Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July
30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development
and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially
re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands

G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land
and also because he was an alien.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for
the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not
complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right
could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title
over public land by prescription.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Oh

Cho V. Director Of Lands (1946)
Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

 Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection of his application based on disqualification as alien (Chinese) from
acquiring lands of the public domain.
 He had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940
ISSUE: W/N Oh Cho entitled to decree or registration of the lot.

HELD: NO.
 GR: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the
public domain
 Exception: in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
 that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño v. Insular Government) - not
applicable since only from 1880
 His immediate possesor failed to comply with the condition precedent to apply for the registration of the
land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894 so what was transferred to Oh Cho
is merely possesory right which cannot ripen to ownership by prescription (aliens disqualified to own by
prescription)

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381
Phil. 761)
“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to
be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf
of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner
of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature.
Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane
and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not
covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the
respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his
deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau
of Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari
contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the
presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit registration of land in
his favor?

Ruling:

The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act providing that a person alleging
in his petition or application ownership in fee simple must present muniments of title to substantiate
his claim of ownership, presenting evidence of his possession in the concept of an owner in a manner
and number of years required by law. The manner shall be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property known as agricultural land of the public domain for 30 years preceding the
filing of application for confirmation (Commonwealth Act No. 141).
Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor unless occupant of the
same is under claim of ownership for the required period. Even in the absence of opposition the court
can deny registration of land under the Torrens System on ground that an applicant failed to establish
his ownership by a fee simple on the property sought to be registered.

The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue
of extrajudicialsettlement and order and at the same time he filed his application for registration
in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only for 26 years. His mere allegation that his
mother was in possession of the land since 1911 is self serving and hearsay and is inadmissible
as evidence. The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as evidence do not substantiate clear
proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to prove that his predecessor-in-interest occupied the
land under the condition laid down by law, he can only establish his possession of the land from
1949. Respondent failed to prove his muniment of title for the registration of the land under the
Registration Act with failure to present convincing and positive proof of his continuous, open,
uninterrupted and notorious occupation of lot 6 in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years.