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Materials and Inspection Engineering
‘The Rusty Chronicle’
December 2001
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2




A new Method to Determine Soil Corrosivity 6
Low silicon carbon steel in sulphur-containing, high temperature environments 6
Gas Plant cooling water problems 7
Selection of gaskets for acid services 8
Synergistic Effects of Chloride and H2S on Sulphide Stress 9
Cracking/Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steels 9
New DEP for Cr-Mo Equipment 9
Caustic SCC in Austenitic stainless steel 10
St Fergus gas plant cuts potential vibration problems in pipework 11
Welding Specifications latest developments 12

Non Intrusive Inspection at elevated temperature 13
Storage tank fabrication inspection - TOFD in lieu of RT 13
101 Essential Elements in a PEI Management Program 15
Engineering Highlights – Equilon Enterprises, LLC – October, 2001 18


The Rusty Crossword 20


New Hydrocarbon Accounting System - Potential for Corrosivity Mapping 21


If you have any questions or comments about the Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter, please contact the editor
Drew Green (Tel.: +31 (0)20 630 3167, E-mail: drew.green@shell.com).

The material in this Newsletter is for use by the operating units constituting Shell Global Solutions and the companies with which they have a service agreement
only, and is provided subject to the terms of the relevant service agreements. It is provided for the purpose of information only and should not be applied in any
specific situation without having obtained further clarification and advice from Shell Global Solutions. The operating units constituting Shell Global Solutions accept
no liability for the application of the material contained herein by anyone.
Copyright of this publication is vested in Shell Global Solutions International B.V., The Hague.
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2


New CUI Inspection and Maintenance Practice Being Issued

Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is older than our industry, and almost all processing facilities have
equipment that suffers from the “disease”. In some facilities in moist, warm climates, it’s a major expense,
whereas in others like arid climates it’s more of an occasional nuisance. Regardless, it still needs to be
managed properly in order to avoid reliability and process safety impacts on our business.

Shell Chemicals has identified CUI as a major threat to their business and has funded an effort to come
up with a practical, cost-effective inspection and maintenance program for operating facilities. To that
end, an international group of Shell inspection and maintenance engineers have assembled a new
standard (recommended practice) for risk-based inspection and maintenance of equipment susceptible to
CUI. That standard, which is due to be issued in January, describes how to assess the risk (probability
and consequence) of CUI, utilizing the Shell RAM (Risk Assessment Matrix). After assessing the CUI risk
associated with susceptible equipment and piping, the standard recommends one of six different
inspection strategies, commensurate with the level of risk associated with a potential CUI leak. I fully
expect that sites that implement such a risk-based program, will be able to achieve the lowest total cost of
ownership for their operating equipment susceptible to CUI.

The document contains a lot of information about the CUI problem and is easy to understand and apply.
In addition to the risk assessment and inspection strategy determination, the document includes sections
on CUI inspection tools and techniques, CUI record keeping, how to determine the likelihood and
susceptibility to CUI, information on coatings, cladding, and insulation, and CUI preventative
maintenance and restoration.

Many of our chemicals manufacturing sites have already begun to use the document. It’s a good example
of what an international network of subject-matter-experts can do in a relatively short period of time. I’m
aware of many other topics related to corrosion and asset integrity preservation, where site or national
standards currently exist, that would be good starting points for creating more international
recommended practices.

Contacts for further information are Andre Blaauw and John Reynolds.

M. A. (Mike) Rogalski

I’d like to draw your attention to two editorial errors noted in the last Rusty Chronicle - Issue 1-2001 as follows:
1. A glaring ommission in the Staff Moves section was that Mr John Whitfield was transferred out from the
position of OGEI/1 distributed team worker in Singapore to take up a new role as Integrity Manager
at Shell Chemicals Stanlow Site in the UK. To quote John “How often we forget those closest to us!”.
I wish John every success in his new job and offer my humble apologies for the error.
2. In the technical achievement section the SADAF Chemicals company in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was
referred to as a third party customer - SADAF is ofcourse a Shell joint venture company. Again
my apologies for the error.
Finally thanks to all those who have contributed to the Newsletter in 2001, without your support this publication
would simply not be possible. To all The Rusty Chronicle readers I wish you a happy and successful 2002.

Drew Green (Editor)

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Far East and European MIEM 2001 Delegates at the European MIEM gave an average CSI score
The Far East and European Materials and Inspection Engi- of 3.6 (on a scale from 0-5), against our target of 3.5, which
neering Meetings (MIEM) were held in Kuala Lumpur in Octo- illustrates that overall opinion is positive. Several points for
ber and Amsterdam in November respectively. These meet- improvement were noted during the meetings and these will
ings were again very popular with around 100 delegates be considered during the preparation for next years MIEM.
attending in total. The agenda covered a wide range of top- Whilst we’re on the subject please note in your diaries that
ics such as: Asset Integrity Management, External Corrosion the European MIEM 2002 will be held in Amsterdam from
Management, The ever popular Technology Market with both 10th to 12th June.
Shell Global Solutions International and third party NDT spe-
cialist service suppliers being represented, OP/EP Corrosion Finally we hope to issue the minutes from the 2001 MIEM in
Issues, The current status of RBI/RRM and last but not least Q2/2002 at the latest.
Non Intrusive Inspection.
Our thanks go to all the contributors and delegates who
The agenda of the MIEM was modified to give more discus- helped to make the 2001 MIEMs such a success long may it
sion time in the form of syndicate sessions. Although these continue.
were generally well received it was clear that we still have
some work to do in preparation and delivery of this aspect Regards from the MIEM organising committee.
of the MIEM.

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2


A new Method to Determine Soil Corrosivity

The Materials and Inspection Engineering group together time expectations of my underground equipment and what
with the Network Environmental Risk Assessment (NERA) do I have to do to control this?“ They can be used as stand-
group have developed a pocket soil corrosivity meter and soil alone tools or as part of ongoing External Corrosion Man-
corrosivity assessment method as an addition to Integrity risk agement.
assessment tools designed to improve equipment management
and reduce costs. The soil corrosivity risk assessment method and the pocket soil
corrosivity meter have been successfully used as part of the
The pocket soil corrosivity meter can be used as a simple tool NERA package with projects in Europe, Africa and Japan.
to quickly assess the potential corrosivity of a soil but it is also The “Pocket Soil Corrosivity Meter” and the NG method were
at the heart of a more extensive risk assessment study. It uses most recently successfully applied for corrosion risk assess-
electrochemical techniques and yields more accurate results ments for BLNG and Shell Expro (Bacton).
than the commonly applied soil resistance measurement meth-
ods. For further information on the techniques or their application
please contact Johan Van Roij, Willem Liek or Andrea
The soil corrosivity risk assessment method, which has been Etheridge.
called “Next Generation” (NG), is a structured approach to
describe the soil, material and site conditions. It allows every-
thing from a desktop study and soil corrosivity measurements
for prioritising underground equipment, to full corrosion and
integrity risk assessment studies. NG has the advantage of
being more accurate, flexible and, in most cases, cheaper in
application than the currently available soil corrosivity assess-
ment methods.

The tools can be used to answer questions like: “Do I need

cathodic protection?”, “What is the corrosion risk of my
underground structures when the CP and/or the coating
fails?”, “Where along the pipeline or on my site are the
areas with the highest corrosion risks?”, “What are the life The ‘Pocket Soil Corrosivity’ meter in use at Bacton.

