Dizon-Pamintuan vs.

People
G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994

Facts: Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when he arrived at his
residence, he immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two
housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that
five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the
house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house.
They were made to lie face down on the floor and thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house
and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left
the house he reported the matter immediately to the police.
The recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00, broken down as follows:

a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") — P75,000.00

b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00

c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") — P3,000.00

He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer
the police and an entrapment was made with their participation. He and his wife posed as a
buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended
by Norma Dizon Pamintuan.

The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items
were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein
private complainants. That the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused
and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that
the stall is owned by one Fredo. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but set aside the
penalty imposed.

Issue: WON the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Held: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the RPC
or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but
becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either
under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would
seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
presumption of fencing 14 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property. 15

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys
and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

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In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly
established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private
complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the authorities and submitted a list of the
lost items and sketches of the jewelry that were later displayed for sale at a stall tended to by
the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for
sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have
knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or
theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This
presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on
the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry
and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer
or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or
entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to
the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is
located." Under the Rules and Regulations 24 promulgated to carry out the provisions of Section
6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person, partnership, firm, corporation, association
or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the business
of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand articles," which refers to any good, article, item,
object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of
whether the same has actually or in fact been used.

Ong v. People

G.R. 190475, April 10, 2013

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Facts: Francisco Azajar bought 44 firestone tires from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation for
P223,401.81. This acquisition was evidenced by a sales invoice and an inventory list
acknowledging receipt of the tires described by their serial numbers. He marked each tire with a
piece of chalk before storing it inside his warehouse. On January 1995, he sold 6 tires. However,
on February, the remaining 38 tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate forcibly opened.
He reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. Hoping to locate the
stolen tires, Azajar canvassed from numerous business establishments until he entered Jong’s
Marketing, a store selling tires, owned by Jaime Ong. There he found a tire which was marked
and matched one of the serial numbers of the stolen tires. A buy-bust operation was conducted.
13 of the 38 tires were recovered.

Ong was convicted of the crime of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612). He denied that he had
knowledge that the tires were stolen, having bought them from Raymond Go of Goldlink.

Issue: Whether the elements of the Anti-Fencing Law are present in the case.

Held: Yes. All the elements of Anti-Fencing are present in the case.

First, Azajar was able to prove that ownership of the tires through the sales invoice and
inventory list, and the happening of the robbery through their Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Second, the facts establish that Ong was in possession of the tires. The serial numbers of the
recovered tires matched those of the serial numbers of the stolen tires. Ong also admitted that
he bought the tires from Goldlink.

Third, the words “should know” denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his
conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong’s experience of 24 years from the business
should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was
his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. He has practiced
the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who
should have exercised prudence.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of the property.

Dimat v. People
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012

Facts: Sonia Delgado, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number
WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42-126134
and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

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On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate
number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was
actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular
Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and
there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818,
which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on
May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG. For
his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in
good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its
engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold
the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and
the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.

Issue: Whether Mel Dimat is guilty for violating the Anti-Fencing law.

Held: Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object
taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing
derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.

Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimats defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions.
The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136
and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of
the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the
correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612
is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof
of criminal intent.[4] Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or
robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.