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Facts:
petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the
parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers
of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a
petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney's fees with the
RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following
pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested
the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot
Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a
need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4)
after investigation, they learned that the mining operators
did not have the required... permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to
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the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did
not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite
knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of
the people of Matnog;and (7) the respondents violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance
of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop
the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the
issuance of... a temporary environment protection order or
TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to
undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of
damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. ...
Referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. Case
was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1)
there was... no final court decree, order or decision yet that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
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petitioners therein failed to exhaust their... administrative
remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits
and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules. Petitioner
Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues:
main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has
jurisdiction... m... whether the petition is dismissible on the
grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or
decision that the public officials allegedly... failed to act on;
(2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint
to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling:
... At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing
the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper
venue. Special civil action for continuing mandamus... shall
be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred
x x x." In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable
neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of
Matnog... and as such, the petition should have been filed
in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the
outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may
be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners... is
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not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element
of jurisdiction. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases In its Resolution dated October 18,
2011, which resolved the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further
ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following
grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision
yet that the... public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2)
the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency. Concept of continuing
mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. He writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a... distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure) similar to the procedure
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition... and mandamus, Section 4, Rule
8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take
further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that
the... determination to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
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applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the
spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing
to it that justice is served. Sufficiency in form and substance
refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8,
Section 1: When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an... environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the... proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do
an act or series of acts until the... judgment is fully satisfied,
and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
Principles:
Writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that
may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
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specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation... or a right therein. Continuing mandamus is a
writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until... judgment is
fully satisfied.
Facts:
The petitioners filed an application for registration
of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI
in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an
opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property.
The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole
tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered
in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon
recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg.
Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna.
The motion to dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was
denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the
municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot
was outside its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal
property of both municipalities, the incorporation
of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the
latter. Thus the right to action accrues to
the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of
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Court recommended to grant the application with its report
disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes
family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the
father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the
ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his
heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently
partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and
ordered the registration of the land in favor of the
petitioner. While examining the records in the course of
granting the registration to the petitioners, it was found out
that the land was already registered in favor of the
respondents Honesto de Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed
the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its Branch IV
in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue
the decree of registration in his favor. The said land was
allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the
father of the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was
destroyed during Japanese occupation. His father continued
possession and occupation of the land until his death and
his wife and children continued the possession thereof and
finally registered it in their name. 7 years later, the
petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the
judgment rendered in their favor by the court and
cancellation of title of the respondents and order the
respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim,
the respondents interpose the defense of latches,
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prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and
asserting the indefeasibility of their title under the Torrens
System.
Issue:
Note:
Jurisdiction issue:
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Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss[7] on
the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly
laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated
as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the
case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the
subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's
claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-
half () portion of the subject property. Since the subject
property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that
petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of
Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.
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Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating
the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's
complaint as a real action.
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Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when
it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue.
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G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
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HELD: NO. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at
bar. This doctrine enunciated that as long as the stipulation
does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate
that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of
the action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing
the venue. According to the court, in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a
contract should be considered merely as agreement on
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. Unless the parties make it clear, by employing
categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish
the venue of actions between them be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the
prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be
regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule. In light of all the
cases surveyed, and the general postulates distilled
therefrom, the question should receive a negative answer.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that
actions between them should be ventilated only at the
place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual
provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention --
the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits
between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City,
but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City,
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at the option of the plaintiff. Kubota's theory that the RTC
had no jurisdiction considering that the venue was
improperly laid is not an accurate statement of legal
principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions.
This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of
damages in an amount considerably in excess of
P20,000.00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional
Trial Court. Assuming that venue was improperly laid in the
Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City
RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that
Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject
matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to
venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to
dismiss, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion
if it then tried and decided the action
FACTS:
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real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment
of the correct docket fees.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the
complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not
respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that
the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by
its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was
denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or
transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of
deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties
enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement.
Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a
real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real
property.
Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real
action is an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the
trial court was in the nature of a real action, although
ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance.
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Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket
fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case
of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of
the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied
in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case
as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to
abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees.
Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case
they filed was one for specific performance and damages
and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor
at the time of the filing of the complaint.
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the principal defendants resides or in the case of a non-
residentdefendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.
Section2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for therespondentÊs action. It provides that personal
actions „may be commencedand tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, orwhere the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in thecase of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
electionof the plaintiff.‰ Considering the respondentÊs
statement in his complaintthat he resides in Imus, Cavite,
the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
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Dissatisfied, Fernando questioned the RTC Decision before
the CA.
In addition to the defenses which he raised during the
proceedings before the RTC, he argued that the RTC of Imus
lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an
adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati
City.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC rulings..
On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA cited Fernando’s failure
to seasonably file before the lower court a motion to dismiss
stating that the action should have been filed in Makati City.
