early
warning of blackouts, fast detection of disturbances in energy
supply, intelligent and real-time energy planning and pricing.
Smart energy data exhibit characteristics of “3Vs” model
describing big data, which are Volume, Velocity and Variety.
A. Big Data Characteristics of Smart Energy Data
1) Volume and Velocity
Smart meters are usually deployed at the scale of
multimillion units. The E-Sketch project showed that hourly
power consumption data will miss much vital information on
how homes consume energy, which is needed for real-time
pricing plans. Also overlapping of peak demand from
individual homes may cause blackouts at some substations
within several seconds [5]. Therefore data generated at the
minute-level and even second-level will be desirable [5-7].
According to 2012 housing units in New York State, 127.1TB
is needed to store each day’s power consumption data [5].
2) Variety
There are many structured and unstructured data from
multiple sources and categories that are relevant to the energy
generation, energy planning, and distribution etc. In addition to
the household appliance-level energy consumption data
generated by the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and
smart meters, other data such as different renewable energy,
weather, and market etc. are collected for the optimal operation
of the system.
B. Motivation
The big data nature of smart energy poses new challenges in
data analytics and security where conventional technologies
cannot deal with. Recently much research effort has been made
to address the challenges of energy big data analytics and
security. Energy big data analytics and security is a very broad
area involving large distributed infrastructure, big data
generation, transmission, storage, sharing and processing, and
security and privacy. In addition to the common challenges of
big data analytics and security, energy big data analytics will
add another dimension of difficulty in dealing with the unique
factor of tight cyber-physical couplings. A systematical and
A. V. Vasilakos is with the Department of Computer, Electrical and Space
Engineering, Luea University of Technology, 97187 Lulea, Sweden, (e-mail:
th.vasilakos@gmail.com).
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comprehensive survey on the new findings will help track the
latest developments in the field, which will be the main
motivation of this paper. Although there exist several surveys
on energy big data analytics, no survey has been found that has
incorporated the security and privacy issues of energy big data
analytics. Our survey will attempt to fill this gap.
C. Main Contributions
In this paper, we will present a survey reflecting the latest
developments in the field. Our contributions are manifold:
• It provides a first comprehensive survey covering both
energy big data analytics and its security in an
integrated framework.
• It proposes several well-designed taxonomies for
energy big data analytics and security, which can help
understand intriguing relationships among many
variables and concepts in the field.
• We have discussed several important lessons learned
from previous research activities. For example, power
system community has a different security concept
from cyber security community, while conventional
cryptography in the cyber security community does
not consider the factors of real-time and the tight
cyber-physical couplings in the advanced power
systems such as smart grids. Such parallel and un-
converged security research activities will leave
severe security loopholes in the gap. We also suggest
the adoption of expanded dependability framework to
close the gap.
• We have provided and discussed open research
questions for future research directions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
an overview is given on the challenges of energy big data
analytics and security/privacy. In Section III, an overall
taxonomy of energy big data analytics is presented. Various
algorithms and schemes on energy big data analytics are
classified under this proposed taxonomy. In Section IV, we
discuss energy big data infrastructure security from cyber-
physical aspect. In Section V, latest developments on energy
big data security and privacy are surveyed and summarized
from data-driven aspect. Section VI will discuss data-driven
schemes for resilient smart grid operations. Open research
questions for future research directions are discussed in Section
VII. Section VIII is devoted to the conclusions.
2
II. CHALLENGES OF ENERGY BIG DATA ANALYTICS AND
SECURITY
In this section, an overview is presented on the challenges of
energy big data analytics and security/privacy. A taxonomy of
challenges of energy big data analytics and security is shown in
Fig. 1.
A. Scalable and Interoperable Computing Infrastructure
A SG is a highly distributed system. The huge amount of data
is collected from every corner including energy generation,
distribution, renewal energy powered vehicles and smart meters
etc. It includes dynamic streaming and non-streaming data,
structure and un-structured data. Also there is a constant flow
of the data e.g. machine to machine, machine to human etc. It
is very challenging to store, share and process such data. A
scalable and interoperable computing infrastructure is
needed.
B. Real-time Big Data Intelligence
A report indicates that overlapping of peak demand from
individual homes may cause blackouts at some substations
within several seconds [5]. Therefore real-time decision is
essential for both system operation and real-time pricing. An
intelligent decision making needs to process current data and
historical data. Given the huge volume and high variety of the
data, it is challenging enough to process such data. With the
constraint of real-time demand, it will be extremely challenging
to design new algorithms that can provide real-time intelligence
from such big data.
C. Big Data Knowledge Representation and Processing
Big data analytics requires new machine learning theory and
artificial intelligence. It is well known that that the process and
outputs from machine learning and artificial intelligence lack of
intuitive physical interpretation [8]. Therefore it is important to
fill this gap by providing suitable knowledge interpretation in
order to make a sound decision based on the intelligence
derived from machine learning and artificial intelligence. This
task is challenging due to the big data nature of the smart energy
data.
D. Big Data Security and Privacy
Smart energy data contain individual user’s private information
which is required to be protected under various legal regulations
[9, 10]. The data can also contain sensitive information of an
organization. More importantly such data
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can be used to make decisions affecting the safe operation of
the critical infrastructure. Therefore security and privacy will
be an important issue. However, this is also very challenging
due to the big data nature of the smart energy data, tight cyber-
physical couplings, distributed and open environment of the
infrastructure.
III. ENERGY BIG DATA ANALYTICS: OVERALL TAXONOMY
A. Overview of Energy Big Data Analytics
Load modeling and forecasting are two major energy big data
intelligence applications. Load modeling is essential to the
understanding of the behavior of the individual and system in
achieving efficient energy management. Load forecasting has
generic load forecasting (long term and medium term) and short
term forecasting. The former is useful for system capacity
planning and planning etc. while the latter is useful for many
aspects including power distribution, demand-response and
pricing [11, 12].
