Power of appointment

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Constitutional Ban on "Midnight Appointments"
The 1987 Constitution expressly commands the President:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
In January, 2010, Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas opined that anyone accepting an unconstitutional appointment would be an
accomplice in the act and be liable for impeachment, as indeed Renato Corona has found himself to be, impeached and presently on trial in
the Senate, after PGMA appointed him Chief Justice just two days before the 2010 May elections.

Bernas' point is crystal clear: Renato Corona in this case has committed a culpable violation of the Constitution by accepting a clearly
unconstitutional appointment from President Gloria Arroyo right smack in the middle of the period during which a Constitutional ban exists
on such "midnight appointments."
Removal Power
1. Removal Power Generally
The President has unfettered, exclusive power to remove his appointees without approval from the legislature. This includes both high-
ranking officials who act as his “alter ego” and executive officers engaged in other normal duties. Such absolute removal power is a
necessary outgrowth of Article II’s grant to the President of general administrative control of those who execute the law.

2. Limitations
The President’s absolute power of removal over government officials is restricted to those whose positions are units of, and subordinate to,
the executive department. This removal power does not extend to officials in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, such as
administrative bodies created by Congress to carry out a statute’s legislative policies. Congress alone holds control over these agencies. This
control includes the power to fix terms of office and conditions for removal.
B. The Power to Pardon
The President has unlimited pardoning power that may be exercised at any time before, during, or after legal proceedings. The power
includes the authority to grant relief from criminal contempt penalties. A pardon is valid even if the one pardoned has not been indicted or
convicted.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587 (Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and Acting Appointments)

Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an
acting capacity. Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can
be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity
to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and
laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him
by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other
cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session.

Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office
for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the
President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter
ego. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.
Fact:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He was designated as general Manager
by the Chairman of the PTA Board. In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his designation
is invalid because it was not her, the President, who appointed him as what is required by PD No. 564. As such, he will remain in the
position until the President appoints a person to serve in a permanent capacity.

Held:
Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, the appointment results in security of tenure.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in
nature. The implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
Matibag vs Benipayo G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet
Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law Department 17against Benipayo, alleging that
her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During the pendency of her
complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the
President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President. the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC. unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. . To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office
will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to
extend ad interim appointments. subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Bautista. Yorac34 and Solicitor General
Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Benipayo.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo.In the instant case. While the Constitution
mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. during
the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. to make appointments that take effect immediately. This is contrary to the rule on
statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law.
PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT; CONFIRMATION BY COA
ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003
Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval
Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the
law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s
suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the
President, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on
May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition
to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence
from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment
of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of
the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to
the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The
fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary,
the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional principle of
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to
prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers. Contrary to the
implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of
removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with
constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the
Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that
Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Power of Control and Supervision
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

Doctrine of qualified political agency

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are
presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him.14 Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision
of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the
said secretary.
Executive departments and offices
DAR, DA, DBM, DepEd, DOE, DOF, DFA, DOH, DILG, DOJ, DOLE, DPWH, DOST, DSWD, DOT, DTI, DOTr
Local government units
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939
FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena,
mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad
unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in
which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary injunction against
the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power to order investigation, it was
provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction.
This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over
administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order investigation
because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and effective.”However, unlike this
power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the
Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power
of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to
suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the
law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are assistants and
agents of the President.
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President
as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in
excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The
additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received
in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the
power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of
control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended
or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary
to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
Military powers (Scope of pres military power)
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent
in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. .
.,― and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care"
power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to
take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces
to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17,
Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected
with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes.
PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that
a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the
time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President
is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by
the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control
the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief.
The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to
require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
sanlakas vs executive secretary 159085
Facts: In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in
Makati demanding for the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation 427 dated 27
July 2003, state of rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. The soldiers
returned to barracks on the same night and the declaration of state of rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No
435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces. Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of
a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration.

Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare General order No 4?

Decision: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has rendered the case moot.

Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is one such
case. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with
more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The presidential issuances themselves
call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces,
it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in
violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in
the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Lacson vs Perez GR No 147780 10 May 2001
Facts: On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. On 06 May
2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners, Panfilo Lacson, Cezar Mancao and
Michael Rey Aquino filed with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
and Miriam Santiago filed mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order. The petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact an in law.

Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No 38 and General Order No 1 are constitutional.

Decision: Petitions are dismissed. The instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a state of rebellion on 06 May 2001.
Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION
(En Banc)

ABAD, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her
report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days
later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and
academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and
academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions
that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the
joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just
eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government
units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress.
No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that
the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the
rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it
having become moot and academic.
AMPATUAN v. PUNO
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She
directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared
unconstitutional.

The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject
places. It is pursuant to her “calling out” power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely
on her wisdom.

The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not
act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.

ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment.
Pardoning Power
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
THE PARDONING POWER
The President with his pardoning power may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment. The President may also grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Definitions
A pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime
he has committed.
A parole is when a prisoner is released from imprisonment but his liberty is not fully restored because the parolee is still considered in the
custody of the law although he is not in confinement.
A commutation is a reduction or mitigation of the penalty, e.g., when the death sentence is reduced to life imprisonment.
A reprieve is merely a postponement of a sentence to a date certain, or a stay of execution. It may be ordered to enable the government to
secure additional evidence to ascertain the guilt of the convict or, in the case of the execution of the death sentence upon a pregrant
woman, to prevent the killing of her unborn child.
An amnesty is an act of grace given with the concurrence of Congress. It is usually extended to groups of persons who committed political
offenses and it abolishes the offense itself.

Kinds of Pardon
Pardon may be classified into
absolute or conditional; and
plenary or partial.
An absolute pardon is one given without any conditions attached. Whereas, a conditional pardon is one under which the convict is required
to comply with certain requirements. In conditional pardon, the offender has the right to reject the pardon if he feels that the conditions
imposed are more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. On the other hand, in case of absolute pardon, it is complied even
without the acceptance of the pardonee.

A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas a partial pardon does
not.

Limitations
It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment.
It cannot be granted in cases of violations of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections.
It can be granted only after conviction of final judgment.
It cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt.
It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.
It cannot restore public offices forfeited.
forms of executive clemency ph
(Note: Executive Clemency is the power of the President in criminal cases and in state convictions to pardon a person convicted of a crime,
commute the sentence (shorten it, often to time already served) or reduce it from death to another lesser sentence. There are many
reasons for exercising this power including real doubts about the guilt of the party, apparent excessive sentence, humanitarian concerns
such as illness or an aged inmate, to clear the record of some who has demonstrated rehabilitation or public service or because the party is
a political or personal friend of the President. (This definition is lifted from Federal law interpretation which Philippine laws reckon.)

*****

Prisoners need not lose hope. The rule on the issuance of executive clemency has been amended to define in clear terms how a person
serving time will eventually be released.

Under the new amended rules made by the Board of Pardons and Parole, inmates who suffer from serious, contagious, or life threatening
illness or disease and those prisoners with severe disability can now be recommended for executive clemency.

Based on the amended guidelines under the extraordinary circumstances, an inmate suffering from serious, contagious or life threatening
disease ,or with severe physical disability such as those who are totally blind, paralyzed or bedridden can be subject for recommendation
for executive clemency.

However, the condition of the inmate should be certified “under oath” by a physician of the Bureau of Corrections Hospital and likewise
certified under oath by a physician designated by the Department of Health (DOH).

Under the same guidelines on extraordinary circumstances, the Board shall also recommend to the President the grant of executive
clemency when any of the following extraordinary circumstances are present:

• The trial court or appellate court in its decision recommended the grant of executive clemency for the inmate;
• Evidence which the court failed to consider, before conviction, which would have just justified an acquittal of the accused;
• Alien inmates where diplomatic considerations and amity among nations necessitates review; and
• Such other similar or analogous circumstances whenever the interest of justice will be served thereby.
In such case none of the extraordinary circumstances enumerated the Board may review or recommend to the President the grant of
executive clemency to an inmate provided the inmate meets the following minimum requirements of imprisonment.
For commutation of sentence the inmate should have served:
• At least one – third of the definite or aggregate prison terms;
• At least one-half of the minimum of the indeterminate prison term or aggregate minimum of the indeterminate prison terms;

