Assignment for June 9, 2018

1. Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. CA, 300 SCRA 20

2. Teague vs. Fernandez 51 SCRA 181

3. Cipriano vs. CA, 263 SCRA 711

4. Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.) Inc. Mar 31, 1966

5. Santiago vs. De leon CA-GR No.16180-R March 21, 1960

6, Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Baladan 91 Phil 488

7. Air France vs Carrascoso, L21438, Sept. 28, 1996

8. Ramos vs. CA, GR No.124354, December 29, 1999

9. Ramos vs. CA GR No 124354, April 11, 2002

10. Valenzuela vs. CA 253 SCRA 303

11. Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co., GR No. 15688, Nov. 19,
1921

12. Allied Banking Corp vs. CA, 1989

1
 The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes
Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place;
(3) shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)
Teague vs. Fernandez injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is
argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability
Subject: Torts and Damages
since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes injury complained of. According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and
stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
FACTS: violation of the ordinance.”
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence
two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard
and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was owned and operated by Teague. The HELD:
said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width,
was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it
it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders
was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a
and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen,
Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, stairway available.
tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The
“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened,
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi
was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.”
Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including
To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and
does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate
several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased’s five
to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that
brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague
it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there
as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.
be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by
CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This
finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section
491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The
alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey
of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two
of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the
building had a second stairway under construction.

2
CIPRIANO VS COURT OF APPEALS (1996)

6 Feb 2018

ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES Africa vs. Caltex

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 107968; October 30, 1996] Obligations and Contracts| Fortuitous
Events|
FACTS:
Elias S. Cipriano is a business owner engaged in rustproofing of vehicles.
Private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a
1990 model Kia Pride car to petitioner’s shop for rustproofing. Sometime in
1991, a fire broke out and spread adjoining to petitioner’s rustproofing shop.
The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private
respondent’s Kia Pride. Private respondent then sent a letter to petitioner,
demanding reimbursement for the value of the car. In reply, petitioner denied
liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event.
Private respondent filed a suit for the value of car and for damages citing that
the vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner
due to its failure to register his business with the DTI under P.D. No. 1572 and
to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s failure to insure his business and vehicles constituted
negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured
against.
HELD:
Yes. The answer is affirmative.
Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. Petitioner’s negligence is the
source of his obligation. He is held liable for for his negligence in not complying
with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss
occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was
petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate
cause of the loss. There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it
is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty or negligence
rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this
case may be considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt
petitioner from liability for loss.
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service
station at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among
them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex
Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent in
charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the
petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their
employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the
part of the respondents.
Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks
for itself.” For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites
should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate
cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen.
Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.

3
Santiago vs. De Leon CA-G.R. No. 16180-R, March 21, 1960]

Conduct which might otherwise be considered contributory negligence may Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)
not be so considered where a person is injured in attempting to save others
from imminent danger of personal injury or death even though in attempting
such rescue he thereby imperils his own life. In determining whether one FACTS:
making or attempting such rescue exercised ordinary care, all the surrounding Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
circumstances are to be considered including the existing emergency, the left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
alarm, excitement and confusion usually present, the uncertainty as to the On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
means to be employed, the necessity for immediate action, and the liability to Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
err in the choice of the best course of action to pursue. ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first
class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
Requisites to make a tortfeasor liable to the rescuer: 1. vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
2. 3. 4. alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class"
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
The tortfeasor was negligent to the person rescued and such negligence Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some
caused peril or the appearance of peril to the person rescued. The peril or commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
appearance of peril was imminent. A reasonable prudent person who would
have concluded such peril or appearance of peril existent. The rescuer acted DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
with reasonable care in effectuating the rescue. 1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
II. P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with
3. 4. interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid;
plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
If he reports the accident to the nearest officer of the law; or III. If he has to 2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
summon a physician or nurse to aid the victim.” Individuals who are required P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
by law to take care another person. E.g. parents to their children. Defendant respects", with costs against petitioner.
in special relationships. E.g. Common carriers to their passengers. Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto
has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad

4
faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier
— a case ofquasi-delict. Damages are proper.
RAMOS VC. CA
facts: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-
year old robust woman. Except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to
pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as
normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), she has three children
whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of the
discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sough
professional advice. She was told to undergo an operation for the removal of
a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which
revealed that she was fit for the said surgery. Through the intercession of a
mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for the first time and she
was advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy
and the same was agreed to be scheduled on June 17,1985 at 9:00am at the
Delos Santos Medical Center. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist to which the latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled
operation, she was admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation,
Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr. Osaka arrived at
the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina
when Herminda heard her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and there
were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call to another
anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully intubated Erlina. The patient’s
nails became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.
After the operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to lack
of oxygen supply to Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.
Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages
against petitioner for the result to Erlinda of the said operation.
Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption
of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate case of her piteous condition.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically follow that it apply to all cases
of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa
liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between
the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual
and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment.
Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are responsible for 1/3 of
deaths and serious injuries associated with anesthesia. Nevertheless, 98% or
the vast majority of difficult intubation may be anticipated by performing a
thorough evaluation of the patient’s airway prior to the operation. As stated
beforehand, respondent, Dra. Guttierez failed to observe the proper pre-
operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had
appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the pre-operative
evaluation, respondent physician could have been more prepared to meet the
contingency brought about by the perceived atomic variations in the patient’s
neck and oral area; defects which could have been easily overcome by a prior
knowledge of those variations together with a change in technique. In other
words, an experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough
pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short
5
neck and potruding teeth. Having failed to observe common medical
standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra.
Guttierez negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
Rodrigueza vs. Manila Electric Railroad
The house of the plaintiff was razed by fire because of the sparks emitted by
one of the trains of defendant railroad company. The fire started in one house
and wind caused fire to transfer to another house until it reached plaintiff’s
property. The wind was not an intervening cause because it was already in
operation at the time the negligent act of the defendant was performed.
However, even if the wind was not yet operating, the same cannot be
considered an efficient intervening cause because the wind did not break the
chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant and the resulting
damage to the plaintiff.
Foreseeable intervening cause The rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that
foreseeable intervening causes cannot be considered sufficient intervening
causes. Because there is an opportunity to guard against it. In the above-
discussed Rodrigueza case, even if the wind was not yet operating at the time
the negligent act was committed, the same cannot be considered an efficient
intervening cause because it was a foreseeable intervening cause. The wind
may be considered a “common recurrent feature of the environment.” If the
intervening cause is a recurrent feature of the environment, they cannot be
considered efficient because they are foreseeable. i.
A tortfeasor is liable for the consequence of negligence, mistake, or lack of
skill of a physician or surgeon whose treatment aggravated the original injury.
The same is considered a normal and foreseeable risk. The rule is based on
the reasoning that the additional harm is either: (1) a part of the original injury,
(2) the natural and probable consequences of the tortfeasor’s original
negligence or (3) the normal incidence of medical care necessitated by the
tortfeasor’s original negligence.
Test of the sufficiency of an intervening cause to defeat recovery for
negligence: i.
It must be new and independent, not under the control of the original
wrongdoer, or one which by the exercise of reasonable foresight and
diligence, he should have anticipated and guarded against it. It must break the
continuity of causal connection between the original negligent act or omission.
The injury so that the former cannot be said to have been the efficient cause
of the latter.
i.e. If A throws a hot object to B who in turn threw it to C, there is an intervening
cause in the absence of which the C would not have been injured.
Nevertheless, A is liable because he had wrongfully set in motion a force
which continued to operate until it cause the injury. If A had thrown the object
in a
Medical treatment as intervening cause
There will only be an efficient intervening cause where the original tortfeasor
is not liable if the injured failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the
services of a competent physician or surgeon. ii.
Unforeseen and unexpected act or cause
Africa vs. Caltex The defendant argued that the fire in the gasoline station
which occurred while gasoline was being unloaded was caused through the
acts of astranger who, without authority, or permission of answering
defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted
match in the premises. The Supreme Court ruled that no evidence on this
point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true it does not
extenuate defendant’s negligence. The Supreme Court adopted the view that
“if the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously
operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent,
tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
does not protect the actor from liability. Stated in another way, the intervention
of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a
wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and
proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.’’
An unforseen and unexpected act of a third person may not therefore be
considered efficient intervening cause if it is duplicative in nature or if it merely
aggravated the injury that resulted because of a priorcause.