Low silicon carbon steel in sulphur-containing, high

temperature environments
A recent failure at MER illustrates the well-known failure of Silicon content of the replaced piping section was analysed
carbon steel serving in sulphidising atmospheres at elevated and was found to vary from 0.19 to 0.25 % with the excep-
temperatures. This is a reminder of the necessity to specify sil- tion of the failed elbow at 0.10 %, which still met the mini-
icon-killed steel in such an environment. mum specification requirement.

In November 2000, after 13 years in service, MER’s desu- Silicon content is known to play a role in the mitigation of high
perating column failed at an elbow of the bottom outlet pip- temperature sulphidation corrosion and there are many indus-
ing. The column was operating at 370 °C and in an envi- trial and Shell experiences, similar to the above, attributed
ronment containing 2.2% sulphur. The bottom was clad with to low silicon carbon steel material (many of which can be
410 SS, but the piping had been changed from 5Cr-0.5Mo found by searching the NACE Refin*Cor database). Differ-
to carbon steel with a 0.1 % min silicon content specification. ences in corrosion rates, from 3 to 10 times higher, have been
found in low silicon material. For this reason, it has been Shell
The failure occurred near to an elbow. The piping upstream standard to use silicon-killed (A106) piping for high tem-
of this elbow, just before a weld, showed a much higher cor- perature applications where sulphur or H2S could be present,
rosion rate than the downstream piping. This suggests that the before temperature or sulphur levels dictate upgrading to 5Cr
metallurgy of the piping may have played a significant role steel. Current practice is to use 5 Cr steel in slurry/LCO/HCO
in the mechanism of failure. service at temperatures above 240 – 250 °C.

The corrosion rate (since 1987) of this circuit varies from For further information contact the Editor.
10 MPY to 18 MPY, except for 30 MPY of the failed elbow.

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Gas Plant cooling water problems
As heat exchangers are a crucial part of LNG plants, it is
essential to keep the interval between maintenance proce-
dures as long as possible. From a starting point of the details
of the cooling medium, improved maintenance intervals can
be achieved by careful materials selection and sufficient cor-
rosion protection.

Corrosion damage recently observed in part of the seawa-

ter heat exchanger system of an LNG plant has highlighted
the importance of these factors.

The following materials were used:

Tubes: CuNi 66Cu30Ni2Fe2Mn;
Tube sheets: carbon steel with aluminium-bronze explosion-
bonded cladding on the water side;
Channel boxes and covers: carbon steel with aluminium Pitting on an Aluminium Bronze tubesheet.
bronze cladding. The plates were explosion clad and the
rest was overlay welded;
Water lines: GRE; However, since the soft iron anodes have an expected life,
Gaskets: mostly brass corrugated double jacketed graphite which is shorter than that required by the major mainte-
or non-asbestos filler. nance cycles and extra ferrous ion dosing is not allowed, it
has been decided instead to install an impressed current
The brass of the pass partition gasket, as the least noble metal, cathodic protection system to the majority of the seawater heat
corroded resulting in a narrow gap. Seawater bypass start- exchangers. The objective of such a system is to polarise the
ed at this narrow gap in the corroded portion of the gasket, aluminium bronze surface of the tube sheets and channel
and the seawater velocity caused erosion induced corrosion boxes by -100 mV to stop the observed galvanic corrosion.
of the pass partition and the grooves in the tubesheet/chan- This method is suitable for the protection of the in- and out-
nel cover. The temporary repairs made to keep the system run- let channel boxes and for the return channel boxes of the non-
ning need to be completed now by an extensive repair cam- floating head exchangers.
paign. Replacement of the gaskets with more suitable
materials will eliminate some of the problems in the future. For the floating heads, the impracticalities of installing noz-
zles, anodes and cabling have resulted in another solution.
At the same time, pitting corrosion of the aluminium bronze Using an aluminium spray coating will protect the floating
occurred; in particular in the weld overlay areas. The sensi- head and the accompanying tubesheet in this area. An alu-
tivity of the aluminium bronze to pitting remains a concern. minium spray coating is sacrificial to the aluminium bronze
With the relatively low iron content of the seawater in that part and CuNi. Therefore, coating of the tubesheets is without risk
of the world, soft iron anodes have proven to protect the alu- of preferential galvanic corrosion of the aluminium bronze
minium bronze. Apart from electrochemical protection, addi- cladding by the CuNi tubes, if there is any small damage of
tion of iron to the seawater may offer a mechanism of pro- the coating.
tection since copper-based alloys require some iron in order
to build a protective scale. For further information contact Simon Marsh

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Selection of gaskets for acid services

Berre site located south of France operates chemical plants Example of gasket photography
using acid (e.g. H2SO4) in the process. In 1996 we banned Bad gasket after - before test
all asbestos gaskets and from 1997 to 2000, we contracted
one supplier for acid gasket (PGACF from Siem Supranite).
But increase of gasket budget (especially maintenance costs
during turnaround) was a big concern for maintenance peo-
ple. We estimate mean costs increased by roughly 450
kEuro/year for piping and vessels. In consequence a study
was conducted in order to seek and to approve new gaskets,
and to negotiate a new 3 years contract.

From Shell MESC specification SPE 85/104 & suppliers data
we selected eight gaskets from six suppliers, and tested them
following CEN standard procedure. Tests were conducted by
the French Cetim organisation who are specialised in labo-
ratory tests for valves and gaskets. Tests consisted of leakage,
thickness change, creep measurements at service tempera- Good gasket after - before test
tures, and visual examination.

Only four gaskets were accepted. The others were sub-stan-

dard and two were found dangerous for acid service.

Many suppliers were prepared to provide gaskets but only
a few are fit for service. This study will allow us to reduce gas-
ket expenditure while maintaining a good level of quality &
safety. You can obtain more information from the author.

Example of leakage curve

Samples diameter 40 mm
Pressure 40 bar Helium
In red: Temperature range from 20 °C to 260 °C
In blue: Leak of Helium (atm.cm3/s)
• Cetim test report - 16th January 2001
• CEN standard Pr En 13555
• Shell MESC SPE 85/104 Gaskets, PTFE, reinforced with
mineral filler.

For further information contact Philippe Fevrier,

Shell Chemicals Berre

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

New DEP for Cr-Mo Equipment
A new DEP titled “MATERIALS AND FABRICATION REQUIRE- hydroprocessing reactors. A Materials Properties Council
MENTS FOR Cr-Mo HEAVY WALL PRESSURE VESSELS (MPC) committee of interested parties was put together to
(AMENDMENTS/SUPPLEMENTS TO API 934)” will be includ- study this proposal and create a draft standard from a ques-
ed on the next DEP CD-ROM. The issue of this DEP is timely tionnaire that evaluated end user best practices and require-
since there are several new hydroprocessing projects currently ments. I formed and chaired this original MPC committee,
being developed to address the need for lower sulphur prod- prior to joining Shell. In 1996 the MPC committee proposal
uct specifications and this DEP will be used for the reactor ves- for a standard specification was sent to the American
sels and high pressure heat exchanger equipment. Petroleum Institute (API) with a recommendation that a RP be
developed. After a few years of additional work the RP was
As you can see by the title, this DEP is in fact an endorsement, ready for balloting. Hearl Mead and Dick Horvath of Equi-
with a few additional requirements, of the recently published lon were very active in resolving the ballot comments and get-
API 934 Recommended Practice (RP), which addresses the ting this RP to the publication stage. The RP was finally pub-
same subject. This industry consensus document brings togeth- lished in early 2001. Andre Blaauw then took the lead in
er the best practices and experiences of all the major engi- getting the DEP ready. This DEP has now been fully approved
neering contractors, fabricators and end users and has taken and implemented in the Shell GSI standards system.
many years of committee effort and review cycles. Here is a
brief history of the document highlighting the input and con- It is hoped that the use of this DEP/API RP on Shell SGI pro-
tributions of several Shell and Equilon staff members. jects will make it easier, quicker and cheaper to purchase
reactors and other high pressure Cr-Mo equipment that com-
In early 1990 it was felt that there was sufficient commonal- plies with rigorous industry standardised materials compo-
ity between the end user and contractor specifications for Cr- sition, testing, fabrication and inspection requirements.
Mo equipment that an industry standard could be developed
that could ultimately reduce costs and delivery times for For further information contact Keith Lewis