Due to its real-time nature, short-term forecasting is most
challenging. Several models have been developed for energy
load forecasting over big data [12-22]. A cost-effective method
is the penalized linear regression-based MapReduce algorithms
[22], where the MapReduce algorithm can reduce the training
dataset significantly for the penalized linear

Table I: Summary of Smart Grid Data

Data Source Data Category Representative Data

Generator name, type, ID, baseMVA, rated power factor, control

mode, minimum reactive power output, maximum reactive power
Turbine Generator built-in output, minimum machine operating voltage, maximum machine
generator parameters operating voltage, low control power limit MW, low economic
based energy power limit MW, high economic power limit MW, high control
generation power limit MW, and commitment priority rank
Power including Connectivity connected bus numbers, and group number
Generation fossil, wind Operational Magnitude of generator MW output, generator heat rate curve,
Process and hydraulic data Status data voltage regulation conditions, real power participation factor,
Energy reactive power participation factor, post-contingency response
factor, real power dispatch factor, and transient reactance
System parameters Nominal power, open circuit voltage, short circuit current,
Solar Panel maximum power voltage, maximum power current, peak power,
and module efficiency
Operational data Module connectivity, DC output
Line data Connectivity, section series resistance, section series reactance,
shunt conductance, length of section, AC real power
Distribution Process Shunt device data Connectivity, shunt baseMVA, shunt voltage regulation
conditions, and control mode
Transformer data Connectivity, transformer voltage regulation conditions,
transformer’s status, transformer baseMVA, resistance and
reactance
Power consumption device Device type, number of devices, device ID, device parameters
data
Measurement device data Smart meter IDs and parameters; phasor measurement unit (PMU)
IDs and parameters; and AMI parameters
Consumer Process Load bus IDs, connectivity, load status, load analog value, load
model type, load type, minimum voltage, maximum voltage,
minimum real power, maximum real power, reference real power,
Load data minimum reactive power, maximum reactive power, reference
reactive power, load negative sequence conductance, load
negative sequence susceptance, load grounding resistance, and
load grounding reactance
System monitoring data Abnormal event notification, and estimated system state
Device control signal Generator control signal, switch control signal, smart meter
Intelligence Process control signal, and AMI control signal
Intelligence application Weather forecast data, planning, pricing, and market data
related data
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regression. The framework of the “similar day” approach, being

used in conventional short-term forecasting, seems to be useful
for the short-term forecasting over energy big data [17, 18].
Energy big data analytics is a very broad area, covering big data
generation infrastructure, big data computing
platform/architecture, big data intelligence applications, big
data intelligence algorithms and tools, and big data security and
privacy. To deal with such complicated environment, a well-
structured analysis framework is desirable. In the next section,
taxonomy will be designed in order to provide such a structured
analysis framework.
B. Overall Taxonomy
In order to understand the issues related to energy big data
analytics, it will be helpful to know what types of data a SG can
encounter. There are many different data related to energy data
analytics and it is impossible to provide a complete list here.
Based on the power system application data dictionary [23], we
provide a summary of various smart grid relevant energy data
as shown in Table I. Basically the classification is based on the
data generation source.
In order to provide a systematical analysis of the techniques
related to energy big data analytics, we need to provide a
structure or classification to these vast amounts of techniques.
Taxonomy is an effective tool in providing a structure for the
distributed and complicated environment. Designing a good
taxonomy is non-trivial as it needs to meet the seven principles
of taxonomy design [2]. By following the seven taxonomy
design principles [2], a taxonomy is designed for the overall
energy big data analytics as shown in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2, energy big data analytics are categorized into three
distinct categories: (i) energy big data architecture/platform, (ii)
energy big data intelligence, and (iii) energy big data security
and privacy. Different from a common perception that energy
big analytics is on energy big data intelligence, our proposed
taxonomy has placed the above three mentioned components
under an integrated framework.
This is because an optimal energy big data intelligence
scheme is tightly coupled with how energy big data is stored,
accessed, and communicated. Also as energy data involve
human privacy and system security, energy big data intelligence
schemes have to address the issue of privacy and security. For
example, the best platform of energy big data intelligence is
cloud computing where data are encrypted. Data intelligence
over these encrypted data has to tailor its design to complying
with the underlying privacy and security protection
mechanisms.
This overall taxonomy shows the intriguing relations among
various components under energy big data analytics. For
example, components of Control System Aspect, Cyber
Security Aspect, and energy big data oriented anomaly
detection will be tightly coupled with Data-driven Resilient SG
Management. Such knowledge will be helpful in the
understanding of the issues in the energy big data security and
privacy, which will be the focus in the remaining sections.
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IV. ENERGY BIG DATA INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM SECURITY:
CYBER PHYSICAL ASPECT
Smart energy data contain commercial information of
companies, and involve end users’ privacy. A SG, as an open
critical infrastructure, is vulnerable to cyber-attacks which
could lead to catastrophic disasters. In the energy sector, the
concept of system security differs from the one in the cyber
security community. Although energy system security and
cyber security are both integral parts of the energy
infrastructure security, little research effort has been made to
consider them in a coherent framework. In this section, we will
attempt to discuss energy infrastructure security methods in a
coherence framework and reveal lessons we have learned from
the prior ignorance of such coherence.
In the energy sector, security is defined as the ability of a
power system to withstand sudden disturbances [24, 25].
Traditionally such security is concerned with designing a
system that can provide acceptable service under sudden
disturbances from equipment faults and/or nature disasters.
Such design relies heavily on the technique called contingency
analysis [25]. The contingency analysis refers to a systematical
system security assessment, which is often dependent on
performing evaluation of the state estimator against possible
occurrence of credible contingencies to determine whether
steady-state operating limits would be violated. Traditionally
the possible occurrence of credible contingencies is most likely
from equipment faults and nature disasters. Therefore most
relevant theories and models are based on the parts random fault
and nature disaster occurrence probability distribution.
onomy of Energy Big Data Analytics
5
Unfortunately such energy systems are most unlikely to
withstand cyber-attacks. Instead of following the nature random
equipment fault/failure probability distribution, cyber-attacks
will usually target most critical components of the energy
system and conduct coordinated attacks, which will generate
concatenated failures leading to far more severe damages than
what can be coped with by the traditional security system
design. Security incorporating tight cyber-physical coupling
has become a new exciting research paradigm. With the
emerging smart grid, it will become a pressing research issue.
