Civil Law Review Cases Family Code (Consolidated)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASES FAMILY CODE
CASE NO. 1
Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero
Facts:
On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Aßcebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,
was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girl’s Baptismal
Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents
Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment
and a product of complainnat’s hatred and jealousy. By respondent’s own admission however, he
had an illicit relationship with the petitioner’s wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit
relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a “kasunduan”
in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their marriage ties
and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go to court to
institute any action against the other.
Issue: Whether or not the “Kasunduan” is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.
Ruling: SC ruled that respondent’s justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary, re-
spondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that
marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an institution of public order and policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the par-
ties. Respondent is suspended for 6 months. ###
CASE NO. 2
ESPINOSA, ET AL VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA
FACTS:
On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal ad-
vice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a doc-
ument entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the
conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow
employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was
not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-
CBD. Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her
and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to per-
suade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature
and notarized the contract.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”
2. W/N the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD:
SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial ap-
proval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegra-
tion of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudi-
cially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.
Attorney’s notarization of illegal document. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegra-
tion of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudi-
cially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what respondent did in this case. In
preparing and notarizing an agreement for extrajudicial dissolution of marriage — a void docu-
ment — respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Respondent knew fully well that the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” has no legal effect and is
against public policy. Therefore, respondent may be suspended from office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. ###
CASE NO. 3:
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs.TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, 2014
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE: Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina
on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
She included in her complaint that the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certifi-
cate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR. During the existence of
Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his
family and his whereabouts was not known.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name
of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous,
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. In the absence of the marriage con-
tract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it con-
sidered the same as mere self-serving assertions.
ISSUE: Whether or not other competent and relevant evidence may be presented to prove the
existence of the marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate.
HELD: YES.
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evi-
dence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses
to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The per-
son who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness
to the fact of marriage."
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not re-
garded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was estab-
lished by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the
marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown
by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary –
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. ###
CASE NO. 4
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.LIBERTY D. ALBIOS [2013]
FACTS
Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC) in 2004. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any inten-
tion of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She de-
scribed their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. Summons was served on
Fringer but he neither not file his answer nor appear in court.
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citi-
zenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the cere-
mony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed
her petition for citizenship. RTC and CA declared the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING
Respondent’s marriage is not void. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contract-
ing parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelli-
gent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the benefi-
cial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, in-
toxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also con-
scious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of
their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evi-
denced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citi-
zenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention
of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It
is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the re-
spondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual mar-
riage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, there-
fore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real inten-
tion to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be de-
clared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a mar-
riage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requi-
sites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid. ###
CASE NO. 5
Santiago vs. People of the Philippines
Facts: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who
had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was
a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997.
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She
also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven
valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated
without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement
of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not
lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the ab-
sence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
The RTC finds the accused Santiago guilty of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Santiago is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling: YES. Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the
nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in
the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned below the validity
of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a
marriage license are void ab initio.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place with-
out a marriage license based on their declaration that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. However, the evidence on record
shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows
that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage. It appears
that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohab-
ited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no mar-
riage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated
by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situa-
tion wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos
without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement un-
der the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract. Thus, in the case at bar,
we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge
her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. ###
CASE NO. 6:
RENE RONULOvs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2014 [PONENTE: BRION, J.]
TOPIC: Requisites of Marriage
FACTS:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating
priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
RULING:
Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or au-
thorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the per-
formance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is like-
wise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the con-
tracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Mar-
riage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically pe-
nalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty. ###
CASE NO. 7
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., 2013
Topic: Requisites of Marriage – Marriage License
FACTS
Benjamin and Sally were romantically involved since 1979, and by 1982, they were living together. This
happened despite the fact that Benjamin is in fact married to one Azucena, with whom they had three
children, since 1973. To appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sally produced two children, and even
acquired several real properties throughout their cohabitation. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally
ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was biga-
mous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties,
Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in
their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced
her to his family and friends as his wife.
ISSUE: Was there a valid subsequent marriage constituting an element in the crime of bigamy?
RULING:
No. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for va-
lidity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. It was
also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends
and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."
Notes:
In this case, the Supreme Court delineated that a marriage can be both void ab initio and nonexistent,
contrary to Sally’s contention that it cannot be both. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage sol-
emnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without
a license. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated
or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." ###
CASE NO. 8
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and
8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married with-
out any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of
the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of co-
habitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or an-
nulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pep-
ito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his law-
ful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial compan-
ionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. ###
CASE NO. 9.
REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT
Requisites of Marriage
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June
1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or dec-
laration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and
his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affi-
davit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living to-
gether only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on No-
vember 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invali-
dates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an excep-
tion to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an ac-
tion for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time. ###
CASE NO: 10
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI

ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO
Marriages; As both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior mar-
riage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. Also, in a void marriage, any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the life-
time of the parties to the marriage.
FACTS:
Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice in 1993—initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Ta-
mano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
In1994, private respondents Zorayda)and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own
behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a com-
plaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda in 1958
under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
The complaint likewise averred that:
The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New
Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the sub-
sequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio be-
cause he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsist-
ing, and his status being declared as “divorced” has no factual or legal basis, because the de-
ceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so
because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code.
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Arti-
cle 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philip-
pines.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous
HELD: YES. The subsequent marriage is bigamous.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. We already ruled that “Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situ-
ation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”Moreover, the Muslim
Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override
the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its pro-
visions unless otherwise provided.
In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. ###
CASE NO. 11
LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, PE-

TITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED
BY CORAZON BUENA, RESPONDENTS. [2015]
FACTS
Luis Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as
husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and
lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children. Uy alleged in 1964,he and his wife acquired a resi-
dential land. The TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis
G. Uy." Further, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, another residential land adjacent to the first
property from the Sps. Contreras. Thereafter, a split level house was constructed. Rosca denied
the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of merit.
Uy through his witnesses, testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired
by Uy and Rosca. Both witnesses alleged that the house existed until it was demolished; and that
the funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business.
Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during WW II, she and Uy cohabited
and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage
ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which oc-
curred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.
Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to
their physical separation before the year 1973.
In 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking
Corporation using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan, Rosca executed an Affi-
davit of Ownership dated 27 Sept 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner of the
484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2) the land was regis-
tered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-
24660 was merely a description of her status.
ISSUE: Whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
RULING: The marriage is not valid. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage."Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.However, this pre-
sumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.Marriage may be
proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
In Pugeda v. Trias,we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the mar-
riage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may
also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that the best documentary evidence of
a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the present case being the mar-
riage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the con-
tracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the
person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the
Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was
solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the
interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Sec-
tion 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the mar-
riage.Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have
sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the
marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a sin-
gle relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy
submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant
Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage
was not consummated. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to
Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which ap-
plies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147 pro-
vides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohab-
itation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descend-
ants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary. ###
CASE NO. 12
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others,
the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage cere-
mony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Infor-
mation filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the RTC of Bohol. The petitioner
moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification
of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasona-
ble doubt of the crime of Bigamy. The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. Meanwhile, on
October 23, 1997, or while the appeal was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 (Petition for Divorce) declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
However, the CA still affirmed in toto the decision of lower court. It stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA
held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a big-
amy case.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner Morigo guilty of the crime of Bigamy.
Ruling: NO. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the of-
fender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have
been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage con-
tract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply
means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The first element of
bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first mar-
riage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logi-
cal that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. ###
CASE 13:
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.

LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, 2014[BERSAMIN, J]
NATURE OF CASE: The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals
the adverse decision, whereby the CA affirmed the decision RTC.
TOPIC: Requisites of Marriage, NCC 15

FACTS::
 ATTY. LUNA,
o a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the law firm Sycip Law Offices
o at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Parañaque and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral
in San Miguel, Bulacan.
o they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Ara-
celi Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda
L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
o After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
 ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Dominican
Republic.
o on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLE-
DAD.
o Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together
as husband and wife until 1987.
 ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON where ATTY. LUNA was the manag-
ing partner.
 LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to be used as law of-
fice of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed which was registered bearing the following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, mar-
ried to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A.
Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x"
 Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan
in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761
was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, mar-
ried to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x"
 LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common.
o The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share.
o ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G.
Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said
law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
 After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
o Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit be-
longing to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
 The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD
against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.
o The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence
of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that
since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon
the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½
share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which
was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the sub-
ject properties.
 The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts ruling that the
24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been acquired by
Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
 Both parties appealed to the CA.
 The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate
wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree ob-
tained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with
EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdic-
tion.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had val-
idly dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.
(2) Whether or not the contention of Soledad Lavadia that the divorce decree obtained
abroad by her Filipino spouse valid in the Philippines.
RULING:
(1) Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philip-
pines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality
rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condi-
tion and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty.
Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 termi-
nated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such,
the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of
the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Do-
minican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugen-
ia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The
non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the
sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment
of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground
expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists,
no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
(2) No. The contention of Soledad Lavadia is not considered valid since under Philippine Laws,
divorce decree between Filipinos are not recognized which means that the first marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia was not dissolved which makes her marriage with Atty. Luna as void ab
initio. In this case, the properties acquired is governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant
with Article 144 of the Civil Code. In order to establish co-ownership, the petitioner must offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership to which she did not provide sufficient and competent could not warrant relief in her
favor. Thus, the petition is denied. The subject properties were awarded in favor of the heirs of
Atty. Luna from his first marriage. ###
CASE NO. 14
Republic of the Philippinesvs. Cipriano Orbecido III, 2005
Topic: Requisites of Marriage
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. The
OSG only raises one pure question of law: Whether respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE: Can Cipriano validly remarry under Philippine law?
RULING: Yes. On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation pre-
sented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. However, the Supreme Court
determined the legislative intent looking through the deliberations on the revision committee of
the Civil Code. The committee, through Judge Alicia Sempio-Dy, expounded that the purpose of
Art. 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, it can be
averred that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mis-
chievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed accord-
ing to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the following are the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the mar-
riage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse ca-
pacitating the latter to remarry.
Notes:
 The court in this case ruled against the assumption by the OSG that Cipriano should file
for annulment instead, because there is no question as to the validity of the first mar-
riage.
 Despite the landmark declarations and interpretation by the Supreme Court favoring
Cipriano, the Court ultimately ruled in favor of the OSG, as Cipriano failed to provide
competent evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. ###
Case NO. 15
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS, 2010
Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commit-
ments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime
in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desir-
ous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certifi-
cate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philip-
pine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or dec-
laration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a simi-
lar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its October 30,
2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to re-
marry under Philippine law.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not neces-
sarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign au-
thority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) ac-
companied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the di-
vorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to re-
mand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Cana-
dian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. ###
CASE NO. 16
FUJIKI VS. MARINAY
Requisites of Marriage
FACTS:
In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in
the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting,
married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and
Maekara later went to Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back
home to the Philippines together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the petition under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basi-
cally, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a petition for such may only be filed by
the husband or wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct.
HELD:
No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. What’s applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor General:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons” in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, “[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x.” The Japanese Fami-
ly Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Thus:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Mar-
riages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relat-
ing to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreo-
ver, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only
the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if
the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
But how will Fujiki’s petition in the RTC prosper?
Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specif-
ic, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office. ###
CASE NO. 17
MEDINA vs. KOIKE, 2016
Article 26 of the Family Code allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent mar-
riage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. The provision reads. The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married in 2005 in Quezon City. Their un-
ion bore two children.
In 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the
Mayor of Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certifi-
cate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on
file with the Local Civil Registrar, Doreen filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine laws recognise foreign divorce
HELD: YES.
Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
Under the said provision, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to deter-
mine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
Hpwever, it is worthy to note that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.”
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. ###
CASE NO. 18
Capili vs. People of the Philippines
Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it
would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant crimi-
nal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning. Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the
RTC.
The RTC of Pasig granted the Petition to Dismiss the case. Aggrieved, the private respondent
filed n appeal before the CA which the latter reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this peti-
tion.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling: NO. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a sec-
ond or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essen-
tial requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contract-
ed on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature
does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. ###
CASE 19.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, 2001
FACTS: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had 2 offsprings;
and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño
became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed
away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assis-
tance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was
able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the sub-
sistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection
of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void
ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila
ISSUE: WHICH MARRIAGE TO SPO4 CARINO IS VALID?
RULING: NONE. Under Article 40, FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be in-
voked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be in-
voked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous mar-
riage void.However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property re-
gime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.In such in-
stances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Under the NCC, the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,and the absence thereof, subject to cer-
tain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their mar-
riage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, MM, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Ap-
peals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a mar-
riage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification is-
sued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the neces-
sary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license re-
quirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
However, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
“death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judi-
cial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter a sec-
ond marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. ###
CASE NO. 20
QUIAZON, et al. vs. BELEN et al., 2013
Void & Voidable Marriages
FACTS:
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are
common-law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo having
conceived at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Filiation
was proven by her Birth Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it
was bigamous.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting that the
venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising
the argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration
and that the CA erred in declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise
has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite the
death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.
HELD:
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attach the mar-
riage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn the existence of such marriage even after
the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching its
validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of nul-
lity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be
an interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in the estate. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an inter-
ested party. ###
CASE NO. 21
JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO, 2010
Psychological incapacity: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)

juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability; It must be confined to “the most serious cases of per-
sonality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.”
FACTS:
Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the es-
sential obligations of marriage. Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he
submit himself to a psychological examination with a psychologist. The RTC annulled the mar-
riage. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
“True, as stated in Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals and Republic vs. Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence
that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony
of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient
to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question. Jocelyn now seeks the reversal
of CA’s decision.
ISSUE: WON evidence presented by petitioner sufficient to establish psychological

incapacity.
HELD: NO. As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angeli-
to’s psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations.
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence—the psy-
chologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report—that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only
in an indirect manner—she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, se-
vere and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we rec-
ognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations be-
tween the parties. For a determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, infor-
mation coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and
friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility,
at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by suppos-
edly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condi-
tion. Neither is Jocelyn’s testimony sufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from
him—all of which occurred after the marriage. ###
CASE NO. 22
VALERIO E. KALAWvs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, 2015 [Bersamin J.]
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the com-
plaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for
the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was in-
deed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard
to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in
this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to
be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for dec-
laration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so
strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” In-
stead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no
case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual mi-
lieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for

the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in
the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelli-
gent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, anteced-
ent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection
can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be

personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical exami-
nation of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence
showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjec-

tural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to es-
tablish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because
it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a
merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate
basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts suffi-
ciently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of mar-
riages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant
should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong ses-
sions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral
fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions
did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on No-
vember 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. ###
CASE NO. 23
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARI-

LYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were
married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children. In 1985, Mari-
lyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had
not been seen nor heard from again. Twenty-three years later, petitioner filed a petition for dec-
laration of nullity of marriage, citing as a ground that Marilyn was psychologically incapable of
fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to pro-
vide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and
sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad. He also presented as evidence the expert
evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag, which averred that Marilyn's psychological incapacity is
grave, permanent and incurable. Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition on the
ground that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psy-
chologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed psychological incapacity,
he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
ISSUE: Is he evidence presented sufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity?
RULING: No.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits
and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation
report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of
Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition.""[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage." Peti-
tioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical
antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activ-
ities defying social and moral ethics," and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible,
immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on
these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or self-
ishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying
that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four
children; and the only reason for his filing the case was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the
marriage and family when she left to work abroad.
Note:
As the Supreme Court, ultimately, is not a trier of facts, it is hard pressed to disagree with con-
curring findings of both the RTC and the CA on matters of fact in evidence, particularly with re-
spect to a ground that requires such a heavy helping of facts as psychological incapacity. Petition
DENIED. ###
CASE NO. 24
Mallilin v Jamesolamin
Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psy-
chological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to com-
ply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent
during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, defi-
ciency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert
who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for
marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila
(Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as con-
templated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Issue: Whether to consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment

under Article 36 is proper and controlling.
Ruling: No.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon
1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of
psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,20 inter-
pretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by
our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive. ###
CASE NO. 25
Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr.
Facts: On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie). Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin,
Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got
married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for
a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hong Kong as a domes-
tic helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise
had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but
failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his con-
tract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but
they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife
Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another mar-
riage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose
to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The Republic, on appeal, claims that that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locat-
ing Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly concluded the respondent’s wife was indeed already
dead.
Ruling: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family
Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element, the holding is that the —
“mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news
that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invo-
cation of the] general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement
of “well-founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is al-
ready dead.
Given the Court’s imposition of “strict standard” in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in
reference to the “well-founded belief” standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to
locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence pre-
scribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, de-
termined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course
of his search. ###
CASE NO. 26
Republic of the Philippines vs. Edna Orcellino-Villanueva,2015
FACTS: Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. In 1992, Edna
worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia
City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their conju-
gal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave
from work and returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law
and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence.
She also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives. On
August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8, 2009 Order, the RTC
granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo's death. On August 13,
2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC before the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-founded belief
that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead, which the latter dismissed.
ISSUE: WON ROMEO VILLANUEVA SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY DECLARED AS PRESUMPTIVELY
DEAD.
RULING: NO. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of pre-
sumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead.
In this case, Edna failed. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present
spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circum-
stances, the absent spouse is already dead.
Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the
absentee... spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied
petitions for the declaration of presumptive death on the said basis.
In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the whereabouts and the sta-
tus of her husband. She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the
Philippines to look for her husband. She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from
their common friends in the same city and in Valencia City. She went as far as the birthplace of
her husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could inquire from her husband's relatives.
Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from them because none of
them had knowledge of the existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years. Moreo-
ver, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been miss-
ing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt
to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared.
Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and serious enough to give
meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was already dead. ###
CASE NO. 27
SANTOS vs. SANTOS
Re-marriage due to absence of spouse
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
on une 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired
about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo
claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Ce-
lerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when
she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropri-
ate remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the proper remedy of Celerina to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry declaring her reappearance as stated in Article 42 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being termi-
nated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading
of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappear-
ance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reap-
pearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance;
and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The exist-
ence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the sub-
sequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in
the Family Code are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the ab-
sent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been an-
nulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not rec-
orded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law,
and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal.
This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity
of the second marriage.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other
spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent mar-
riage may be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years; (2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the ab-
sent spouse was already dead; (3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declara-
tion of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is al-
ready dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contract-
ed prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the
party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to
declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage dur-
ing the subsistence of another marriage still applies. ###
CASE NO. 28
ALMELOR VS RTC OF LAS PIÑAS, 2008
Annulment of Marriage: A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality; It is the concealment of homosexuali-
ty, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.—Even assum-
ing, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear—a marriage may be annulled when
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. No-
where in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homo-
sexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in
giving consent to the marriage.
FACTS:
Leonida filed a petition to annulmarriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapaci-
tated to perform his marital obligations. She stated among others that Manuel concealed his ho-
mosexuality. A clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. RTC granted the
petition for annulment. However, CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: WON Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a mar-

riage, not homosexuality per se.
HELD: YES. Concealment of homosexuality
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a ho-
mosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of wit-
nesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appre-
ciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear—a marriage may be an-
nulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homo-
sexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel
was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting
fraud.Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. ###
CASE NO. 29
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee,

1956
TOPIC: Legal Separation, Adm. Matter No. 02-11-11 SC on Legal Separation (Effective March 15,
2003)
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August
1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the
sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an
agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July
1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local
college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eli-
ong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of
the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of
the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where
they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in
their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but in-
stead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint for legal separa-
tion against his wife Leonila Ginez.. The case was dismissed on the ground of alleged condona-
tion.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a
ground for dismissal of the action.
RULING: Yes.
There was condonation because the husband, Benjamin Bugayong, actively searched for hiswife
in Pangasinan after she left the conjugal home. The act of Benjamin in persuading Leonizato
come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the
house of his cousin and together slept there as husband and wife and the further fact that in the
second night they slept together in their house as husband and wife - all these facts have no
other meaning than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was condo-
nation of the wife by the husband. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the par-
ties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms
of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. ###
CASE NO. 30
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-

