Cain Sean

An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Implications for U.S.
House Election
Competition
Author(s): Sean A. Cain
Source: Political Behavior, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 375-405
Published by: Springer
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Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^*05
DOI 10.1 007/s 1 1 1 09-0 1 0-9 140-y
An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its

Implications for U.S. House Election Competition
Sean A. Cain
Published online: 26 September 2010

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract Does the hiring of political consultants make election races more
competitive? If so, why? Most scholars of political consulting argue their expertis
enhances competition; I argue that consultant reputation also boosts competition.
Many political consultants are part of the Washington establishment, which notices
their association with candidates. In particular, congressional candidates of the out
party, especially challengers, have an incentive to hire the most reputable consul-
tants to signal to political elites their viability. I demonstrate a positive empirical
relationship between out-party candidates hiring top consultants (compared to less
reputable ones) and how competitive their race is perceived by elites. These findings
and theoretical insight provide a basis for understanding the high costs of political
consultants and their impact on election outcomes.
Keywords Elite theory • Political consulting • Campaigns • Elections •

U.S. House of Representatives
Introduction
Much of the literature about the performance of political consultants in U.S.

elections has focused on their role as specialists in the often highly technical
services-such as direct mail, issue and opposition research, television and radio
advertising, public opinion polling, and fundraising-that are important to any
candidate seeking votes in contemporary elections (Napolitan 1972; Agranoff 1976;
Luntz 1988; Medvic and Lenart 1997; Herrnson 2000; Medvic 2000, 2001; Dulio
2004). This scholarship sees consultants as instruments candidates use in the pursuit
S. A. Cain (El)
Department of Political Science, Loyola University New Orleans,
6363 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
e-mail: scain@loyno.edu
Ô Springer
376 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
of votes; hence, I call this the inst

perspective, the more a candidate
competitive her election race, the
experienced political consultant.
Yet the instrumental view does n
by, for instance, challengers run
uncompetitive races or, more sign
competitive races. For example,
unfavorable to Republican member
2007). Those who had won margina
worried that Democratic political c
a challenger with a good chance
according to the political consultin
which records which candidates
(Blanchfield et al. 2006), 44% of
marginal Republicans failed to hir
And in such a good year for Demo
for re-election, big-name consultan
8% of Republican challengers runn
appear to be a small fraction, and
nine different top-tier firms w
incumbents defeated in 2006 did n
more than forty Republican incum
60% of the two-party vote. Clearly
time, of course, the presence of
races is not the sole cause of electo
Yet does candidate hiring of politi
congressional races? And why? B
explain the mismatch described
consultants would risk working fo
why candidates might prefer som
answer are significant for understa
how human and financial resource
that of the biennial campaigns f
competitive elections are rare and
The study of the influence of p
representative democracy more
theoretical insight (Thurber 1998).
elite theory of political consulting,
political establishment and in dem
elite theory of political consultan
alternative, to the instrumental vie
1 Where "marginal" is defined as having bee

(Mayhew 1974a).
2 What constitutes a "top-tier" consulting fi
4^ Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^05 377
to elites but many are also hired t

theory perspective, I derive and t
consulting firm an out-party cand
the more likely the candidate's ra
elites. On the other hand, the mor
less competitive elites will perceiv
Instrumental Use of Consultants and Candidate-Centered Politics
The instrumental view of political consulting is consistent with the broader theme in
postwar research into American elections positing a decline in party-centered
campaigning and the emergence of candidate-centered campaigns. The candidate
and her autonomous campaign organization, rather than her party or any other actor
for that matter, is viewed as the key strategic player and critical unit of analysis
(Agranoff 1976; Aldrich 1995; Wattenberg 1996). Even as political parties in recent
years have asserted themselves in fundraising and advertising in congressional
elections, campaigns remain candidate-centered because candidates are independent
political entrepreneurs who assume the "risks, pains, and rewards" of running for
Congress because they self-select to run, raise most of their own resources, and
build their own campaign organizations (Jacobson 2009, p. 5). The candidate-
centered approach assumes that candidates have the primary goal of winning elected
office (Wittman 1983, pp. 142-143; Simon 2002, p. 44). Moreover, it assumes that
the candidate, not the party or its activists, is the point of contact with the voter
(Aldrich 1995, p. 259). Direct primaries create incentives for candidates to build
their own independent campaign organizations, run their own campaigns, and
devise their own campaign strategies to win nomination (Herrnson 2008, p. 7).
Furthermore, politicians' strategic decisions about whether to run for office are
often depicted as a response to exogenous conditions. These include the state of the
economy or scandal plaguing the opposing party (Jacobson and Kernell 1983) or the
favorability of election district boundaries (Tufte 1973; Cox and Katz 1996,
pp. 492-494). Candidates exploit exogenous conditions to attack their opponents,
emphasizing issues and policies they feel are to their advantage (Simon 2002, p. 63).
The effectiveness or quality of any election campaign is attributable to the quality of
the candidate-his or her political experience and skills (Bond et al. 1985; Krásno
and Green 1988; Jacobson 1989). Under this paradigm, it is the candidate, not her
consultants, who reacts strategically to the political environment.
Disconnect Between the Goals of Political Consultants and U.S. House