Recently some developments have been made to extend
power system security into covering cyber-attacks as
disturbances [26-29]. These works focus on two important
aspects of smart grid security: (i) Security framework covering
cyber aspect, and (ii) Cyber-physical coupling modeling.
Security framework covering cyber aspect: Traditional
power system security design is based on the properties of pure
power system physical components such as relay devices, and
switches etc. The random fault/failure properties have played a
pivotal role in system security assessment and resilient
mechanism design. For the emerging smart grid systems, it is
essential to develop a new security framework that can cover
other factors due to the introduction of the ICT technology. In
[26], a distributed agent based security framework is proposed
to deal with possible system damage caused by the cyber-
attacks. The proposed framework utilized peer-to-peer
communication architecture, reputation-based trust
management scheme and a data retransmission scheme to detect
possible cyber-attacks. Although such frameworks have
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incorporated ICT components into the security, they are mostly
based on the high-level abstraction of the cyber impact, e.,
reputation, in detecting possible cyber-attacks. Such coarse
generalization tends to generate too conservative results,
leading to inefficiency. A more accurate description of cyber-
physical interaction will help produce optimal results.
Cyber-physical coupling modeling: The most
unconventional security feature in smart grids is the tight
cyber-physical coupling. We have following two interesting
observations:
• Real-time factor: Traditional power system security
involves real-time factor while traditional
cryptography does not involve this factor.
• Cyber-physical interaction: Both traditional power
system security and cryptography do not consider such
interactions. Yet, in reality, cyber activities can impact
physical processes significantly and the characteristics
of a physical process can also be used for detecting
cyber-attacks [2].
Therefore, a good understanding of the tight cyber-physical
coupling will be essential for the smart grid infrastructure
security. Some efforts have been made on this aspect. In [28],
cause-effect relationships of cyber-physical system have been
used to estimate the impact of cyber-attacks. A graph theory
approach is used to model such relationships. Although cause-
effect relationships of cyber-physical systems are very
important for the understanding the cyber-physical coupling
characteristics, such relationships are from qualitative aspect
which is not sufficient. This is because the physical operation
process of a power system depends also on the real-time
quantitative relationships of the cyber-physical coupling.
In [27], a security-oriented stochastic risk index CPINDEX
is proposed to measure the security level of the underlying
cyber-physical settings in the smart grid. This is the first
comprehensive attempt in describing the quantitative
relationships of the cyber-physical coupling and their impact to
a smart grid system security. The proposed CPINDEX utilizes
the information of system logs and other information to
estimate the security index by using belief propagation
algorithms. An interesting security measure named cyber-
physical index is proposed as follows:
CP ( s ) = ∑ CI PC (α ) × Pr( root (CTα ) = 0 | s ) , (1)
α ∈ A( s )
where s is system security state, α represents a critical asset,
CI PC (α ) is the physical contingency ranking centrality index,
and CTα represents Boolean expressions consequence trees
related to low level detectable incidents. A(s) refers to all the
assets in the control of a physical equipment and the probability
that the asset α is affected due to the attack at the current
network security state is represented by Pr( rootCTα ) = 0 | s ).
This index can effectively measure the severity of the
damage/risk when a specific physical incident happens due to
cyber-attacks. We can have following observations:
6
• System security state is not a well-defined concept,
which is hard to describe quantitatively. Security risk
could be a better mechanism.
• Mathematically eq.(1) represents the average or
expectation of the impact to the assets being controlled
by the same physical equipment. In practical
applications, measurement of the maximum impact to
the system will be more concerned.
In summary, we can have following observations:
• Most of system security works are within the control
engineering community where the major research
focus is on physical process and many conventional
cyber security issues, e.g., confidentiality etc., are
seldom considered.
• The system security definition is very similar to the
concept of reliability in the domain of cyber security:
Under the impact of cyber-attacks on command
signals, and system state etc., the system can maintain
the service quality within a tolerable error range [30].
The dependability framework can integrate these two
security definitions seamlessly together [30].
V. ENERGY BIG DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY: DATA-
DRIVEN ASPECT
In the domain of cyber security, security is defined and
characterized as follows [30]:
• Reliability: Even under the disturbances of faults and
cyber-attacks, the system correct service can be
maintained within a certain level.
• Confidentiality: Property that data or information is
not made available to unauthorized persons or
processes. In the proposed dependability framework
[30], it refers to the property that unauthorized persons
or processes will not be able to observe the
values/contents of the sensitive variables of the
relevant systems.
• Availability: Readiness for correct service. The correct
service is defined as delivered system behavior that is
within the error tolerance boundary. .
• Integrity: Absence of malicious external disturbance,
which makes the system output off its desired service.
• Maintainability: Ability to undergo modifications and
repairs.
• Authenticity: Ability to provide services with provable
origin.
• Non-repudiation: Services provided cannot be
disclaimed later.
Although many security solutions have been made for SGs,
most of them are not big data oriented. Recently new
developments have been made for energy big data security and
privacy [31-36]. These new achievements cover three important
aspects of energy big data security: (i) big data oriented
cryptosystems [31, 32], (ii) big data oriented privacy-preserving
intelligent financial applications [33], and (iii) big data oriented
anomaly detection [33-35, 37].
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A. Big Data Oriented Cryptosystems
Cryptography is the most fundamental component in a
security system. As a SG is of a hierarchical structure, its
relevant big data oriented cryptosystems will normally have a
focus on individual hierarchical levels. Existing energy big data
oriented cryptosystems can be classified into following two
categories: (i) AMI and smart meters oriented big data privacy
and security, and (ii) scalable privacy-preserving data-sharing
and authentication schemes for overall smart grids, and (iii)
Smart grid big data oriented scalable public-key certificate
revocation schemes.
