yay These are case digests spouse shall be illegal and void

from its performance, unless:

G.R. No. L-5877 Case Digest
G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, (a) The first marriage was
1954 annulled or dissolved;
People of the Philippines
vs Arturo Mendoza (b) The first spouse had been
Ponente: Paras absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage
Facts: without the spouse present having
August 1936, Jovita de Asis and news of the absentee being alive,
Arturo Mendoza got married in or the absentee being generally
Marikina. During their marriage, considered as dead and believed to
Arturo was marred to Olga Lema in be so by the spouse present at the
Manila. When Jovita died, Arturo time of contracting such
contracted another marriage with subsequent marriage, the marriage
Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna. so contracted being valid in
This last marriage gave rise to either case until declared null
his prosecution for bigamy. and void by a competent court.

Arturo contends that his marriage This statutory provision plainly

with Lema is null and void, makes a subsequent marriage
therefore non-existent at the time contracted by any person during
he married Jovita. Then his 3rd the lifetime of his first spouse
marriage was valid also because it illegal and void from its
occurred after the death of performance, and no judicial
Jovita. decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity, as distinguished
Solicitor General argues that, from mere annullable marriages.
even assuming that Arturo's There is here no pretence that
marriage to Lema is void, he is appellant's second marriage with
not exempt from criminal liability Olga Lema was contracted in the
in the absence of judicial belief that the first spouse,
annulment of said bigamous Jovita de Asis, has been absent
marriage. for seven consecutive years or
generally considered as dead, so
as to render said marriage valid
Ruling:
until declared null and void by a
it is admitted that appellant's
competent court.
second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of
his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis. Section 29 of the marriage Wherefore, the appealed judgment
law (act 3613), in force at the is reversed and the defendant-
time the appellant contracted his appellant acquitted, with costs de
second marriage in 1941, provides officio so ordered.
as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage

subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first

People vs. Aragon
100 Phil 1033
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with
Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter
subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with
Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is
in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he
commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When
Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where
the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on
suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo
to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo,
Rosima contracted a third marriage with
Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of
bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null
and void.
HELD:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of
the second wife whose marriage with Rosima
was not renewed after the death of the first
wife and before the third marriage was entered
into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one
and prosecution against Rosima for contracting
marriage cannot prosper.
TOLENTINO v. PARAS
Topic: Void Marriages; Bigamous and
Polygamous Marriages
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review on
Certiorari; reversal of respondent Court's Order,
dismissing petitioner's suit for her
"declaration . . . as the lawful surviving spouse
of deceased Amado Tolentino and the
correction of the death certificate of the same"
Doctrine: There is no better proof of marriage
than the admission by the accused of the
existence of such marriage. The second
marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and
of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage
Facts: Amado Tolentino had contracted a second
marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November
1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner,
Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31,
1943, was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy. Amado
pleaded guilty and after he had served the
prison sentence imposed on him, he continued
to live with respondent until his death on July
25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry
"Name of Surviving Spouse—Maria Clemente."
Petitioner sought to correct the name of the
surviving spouse in the death certificate from
"Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her
name in in a special proceeding for correction of
entry. The lower Court dismissed the petition
"for lack of the proper requisites under the law"
and indicated the need for a more detailed
proceeding.
Petitioner filed a case against private
respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of
Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the
lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of
the death certificate of Amado. In an Order,
dated October 21, 1975, respondent Court,
upon private respondent's instance, dismissed
the case, stating: (1) the correction of the entry
in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
proper remedy because the issue involved is
marital relationship; (2) the Court has not
acquired proper jurisdiction because as
prescribed under Art. 108, read together with
Art. 412 of the Civil Code—publication is
needed in a case like this, and up to now, there
has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense,
the subject matter of this case has been aptly
discussed in Special Proceeding which this Court
has already dismissed, also for lack of the
proper requisites under the law.
Issue/s:
WON the petitioner may validly rectify the
erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar
Ruling:
YES
Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the
correction of entry contemplated in Article 412
of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration
that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the
deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for
the correction of the entry in the death
certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a
proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as
contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A
claim of right is asserted against one who has an
interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as
the individual most affected, is a party
defendant, and has appeared to contest the
petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil
Registrar is also a party defendant. The
publication required by the Court below
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not
absolutely necessary for no other parties are
involved.
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea,
was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence
furnishes the necessary proof of the marital
status of petitioner and the deceased. There is
no better proof of marriage than the admission
by the accused of the existence of such
marriage. The second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the
lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from
the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof
nor remand to the Court below, that private
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the
deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of
the erroneous entry in the records of the Local
Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Order, dated
October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby
set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino,
hereby declared the surviving spouse of the
deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the
corresponding correction be made in the latter's
death certificate in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
and KARLHEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City filed
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s
previously existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of
the said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
the said marriage was null and void as she and
first husband Eduardo Maxion was forced to
enter the said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties
was the status of the first marriage (whether
the said prior marriage is void or merely
voidable). Lilia contested the validity of the pre
trial order asking for respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for Lilia Wiegel
to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
by fore.
Ruling:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that
her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely voidable. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married
to her first husband, consequently, her marriage
to respondent is void.
TITLE: Donato vs. Luna
CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner
Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979
with the lower court in Manila. This was based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on
September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil
action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground
that Paz consented to entering into the
marriage which was Donato’s second since she
had no previous knowledge that Donato was
already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping
on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his
second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent
to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
which reason, the requisite marriage license
was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz
until November 1978 where Paz left their home
upon learning that Donato already previously
married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for
bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment
of marriage pending before the juvenile and
domestic relations court on the ground that
latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on
prejudicial question since a case for annulment
of marriage can only be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused if it was proved that petitioners
consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to
show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question
shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should
be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
TERRE v. TERRE
TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)
PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B.
Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with “grossly
immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman
other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting
No judicial action having been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of
such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of
minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy
Terre was then married to a certain Merlito
Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty.
Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant
that her marriage was void ab initio and they
are free to contract marriage. In their marriage
license, despite her objection, he wrote “single”
as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and
subsequently contracted another marriage to
Helina Malicdem believing again that her
previous marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is
needed to enter into a subsequent marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part
of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious
defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic
fact which underscores that bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, the
pretended defense is the same argument by
which he inveigled complainant into believing
that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla
being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and
Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each
other), she was free to contract a second
marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should