appellant, vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee. 1972
Topic: Legal Separation
FACTS
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her, that they had no child, and that she discovered her
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. In his an-
swer to the petition however, Eufemio filed a counter-claim for declaration of absolute nullity of
his marriage with Carmen, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated accord-
ing to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. Subsequently, Carmen died in
a vehicular accident. On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for le-
gal separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed be-
yond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Car-
men abated the action for legal separation. The counsel for Carmen however, moved to have her
father Macario substitute her. Eufemio opposed this motion.
ISSUE: When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a dec-
laration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
RULING:
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit
to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted
that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim". The petition for legal
separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the same marriage can stand independ-
ent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation
converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-
supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-
condition.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation. Being personal in character, it follows that the death
of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum
persona. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that
they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death
of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Furthermore, as the effects of the decree over
property rights of the spouses (Article 106) are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses,
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on substitution cannot be made to apply.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his mar-
riage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the
death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her de-
mise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and deter-
mined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. In
fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article
83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding. ###
CASE No. 31
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age
of majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; Wil-
liam would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of
his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her; on December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because
of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house;
she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and
brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor,
Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quar-
reled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in
their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office be-
low.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to
the repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand
maintains that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and
ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his
sole efforts also, William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who aban-
doned their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in or-
der for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe.
What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial in-
terests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground
for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim
of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-
beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a
smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the
courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family,
a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justi-
fiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abu-
sive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. ###
CASE NO. 32
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE
and JANE DO, 2000
FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many
years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
Club.
 1942: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for
a period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed rea-
sons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in
Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six
(6) children.
 1997: upon Potencianos arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months
in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepres-
sant drug prescribed by his doctor in NY, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
 Feb. 1998: Erlinda filed with the RTC Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
 May 1998: after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati
 1999: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of law-
yer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondentsrefused petitioners demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss?
RULING: NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be en-
forced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary dep-
rivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The
fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not nec-
essarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the CA concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty. The CA
also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it
clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the CA observed that he was of sound and alert
mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound
mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices
revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may
not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Po-
tenciano. He made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or
seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
reason to reverse the findings of the CA. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Es m
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. ###
CASE NO. 33
Valino vs. Adriano
Facts: Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law
Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had
two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Tere-
sa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually sepa-
rated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned
about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were
then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents
were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respond-
ents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and ex-
emplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Issue: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano
Ruling: ROSARIO ADRIANO, the legal wife.
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies
the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case
of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be pre-
ferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed with-
out the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. — The immediate duty of bury-
ing the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses;
x x x x.
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
common law partner.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral ar-
rangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she
was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband
is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and for-
giveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the
respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment
for a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As
soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and
the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
CASE NO. 34
DOMINGO VS. SPS. MOLINA
Topic: Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
FACTS:
Anastacio and Flora Domingo (an undisputed fact is that they were married before the enactment
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988) settled in a piece of land in Camiling Tarlac, and through-
out their marriage, Anastacio incurred debt from the Molina spouses. 10 years after Flora died,
Anastacio sold his interest over the land to answer for his debts. Upon hearing of this, Melecio,
son of the Domingo spouses, filed a complaint for the annulment of title and recovery of owner-
ship over the portion of land transferred by Anastacio to the Molinas. Among several allegations
of fraud, Melecio also claimed that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the
subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
ISSUE: Is the transfer made by Anastacio void for failing to obtain Flora’s consent?
RULING:
No. In the outset, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains (the default regime before the FC)
between Anastacio and Flora had already dissolved prior to the sale. Article 130 of the Family
Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquida-
tion. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any dis-
position or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage
shall be void. While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the
conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not ap-
ply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Furthermore, the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-
ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquida-
tion and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided
share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until
liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal
partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of
the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. ###
CASE NO. 35
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GAR-
CIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAME-
LY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HE-
HERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA, 2014
TOPIC: Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
Facts: Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed SPAs authorizing
spouses Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB by
way of mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB which were in-
scribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against spouses Garcia and
PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to
Ligaya and they became owners pro indivisio upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described
in the as a “widower.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during marriage or there-
after.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the name of one
spouse does not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of
Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr.
cannot mortgage the entire property. ###
CASE NO. 36
TAN VS. ANDRADE
Persons and Family Relations: Property Relations
FACTS: Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which she mort-
gaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was about to
expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties.
Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Ab-
solute Sale.
Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests over the properties. The
Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Bobby
extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving the latter until 7:00 in the
evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum of P310,000. When Proceso
failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the properties, and the TCTs
were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a complaint for recon-
veyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged that
the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage which was
entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the sub-
ject properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal in
nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares.
The RTC dimissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late hus-
band and co-owned by her and her children
HELD: NO
Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which states that
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply,
the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed ac-
quired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:
xxx As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal part-
nership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of
when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be re-
butted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of
the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party as-
serting it.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was termi-
nated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the
subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda.
de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was ad-
duced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the cover-
ture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s dec-
laration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale
was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these
incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario. ###
CASE NO. 37
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR., respondent.
Conjugal Properties; Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse

must be consented to by the other; otherwise, it is void.
FACTS:
Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land
in Malolos, Bulacan. The properties were mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan. According to Philip-
pine National Bank, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly consented to the loan.9
When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, PNB foreclosed the mortgaged real
properties. Venancio fileda Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mort-
gage against PNB. In assailing the validity of the real estate mortgage, Venancio claimed that his
wife undertook the loan and the mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on
the promissory notes and the mortgage. Since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal proper-
ties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was void.
ISSUE: WON consent of spouses is required to any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal

property.
HELD: YES.
It is not disputed that the Reyes Spouses were married in 1973, before the Family Code took ef-
fect. Under the Family Code, their property regime is Conjugal Partnership of Gains; thus, Article
124 is the applicable provision regarding the administration of their conjugal property. It states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encum-
brance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transac-
tion shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Any disposi-
tion or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by
the other; otherwise, it is void. ###
CASE NO. 38
PELAYO vs. PEREZ
Property Relations between H&W
FACTS:
David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred to Melki
Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature is eligible
witnesses such execution of deed.
Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez applica-
tion was denied. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but
she refused. He then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses.
The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack of marital consent as pro-
vided by Art. 166 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale was null and viol for lack of marital consent.
HELD:
Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January 11, 1988
when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conju-
gal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions of law
provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property not the Longugal property w/o the wife’s consent. It she refuses o give her con-
sent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask
the court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her
heir, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alien-
ated by the husband.
CASE NO. 39
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA
P. DELA CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work
in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The
trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Ha-
waii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a
house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. Two (2) months before they marry, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On
the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convict-
ed of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two (2) years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against pe-
titioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the com-
plaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: WON the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.
RULING: Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in com-
mon in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribu-
tion of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business
of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May
17, 1973, petitioner was only around 20 yrs of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pen-
sioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in
1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there be-
ing no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their
case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they
commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even as-
suming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland
in Binalonan, Pangasinan, this Court finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. ###
CASE NO. 40
Barrido vs. Nonato
Facts: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta
N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a
house and lot. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psycholog-
ical incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the proper-
ty, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato
filed a Complaint for partition before the MTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. The MTCC of Bacolod rendered decision in
favor of Marrieta Barrido applying Art. 129 of the Family Code. Nonato appealed the decision be-
fore the RTC which reversed the ruling of MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly ap-
plied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the
subject property to Barrido. The RTC rendered new judgment ordering the parties to equitably
partition the house and lot. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of this case is conjugal after being sold to the chil-
dren of Nonato.
Ruling: YES, during the marriage. But Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages
on the spouses’ property relations.
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the pro-
cedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. This particular kind of co-
ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each oth-
er, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these ele-
ments are present. The term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to
have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been ob-
tained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the proper-
ty shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property ac-
quired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation. ###
CASE NO. 41
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, respondent, 2005
Marital Disqualification: During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants (Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court).
The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2.
If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The poli-
cy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occa-
sional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there
is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testi-
mony of the other.
FACTS:
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for
arson. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alva-
rez, sister of respondent. The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as
the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motio to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification.
ISSUE: WON during marriage, spouses are disqualified from testifying for or against one anoth-
er.
HELD: YES.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.—During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.”
The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The
policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where
there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domes-
tic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tran-
quility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
“The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect.
Note however that, for marital disqualification to apply, it is necessary that the marriage is valid
and subsisting at the time the testimony is offered. ###
CASE NO. 42
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
TOPIC: The Family (Art. 149- 162)
FACTS:
Alberto Moreno , respondent ( filed with the RTC of Caloocan a complaint against Hiyas Savings
and Loan Bank, Inc his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. He contended that he did not secure/ sign
any loan from petitioner,or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; and his his wife was
acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, (who were benefited from the loan), made
it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage and he could not have executed the contract
because he was working abroad.Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private re-
spondent failed to comply with Article 151 of FC where it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. Moreno allegedly argues that in cases where one
of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under Art. 150 of FC failure to
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff
before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since
three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in
its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable RTC denied motion to dismiss. Court agreed with plain-
tiff(Moreno). Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration. RTC again denied motion of par-
tial reconsideration ruling that failure to allege in complaint that earnest effort towards a com-
promise were made by plaintiff is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is a ground for a motion to dismiss in
suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved
in the suit.
HELD: YES. instant petition should be dismissed. petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. Article 151 of the
Family Code provides as follows:No suit between members of the same family shall prosper un-
less it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a com-
promise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that
earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. The Court finds no
specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in
the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the pre-
sent case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are
clear that the provisions apply to suits involving "members of the same family" under Article 150
of the FC:ART. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Be-
tween parents and children;(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.and Article 217 of the Civil Code: ART.
217. Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife, (2) Between parent
and child;(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants, (4) Among brothers and sis-
ters.Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the
same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a mem-
ber of that same family. ###
CASE NO. 43
EULOGIO VS. BELL
ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULO-

