CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES – CHAPTER 5
Jann Claudine M. Amago 4 – B
ARTICLE 2 – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Section 1 – Republicanism
A. Nemo est supra leges
1. Villavicencio vs. Lukban
Facts:
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila,
ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for
doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed
that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an
haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses
from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead
of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the
assumption that they were being transported to another police station
while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women
being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges
against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco
Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus
to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the
170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were
deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them
a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing
Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
Issue: Whether we are a government of laws or a government of
men.
Ruling:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE; LlBERTY;
HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.—One hundred and seventy women,
who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the
city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the
chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation
authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of
that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas
corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila
who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of
court for his failure to comply with the order of the court.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas
corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to
meet a situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may
be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is also no bar
to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the
proper remedy.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—These women, despite their being in a sense
lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
4.ID.; ID.—The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by
constitutions and deeply imbedded in American jurisprudence.
11.ID.; ID.—The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom
of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved
parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and
truly waived this right.
12.ID.; ID.—The true principle should be that if the respondent is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court, and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so.
13.ID.; ID.—Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for
the writ, is no reason why the writ should not issue.
14.ID. ; ID.—The place of confinement is not important to the relief if
the guilty party is within the reach of process so that by the power of
the court he can be compelled to release his grasp.
15.ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT.—For respondents to fulfill the
order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three courses
were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these ,persons could
not safely be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have.
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)
16.CONTEMPT OF COURT.—The power to punish for contempt of
court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. . Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail.
17.ID.—When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does
not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate
its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined.
18.ID.—An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience
to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt
committed in the face of the court.
19.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.—The Government of the Philippine
Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist in
retaining it as a government of laws and not of men.
20.ID, ; ID.—No official, however high, is above the law.
21.ID.; ID.—The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official.
Principle of Checks and Balances
2. Senate vs. Ermita
Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; In light of the highly
exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential
to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege,
though she may authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke
the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the
President,” which means that he personally consulted with
her.—In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court
finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke
the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that
he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to
uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is
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not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is
further invalid on this score.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; When an official is
being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be
afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege.—When an official is being summoned by Congress on a
matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President
or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary
invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure
of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of
the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 3 of E.O.
464 is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated—
that such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect
for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization
itself.—The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring
officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O.
464 is to ensure “respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation.” That such rights must indeed be respected
by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution
mandating that “[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.” In light of the above discussion of Section
3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such
officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Facts:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted
the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate
president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials
of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads
are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only
2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that
it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation
in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
Issue: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour.
The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour,
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned
and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction
was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied
to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself
or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its
right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
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only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
3. In re: Manzano
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice
perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive
Order No. 856, it is provided that—
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice
shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and
other courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency
performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative
functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained
to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion
in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory
not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify
a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or
perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher
court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an
attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they
form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and
performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of
such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC
judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the
laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance
may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
4. Angara vs Electoral Commission *Check Judge A Consti notes
5. Casibang vs. Aquino
Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang,his only rival, filed a protest against
election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and
irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973
Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had
lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new
Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.
Constitutional Law; Elections; The 1973 Constitution did not
render moot and academic election protest cases that were
pending.—Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not
render moot and academic pending election protest cases.
Same; Same; Security of Tenure; Grant to continue in office
cannot be applied to incumbents whose election is under
protest or contest.—The constitutional grant of privilege to continue
in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who
were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new
Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing
the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest, it neither
was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a
candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in
the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at
the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-
elect’s right to the contested office. x x x The Constitutional Convention
could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect
those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein
private respondents to the respective offices which they are now
holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to
giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms
of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the
sanctity of the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; Right of incumbent to continue holding
office indefinitely under Sec. 9, Article XVII of the new
Constitution is based on a proclamation that he has been duly
elected.—The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue
in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII
of the New constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the
November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were
not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no
right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges
and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy
the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional
provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legality of the election is a requisite
for indefinite incumbency in office.—Until a subsequent law or
presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election
which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide
adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee)
would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree
terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII
of the 1973 Constitution:
Same; Same; Same; “Term of Office” distinguished from “Right
to hold office.”—There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and
the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of office is the period during which
an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its
functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a
public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. x x x Although Section 9, Article XVII of the
New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest,
of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their
respective offices.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction to try of Election Contests.—While
under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and
city officials (Par. 2 of. Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution),
such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.
6. Tanada vs. Cuenco*Check Judge A Consti notes
7. Sanidad vs. COMELEC
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Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD
No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No.
1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22
Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;
to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended
that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
Issue: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
Ruling: YES.
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification
raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals
of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power
to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto
the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2
of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook
the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite
on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought
to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport
to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus
the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within
the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form
a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also
sits as the legislature.
8. Daza vs. Singson
Facts:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House
of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen
and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to
challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the
composition of the Commission on Appointments
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s
expanded jurisdiction includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the goverment; Case at bar.—To summarize,
then, we hold, in view of the foregoing consideration, that the issue
presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the
legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical
flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence
of such a defect, the same maybe brushed aside, conformably to
existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised maybe
addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the
House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include
the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
Non – delegation of powers
9. Philippine InterIsland Shipping Association vs. CA
It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for
an increase in pilotagerates was given by the then President Marcos
through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088
“PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES
FOR PILOTAGE SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND
COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLICPORTS. The
executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing
pilotage
fees previously fixed by the PPA.” During that time the
President was exercising legislative power and was authorized
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However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was
issued hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby PPA has
the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86,
which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and evenentirely left
the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties
to acontract..
Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the
Philippines is just an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to this
issue. For Purposes of Admin Law we should not care about it.
Issue: Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which
PPA has the powerto modify the same.Held: EO 1088 is a law.
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.is no basis
for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise
of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to
revise the ratespreviously fixed by the PPA through the
issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could inturn revise those
fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-
86,which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely
left the fees to be paid forpilotage to the agreement of
the parties to a contract. The orders previously issuedby the
PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated
by it in theexercise of delegated power. As such these could
only be amended or revised by law,as the President did by E.O.
No. 1088.It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should
not be considered a statutebecause that would imply the
withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determineswhether
an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but
its nature.Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the
rates of charges for services,including pilotage service, has
always been regarded as legislative in character
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As then
President Marcos in the exercise of legislative powers could
delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise
it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power
vested by P.D. No. 857.—Nor is there any doubt of the power of the
then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O.
No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of
the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under
the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857 which
created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service
in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been
delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of
charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what
the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could
delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in
specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D.
No. 857, §20(a) in the PPA “to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or
decrease such rates, charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by
the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot
be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the
existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-
fixing powers, by virtue of the former’s plenary power of
legislation, and when Congress does so, the result is not the
withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but
cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and
expertise are required.—The case presented is similar to the fixing
of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act (R.A. No. 6727) whereby
minimum wages are determined by Congress and provided by law,
subject to revision by Wage Boards should later conditions warrant their
revision. It cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime
despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-
fixing powers, by virtue of the former’s plenary power of legislation.
When Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers
delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area
where initiative and expertise are required.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
10. Miners Association vs. Factoran
Facts:
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos
211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211
prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture,
co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.”
and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2
years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No.
57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and
gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of
mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the
instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this
Court.
Issue: Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?
Ruling: YES.
Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance
and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through
"license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are
deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing
law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section
7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those
granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard,
may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being
co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal
basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
5
Legislative Standard need not be expressed
11. Chionbian vs. Orbos
Facts:
Pursuant To The Constitution, Congress Passed R.A 6734, The Organic
Act For The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao Calling For A
Plebiscite To Create An Autonomous Region. The Provinces Of Lanao
Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu And Tawi-Tawi, Which Voted For The
Creation Of Such Region Were Later On Known As The Autonomous
Region In Muslim Mindanao. Consistent With The Authority Granted By
Article XIX, Section 13 Of RA 6734 Which Authorizes The Pres ident
To Merg e The Exis ting Reg ions, Pres ide nt Cor azon Aquino
Issued E.O No. 429 Provid ing For The Reorganization Of The
Administrative Regions In Mindanao. Petitioners Contend That
Art. XIX , Section 13 Of R.A. No. 6734 Is Unconstitutional
Beca use I t Unduly De lega te s Legislative Power To The President
By Authorizing Him To Merge By Administrative Determination The
