G.R. No.

133739 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS COCA JR., RICARDO COCA and RAMIL COCA, accused-appellants.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal
Case No. CBU-43013 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of murder; sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P50,000.00, plus the costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

The Information against accused-appellants states:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1996, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a gun, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
Edilberto Banate, by shooting him with said gun, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries:

"GUNSHOT WOUND"

as a consequence of which said Edilberto Banate died after four (4) months.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment on January 23, 1997, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.3 Trial on the merits
thereafter followed.

Accused-appellants and the victim, Edilberto Banate, were related by affinity, and all residents of
Cabulihan, Guba, Cebu City. Brothers Ricardo Coca and Tomas Coca, Jr. are the first degree
cousins of Merolina Banate, the victim's wife; while Ramil Coca is the son of Ricardo Coca. 4

At about 9:00 in the evening of March 13, 1996, Tomas, Ricardo and Ramil Coca mauled the victim,
as a result of which the latter sustained several injuries and seriously broke his left
shoulder.5 Unluckily, this was just the beginning of the dangers yet to beset him.

A week later, on March 20, 1996, at 7:00 in the evening, while the victim was having supper with his
wife Merolina and their two children inside their kitchen, a sudden burst of gunfire emanated from
underneath the house. Merolina peeped through the slits on the floor and saw three persons sitting
on their heels. The fluorescent lamp which illuminated their kitchen and the 100 watt bulb of the
adjacent house directly opposite the kitchen enabled Merolina to identify accused-appellant Tomas,
Ricardo and Ramil Coca, who were all underneath the house and looking upwards. Tomas Coca
was positioned between Ricardo and Ramil and aiming a gun at Edilberto. She turned and saw her
husband, slumped on the floor with blood oozing from his body. 6

Meanwhile, Alexander Singson, a visitor at Merolina's house who left earlier to buy cigarettes was
alerted by the gunshots. He hurried to the scene and saw the three accused-appellants running
away from the house of the victim. Thereafter, he rushed to the house of the victim and helped bring
him to the hospital.7

The victim sustained a massive gunshot would on the chest. The bullet pierced the right rib,
penetrating the pulmonary region all the way to, and fracturing the spinal column, where the slug
was embedded. As a consequence, the victim became paralyzed from waist down. He eventually
died on July 2, 1996.8

Meronila purposely withheld the identity of the culprits. She feared that revealing the names of the
persons who shot her husband would endanger not only her life but also that of her children who
were alone in their house all through out the time that she was in the hospital with her injured
husband. It was only after almost five months, or on August 19, 1996, that she finally divulged the
identities of the perpetrators.9

Accused-appellants, on the other hand, raised the defense of denial and alibi. Tomas Coca, Jr.
testified that at about 7:00 in the evening of March 20, 1996, he and Ricardo Coca attended a
birthday party in the house of a certain Mario Rebales 10 at Calubihan, Guba, Cebu City. Sometime
that evening, Ramil Coca arrived and informed them that Edilberto Banate was shot. Then, he
followed Ricardo Coca and Pedro Soquib to the house of the victim but he did not proceed when he
noticed that there were no more people there. 11 This was corroborated by Ricardo Coca who
declared that on the night of March 20, 1996, he and Tomas were in the house of Mario Rebales, as
he was hired to cook the food for the birthday party of Rebales' daughter. After sometime, his son,
Ramil Coca, arrived and told them that Edilberto Banate was shot. Thereafter, he and Pedro Soquib,
followed by Ramil and Tomas, proceeded to the house of the victim, but the latter was already
brought to the hospital.12

Ramil Coca affirmed the version of Ricardo and Tomas and added that on the night of March 20,
1996, he was eating supper with his family when they heard three successive gunshots. When he
and his mother went out to check what happened, they saw Roel Soquib and Melino Leyson carrying
the body of Edilberto Banate. Then, at the instruction of his mother, he proceeded to the house of
Mario Rebales to inform his father of the shooting incident. Thereafter, his father, Ricardo and Pedro
Soquib followed by Tomas, proceeded to the scene of the crime; while he went home. 13

