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On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an
quash the writ of execution on the ground that the answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its
same was "issued without the requirements of Section defenses can be set up during the hearing of the
17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been motion even if the same are not reduced to writing"
complied with," more specifically, that the same was (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in
issued without the required "summary hearing". This this pretense because, as stated above, the record
motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958. will show that when the motion was called, what the
surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed
and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for stated in the order given in open court upon request of
reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; the surety's counsel that after the four-day period
which motion was likewise denied by order of March within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be
26, 1958. deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel
apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
and March 26, 1958 — denying the surety's motion to
quash the writ of execution and motion for It is also urged that although according to Section 17
reconsideration, respectively — the surety has of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate
interposed the appeal on hand. action, there must, however, be a separate judgment
against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond
The surety insists that the lower court should have (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A
granted its motion to quash the writ of execution bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section
because the same was issued without the summary 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff
of any judgment he may recover in the action," and
stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-
after the judgment for the plaintiff has become D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732
executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan,
(Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the Batangas. [3]
bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the
surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for
despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue initial hearing on 22 October 1997.[4] On 7 August 1997, it
against the surety to enforce the obligation of the issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4
bond. November 1997.[5]
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with
and Fidelity Company, Inc. the RTC.[6]
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that
BRION, since the former had actively participated in the proceedings
PEREZ, before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
SERENO, and challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from
REYES, JJ. questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.[15]
The CA further found that respondent Corporation had
Promulgated: sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the
subject property after having proven open, continuous,
March 14, 2012 exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even
------x before the outbreak of World War II.[16]
DECISION Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this
instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in
SERENO, J.: support of its appeal:
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall
belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to from the date of the order. x x x.
him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are
aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed In this case, the application for original registration was filed on
pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of
an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting
the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96
Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that days from the Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was
estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact
from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v.
Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein
construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only contended that there was failure to comply with the
in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because
that in the latter case. there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the
initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the
exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself
filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner
could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the
MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he
When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official
neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within
doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
appeal. omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor
control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an requirements of the law.[32]
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for
it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such registration on account of events beyond its control.
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because
1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,[33] within petitioner opposed respondent Corporations application for
the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second
Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance,
application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed
Property Registration Decree.[34] ₱100,000.
Petitioner is incorrect. Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should
not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather,
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that
of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of the the value of the property sought to be registered may be
application for registration, as provided in the Property ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant;
Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its jurisdiction. second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are
Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the of the real property.[42]
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance
with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined
over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. using the first method, because the records are bereft of any
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the
Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the
action or inaction of the court. second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only
periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims
deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to the property.
be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the records of this
case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by
filing of the application for registration,[37] except that it had to respondent Corporation together with its application for
issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set registration. From the records, we find that the assessed value
beyond the 90-day period provided by law. of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.[43] Based
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of
the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the
respondents application for original registration was MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
₱160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. Reorganization Act, as amended.
Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral III
and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of
which should not exceed ₱100,000. A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
We are not persuaded. public domain.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee AND D.J. WARBY, Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG,
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither Respondents.
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such
original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court Law Offices, for Petitioners.
are null and void.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case Offices for Private Respondent.
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
the amended complaint.
SYLLABUS
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of 1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED
over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is RETROSPECTIVELY. — Private respondent claims that the
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as
practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that
in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
directed that the amount of damages be specified in the be construed as applicable to actions pending and
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
damages sought in the much reduced amount of retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required
docket fee is obvious.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. —
repetition of this unethical practice. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from
reglementary period. the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
SUPREME COURT The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1)
Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790
Manila square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-
46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the defendants to
occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having
himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands
EN BANC on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable
rentals therefor, but these demands had been refused; and (4)
the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the same
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989 reliefs, to wit:
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, 1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied
petitioners, by the defendants;
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, 2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be
Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped
Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of by them;
Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three 4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation
fees of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;" 4
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the mandatory
and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ... Supreme Court
dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally
damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;" and important reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in rendering
the Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of
any proper cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in law to the admitted facts.
dispute.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand,
from the record. or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the
estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words, as already
above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property,
in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings,
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of
the amount sought in the amended pleading. the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside
from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees).
19
Republic of the Philippines 3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all
SUPREME COURT incidental expenses in the wake in serving those
Manila who condoled ………… 15,000.00
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., 7. Attorney’s fees ……………………………………… 25,000.00
represented by Ruben Reinoso Jr., Petitioners,
vs. ₱
Or a total of
COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE 250,000.00
GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,** Respondent.