GIO, petitioners, vs. PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL,
PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PAT-
ERNO FERDINAND BELL III, and PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL
IV, respondents.
Facts of the case

The respondents are members of a family. In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a
Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and dam-
ages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios).
It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ba-
tangas City, Branch 84. The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of
sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house
and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of
the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to peti-
tioners in the amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum. The title of the
house and lot were transferred to the respondents
The spouses’ liability to the petitioners was not settled and so the RTC levied the
reconstituted family home. The respondents filed a motion lifting the writ of exe-
cution on the family home citing that it is exempt under Art 160. The RTC lifted
the writ of execution.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution.
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market val-
ue of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it
was located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them
for P1 million. The RTC issued a writ of execution to the family home. This was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, petition to the SC.
Issue:
Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 155
and 160 of the Family Code
Decision:
The family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the
statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. To
elaborate, any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by
the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be ex-
empt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions
obtain:
(a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been deter-
mined to fall below the statutory limit; and
(b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit.
Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount
above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and
160. Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family
home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to
thwart the just claims of their creditors.
CASE NO. 44
PATRICION VS. DARIO
The Family Home
FACTS:
Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Que-
zon City, (755) square meters
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to parti-
tion the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to parti-
tion the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition.On Oc-
tober 3, 2002, the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following man-
ner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial
court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may
put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the
aforestated manner.In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the com-
plaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the fami-
ly home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling
reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respond-
ent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor benefi-
ciary of the family home.
ISSUE:
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to
such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home;
and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite
the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or
an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descend-
ants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term de-
scendants contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family
home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grand-
children of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respond-
ents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first req-
uisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail
of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son
of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies
the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from
his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for
legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father,
herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from
his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under
Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother
for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now es-
tablish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising every-
thing indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.[16] Legal support has the
following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the
obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It
is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. ###
CASE NO. 45
Arriola vs. Arriola, 2008.
Topic: The Family Home
FACTS
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola
(petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel).
Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner
Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. As the parties failed
to arrive at an agreement as to how partition is to be made, the RTC ordered that the property
be disposed of through auction sale. Petitioners however, refused to include in the auction the
house (subject house) standing on the subject land. Respondent claims that the subject house
was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been
their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record establish that the sub-
ject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code.
ISSUE: Should the family home be included in the auction sale in the partition judgment?
RULING:
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the
family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the
judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code
and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to
the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specif-
ic portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family resi-
dence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor benefi-
ciary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of
its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security
and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the un-
married head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods un-
less the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the
parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as sug-
gested by the parties. ###
CASE NO. 46
SPS. ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D.
ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, ET AL. G.R. No. 185064, [January 16, 2012]
FACTS: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located
in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family
home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero,
which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check
for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored be-
cause the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses
De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC
acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of exe-
cution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased
the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the
Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the
Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they
are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title
over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for eject-
ment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the
regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens
title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend
that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family
Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of ex-
ecution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in
this case.
RULING: YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the
family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it
at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
PLEASE TAKE NOTE THE FF BELOW:
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution,
could be summarized as follows:
1. Family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
2. Family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
3. Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family
homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the sub-
ject property was a family home. ###
CASE NO. 47
Equitable PCIB, Inc. vs. OJ-Mack Trading, Inc. et. al.
Facts: Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equi-
table PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of Four Million Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred
Pesos (P4,048,800.00). As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was exe-
cuted over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila
where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal
debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark
Trading, Inc. The REM was annotated on Condominium Certificate of Title No. PT-21363 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation. In a letter

dated May 15, 2002, they offered to settle their indebtedness “with the assignment to the Bank
of a commercial lot of corresponding value” and also requested for recomputation at a lower in-
terest rate and condonation of penalties. While petitioner’s officers held a meeting with respond-
ent Oscar Martinez, the latter however failed to submit the required documents such as certifi-
cates of title and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage
debt via dacion en pago. Consequently, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition. Respondents sought to enjoin the impending fore-
closure sale alleging that the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and
also claiming defects in the execution of the REM. It was further averred that the subject proper-
ty is being used and occupied by respondent-spouses as a family home.
Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr. granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction which
the appellate court sustained the assailed order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, the petitioner argued that the appellate court’s conclu-
sion that respondents possess proprietary right over the mortgaged property subject of foreclo-
sure is utterly baseless. While the condominium unit is supposedly a family home, it is admittedly
owned by respondent corporation and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute community of
respondent-spouses. On the other hand, respondents claimed that the extrajudicial foreclosure
will cause grave injustice and irreparable injury to respondent-spouses and their four (4) young
children because their family home, in which they were residing since 1997, at least insofar as it
is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner, on the
other hand, will not suffer any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure
and public auction of the third-party mortgagor’s property while the case for annulment of REM
on said property is being tried.
Ruling: NO. The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of mani-
fest abuse. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown
that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of
injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. On the face of their
clear admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the mort-
gage, petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary con-
sequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the prin-
cipal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and
to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of
the obligation. ###
CASE NO. 48
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS et. al., vs. DANILO PANGILINAN et. al.,
Family Home: If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code, or
before 3 August 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code; For family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially,
and the exemption from execution is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long
as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein.
FACTS:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate
amount of P1,661,490.30.
The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the
parties, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff NLRC implemented
by levying a property in Ramos’ name. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home,
hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to
quash the writ of execution. Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property is not
the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served
as the company’s business address as borne by the company’s letterhead. Respondents added
that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value equiva-
lent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.
ISSUE: WON the levy upon the purported family home is valid.
HELD: NO. They failed to observe the rules provided by the Civil Code
The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the
person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cas-
es.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially.
They are constituted as such by operation of law.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law ap-
plies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applica-
ble. (1) If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family
home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s
order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. (2) On the other
hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413
actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with con-
sent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where
it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided un-
der Art. 15514 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after Au-
gust 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted pri-
or to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure man-
dated by the Civil Code. There is no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle
cannot be availed of by petitioners. ###
CASE N0. 40
AGUILAR vs. SIASAT, 2015
Paternity & Filiation
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, Included in their estate are two parcels of land
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil
case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat alleged that pe-
titioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discov-
ered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat
clan could have stolen the same.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity
and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses;
that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited
the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers
and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen,
but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner cannot prove filiation to the Spouse Aguilar who is the owner of
the land due to the loss of his Certificate of Live Birth and Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1is a
mere proof of open and continuous possession.
HELD:
NO.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not re-
quire a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicat-
ed on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment. ###
CASE NO. 50
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA AL-
MONTE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]
TOPIC: Paternity and Filiation
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere married in
1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, howev-
er, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of biga-
my. He alleged that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter had married one
Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s mar-
riage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to
the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mar-
io and not petitioner Gerardo.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage
of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at
the time Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legit-
imate child of private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the
child because such right is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never be-
came her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The petition was denied. ###
CASE NO. 51
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO,

HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTO-
NIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO,
PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners, v. ANACLETO ALCORAN AND ELENETTE
SUNJACO, Respondents. [2015]
FACTS
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their union had no offspring. Nicolas had
an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on
July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas’ marriage to Florencia.
Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died subsequently leaving the
properties to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims en-
titlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina
ISSUES
1. Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran
2. Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.
RULING
1. Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of
Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental
showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. We stressed
in Cenido v. Apacionado, the recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or her-
self, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a volun-
tary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the pa-
ternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."
2. Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with,
Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son
of Joaquina. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner,
such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Inter-
mediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto
could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and testament, i.e.,
the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. ###
CASE NO. 52
Grande vs. Antonio
Facts: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period
of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by
respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change
of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recog-
nition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that “the evidence at
hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the
sole parental authority and physical custody of respondent Antonio.”
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied. Peti-
tioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the
mother over her illegitimate children. In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part
the Decision of the RTC which include, among others, a clause compelling the use by the children
of the surname “ANTONIO” as the legal consequence of the recognition made by the respondent
Antonio (the father).
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsider-
ation, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’
surname to “Antonio.” When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present
petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code — as amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language — may not be invoked by a father to compel
the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
Issue: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegiti-
mate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling: There is NONE. It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the fa-
ther. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of
Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right
to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein re-
spondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the sur-
name of their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal mean-
ing free from any interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use
his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambi-
guity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word “may”
in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children. ###
CASE NO. 53
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO, represented
by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,versus RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his
capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177728. July 31, 2009.
Topic: Paternity and Filiation
FACTS
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and
then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Do-
mingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On
September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie,
who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for regis-
tration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, but the same was denied by the local city civil registrar on the ground
that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the childunder Republic Act No. 9255. Jenie countered that under Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by RA No. 9255, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father (both of which Jenie managed to present). They maintained that the Auto-
biography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a private handwritten
instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
ISSUE: Has Jenie satisfactorily complied with the requirements for recognition of paternity?
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Du-
lumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and
about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the
child of Jenie is Dominique’s. In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledg-
ing parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwrit-
ten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. ###
CASE NO 54
VERCELES vs. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor
VERNA AIZA POSADA, 2007
Paternity and Filiation; Any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition, it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judi-
cial approval.—A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states
“Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite,” Clarissa’s averments therein, her meeting with
petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy,
birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for
recognition of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada was allegedly impregnated by Averceles. In a letter, she told
him she was pregnant. He replied in a handwritten letter saying:
“Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because I love you
and you love me. Let us rejoice a common responsibility – you and I shall take care of it and let
him/her see the light of this beautiful world. We know what to do to protect our honor and integ-
rity.”
Posada explained petitioner used an alias “Ninoy” and ad dressed her as “Chris,” probably be-
cause of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioner’s penmanship
which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in
his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures petitioner gave her of his
youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filiation of the child as the illegitimate child of petitioner may be
proven through the letters presented.
HELD: YES.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it
was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his con-
sent.
He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity
but mere expressions of concern and advice.
But the Court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is re-
quired. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits “A” to “D” are declarations that lead no-
where but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in
these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of
petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come
to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found by
the courts a quo. ###
Case NO. 55
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS, 2015
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes
a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed adocument declaring them-
selves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took pos-
session and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Car-
idad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the posses-
sion against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her par-
ents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of
their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their
ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as con-
firmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta.
Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elemen-
tary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as sup-
ported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial
court found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered.
It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation
of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous pos-
session of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the le-
gitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was
born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in
the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave
birth to respondent on a specific date.
It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or mid-
wife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the
law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation
via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary
evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative par-
ents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying
for her tuition and other school expenses;
(3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death
of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of
the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the le-
gal heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing theintroduction of secondary evi-
dence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth certifi-
cate.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a directaction under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filia-
tion cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment
of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.
In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent
is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family
Code.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent
is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts.
The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the
NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to ex-
plain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to
the respondent’s birth.
With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respond-
ent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate. ###
CASE NO 56
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO
SYNOPSIS
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice
and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it ap-
pears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legiti-
mate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
FACTS
Rosario and Jose were married in 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been trou-
bled. They had a child, who was born in 1963 who lived for 9 days only. Rosario allegedly left
Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. However, they
briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived
as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City.
Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because
Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. In 2000, Jose filed a petitionfor adoption
before the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper, which was
granted. At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. On October 8, 2006, Jo-
se died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.
In 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment the decision of the trial
court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. In their petition, they learned of the adoption some-
time in 2005. They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court was fraud-
ulent.They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of infor-
mation, such as the age of their mother and the time she gave birth and the father of the chil-
dren. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but
the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth.
Petitioners arguethat because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false
information shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial court,they were
not given the opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed
from them.Petitioners also argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent,
not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such
consent was never secured from Joanne.
While respondents argue that there was constructive notice through publication for 3 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also
notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.They argue that since the alleged fraud was per-
petrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a
ground for annulment of judgment.They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable par-
ties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state.
ISSUE
Whether the adoption laws require the consent of the spouse and children as a requisite in the
proceedings.
RULING
Petitioners are correct.It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption
on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the proceedings. The law on
adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent
of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's con-
sent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered com-
pliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the pro-
ceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or old-
er. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the pro-
spective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share
their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.It is undisputed
that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the
time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption
to be valid. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he
and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Person-
al service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to
ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction. ###
CASE NO. 57
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim
Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim).
They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were
named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children
to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Re-
public Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on
24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before
the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the
filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael
was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Peti-
tioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael.
The trial court rendered decision dismissing the petition. It ruled that joint adoption by the hus-
band and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
In this present petition, the petitioner argues that argues that joint parental authority is not nec-
essary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and al-
ready married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore nec-
essary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
Ruling: NO. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: x x x
The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the hus-
band and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authori-
ty over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of
a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, hav-
ing remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the peti-
tions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petition-
er fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopt-
ed are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are
not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separat-
ed from each other.
Moreover, the fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Con-
sent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must
have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the ap-
plication for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualifica-
tion to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither
are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. ###
CASE NO. 58
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONO-

RATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner, 2005
TOPIC: ADOPTION
FACTS:Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her moth-
er's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pur-
suant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural moth-
er should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the sur-
name of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed
to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegiti-
mate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may
use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without dis-
crimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, pos-
sess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem
which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish
a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legiti-
mate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared
to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. ###
CASE NO. 59
LAHOM vs. SIBULO. 2003
Adoption; The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child accepted
the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its under-
lying intent was geared to favor the adopted child; Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate
status of the adopted child not only in his new family but also in the society as well; The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child
the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
FACTS:
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took in their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
and to brought him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth,
love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and
Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin, until the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued. On March 221998, R.A.
No. 8552, also known as the “Domestic Adoption Act”, went into effect. However, on December
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or re-
scinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
HELD: NO.
The Philippines, a State Party to the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, ac-
cepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and
privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of
an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul
the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being
vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is sub-
ject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would
lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken
away at anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy,
however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to
an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter
may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. ###
CASE NO. 60 (SUNSHINE)
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM, 2014