1) AMI and Smart Meters Oriented Big Data Privacy and
Security
AMI and smart meters are major components of big data
generation and they provide the major source for intelligent
applications. Data aggregation mechanisms can effectively
reduce the data size for further processing and address the
privacy issue. Although much research effort has been made on
how to perform data aggregation, less effort has been made on
how to make methods of performing data aggregation and
encryption scalable. Recently some progress has been made on
this through reducing the computation load of real-time smart
meter data encryption [38], and providing scalable encryption
[39, 40]. In [38], an online/offline attribute based encryption
(ABE) scheme is proposed which is based on the J.Hur’s ABE
scheme with hidden policy. The involved data privacy and
policy privacy are achieved due to the properties of the J.Hur’s
ABE scheme with hidden policy. On the other hand, the
computational load of the encryption is significantly reduced by
splitting the encryption algorithm into online and offline phases
where the tedious decryption operations can be delegated to the
offline phases. This can effectively reduce the real-time
computing demand which is related to the big data velocity
aspect.
In [39], a privacy-enhanced data aggregation scheme is
proposed against internal attackers in smart grid. In this scheme,
electricity suppliers can learn about the current energy usage of
each neighborhood to arrange energy supply and distribution
without knowing the individual electricity consumption of each
user. Secure batch verification and formal proofs are provided.
This is the first scheme against internal attackers.
In this proposed scheme, the aggregator and users generate
their relevant public-private key pairs, then the offline trusted
third party (TTP) sends the blinding factors to the aggregator
and each user. The end user U i collects his/her power
consumption reading mi from own smart meter and computes
(
a ciphertext CTi = g 0 i H 2 (t ) h ri
m
)
' πi
and a signature σ i . Upon
receiving the signature and cipertext pairs from all users, the
aggregator can compute the aggregated energy usages of the
n
neighborhood ∑ mi by taking the discrete log of ( g )i∑=1 mi . This
n
i =1
is feasible as the total power usage within a neighborhood is
not a large number within a regular interview, and the
computation can take polynomial time using the Pollard’s
lambda method.
7
Although such privacy-preserving data aggregation solutions
are strong from cryptographic aspect, they are vulnerable to
human factor attack [41, 42]. For example, an adversary can
infer a person’s meter reading from the knowledge of the
person’s presence or absence in the property. In [42], a new
attack has been identified and formalized. The attack could
exploit about the presence or absence of a specific person to
infer his meter readings via human-factor-aware differential
aggregation (HAD). This attack could not be addressed by
existing privacy-preserving aggregation protocols proposed for
smart grids. In order to address this problem, two new
protocols, including basic scheme and advanced scheme, have
been proposed to resist the HAD attack [42].
Wan et al. [40] show that a recent proposed key management
scheme for AMI suffers from the desynchronization attack and
is not scalable. To address these issues, a new scalable key
management scheme (SKM) based on the combination of
identity-based cryptosystem and efficient key tree technique is
proposed [40]. The complexity of the proposed SKM is O(log
n) in each aspect of computation and communication, which is
scalable in terms of the number of smart meters n. Although it
provides a solution for scalable key management for AMI and
associated smart meters, it does not address the issue of secure
communication and /or secure data sharing with other parts of
the smart grid, e.g., control centers etc. It is desirable to develop
a framework that can cover the whole smart grid operation
ranges. This issue can be addressed by cryptosystems designed
for the overall system.
2) Scalable Privacy-preserving Data-sharing and
Authentication Schemes for overall Smart Grids
A smart grid is a large distributed system with hierarchical
structure. Most existing research works consider only the
lowest level components e.g. smart meters, which will be
exposed to new attacks when coming across different
hierarchical levels [43]. Recently some developments have
been made to address this issue by covering higher hierarchical
levels. In [44], a SmartAnalyzer security analysis tool is
proposed for analyzing threats in AMI. It can provide formal
modeling of AMI configuration and systematic diagnosing of
smart meter unusual traces. The accuracy and scalability of the
tool are evaluated on an AMI testbed and various synthetic test
networks. In [42], the scope and functionalities of a smart grid
have been introduced covering its automation and control
system, and communications. It presents a general SCADA
cyberattack process and proposed a conceptual layered
framework for protecting power grid automation systems
against cyberattacks without compromising the timely
availability of control and signal data. The on-site test of the
developed security prototype system has been discussed.
In addition to the work on directly handling the smart meter
data, research efforts have been made on designing scalable
cryptosystems for the overall smart grids [45-49]. The
homomorphic encryption mechanism has been used to design a
distributed smart grid dataset access control scheme achieving
both privacy-preserving data aggregation and access control
[49], and scalable privacy-preserving demand response scheme
with adaptive key evolution in smart grids [47].
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Recently more general SG oriented scalable cryptosystems
have been developed [48]. In [48], an identity-based ring
signature scheme with forward security has been proposed. The
property of the identify-based ring signature can eliminate the
process of certificate verification. The property of forward
security can enjoy the following advantage: if a secrete key of
a user has been compromised, all previous generated signatures
including this user still remain valid. This property is very
useful for large scale data sharing SG system because it is
infeasible to request all data owners to re-authenticate their data
when one user has been compromised. In [31], a secure cloud
computing based framework for big data information
management in smart grids is proposed. The proposed
framework is a hierarchical structure consisting of multiple
interconnected regional clouds. Four types of services are
provided via this cloud computing architecture: (i) Information
storages. They store all smart grid information received from
intelligent devices such as smart meters. (ii) General user
services. They supply all services that an energy consumer will
need. (iii) Control and management services, and (iv)
Electricity distribution services. Based on this architecture, an
identity-based cryptography scheme is proposed for
authentication of data and nodes. Confidentiality and
nonrepudiation security features have also been supported. The
proposed security scheme provides two related but different
constructions for confidentiality service and authentication
service.
