Analysis
August 31, 2009
Summary: A year ago, a World Cup
qualifying match between Turkey
and Armenia signaled a thaw in
relations between the traditionally
hostile neighbors. Such a normal-
izing in relations would also arm
Washington and the new administra-
tion against long-running attempts
by the Armenian-American diaspora
to push through a Congressional
resolution that would label the
1915 mass slaughter of Ottoman
Armenians as genocide. At a time
when Turkish support in Afghanistan
and Iraq are critical, adoption of
such a piece of legislation would
most certainly trigger a crisis in
Turkish-American relations.
However, Armenia and Turkey have
conflicting interests in Azerbaijan
that have brought rapprochement
between the two countries to a
stand still, making the prospects of
peace that much more unlikely.
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Turkey and Armenia: Soccer Diplomacy Shifting
Rules are Creating a Zero-Sum Game
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — On September 6 of
last year, Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s
president, became the first-ever
Turkish leader to set foot in Armenia.
The occasion was a World Cup pre-
qualifier match pitting Turkey against
Armenia. Many viewed Gül’s decision
to accept his Armenian counterpart
Serzh Sargysan’s invitation auguring
the establishment of formal ties
between the traditionally hostile
neighbors and the re-opening of their
long frozen border.
Normalizing relations between Turkey
and Armenia has been a pressing goal
for successive American administra-
tions. Friendship between the two
countries would arm Washington
against long-running attempts by
the Armenian-American diaspora to
push through a Congressional bill
that would formally classify the mass
slaughter in 1915 of Armenians under
the Ottoman Empire as genocide.
With anti-American sentiments in
Turkey riding high, adoption of such
legislation would be certain to trigger
another crisis in Turkish-American
ties at a time when Turkish support
is crucial to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
Additionally, peace between Turkey
and Armenia would draw the land-
locked former Soviet Republic out of
Russia’s orbit and help cement West-
ern influence—and stability—in the
southern Caucasus.
A Turkey that is engaged with
Armenia would be in a stronger
position to coax the latter into a
settlement with Azerbaijan over the
disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.
Peace between Azerbaijan and
Armenia would not only blunt
Russian influence but Iran’s as well.
Finally, there is a moral dimension.
Extending the hand of friendship to
Armenia would help mitigate if not
erase decades of bitterness harbored
by millions of Armenians across the
globe.
Over a year ago, these arguments
propelled Turkish policymakers to
abandon the position that peace with
Armenia would only be possible if
Armenia made peace with Azerbaijan.
Aided by Swiss mediation and Ameri-
can encouragement, Turkish and
Armenian diplomats held a series of
secret talks aimed at establishing ties
and re-opening the border.
Analysis
Peace at last?
Gül’s September visit to Yerevan gave the process a big
boost. Six months later, on April 22, the two countries
announced that they had initiated a “roadmap” setting out
the parameters for formalizing ties. The roadmap called
for a set of joint commissions that would, among other
things, examine the events of 1915, and foresaw the even-
tual re-opening of the border without preconditions. The
timing of the announcement, however, raised suspicions in
Yerevan, as the roadmap had been initiated well before April
22. Was it meant to prevent U.S. President Barack Obama
from using the term “genocide” in his April 24th statement,
marking the anniversary of the killings? Obama’s use of the
phrase “Medz Yeghern,” which means “Great Catastrophe”
in Armenian, provoked deep anger among American-Ar-
menians who recalled his campaign pledge to recognize the
genocide. Turkey wasn’t thrilled by the reference, but at least
the G-word had been averted. The expectation in Washing-
ton was that Turkey would now sign off with Armenia.
Ankara shifts the goalposts
Armenia’s suspicions may well have been right. Within days
of announcing the roadmap, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Turkey’s prime minister, declared before the Azerbaijani
Parliament that Turkish-Armenian peace would not be pos-
sible until Armenia withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh and
its surrounding region. His announcement hit like a cold
shower in Yerevan, Washington, and Ankara alike. What had
triggered it?
Enter Azerbaijan
There were several reasons for the policy change. First and
foremost were the cries of treason from Azerbaijan. Despite
the theoretically cozy ties between Ankara and Baku, the
Azeris were apparently unaware of the precise wording of
the roadmap. Azeri threats to turn to Russia and an un-
expected gas deal signed between the two countries led to
panic in Ankara. Turkey’s ambitions to become the main
transit hub for natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan
hung in the balance. Erdoğan’s trip to Baku soothed Azeri
nerves, but in the words of a senior Turkish diplomat
“immense damage to our relations” had been wrought.
2
This begs the question of how Ankara failed to foresee
Baku’s reaction. The conventional wisdom was that Azer-
baijan needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Azerbaijan.
With the September presidential elections out of the way, it
was widely assumed that Azerbaijan would relent. What no
one accounted for was Moscow exploiting the opportunity
to increase its leverage over Azerbaijan.
But there was another aspect to Turkey’s behavior. Recon-
ciliation with Armenia was primarily driven by the dovish
Gül. Erdoğan was never fully on board. Nor was Ahmet
Davutoğlu, who before becoming Turkey’s foreign minister
in May, had served as Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor.
Davutoğlu has long maintained that peace with Armenia
would not be sustainable unless Karabakh were resolved.
Should the conflict resume, would Turkey be forced to re-
seal its border with Armenia? It’s a thin argument. Armenia
won the war, so it is unlikely to reignite it.
Sargysan’s gamble
Meanwhile, Turkey keeps raising the bar. It insists that any
deal with Armenia needs to be ratified by the parliament.
This would be a first. When Turkey recognized and estab-
lished diplomatic relations with Kosovo, for instance, the
parliament was not involved. All of this has placed
Sargysyan, Armenia’s president, in an increasingly untenable
position at home, where there is already widespread anger at
the government for going along with the creation of a joint
historical commission. For many, this amounts to calling
genocide into doubt. The ultra-nationalist Dashnak party,
which pulled out of the government following the announce-
ment of the road map, is now baying for blood. Their target
is, Eduard Nalbandian, Armenia’s foreign minister.
In a bid to stanch their anger, Sargysan declared that he
would not attend a Turkey-Armenia football match sched-
uled for October 14 unless the border was re-opened or was
close to be being re-opened. Amid fears that the rapproche-
ment process will crumble, Swiss mediators have resumed
efforts to get each side to agree on a path that would clear
the way for formal ties and re-opening the border. Turkey’s
reported refusal to cede to Armenia’s demands to reiterate
that the deal is unconditional (i.e. not linked to progress
Analysis

Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist

on Karabakh) temporarily stalled the process. Armenia has
now dropped this demand but wants something concrete Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
from Turkey. Otherwise Sargysan will not come. At the time writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
of publication of this analysis, there were widespread
reports that compromise had been struck and that Turkey About GMF
and Armenia would issue respective declarations underscor-
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
ing their commitment to the implementation of the April nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
22nd agreement. The declaration, was expected among other dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
things, to outline a time frame for political consultations between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
that would precede the signing of that agreement. However, individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
qualms from Armenia that Turkey would drag out the convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
process are yet to be overcome. and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
A Turkish hold out for concessions on Karabakh would supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. In
be equally unrealistic. When former Armenian President addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven
Levon Ter Petrossian tried this in 1998, he was pushed out offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,
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of power. Few policymakers in Ankara seem to understand
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The U.S. administration continues to insist that Turkish-
Armenian normalization should proceed independently of
Karabakh. In private, American officials warn that a
Congressional resolution on the term “genocide” may not
only be revived but approved this time. The trouble is that
Erdoğan, who has final say on foreign policy, is steeped
in efforts to solve Turkey’s biggest headache, its Kurdish
problem. Many of the proposed measures are a hard sell.
Erdoğan’s nationalist opponents are already accusing him
of talking to terrorists. A deal with Armenia that sidelines
Azerbaijan would give them further ammunition.

So the question is whether a no show from Sargysan on

October 14 will spell the end of Turkish-Armenian peace?
Probably not. Realpolitik will once again prevail and diplo-
macy will intervene. But unless Ankara softens its stance,
it may take a long time before Turkey and Armenia shake
hands.