(It was submitted to the Department of Philosophy of the University of

Liverpool at 2008, as part of the MPhil-PhD on philosophy.

THE STOIC THEORY OF TIME

The nature of time along with the nature of space is among the most

fundamental and critical concepts in any possible philosophy. As Tzamalikos

argues in ‘Origen and the Stoic View of Time’:

Indeed, the notion of time constitutes the core of any entire philosophy.

Hence, the way thinkers conceive of time derives from their overall view of

reality, their fundamental philosophical premises, their notion of being, and

their methods and dialectics. Yet there is also mutual influence: not only does

philosophy presuppose a certain conception of time, but also any given view

of time determines the nature of a general philosophical attitude: how to live,

the purpose of life, how to face death, the basis of hope, the concept of God,

a Weltanschauung and destiny, if any, the questions of creation, and all the

secular implications that the notion of creation involves- all these notions

bound to the concept of time.1

Time is such a familiar and intimate notion of our every-day life that we think

that we do not even have to argue about its essence or its existence. As

McTaggart though remind us: ‘In philosophy, time is treated as unreal by

1Panayiotis Tzamalikos, ‘Origen and the Stoic View of Time’, Journal of the History of Ideas,
Vol.52, No.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1991), p.535.

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Spinoza, by Kant, and by Hegel.’2 The Stoics, along with the former

philosophers, also did not consider time as ‘real’. Nevertheless, if we want to

understand their philosophical position about the nature of time, we must

understand that when we speak of the ‘Stoic theory of time’, we are referring

to a theory that did not remain the same through the years. As Long

underlines in Problems in Stoicism: ‘But Stoicism is a broad term, broad

enough to admit divergence and development in a variety of fields. Numenius

tells us that internal disagreement and argument were features of Stoicism

from the beginning.’3

The purpose of this paper will be to try to reconstruct a ‘Stoic theory of time’.

The problems though are many and nontrivial, we do not have in our

possession anything else but only fragments of their theory of time, and even

these few lines are coming either from their opponents, like Plutarch and

Proclus, or from people who they are not in a position to understand

completely the Stoic philosophy, like Aetius and Stobaeus. Regardless of the

lack of complete texts and the variety of the definitions by Zeno and his

successors though, we can make an approach to Stoics’ viewpoints of time.

‘Most of the Stoics assert that motion itself is the essence of time.’4

This is the most general and subtractive definition of time we have

considering Stoics’ thought about the essence of time. Two are the most

important elements that we can detract from it: a) time has essence and b)

time is motion or motion is time. The specific fragment though is so brief that

2 J.M.E. McTaggart, ‘Selection from the Nature of Existence’, in Metaphysics: a guide and
anthology, Edited by Tim Crane and Catalin Farkas, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004,
p.454.
3 ‘Problems in Stoicism’, Edited by A.A. Long, Published by The Athlone Press, 1971,
introduction, p.3.
4 Aetius 1.22.7 (in Diels (1879) 318,24-5;SVF 2.514;trans.Saunders).

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we are not able to have a clear idea either about which of the Stoics held this

opinion about time or which was the context that gave to this fragment its

generic meaning, we do not know for example what is the exact meaning of

the word ‘essence’. Relating time with motion though is characteristic of the

ancient Greek philosophy, e.g. Plato in Timaeus defines time as the moving

image of eternity (37c) and Aristotle tells us that time is the ‘measure or

number of motion’ (Physics 217b-224a).5

We know for sure that Zeno along with Chrysippus did not consider time to be

simply the motion. Instead of that:

Whereas of the Stoics Zeno said that time is the extension of all

movement simpliciter, while Chrysippus (called it) the extension of the

movement of the world.6

Plutarch verifies that ‘extension of motion’ instead of simply the ‘motion’ is the

concept of time, at least for some of the Stoics :‘(…) think time (…as)

extension of motion and nothing else, as did some of the Stoics.’7

For the present we are still unable to say anything certain about Stoics’ theory

of time, but the fact that they did not –all of them- agreed in the definition of

time; for some of them was just the motion, for Zeno and Chrysippus was the

extension of movement, although Zeno talked about time as the extension of

all movement in general, while Chrysippus talked about time as the extension

of the world. The first fragment that we can use for a more accurate account

of Zeno’s theory of time is:

5 The stress is mine.

6 Simplicius in Cat. 350,15-16 Kalbfleisch (part of SVF 2.510; LS 51A; trans Gaskin).
7 Plutarch Quaest. Plat.1007a (SVF 2.515).