Existing Regions Or At Any Ra te Provides No Stand ard For T he
Exercise Of T he Powe r De lega ted A nd That T he Pow er
Granted Is Not Expressed In The Title Of The Law.Aw They Also
Challenge The Validity Of E.O. No. 429 On The Ground That The Power
Granted By RA 6734 To The President Is Only To Merge Regions IX And
XII But Not To Reorganize The Entire Administrative Regions In
Mindanao And Certainly Not To Transfer The Regional Center Of Region
IX From Zamboanga City To Pagadian City.
Issue: Whether Or Not The R.A 6734 Is Invalid Because It Contains
No Standard To Guide The President’s Discretion.
Ruling: NO.
In Conferring On The President The Power To Merge By
Administrative Determination The Existing Regions Following The
Establishment Of The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao,
Congress Merely Followed The Pattern Set In Previous Legislation Dating
Back To The Initial Organization Of Administrative Regions In 1972. The
Choice Of The President As Delegate Is Logical Because The Division Of
The Country Into Regions Is Intended To Facilitate Not Only The
Administration Of Local Governments But Also The Direction Of
Executive Departments Which The Law Requires Should Have
Regional Offices. While The Power To Merge Administrative Regions
Is Not Expressly Provided For In The Constitution, It Is A Power Which
Has Traditionally Been Lodged With The President To Facilitate The
Exercise Of The Power Of General Supervision Over Local Governments.
(Abbas V. COMELEC) The Regions Themselves Are Not Territorial And
Political Divisions Like Provinces, Cities, Municipalities And Barangays
But Are "Mere Groupings Of Contiguous Provinces For Administrative
Purposes. The Power Conferred On The President Is Similar To The
Power To Adjust Municipal Boundaries Which Has Been Described As
"Administrative In Nature.” (Pelaez V. Auditor General)Thus, The
Regrouping Is Done Only On Paper. It Involves No More Than Are
Definition Or Redrawing Of The Lines Separating Administrative Regions
For The Purpose Of Facilitating The Administrative Supervision Of
Local Government Units By The President And Insuring The Efficient
Delivery Of Essential Services
12. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional
duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991,
EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and
other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a
representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact
revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures.
Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Ruling:
Constitutional Law; Tariff & Customs; The President may
increase tariff rates when authorized by Congress.—Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: “(2) The
Congress may,by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit
constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix
“within specific limits” “tariff rates x x x and other duties or imposts x x
x.”
Same; Same; President may increase tariff rates as authorized
by law even for revenue purposes solely.—In the third place,
customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very
much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising
and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that “customs
duties” is “the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation
of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported
from, or exported to, a foreign country.” The levying of customs duties
on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting
local industries___where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same
customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental
revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever,
designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs
duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of
which become public funds—have either or both the generation of
revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving
purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular
instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since
the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the
crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be
seen to have some “protective” impact upon indigenous oil production.
For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased.
At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the
government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates
or special duty.
Same; Same; Same.—In the fourth place, petitioner’s concept which
he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly
narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code estabishes
general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by
that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must
be exercised in “the interest of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security.” Petitioner, however, insiststhat the “protection
of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured
by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore
“protection of local industries” is the sum total or the alpha and the
omega of “the national economy, general welfare and/or national
security.” We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined
and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in
Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers,
who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the
very least as important a dimension of “the national ecomony, general
welfare and national security” as the protection of local industries. And
so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the
purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy
6
quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local
manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
13. People vs. Vera
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila.
He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it
is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law
is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it
is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power.
Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power
of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation
of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer
or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as
mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is
a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act
to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There
is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must
act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given
absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine
of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so
protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or
not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary
of a probation officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our
Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this
is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given
by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray
the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or
fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in
the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy
the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly
situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This
is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of
the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be
in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards.
14. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power
EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular
No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial
expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the
POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a
violation of non-delegation of powers
Ruling: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern
Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to
promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation.
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature
to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
7
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified
its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however,
be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
15. USA vs. Ang Tang Ho
Facts:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed
and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and
Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive
Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO
fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang
Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6thof August 1919. On
August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was
found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is
an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor
General.
Ruling:
1. ORGANIC LAW.—By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and
the Constitution of the United States, all powers are. vested in the
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute; and of
the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority
to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no authority to
make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no power to make
or execute the law.
2. POWER.—Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each
branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional.
3. THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot delegate
legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto
itself and within itself, and it does nothing mor£ than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into
effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation
of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself
does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative
act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the Governor-Geheral, the act is a delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
4. No CRIME TO SELL.—After the passage of Act No. 2868, and
without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a dealer
in rice could sell it at, any price and he would not commit a crime.
There was no legislative act which made it a crime to sell rice at
any price.
5. CRIME BY PROCLAMATION.—When Act No. 2868 is analyzed,
it is the violation of the Proclamatlon of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if
at all, because of the Proclamation by the Governor-General.
6. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.—In so far as Act No. 2868 undertakes to
authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a
proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in
violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional and void.
7. CONSTITUTION.—The Constitution is something solid,
permanent and substantial. Its stability protects the rights, liberty,
and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and its
construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions.