Confidentiality Service:
Key generation phase: The trusted external party PKG
generates two groups G1 , G2 of prime order q and an
computational efficient pairing: e : G1 × G2 → G2 , generator g
and hash functions H i . It picks up a random key s∈Z q and
computes its public key u = g . Then it sets up the master key
s
mk = s for the top cloud, and distribute the set of public
parameters params=( G 1 ,G2 ,e, g ,u , H 1 , H 2 ) to top and regional
clouds and end-users. Upon receiving identities TC, IS, A, and
EU from the top cloud, information storage unit in the regional
cloud, service in the regional cloud, and the end user, the PKG
will calculate their corresponding private keys
K TC = H 1 (TC ) , K IS = H 1 ( IS ) , K SerA = H 1 ( SerA) , K EU = H 1 ( EU )
s s
and returns to them.
Encryption phase: For the encryption of the message M
intended for the top cloud, an entity in the regional cloud can
select a random key r ∈ Z q and compute the ciphertext
C1 = g , C 2 = M ⋅ e (u , H 1 (TC ) ) . Then it sends the ciphertext to
r r
the top cloud. Once receiving the above ciphertext, the top
cloud TC can recover the message as M = C 2 / e (C1 , K TC ) .
Similarly encryption and decryption can be performed between
an end user and information storage unit in the regional cloud;
proxy and the service etc.
Authentication Service:
The key generation process is similar to the identity based
encryption (IBE) scheme used in the confidentiality service
Transactions on Smart Grid
8
oriented scheme. A signature component is added for the
authentication service as follows:
For a message M, a cloud can pick a random number r∈Z q
and compute its signature as σ 1 = g Mr K TC ,σ 2 = g 0r where
g1 = H 1 (TC )∈G1 , g M = H 1 (TC , M )∈G1 . Any party can verify this
signature by using the cloud’s pubic key by checking
e ( g 0 ,σ 1 )= e (u , g1 )e (σ 2 , g M ) .
3) Smart Grid Big Data Oriented Scalable Public-key
Certificate Revocation Schemes
Most of cryptosystems for energy big data are public key
infrastructure (PKI) based due to the advantages of access
control, and nonrepudiation etc. However PKI schemes will
require public key certificates in binding the user and the
associated public key. There exists a need for certificate
revocation when the certificate expires, security policy changes
and/or a key or a node has been compromised. In addressing
this issue, scalable and efficient SG oriented PKI certificate
revocation schemes have been proposed [50-52]. In [52], a
Bloom filter based scheme is proposed for the efficient
certificate revocation for large-scale AMI networks. The
proposed scheme is constructed based on the Merkle tree to
enable the gateway to provide proof for certificate revocation
without contacting the certificate authority in achieving
significant overhead savings. In [50], a scheme based on the
compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) is proposed
for pseudonymous public key infrastructure. It is shown the
proposed scheme is secure and the size of the certificate
revocation list is linear with the number of revoked certificate
series. This scheme has been applied to the vehicle-to-grid
communication application [53].
The cryptosystems discussed above are mainly concerned
with data security and node authentication. They are not
suitable for other important energy big data security related
applications such as privacy-preserving intelligent applications,
and energy big data oriented anomaly detection. For these
applications, different security mechanisms are needed.
4). Big Data Oriented Privacy-preserving Intelligent
Applications
For privacy-preserving intelligent applications, the big
s s
challenge is how to find useful information from potential
protected/encrypted big data. Efficiency/scalability is another
hard constraint. Privacy-preserving pricing is a typical
application of big energy analytics. In [54], a usage-based
dynamic pricing (UDP) scheme is proposed for smart grid
which is privacy-preserving. The proposed scheme has 4
phases: (i) The utility company first defines the usage threshold
em of the local power grid, defines the dynamic price function
f(), and selects random secretes for each community and its
gateway C. (ii) Customers will report their electricity usage per
time slot in the encrypted mode to their community gateway C
where decryption will be conducted to obtain these data. Then
it sends back a price indicator to the customer. (iii) The
community gateway C will forward the received electricity
usage to the utility company. (iv) The utility company will
recover the electricity usage and compute the actual electricity
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price for each customer. The above scheme is constructed
through the homomorphic encryption technique where privacy
is guaranteed. Scalability and efficiency have been achieved via
this distributed encryption process.
The above scheme is targeting a specific application of the
SG in a community environment. It is desirable to develop more
generic energy big data intelligent schemes to accommodate
variant applications in a more general environment. One
solution is to retrieve general features over encrypted energy
big data [32, 55-57]. In [55], a privacy-preserving deep
computation model is proposed. The proposed model uses
Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) encryption scheme
to encrypt the private data and then employs cloud servers to
perform the high-order back-propagation algorithm on the
encrypted data for deep computation model training. The
proposed scheme is highly scalable with privacy-preserving.
Direct feature retrieval over encrypted big data is very
difficult and costly. A more cost-effective way is to first retrieve
all relevant records (raw features) from the big data and then
perform relevant intelligent applications based on these records.
A range query has been a popular operation in database in
retrieving all records where some value is within a range, which
will very useful for the efficient application over big data. For
example, in the smart grid financial application, energy buyers
can filter out the energy with reasonable price with the help of
the keyword specifying the range of price. For privacy-
preserving query, query over encrypted database is the
solution. Unfortunately existing encrypted keyword search
schemes in smart grid auction market cannot achieve range
query of keywords [57]. In order to address this issue, some
recent research efforts have been made [32, 56, 57]. In [57], a
SG auction market oriented scheme is proposed which can
support both range query and ranked search over encrypted big
data. Based on the homomorphic Pailier encryption, it can
aggregate multidimensional keywords of the buyer and the
seller where the comparison between the keywords of all sellers
and one buyer can be conducted with only one calculation. In
[32], a more generic privacy-preserving range query (PaRQ)
scheme is proposed to perform query over encrypted metering
data for the intelligent financial auditing applications. The PaRq
constructs a hidden vector encryption based range query
predicate to encrypt the searchable attributes and session keys
of the encrypted data, The requester’s range can be transferred
into two query tokens to be used to find the matched query
results. More specifically, for a range query
p = ( a1 ≤ x1 ≤ b1 ) ∧ ( a2 ≤ x2 ≤ b2 )... ∧ ( an ≤ xn ≤ bn ), the
control center will divide P into two parts:
p≥ = ( a1 ≤ x1 ) ∧ ( a2 ≤ x2 )... ∧ ( an ≤ xn ),
p≤ = ( x1 ≤ b1 ) ∧ ( x2 ≤ b2 )... ∧ ( xn ≤ bn ).