For damages to property:
DECISION
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against defendant
Jose Guballa:
MENDOZA, J.:
GROUNDS:
1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to
defendant-cross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by
Br. 9, RTC-Malolos, Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G- A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING
Tapales); hence, cannot recover twice. of the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to this case.
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at ₱ 150.00
per day) and for two (2) months jeepney stayed B. The issue on the specification of the damages
at the repair ₱ appearing in the prayer of the Complaint was NEVER
shop………………………………………. 9,000.00 PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN
THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL
3. Moral damages ………………………... 10,000.00
COURT) NOR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
4. Exemplary damages …………………. 10,000.00
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more
5. Attorney’s fees………………………… 15,000.00 substantial issue as to the negligence of the private
respondents and their culpability to petitioners."7
₱
or a total of
44,000.00
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not
have been applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant prior to the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987.
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby They plead that though this Court stated that failure to state the
renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party plaintiff by way of correct amount of damages would lead to the dismissal of the
3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the amount of ₱ complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.
50,000.00 undertaking plus ₱ 10,000.00 as and for attorney’s
fees. Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of
the complaint in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court damages they were entitled to, because the amount of the lost
that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party income would still be finally determined in the course of the trial
plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims as specified of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial court
above, respectively. Totality of evidence preponderance in their remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as
favor. long as the correct amount would be paid subsequently.
JUDGMENT Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never
put in issue either in the RTC or in the CA.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows: The Court finds merit in the petition.
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso, The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
Sr………………………………………….₱ 250,000.00; prescribed period is mandatory.8 In Manchester v. Court of
Appeals,9 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
passenger jeepney …………. ₱ 44,000.00; years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,10 wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV- pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee,
09527………………………………… ₱ 60,000.00; the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on
annum from date of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs. the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness
Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally; to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required.11 Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas
Bank v. Ros,12 the Court explained that where the party does
Costs of suit. not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
SO ORDERED.3 by paying additional docket fees when required by the court,
the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It
aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket
pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v. CA.4 In fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in, ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette
petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees. 5 College v. Pilotin,13 the Court stated:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
but it was denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994. 6 Hence, payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
this appeal, anchored on the following strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and collect the corresponding fees.
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.14 As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly
unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action,
hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to
genuine disputes fairly and equitably,15 for it is far better to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the
dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and
than on a technicality that may result in injustice. the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of
the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to
before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the
decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment case on the merits.
of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA
which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason. The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso,
the jeepney passenger, died as a result of the collision of
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 o’clock
application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was
fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was
appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a the negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very
technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot report of the police
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of authorities and the narration of the jeepneydriver and his
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is passengers, the collision was brought about because the truck
not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. 16 driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side
portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade,
hitting the passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was of the RTC appears in its decision as follows:
filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling
could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to
the petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as
Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases proper consideration of all the circumstances and factors
of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of bearing on the issue as to who is responsible for the instant
Appeals17 and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of vehicular mishap convince and persuade this Court that
Zamboanga.18 In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant
Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan),19 it was stated that the "intent Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on
of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply the records and its influence support plaintiffs’ plaint including
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in that of defendant Tapales.
view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new
rules." In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136),
failed to pay the correct docket fees on time. reads as follows:
We held in another case: "Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were difficulty of operation in compliance therewith, every person
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to of the highway."
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is
case from its operation.20 convinced of the veracity of the version of the passenger
jeepney driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs’ and Tapales’
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward bound
the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-
assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on 64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984) the "sand & gravel" truck from the
the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which opposite direction driven by Mariano Geronimo, the headlights
provides: of which the former had seen while still at a distance of about
30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1 and 2,
upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment into lanes 3 and 4 at high speed "napakabilis po ng dating ng
awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more truck." (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985) in the process hitting them
than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay (Jeepney passenger) at the left side up to where the reserve
tire was in an oblique manner "pahilis" (57 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985). Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due to the strong another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
impact was thrown "resting on its right side while the left side damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)". The passengers of existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
the jeepney and its driver were injured including two quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney suffered
considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5- xxxx
Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair
shop.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect persons for whom one is responsible.