Synergistic Effects of Chloride and H2S on Sulphide Stress

Cracking/Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steels

Shell GSI have recently investigated a case of Stress Corro- There is currently a proposed Revision to NACE Standard
sion Cracking on a new facility. The mechanism is reported MR0175 - 2001, in which quantitative guidelines are given
as Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking, however the cause for various austenitic stainless steels, defining acceptable lim-
cannot positively be traced to the presence of ‘’significantly its, where applicable, for temperature, H2S pp, CO2 pp.
high’’ levels of chloride alone. It is currently believed that the and Chloride level.
presence of H2S may have played a role in the cracking
mechanism. As a guideline, 18/8 Austenitic Stainless Steels are limited
to a maximum temperature of 60 °C and 100 KPa abs. H2S
For certain Austenitic Stainless steels, it has been recognized pp, for Chloride levels exceeding 50 mg/l. If Chloride is
that there may be a synergistic effect of certain species, such < 50 mg/l, the allowable H2S pp may be raised to a maxi-
as Chloride, on Sulphide Stress Cracking and/or H2S on mum of 350 KPa abs.
Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking. To date, no quantitative
limiting guidelines have been able to be given. For further information contact Marc Kemp

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Caustic SCC in Austenitic stainless steel

A newly constructed Type 347 SS component failed recent-
ly after less than 40 hours of service primarily exposed to
steam. The failure consisted of severe cracking of welds
throughout the component. Most of the cracking was of cir-
cumferential welds that had not been stress-relieved, but
other welds also cracked. Cracks ran both along the length
of the welds and perpendicular to the welds.

Metallographic cross sections showed that the cracks were

transgranular and highly branched. Most materials and cor-
rosion engineers associate this appearance so closely with
chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) that one can eas-
This micrograph shows a small network of secondary cracks near the initiation
ily jump to the wrong conclusion without careful considera-
point of a large crack.
tion of all evidence. A recent paper calls caustic SCC of
stainless steels a “forgotten phenomenon” because most study
of this failure mechanism was done about thirty years ago.* 4. Caustic SCC may sometimes produce a “bluing” of the
Most metallurgists are familiar with caustic cracking of car- fracture surface. While this color change should not be
bon steel, but caustic cracking of austenitic stainless steels is considered a reliable evidence, some of the fracture sur-
less well-known. faces in the most recent failure were a deep blue color.

The point of this note is to review some of the important evi- Awareness
dence in identifying a caustic SCC failure mode and to cre- 1. Cracking can occur very quickly. If hot caustic of any
ate awareness of the problem. This kind of failure can be concentration is contacting stainless steel equipment, the
quick, unexpected, and spectacular. Care must be taken in risk of cracking is immediate. For temperatures above
design and operation to avoid these failures. 300°F (150 °C), any concentration over 20% can cause
cracking within a day. Lower concentrations require
Identification: higher temperatures, but temperatures near 600 °F
1. The most important point in identifying caustic SCC is (315 °C) can cause cracking within a day at any con-
that the cracks may be either transgranular or inter- centration. These exposures must be avoided, and if
granular. Transgranular caustic SCC will have the same they occur, the equipment should be inspected as quick-
branched appearance as chloride SCC, and crack ly as possible. Temperatures as low as 200 °F (100 °C)
appearance alone is not a reliable means of distin- can cause cracking within 100 to 300 days, and the
guishing between these failure modes. safe limit is now considered to be in the 150 °F (65 °C)
2. The presence of caustic within the cracks is very good to 200 °F (100 °C) range.
evidence for caustic SCC. A quick test that will give 2. Stress relief offers some protection, but this protection is
some evidence is to wet the fracture surface with a drop not certain. Very low stress levels can propagate caustic
of water and measure the pH of the water using pH stress cracks, and elimination of the caustic exposure is
paper. A basic pH suggests the presence of caustic. the only certain mitigation.
More reliable evidence can be found by looking for 3. Alloys with higher nickel content have improved resis-
sodium or potassium and oxygen in a crack using an tance to caustic SCC, but they are not immune. Molyb-
SEM with X-ray spectroscopy capabilities. Dry grinding denum makes a stainless steel more susceptible to caus-
a cross section of a crack is the most direct way to look tic SCC, so Type 316 SS will have less resistance than
for these elements, but liquid extraction can be very Type 304 SS. At some caustic concentrations, sensitized
effective as well. Because many caustic supplies also stainless steel is much more susceptible than non-sensi-
contain chlorides, chloride may be coincident with sodi- tized stainless steel. Therefore low-carbon and stabi-
um. The presence of chloride is not necessarily evidence lized grades may offer improved resistance.
of chloride SCC. 4. Coatings have offered good resistance to external
3. Caustic SCC may propagate very quickly. Crack growth cracking where caustic splashes or drips on equipment
rates of a quarter inch (6.25 mm) per hour have been walls. Protective coatings are particularly recommended
measured in Type 347 SS. A very fast failure is a rea- for Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) situations.
son to suspect caustic SCC.

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Although there can be pitfalls in the diagnosis of a caustic * Esmacher, M.J., Stress Corrosion Cracking of Stainless Steel
stress corrosion cracking problem in austenitic stainless steels, Components in Steam Service, Paper No. 1496, Corrosion
the analysis is straightforward when all of the evidence is 2001 Conference Papers, Houston, Texas, 2001.
carefully collected and evaluated. Operational variables,
particularly temperature, are very important in this analysis. For further information contact Bill Kelly PEI
Avoidance depends on awareness and precautions to avoid
exposure of stainless steels to hot caustic.