The version of the defense was further corroborated by the testimonies of defense witnesses Pedro
Soquib and Mario Rebales.14 Defense witnesses Sergio Borres and Roel Soquib, who helped bring
the victim to the hospital, further narrated that Merolina Banate told them that she was not able to
recognize the culprit because it was dark. 15

On July 30, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Tomas Coca,
Jr., Ricardo Coca and Ramil Coca are hereby imposed each the penalty of RECLUSON
PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the law; to jointly indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Edilberto Banate in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused,
however, are credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided that they will
signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.16

In their appeal, accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrators. They claimed that at 7:00 in the evening, it was
impossible for Merolina Banate to recognize the culprits through a ¾ inch gap on the bamboo
flooring, considering that the area underneath the house where the gunfire allegedly came from was
dark. In the same vein, accused-appellants assert that the testimony of Alexander Singson is
fabricated. According to them, it is unbelievable that Singson had committed to memory the
appearance of the assailants not only because it was dark, but also because Singson himself
admitted that he saw the assailants only for the first time during the incident. They further argued
that if Merolina indeed recognized the perpetrators, she would have immediately revealed their
names to those who responded and to the members of the media who interviewed her. Accused-
appellants likewise alleged that Merolina's reaction immediately after the gun bursts was contrary to
human experience. The natural reaction would have been to seek cover, turn off the light, shout for
help, or cuddle the injured, and not to peep through the floor where the shots came from. Finally,
accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca contend that even assuming that the version of the
prosecution were true, they should have been acquitted considering that there was no evidence to
show that they connived with accused-appellant Tomas Coca, Jr.

The contentions are without merit.

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness have identified
the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and
the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should
normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow
identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper
situations, be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses
solely on that ground unmeritorious.17

In the case at bar, the kitchen/dining area where the victim was shot from underneath the house was
illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. There would therefore be light falling on the faces of accused-
appellants, especially so that they were all facing upwards. Ordinary human experience would tell us
that bamboo flooring with gaps smaller than an inch allows every ray of light emanating from a
fluorescent lamp to freely penetrate through the bamboo slats. With this environmental milieu, the
fluorescent lamp would indeed provide sufficient illumination to identify the accused-appellants
underneath a 3 to 4 feet high bamboo flooring. What is more, the 100 watt bulb of the adjacent
house, six meters away, and directly opposite the kitchen where the victim was shot, provided
additional illumination below the victim's house. Clearly, therefore, the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime certainly obliterate the slightest shred of doubt on the veracity of
accused-appellant's identification.

Moreover, it is not amiss to state that "relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural knack for
remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
obtaining justice for the victim by the malefactor being brought to the face of the law." Indeed, family
members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants.18 With more reason therefore that we should believe the positive identification of
accused-appellants by Merolina Banate. Being close blood relatives and residents of the same
barangay, Merolina would naturally and particularly be familiar with the face and build of accused-
appellants.

A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that even under cross-examination, Merolina
stayed firm and consistent in her identification of accused-appellants, thus –

ATTY. VAILOCES:
Q. You will admit that you did not see the person or persons in the act of shooting your
husband?

A. I do not admit because I actually saw the persons who actually shot my husband.

Q. What did you see?

A. I saw the three of them.

xxx xxx x x x19

Q. You said that you saw Tomas Coca in the act of shooting although that is not stated in
your affidavit. My question now is: how were you able to see when it was nighttime?

A. I intently peep through the floor and because it was well-lighted by the fluorescent
lamp I vividly saw them underneath the house. I know them because they are my close
relatives.