Challengers
However, the political consultants who craft and implement campaign strategies do
not always share the same goals as their clients. The primary political goal for
candidates for elected office is winning election, and that for incumbent Members of
Congress is re-election (Mayhew 1974b). Consultants' goals include advancing
their own beliefs or ideologies and making money (Magleby et al. 2000, p. 35).
Their primary considerations when choosing clients is to work for candidates who
Springer
378 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^*05
share their ideological views and w

to consider a potential client's od
consultants view their collection o
ratio of wins to losses as well as to
Consultants also value working
competitive races, even if these
Both maximizing win-loss records
the bottom line. For instance, Hou
are typically well-funded incumbe
raise and spend substantial funds t
These financial considerations a
contracting with incumbent offic
incumbents in the early 1990s hired
that losing incumbents, on average
winning challengers hired near
elections, ofw course, incumbents
challengers. Winning candidates
election cycle (Sabato 1981, pp. 42-
procure consulting services.
But where does this leave a challe
that having a consultant on a can
winning a seat in Congress. If con
then a candidate is out of luck if s
be in a close race that might attra
firms with limited staffs risk over
A survey of campaign professio
whether their clients could pay
governing (Thurber et al. 2000, p.
For a candidate with long odds of
on whether she could erase the p
campaign contributors, party le
mounting a competitive race or, at
political consultant might then ho
was viable and could conceivably
the very least, run a competitive r
could, in turn, signal the candidat
improving the candidate's electio
benefit of the consultant.
However, receiving payment should be a key source of hesitation with taking on

a client who is not assured of victory. First, the majority of House challengers are
underfunded compared to their incumbent opponents (Jacobson 2009, p. 46).
Second, very few consultants will accept payment as a condition of the client
winning election (Grossman 2009, p. 10). Unlike large commercial advertising firms
with revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars, most political consulting firms
can more accurately be described as small businesses, and many firms crowding the
market has resulted in "a stagnation in prices charged for professional services"
Ö Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405 379
(Johnson 2000, pp. 42^4-6). Any co

clients' viability but their ability
correlated in American election
2009). So unless a long-shot chal
chance of winning, there is little
hope their performance beats earl
Consultant Reputation
Yet even if prices stagnate acro

market favors top political consu
among other elites. The intuition
market hiring in which applicants
by communicating their educatio
credentials put the applicant in a
if there are other applicants w
especially strong position if the e
signal of their quality but also as
which the employer seeks access.
signaling behaviors, including con
If a consumer spends lavishly on v
belongs in their income class o
conspicuous consumption are ne
p. 94). In other words, the wealth
status seeker who buys and sh
affordable good would suffice,
the same. For example, a resident
next-door neighbor's true wealth
their driveway (Bagwell and Bern
In considering the relevance of
the candidate-consultant relation
necessary. Candidates do not need
Campaign finance reports ar
Commission, so candidates ar
consumption, any uncertainty
resources because no such uncerta
that some consultants are more of
namely media consulting, are mor
pp. 43^4; Grossman 2009, pp. 9-
not found that some consultants
provide the same service. The mo
better service than cheaper firms
but at a higher price charged only
Instead, I argue that top consult
nonetheless a visible good with a
There is a perception amongst co
â Springer
380 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
the market. Dulio's consultant su

effective firms in all the major spe
polling and media (2004, pp. 137-14
reputation is renown or effectivenes
amounts to either 80 or 76 firms,
small proportion of all the firms act
number as many as 2,500 (Johnso
market for expert services in whic
searching for reliable experts, is hig
to be solved are too significant to r
reliability (Wolinsky 1993).
The reputation of a firm is a chara
these are two qualities necessary for
its customers and financially rewar
perceptual representation of a comp
describe the firm's overall appeal to
leading rivals" (Fombrun 1996, p.
p. 1078). A firm building or maintain
moves that might result in failures
that risky business environments en
failed in the past (Dollinger et al. 1
The consultant whose reputation an
should exercise discretion in decidin
factors may indicate the candidate'
expected to win by a large margin a
just as would boasting of a winning
candidates. Even with some losses un
on the tough fight, steers the dark
than expected will build its reputati
factors can signal competitiveness,
candidates, especially challengers (J
impressive challenger experience or
1983; Krásno and Green 1988), di
1987), party targeting (Glasgow 200
party's candidates over the other's
gaming the odds of winning should
competitiveness of a client's race.
Status-Hunting Congressional Chall
A House challenger, compared to an

client if these other indicators do no
universally poorly funded, and trem
a challenger's chances of winning (J
Fortunately, out-party candidates h
elites to whom hiring of well-reput
Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405 381
elites - journalists, prognosticators

utors - deem a challenger's seat
greatly increases con the resources
improve challengers' chances in t
ment has numerous channels for p
The congressional press galleries in
the ratio of reporters to represent
seventy to one (Graber 2009, p. 29
and the Washington Post not only
" interelite communication" (Dye 2
And major-party challengers quic
are. The political party campaign c
lists of approved consultants and v
"unofficial wing" of the party ma
other actors who function as ad
advisors "supply technical assist
elections" (Schwartz 1990, pp. 54-5
the credentials and reputations of c
as to which of their peers are the m
such that effectiveness and renow
2004, pp. 142-147). Political insid
action committees, tend to take no
for a candidate (Herrnson 1992).
By contrast, incumbent members of
the political elite. They also have rais
of victory by reserving funds for th
Zemsky 1995, p. 303). Being expected
pay for
campaign activities makes
Congress raise money whenever the
opponent but fear a stronger challe
amounts of their war chests even w
levels they do when facing quality
incumbents spend money regardless
consultants should be associated wit
close calls. Dulio (2004, p. 156) ar
perceived as running in a competiti
From an elite-theoretic point of v
a priority for incumbents as a sign t
safety. Top consultants may worry
their reputations. Hence, an incum
firms instead of top firms may sign
Elite Politicking and Election Camp
The argument that congressiona

signal their viability is not new, b
Ô Springer
382 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-^05
beliefs about a campaign's compet

professional campaign organization
prospects to campaign contribut
donors - has been studied before
Herrnson and Medvic show a pos
campaign professionalism (i.e., thei
consultants) and PAC receipts and t
concretely on reputation, and he sh
consultants considered "well-know
concludes that these consultants
(2004, p. 155). However, he does no
well-known or effective can achieve the same result. And none of these authors'
analyses demonstrate that consultant hiring actually helps their clients gain any elite
attention. Instead, it is inferred from the fruits of that attention.
Ultimately, it must bear fruit for out-party candidates, especially challengers, to
spend their scarce resources contracting with costly, big-name consultants when
there are a plethora of less renowned, cheaper consultants. Election day payoffs are
more distant than the more immediate payoff of changed elite perceptions about the
challenger's viability and the potential for her race to be competitive come
November. Contracting with top consultants should be a more observable and
credible signal to elites than contracting with less regarded consultants, and it
should be more persuasive to elites than other indicators of competitiveness are.
And elite perception of competitiveness should be positively correlated with the
ultimate closeness of the race.
The empirical challenge is to measure consultant use in a manner that separates

consulting firms according to reputation, to measure changes in elite beliefs about
the competitiveness of congressional races, and to define the parameters of the
relationship between the two.
Data
Dependent Variable: Change in Elite Perceptions of House Race