St Fergus gas plant cuts potential vibration problems in pipework

Shell Global Solutions has played a key role in enabling the
St Fergus gas plant in the UK to increase throughput safely
by minimising the risk of vibrational fatigue in the key pip-
ing systems, and hence avoid major spending on new infras-

A joint team from Shell Global Solutions, Shell St Fergus and

ATL Consulting used a new vibration management procedure
to identify those main lines and small-bore connections at the
plant with an increased potential risk from vibration failure.
Shell Global Solutions and ATL have developed the procedure.
After the study, preventive measures could confidently be
taken to minimise fatigue prior to the planned increase in
throughput. identified as requiring main-line modifications. In addition,
70 lines needed their small-bore connections to be checked
Out of several thousands of piping connections affected by – adequate protection can often be provided by simple brac-
the increased production, only a small proportion required ing or removal of cantilevered masses (e.g. isolation valves
bracing. This bracing will lead to both higher plant availability on low-point drains or high-point vents) if required.
and increased health, safety and environment integrity at the
St. Fergus plant. As a consequence of the work at St. Fergus a management
procedure was developed that can be generically applied as
One of the most significant benefits will be the minimisation the template for specific projects, plant changes and site
of unexpected, potentially hazardous and extremely expen- observations. Application of this management process also
sive, small-bore connection failures. The magnitude of poten- enables technology transfer to local personnel, to allow man-
tial production savings can be illustrated by realising that the agement of threatening vibrational fatigue to continue after
average downtime to repair a broken small-bore connection the study team has dispersed.
can be about a day. On an average-sized gas plant this could
easily mean $0.5 million in lost production. A software package, part of the vibration management pro-
cedure, offers a proactive methodology that can be carried
At St Fergus 342 main lines were assessed. The vibration out by on-site personnel with no specific vibration expertise,
management procedure revealed that 264 of these lines such as mechanical or inspection engineers. A further advan-
would not suffer sufficient vibration, under the proposed tage is that assessment time for small-bore connections and
throughputs, for the small-bore connections or mainline main-line pipework is typically reduced by about 75% using
pipework to be a concern. A further four were shown to need the vibration management procedure in comparison to the tra-
vibration monitoring when throughput increases. ditional assessment methods. In addition, a verifiable audit
trail is created.
However, 78 lines, required specialist, detailed analysis to
quantify the risk of failure. Of these, 22 lines (6 systems) were For further information contact Tom Martin

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Welding Specifications latest developments

Major oil companies have compared their company owned c. Structural items attached and related to process equip-
welding specifications and developed a generic welding ment
specification, which has recently been published as: d. Any other equipment or component item when refer-
enced by an applicable purchase document
API 582: Recommended Practice and Supplementary Welding This API document is general in nature and is intended to aug-
Guidelines for the Chemical, Oil, and Gas Industries. ment the welding requirements of ASME Section IX and sim-
Don Kim of Equilon has played a major role in achieving this ilar Codes, Standards and Practices. The intent of API 582 is
milestone. The aim is that this API recommended practice will to be inclusive of Chemical, Oil and Gas Industry standards,
provide uniformity in setting welding requirements although there are many areas not covered herein, e.g.
This Recommended Practice provides supplementary guide- pipeline welding and offshore structural welding are inten-
lines and practices for welding and welding related topics for tionally not covered.
shop and field fabrication, repair and modification of:
a. Pressure-containing equipment such as pressure vessels, It is the intention that API 582 will replace the general sec-
heat exchangers, tankage, piping, heater tubes, pres- tion of DEP Welding of Metals. Specific weld-
sure boundaries of rotating equipment, and attachments ing issues will be covered with the development of welding
welded thereto. best practices on an as needed basis.
b. Non-removable internals for pressure vessels
For further information contact Andre Blaauw

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Storage tank fabrication inspection - TOFD in lieu of RT
During a tank construction project for one of the operating TOFD and PE is strongly determined by the restrictions on
units a first time application was realised, inspecting the access (it was for instance decided that the main inspection
welds of a storage tank by automated ultrasonics in lieu of should be carried out from one side of the plate only) and by
radiography (RT). At the request of the tank construction con- the geometry of the welds. At the end some welds had to be
tractor a change in the inspection approach was proposed, excluded from UT (falling back on RT) because TOFD had
with the clear benefit of shorter fabrication schedules in the unacceptably large blind zones in places.
A significant effort was given to the validation of the proce-
The OU project team requested Shell Global Solutions to dure, inspection system and personnel, following a formal
support them with the approval of the proposed procedure. system as defined in the European Inspection Qualification
Salient aspects and learning points from this exercise are Methodology for the Pressure Equipment Industry, based on
given below: practical assessment and technical justification. Such a rig-
orous validation was required as the contractor had to force
The ultrasonic inspection was initially based on the require- the inspection team up the learning curve in a relatively short
ments as stated in ASME Code Case 22351, which is appli- period of time, including training by an experienced NDT con-
cable to a wall thickness range of 0.5”-12”. The Code Case tractor prior to mobilisation and training and validation dur-
provides accept/reject criteria purely based on defect dimen- ing the implementation on-site.
sions and requires sizing techniques to be used having
demonstrated an “acceptable performance”. The conse- For rounding off the field validation the need arose to carry
quence is that in the range of interest (<1” WT) only the Time out a formal, independent validation of the inspection per-
of Flight Diffraction technique can meet code requirements. sonnel. For this purpose an independent validation was car-
ried out of the personnel aspects, by an institute independent
Upon implementation, for the lower wall thickness range, the from Shell, the Inspection Validation Centre (IVC) from the UK.
flaw length rejection criteria appeared so tight that this would This approach qualified the inspection team, allowing the con-
result in too many rejected indications, thus unnecessary tractor to start implementing the ultrasonic inspection on the
repairs. Therefore the criteria of the Draft European code for tank.
TOFD2 were included in this project, amalgamated with com-
plementary ASME Code Case requirements. References
1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Case 2235-2,
The requirements of the ASME Code Case clearly reflect the “Use of ultrasonic examination in Lieu of Radiography,
intent to produce an objective, reproducible inspection result: Section VIII, Division 1 and 2”, Approval Date: Febru-
it requires automated examination; it also avoids charac- ary 7, 2000 (followed now by 2235-3, July 10, 2001)
terising indications as planar/non-planar, treating all the 2. Draft European Standard, prEN XXXX, 19th November
same. 1997, “Acceptance criteria for the Time of Flight
Diffraction inspection technique, Document TO 97-50
Although TOFD was chosen as the main technique it became rev.1”.
very clear that additional pulse echo angle beam examina-
tion (PE) was required to fully satisfy the Code requirements. For further information contact Sieger Terpstra
A learning point of the whole exercise was that the mix of or Michell Schipper

Non Intrusive Inspection at elevated temperature

On Shell Nederland Chemicals site at Moerdijk non intrusive Inspection MSPO reactor vessel
inspection has been carried out on a reactor vessel and a heat Several years ago an on-stream inspection was developed for
exchanger shell of the MSPO plant. With the inspection of the Seraya Chemicals, to inspect their SMPO EBHP reactor ves-
reactor SNC could avoid opening up the vessel in an upcom- sel. This demonstrated that small pitting in the order of 2-5
ing shutdown, while inspection of the heat exchanger shell mm diameter and 2-5 mm depth in the wall of a stainless steel
avoided a required shut down well before the planned shut- vessel (20 mm WT) could be detected reliably by ultrasonic
down to enable replacement of the shell. The special nature semi-mechanised inspection, at a temperature of 160 °C. Sev-
of these inspections was that they combined the need to eral repeat measurements proved the reproducibility of these
inspect for very small pitting and cracking at a temperature measurements, although some teething problems had to be
of around 160 °C. overcome when inspecting at 160 °C.

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

A similar inspection was required this time on the EBHP reac- Pitting and crack detection in heat exchang-
tor in Moerdijk; however, the presence of a roll bond cladding er header
at the inside provided an additional challenge: the interface A heat exchanger header box, made of stainless steel 321,
echo from the clad-to-basemetal transition produces an ultra- needed inspection to demonstrate that cracks found during
sonic echo that is in the order of the respons from pitting in an earlier internal inspection had not grown. Although a small
the given size range. item by its size, the non intrusive inspection was not straight-
forward, giving some interesting learning points.