have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court
which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage , a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential.
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got
married in December 1914. On January 10,
1918, Jones secured a passport. She never
heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a
proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing.
On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur
as an absentee with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take
effect until six months after its publication in the
official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the
Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued
another order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence, publication thereof
having been made in the Official Gazette and in
"El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted
a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When
Marciana died intestate, Felix was appointed as
judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita
Jones, Marciana’s daughter from her first
marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the
only heir of her mother and that her mother’s
marriage to Felix was null and void on the
ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court
issued an order for the taking effect of
declaration of absence & publication thereof) to
May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage)
was below the 7-year prescriptive period. With
this, the marriage would be null and void and
would render her as the sole heir.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix
is null and void. W/N Felix is a legitimate heir of
Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana
Escaño's former husband should be counted
from January 10, 1918, the date on which the
last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was
received, and from said date to May 6, 1927,
more than nine years elapsed. The validity of
the marriage makes him a legitimate heir.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA
affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the
ground of psychological incapacity. The couple
got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends
whom he squandered his money, depends on
his parents for aid and assistance and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances.
In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and
as a result their relationship was estranged.
Roridel quit her work and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo
subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties
due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s
action at the time of the marriage did not
manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony
by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the
grounds of psychological incapacity laid set
forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs
to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be
medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence
at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to
disable the person in complying with
the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in
Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial
Appellate Court or the Catholic Church
must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting
attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to
act on behalf of the state.
Choa vs. Choa
GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in
1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl
Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards,
he filed an amended complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial
and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to
controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with
perjury, concubinage and deportation which
shows latter’s psychological incapacity because
according to him it clearly showed that his wife
not only wanted him behind bars but also to
banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented
quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by
Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any
way show the alleged psychological incapacity
of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and
shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained
about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely
lack of attention to children, immaturity, and
lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and
none of these three, singly or collectively,
constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the
performance of marital obligations. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from
other witnesses failed to identify and prove root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It
just established that the spouses had an
incompatibility or a defect that could possibly
be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.
The totality of evidence presented was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any
medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana
were legally married union begot five children
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R.
Bengzon (―respondent Tadeo‖) filed a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage againstpetitioner
Diana M. Barcelona (―petitioner
Diana‖).Petition further alleged that petitioner
Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the celebration of their marriage to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time. The petition alleged the non-
complied marital obligations: During their
marriage, they had frequent quarrels due
to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming
from a rich family, was a disorganized
housekeeper and was frequently out of the
house. She would go to her sister‘s house or
would play tennis
the whole day When the family had crisis due to
several miscarriages suffered by respondent and
the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husband On November 1977, the respondent,
who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to
temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his
desire
e to keep peace in the family and to safeguard
the respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was
compelled to leave
their conjugal dwelling The respondent at
the time of the celebration of their marriage
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage and
such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity was conclusively
found in the psychological examination
conducted on the relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent Diana claims that
petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in
Molina case and there is no cause for action
ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action
against Diana
HELD: YES, since petition stated legal right
of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana,
and her act or omission as seen infects FAILURE
TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF
ILLNESS Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage –petition does not need
to show (NOT) root cause since only experts can
determine it b the physical manifestations of
physical incapacity
RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE
OF ACTION
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
SIMPLIFICATION
DIANA contends that the 2nd petition of his
husband is defective because it fails to allege
the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules
do not require the petition to allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity, it
follows that there is no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. (only experts can determine the root
cause and at times they couldn’t determine it).
What the new Rules require
the petition to allege are physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity. Second
petition of Tadeo complies with this
requirement. (he has stated in his petition facts
to support his claim
– stated in the FACTS
Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in
1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on
the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-
Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays
with his family. Toshio sent money for two
months and after that he stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times
but never respondent. In 1991, she learned
from her friend that Toshio visited the country
but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given
address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an
ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was
granted and the summons, accompanied by a
copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer
the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have
greatly helped Lolita had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified
Toshio’s illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital
obligation due to some psychological, not
physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Morigo vs People
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete
and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in
1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario
Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with
bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed
a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his
marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed
declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to
be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely
signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does
not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not
commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case
filed.
423 SCRA 272 (467 Phil. 723) – Civil Law –
Family Code – Bigamy – Exists even if one