FISCAL GALANIDA:

There was a portion not translated:

WITNESS:

A. And even the adjacent area it was also well lighted. Moreover, they are my close
relatives even by their smell I could sense they were (sic).

xxx xxx xxx

Q. What light illumines (sic) from (sic) the outside portion of the house?

xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:

A. It was a 100 watt bulb near our house. It gave bright light from the outside.

Q. How far is that bulb outside to the place where you allegedly saw Tomas Coca?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Witness indicating a distance of six (6) meters

xxx xxx x x x20

ATTY. VAILOCES:

Q. When you said you saw Tomas Coca underneath your house and then left your house
of course he was the only one you saw and no other persons?
 A. The three of them. It was Jr. Coca who held the firearm.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. VAILOCES:

Q. Now, what were the other two doing at the time you saw them?

A. They were by the side also looking towards us.

COURT:

Q. You are sure of that?

A. I am sure Your Honor.21

Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified by prosecution witness Alexander Singson as

the persons he saw running away from the house of the victim right after he heard the gunshots. But
even if we disregard the testimony of Singson, the persuasive and compelling testimony of the
victim's wife, juxtaposed with the circumstances which proved feasible the identification of accused-
appellants, are enough to prove their culpability beyond any scintilla of doubt.

Neither does the failure of Merolina to immediately reveal the identity of the culprits cast doubt on
the truthfulness of her testimony. It must be stressed that Merolina was anxious of her and her
children's safety. The threat on their lives was indeed a deterrent strong enough to mute her. As
consistently held by the Court, fear of reprisal and death threats are accepted as adequate
explanations for the delay in reporting crimes. 22

Moreover, Merolina's act of peeping through the flooring immediately after they were fired upon was
not contrary to human experience. Merolina was not yet aware that her husband was hit when she
instinctively looked through the gaps in the bamboo floor. Hence, her instinct could not have told her
at that time to cuddle her husband. At any rate, it is a settled jurisprudence that different people react
differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person's spontaneous response may
be aggression while another person's reaction may be cold indifference. 23

While it is true that accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca did not actually shoot the victim,
their conspiratorial acts and omissions would likewise make them liable for his death. Ricardo and
Ramil purposely accompanied Tomas underneath the house of the victim, such that they could not
be considered innocent spectators. They simultaneously left the scene of the crime together with
Tomas and did nothing to stop or prevent the latter from shooting the victim. Finally, they had the
motive to kill the victim as they in fact previously mauled him after a misunderstanding.

So also, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants must fail. Not only are said
defenses inherently weak, they cannot likewise prevail over their positive identification 24 by
prosecution witness Merolina Banate, who was not shown to have been impelled by any ill-motive to
falsely impute the commission of the crime against them, her very own relatives. Furthermore,
the locus criminis is only 300 meters25 and 40 meters26 away, respectively, from the place where
accused-appellants Ricardo and Tomas, as well as Ramil, were allegedly at when the crime
occurred. This negates the physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime at the
time the felony was committed.27
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the execution
of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the person of the
victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter. 28 Judging from the circumstances
which attended the shooting of the deceased, treachery undoubtedly qualified the present case to
murder. This is so because accused-appellants obviously devised a way, that is, by shooting the
victim from underneath the house, to effectively execute the crime without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the unsuspecting victim might put up. 1âwphi1.nêt

In sum, the Court finds that the trial court did not err in upholding the version of the prosecution and
disregarding the defenses put up by accused-appellants. Though Merolina did not see the actual
shooting of her husband, the circumstantial evidences presented by the prosecution are sufficient to
sustain a conviction. Under the Rules of Court, conviction based on circumstantial evidence is
sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.29 Here, more than one circumstance was presented by the
prosecution. The victim's wife heard gunshots from underneath their house. Immediately thereafter,
she peeped through their bamboo flooring and saw the three accused-appellants sitting on their
heels and looking upwards. Accused-appellant Tomas Coca, Jr. was holding a gun pointed upwards
while seated between accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca. When she turned to her
husband, she saw that he was shot. As the three accused-appellants fled, prosecution witness
Alexander Singson saw them running away from the house of the victim. All these, added to
accused-appellants' previous altercation with the victim, form an unbroken chain of circumstances
pointing to accused-appellants, and no other, as the persons responsible for the victim's death.