8. PRIVATE RIGHTS.—In the instant case, the law was not dealing
with Government property. It was dealing with private property
and private rights which are sacred under the Constitution.
9. PRIVATE PROPERTY.—In the instant case, the rice was the
personal, private property of the defendant. The Government had
not bought it, did not claim to own it, or have any interest in it at
the time the defendant sold it to one of his customers.
10. POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE.—By the organic act
and subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate
and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislature, which is
elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands.
11. OPINION LIMITED.—This opinion is confined to the right of the
Governor-General to issue a proclamation fixing the maximum price
at which rice should be sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at a
higher price, and to that extent holds that it is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or undertake to
construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of
Act No. 2868. United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, No. 17122
February 27, 1922
16. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as
a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the
following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a)
8
the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education.
Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;
x x x maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect
from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall
accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools:
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student
who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of
any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements
that may be deemed admissible.”
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the
school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT,
an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country.
The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on
the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical
Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other
admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility
for admission into the medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Ruling: YES.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools
in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote
all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of
the general community. An important component of that public order is
the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this
type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted
to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among
other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for
medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and
economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission testlike the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection
of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality
of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the
NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is
the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of
the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Section 3 – Civilian Supremacy
17. IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military.
Ruling:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their
duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
9
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot
be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does
it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Section 4 – Government to serve and protect the people/
People to defend the State
18. People vs. Lagman
Facts:
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being
compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense
Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he
has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish
to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the
said law.
Issue: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
Ruling: YES.
The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the
will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.”
Section 10 – Social Justice
19. Calalang vs. Williams
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuanc
e of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-
drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Ruling:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience
of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said
law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of
the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not
be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring
its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest
good to the greatest number.”
20. Tanada vs. Angara
21. Garcia vs. BOI
Facts:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private
corporation, applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI)
in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the
Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for
the proposed investment but later submitted an amended application to
change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site,
Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested
a copy of BPC’s original and amended application documents. The BoI
denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined
to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and
that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the
confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI
subsequently approved the amended application without holding a
second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia
filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in
yielding to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
10
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s Constitutional
right to have access to information on matters of public concern under
Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because
it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they
breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in
fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed
and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
provides that “all applications and their supporting documents filed
under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any
person, except with the consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized
that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order
disclosure of the application, amended application, and supporting
documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information,
“the Constitution does not open every door to any and all information”
because “the law may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny”. Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential,
commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a
test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to
access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that
BPC could withhold under its ruling.
Section 12&13 – Family&Youth
22. Meyer vs. Nebraska
On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial
School, a one-room schoolhouse in Hampton, Nebraska, taught the
subject of reading in the German language to 10-year-old Raymond
Parpart, a fourth-grader. The Hamilton County Attorney entered the
classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He
charged Meyer with violating the Siman Act.[3]
Meyer was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county,
Nebraska, and fined $25 (about $305 in 2017 dollars). The Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by a vote of 4 to 2. The majority
thought the law a proper response to "the baneful effects" of allowing
immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results
"inimical to our own safety." The dissent called the Siman Act the work
of "crowd psychology."[3]
Meyer appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. His lead
attorney was Arthur Mullen, an Irish Catholic and a prominent Democrat,
who had earlier failed in his attempt to obtain an injunction against
enforcement of the Siman Act from the Nebraska State Supreme Court.
Oral arguments expressed conflicting interpretations of the World War I
experience. Mullen attributed the law to "hatred, national bigotry and
racial prejudice engendered by the World War." Opposing counsel
countered that "it is the ambition of the State to have its entire
population 100 per cent. American."
Ruling:
Liberty" protected by the Due Process clause "[w]ithout doubt...denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
Analyzing in that context the liberty of the teacher and of parents with
respect to their children, McReynolds wrote: "Practically, education of
the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified
persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been
regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public
welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be
regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as
helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as
part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents
to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the
liberty of the amendment." And further: "Evidently the Legislature has
attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language
teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with
the power of parents to control the education of their own."
And finally: "That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order
to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is
clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those
who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by
methods which conflict with the Constitution—a desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means."
He allowed that wartime circumstances might justify a different
understanding, but that Nebraska had not demonstrated sufficient need
"in time of peace and domestic tranquility" to justify "the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed."
23. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters
A law prohibiting the establishment of private schools and in effect
confing the education youth to public institutions of learning was
likewise annulled because it would standardize the thinking of children,
who according to the court, wer not mere creatures of the state.
24. Wisconsin vs. Yoder
U.S. Supreme Court on May 15, 1972, ruled (7–0)
that Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law was unconstitutional
when applied to the Amish, because it violated their rights under
the First Amendment, which guaranteed the free exercise of religion.
The case involved three Amish fathers—Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and
Adin Yutzy—who, in accordance with their religion, refused to enroll