Competitiveness
I fill in the blanks empirically by presenting a measure of elite attention, namely

how competitive Washington insiders believe House races to be at two different
points in the election cycle, and then I construct a dependent variable that quantifies
changes in elite beliefs from early to late in the four election years under study,
2000 to 2006. For elite beliefs about House competitiveness, I use the House
seat rankings of the Cook Political Report. Charles Cook is a mainstay of the
Washington establishment and earns a living commenting on political fortunes and
predicting election outcomes. Mr. Cook has been called "the most prominent" of
the Washington "election prognosticators" for his television appearances, magazine
column, self-commissioned poll, and paid speaking engagements in which he shares
his wisdom with lobbyists and interest groups (Milbank 2006). Cook publishes his
Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405 383
House rankings in his newslette

election season, though more frequ
rankings for each election year fr
Cook published in his report in the
in chronological order, February
October 20, 2002, February 24, 2
October 30, 2006.
From these rankings, I construct
The October dates were selected fo
should reflect Cook's near-cumulat
before voters finally decided for t
rankings are right before primary
are more than a residue of the pri
timing of primaries. The dependen
and October rankings, that is, the
Cook believed the race to be. I incl
baseline from which beliefs abo
season.
I have coded the rankings such that they range from least c
favorable for the out-party candidate, and then after quantifying
I subtract the February rankings from the October rankings to
the change in Cook's beliefs about each seat's competitivene
Cook identifies seats as "Likely Democratic," "Lean Democr
Toss-up," "Republican Toss-up," "Lean Republican," and "L
with safe seats unmentioned. Taking into account whether
Republicans were the in-party or out-party, I recode the seats s
from "Safe In-party" to "Likely Out-party." In the rankings un
not identify any seat as safe for the out-party candidate, and I
safe seats go unmentioned in his rankings, all safe seats were saf
party. I also combined Democratic and Republican toss-up seat
category because Cook's party designation refers to the party h
it is an open seat, the party most recently holding the seat. Henc
"Out-party Toss-up" category. If safe seats are coded as 0, then
1, "Leans In-party" is 2, "Toss-up" is 3, "Leans Out-party" is 4,
party" is 5. Subtracting the February rankings from the Octobe
measure of changed beliefs about House race competitiveness p
that ranges from -3 to 4. Over the four election cycles, 130 of
less competitive for the out-party candidate from February to
nearly equal amount, 129, became more competitive.
These perceptions of competitiveness generally, but not perfe
reality on Election Day. In general, the number of races consid
marginally competitive - that is, not "safe" - roughly matched
that had marginal outcomes on election day, where the two-par
was less than 20% points, using Mayhew's (1974a) standard for
four election years studied here, in which there were 1,74
ranked 300 races higher than "safe" in October, and 360 races
â Springer
384 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
by less than twenty points. Cook

his "unsafe" races were won by m
predicted to be at least somewhat
election day. Cook was better at p
by less than twenty points. Th
October of each election year an
combined.
Similarly, Cook was perceptive but by no means perfect in adjusting his beliefs
about how more or less competitive House races became during the electoral cycle.
Presumably, more races deemed to have declined in competitiveness should be
ultimately non-marginal than races that were perceived more competitive from
February to October, and this was largely the case. In only 13% of races for which
the difference between the October and February Cook rankings was greater than
zero was the final outcome decided by more than 20% points. And of races that
Cook perceived less competitive, in which the difference between the two rankings
was less than zero, 57% were non-marginal on Election Day. By comparison, of the
1,480 races whose ranking did not change, fully 87% were non-marginal. More
importantly, only three House contests that Cook indicated had declined in
competitiveness from February to October resulted in the in-party candidate losing
compared to 127 winning, while the in-party lost 35% of races increasing in
perceived closeness. A House incumbent or in-party open-seat candidate, then,
should see a drop in Cook's ranking as a very good sign that he or she is likely to
survive in November, while challengers and out-party open-seat candidates should
delight in climbing Cook's chart. Table 1 provides a cross-tabulation comparing the
Cook rankings of races in February with October of the election years 2000 to 2006.
In each cell is the number of races, out of a total of 1,740, that corresponding to a
particular combination of rankings in February and October. Beneath each count is
the percentage of those races won by the out-party candidate. For example, there
were 14 races in the period of study that Cook perceived safe in February but toss-
ups in October, and the out-party candidate won 57% of these races.
Independent Variables: Consultant Use and Reputation
In addition to measuring changes in elite perceptions of competitiveness, it is

necessary to operationalize consultant participation in House races and consultant
reputation to test hypotheses about the relationship between consultant reputation
and elite perceptions about campaign competitiveness. I have constructed two
measures of consultant use and reputation, one a subjective judgment by industry
insiders and the other an objective measure of consultant win-loss record. Both
measures vary significantly from other measures of consultant use and reputation
found in the political science literature on political consulting, and they therefore
require thoughtful justification.
In the political consulting literature, the degree to which political consultants are
involved in election campaigns is referred to as campaign professionalism. Herrnson
(1992), Medvic and Lenart (1997), and Medvic (2001) operationalize profession-
alism as the number of types of activities - polling, media, and so on - performed
Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^*05 385
Table 1 February and October Cook political

out-party victory
October Total races,
Out-p
likely leaning leaning likely seat
February
Out-party likely - 1 1
100% 100%
Out-party leaning 1 4 1 - - - 6
100% 75% 100% 83%
Toss-up 2 8 31 13 2 5 61
100% 100% 58% 0% 0% 0% 46%
In-party leaning - - 29 37 27 12 105