More importantly, the Court explained that the case was a
personal action since it did not involve a claim of ownership
of the subject property, but only sought Fernando’s
execution of a deed of sale in the respondent’s favor. Thus,
the venue for the action was the residence of the plaintiff or
the defendant, at the plaintiff’s option.
Petitioner Fernando’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON THE VENUE OF THE ACTION IS RTC MAKATI OR
RTC IMUS, CAVITE?
RULING: Venue of an Action for Specific Performance
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As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the
action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati
City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced.
The suit was still essentially for specific performance, a
personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a
deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had
previously made.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal
actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff."
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint
that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the
RTC of Imus was proper.
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over the area where the real property or any part thereof
lies.
The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because
venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional
Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of
land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of
such action is unquestionably within the territorial
jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or
part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property, or
for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any
part thereof lies.
On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity)
sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop
Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a parcel of land located at
Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the
subject property was a vacant residential lot without any
illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject
property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square
meters usable area.
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ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual
condition of the property, demanded from TRB the
rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property.
TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao, for annulment of sale and
damages against TRB.
TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, the trial court
denied the motion.7
TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, contending that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, REVERSING
THE DECISION OF THE RTC on ground of improper venue.”9
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON DISMISSAL WAS VALID ON THE GROUND OF
IMPROPER VENUE?
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In the case at bar, the trial court erred grievously amounting
to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent
TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly
laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for
annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3
Asin Road, Baguio City.
The venue of such action is unquestionably within the
territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real
property or part thereof lies.
IN THE CASE AT BAR THE PROPERTY WAS LOCATED IN
BAGUIO BUT THE COM[PLAINT WAS FILED IN RTC DAVA0
The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and
grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the area where the real property or any part thereof
lies (BAGUIO CITY)
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. and Jens Peter
Henrichsen v. Klaus Schonfeld G.R. 166920
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FACTS:
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Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment
appended to the letter of employment reads:
21 Arbitration
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and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation
sector in the Philippines.
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A motion for the reconsideration of the above decision was
filed by PPI and Henrichsen, which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit.
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expressing their purpose and design that actions between
them be litigated only at the place named by them.
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allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would
be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the
allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were
among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must
be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:
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Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule
1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue
to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
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proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of
similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to
determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the
proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a
determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary
action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling
on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed,
be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA vs. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA
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FACTS: From the records, it appears that on 27 February
2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the
National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for
brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist
from framing up Petitioner for the fake ambush incident by
filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner
in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo,
the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to
file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1 March
2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining
whether a temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested
that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases.
Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge
noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily
in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.
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Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main
case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing.
Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by
then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De
Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied
the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed
by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court
assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
ISSUE: whether or not rules on summary procedure are
applicable in petitions for the issuance of writs of amparo
HELD: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable
and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the
people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as
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an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as,
among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural
irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive
pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those
whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing
summons and requiring an Answer.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special
rule that the Court has devised for the following
circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
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Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings,
where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does
not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or
both, x x x.
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure
only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how
this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC.
Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A
writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
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particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the
main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a
Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been
properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a
memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of
De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be
done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants
and is a final pleading usually required before the case is
submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March
2012 itself.
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The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished
from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure
outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required
acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's
life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ"
cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the
petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically
symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."
G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA and FERNANDO
SARAZA, vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO
FACTS: The case stems from an amended complaint filed by
William Francisco against Fernando and Spouses Teodoro
and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza). The
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respondent alleged in his complaint that on September 1,
1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that
provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share
in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at that time
was still registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40376
(later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration
of ₱3,200,000.00. The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid
upon the Agreement’s execution, while the balance of
₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses
Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of
sale conveying the property was to be executed by
Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any
reason to transfer the subject property to the respondent’s
name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-sq m property covered
by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the
loan that was to be paid by the respondent shall be
considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses
Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement. The
respondent was also allowed to take immediate possession
of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a
contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB
with an Authority, allowing the respondent to pay their
obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring,
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to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126
upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and
to perform such other acts as may be necessary in
connection with the settlement of the loan.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached
₱226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’
issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would
authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The
petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the
respondent found out that the petitioners had instead
executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the
owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the
mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza
also caused the eviction of the respondent from the
property covered by TCT No. 156126. These prompted the
respondent to institute the civil case for specific
performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of
Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over
the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a
property situated in Makati City.
HELD: As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument
that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of
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Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced.
Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the
transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action,
because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of
absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously
made.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a
case for specific performance with damages before the RTC
of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of
land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court
sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of
the original Complaint for specific performance with
damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC of
Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject
lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had
jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court
reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with
damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court
where any of the parties reside.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal
actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
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defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the
respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in
Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.
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