By using Boneh and Water’s Hidden Vector Encryption
(HVE) predicate encryption [58], privacy-preserving tokens
with constant size can be generated which can reduce
communication overhead, computation overhead and response
time significantly. Security analysis demonstrates that data
confidentiality and query privacy are preserved. Also
simulation results show that the proposed scheme is scalable
which is suitable for big data analytics. A major limitation of
this scheme is the specific environment setting where a central
control center is connected to two cloud servers and acts as a
proxy for the users and the searcher. A practical SG would
require more general and complex environment such as more
distributed cloud servers, multiple control centers, and direct
communication between users and clouds etc.
5) Summary of Energy Big Data Oriented Cryptosystems
In Table II, we provide summarized comparisons of various
energy big data oriented cryptosystems. The comparison is
made from the aspects of functionality including
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, and
privacy-preserving intelligence; scalability, cost and data
source.

Table II Summary of Energy Big Data Oriented Cryptosystem

Security and Privacy Features Energy Big Data Oriented Cryptosystem
Identity-based key Cloud service Privacy-
tree cryptosystem based Hierarchical preserving
Cryptosystem Range Query
Scheme
AMI& Smart Meter Data Good N/A
Confidentiality Comm. Good
Overall SG AMI& Smart Good N/A
Meter Data Comm. N/A
Stored Data Access N/A Good Good
Integrity AMI& Smart Meter Data Good Good N/A
Comm.
Overall SG AMI& Smart N/A Good N/A
Meter Data Comm.
Stored Data Access N/A Good Good
Authenticity AMI& Smart Meter Data Good Good N/A
Comm.
Overall SG AMI& Smart N/A Good N/A
Meter Data Comm.
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Stored Data Access
Non-repudiation AMI& Smart Meter Data
Comm.
Overall SG AMI& Smart
Meter Data Comm.
Stored Data Access
Privacy-preserving intelligent applications
Scalability
Cost
References
B. Big Data Oriented Anomaly Detection
Although traditional cryptographic methods can provide
strong solutions for message based security, they are ineffective
in addressing issues related to real-time tight cyber-physical
couplings because conventional cryptography does not consider
real-time factor and tight cyber-physical couplings. On the
other hand, a power system obeys relevant physical laws.
Therefore we can utilize such physical process knowledge to
help detect anomaly behavior which could be related to cyber-
attacks and/or energy theft. In [29], a reputation based trust
management system has been introduced. It aims to address the
risks of cyber-attacks originated from misusing information
generated within the smart grid. The risks of cyber-attacks are
broad [29]:
• Customer profiling attack: smart meter data contain
private information of user’s usage. They can be used
to determine, among many other things, when
residential customers are and are not at home. Such
information will be detrimental to individuals if it is
used by thieves.
• IP spoofing attack: It can be used to redirect smart
grid information to an adversary’s own computer for
further analysis. It can also cause a smart grid
communication node appear non-responsive and
faulty, which will reduce its assigned trust value in
trust based security mechanisms.
• Man-in-the-middle attack: Such attacks can either
covertly monitor or manipulate information between
two smart grid communication nodes.
• Denial of service attack: It can prevent smart grid
from providing services.
• System hijacking attack: It can obtain unauthorized
remote access to a smart grid node.
Anomaly detection is a powerful mechanism for smart grid
fault detection [59], power theft and fraud detection [36, 59],
and cyber intrusion detection [37, 59]. Unfortunately most of
the existing solutions are not big data oriented. Recently several
algorithms have been developed in addressing this issue [33-35,
59]. These algorithms can be classified into following two
categories: (i) general energy big data oriented anomaly
detection algorithms applicable to electricity theft, fault and
cyber intrusions, (ii) energy theft based algorithm, and (iii)
physical process based anomaly detection scheme against false
data-injection attacks.
10
N/A Good Good
Good Good N/A
N/A Good N/A
N/A Good Good
N/A N/A Good
Good Good Good
Low Medium Medium
[39, 40] [31, 48] [54, 56, 57]
1) Generic Energy Big Data Anomaly Detection
In a smart grid, anomaly based intrusion detection system
(IDS) design is far more challenging and also critical due to the
real-time and cyber-physical interaction factors. For example, a
delayed command signal or a compromised command signal
can cause the physical power system to become unstable. As
there could exist multiple sources, e.g., fault, cyber intrusion
and electricity theft, leading to the observed abnormal data of a
smart grid, it is not always easy to determine which source is
behind the observed abnormal data. Therefore research efforts
have been made to design general energy big data oriented
anomaly detection algorithms applicable to electricity theft,
fault and cyber intrusions without identifying the source
causing the anomaly [33, 34]. In [33], a scalable method is
proposed to observe anomaly behavior over energy big data.
Supervised learning classifiers have been applied to finding
anomaly data. It can be used to detect electricity theft, fault, and
cyber intrusions. This approach has utilized some ad hoc
intuitions in addressing the big data challenge.
A more rigorous algorithm is proposed in [34] for detecting
energy big data anomaly algorithm. In [34], a data-driven
scheme is proposed for monitoring the abnormal events
happening in a smart grid. In order to address the issue of high-
dimensional analysis, a big data architecture is designed based
on the random matrix theory. A statistic named mean spectral
radius (MSR) is proposed to reflect the correlations of system
data in different dimensions. The smart grid state can be
monitored from a distributed MSR estimated locally. It is
shown that anomaly events of the smart grid can be detected
with the proposed scheme under reasonable cost. More
specifically suppose data collected at the energy system at time
t i is expressed as a vector x̂ti . Use Ωx̂ to represent all the
collections of the raw data accumulated in the database. The
size ( x̂ti ) represents the dimension of the data at time t i whose
upper bound will be very big due to the large number of
variables in the system. By using the probability Ring Law, the
smart grid system state can be estimated as the mean of the
~
radius of all eigenvalues of Z that is formed by the interested
data area specified by a split-window (e.g., N rows, T columns).