• At least 10 years for inmates sentenced to one reclusion perpetua or one life imprisonment, for crimes/offenses not punished under
Republic Act No. 7659 and other special laws;
• At least 13 years for inmates whose indeterminate and /or definite prison terms were adjusted to a definite prison term of 40 years in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code as amended;

• At least 15 years for inmates convicted of heinous crimes as defined in RA 7659or other special laws, committed on or after January 1,
1994 and sentenced to one reclusion pepetua or one life imprisonment;

• At least 18 years for inmates convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment for violation of RA 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” or RA 9165 known as “The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002”; and for
kidnapping for ransom or violation of the laws on terrorism, plunder and transnational crimes;

• At least 20 years for inmates sentenced to two or more reclusion perpetua even if their sentences were adjusted to a definite prison term
of forty years in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

• At least 25 years for inmates originally sentenced to death penalty but which was automatically reduced or commuted to reclusion
perpetua.( As amended by Board Resolution No. 24-4-10 dated April 13, 2010.)

For Conditional Pardon, an inmate should have served at least one-half of the maximum of the original indeterminate and /or definite
prison term. (As amended by Board Resolution No. 24-4-10 dated April 13, 2010.)

Stated in the same guidelines that “Compliance with the above – mentioned periods of imprisonment shall be without prejudice to the
results of publication, community interview, pre-executive clemency investigation report, institutional conduct, NBI records check,
psychological test, notices, comments from the victim or victim’s relatives, court certifications of the non-existence of any record of
pending appeal or case, and other pertinent documents and factors.”
Diplomatic power
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.
Senate concurrence with treaties and international agreements
Treaties and executive agreements
The Constitution seems to have no room for so-called executive agreements that the President, in behalf of our Republic, can enter into
with other States without need of Senate concurrence. In fact, it requires that all “treaties and international agreements” —apparently
covering the entire gamut of State-to-State accords. We are told, though, by commentators like Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, that when the
Constitutional Commission debated this portion of the draft, the commissioners seemed to agree that it was “understood” that the
President retained the right, in accordance with constitutional tradition—inherited no doubt from the United States—to enter into
executive agreements that needed no concurrence by the Senate. In the case of the United Kingdom that has no written charter, the
“British Constitution” refers in large measure to “constitutional institutions and traditions.” Apparently, executive agreements fall into
this category—or something analogous to it—insofar as Philippine constitutional tradition is concerned. But if we are to heed the salutary
precept that it is not the vagaries of often-inconclusive debates at the time the Constitution was crafted that control but the text of the
fundamental law, then there really seems to be very little reason to adhere to this “tradition”, its US provenance notwithstanding.

One reason of course that the courts loathe abandoning the tradition is the fact that the Constitution apportions governmental power in
such wise as to leave to the president the conduct of foreign relations, and it would make of the president a most inept agent for foreign
negotiations were he to be completely bereft of the power to enter into agreements that were binding. But there is equally good reason
for the long-standing rule that treaties never enter into force in the Philippines (as in many other jurisdictions) without the concurrence
(many times wrongly called “ratification”) of Senate. Two reasons are more recently advanced. First, Senate concurrence is a necessary
check on the exercise of presidential power. Second, since treaties, once in force, have the force of statutes, the President would in effect
enjoy the power to write law where he is free to enter into treaties that would bind us without the participation of the Legislature.

But what, exactly, is appropriate subject matter for treaties in contrast to what may lawfully be the subject of executive agreements? The
Edca decision of the Supreme Court was a chance to clarify the distinction, but comments that have thus far come my way have centered
on the desirability of American’s proximity at a time that China, the bully, throws its weight around in the West Philippine Sea and creates
waves more monstrous than tsunamis. When the Supreme Court passed on the Visiting Forces Agreement, it noted that in the Untied
States, most agreements were effected through executive agreements, not treaties. That is the reason that the Supreme Court allowed the
VFA to pass scrutiny, even if the 1987 Constitution requires that the agreement be embodied in a treaty. This requirement, the Court
construed to mean: “embodied in an instrument that has the force of a treaty” —its divergent nomenclature notwithstanding!