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 Zeno said that time is the interval of movement which holds the measure

and standard of swiftness and slowness (…).8

Here we have a ‘relative’ theory of time that identify time with the interval of

movement from which we can say if something or someone is moving faster

or slower than something or someone else. It is a ‘relative’ theory of time

because here we cannot speak of time as it would be something by itself but

only as a simple measure of swiftness or slowness. We can imagine two

runners that are running 100 meters and one of them is finishing first and the

other second. Here the time is just the measure of their swiftness and their

slowness respectively; the first one ran the distance in less time than the

second. There is no time outside their competition. Time then has no

existence, no essence on its own. Proclus and Diogenes Laertius affirm this

‘relative’ theory:

From what has been said one should also realize that Plato had a quite

different view of time from the Stoics…The Stoics make it a mere thought,

insubstantial and very close to non-existent. For in their view time was one of

the incorporeals, which they disparage as inactive and non-existent and

subsisting merely in thoughts.9 ‘Time too is incorporeal, being the measure of

the world’s motion.’10

8Stobaeus 1,104,7-11 Wachsmuth (part of Arius Didymous fr. 26 (in Diels (1879) 461,4-6);
SVF 1.93; trans. Sambursky).
9 Proclus in Tim. 3,95,7-15 Diehl (SVF 2.521; LS 51F; trans. LS).
10 Diogenes Laertius 7.141 (SVF 2.520).

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For Stoics, time along with space, void and expression (το λεκτόν), are

‘incorporeals’.11 Stoics in their theory spoke of three degrees of reality: a) the

‘beings’ that were wholly real and were bodies, b) the ‘incorporeals’ that were

called ‘somethings’ (τινά) and they were not regarded as ‘beings, and c) the

‘nothings’ (ούτινα) that were mere concepts. Time is a ‘something’, located

between being and non-being, in a state between existence and non-

existence.12 In this way though, Proclus is wrong to allegate that time for

Stoics was a mere thought with no existence at all. Time was needed by the

Stoics in order to function as the measure of swiftness or slowness of the

bodies. Bodies are real and we need space to ‘locate’ them and time to

‘measure’ their movement. 


We saw, so far, five different definitions of time: a) time is motion, b) time is

the extension of motion, c) time is the interval of movement, d) time is the

extension of all movement and e) time is the extension of the movement of

the world. For Zeno time is either the c) or the d), for Chrysippus time is the

e), and the a) and b) definitions of time are belonging either to other Stoics or

they are simplified definitions of the former mentioned. The one thing that they

have in common is that for all the previous definitions time is depending to

something else in order to have a meaning, thus the only thing that is sure so

far about the Stoic theory of time is that time is considered to be relative. For

Zeno in particular time has to do with the movements of any kind of bodies.

For Chrysippus on the other side time has to do with the movement of the

11A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers, Vol.1, Cambridge University
Press, 2008, p.163.
12 Tzamalikos, pp.538-540.

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world, in this way time acquires a more stable point of reference, which is the

whole world instead of any kind of moving body.13

Unfortunately we do not have another fragment that could explain to us

Zeno’s theory in more details. We do have though for Chrysippus’ theory of

time.