With eddy current the majority of the header could be inspect-

ed, but material properties of the upper nozzle and an area
of the header shell around the nozzle disturbed the eddy cur-
rent inspection. This had to be inspected with ultrasonics.

Figure 1 With an ultrasonic normal beam probe on a cladded reactor wall

echoes are obtained from the clad interface, backwall of the
cladding surface, and a possible pit in the 3 mm thick clad layer. If
the pit would grow through the clad layer into the C-steel base
metal then an echo would appear in front of the interface echo.

An option that is not feasible is to try to detect a pit-echo in

Figure 2 Stainless steel header box requiring non intrusive inspection. UT was
between the cladlayer echoes; that would require an extreme-
applied to the top nozzle and the shell around it, the remainder was
ly high resolution and an unrealistic setting of gates and
covered by eddy current.
thresholds to detect these pit echoes. With simple, fast scan-
ning semi-mechanised systems such as “Mapscan”, ‘And-
scan”, or “Seescan” this will not lead to a robust scan set-up. The angle beam inspection for cracks was outwith normal
practice, requiring scanning at a carefully selected sensitivi-
The way out of this problem was found by carefully selecting ty, also in many directions, because of the unknown orien-
the probe, optimising the response of the pit-echo relative to tation of the cracks; aim was to ensure detection of signifi-
the clad interface echo. This allowed robust echo-detection, cant cracks if present (for which FFP analysis was done) and
as depicted in figure 1. avoid false calls on minute SCC that had remained after a
previous repair. Inspection near the shell-nozzle weld required
With such a probe, capable to operate at elevated temper- extra care as well, to avoid false calls from the grainy weld
ature, tests were performed on pitted specimens at elevated material.
temperature, to demonstrate that the system was able to
detect the defects. During the actual inspection on the reac- A specification was prepared by Shell Global Solutions, so
tor no defects were detected, but it could be proven that the that SNC could develop a procedure together with the NDT
inspection was carried out with the required sensitivity by contractor. Procedure and contractor team were validated
closely watching the echo patterns during scanning. The prior to field inspection, whereafter a successful inspection
inspection proved to be very successful. could be carried out.

For further information contact Michell Schipper

or Sieger Terpstra
Thanks to Rien Neggers of SNC Moerdijk

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

101 Essential Elements in a PEI Management Program

Summary tactics, or the results may well be a breech of containment.

This item contains a significantly shortened version of John
Reynolds’ original paper. In the interest of saving space but Do you have an effective MOC work process in place that will
still giving you a good flavour of what’s on offer only the first allow inspectors to know when and if they need to change
10 of the actual 101essential elements are included. Com- inspection methods and schedule, to account for a process
plete copies of the article are available from the author or the change?
Positive Material Identification (PMI)
Abstract An effective PMI program for new and existing alloy piping
The full paper outlines the 101 essential elements that need to systems is another top priority for PEIM. API RP 578, Mate-
be in place, and functioning well, to effectively and effi- rial Verification for New and Existing Alloy Piping Systems,
ciently, preserve and protect the reliability and integrity of is an excellent document for instituting an effective PMI pro-
pressure equipment (vessels, exchangers, furnaces, boilers, gram for new installations, maintenance materials, and for
piping, tanks, relief systems) in the refining and petrochem- checking of materials of existing systems, in-service, that
ical industry. This paper is not just about minimum compli- may have rogue materials in place. Time and time again,
ance with rules, regulations or standards; rather it is about users report incidents related to the failure of a piece of a pip-
what needs to be accomplished to build and maintain a pro- ing system that was not the same as that specified for the rest
gram of operational excellence in pressure equipment integri- of the piping system. PMI surveys, made by users looking for
ty that will permit owner-users to make maximum use of their off-spec material, routinely report finding between 1 and
physical assets to generate income. Compliance is not the key 3% incorrect materials, with some reporting non-confor-
to success in pressure equipment integrity management mances up in the double digits. I believe that PMI problems
(PEIM); operational excellence is. account for one of the leading causes of breaches of con-
tainment in our industry which are classified as mechanical
Each of the 101 work processes outlined in this paper, is integrity incidents.
explained concisely to the extent necessary, so that owner-
users will know what needs to be done to maintain and Are you using API 578 effectively to identify rogue materi-
improve their PEIM program. This paper does not prescribe als that might cause unexpected failures in your pressure
how each of these 101 key elements is to be accomplished, equipment, for both new and existing equipment?
as that description would result in a book rather than a
paper. This paper simply outlines all the fundamentals that are Temporary Repairs and Installations
necessary to avoid losses, avoid safety incidents, and main- An effective QA/QC program must be in place to assure that
tain reliability of pressure equipment. It pulls together a com- temporary repairs are completed, only by qualified person-
plete overview of the entire spectrum of programs, proce- nel, using approved methods and procedures, so that the risk
dures, and preventative measures needed to achieve first of an incident is not increased by faulty or inadequate repairs.
quartile performance in maintaining pressure equipment This includes all leak sealing and leak dissipating devices.
integrity (PEI). Likewise, it is necessary to record and track temporary pip-
ing installations, to make sure they are adequate for the pur-
The first ten essential elements of pose intended and the length of time intended. An effective
PEIM MOC procedure should cover both of these issues.

Management of Change (MOC) for PEI Do you have an effective work process in place for tempo-
Issues rary repairs and temporary installations that will avoid
MOC is one of the most important aspects PEIM. There is a unscheduled outages from the failures of inappropriate
multitude of incidents that can be traced to changes that repairs or installations?
were made in the hardware or process chemistry that even-
tually caused a breech of containment. Process chemistry Key and Critical (K/C) Materials
changes are equally, if not more important than hardware Degradation Variables
changes when it comes to the need for effective MOC. Unfor- Identifying, documenting, and implementing K/C variables
tunately, many involved more in the operation and process for all historic and potential issues that could impact pressure
side of our business, sometimes make changes to equipment equipment integrity, is of utmost importance. There needs to
and process variables, assuming that any change in materi- be a systematic process, involving appropriate subject mat-
al degradation will be picked up in the next inspection. That’s ter experts (SME’s) to identify and document each process
simply not the way it works. Inspectors must know about variable that must stay within a specific range in order not
these changes in order to change their inspection strategy and to increase the chances of equipment failure beyond that nor-