45% 5% 0% 0% 14%
In-party likely - 1 12 22 55 69 159

0% 58% 9% 5% 1% 8%
Safe seat - 1 14 13 26 1354 1408
100% 57% 15% 4% 0.1% 1%
Total races, 3 15 87 85 110 1440

October ranking 100% 87% 54% 7% 4% 0%
Note: Empty cells represent rank changes that did not occur in the 4 years of stud
rated no race that had been safe in February as most favorable or "likely" for the
October
by consultants. In their analyses, professionalized campaigns, when compared to

amateur campaigns, are those using political consultants to provide a variety of
campaign-related services. While Herrnson compiled his data from surveys of
campaign managers, as did Dulio (2004), Medvic compiled his from Campaigns &
Elections magazine's "The Winners and The Losers" scorecard, which lists the
campaign activities for each major consulting firm in addition to which races each
firm participated in. Dulio is unique in attempting to measure consultant reputation,
and he did so by asking campaign professionals via survey questionnaire whom they
thought were either the most "effective" or "well-known" firms in the industry
(2004, pp. 138-145).
Like Medvic, I begin by using for my first measure of reputation Campaigns &
Elections magazine's "The Winners and The Losers" scorecard. However, while
Medvic' s index accounted for the number of types of campaign services provided
by consultants, I use the number of consulting firms working for a House candidate
as my measure of professionalism, and I create two such counts, one for the in-party
candidate and one for the out-party. The breadth of a campaign organization's
professionalism may be misrepresented if, for instance, two consulting firms
provided media advertising expertise, which would be discounted in Medvic' s
index.
â Springer
386 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
My theory concerns consultant re

provide,3 and the model present
reputation in campaign organiza
according two whether they fell i
A firm is considered to be first-tie
call of firms having the "Best Clie
the exception of firms in 2006.4 Fo
listed in the post-2000 scorecard wh
U.S. House of Representatives, 3
Client Lists" in the post- 1998 score
contracting with at least one Ho
commended in the "Best Client Lis
addition to the number of firms h
percentage i of firms hired by the
top-tier of firms. Unlike Dulio's m
"well-known" a firm is according
the renown of their peers (2004, pp
may not capture how well peers in
it does account for how those near
journal, do. Yet it does not suffer
sample of survey respondents (Dul
Instead of response error, relying
firms having the best clients (or 4
reputation 2 years later within th
of external validity and selection
because the measure I employ is bas
may rather crudely measure varyi
selection bias, while Campaigns &
may undersample firms with lower
suggested that Campaigns & Elec
scorecard represents only a subset
while Medvic's operationalization
scorecard as the population of fi
addition to the 289 firms listed
scorecard as working for clients r
2000 and the 246 in 2006, there we
However, if Johnson (2001) is co
3 For example, media consultants may be m

robo-calling services, as well as for garner
differences in type is not explored here. I
divided into those who shape campaign str
services and products.
4 In 2004, C&E did not include a "Best Clie
for 2006, I use the Best Client List from 20
5 Dulio's (2004) questionnaire about consult
attitudes of campaign professionals, and its
<£) Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^05 387
industry. Many political consultants

their work to or be identified
undersampling may well result in u
on elite opinion if there are many o
and if those included firms who wer
are not the lowest tier of consultants
listed by C&E have generally obtain
and that firms altogether ignored
result of this likelihood, I shall refe
but not falling on the "Best Client
reputation whatsoever. Consultants w
reputation remain unobserved withi
firms not listed in C&E' s scorecard
The second measure of reputation
more objective than using the Best
tiers and a count of candidates' c
clients from the prior election cyc
current election cycle. I then calcula
race as a separate variable. This allo
win-loss record for a firm with
political elites than a 50% win-loss r
House candidate hired only these
would be 20, and her win-loss "sc
former firm and eight from the lat
for having won races in the past.
While this measure of consultant r
tiered measure, it is not without fl
House clients of consulting firms an
other offices. It would be impos
importance to reputation-building
political consultants work with.
presidential candidate is a sign o
quantify the loss of that candidate
only House clients to construct the
consultant ability to win races rath
prominent races. However, many f
cycle did not have any House client
score I construct. These firms m
distinct from ability alone.
Comparing the two types of consu
positive correlation between being
other, as top-tier clients are likelier
candidates. Table 2 presents comp
firms in 2000 and 2002 according t
Clients" after the 1998 and 2000 Ho
and 2006 win-loss records of firm
Ö Springer
388 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
Table 2 Mean House clients,

Mean House Mean winning % Winning % With
wins, and win-loss records for
candidate House clients House race winning
top-tier, 2nd-tier, and all clients record
consulting firms
2000
Top-tier 9.57 6.31 65.9 69.3

2nd-tier 2.92 1.68 57.5 51.9
All firms 5.27 3.31 62.8 58.0
2002
Top-tier 10.5 7.51 71.7 80.4

2nd-tier 3.08 1.89 61.3 61.1
All firms 6.73 4.66 69.2 70.5
2004
Top-tier 7.65 4.88 63.8 64.7

2nd-tier 2.84 1.59 56.1 48.0
All firms 4.53 2.99 66.0 54.0

Note : 2000 Tiers derived from
2006
1998 Best Clients List, 2002
tiers derived from 2000 Best Top-tier 8.06 5.72 70.9 58.5
Clients List, 2004 and 2006 tiers 2nd-tier 2.53 1.45 57.3 40.1
derived from 2002 Best Clients All firms 4.46 2.70 60.5 46.2
List
top-tier firms as a group had better win-

greater percentage of top-tier than s
Candidates who hired firms with top-tier
race than firms that were not top-tier. It
attract considerably more clients than sec
Descriptive statistics provide a snapshot
of consultants of each reputation tier, and
more consultants and more top-tier ones
challengers. Table 3 shows consultant hirin
In incumbent-challenger races, incumbent
consultants as challengers. This correspon
in the 4 years studied hiring at least one
reported by Campaigns & Elections : Poli
hired at least one consulting firm. But wh
roughly as many as incumbents did. Yet f
were top-tier. Amongst open-seat candid
more consultants than out-party ones, wh
top-tier.
Measuring reputation by the past client loads and win-loss records of consulting
firms hired by House candidates reveals a similar pattern, with in-party candidates,
whether incumbent or open-seat, hiring firms that had greater client capacity and
won more of their races than out-party candidates. Table 4 shows that, on average,
challengers' firms had worked with roughly ten fewer House candidates in the prior
election and had win-loss records eight percentage points lower than incumbents'
Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^105 389
Table 3 Tallies of consulting firms for H