If this value deviates significantly across two consecutive time
windows, an anomaly will be announced.
2) Energy Theft Detection
Energy theft has been a serious problem in the power service
industry. It is estimated that the annual losses in the United
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States alone can reach $6 billion [60]. In [60], investigation has
been conducted on adversary means of defrauding by
manipulating AMI systems. An energy theft attack tree has
been constructed to explore various vulnerabilities of energy
theft. It is found that manipulating the demand information at
AMI is the most effective way for energy theft [60].
Energy theft is another important issue which can be
detected via machine learning based anomaly detection. In [61],
a multi-sensor energy detection framework for the Ami is
proposed. The proposed scheme, named as AMIDS, is an AMI
intrusion detection system. It fuses meter audit logs of physical
and cyber events with consumption data to increase the
accuracy in detecting theft-related behavior. One limitation of
this approach is the difficulty in collecting reliable physical
activity logs for the large-scale smart grid. In [62], a game-
theoretic framework is proposed to model the adversarial nature
of the electricity theft problem. It considers two environments,
i.e., unregulated monopoly and perfect competition. This
framework can help detect electricity theft through the
observation of the power usage behavior. Suppose we use
B
q g , q f to represent expected energy usage from genuine type of
customers and fraudulent type of customers respectively. The
framework considers following two hypotheses:
[ ]
iid
H g : Y1 ,..., YK ≅ f g ,
i i
E Yt i = q g ,
[ ]
iid
H f : Y1 ,..., YK ≅ f f , E Yt = q f < q g ,
i i i B
i
where yt is a meter measurement collected at the ith customer’s
meter at time t which is a realization of the random variable Yt i
. f g , f f denote the probability density function of the meter
measurements of the genuine customer and fraudulent customer
respectively. Setting a threshold τ , for a customer i, then we
have following fraudulent detection rule:
K i
 ∑ yt < τ , fraudulent
t =1
K
 ∑ yi ≥ τ , genuine
t =1 t
It is interesting to observe that, like many other similar
approaches, the above mentioned game-theoretic framework
for energy theft detection is based on behaviors of individual
meter reading. They are not applicable when dealing with
coordinated attacks. In [63], two types of data attacks have been
investigated. One attack is that an adversary has compromised
a sufficient number of smart meters so that the network state
becomes unobservable by the control center. A graph theoretic
approach has been proposed to characterize the smallest set of
attacked smart meters that can cause network unobservability.
Another type of attack is that an adversary controls only a small
number of smart meters. Such attack can be examined from a
decision theoretic perspective for both the control center and
the adversary.
3) Physical Process based Anomaly Detection Scheme against
False Data-injection Attacks
Transactions on Smart Grid
11
With the emerging smart grid, a new type of cyberintrusion
is looming which attempts to alter the power load through the
Internet via automatic and distributed software intruding agents
[64]. Such attacks can compromise direct load control
command signals, demand side management price signals etc.
In [64], a systematical investigation has been conducted to
identify a variety of practical loads that can be vulnerable to
Internet-based load altering attacks. It also provides an
overview of potential defense mechanisms including:
• Protection of Command and Price Signal using (i) private
key encryption and message authentication code, (ii) efficient
group key management
• Protection of smart meters and data centers
• Load anomaly detection
In a smart grid, state estimation is used to estimate the power
grid state based on the meter measurement data. This
information will be used in the reliable operation of the smart
grid, contingency analysis, optimal power flow, and pricing etc.
[65, 66]. Recently false data-injection attacks have been
reported which can bypass existing bad data detection
techniques [66]. This discovery has sparked a strong interest in
exploring various strategies of false data-injection attacks and
countering measures [65-81].
(4) Suppose the state x = ( x , x ,..., x )T and the measurement data
1 2 n
is expressed as z = Hx + e where H is related to network
configurations and the measurement error, and e is assumed
normally distributed with zero mean. Conventional bad data
measurement detection is based the observation whether the
measurement residual z− Hx is larger than a predefined
threshold τ or not [66]. In the basic false data-injection
attacks, the measurement data received at the control center will
be z a = z + a where a is the attack vector. When the adversary
chooses a= Hc as the attack vector, we will have z = H ( x + c ) + e
where such attacks are unobservable as the measurement
residual will be within the bad data detection threshold [66]. In
. (5) practice, an adversary can only compromise a small set of
meters, and hence a sparse structure a is generated where most
of a ’s entries are zeros. These k nonzero entries will
correspond to the k compromised meters.
In [68], it is shown that smallest size unobservable attack,
i.e., an observable attack with smallest number of compromised
meters k, can be identified in polynomial time via the graph
theory. If the adversary can compromise a much smaller set of
meters, i.e., in the weal attack regime, it is possible to detect the
presence of such attacks via the generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT). A similar work can be found in [82] where the
problem of finding the minimum number of measurement
points to be attacked undetectably can be reduced to minimum
cut problems on hypergraphs. Most recently two data-driven
strategies for unobservable attacks are presented where detailed
knowledge of system parameters are not needed [83]. The first
strategy is to affect the system state by hiding directly the attack
vector in the system subspace. The second strategy misleads the
bad data detection mechanism so that data not under attack are
removed.
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Most recent developments along this line are: (i) the
centralized sparse attack construction case is extended to a
distributed framework for both the estimation and attack
problems. Corresponding optimization is formulated together
with a proposed solution [74], (ii) an optimal data-injection
attacking strategy is designed to selecting a set of meters which
can cause maximum damage. A temporal-based detection using
online nonparametric cusum change detection mechanism is
proposed to detect such attacks [65], and (iii) a new CUSUM-
type algorithms based on the generalized likelihood ration
(GLR) is proposed for centralized and distributed cyber-attack
detection. The proposed scheme is efficient in terms of low
communication overhead and small detection delay [69].