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

mally expected. Then, an effective implementation process, Furnace Monitoring and Inspection
including operator training, on each K/C variable, needs to Furnaces often are big contributors to reliability problems in
be accomplished. These K/C variables include not only the major hydrocarbon process facilities. As such, an effective
standard pressures and temperatures, but often include flow furnace program to monitor flame patterns, tube tempera-
rates, a multitude of chemistry limitations, hydrogen partial tures, hot spots, etc. is important to preventing tube leaks and
pressures, heating and cooling rates, moisture contents, chlo- ruptures. Likewise, when a furnace is down for inspection and
ride contamination limits, and a large variety of other vari- maintenance, inspectors and engineers, knowledgeable in
ables that may affect the ability of construction materials to potential deterioration mechanisms for tubulars, structural
resist degradation. Establishing and changing the list of PEI members and refractory need to specify and implement an
K/C variables should be another MOC issue. effective inspection and data analysis effort. This effort will
identify potential causes of deterioration and predict remain-
Do you have all the key and critical operating variables, that ing life of each furnace coil in the radiant and convection sec-
can cause materials degradation, identified, documented, tions. Furnace inspection and maintenance is a specialized
communicated and understood by operators in your plant? body of knowledge that needs to be imparted to those
involved, in order to avoid unexpected reliability hits when
Materials and Corrosion Engineering a furnace comes off line in the middle of a run. And, don’t
Routine access to subject matter experts (SME’s) in materials always assume that furnace tube failures are just reliability
and corrosion is paramount for any process unit that is or has problems; as higher-pressure hydroprocess furnace tube rup-
the potential for being corrosive or otherwise causing mate- tures have resulted in injuries and fatalities? The last fatality
rials degradation that could lead to unexpected equipment from a furnace tube rupture, that I’m familiar with, occurred
failure. This expertise needs to be brought to bear, pro-active- just a few years ago at a Canadian refinery.
ly, to prevent materials problems as well as reactively to
understand and solve corrosion problems. To be most effec- Do all your furnace coils have a reliable structural integrity
tive these SME’s need to work very closely with inspectors, as analysis and remnant life prediction so that you will not be
well as equipment and process engineers. The most well surprised by predictable failures that could have been avoid-
rounded materials and corrosion SME’s should be knowl- ed by scheduled inspection and maintenance?
edgeable, not just in metallurgy and materials selection, but
also in process chemistry, corrosion and degradation mech- Brittle Fracture Prevention
anisms, corrosion and materials degradation prevention and On the opposite end of the temperature spectrum from fur-
mitigation. naces is the need to have an effective program in place for
the prevention of brittle fracture. An in-service brittle fracture
Do you have easy access to materials and corrosion SME’s is one of those very low probabilities – very high conse-
who provide guidance and knowledge transfer to your inspec- quence events that must be avoided at all costs. Hence inspec-
tors, in order to be able to predict where and when degra- tors, engineers and operators must be knowledgeable in the
dation will occur, so that inspections can be scheduled to avoid potential for brittle fracture of materials operating below
unexpected breeches of containment? their brittle to ductile transition temperature (that’s metallur-
gical speak for operating below a temperature range where
Inspection for Environmental Cracking they are suitable). API RP 920, Prevention of Brittle Fracture
An effective inspection program must be in place if there is of Pressure Vessels, outlines some effective inspection and
a potential for any of the multitude of possible environmen- maintenance steps to take to avoid this potential. Special care
tally caused cracking mechanisms, e.g. caustics, amines, and procedures are necessary to control cooling and heat-
chlorides, wet hydrogen sulfide, polythionic acids, ammonia, ing rates of heavy wall equipment in hydroprocess environ-
dearators, etc. An effective prevention program, led by the ments. The new API RP 579, Fitness for Service also provides
SME’s referenced above, is vital to such an effort; but when excellent guidance on how to assess the potential for brittle
there is still a potential, an effective inspection program (tools, fracture of equipment. Every few years I read about an enor-
techniques, procedures, methods) must be in place to detect mous, catastrophic loss from brittle fracture. The last one was
the presence of environmental cracking. These programs, in a gas plant in Australia, which resulted in two fatalities and
including the proper surface preparation, must be sensitive a very large loss for the company, as well as a huge impact
enough to detect and quantify the damage that is occurring, on customers.
if any. Materials and corrosion SME’s are vital to under-
standing and predicting when and where any of these envi- Do all the right people at your plant know the minimum
ronmentally caused cracking mechanisms may be an issue. design metal temperature (MDMT) of all your equipment and
how to avoid the potential of brittle fracture, especially from
Do you have all potential environmentally caused cracking operating upsets?
mechanisms identified, and appropriate inspections planned,
to avoid cracking failures in your pressure equipment?

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Effective Inspection Record Keeping Systems Flare System Inspection
Effective inspection record keeping systems are fundamental Flare systems must be inspected routinely for fouling and
to an effective PEIM program. Yet, often, inadequate record corrosion. Clearly, when we need our flare systems to oper-
keeping is at the root of equipment failures and reliability ate in accordance with design under emergency relief con-
problems. Effective record keeping is not fun and it does not ditions, we want to be assured that they are not fouled or
usually get much notice, until there is a major incident, and degraded. Radiographic inspections for fouling material at
inadequate records are found to be a major contributing fac- strategic points will sometimes reveal that the flare lines are
tor. There must be an effective Inspection Data Management partially plugged; in which case some maintenance and/or
Program (IDMP) in place and it must be kept up to date, or operating measures to clear the restrictions will be necessary.
you cannot have an effective PEIM program. This is such a Ultrasonic scanning and/or radiographic inspections for
vital aspect, that regular internal audits should be conduct- thinning are also vital to integrity management of flare sys-
ed by those knowledgeable in effective records systems to tems. Major disasters have occurred when thin flare lines sep-
determine if and where deficiencies exist. Just a couple of arated and fell to the ground during slug flow conditions that
years ago, a refinery in Texas suffered a large incident when have occurred during emergency relief scenarios. The last one
a section of pipe ruptured. Inadequate record keeping prac- that I’m aware of occurred in a refinery in Great Britain in
tices were a primary cause, since it was previously known that the early 90’s.
the pipe was getting thin.
Are your flare systems “out of sight – out of mind”; or do you
Do you keep all the data and information in your IDMP com- do sufficient monitoring and maintenance to rest assured
pletely up to date, with all the pertinent information from pre- that your most important emergency control system will per-
vious inspections, so that you can assess the integrity of your form in accordance with design, when you need it most?
equipment and schedule the next inspection on the basis of
necessary facts? For further information contact John T. Reynolds

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Engineering Highlights – Equilon Enterprises, LLC – October, 2001