House races, by type of race and incumben
N Mean Std. dev. Max. % Top-tier
Unopposed incumbents 160 (of 261) 1.66 0.98 6 68.4

Opposed incumbents 1,045 (of 1,320) 2.30 1.29 8 70.3
Challengers 357 (of 1,320) 2.43 1.51 7 56.6
In-party open-seat candidates 140 (of 147) 3.47 1.64 8 64.2
Out-party open-seat candidates 101 (of 147) 3.29 1.70 9 59.0
Note: Incumbent-incumbent races excluded and races with unopposed open-seat c
Table 4 Tallies of consulting firms' past client loads and past win-loss records in
of race and incumbency status, 2000 to 2006
N Mean Std. dev. Max. Win %
Unopposed incumbents 160 (of 261) 22.90 21.20 124 78.4

Opposed incumbents 1,045 (of 1,320) 33.18 28.67 182 75.1
Challengers 357 (of 1,320) 22.75 23.90 127 67.2
In-party open-seat candidates 140 (of 147) 41.61 30.51 141 70.7
Out-party open-seat candidates 101 (of 147) 33.81 26.28 116 67.0
Note : Incumbent-incumbent races excluded and races with unopposed open-seat candid
firms. To the extent that past client load measures a firm's experience
out-party open-seat candidates' firms had a similar disadvantage to their
though less so with respect to win-loss records. Either reputation m
reveals out-party candidates' weaker ability to contract with reputable
was particularly the case for challengers, the vast majority of whom we
hire any consulting firms.
And out-party candidates who hire consultants, whether reputable or n
assured of their race consequently being perceived more competiti
presents descriptive statistics of in-party and out-party consultant use by
measure and by whether the candidate's race became more or less comp
Cook's rankings from February to October of the election year. In nearly
races that Cook prognosticated as becoming more competitive over the co
election season, out-party candidates had hired at least one consultant,
party candidate hired at least one consultant in slightly more than half
130) of the races that had declined in competitiveness. Yet in thes
candidate hired nearly as many top-tier firms as in races with an impro
The consultants who were hired by candidates whose ranking dec
equivalent win-loss records to the firms of candidates whose race b
competitive. Elites like Cook may not observe all signals sent via hiring c
or they may weigh other indicators of competitiveness more heav
reputable consultants may be associated with a buzz about the race b
assure, alone, that it is positive or negative.
â Springer
390 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
Table 5 Mean consultant use among candidat

cook ranking change, 2000 to 2006
Cook ranking change from F
Negative No change Positive
In-party top-tier 2.16 1.53 2.06

In-party % top-tier 70.5 69.1 67.5
In-party wins 28.83 23.35 33.57
In-party win-loss record (%) 72.6 75.4 72.5
N 126 (of 130) 1,109 (of 1,481) 120 (of 129)
Out-party top-tier 1.63 1.29 1.91
Out-party % top-tier 56.2 55.9 59.8
Out-party wins 22.40 15.43 17.37
Out-party win-loss record (%) 67.4 66.8 67.4
N 70 (of 1 30) 272 (of 1 ,48 1 ) 1 23 (of 1 29)
Note : Observations refer to the number of in-party or o

consultant out of the number of races that fell into a par
Additional Independent Variables: Alternative
The analysis that follows includes several su

pertaining to in-party and out-party use of co
for whether the election race was for an open
was most recently held by a Democrat, and a du
incumbents against each other due to redisric
the redrawn district whose party's preside
district-level winner in the prior presidential
candidate and the other incumbent is consider
challenger and open-seat candidate spending l
a House race is (Jacobson 1978; Abramowitz 1991), there are variables for
expenditures by the incumbent or open-seat candidate of the most recent
incumbent's party and a variable for spending by the out-party candidate, either a
challenger or the open-seat candidate of the party not having most recently held the
seat. As a measure of district partisanship, there is a variable for the district-level
vote of the most recent presidential candidate of the incumbent's party (Abramowitz
1991; Erikson and Palfry 2009). I also control for year effects with dummy variables
for 2002, 2004, and 2006, using 2000 as the base year.
It is also necessary to account for electoral events that might intervene between
the February and October Cook ratings. First are special elections whose outcome
may affect elite beliefs about how competitive the race will be in November. There
were three special elections between the early and late Cook ratings in the 4 years
under study, and I include a dummy variable for districts holding special elections
during this interval. And second are primary elections, which may alter elite beliefs
about how competitive the general election race will be. My variable for the
occurrence of contested primaries is constructed based on the premise that a
ô Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405 391
nominee who has had to withstand