But our Supreme Court, in past decisions, quite rightly, to my mind, drew the line in holding that executive agreements could do without
Senate concurrence only if they were pursuant to, in consonance with or in implementation of treaties already ratified to which Senate has
given its concurrence, or in compliance with statutory requirements. The logic is not difficult to follow: Where an executive agreement
follows upon a treaty or a statute and is forged pursuant to it, then there is no breaking of new ground, no covering of matters not earlier
passed upon by Senate or by the Legislature in whole. But where an agreement purports to be in consequence of a treaty but actually
brings about a re-alignment of right and obligations, has not the divide between proper subject matter for a treaty and that of an executive
agreement been crossed?

Matters become considerably more testy when dealing with foreign military bases, the presence of foreign troops or the installation of
materiel. Following the acrimonious debates over the issue of military bases in the Philippines and the narrow defeat of the measure in the
Senate, and the anti-American sentiment that has, on occasion, surfaced rather powerfully in our country, the Constitution has a special
provision on agreements covering these subjects: requiring Senate concurrence, determining the instrument that both governments are to
use, and subjecting the proposal, if deemed necessary by Congress, to a referendum. All the more reason then to be parsimonious about
what we are willing to consign to the domain of executive agreements that can do without Senate concurrence!

The debate over the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold Edca will continue for some time to come. There will be side issues— “side” in
relation to constitutional law, but of the essence in relation to Philippine security interests—such as the bullying of China and its arrant
encroachments in disputed marine areas. But if anything at all, the Court’s decision—as well as the discourse it has provoked —
underscores the fundamental inadequacy of a formalistic approach to the fundamental law of the land.
Treaty or executive agreement?
MANILA, Philippines–What is the main legal question regarding the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Edca)?

What will be debated Tuesday in the Supreme Court is whether the Edca is a treaty or an executive agreement. Both of these bind the
Philippine government in its dealings with other governments, but each has different constitutional requirements to become valid. The
Philippines has signed the Edca merely as an executive agreement, but the petitioners before the Supreme Court have challenged this.

The Supreme Court has long held that under international law, executive agreements and treaties are practically the same in their ability to
bind the Philippine government to an agreement with another government. “[T]here is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned,” the court said.

A treaty needs the concurrence of the Senate in order to be valid while an executive agreement needs only the signature of the President
or his representative without need of Senate concurrence. The Edca was signed by Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and wasn’t
submitted for Senate ratification.

The Constitution says: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.” However, the Supreme Court has explained that “executive agreements” are not subject to that requirement.
“Treaties are formal documents which require ratification by the Senate, while executive agreements become binding through executive
action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.”

A full-fledged treaty is required only when an agreement involves changes in Philippine national policy, and the agreement must therefore
be submitted to the Senate for ratification. On the other hand, when an agreement merely implements already existing treaty obligations,
laws or policy, an executive agreement will suffice.
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki
in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
“milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and
growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as
removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last
November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and
trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the
Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader
national development concerns.

Issues:

1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and
as members of the Congress

2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full
public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G.
Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus
the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court
lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in
the course of the negotiations.

The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing
these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.”

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally
involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain
more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware that behind the
dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a
zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to
veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.”
Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer
Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela,
Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo
Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon,
Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-
US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel,
headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines
in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for
brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its
concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII,
the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal
controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs
purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes
and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred
to it by law.
Powers relative to appropriastion measures
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.
Delegated powers (arts VII sec 23 and sec 28)
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.

ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Definition of Legislative Power:

The authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them.

Classification of legislative power: (O De CO)

Original – Possessed by the people in their sovereign capacity
Delegated – Possessed by Congress and other legislative bodies by virtue of the Constitution
Constituent – The power to amend or revise the Constitution
Ordinary – The power to pass ordinary laws
Note:

The original legislative power of the people is exercised via initiative and referendum. In this manner, people can directly propose and
enact laws, or approve or reject any act or law passed by Congress or a local government unit.

Limits on the legislative power of Congress:

Substantive – limitations on the content of laws. E.g. no law shall be passed establishing a state religion.
Procedural – limitations on the manner of passing laws. E.g. generally a bill must go through three readings on three separate days.
Note:

Provided that these two limitations are not exceeded, Congress’ legislative power is plenary.