The above schemes are based on the principle of power
system physical process. The fundamental cause of false data-
injection attacks is the modification of sensed meter data. At the
data level, cryptographic authentication mechanisms such as
message authentication code can address effectively the issue
of data integrity. Recently some effort has been made in this
field. In [73], an anomaly detection mechanism is designed with
an integrated watermarking component to address the false data
injection attacks in smart grids. This scheme can help detect
more stealthy attacks that involve subtle manipulation of the
measurement data. In [71], a polynomial-based compromise-
resilient en-route filtering scheme (PREF) is proposed to
filtering false injected data effectively and achieve a high
resilience to the number of compromised nodes without relying
on static routes and node localization. The limitation is the
specific application environment of wireless sensor networks
where the filtering relies on the cooperation of the sensor nodes
during the message forwarding process. It is not applicable for
the meter that does not go through this forwarding process, e.g.,
the meter is just one hop to the smart grid. Also the pre-stored
master key mechanism will make it costly in key update. As a
matter of fact, hardware attacks can reveal data stored in the
hardware. Most recently a short-term state forecasting-aided
method is proposed to detect smart grid general false data
injection attacks [84]. This idea is to extend the approximate
DC model to a more general linear model that can handle both
supervisory control and data acquisition and phasor
measurement unit measurements.
VI. DATA-DRIVEN SCHEMES FOR RESILIENT SG OPERATION:
SECURITY-CONSTRAINED OPTIMAL POWER FLOW (SCOPF)
The network state estimated from the state estimator can be
used for resilient SG operations including planning, operational
planning, pricing and real-time operation of the system [85]. In
some cases, a severe incident e.g. natural disaster or cyber-
attack can trigger contingency actions and it is very important
that the SG can maintain resilient operations. The SCOPF is a
useful tool for this purpose which can make correct
actions/decisions against a set of predefined contingencies. Due
to the big data nature of the SG, the SCOPF problem will
become a nonlinear, non-convex, and large-scale optimization
problem with both continues and discrete variables, which is
very challenging [85]. SCOPF problem usually has two aspects
(i) SCOPF problem and (ii) SCOPF problem solution including
reducing the size of the SCOPF problem, efficient algorithms
12
for handling challenges brought about by the mixed continuous
variables and discrete variables.
SCOPF problem formulation includes the modelling of a
limited number of post-contingency control actions,
determining the minimum number of control actions,
determining the sequence of control actions, and handling
voltage and transient stability in SCOPF [85]. In [86], an
optimization-based approach is proposed for identifying
constraints that are necessary and sufficient to the description
of the feasible set of an SCOPF problem. It is shown that the
resulting sizes of SCOPF problems are much smaller and can
be solved much faster.
Recently some efforts have been made to incorporate
cyberattack issue into the SCOPF problem formulation. In [87],
investigation has been conducted in analyzing the behavior of
the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) algorithm in the presence of
false data-injection and the resulting consequences to the
system operator. It characterizes the set of attacks that may lead
the operator to apply the erroneous OPF recommendation. In
[88], it considers the problem of characterizing impacts of bad
data on real-time locational marginal price (LMP). Numeric
simulations are provided to illustrate the worst performance for
IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 networks.
SCOPF problem solution includes reducing the size of the
SCOPF problem, efficient algorithms for handling challenges
brought about by the mixed continuous variables and discrete
variables [85]. For large-scale smart grids, it is impossible to
obtain the direct solution of the SCOPF problems due to the
memory limitation and/or prohibitive computation times [89].
As a result, many indirect solutions are proposed such as
iterative contingency selection schemes; decomposition
method; network compression and hybrid methods that
combine contingency selection and network compression [89].
VII. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Smart energy big data analytics is a very complex and
challenging topic. In addition to sharing many common issues
with the generic big data analytics, smart energy big data
involve extensively with physical processes where data
intelligence can have a huge impact to the safe operation of the
systems in real-time. This tight cyber-physical dimension has
brought about many exciting research problems. Following is
the list of open research problems:
• Holistic and modular architectures: Existing
architectures for smart energy big data analytics are
based on generic cloud computing architectures. They
are either too general to be implemented or too specific
without covering sufficient functionalities. A holistic
and modular energy big data analytics architecture
based platform is needed to ensure the widest coverage
of issues related to smart energy big data analytics and
interoperability among various modules including new
modules.
• Platform incorporating real-time control: Existing
platforms for smart energy big data analytics is mainly
for data sharing and intelligence, or precisely system
monitoring and financial related intelligence. It is
desirable to incorporate a real-time control module
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that can produce real-time physical control signals
based on the smart energy big data analytics.
• Co-design of smart energy big data analytics and
security mechanism: Existing smart energy big data
analytics schemes and the security schemes are
designed separately. Security functions are mostly
aftermath thoughts. A co-design of smart energy big
data analytics and security mechanisms can produce a
seamless integrated framework which can reduce the
security risk to the minimum.
• Distributed and parallel intelligence: Smart energy big
data analytics is experiencing data explosion collected
from distributed sources. A distributed and parallel
intelligence can effectively address this problem
which can also reduce the raw data accumulation and
communication significantly. Existing aggregation or
summarization methods can achieve the same aim of
reducing large raw data. However as aggregation or
summarization methods are targeting local raw data
without considering overall system target, they can
lose very useful information which would be needed
for specific applications. A good distributed
intelligence algorithm should be built upon a solid
theoretical basis to approximate the relevant overall
performance indicator. For example, for anomaly
detection in a wireless sensor network, distributed
local intelligence
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13
based on the observations from a single node or
several neighboring nodes should be able to estimate
the overall sensor network data probability density
distribution with a solid theoretical basis [75, 76].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have surveyed the latest developments in
the field of energy big data analytics and security/privacy. We
have provided a comprehensive coverage of energy big data
analytics and security/privacy ranging from energy big data
architecture, intelligence applications, cryptosystem design,
system security assessment, cyber intrusion detection, secure
financial intelligent application, and electricity theft.
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