The trial court did not overlook any fact of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would
have altered the result of the case. Hence, its findings of facts and assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses deserve to be sustained on appeal. For having had the distinct opportunity of directly
observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses under oath, the trial court is in a better
position to ascertain whether or not a witness is telling the truth. 30

The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.31 The two penalties being both
indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the lesser of the two penalties, which is reclusion perpetua, should be applied pursuant to
the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for accused-appellant's civil liability, he should, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
the costs, further pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in line
with recent jurisprudence.32

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-43013, finding accused-appellants Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo
Coca, and Ramil Coca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing each
of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in
addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs, accused-appellants are further ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003]

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A.

MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-
appellants, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH
DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and
Resolution of December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson
(Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 4497, for
the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on
January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in
the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin
(Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00. [1]

Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles

Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that
the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. [2]

By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the
petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the
deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following which she was issued
letters of administration. [3]

During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia,
and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the
transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who
invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known
as the Dead Mans Statute which reads:

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (Emphasis supplied)

Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she
had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued [4]

by him before his death; before the deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce
settlement of the checks from his (the deceaseds) son Jerry who told her that
his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the
death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for
payment but were dishonored due to the closure of his account.
[5] [6]

Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she
knew that the deceased issued five checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt;
[7]

and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the
bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account. [8]

Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and
mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased
borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law,
respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased, two to [9]

Angeles and the other to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died
[10]

or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing
the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never
did; and after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the
checks but were dishonored as the account against which they were drawn
was closed, hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter dated February
[11] [12]

6, 1990 addressed to the deceaseds heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy,
and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled. [13]

The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient

to form a belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they
ever existed, they had been paid and extinguished, are usurious and illegal
and are, in any event, barred by prescription. And she objected to the
[14]

admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by

the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Mans Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the
administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the
daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola,
Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.
 At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were
issued by the deceased and that the return slips were issued by the
depository/clearing bank. [15]

After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate
manifestations informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against their claims. [16]

Finding that the Dead Mans Statute does not apply to the witnesses who
testified in support of the subject claims against the estate, the trial court
issued an Order of December 8, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
[17]

WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in

due course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of
P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; Angeles A.
[18]

Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount
of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled intestate estate.

On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR

FAILURE TO PAY THE FILING FEES THEREON

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] BECAUSE

[THEY ARE] ALREADY BARRED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR
STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S]

EVIDENCE OF THE CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MANS
STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE

IV.

THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, [19]

the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court,
by Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:

1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;

2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00; [20]

3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and

4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the
deceased JUAN BON FING SY.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)

The claimants Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

[21]

decision having been denied by Resolution of December 9, 1996, they filed [22]

the present petition anchored on the following assigned errors:

FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THE CLAIMS OF CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO
A. MONTINOLA, JR..

SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING

THAT CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY
[ON] THE CLAIM OF CELEDONIA SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA.
(Underscoring in the original)[23]

With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the
administratrix did not deny the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to
controvert it, and neither did she deny the execution and genuineness of the
checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return slips issued by
the clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of
the Montinolas insufficient to prove their claims.
The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the
checks-exhibits of the Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not
categorically state that she saw the filling up and signing of the checks by the
deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical
and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a
circumvention of the Dead Mans Statute. [24]

The administratrixs counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party

has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the
credibility of the witness orsubject only to well recognized exceptions none of
which is here presentthe admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of
relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution
in the assessment of a witness testimony but is not necessarily a negative
element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded
to it.
[25]

Jades testimony on the genuineness of the deceaseds signature on the

checks-exhibits of the Montinolas is clear:
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company
Check No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are
referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are
referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July
6, 1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you
referring to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
A: Mr. Sys signature.
 Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)

The genuineness of the deceaseds signature having been shown, he

is prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value,
following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. Every negotiable instrument is

deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for
value. (Underscoring and italics in the original; emphasis supplied),

Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima
facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who
expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same
does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2)
their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.