Chrysippus said time is the dimension (diastema) of motion according

to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of; or the dimension

accompanying the world’s motion. And (he says) every single thing moves

and exists in accordance with time (…) Just as the void in its totality is infinite

in every respect, so time in its totality is infinite on either side. For both the

past and the future are infinite. He says most clearly that no time is wholly

present. For since continuous things are infinitely divisible, on the basis of this

division every time too is infinitely divisible. Consequently no time is present

exactly, but it is broadly (κατά πλάτος) said to be so. He also says that only

the present belongs (υπάρχειν); the past and the future subsist (υφεστάναι),

but belong (υπάρχειν) in no way, just as only predicates which are (actual)

attributes are said to ‘belong’, for instance, walking around belongs to me

when I am walking around, but it does not belong when I am lying or sitting. 14

We have some new elements of Chrysippus’ theory here: a) time in its totality

is infinite, b)time is continuous thus it is infinitely divisible, c)time is present

13Tzamalikos disagree with the hypothesis that Zeno and Chrysippus had different theories
about time, but in this point I follow Rist’s opinion: J.M.Rist, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge at
the University Press, 1969, pp.275-277.
14 Stobaeus 1,106,5-23 Wachsmuth (part of Arius Didymus fr. 26 (in Diels (1879),
461,23-462,3); SVF 2.509; LS 51B).

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only in broadly speaking and d)only the present ‘belongs’, while the past and

the future only ‘subsist’. So time a) has no limits either in the past or in future.

The world is finite but it never stops moving, thus time which is the measure of

the movement of the world is infinite. b) Time is also continuous which means

that we cannot find ‘atoms’ of time, on the contrary, no matter how far we are

willing to divide time we will not find a ‘moment’. c) That is why Chrysippus

argues for the present as something that exists only in the broader sense. I

can say that ‘now’ is the moment that I typed the word ‘now’ but I can assert

that only if I accept that this moment outstretches from the time that I typed ‘n’

till the time that I typed ‘w’. The past and the future are not real attributes to a

body’s present condition, only the present belongs to that condition. While I

am typing this paper, the time of my action of ‘typing’ is present, because my

body (my fingers) is acting in this way. The very moment I will stop typing, I

cannot say that I have as part of my present body-condition the act of ‘I was

typing’. We have to have in mind that for Stoics only bodies exist. Time is an

attribute to my body’s condition so far as this time ‘signalizes’ my body’s real

movement. All these concepts though of past, future and present are merely

ways of describing something that is continuous, i.e. something that cannot

have real distinctions such as past, present, and future. We will be able to see

this clearly in the following passage from Plutarch.

Chrysippus, on the other hand, wishing to treat the division with finesse

says in his treatise on the Void and in some others that the part of time that is

past and the part that is future subsist but to no exist and only what is present

exists; but in the third and fourth and fifth books on Parts he affirms that of

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present time part is future and part has gone by. Consequently it turns out that

he divides the existing part of time into parts that are non-existent and what

does exist, or rather that he leaves absolutely nothing of time existing if what

is present has no part that is no future or past.15

In this sense, even the present has no real existence, which is because the

present is constituted partly of the past and partly of the future. Now that I am

typing the word ‘now’, when I type ‘n’ I am partly on the future because the

typing will be finished when I will type ‘w’, and when I will type ‘w’ I will have

already typed ‘n’. Even when I am thinking to type the word ‘now’, my thought

is partly in the past, because there is always a certain time past before my

fingers will follow my thought and another time past before I realized that I am

thinking to type the word ‘now’. From the moment that for Chrysippus (and his

followers) time is continuous, it comes very naturally to him to consider any

kind of ‘pieces’ of time merely concepts with no further actual existence. We

can speak thus for the ‘flux of time’ and not for the parts of time.

In strict conformity with the dynamic conception of continua -spatial as

well as temporal- the present qua limit of time is not sharp but forms a fringe

covering the immediate past and future. In contradistinction to the static

concept of an “atom of time” we have thus to regard the Stoic present as a

shrinking duration of only indistinctly defined boundaries. The physical

significance of such a duration is that it still represents an eventlike structure,

it is an elementary event, and macroscopic time is composed of the

15Plutarch Comm. Not. 1081f-1082a (parts are SVF 2.518 and 517; part of LS 51C; trans.
Cherniss).

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succession of such events in the same sense as every part of the earth is

earth and every part of the sea is sea. The mathematical ‘now’ towards which

the shrinking intervals of duration converge has no physical significance.16

Flexibility is the most proper feature of the Stoic theory of time. Recognizing

that time does not exist by itself, and willing to produce a theory of time that

could accurately depict the flux of time, Stoics or at least Chrysippus and his

successors, accomplished to create a theory of time different from those of

Plato and Aristotle.

