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Garbo vs. CA an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Petitioner offers no cogent
July 5, 1996 Francisco, J. reason and none appears on record to justify her failure to file her
amended or redrafted record on appeal as directed by the probate court
FACTS: The RTC appointed Gloria Z. Garbo administratrix of the intestate twice despite the vehement objection of the private respondent.
estate of Manuel G. Garbo. Three months later, the intestate estate of Petitioners failure, if not an obstinate refusal to comply with the probate
Manuel G. Garbos wife, Magdalena B. Garbo, filed a petition for the courts orders is fatal. Decision Affirmed.
allowance of Manuel G. Garbos Last Will and Testament which devised and
bequeathed all of Manuel’s properties and assets exclusively to his wife SSS vs. Chaves
Magdalena. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal and, subsequently, her Oct. 13, 2004 Quisumbing, J.
record on appeal. Contending that pertinent pleadings were not included in
the record on appeal, private respondent objected to its admission. FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, for
Petitioner filed her compliance not by filing the amended record on appeal Specific Performance. They prayed that the Social Security System (SSS) be
but by attaching the omitted pages to be annexed or inserted to the ordered (1) to cancel the mortgage on the properties of the spouses; (2) to
original record on appeal which private respondent stressed in his release the documents covering the said properties; and (3) to pay the
opposition to compliance. The probate court directed the issuance of spouses moral damages. The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim
letters of administration in favor of private respondent. The CA dismissed alleging that the private respondents had an unpaid obligation. On motion
the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the probate courts of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses, respondent
Order. Petitioner argues that she has substantially complied with the judge issued an Order declaring petitioner in default and allowed private
probate courts order to submit an amended record on appeal and that she respondents to present their evidence ex-parte. The petitioner appealed
is entitled to the liberal application of the rules. the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals
by way of a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court and respondent Court of Appeals petition.
properly dismissed petitioners appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in declaring the
HELD: NO. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication petitioner in default.
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the
rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the HELD: YES. There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a declare a party-defendant as in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality conference. The declaration of default for nonappearance at a pre-trial
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. Aside
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the motion
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case to lift the order of default must further show that the defendant has a
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the

order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not accompanied reglementary period provided by law as it failed to state the date when
by affidavits of merits, it may properly be denied. A perusal of petitioners petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB. The appellate court
motion to lift order of default shows that it is neither under oath nor ruled that the issue of which administrative disciplinary authority had
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing. jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only for the first time
There was also no showing, save in the instant petition, that it has before it. He did not raise it before the SDHO nor before the NAB.
meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the
order of default set aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly denied petitioners ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate courts denial of the motion for
motion. Petition Denied. reconsideration was based on purely technical considerations.

Quiambao vs. CA HELD: NO. The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates
March 28, 2005 Tinga, J. such as the date when the resolution or order denying a motion for
reconsideration was received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
FACTS: Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along Capulong Street in Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43. But the scenario is not
Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin present in the case at bar for the aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition
Garais who left the house the day before. After having asked her neighbors filed with the appellate court reflected the date when petitioner actually
and bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a certain policeman received the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23
was looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the September 1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied
area as directed by the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by so as not to frustrate substantial justice that this Court seeks to achieve.
petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in being passive to
Police (PNP), Western Police District Command, and five (5) other persons. Catolicos surreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary
Quiambao and his companions forcibly took Catolicos handbag and carried documents of which petitioner was not furnished and to the latter's
away its contents consisting of precious assorted merchandise, jewelry and prejudice. Sad to say, the matter is a factual one which is outside the ambit
other personal items worth approximately Nine Thousand Pesos of this mode of review. Besides, this issue was not even raised in the
(P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner- motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals.
type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, Petition Denied.
while thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and warned her not
to look anymore for her housemaid. The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise Barcenas vs. Tomas
conducted an investigation on the charges filed. The Summary Dismissal March 31, 2005 Panganiban, J.
Hearing Officer (SDHO) recommended the dismissal of petitioner. The
National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. The Third Division of Petitioners are required by the Rules of Court to provide appellate courts
the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from with certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the
police service. The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state all subjects of review, as well as the material portions of the record. The
the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reason for such requirement is that these documents and pleadings are