general election from the expense
primary (Herrnson
252-2 2008, pp.
election races in which only the i
with at least one opponent, - 1 fo
won a contested primary, and zer
nominee had faced a contested pr
Because the dependent variable
necessary to control for the Febr
The Cook rankings are non-scalar
ranging from most favorable to
candidate. Respectively, these dum
out-party candidate to win, (2) w
whether it is a toss-up, (4) wheth
whether the race is likely to be w
seats are the baseline.
The last of the independent variables pertains to candidate quality, and because
all 435 races in each of the 4 years are included in the econometric model below,
the variable will be coded in a manner different from what is common in election
studies. Candidate quality is often treated as a binomial variable for whether the
candidate has held prior elected office and, therefore, has the necessary political
experience to run a successful campaign (Jacobson 1980; Cox and Katz 1996). It is
important to control for candidate quality because the traits of the candidates
running may very well be something that attracts the attention of political elites.
Moreover, it will allow me to test whether it is the attractiveness and skill of the
candidate that matters to elites, as would be predicted using Krasno and Green's
(1988) view of candidate quality, or whether it is the decisions (for example, overall
spending or contracting with political consultants) that experienced candidates more
proficiently make than inexperienced ones that get noticed by elites, as would be the
extension of the view of Bond et al. (1985).
In models of incumbent-challenger races, the candidate quality variable refers to
the experience of the challenger, as the incumbent is already assumed to have
political experience that contributed to success in winning elected office. However,
including open-seat races in this model that separates in-party and out-party
candidates creates a coding problem because open-seat candidates of the party that
had most recently held the seat are treated as in-party candidates in the campaign
spending and political consultant variables. And those open-seat candidates of the
party that had not just held the seat are grouped together with challengers.
Therefore, a challenger quality variable would introduce bias in a model including
all 435 House races if it is only challengers who can be coded as having political
experience from holding prior office because the model would not account for the
quality of open-seat candidates who are not of the previous incumbent's party.
Because open-seat races are typically more competitive than incumbent-challenger
races and attract more experienced candidates who see an opportunity for a victory,
it would bias the coefficient on candidate quality if only challengers are coded as
being quality candidates. To prevent this problem, I use a variable henceforth called
ô Springer
392 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^105
quality advantage. This variable is

quality advantage variable, whic
party of the candidate, if one can
not, and was coded 0 if both or n
analysis ranges from safest for th
party candidate, I modify Cox and
candidate, typically the incumb
candidate has not are coded -1, ra
and all others where no candidate
Model Specification
I use ordered probit as the mod

candidate consultant use and chan
is the appropriate model for two
follows a clear ordering, and ca
difference between an increase of
points may not be the same as the
points. Second, estimating the cha
rankings is vital to empirically ev
value from -3 to 4, so it incor
competitiveness but also waning c
the dependent variable ranges fro
hypothesis that the hiring of top
hypothesis that hiring too many
The ordered probit model takes
(2000). The likelihood function i

of values in the dependent var
dependent variable, there are eigh
race, H' = Ф(т! - X'ß), n2 = Ф
- Ф(т2 - X'ß), тг4 = Ф(Т4 -
- X'ß), 7l6 = Ф(т6 - X'ß) - Ф(
and л:8 = 1 - Ф(т7 - X'ß), wher
dependent variable, Ф indicate
cumulative normal distribution, a
of a race declining by three rank
probability of a race dropping two
rank, 7t4 is the probability of a
probability of a race increasin
improving two ranks, n7 is the pr
the probability of a race jumping f
cut points that define the thresho
There will be two primary versio
the tiered reputation measure, wit
one for the number of consulting
â Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^*05 393
percentage of those firms that we

reputation measure, with the two
House client loads of their consultants and the other the House win-loss record from
the prior election cycle of the consultants hired by the candidate.
There will be a full model for each of these two models, followed by three
modified models to assess possible sources of bias in the estimation. The full model
will be the key one for assessing the impact on competitiveness of top-reputed and
less-reputed campaign professionals. This model tries to replicate in econometric
form the process by which Cook might select House race rankings. Operationally,
then, the number of cases included in the model must be 435 per year, which is the
domain of House races from which Cook might select races for a particular level of
competitiveness. As a result, it would be inappropriate to create separate models for
Democratic-held and Republican-held seats or incumbent-held and open-seat races.
Indeed, a seat being open - or, for that matter, one in which two incumbents have
been forced to square off due to redisricting - should well be a factor in whether the
race is considered competitive, and it should be expected that political journalists
would tend to focus on these races. The term "in-party" refers to the current
officeholder or the open-seat candidate of the party of the most recent incumbent.
The term "out-party" refers to the challenger or the open-seat candidate of the party
not most recently holding the seat.6 The second model drops all open-seat races and
all races featuring two incumbents in order to assess the possibility that the presence
of open-seat races and incumbent-incumbent races in the estimation drives the
results. In this version, all in-party candidates are incumbents and out-party
candidates are challengers.
Another potential problem is the inclusion of unopposed races. Obviously, all of
these races fell under Cook's "safe" ranking. Because they do not vary across the
four categories of competitiveness and no unopposed seat saw its ranking change,
including a dummy variable for whether a seat is unopposed may perturb the
standard errors, so no such variable will be included. However, including these races
as observations may bias the coefficients, such that, for instance, the coefficient on
out-party candidate spending is built in part upon the absence of out-party spending
in unopposed races where there is only an incumbent. To evaluate this prospect, the
third version of the model drops all unopposed seats from the estimate. Neither the
omission of open-seat races nor of unopposed races substantially alters the results.
The fourth version of the model is intended to evaluate the possibility that what
matters is not the reputation of the consultants that out-party candidates hire but
hiring any consultants at all. As Tables 3 and 4 showed, the vast majority of
challengers and many out-party open-seat candidates do not hire any consulting
firms. Including these candidates in the full model introduces many zeroes, such that
it is possible that a positive statistical relationship between having a high percentage
of top-tier or winning consultants might reflect merely having any consultants.
6 It is necessary to account for independent members of Congress. Rep. Bernard Sanders of Vermont has
long caucused with the Democrats (Barone and Ujifusa 1999), so I consider his seat Democratic. In 2000,
incumbent Rep. Virgil Goode of Virginia ran as an Independent, but in January of that year he made the
decision to caucus with the Republicans, so I consider his seat Republican. See http://www.cnn.com/
2000/ALLroLITICS/stories/01/26/goode.gop/ (accessed Sept. 7, 2010).
â Springer
394 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^05
Therefore, the fourth model exclu