Turnaround Work Scope Assessment for the EQUILON - Bakersfield Refinery in September of 2001.
Phenol-3 at DPCP This project consisted of 40+ hours of hands-on classroom
Author: John Reynolds, Pressure Equipment training and competency testing for the users, while the exist-
Integrity ing Ultrapipe database was being converted into the EMPRV
Requestor/Sponsor: Steve Rathweg/Joe Gilbert Oracle database format.
A risk-based turnaround work scope assessment was con-
ducted on numerous equipment items scheduled for inspec- Martinez FCCU Power Recovery Turbine
tion and maintenance in the planned March/02 turnaround Vibration
for PA-3. Using risk-based assessments, several large equip- Authors: J. A. Horwege, Pressure Equipment
ment items (columns and reboilers) were determined to be suit- Integrity, M. J. Drosjack, Reliability & Process
able for consideration to extend internal inspection require- Safety, R.A. Sanborn, Energy & Equipment Engi-
ments until the next turnaround, without incurring neering, R. A. Arbesman, Cat Cracking, John
unacceptable risks (safety or reliability). This work process also Felten and K.S. Taylor, Martinez
allows turnaround planners to balance major inspections Sponsor: W. J. McNally Manager Cracked Prod-
over the coming decade, as opposed to having them all fall ucts, Martinez
early in the decade during the upcoming turnaround. The The Martinez FCCU Power Recovery Turbine (Hot Gas
work process consumed about 30-40 person hours, and is Expander) has been experiencing increased vibration since
expected to save several hundred thousand dollars in March April. The vibration was not reduced by normal on-line
turnaround costs, and possibly much more if the scheduled cleaning techniques. Analysis of the vibration data sug-
turnaround can now be shortened. gested that the problem might be related to pipe supports or
expansion joints on the inlet or outlet pipe. WTC provided
PSRC FCCU Cat Losses Investigation and on site inspection, definition and analysis of measurements
Correction that concluded that although the support was not functioning
R. A. Sanborn and Y. Chen, Energy & Equipment as designed, and was significantly different than best prac-
Engineering, J. A. Horwege, Pressure Equipment tice design, the pipe system was probably not the cause of
Integrity, K. Kraft, PSRC, R. A. Arbesman, Cat the vibration. WTC provided design details for short term cor-
Cracking rections to the pipe supports that will minimize the risk of mal-
Sponsor: Joe Wall - Tech Manager function until a planned replacement of the pipe to reflect
The PSRC FCCU began experiencing high catalyst losses in proven best practice is complete. The actual cause of the
May. The losses increased slowly over the summer. In the last vibration was blade erosion due to high catalyst losses from
week in August, losses jumped to unacceptable levels the Third Stage Separator (TSS). WTC coordinated the
(100TPD). WTC worked with PSRC staff to perform on-site inspection of the TSS and determined that the cat losses were
inspection and process analysis. It was determined that the caused by partial blockage of the TSS by refractory debris.
cause of the loss was very severe localized erosion in the
cyclone system. The erosion was due to partial bypassing of Remote Installation of Monitoring Software
the primary cyclone due to a short “Gas Outlet Tube” in the at Stanlow, UK
primary cyclones. WTC designed short term corrections to Author: Automation Engineering
reduce the erosion, and provided risk based repair recom- Sponsor: David Cole – Shell UK, Stanlow Refinery
mendations and details to allow operation to the next sched- Equilon/SIOP’s monitoring and diagnosis software, MD-1,
uled turnaround. While the FCCU was down for these repairs, was recently installed at Shell’s Stanlow UK Refinery by ET per-
WTC led a risk analysis of the balance of the unit and inspect- sonnel working from PCs in their offices at Westhollow. MD-
ed other high risk areas. This inspection identified two slide 1 is a process control system monitoring application that
valves that required significant repairs to complete the run with requires IT intensive configuration to connect to a process his-
minimal risk of an additional unscheduled shutdown. The unit torian, database application, and e-mail server. Originally,
was restarted with normal operation in September. The esti- a business trip to the UK was planned to perform the instal-
mated savings for PSRC related to reducing the potential lation, but by using Windows NetMeeting (a GI compliant
duration of this unscheduled shutdown is in the order of application included in Windows 2000), ET personnel were
$800,000. able to perform the installation using remote desktop control.
It is estimated that it would have cost over $10k USD to send
EMPRV an extra developer on the trip overseas. The success of the
Author: Greg Briner, Pressure Equipment Inspec- remote installation has been publicized, and similar savings
tion Department are expected on future installations as well as on the main-
Sponsor: G. K. King – Martinez Refining tenance of existing installations.
Inspection Data Management Software was implemented at

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Heat Exchanger Tubular Inspection - Perfor-
mance Demonstration Testing
Author: Jim Haupt, Pressure Equipment Integrity
Sponsor: NDE TechNet, Mark Bell
This ongoing project has reached two further milestones.
The primary objective of the project is to screen non-destruc-
tive testing people and companies that we use to inspect our
heat exchanger tubes for corrosion and cracking damage.
Industry data indicates that heat exchangers are the cause
of a large proportion (31%) of unplanned unit shutdowns. The
milestones are: 1. An Intranet based Excel spreadsheet with
the performance data of all the examinees is available to all
company inspection personnel. 2. A Microsoft Access
database, which is used by the examinee, that is capable of
grading and printing test results immediately after the test.
This replaces the slow and cumbersome paper-based system.
This database will also be populated with all of the previous
paper-based data so detailed queries can be run on the

Engineering (R. W. Rolke)

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2


The Rusty Crossword

Lighten up and take a moment to ponder this quiz – if you’ve
read the newsletter this should be a breeze!
Send your answers to emma.mcdonald@shell.com
1 2 3 4
by the end of February 2002. Correct answers will
be put into a hat and the winner drawn receives an
exclusive Shell Global Solutions spirit level/screw-
driver tool.

7 8 9



12 13 14
(Stay tuned….the answer will be printed in the next
issue of the Rusty Chronicle)

15 16

Across Down
1 Out of sight, out of mind? (3) 1 Can be white, grey, ductile... (4, 4)
5 Degradation of steel at high temperature and high 2 A wet relation. (2)
hydrogen partial pressure. (4) 3 Rapid cracking of austenitic stainless steel. (7, 3)
7 Straight-run crude oil fraction between LPG and 4 Why stainless steel is stainless. (8)
naptha. (4) 6 Defend your buried assets with this. (2)
9 An obnoxious, smelly gas. (3) 8 As dense as ~ 7.9 g/cm3 (2)
10 Based on probability and consequence... (3) 9 Discontinuity in a coating or a well deserved break. (7)
11 Galvanises steel. (4) 13 We can’t live without these abbreviations! (3)
12 PEC, DOS, AE, UT to name a few. (3)
14. Detection, amplification and display of secondary
electrons. (3)
15. Test for toughness. (6)
16. Watch those emissions! (2)

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2


New Hydrocarbon Accounting System - Potential for Corrosivity Mapping

Shell have recently signed an agreement with TietoEnator for EC has modules catering for chemical handling, storage and
a new Hydrocarbon Accounting and Production Reporting usage and also lab analysis. EC handles actual production
System. and also forecast production 0 - 24 months and is com-
prised of a comprehensive suite of programmes. EC will be
The software, which is being implemented globally in Shell linked to SAP and probably use the SAP asset register.
OU’s, is Energy-Components (EC)
(http://energy-components.com) OGEI/2 are investigating feasibility of configuring a ‘corro-
by Tietoenator sivity mapping’ module utilising live EC data and existing
(http://tietoenator.com). SGSI corrosion rate calculation tools.
This covers production, transport and sales of products and
also has production operations functionality. For further information please contact Marc Kemp

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2


OGEI Staff Moves 2001 (in)

Name From To Date
E. B. McDonald (Emma) New joiner OGEI/1 05-11-2001
A. Etheridge (Andrea) OGE/1 New starter 29-10-2001

OGEI Staff Moves 2001 (out)

Name From To Date
J. Whitfield (John) OGEI/1 Shell Chemicals 15-03-2001

• In the previuous issue we showed the services available from OGEI.

• For this issue we are simply listing the department personnel contact details.
• We plan to rationalise the services descriptions in the next issue.