needed by the reviewing courts in resolving whether to give due course to unwillingness of lower court personnel to provide the needed documents.
petitions. Hence, this requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored or No proof was adduced to validate these excuses, however. Unfortunately,
violated. Failure to comply with it hinders the review of cases on the petitioners have not given any reasonable justification for liberalizing the
merits, deprives the appellate courts of definitive bases for their actions, rules here. As pointed out earlier, because they had not moved for a
results in frustrating delays, and contributes havoc to the orderly reconsideration of the CA Resolution -- for which they cited no reason --
administration of justice. they were not able to show reasonable diligence in subsequently
complying with the requirements. They must be reminded that except for
FACTS: A case for recovery of ownership and possession of real property the most compelling grounds, procedural rules must be strictly complied
with damages was filed by Respondent Spouses Anastacio Tomas and with to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Petition Denied.
Candida Caliboso against the heirs of Veronica Tolentino. The Complaint
stated, among others, that after the death of her husband, Benedicto Daikoku Electronic Phils., Inc. vs. Alberto Raza
Guerzon, Veronica sold to respondents a one-hectare portion of her June 25, 2009 Velasco, Jr., J.
undivided share, the land was co-owned by her and her ten children.
Respondents took possession of the property immediately after the sale. FACTS: Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as company driver,
The couple migrated to the United States, leaving the lot in the possession eventually assigning him to serve as personal driver to its president,
of Victoriano Tomas, the husband’s brother. The heirs of Veronica executed Mamuro Ono (Ono, hereafter). By arrangement, Alberto, at the end of each
an Extrajudicial Partition covering the entire property. As a result, a new working day which usually starts early morning and ends late at night,
title was issued in the name of one of the heirs, Maximo Guerzon, who parks the car at an assigned slot outside of Onos place of residence.
wrested possession of the lot from Victoriano Tomas. Ruling that Alberto, after being let off by Ono, took the company vehicle to his own
respondents had the better right of possession and ownership of the land place also in Makati City. This incident did not go unnoticed, as Ono asked
in question, the MTC held that the sale of the one-hectare portion to them Alberto the following morning where he parked the car the night before. In
had sufficiently been established by the notarized document of sale and by response, Alberto said that he parked the car in the usual condominium
their continuous possession of the property. The RTC affirmed the decision parking area but at the wrong slot. Alberto received a show-cause notice
of the MTC. The CA dismissed the Petition for Review because of the why he should not be disciplined for dishonesty. A day after, Alberto
following procedural infirmities. submitted his written explanation of the incident, owning up to the lie he
told Ono and apologizing and expressing his regret for his mistake.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in giving evidentiary weight to Following an investigation, the investigation committee recommended that
the deed of sale. Alberto be suspended for 12 days without pay for the infraction of parking
the company vehicle at his residence and for deliberately lying about it. The
HELD: NO. Petitioners do not deny that the pertinent pleadings and committee considered Albertos voluntary admission of guilt and apology as
portions of the record in support of their allegations were not attached to mitigating circumstances. Daikoku’s general affairs manager, however, was
the Petition as required by Section 2(d) of Rule 42. They attribute this unmoved and ordered Alberto dismissed from the service. The labor
procedural lapse to personal shortcomings, as well as to the purported arbiter, on the finding that Albertos dismissal was predicated, among