that the "gravel & sand" truck was running in high speed on the
good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the
wooden barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered xxxx
its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
same in a manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
forthwith swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged
At the time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on its right in any business or industry.
lane No. 4 and even during the moments before said bumping,
moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then xxxx
somewhat rough because being repaired also according to
Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one
of those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
Mondalia are convincing and consistent in depicting the true persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
facts of the case untainted by vacillation and therefore, worthy diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and confirmed by the
sketch drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury
Division, NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166-168, records; families in the selection or supervision of his employee.23 Thus,
the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8- required to examine them as to their qualification, experience
Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy of which is on page and service record. With respect to the supervision of
594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping indeed occurred employees, employers must formulate standard operating
at lane No. 4 and showing how the ‘gavel & sand’ truck is procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must
having been made right after the accident is a piece of be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the evidence.24 Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that
bumping-occurrence. The rule that official duty had been the evidence presented by respondent Guballa was wanting. It
performed (Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. ruled:
Rules of Court) – there being no evidence adduced and made
of record to the contrary – is that said circumstance involving
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to
the two vehicles had been the result of an official investigation
overthrow this presumption of negligence by showing that he
and must be taken as true by this Court.211awphi1
had exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it
that the driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of assigned to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water,
fault in automobile collisions,22 the position of the two vehicles, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that
as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the
that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary collision in litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever
records disclosed that the truck was speeding along E. his trucks gets out of the compound to make deliveries, it is
Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the always accompanied with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This
passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction. was all which he considered as selection and supervision in
When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility.
No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit the left middle side This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to
portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both an exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of selection and supervision of his driver Mariano Geronimo."25
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful,
because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994
under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle
Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
thereof.
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the REINSTATED.
truck owner, Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence in the hiring and supervision of his employee.
SO ORDERED.
Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
provides:
FIRST DIVISION
The Facts
On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondent.[7] Petitioners received the Decision on
November 26, 1998. On the same date, they filed a Notice of
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court[5] as
Appeal, which the RTC approved on December 2, 1998.
follows:
1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed; SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. x x x.
2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the
authority to dismiss the appeal.[14]
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the
clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
payment of the docket fees. and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.
Sole Issue: x x x x x x x x x.
Timeliness of Payment of In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x
x x the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on
the following requirements must be complied with. First, within the part of the appellant.[27]
15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that
rendered the judgment or final order sought to be appealed;
second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and
third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of In the present case, petitioners have not shown any
appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. In
clerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final order. fact, the manner in which they presented their case before us
leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we are almost tempted
to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this Court as
well as the appellate court.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory,[19] even
jurisdictional,[20] for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise,
the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject The present case calls for the adjudication of whether
matter of the action,[21] and the decision or final order sought petitioners paid the docket fees on time. Hence, it is essential
to be appealed from would become final and executory.[22] that they specify the exact dates when they filed their notice of
appeal and paid the corresponding docket fees. But nowhere in
their pleadings did they do so. All they said was that the appeal
had been seasonably filed.
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid
the docket fees. After resolving thrice the timeliness of the
payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found that these had
been paid one (1) year and 11 days from the filing of their In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an
notice of appeal. appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed
a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15
days from the issuance of the trial court Decision being
appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same period; and
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received (3) served the notice to the adverse party.
the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision. Consequently, they had
15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November
26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the
records shows that they paid these only on July 8, 1999,[23] or True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the
after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for prescribed period, but they paid the docket fees only seven (7)
payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page 6 of their
November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to Petition[28] that the appeal was seasonably filed, but later said
appeal, had long become final and executory. that the the appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April
1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the
foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed
Relaxation of the Rule on with the payment of docket fees on time.[29]
Nonpayment of Docket Fees They admitted, though, that because of the excusable
negligence or mistake of their counsel, the official receipts for
the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They reasoned
that they had failed to transmit the proof of payment of the
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.[30] At any
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay event, respondent denies being served such notice.[31]
those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in by respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTCs
consideration of all attendant circumstances.[24] approval of petitioners notice of appeal, the required docket
fees for the latter were still not paid on time. From November
23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, until
April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[25] made no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than two
the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, (2) months to immediately pay the docket fees after being
but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed informed of the April 23, 1999 Order denying respondents
willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order approving
fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals[26] saw us again relaxing petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected
the Rules when we declared therein that the appellate court sincere willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when
may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if
respondent had raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket
fees as early as December 28, 1998.
SO ORDERED.