Corollaries of legislative power:

Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. Since Congress’ powers are plenary, and limited only by the Constitution, any attempt to limit the
powers of future Congresses via an irrepealable law is not allowed.
Congress, as a general rule, cannot delegate its legislative power. Since the people have already delegated legislative power to Congress,
the latter cannot delegate it any further.
EXCEPTIONS:

Delegation of legislative power to local government units;

Instances when the Constitution itself allows for such delegation [see Art. VI Sec. 23(2)]
What may Congress delegate:
Congress can only delegate, usually to administrative agencies, RULE-MAKING POWER or LAW EXECUTION. This involves either of two tasks
for the administrative agencies:
“Filling up the details” on an otherwise complete statute; or
Ascertaining the facts necessary to bring a “contingent” law or provision into actual operation.
Veto powers art VII sec 27
The power of the President to refuse to approve a bill or joint resolution and thus prevent its enactment into law is the veto. The President
has ten days (excluding Sundays) to sign a bill passed by Congress.
The President of the Philippines may refuse to sign a bill, sending the bill back to the house where it originated along with his objections.
Congress can override the veto via a two-thirds vote with both houses voting separately, after which the bill becomes law.
residual powers) (law) Power that is retained by the government after other powers were distributed to other authorities in the course of
elections or by the process of delegation.
As declared by the Supreme Court, the residual power it is the power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It may also be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. (Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668)
Suarez (2015) cited Hyman where the latter advanced the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable and is best lodged
in the President.
This power has been further enunciated by the Supreme Court where it stated that “The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive.” Thus, the Executive Department is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. (Biraogo et al. vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010).
As Nolledo (1993) explains: “The President is enjoined to do justice to every man. The President must consecrate himself to the service of
the Nation. He holds the highest position within the gift of his people, the latter trusting that he is offering himself to the service of the
whole nation, not to the service of himself or those close to him. In no case must the President violate the sacred duties of being the Head
of State and Government. His service belongs to the people. He holds the highest and exalted position of the land as a trust. If he
becomes unworthy of that trust, he must resign because he becomes a disgrace to the presidency.”
In the exercise of the power to enforce and administer laws, the President of the Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority. This
corresponding awesome responsibility makes him the most influential person in the land. In the hands of a Magsaysay or Quezon, it can be
an instrument to uplift a common man; in the hands of a Marcos, it can deprave and pervert it into a bludgeon of oppression. Indeed, the
impact of the Presidency upon the nation is tremendous. (Cruz, 1991).
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about
to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The
phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices
(Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
(Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Prohibitions, Inhibitions and Disqualifications of the Pres, VP and Official Family
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
[ G. R. NO. 156982, SEPTEMBER 08, 2004 ]
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, DIRECTOR IV, NCR, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, AND ERNESTO C. EULALIA, RESIDENT AUDITOR, NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION. RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
 Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos
through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to
their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia
disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June
27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members

RULING: The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex
officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of
additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
Rules on Succession (Art VII, Secs 7-12)

Judicial Department
The Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Under the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, it is vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed
six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a
judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no
part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by
all lower collegiate courts.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts,
and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall
forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall
state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.

The President is given the so-called calling out power which is a discretionary power solely vested in him. Generally, the courts cannot
inquire in this and substitute it for its own decision since this is a political question. But if it can be shown that there is a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the President, it will be subject to judicial review. This is now the effect of the expanded power of the judiciary.
"political question" doctrine arising from the principle of separation of powers, the Judicial Branch cannot decide questions "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government" (Tañada vs. Cuenco 103
Phil.1068). In the matter of the power of appointment, there is no question that it is executive in nature (Gov’t vs. Springer 50 Phil.
259). It is essentially a discretionary power of the president performed according to "his best lights". (Luego vs. CSC 143 SCRA 327). The
selection of the appointee–taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality – is the prerogative and a matter addressed solely to the discretion of the appointing authority (Lapinid vs. CSC 197 SCRA
106). Thus both the Luego and Lapinid cases categorically declare that "this is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide".
Call it the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial restraint, which limits the judges’ exercise of their own decisions based on stare decisis or
existing laws, as opposed to judicial activism, whose judicial rulings are suspected of being based on personal or political considerations
rather than on existing laws.
Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that
any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in
R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts
which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.
Judicial review - a formal legal investigation conducted into a matter of public concern by a judge, appointed by the government.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most
number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the
victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec.
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission
denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's
protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission
as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
Symbolic – to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of grave public importance for the
guidance of and restraint upon the future (Igot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L‐352245, Jan. 22, 1980)
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
J. Cruz

Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for
violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of
this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner
the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by
the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due process clause, however, the wording was
ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances.
There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on
human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal
offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This
power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies with the existence of a lawful
method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to
correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in
the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to
him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

RTC’s Ruling:

1. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it
vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true
copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Court’s Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What he found only was that it
was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done. Supervision sees to it that the rules
are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions (2) non-compliance with
prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.
Operative Fact Doctrine
League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the
subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad
rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue
set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because
RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and
not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a
city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in
the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Requisites of Judicial Review
Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable
action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been
or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR
were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the
creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to
enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
See page 6
IBP vs. Zamora
See page 9
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed
seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait
by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the
government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court
consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was moot because the service
contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case.” Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention
the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the
particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals,
through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or
other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that
the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional
constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to
be signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not
reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which
generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the
exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the
seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS
area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in
that area. Id., p. 34.
Safeguards of Judicial Independence
following are the constitutional safeguards to maintain judicial independence:
1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and cannot be abolished by mere legislation.
2) The members of the Supreme Court cannot be removed except by impeachment.
3) The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its minimum jurisdiction prescribed in Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.
4) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law without its advice and concurrence.
5) Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
6) The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel.
7) The Supreme Court has exclusive power to discipline Judges of lower courts.
8) The Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the Judiciary.
9) Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency performing quasi-Judicial or administrative functions.
10) The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be decreased during their continuance in office.
11) The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.
12) The Supreme Court has exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure.
13) Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to other stations.
14) It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed. (pp. 229-31.)
Political Law Bar Question 2000.
Judicial restraint
Judicial restraint is a theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges to limit the exercise of their own power. It asserts that judges
should hesitate to strike down laws unless they are obviously unconstitutional, though what counts as obviously unconstitutional is itself a
matter of some debate.
Appointments to the Judiciary
By virtue of Article VIII, Section 8, appointments to the judiciary are made by the President of the Philippines based on a list submitted by
the Judicial and Bar Council which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Its principal function is to screen prospective appointees
to any judicial post. It is composed of the chief justice as ex-officio chairman, the Secretary of Justice and representatives of Congress as ex-
officio members, and a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court and a
representative of the private sector as members.
RULES OF THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
SC-Chief Justice
1. CTA
2. Sandiganbayan
3. Court of Appelas
a. RTC - Metro TC - Muni TC in Cities - Muni TC – Muni Circuiy Trial Courts
b. Shari’a District Courts – Sharia’s Circuit Courts

RULE 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT
Sec. 1. Qualifications applicable to all Members of the Judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies.- (a) No person may be appointed
Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court or as Ombudsman or deputy Ombudsman unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines ( Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 7, par. 1; Id., Art. XI, Section 8). chan robles virtual law library.
(b) No person may be appointed judge of any court lower than a collegiate court unless he is a citizen of the Philippines ( Constitution, Art.
VIII, Section 7, par. 2).cralaw
(c) A Member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence (id., id., par. 3) and a member of. the
Philippine Bar (id., id., par. 2).cralaw
Sec. 2. Additional qualifications for Members of the Supreme Court. - No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless
he is at least forty years of age and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines. (id., Id., par 1).cralaw
Sec. 3. Additional qualifications of Members of the Court of Appeals. - No person shall be appointed as Member of the Court of Appeals
unless he possesses the same qualifications as those prescribed for Members of the Supreme Court. ( B.P. Big. 129, Section 7 ).cralaw
Sec. 4. Additional qualifications of Members of the Sandiganbayan. - No person shall be appointed as Member of the Sandiganbayan unless
he is at least forty years of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or has been engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period. (P.D. 1606, as amended, Section
1).cralaw
Sec. 5. Additional qualifications of Ombudsman and his deputies. - The Ombudsman and his deputies must be, at the time of their
appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, a member of the Philippine Bar, must have been for ten
years a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, and must not have been a candidate for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election ( Constitution, Art. XI, Section 8). chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 6. Additional qualifications of Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals. - Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals shall have the same
qualifications as Members of the Supreme Court (R.A. No. 1125, Section 1, in relation to C.A. No. 103, Section 1).
Sec. 7. Additional qualifications of Judges of the Regional Trial Courts. - No person shall be appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court
unless he is at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held
a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. ( B.P. Big. 129, Section 15 ).cralaw
Sec. 8. Additional qualifications of judges of courts of the first level. -No person shall be appointed judge of courts of the first level
(Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court) unless he is at least thirty years
of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. ( B.P. Blg. 129, Section 26 ).cralaw
Sec. 9. Additional qualifications of judges of Shari’a courts.- In addition to the qualifications for Members of Regional Trial Courts, a judge of
the Shari’a District Court must be learned in the Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. ( P.D. No. 1083, Article 140 ).cralaw
No person shall be appointed judge of the Shari’a Circuit Court unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, and has passed an examination
in the Shari’a and Islamic Jurisprudence to be given by the Supreme Court for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to
practice in the Shari’a courts. (id., Article 152 ).
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
See Page 3
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Constitution of the Philippines vests judicial power in one Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. [Section
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