others, on offenses he was neither apprised of nor charged with. The NLRC respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
reversed the decision of the LA and declared that complainant was validly binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the
dismissed from his employment. The appellate court rendered the assailed maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
decision dismissing Daikokus appeal as well as denying Albertos contempt demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
motion. thereof, no payment was made. In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of
cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which
ISSUE: Whether or not Daikoku timely filed its motion for reconsideration SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for
with the NLRC. lack or failure of consideration. The court promulgated its decision in favor
of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
HELD: NO. The relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any Petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through
valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and
must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the rules whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was
and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 36
would defeat the administration of substantive justice. Daikoku urges a less and 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the
rigid application of procedural rules to give way for the resolution of the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that
case on its merits. The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document
and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. The appellate court presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its
saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2, Rule 132 of the
the Court. Petition Denied. Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of
private documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner
Abrenica v. Gonda likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
XXXX evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues
that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34, Rule 132 of the
SCC vs. CA Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate
Feb. 28, 2001 Quisumbing, J. court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-
production of the originals of the documents presented in evidence allows
FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter
SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest ISSUE: Whether or not witness, whose personal knowledge of the
rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated.
balance of the principal upon nonpayment on the due date-January 12,
1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private

HELD: NO. The right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a written contract was proved, as also its record in the registry of
of a party to crossexamine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the plaintiffs in
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross- 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
examine the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take contents thereof. After such preliminary proof had been made, parol
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the evidence of the contents of the document was properly received. The
respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner appellant has moved for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party’s witness. It is evidence.
now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was ISSUE: Whether or not the new trial should be granted based in newly
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the discovered evidence.
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for
petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the HELD: NO. Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency to the showing of due
existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. diligence by the defendant, and as to the failure to procure the affidavits of
Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of the proffered witnesses, the motion must be denied on the ground that
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. Petition such evidence is not "of such a character as to probably change the result."
Partly Granted, the award of attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs bought the land from Don
deleted. Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would be immaterial.
Such evidence would merely strengthen the decision of the court. It would
Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn not overthrow it. What took place during the trial we do not know, but it is
Sept. 17, 1903 Willard, J. certain that evidence was introduced showing that the purchase was made
from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. We must presume that
FACTS: Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question from Don Pablo this was done without objection on the part of the defendant, for no
Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, when Don Miguel exceptions relating to the matter appear in the record. Judgement
Aldeguer, their grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four Affirmed.
children, the present plaintiffs. Don Manuel sold the land to one Martinez,
who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn. In the deed to Martinez, Don Tan Jr. v. CA
Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo XXXX
Garcia twenty-four years before. The court finds that this declaration was
the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any title to the land. Heirs of Simon v. Chua
The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from
parol evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don FACTS:
Pablo and Doña Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary  December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a
evidence was received on this point, but it is also stated that the existence Landbank Check dated December 26, 1996 worth P336,000.00

 December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.  DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts):
 After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct
MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the
 Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes
because there is already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. are different and non-interchangeable
22 - granted by the MeTC  In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to
 Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
the MeTC independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because  In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a
actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance
case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action of the bouncing check

HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC Montañez vs. Cipriano Oct. 22, 2012 Peralta, J.
 Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested FACTS: Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores, during the
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. A
 Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of petition for the Annulment of her (Lourdes) marriage with Socrates on the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC said that at the
and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983,
her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not
of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration
payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, of absolute nullity of the first marriage.
therefore, be brought to naught. However, there is no independent
civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, bigamy filed against respondent.
effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding HELD: YES. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by
allowed Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision

was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter. In Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint against petitioner for
other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage want of employer-employee relationship but ordering the Security Agency
with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning. to pay complainants the amounts sought by them. The Security Agency
However, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's appealed to the NLRC, which modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a holding that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally,
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared with the Security Agency on the ground that petitioner is an indirect
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at employer. Reconsideration sought by petitioner having been denied, this
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first certiorari petition was instituted contending that the NLRC erred in giving
marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of due course to the appeal despite the fact that it was not under oath and
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting. As far back as the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly and severally
1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration liable with the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively Motion for Reconsideration.
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal fee to the NLRC, being not paid is a fatal
acquired rights.” The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the defect.
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of HELD: NO. The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The not fatal defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise by requiring an oath. Payment of the appeal fee is "by no means a mere
from, procedural laws. Petition Granted. technicality but is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal."
However, where as in this case, the fee had been paid, unlike in the Acda
Del Rosario and Sons Logging Ent. Inc. vs. NLRC case, although payment was delayed, the broader interests of justice and
May 31, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J. the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits demanded
that the appeal be given course as, in fact, it was so given by the NLRC.
FACTS: Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a Besides, it was within the inherent power of the NLRC to have allowed the
"Contract of Services" with private respondent Calinar Security Agency late payment of the appeal fee. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee
(Security Agency, for short) whereby the latter undertook to supply the confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and
former with security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each such power must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal
guard. Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances. Judgement
against the Security Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of salary, Affirmed.
non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay. Petitioner
contended that complainants have no cause of action against it due to
absence of employer-employee relationship between them. The Labor

Sasan v. NLRC Certiorari

G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008 under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that
HI was alegitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate petitioners. Hence, the petition.
complaints against E-PCIBank andHI for illegal dismissal. In their position
papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E- ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is
PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, allowed in labor cases.
havingcontinuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the
bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and RULING:The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
performtheir jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because controlling inlabor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every
the latter had no power to do sosince they had become regular employees and all reasonable means toascertain the facts in each case speedily and
of E-PCIBank.For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
for Services with HI, an independent jobcontractor which hired and the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been
assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and held that
messengerialservices thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submi
an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing tted by the parties for the firsttime on appeal. The submission of additional
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could
was oneof its clients. On the basis of the parties’ position papers and submit counter-evidence.
documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not becausetechnical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases
possess therequired substantial capital or investment to actually perform
the job, work, or service under its ownaccount and responsibility as Ong Chia vs. Republic
required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor March 27, 2000 Mendoza, J.
andthe real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to
petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, FACTS: Petitioner was born on China. As a nine-year old boy, he arrived at
respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed thesame to the NLRC, 4th Division. the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed
The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his
into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. At the
time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged under the Revised Naturalization Law. During the hearings, petitioner
in "labor-only contracting."Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petitionfor corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.

Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court BSB Group Inc. vs. Go
whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness Feb. 16, 2010 Peralta, J.
against him. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the FACTS: The BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan).
known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and Bangayan, is Bangayan’s wife, who was employed in the company as a
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the
of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous payments made by the various customers of the company. Bangayan filed
incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the
evidence. The CA ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the
court and brought up for the first time on appeal. company’s coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her
personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
ISSUE: Whether or not the questions not presented in the lower court can (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. Upon a finding that the
be brought up for the first time on appeal in cases of Naturalization. evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor
recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against
HELD: YES. The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being respondent. On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her
a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the or records custodians of Security Bank’s Divisoria Branch, as well as of the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, Asian Savings Bank. Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank
the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not account. The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court.
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents. CA decision Affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative
of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded
by operation of R.A. No. 1405.

HELD: YES. The admission of testimonial and documentary evidence before the fire. In this connection it appears that forty-five cases of old
relative to respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi, P. I., were shipped to Manila before
than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount the fire, but instead of being taken directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia, they were
kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in
inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which which Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. had their offices. Moreover, a
is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent quantity of merchandise purchased from place shortly before the fire,
in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the instead of directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia; and it is the theory of the
controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court. In defendant that new merchandise purchased from Talambiras Brothers was
sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of substituted for the old stock in boxes from Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi,
respondents supposed bank account with Security Bank and the leaving the old goods to be deposited in the bodega to swell the debris of
documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support the fire. There is evidence also, which was credited by the court, to the
thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. effect that on various occasions before the fire goods were removed from
No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were received
appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of without invoice. Some of these goods were subsequently sent away by
respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents Abolafia for sale in the provinces. The trial court found that the proof
objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, submitted was false.
therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court. Petition
Denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the proof submitted was false.

Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. HELD: YES. The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff had
Feb. 21, 1929 Street, J. submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well
founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of
FACTS: Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered two proof, and with respect to at least two of these, we think that the
mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that
purpose of engaging in mercantile business. Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value
& Co., purchased a one-story building; and soon thereafter he begun to of P12,800 when the rule value of said jewellery was about P600; and,
assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which was the subject of secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance
insurance in this case. Nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out company the value of goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by
by Prats in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored. Prats it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two facts are
procured from the agent of the defendant in this case a policy of insurance. consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted
The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of fraudulent
manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at devices and false proof with respect to the loss. The practice of excluding
95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega evidence on doubtful objection to its materiality or technical objection to

the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the conditions, and circumstances.
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of ISSUE: Whether or not the lower Court committed a grave abuse of
the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence
the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat trial when the ruling was made.
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical HELD: YES. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of error without trial when the ruling was made. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this court is always very evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against
loath to take. Appealed Decision Affirmed. his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by
People vs. Yatco other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
Nov. 28, 1955 Reyes, J.B.L., J. evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as
such. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator
FACTS: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence")
still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this
of one Jose Ramos. Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. It is particularly
hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made
progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio.
of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extrajudicial Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its
general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove
was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances,
objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing,
could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not

reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence. The order excluding ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of respondents to file their position
the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the silence.
trial in accordance with law and this opinion.
HELD: NO. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Cormpososa probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain
Aug. 12, 2003 Panganian, J. pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers
to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute. of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply
FACTS: A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
[petitioners] against [respondents] before the MTC. The [C]omplaint Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because
alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor, he died they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief. Petition Denied.
leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren. Out of pity and for
humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to
occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his Calamba Steel Center Inc. v CIR
neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this GR 151857, April 28, 2005
case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people. Francisco Comorposa
left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the Facts:Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the steelblanks for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics
premises through petitioners tolerance. A formal demand was made upon inindustrial and household appliances.In it's amended Corporate Annual
the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 itdeclared a net taxable income of
same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00and tax due in the amount of
and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. The MTC rendered judgment in P3,311,559.00. It also reported uarterlypayments for the second and third
favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. According to the CA, respectively.It is the contention of the petitioner in this case filed in 1997,
respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land that it is entitledto a refund. The refund was purportedly due to income
of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, taxes witheld from it,and remitted in its behalf, by the witholding agents.
physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted Such witheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not utilised in
possession thereof since 1960. 1996 since due to it's income/losspositions for the three quarters of 1996.

the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.
ISSUE: Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyong the Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
taxableyear following that in which the tax credit arises. statement she executed and, as a consequence, they are demanding from
Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs
Held: Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it of Daniela. The RTC declared that the Deed of Absolute sale is null and
isentitled to such refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax void. Herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has
exemptionssuch must be construed strictissimi juris against the taypayer- decided the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the
claimant. Under the NIRC, the only limitation as regards the claiming of tax applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the
refunds is thatsuch must be made within two years. The claim for refund Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported
made by Calambasteel was well within the 2 year period. As regards the by and is even against the evidence on record.
procedure taken by counsel of Calamba Steel in submitting thefinal
adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been conducted, the Court ISSUE Whether or not the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and
saidthat although the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn
jurisprudencemandates that the proceedings before the tax court's shall Statement of Daniela.
not be governed bystrictly technical rules of evidence. Moreoover,
as regards evidence, thecourt further said that Judicial notice could have HELD: YES. The main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
been taken by the cA and theCTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true
by petitioner in another casethen pending with the CTA. intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents
Tating vs. Marcella evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
March 27, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J. weight to this document. There is no issue in the admissibility of the
subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should
FACTS: Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence
in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
name of Nena. The land remained in possession of Daniela. Daniela evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified
selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. The Court finds that both the trial

court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she
is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value
on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of
sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence,
a trust relationship was created between them. Petition Granted.