hire at least one consulting firm.
Hypothesis 1 : Of Consultant Rep

Competitiveness
Iexpect the coefficients on the va

the out-party candidate in the M
be positive and statistically signifi
coefficient would indicate that hiri
no firms at all, is more likely to
as a proxy for political elites, that
party candidate. With respect to
indicate that consultants who had
of performing well again and that
in the election cycle. Positive c
models would also indicate that
winning firms had an increased
dependent variable incorporates n
Hypothesis 2: Of Incumbency, Co
Incumbents, on the other hand, w

deemed vulnerable, so they shoul
This should include hiring numer
firms. The coefficient on each of
the model excluding open-seat
incumbents, should be negative
candidates and races pitting two in
model is not appropriate for test
from the theory, in-party open
Washington political elites as incu
should more closely resemble th
predicted negative coefficient on
each model would demonstrate, as
reputable firms would face an in
those incumbents who hired top f
Results
Beginning with the tiered measures of reputation included in Model A, the results
support the first hypothesis that the more reputable the firms an out-party candidate
hires, the more likely elites are to believe that the candidate's race will become
more competitive. Tables 6 and 7 below show the results for the ordered probit
estimation of Models A and B, respectively. The coefficient of 0.54 in the first
Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^105 395
column of Table 6 is statistically s

consultants they hire, compared to
perceive their race becoming mo
season. The coefficient on the tota
candidate, 0.33, which is also pos
understanding why the results suppo
hired no top-tier consultants, th
relationship between hiring second-
Dividing 0.54 by 0.33 produces a
consultants that would have the sa
top-tier firm. In other words, it is n
associated with positive changes in
of a lesser magnitude.
Using the tiered reputation measu
top- and second-tier firms with
improved prospects for the incu
hypothesis from the estimation of
use by incumbents in the second c
means statistically significant. How
incumbents is both negative and sta
challenger consultant use. Any c
among those listed in the C&E scor
that the incumbent was more likely
faint compared to that sent by cha
Based upon the results using co
reputation, however, there was stro
eses. The coefficient on the win-los
candidate, i.e., the incumbent, in th
statistically significant. Incumbent
races and lost few the prior electio
competitiveness. As for out-party c
the model including only incumben
win-loss records was positive and s
magnitude of the effect of out-par
was 4.35 times that for firms wor
coefficients on both variables a
candidate's consultant use was m
rankings. It should be noted, though
candidate hired no consultants, the
rendered statistically insignificant.
arises from candidates having hired
Of course, the difference in magn
murky due to non-linearity and b
effect along the cumulative distrib
of the cutpoints. The cut points ar
parameter is more likely to be asso
Ô Springer
396 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405
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ö Springer
400 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^105
that the Cook Political Report chan

another. Cut points delineate th
correspond to particular categori
refers to the cut point between the
The larger the value of т7 the highe
must be for a race to be predicted t
two races saw a boost of 4 ranks by
point jump refers to an especially la
be equivalent to, for instance, т4, w
change and those that increased by
One
technique for comparing state
points,such that the lower the diff
mean for the dependent variable w
1991, pp. 33-34). For instance, in
т6 - т5 = 0.78, т5 - т4 = 0.87, т4 - т3 = 3.77, т3 - т2 = 1.47, and т2 - t' -
0.77. These differences are non-zero and rather asymmetrical, so there is an unequal
chance that any conditional mean would fall into adjacent spaces, particularly the
region that separates House races that Cook kept constant from February to October
and those that either increased or decreased by one point in competitiveness. This
asymmetry points to Cook's reluctance to change his race rankings from February to
October. Recall from Table 1 that most of the races that did not change rank were
safe seats. The toughest category to escape for an out-party candidate is the safe
seat.
Discussion: What is the Signal, and Who Sends It?
These findings scratch the surface of previously underexplored strategic relation-

ships between congressional candidates and consultants engaged in electioneering.
The results point to a tradeoff that candidates face in their hiring of campaign
professionals that has been overlooked by the existing literature. For instance,
Dulio's (2004) finding that many campaign professionals identify some of their
colleagues as the most effective or well-known in the industry (pp. 143-144) and
that, for instance, hiring well-known consultants helps raise РАС money (p. 153)
does not demonstrate any drawback to hiring less-well-known firms. But if House
challengers value being seen by political elites as viable, then there is some
drawback to hiring firms who are below the top of the heap. House challengers
would have to weigh whether second-tier firms cost significantly less than well-
reputed firms to warrant an investment in a greater number of lower-tier firms. If a
bigger-name firm offers a higher price, challengers would have to weigh the added
expenses versus the prospective gains from the reputation of a top firm. If the firm's
reputation had been built upon a record of working with clients who won their race
in the past, the challenger would have to weigh whether hiring a firm without a
proven track record of success was worth whatever discount such a firm might offer.
But is the value of a political consulting firm in its name or expertise? The results
here tell only part of the story, and the other part of the story concerns what it does
â Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^*05 401
once hired by the candidate. If firm

trade magazine - considers reput
frequent agents of candidates who
the eyes of political elites, have th
might simply be those whose exper
themselves to elites. Cook may
advertising, scandalous oppositi
activities unmeasured in the above
use of reputable firms. The mer
reputation is measured, might not
In fact, the results, as far as they
alone, when separated from in-par
The more perceptual, tiered measu
of use of top-tier consultants, had
But the more objective reputatio
records, revealed a negative relat
Model В in the second column of T
associated with races becoming safe
had no such effect. One explanation
House races serves is a good indica
help its clients in the eyes of elites
of reputation. From an elite theor
hire top consultants to show their s
time, from an instrumental perspe
services are effective at combating
when using the tiered measuremen
precisely measures consultant abili
to elites, though the insignificant
records presented in the fourth co
excluding out-party candidates wh
the win-loss record measure too cl
win-loss record effect may derive
claimed from the findings present
records directly or the quality of t
What the results here show, th
observe the labor of consultants to draw a conclusion from their association with a
candidate. Presence can be a proxy for performance if reputation is mostly aligned
with quality, at least when evaluating the campaigns of out-party candidates,
especially challengers. However crude the tiered consultant reputation measure, it is
positively, though not perfectly, correlated with win-loss records, as Table 2
showed. An out-party candidate has a better chance of winning when Cook
increases his or her race's rankings. Hence, Cook, or any other member of the
Washington establishment, may use consultant presence as a cue for the likelihood
of a race becoming more competitive in favor of the out-party candidate. For a
candidate, then, part of the value added from hiring a top firm may be unrelated to
the firm's actual work.
Ô Springer
402 Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375^105
Of course, we should not believe