Last Name First Name/ Telephone/extension E-mail Address


OGEI - Materials & Inspection Engineering

Equilon Technology, Llc - Wtc - Houston

Virtual Global Business Manager

Rogalski Mike A. 281-544-7012 marogalski@equilontech.com
31-20-630-2300 mike.a.rogalski@shell.com

OGEI/0 E-Mail: @shell.com

Boes G. 31-20-630-2244 geertje.boes@
Bos I.M. 31-20-630-3050 ingrid.bos@
Kampschöer W.H.A.M. 31-20-630-2121 wilma.kampschoer@
van Langen M.A.C. 31-20-630-2830 mirjam.vanlangen@

OGEI/ 1 - Downstream Materials Engineering Services (Amsterdam) E-Mail: @shell.com

Blaauw A. 31-20-630-3671 andre.blaauw@
de Boer M.P. 31-20-630-2461 marcpaul.deboer@
van Bokhorst J.R. 31-20-630-3554 jan.vanbokhorst@
Geenen P.V. 31-20-630-3146 peter.geenen@
Green A. 31-20-630-3167 drew.green@
Kapusta S.D. 31-20-630-2446 sergio.(s.)d.kapusta@
Lewis K.R. 31-20-630-3147 keith.k.r.lewis@
Liek W.E. 31-20-630-2594 willem.liek@
van Loon P.J.M. 31-20-630-2627 peter.vanloon@
Marsh S.R. 31-20-630-3157 simon.marsh@
McDonald E.M. 31-20-630-2483 emma.mcdonald@
Ryan T.F.J.N. 31-20-630-3117 tim.ryan@
van Roij J.F.M. 31-20-630-3955 johan.vanroij@
Schelling R. 31-20-630-3564 roy.schelling@
van der Schot G.J.J. 31-20-630-3569 gerard.vanderschot@
Smit K. 31-20-630-2308 kees.k.smit@
Terwijn F.X. 31-20-630-2366 frans.terwijn@
Wolfert A. 31-20-630-2298 ton.wolfert@
Etheridge A.M. 44-151-373-5293 andrea.etheridge@
Sargent M.A. 65-263-5398 margaret.a.sargent@shell.com.sg

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

OGEI/ 2 - Upstream Materials Engineering Services (Amsterdam) E-mail: @shell.com
Deurhof A. 31-20-630-2065 bram.deurhof@
Groenenberg C.J.R. 31-20-630-2171 rob.groenenberg@
Hendriksen E.L.J.A. 31-20-630-3544 edwin.Hendriksen@
Huizinga S. 31-20-630-2449 sytze.huizinga@
Janssen F.A.H. 31-20-630-2228 frans.f.janssen@
de Jong J.G. 31-20-630-2592 jan.dejong@
Kemp M.D.N. 31-20-630-2673 marc.d.n.kemp@
Kerkveld G.E. 31-20-630-2438 gert.kerkveld@
Koers R.W.J. 31-20-630-2229 ronald.koers@
Martin J.T. 31-20-630-2205 tom.martin@
Mesman A. 31-20-630-2282 arnold.mesman@
de Mul L.M. 31-20-630-2318 leo.demul@
Ohm R.K. 31-20-630-2628 rob.ohm@
Orzessek K.M. 31-20-630-3160 karin.orzessek@
Prager L.H. 31-20-630-2437 rik.prager@
de Reus J.A.M. 31-20-630-2742 han.dereus@
Rippon I.J. 31-70-311-2719 ian.rippon@
Ritchie D. 31-20-630-2387 david.d.ritchie@
Simon Thomas M.J.J. 31-20-630-2371 maarten.simonthomas@
Stenger C.G.F. 31-20-630-2422 chris.stenger@
Voermans C.W.M. 31-20-630-2485 cees.voermans@
Wilcock N.J. 31-20-630-2079 neil.wilcock@
van Zummeren J.B.W. 31-20-630-2493 hans.vanzummeren@

OGEI/ 3 - Inspection Technology (Amsterdam) E-mail: @shell.com

Crouzen P.C.N. 31-20-630-2547 paul.crouzen@
Geelen P.M.H. 31-20-630-2097 pierre.geelen@
Jager S.F. 31-20-630-2753 sicco.jager@
Kronemeijer D.A. 31-20-630-2643 dick.kronemeijer@
van de Loo P.J. 31-20-630-2560 peter.vandeloo@
Munns I.J. 31-20-630-2529 ian.munns@
van Nisselroij J.J.M. 31-20-630-2564 jacq.vannisselroij@
Roosenbrand A.G. 31-20-630-2384 bert.roosenbrand
Schipper C.M. 31-20-630-2590 michell.schipper@
van der Steen J. 31-20-630-3529 hans.vandersteen@
Terpstra S. 31-20-630-3059 sieger.terpstra@
van der Veer P.A.J. 31-20-630-2405 peter.vanderveer@
Visser A. 31-20-630-2728 auke.visser@

OGEI/ 4 - Materials & Integrity (WTC - Houston)

Brownlee Kirk 281-544-8538 kirk.brownlee@shell.com
Chang Ben 281-544-7332 benjamin.chang@shell.com
Chang Jemei 281-544-6034 jemei.chang@shell.com
Hummel Bob 281-544-7616 robert.hummel@shell.com
John Randy 281-544-7229 randy.john@shell.com
Kriegel Owen 281-544-7895 owen.kriegel@shell.com
Miglin Bruce 281-544-9090 bruce.miglin@shell.com
Mitschke Howard 281-544-8012 howard.mitschke@shell.com
ODell Bill 281-544-8059 bill.odell@shell.com
Pots Bert 281-544-7028 bert.pots@shell.com
Schmidt Paul 281-544-8273 paul.schmidt@shell.com
Shrout Kay 281-544-7972 kay.shrout@shell.com
Skogsberg Lillian 281-544-8675 lillian.skogsberg@shell.com
Stockman Jeff 281-544-8018 jeff.stockman@shell.com
Uralil Francis 281-544-8540 francis.uralil@shell.com
Wheaton Lonnie 281-544-7432 lonnie.wheaton@shell.com

The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2001 - issue 2

Pressure Equipment Integrity Department (WTC - Houston)

Bell Mark 281-544-7653 mbell@EquilonTech.com
Blair Linda 281-544-7971 lcblair@EquilonTech.com
Briner Greg 281-544-8535 gcbriner@EquilonTech.com
Dominguez Wendy 281-544-7900 wbdominguez@EquilonTech.com
Edmondson Jim 281-544-6790 jgedmondson@EquilonTech.com
Fan Deyuan 281-544-7132 dfan@EquilonTech.com
Fort Bill 281-544-8171 wcfort@EquilonTech.com
Gonzalez Manuel 281-544-9197 magonzalez@EquilonTech.com
Hassell Jess 281-544-8089 jchassell@EquilonTech.com
Haupt Jim 281-544-7464 jdhaupt@EquilonTech.com
Horvath Dick 281-544-8045 rjhorvath@EquilonTech.com
Horwege Jason 281-544-8047 jahorwege@EquilonTech.com
Jackson Jacque 281-544-8010 jmjackson@EquilonTech.com
Jones Mark 314-214-0222 jmjones@EquilonTech.com
Kelly Bill 281-544-7976 wkkelly@EquilonTech.com
Kelley Nathan 281-544-7149 nkelley@EquilonTech.com
Kim Don 281-544-7187 dskim@EquilonTech.com
Malone George 281-544-7865 ghmalone@EquilonTech.com
Mead Hearl 281-544-8711 hemead@EquilonTech.com
Parikh Prashant 281-544-7927 pdparikh@EquilonTech.com
Reynolds John 281-544-8194 jtreynolds@EquilonTech.com
Rothengass Dick 281-544-7925 rdrothengass@EquilonTech.com
Virani Saher 281-544-7914 svirani@EquilonTech.com
Wang David 281-544-8333 wdwang@EquilonTech.com
Whittington Lee 281-544-8564 lawhittington@EquilonTech.com
Wylie Tom 281-544-6215 tpwylie@EquilonTech.com
Zimmerman Larry 281-544-9033 lwzimmerman@EquilonTech.com


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