their children, aged 14 and 15, in public or private schools after they
had completed the eighth grade. The state of Wisconsin required,
pursuant to its compulsory attendance law, that children attend school
to the age of 16. The fathers were found guilty of violating the law, and
each was fined $5. A trial and circuit court upheld the convictions,
concluding that the state law was a “reasonable and constitutional” use
of government power. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, found
that the application of the law to the Amish violated the First
Amendment’s free exercise of religion provision.
On May 15, 1972, the case was argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court; William Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., did not
participate in the consideration or decision. In
a comprehensive examination of the Amish, the court found their
religious beliefs and way of life to be “inseparable and interdependent”
and to not have been “altered in fundamentals for centuries.” The court
went on to conclude that secondary schooling would expose Amish
children to attitudes and values that ran counter to their beliefs and
would interfere with both the child’s religious development and his or
her integration into the Amish lifestyle. According to the court, to
compel Amish children to enroll in public or private high schools past the
eighth grade would have mandated that they “either abandon belief and
be assimilated into society at large or be forced to migrate to some other
and more tolerant region.”
The court rejected Wisconsin’s argument that “its interest in
its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the
established religious practices of the Amish must give way,” finding
instead that the absence of one or two additional years of education
would neither make the children burdens on society nor impair their
health or safety. During these years the Amish children were not
inactive, and the court remarked favorably on the Amish “alternative
mode of continuing informal vocational education.” On the basis of these
findings, the court ruled that the Wisconsin compulsory school
attendance law was not applicable to the Amish under the free-exercise
clause.
11
Section 16 – Promotion of health and ecology
25. Oposa va. Factoran
Facts:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at
the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises
a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
Ruling:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint
a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation
of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to
a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides
for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows
the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by
which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment
clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED
and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
Section 19 – Self – reliant and independent national economy
26. Tanada vs. Angara
27. Garcia vs. BOI
Section 21 – Land Reform
28. Association of Small Land Owners vs. Juico
*Check Judge A notes
29. Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and
AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking
HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution.
Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred
in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution].
It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their
printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Court decision.
Issues:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
12
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and
previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not
just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just
compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were
placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their
land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have
fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision
that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of
HLI be reconsidered?
Ruling:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for
reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option
granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision
that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority,
the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but
also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification
or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that
resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative
fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves
whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised
at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis
mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under
RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made
no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but
found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of
Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the
revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as
regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should
not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law,
from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but
were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011
Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads,
irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in
the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court
reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting
the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual
qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and
considering that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area
with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the
500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted
to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot
acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of
the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted
land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to
the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking”
is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since
this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution
scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21,
1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation
of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted
that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock
distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the
DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final
and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original
action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified
FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred
or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the
emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has
not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the
EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts
at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the
day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land
distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.
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[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch
as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands]
given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted
that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%.
Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain
as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands
of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one
share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the
formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI
capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of
the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
Section 22 – Indigenous Cultural Community
30. Cruz vs. DENR Secretary
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of
the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
Ruling: NO.
The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over
the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right
of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
Section 25 – Local Government
31. Limbonas vs. Mangelin
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held
a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated
from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be
declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker
of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition
had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Ruling:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable".
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves
an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category
[CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the
organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits
of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts,
say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But
if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And
if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,
with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion
is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess,"
it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be
called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
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this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions 33. Disomangcop vs. DPWH Secretary
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold
the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. Section 26 – Equal Opportunities

32. Basco vs. PAGCOR 34. Pamatong vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose
taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly
show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative
act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
has the “inherent power to tax.”

The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be

stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”,
which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due
to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power
of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the
City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.

2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has

long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the
National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the

National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role,
to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the

Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government

to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which
Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does
not make local governments sovereign within the state.

Autonomous Region

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