Support
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philip-
pines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides
again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a com-
plaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his un-
justified failure to support his minor child.
HELD:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In inter-
national law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a na-
tional of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead
and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obli-
gation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be al-
leged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most im-
portant function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is enti-
tled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here. ###
CASE NO. 61
LIM vs. LIM, 2006
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT
Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of peti-
tioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shoul-
dered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the
in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defend-
ants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial
court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
Issue: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respond-
ents.
Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal sup-
port to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their
petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying
on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either
by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
CASE NO. 62
EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner, vs. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN
LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON,
Respondents, 2006.
Topic: Support
FACTS
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of peti-
tioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson.Not long after the birth of Maonaa, peti-
tioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. It appears that from the start of their
estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his com-
mitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As
things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts to-
wards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their
children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of
1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of
Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City.
In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Ed-
ward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to
graduate. In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet
their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the
land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. The
RTC ordered the defendant Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months,
or 18 years, of support in arrears.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in ruling for the continued support by the respondent?
RULING: No.
Conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even be-
fore the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not
plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demand-
ing support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during
the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support ap-
pears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in
the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by
legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however,
definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the
situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. Petitioner also rais-
es the fact that his uncle, Noel Daban, had been paying money for support of the children in his
stead. However, pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact re-
imbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support
when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy
individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the pe-
titioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly
enriching himself at the expense of another. ###
CASE NO. 63
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO

C. SALIENTES, Petitioners, vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., RTC, BRANCH No. 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents.
FACTS
Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents. Due to in-laws problems, pri-
vate respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Ma-
rie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented
from seeing his son. Later, Loran as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody. The trial court issued the an Order “to produce the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show
cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.”Consequently, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA which affirmed the decision of the trial court that the January
23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the
standard order issued for the production of restrained persons.
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the FC, which provides that no
child under7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal
or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to
show cause and explain the custody of her very own child. While Loran counters that petitioners
argument based on Art. 213 of the FC applies only to the second part of his petition regarding
the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father
to see his son. Further, he maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have
shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner
Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess,
he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
RULING
YES. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, respondent Loran and petitioner Ma-
rie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further,
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of their child. In this case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of
his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is availa-
ble to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Again, it bears
stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely di-
rected petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented
from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within
15 after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall is-
sue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the
court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing
the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.###
CASE NO.64
Beckett vs. Judge Sarmiento, Jr.
Facts: Geoffrey Beckett (Beckett or Complainant), an Australian national, was previously married
to Eltesa Densing Beckett (Eltesa), a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born on June 29, 2001,
Geoffrey Beckett, Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.).
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Beckett alleged that their union was, from the start, far from ideal. In
fact, according to him, they eventually separated and, worse still, they sued each other.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, otherwise
known as the Violence against Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges against Eltesa, one of
which was for adultery.
The couple entered into a compromise agreement in which Eltesa and Beckett agreed and under-
took, among others, to cause the dismissal of all pending civil and criminal cases each may have
filed against the other. They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have full and permanent
custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa.
During the March 1, 2011 conference on the application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then
nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not
wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite
Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, dated March 1, 2011, directing inter
alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring the child
in the pre-trial conference set for March 15, 2001. For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr.
to Beckett did not materialize.
Judge Sarmiento, in open court, issued an order without Becket’s comments, giving Eltesa provi-
sional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. and at the same time directing the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) to conduct a social case study on the child. Based on the factual
backdrop, Beckett instituted a complaint holding Judge Sarmiento Jr. liable for gross ignorance of
the law. He states in this regard that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own Decision
which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jr’s. custody,
granted, via his Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to
refers to the judgment on compromise agreement.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling: NO. Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his
mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the
legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the
child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential
command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of
custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, “is not permanent and unalterable [and]
can always be re-examined and adjusted.” And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in
Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as “permanent and unbending,”
the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such
that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very
real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force
and effect of res judicata.
Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-
settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, un-
less the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the
child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless
the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in custo-
dy cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as re-
flected in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that “in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.”
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise,
the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respect-
ed. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is
not, to reiterate, permanent. In Espiritu, We ruled that:
x x x The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was
given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custo-
dy can always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best in-
terests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that ei-
ther parent is chosen to be the custodian. x x x
###
CASE NO. 65
BAGTAS VS HON SANTOS
Facts: Maricel ran away from her parents Antonio and Rosita Gallardo to live with her
boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy. Maricel's boyfriend left her. Mar-
icel returned to her parents but ran away again and went to Noel and Lydia. There, she entrusted
to the two the custody of Maryl, and left behind a note relinquishing her parental rights over
Maryl in their favor.
When Spouses Gallardo learned about this, they tried to obtain the custody of Maryl but Noel and
Lydia refused. Thus, Spouses Gallardo filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC. At the
RTC, both parties agreed to a shared custody of Maryl, where the grandparents took custody of
her during weekends. The Regional Trial Court approved the agreement. Unfortunately, Spouses
Gallardo took Maryl away and brought her to Samar. Hence, Noel and Lydia filed a motion to cite
in contempt Spouses Gallardo. They also filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus
based on Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, citing the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with a lawful order
of the court.
The RTC cited Spouses Gallardo in contempt and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed
by them for mootness, since Maryl was already in their custody. Noel and Lydia filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the action should have been dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to them to preserve the status
quo ante. The RTC denied the MR ruling that the sole purpose for the filing of the petition is to
cause the production before the Court of the person of Maryl, not a determination of the legality
or illegality of custody.
Issue: Was the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus the production of Maryl
Joy before the trial court and that it would be moot upon said production?
Held: No. Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to
the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus
is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the right-
ful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for
habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient
basis.
It is true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216
also states that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child. However, in determining who has the
rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important consideration. The court is
not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
There are three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a
right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the
minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the
petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC
hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to Spouses Gallardo without
conducting any trial.
Case to the RTC for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the Antonio
and Rosita to have custody of Maryl Joy. ###
CASE NO. 66
VANCIL vs. BELMES, 2001
Guardianship; Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner to be his guardian.—We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of peti-
tioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which pro-
vides: “Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the per-
sons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary, x x x.”
Substitute Parental Authority: Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substi-
tute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.. However,
considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respon-
dent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that re-
spondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reed-
er had two children by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before RTC a guardianship proceedings
over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6six
years old while Vincent was two years old. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are
residets of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s
death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
“On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition
to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition
for guardianship.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor should be his guardian.
HELD: The Mother.
The court held that being the natural mother of the minor, she has the preferential right over
that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides:
“Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary, x x x.”
“Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to
the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.”
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. However, Petitioner’s claim
to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pur-
suant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
“Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent, x x x.”
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive
and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in assert-
ing her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not
proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vin-
cent. ###
CASE NO. 67
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO,
Petitioners, - versus - JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MI-
RANDA, Respondent, 2010
Topic: Substitute Parental Authority
FACTS:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges SJCs premis-
es, the class to which respondent Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science exper-
iment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of petitioner Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of petitioner SJC. Tabugo left her class
while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward inci-
dent or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one
of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with mag-
nifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and sev-
eral particles of which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group
mates. As a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for
which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon learning of the inci-
dent and because of the need for finances, [Jaysons] mother, who was working abroad, had to
rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from
November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00.
ISSUE: Having established that the proximate cause of the injury was the failure of the petition-
er to prevent the foreseeable mishap, is the school (and the teacher) liable therefor
RULING:
Yes. Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institu-
tion engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is demon-
strated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students alt-
hough it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experi-
ments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the exper-
iment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the
classfifty (50) students conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that petition-
er Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the heated com-
pound. In this case, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened
during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This ne-
glect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost
degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the
proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. ###
CASE NO. 68
REPUBLIC vs. GRANADA, 2012
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had
asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had
failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no juris-
diction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death,
based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judg-
ment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule
45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of presump-
tive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.
HELD:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if the RTC
erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declara-
tion of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declara-
tion of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded be-
lief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate
the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance re-
lating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usu-
ally control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to
explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evi-
dence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many cir-
cumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Di-
osdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, re-
spondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. ###
CASE NO. 69
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164435. June 29, 2010 (MR)
Topic: Retroactivity of the Family Code
FACTS:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal. On May 31, 2000,
petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. Jarillo
subsequently contracted another marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of
Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979. On July 14,
2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded. For her
defense, petitioner insisted that, among other grounds, her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was af-
firmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy
when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to
Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presump-
tion is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. This
ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court, stating that The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime
of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and sub-
sisting.
In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner further argued that since the marriages she entered
into were before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judg-
ment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE: Should Jarillo be convicted for bigamy?
RULING:
Yes. As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the
Family Code itself provides that said Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prej-
udice or impair vested or acquired rights. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroac-
tive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and
this, the Court shall never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of
the Family Code should not be applied to her case, cannot be upheld. ###
USE OF SURNAME
CASE NO. 70
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He under-
went psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and
sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certifi-
cate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Phil-
ippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his
birth certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 –
Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Arti-
cle 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law
in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals
of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassign-
ment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no le-
gal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth cer-
tificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
CASE NO. 71
Republic of the Philippines vs. Cagandahan
Facts: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a fe-
male in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male charac-
teristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent
an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines, through OSG, filed this
petition raising pure questions of law and seeking the reversal of the decision of the lower court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respond-
ent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff,” under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling: NO. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. To-
gether with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the cor-
rection of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in en-
tries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and cor-
rectable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1)
Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judg-
ments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) ac-
knowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article
407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance
of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much andro-
gen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1)
swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The term is now of widespread
use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteris-
tics of both male and female sexes.”
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the de-
termining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (andro-
gen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual devel-
opment in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. ###
CASE NO. 72
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[2010]
FACTS
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then
expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following en-
tries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and
Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA office in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport. Petitioners request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Bretana III, representing petition-
er, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request, in which
through the DFA Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus:
This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to
use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman appli-
cant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and
death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) which dismissed the appeal and
ruled that Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 offers no leeway for
any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of
marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes. The OP fur-
ther held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the
former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it
should yield to RA No. 8239.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport,
can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of
her marriage.
2. Whether there is a conflict between Art. 370 and Section 5(D) OF RA NO. 8239, the law
governing the passport issuance.
RULING
1. The petition lacks merit. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the
case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides that a married woman may use:
(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBANDS SUR-
NAME, OR
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR
(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT
SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.
The above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive
rather than obligatory. Citing the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court, this
Court explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial
authority to use her husbands name by prefixing the word Mrs. before
her husbands full name or by adding her husbands surname to her

maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the
case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim
Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as use
of her former husbands is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolenti-
no, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner
married her husband, she did not change her but only her civil status.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the sur-
name of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. (Empha-
sis supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in
any of the ways provided by Article 370,CC. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the 3
names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited
from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in conso-
nance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
2. RA 8239, INCLUDING ITS IRR, DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MARRIED WOMAN FROM USING
HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT. IN FACT, IN RECOGNITION OF THIS RIGHT, THE DFA
ALLOWS A MARRIED WOMAN WHO APPLIES FOR A PASSPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME TO USE
HER MAIDEN NAME. SUCH AN APPLICANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND'S SUR-
NAME.
Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her
maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.This prohibi-
tion, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370
of the Civil Code.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. HOWEVER, ONCE A MAR-
RIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER HUSBANDS SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT, SHE MAY NOT
REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED IN SECTION
5(D) OF RA 8239. THESE INSTANCES ARE: (1) DEATH OF HUSBAND, (2) DIVORCE, (3) ANNUL-
MENT, OR (4) NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. SINCE PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO HER HUSBAND SUB-
SISTS, SHE MAY NOT RESUME HER MAIDEN NAME IN THE REPLACEMENT PASSPORT. OTHER-
WISE STATED, A MARRIED WOMAN'S REVERSION TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME MUST BE
BASED ONLY ON THE SEVERANCE OF THE MARRIAGE.
EVEN ASSUMING RA 8239 CONFLICTS WITH THE CIVIL CODE, THE PROVISIONS OF RA 8239
WHICH IS A SPECIAL LAW SPECIFICALLY DEALING WITH PASSPORT ISSUANCE MUST PREVAIL
OVER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE XIII OF THE CIVIL CODE WHICH IS THE GENERAL LAW ON
THE USE OF SURNAMES. A BASIC TENET IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS THAT A SPECIAL
LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL LAW. ###
END

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASES FAMILY CODE

Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero

ESPINOSA, ET AL VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA

1. W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”

2. W/N the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs.TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.LIBERTY D. ALBIOS [2013]

Santiago vs. People of the Philippines

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Santiago is guilty of the crime of bigamy.

RENE RONULOvs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2014 [PONENTE: BRION, J.]

TOPIC: Requisites of Marriage

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., 2013

Topic: Requisites of Marriage – Marriage License

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG, 2000

REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI

HELD: YES. The subsequent marriage is bigamous.

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, PE-

ISSUE: Whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.

TOPIC: Requisites of Marriage, NCC 15

Republic of the Philippinesvs. Cipriano Orbecido III, 2005

Topic: Requisites of Marriage

ISSUE: Can Cipriano validly remarry under Philippine law?

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;

Whether or not the RTC is correct.

But how will Fujiki’s petition in the RTC prosper?

Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through

(1) an official publication or

MEDINA vs. KOIKE, 2016

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine laws recognise foreign divorce

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, 2001

ISSUE: WHICH MARRIAGE TO SPO4 CARINO IS VALID?

QUIAZON, et al. vs. BELEN et al., 2013

Void & Voidable Marriages

Psychological incapacity: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)

ISSUE: WON evidence presented by petitioner sufficient to establish psychological

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjec-

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARI-

Topic: Psychological Incapacity

ISSUE: Is he evidence presented sufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity?

Issue: Whether to consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment

Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr.

With respect to the third element, the holding is that the —

Re-marriage due to absence of spouse

ALMELOR VS RTC OF LAS PIÑAS, 2008

ISSUE: WON Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a mar-

HELD: YES. Concealment of homosexuality

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee,

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-

Topic: Legal Separation

Valino vs. Adriano

Ruling: ROSARIO ADRIANO, the legal wife.