The Supreme Court is composed of one Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices, all of whom are appointed by the President from a list
of recommendees presented by the Judicial and Bar Council.

The members of the Supreme Court serve during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 or unless removed by impeachment for any
of the grounds provided by the Constitution.

The Court sits either en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 5440

AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS NINE AND SEVENTEEN OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1948.

Section 1. Section nine of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 9. The Supreme Court; quorum of the court; designation of Justices of the Court of Appeals and District Judges to sit in the Supreme
Court; number of Justices necessary to reach a decision. The Supreme Court of the Philippines shall consist of a Chief Justice and ten
Associates Justices, which shall sit in banc in the hearing and determination of all cases within its jurisdiction. The presence of six Justices
shall be necessary to constitute a quorum except when the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, in which case the
presence of eight Justices shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of a quorum, the Court shall stand ipso facto adjourned
until such time as the requisite number shall be present, and a memorandum showing this fact shall be inserted by the clerk in the minutes
of the court.

"If on account of illness, absence, or incapacity upon any of the grounds mentioned in Section one, Rule One hundred and thirty-seven of
the Rules of Court, of any of the Justices of the Supreme Court, or whenever, by reason of temporary disability of any Justice thereof, or
vacancies occurring therein, the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render a judgment in any given case,
as heretofore provided, is not present, the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice, may designate such
number of Justices of the Court of Appeals or District Judges as may be necessary, to sit temporarily as Justices of the Supreme Court in
order to form a quorum, or until a judgment in said case is reached: Provided, however, That no Justice of the Court of Appeals or District
Judge may be designated to act in any case in the decision of which he has taken part.

"The concurrence of at least six Justices of the Court shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. However, for the purpose of
declaring a law of a treaty unconstitutional, at least eight Justices must concur. When the necessary majority, as herein provided, to declare
a law or a treaty unconstitutional cannot be had, the Court shall so declare, and in such case the validity or constitutionality of the Act or
treaty involved shall be deemed upheld.

"Whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by eight Justices of the Court. When
eight Justices fail to reach a decision as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
imposed."

Section 2. Section seventeen of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Court of Appeals.

"In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance:

"1. In petition for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; and

"2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.

"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

"(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses
which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or
accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;

"(2) All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization; and

"(3) All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

"The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

"(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question;
"(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toil, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
"(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
"(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or
jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed,
revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and

"(5) Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the
Public Service Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Commission."
Section 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for the procedure governing petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments
mentioned in Section seventeen of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended by this Act and the effect of the filing
thereof on the judgment of or decree sought to be reviewed. Until the Supreme Court provides otherwise, said petitions shall be filed
within the period fixed in the rules of court for appeals in criminal or civil cases or special civil actions or special proceedings, depending
upon the nature of the case in which the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed, was rendered; the filing of said petition shall stay the
execution of the judgment sought to be reviewed; and the aforesaid petitions shall be filed and served in the form required for petitions for
review by certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Section 4. This Act shall not affect appeals perfected before its passage.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
administrative supervision over lower courts
The Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an administrative complaint against a sitting Justice of this Court by invoking Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution. This provision states that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof. This provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department of Justice used to exercise over the courts
and their personnel.