marriage is declared void
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with
Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the
later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to
a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain
Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record
of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void
ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence
he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of
bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish
the validity of the first marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity
or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes “any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A
plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Yaptinchay vs. Torres28
SCRA 489, G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969
FACTS:
•Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay, the
petitioner, lived as husband and wife openly for
19 years.
•Isidro Yaptinchay died Intestate.
•Teresita Yaptinchay was first appointed by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, as Special Administratrix and then
as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay.
•An opposition was registered by Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and
Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the
ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not
being an heir of the decedent.
•After the parties were heard, the probate
court granted counter-petitioners ‘prayer and
named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special
administratrix upon aP50,000-bond.
•This time, Teresita filed in another
branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action
for replevin and preliminary injunction for
liquidation of the partnership supposedly
formed during the period of her cohabitation
with Isidro and for damages. Respondent judge
Torres ordered issued a temporary restraining
order that Virginia et. al. and their agents from
disposing any of the properties listed in the
complaint and from interfering with Teresita’s
rights to, and possession over the house now
standing at North Forbes Park
ISSUE:
W/N preliminary injunction may be granted (in
relation to Teresita’s prayers)
HELD:
NO. Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction dissolved and set aside.
Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose
of taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of
another whose title thereto has not been
clearly established. In the verified petition
before this Court, Teresita avers that
construction of said North Forbes Park property
was undertaken jointly by her and deceased,
Teresita even contributing her own exclusive
funds therefore. But in her amended complaint
she had said that she acquired through her own
personal fundsand efforts real properties such
as North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al.
dispute Teresita’s claim of complete or even
partial ownership of the house. Maintaining
that construction of that house was undertaken
by the deceased without Teresita's intervention
and with his own personal funds. Note that
it was only after hearing and considering the
evidence adduced and the fact that after the
death of Isidro the Forbes Park house was
among the properties of the deceased placed
under Virginia’s administration that respondent
judge issued the injunction order. Thus,
petitioner herein is not entitled to the
injunction she prayed for below. Furthermore,
grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of
which appellate courts will not interfere except
in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresita’s
presented loans that she had contracted during
the period when said house was
under construction as proof of ownership,
evidence was wanting which would correlate
such loans to the construction work—the
evidence, on
the contrary were indicative that the loans she
obtained from the bank were for purposes
other than the construction of the home. Thus,
the unsupported assertion that the North
Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive
property may not be permitted to override the
prima facie presumption that house, having
been constructed on Isidro’s lot (or of the
conjugal partnership) at his instance, and
during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the
estate that should be under the control of the
special administratrix. Nor can petitioner's
claim of ownership presumably based on the
provisions of Art.144, CC be decisive. Art. 144
says that: "When man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership."But stock must be
taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is
circumscribed by conditions, the existence
of which must first be shown before rights
provided there under may be deemed to
accrue. One such condition is that there must
be a clear showing that the petitioner had,
during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such
right to co-ownership is duly established,
petitioner's interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the "present
right" or title that would make available the
protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive
right especially calling for judicial protection
is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect
contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to
enforce an abstract right.
Jocson vs. Robles
Gloria G. Jocson – Plaintiff – Appellee
Ricardo R. Robles – Defendant – Apellant
February 10, 1968
Facts:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson
commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court an action for the annulment of
her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles , on the
ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in
the amended complaint that previous to his
marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958,
defendant Robles had contracted a first
marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had
instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against
the same defendant in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The Plaintiff also demanded
from the defendant moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming
that during their cohabitation, she was
subjected to physical maltreatment by her
husband, resulting in the premature birth of
their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the
validity of the marriage. But he charged
plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by
force, threat and intimidation, to contract that
marriage with her, notwithstanding their
knowledge that he is a married man; and that
said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted
until January, 1963 when he was finally able to
get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff’s claim of
bigamy is valid against the defendant, whilst the
defendant is a married man, who contracted
previous marriage.
Held: No. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE
CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, respondents.
Facts:
Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of
his marriage to Helen Villanueva. However,
despite the fact that Helen was served with
summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which
reason Romulo filed a motion to declare her in
default and to set the date for the presentation
of his evidence.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila declared Helen in default, but, pursuant
to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case
to the City Fiscal for investigation to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties.
Romulo submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy
of his complaint.
The fiscal issued a subpoena to Romulo’s
counsel requiring him to bring Romulo with him
as well as copies of other documents in
connection with the annulment case
However, Romulo’s counsel informed the fiscal
that he could not comply with the subpoena for
it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion, Romulo Tolentino’s counsel prayed
to set the date for the reception of his evidence
on the ground that the City Fiscal had not
submitted a report of his findings despite the
lapse of sixty (60) days when he submitted to
the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion
of Romulo unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the
latter to report whether or not there is
collusion between the parties.
Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in
view of the fact that Romulo is not willing to
submit himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of Article 101
of the New Civil Code.
Romulo filed a petition to annul said order and
to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.

Issue:
WON the order of the respondent judge
dismissing the complaint due to the fact that
the plaintiff is not willing to submit himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal is valid.

Held:
YES, the order of the respondent judge is valid.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and
legal separation based on a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment and direct that in
case of non-appearance of defendant, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State to prevent
fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
Institutions of marriage and of the family are
sacred and therefore are as much the concern
of the State as of the spouses. The State and
the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
The prohibition against annulling a marriage
based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance
of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage
is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the
defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the
court to direct the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the State in order to preserve the
integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.