Given the notorious difficulties of the concept of time, the Stoics’ flexibility

on the subject is to their credit. They recognized that temporal discourse is

unavoidably imprecise and may legitimately vary with the context: we may

speak of a long extension of time, such as a year, as ‘present’. Nor was their

classification of time as incorporeal a denial of its reality as a feature of the

world. If time as such is not a body, Chrysippus was prepared to treat day and

night and longer durations of time as bodies. He seems to have reasoned that

these are physical changes produced by the sun’s movements. 17

After Apollodoros and Posidonius though, Stoics turned completely to moral

philosophy and neglected epistemology and physics. Marcus Aurelius, the

Roman emperor, in his meditations tried to speak of time in a moral manner.

16S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, pp.
104-105.
17 The Hellenistic philosophers, p.308.

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He considered human life to be unimportant and even meaningless,

especially because human life is so small compared to infinite eternity.

Shall mere glory distract you? Look at the swiftness of the oblivion of all

men; the gulf of infinite eternity, behind and before; the hollowness of

applause, the fickleness and folly of those who seem to speak well of you,

and the narrow room in which it is confined. This should make you pause. For

the entire earth is a point (στιγµή) in space, and how small a corner thereof is

this your dwelling place, and how few and paltry those who will sing your

praises here.18

I have to disagree with Rist here, because he sees in the above passage a

theory that displays towards time ‘an attitude radically different from that of

Chrysippus…’19In his opinion, Marcus Aurelius makes a new approach to the

Stoic theory of time because he speaks as if time has no existence at all, not

even the ambiguous existence of an incorporeal. My opinion, on the contrary,

is that Marcus Aurelius is not interested in physics or epistemology, his

interest lies on the morality of human beings. All he says here is that men

should not be drifted by their ephemeral dreams of glory. He wants to

underline the insignificance of men comparing to eternity. Time here plays a

moral role, i.e. signifies the ‘nothingness’ of men. Subject of research here is

not the nature of time but the nature of men compared to eternity (of time).

18 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4.3.

19 Rist, p.283.

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 For in this way you will continually see that man’s life is smoke and

nothingness, especially if you remind yourself that what has once changed will

be no more in infinite time.20

Catherine Rau in her article ‘Theories of Time in Ancient Philosophy’ spends

only few lines for the Stoic theory of time. She considers their philosophy of

time unimportant and insignificant.21 Plotinus though, did not have the same

opinion, thus he used many arguments against Stoics’ theory of time in order

to contravene them (Plot., Enn. 3.7.7. and 3.7.10.) Time is a crucial concept in

any given philosophical system and Stoics tried to make their own diacritical

contribution. Even if we are unable to have a complete picture of their theory

about time, we still can detect their very discernible approach.

20 Meditations, 10.31.
21Catherine Rau, “Theories of Time in Ancient Philosophy”, The Philosophical Review, Vol.
62, No.4 (Oct., 1953), p.517.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1) Diels, H, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1879, Editio Quarta

1965.

2) Kalbfleisch, C., Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias Commentarium,

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca VIII, Berlin: Reimer, 1907.

3) (Edited by) Long, A.A., Problems in Stoicism, Published by the Athlone

Press, 1971.

4) Long, A.A., and Sedley, D.N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol.1,

Cambridge University Press, 2008.

5) McTaggart, J.M.E., ‘Selection from the nature of Existence’, in

Metaphysics: a guide and anthology, Edited by Tim Crane and Catalin

Farkas, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004.

6) Rau, Catherine, ‘Theories of Time in Ancient Philosophy’, The

Philosophical Review, Vol.62, No.4 (Oct., 1953), pp.514-525.

7) Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge at the University Press, 1969.

8) Sambursky, S., Physics of the Stoics, London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1959.

9) Tzamalikos, Panayiotis, ‘Origen and the Stoic View of Time’, Journal of

the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No.4 (Oct-Dec., 1991), pp.535-561.

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