Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No.

146738, March
2, 2001

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur
Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On
January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the
Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was
leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the
nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a
declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of
law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent
to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts
show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized
in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the
topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was
implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court
cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation
of powers
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres.
Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the
right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may
only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the
separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would
be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
CASE DIGEST

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS

GR 88211, Sept. 15, 1989

FACTS:
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the
Republic under a revolutionary government.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx x
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
 Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:
SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of banning
the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the
same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-
chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the
peace, and maintain public order and security.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers
and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's
and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the
conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the
Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread
poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners
in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary,
or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section
13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art.
VIII.
Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is
being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13,
Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to

be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.