find in consultants. Candidates ma
irrelevant to mass persuasion. And
to thwart opponents in the conte
likely to advertise their record of
and Wilhite 1998). My findings
candidates amongst elites but the
choose more reputable firms to w
persuasion would be an artifact
practically, the results do not de
premium price and whether they
point to an incentive for reputable
of signaling competitiveness outw
The potential financial incentive
with candidates gets noticed by
consultants as informants in th
information than Cook about wh
than elites initially thought, an
trajectory may pay off financial
on out-party clients whose races
But if when choosing out-party H
common indicators of competitiv
they appear to do, their profe
especially challengers, is more
decrease, in elite regard.
Yet this finding is robust despit
Despite the evidence presented
reputable consulting firms and ch
are mostly risk-averse in their
subsist heavily, though not entire
clients, and when they do take a r
so with a clear minority of out-pa
caution may displease challeng
strengthen the signal they send w
The insights and findings pres
consultants, and future research s
political parties. National party
1980s and 1990s as campaign
coordinated expenditures (Kolodn
(Kolodny and Dwyre 2006). As a c
Act's ban on soft money fundr
reliant on hard money sources an
funded with independent expendi
the parties aim to help. Party ind
60-fold from 2002 to 2006 (H
challengers in 2004, "99 percent o
Ô Springer
Polit Behav (201 1) 33:375-405 403
already among the top 10 perce

parties may not be coordinating
independently, they have a stro
candidates lists of consulting firm
1988), to finding ways to select t
candidates in targeted races while
consultant reputation matters to p
here might reflect party decis
candidates.
Whether reputation truly differentiates the effectiveness of political consultants is

an important question in the understanding of what produces electoral change in a
representative democracy. The theory and analysis presented here posits and
demonstrates the signaling power of out-party candidates hiring reputable consult-
ing firms. Few House challengers, for instance, hire top consulting firms, but when
they do, their race's odds of being perceived competitive by political elites increase
compared to challengers who hire no consultants or less reputed ones. Several
questions should engage future scholarship into the political consulting industry and
elite politicking more generally. Are top firms over-concentrated in too few election
races, to the point where they become an inefficient expenditure of scare resources?
Does the need to be loved by the establishment trump the need to appeal to the
electorate? Are the resources spent to hire big name consultants spent wisely, or
does trying to win the attention and esteem of elites ultimately fail to persuade
voters?
Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Neal Beck, Peter Burns, Andrew Douglas, Garrett
Glasgow, Paul Herrnson, Gary Jacobson, Sam Kernell, Skip Lupia, John McAdams, Mat McCubbins,
Sam Popkin, Michael Schudson, and Rie Uslaner for helpful comments on various versions of this
research. He is especially thankful to two thoughtful, anonymous Political Behavior reviewers.
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An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Implications for U.S.

An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its

Published online: 26 September 2010

Keywords Elite theory • Political consulting • Campaigns • Elections •

Much of the literature about the performance of political consultants in U.S.

of votes; hence, I call this the inst

1 Where "marginal" is defined as having bee

to elites but many are also hired t

Instrumental Use of Consultants and Candidate-Centered Politics

Disconnect Between the Goals of Political Consultants and U.S. House

share their ideological views and w

However, receiving payment should be a key source of hesitation with taking on

(Johnson 2000, pp. 42^4-6). Any co

Yet even if prices stagnate acro

the market. Dulio's consultant su

Status-Hunting Congressional Chall

A House challenger, compared to an

elites - journalists, prognosticators

Elite Politicking and Election Camp

The argument that congressiona

beliefs about a campaign's compet

The empirical challenge is to measure consultant use in a manner that separates

Dependent Variable: Change in Elite Perceptions of House Race

I fill in the blanks empirically by presenting a measure of elite attention, namely

House rankings in his newslette

by less than twenty points. Cook

Independent Variables: Consultant Use and Reputation

In addition to measuring changes in elite perceptions of competitiveness, it is

Table 1 February and October Cook political

October Total races,

In-party leaning - - 29 37 27 12 105

In-party likely - 1 12 22 55 69 159

Safe seat - 1 14 13 26 1354 1408

100% 57% 15% 4% 0.1% 1%

Total races, 3 15 87 85 110 1440

by consultants. In their analyses, professionalized campaigns, when compared to

My theory concerns consultant re

3 For example, media consultants may be m

industry. Many political consultants

Table 2 Mean House clients,

Top-tier 9.57 6.31 65.9 69.3

All firms 5.27 3.31 62.8 58.0

Top-tier 10.5 7.51 71.7 80.4

All firms 6.73 4.66 69.2 70.5

Top-tier 7.65 4.88 63.8 64.7

All firms 4.53 2.99 66.0 54.0

top-tier firms as a group had better win-

Table 3 Tallies of consulting firms for H

N Mean Std. dev. Max. % Top-tier

Unopposed incumbents 160 (of 261) 1.66 0.98 6 68.4

Note: Incumbent-incumbent races excluded and races with unopposed open-seat c

N Mean Std. dev. Max. Win %

Unopposed incumbents 160 (of 261) 22.90 21.20 124 78.4

Table 5 Mean consultant use among candidat

Cook ranking change from F

Negative No change Positive

In-party top-tier 2.16 1.53 2.06

Note : Observations refer to the number of in-party or o

Additional Independent Variables: Alternative

The analysis that follows includes several su

nominee who has had to withstand

quality advantage. This variable is

I use ordered probit as the mod