ACROSS THE HIMALAYAN GAP

Source: http://ignca.nic.in/ks_41062.htm

Better Understanding

THREE AGREEMENTS AND FIVE PRINCIPLES

BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA
Swaran Singh

56

As suggested by Prof. Tan Chung, I have composed the following as a separate article to be the
reference point to my ensuing piece on India-China confidence building measures. The word
“Panchsheel” (also spelled as “pancasila”) denoted “Five Taboos” in the ancient Buddhist scriptures
governing the personal behaviour of Indian (later Chinese and other foreign) monks. This was taken
from the holy books by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to be applicable to international
behaviours of the modern states. When Nehru proposed to make panchsheel enshrine the first India-
China agreement in 1954 as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the Chinese Premier, Zhou
Enlai, readily agreed. Thus, these five principles have become the joint India-China invention.

All inter-state interactions, especially their written agreements, surely make their contribution towards
evolving an environment of mutual security and mutual confidence yet some remain more directed
towards this motive than others. In that context, this essay consists of, only the three most important
agreements which have laid the foundations and defined the perimeters of confidence and security
building measures (CSBMs) between India and China. These include the Panchsheel Agreement
signed in Beijing on April ‘29, 1954, Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the
Line of Actual Control which was signed in Beijing on September 7, 1993 and the Agreement on
Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control signed in New
Delhi on November 29, 1996. All three agreements have been duty ratified by both sides. Below, I
present to our readers the three documents each with an introductory note explaining the context and
historical significance of them.
1. The Panchsheel Agreement

Popularly known as the Panchsheel Agreement, this was basically a trade pact between China and
India streamlining their bilateral trade operations in Tibet and, therefore, at the time of signing it was
not visualised as a CSBM agreement, though without saying it in so many words, it intended to serve
the same objectives as the latter two CSBM agreements of 1993 and 1999. The negotiations for this
agreement were held in Beijing between December 31, 1953 and April 29, 1954 at the end of which
this agreement was finally signed in Beijing.

The lasting significance of this agreement lies in the fact that this was the first document where both
India and China enunciated the famous ‘Five Principles” (Panchsheel) of peaceful coexistence which
today form the centrepiece of their current CSBMs. And being the basis in defining the code of inter-
state relations, even after 43 years Panchsheel remains an extremely valid framework. In practical
terms, however, China was the immediate beneficiary of this agreement. India, on the other hand had
felt satisfied with its intangible gains. At least that was how Jawahalal Nehru repeatedly explained it
to his people. In terms of its concessions, it meant that for the first time, India recognised China’s
complete control over Tibet. In this agreement India voluntarily gave up its military, communication
and postal and other rights which New Delhi had inherited from the British in accordance with the
Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904. It is strange why India did not demand any reciprocal concession? In
retrospect, this presented a rare opportunity to resolve the rest of the border dispute which is the only
basic problem between these two countries today.

India’s non-insistence on reciprocal concessions while recognising China’s suzerainty over Tibet by
India has, of course, to be understood in the context of the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” spirit of 1950s
where China’s leaders swore of “eternal peace and friendship” and Indian leadership felt satisfied
having got a written guarantee of good behaviour from China in terms of Pachsheel being a part of
this Agreement’s Preamble. Also, such an Indian response has to be understood in view of Nehru’s
personality and beliefs, He had been India’s sole spokesperson on foreign relations and following the
death of Gandhiji (1948) and Sardar Pate1 (1950) Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly emerged as the single
most important leader of the monolith Indian National Congress.

Defending this Agreement in Indian Parliament, he said: “It was the recognition of existing situation
there. Historical and practical considerations necessitated the step.” In April 1954, Nehru was still a
man who sought security in peace and trusted China’s friendly gestures.

Going by the tenor of Nehru’s arguments, this agreement was clearly seen as geared towards
generating mutual trust and confidence between two newly liberated and strongly nationalistic
republics. Thus, in retrospect, this can be safely described as the first Sino-India CSBM Agreement.
Whatever may have been its reasons, had Dalai Lama not left Tibet and sought asylum in India, this
Agreement would have stood the test and been maintained as a momentum towards greater
understanding. And here, Dalai Lama’s arrival in India in 1959 was perhaps the one most important
factor that changed the entire spirit of Sino-lndian relations. Prime Minister Zhou En-lai who during his
earlier visit to New Delhi had assured Nehru of his support in China’s recognising the MacMahon Line
as the Sine-Indian border. He, however, wrote in his famous letter to Nehru later, saying that China
had never recognised the McMahon Line. This portended for a downward trend, gradually resulting in
deteriorating their relations and later leading to the 1962 war. This completely changed the context in
which this Agreement had been signed and their relations remained frozen for the next two decades
or so.