xxx

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as
to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in
the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)
[27]

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in
whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the
transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the
witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should
their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the
transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the
testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the
basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of
Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the
deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute; besides, the [28]

administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined

them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from
testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without

distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he
should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of parties or
assignors of parties to a case. Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on
each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation
omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from
separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias
claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not
thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission
of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the
deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since [29]

the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-

documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said
checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of
the deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By
Celedonias account, she knows the signature of the deceased.
xxx
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit A to E, please go over
these checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these
checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
 x x x[30]

Sanson testified too that he knows the signature of the deceased:

xxx
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit A to G-1 Saquin,
please go over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late
Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[31]

While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully
discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence which reads:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person

may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. x x x,

not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a
comparison with the naked eye of the deceaseds signature appearing on
[32]

each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits

of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account,
they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence,
substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of
evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not
to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against the claims.
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate
estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to
pay:
1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
 2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00; [33]

3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and

4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.
representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,

vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled "Lamberto T. Chua vs. Lilibeth
Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga" and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter collectively referred
to as petitioners).

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga
Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and
wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to
Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the
intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had
Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife respondent,
Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the
gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other
remuneration from the business.

Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation
went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their business
because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories,
balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the
amount indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine
for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.

Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management
of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners
for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership,
petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite,
converting to her own use and advantage its properties.

On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons to
evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of
P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in the partnership,
with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties
of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with
their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the damage
and prejudice of respondent.

On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had
jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.

On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied the
motion to dismiss.

On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that
they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and
attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.

On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the claim
for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs,
accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed and
prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.

On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the motion to
dismiss.

On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial
Conference.

On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.

On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, "as
petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court." 2

On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.

On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the
case of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to
have waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception
of evidence despite notice.

On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive of the
Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, as follows:

(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting

procedures and standards of the properties, assets, income and profits of the Shellite
Gas Appliance Center Since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they
continued the business operations including all businesses derived from Shellite Gas
Appliance Center, submit an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets,
income, profits etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;

(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties,
assets, income and profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and
advantage the legally pertain to the plaintiff and account for the properties mentioned
in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;

(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the
plaintiff in the partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in
schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the petition;

(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits
from the partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the
closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of interest until
fully paid;

(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its
business activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the ½ interest,
shares, participation and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof in money or
money's worth, if the properties are not physically divisible;

(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad
faith and hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; and,

(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic)
and P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.

NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.

 SO ORDERED."3

On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case to
the Court of Appeals.

On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
respects."4

On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:

"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a partnership
between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter''
invitation and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets and business were taken
over by petitioners.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or prescription
did not apply in the instant case.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was competent and
credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that
indeed there was a partnership, the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in the
partnership assets and profits."5

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence
of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners
argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his
witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support
this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:

"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

We are not persuaded.

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are
contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary. 6 Hence, based on the
intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct,
a verbal contract of partnership may arise. 7 The essential profits that must be proven to that a
partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest
in the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and
testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not
the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent's testimony
and that of his witness, Josephine.

The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. 9 But
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:

"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in
prosecuted.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased

person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." 10

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim 11 against respondents in their answer before the trial
court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case
from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". 12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor
or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased. 14

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine
is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent,
the latter being the party plaintiff.

We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value
because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor,
Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she
were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from
this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her
testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.16

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail
over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established
between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary
evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as
sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.

Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial
precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent
and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review. 17 This Court can no longer be tasked to
go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the
trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the
presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the
admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to
object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was offered. 19

With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for
accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the prescribed
period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6)
years20 while the right to demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the person
continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the partnership 22 , in
this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an account
of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved the
partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly
provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the
complete winding up of its business, culminating in its termination. 24

In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should have
been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated
by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with a capital of
P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not
mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical
personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the contract of partnership does not
invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites,
because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that
the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract. 26 In the case at bar, non-compliance
with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership considering that the totality
of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed forged the partnership in question.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that
case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did
not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's
complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with
merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he

maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting
Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial
court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked
upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity
of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for
respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation
case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself
of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be
treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order
of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment
of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993,
which denied petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet
to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion
for reconsideration of its preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada
was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing
attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land
Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent
granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is
situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action[2] for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated
and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes
had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil
case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent
complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon, an information for perjury[5] was filed against respondent Paredes in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.[6] On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was,
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the
case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were
terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by
respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for
preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record
therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution[8] recommending the
criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his
aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:

x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal
Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984
under the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x but said case after
arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the
Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready
reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein x x x. (Italics supplied.)
[9]

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan[10] charging

respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury
and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking
the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public
documents.[12] He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be
a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. [13] These
falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of
the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support
his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur
in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario
that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action
thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. [14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently
discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-
called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in
the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this
case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his
discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion
therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the
filing of falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for
the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the
Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the
absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to
commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had
control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to
present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle
of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be
objected to, if presented in the trial.

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall

any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each
of which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were
filed in the graft court.However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the
requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were
satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct
evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada
and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory
of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two
other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to
deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:

From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during
and after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts
surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by
accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the
offense charged in the information is privileged. [19]

Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied,[20] the controversy

was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are
therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not,
as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
I
 As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must
have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot
be presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters
consent.[21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein
constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule,
we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made
by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any communication, without
distinction or qualification.[22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there
is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client
to his attorney.The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the
client to the attorney by other means.[23]
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and
existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which
such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and
Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of
Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of
the graft case before the Tanodbayan.[24]Also, the acts and words of the parties during
the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes
in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made
between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe
that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is
set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have
already been committed and consummated.
 The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat
inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in
respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the
past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers
advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the
protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to
commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers
advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privilegedcommunications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by
the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between
attorney and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying
words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the
criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of
and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the
past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications
are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime
of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the
authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. [26] In
fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable
relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and
every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the
attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that
such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators
are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a
conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to
whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the
criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court,
having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this
second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our
resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some
ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to
whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent
this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative
facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to
finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the
expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of
remanding it to the trial court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand
charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of
February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was
affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed
against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same
acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations
in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:

Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state

witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate
information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were
all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of
cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet
stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment
that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the
old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three
accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged
for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried
together are called joint defendants.

As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there
having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate
identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same
as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single
action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or
more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense was too broad and
indefinite; hence the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the
fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or more,
as involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more
working together, or shared by or affecting two or more. [30] Had it been intended that all
the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules
could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from
amending the information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by
consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification,
and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty
shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a
state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. [31] not that he must be the
least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be
whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is
eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:

It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he
persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he
did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas
as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a
conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., [34] two conspirators charged with
five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used
as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the
information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found
that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily
convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to
the commission of the crime.
 On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu
was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear
to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the
gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to
those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is
imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found
expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we quote in extenso:

Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for
the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in
a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of
them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant
asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as
the others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For,
despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively
identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway
heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even
the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the
case for the prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated
by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even
assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean the
highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense
and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be
given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least
guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the
offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.

xxx

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the
discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have
been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not
individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery
except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the
most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly
warranted. (Italics ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a
criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and
translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of
depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it
is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that
the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the
procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on
other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that
not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an
accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those
reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on
judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of
the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There
is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for
that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the
purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies,
as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal;
Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-
complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur,
who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate
case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification
of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
 On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the
confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to
testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding
disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein
discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed,
after the retirement of two members of its Second Division [37]and the reconstitution
thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14,
1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and
new members thereof [39]declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon
which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by
Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and
Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by
the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the
arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the
matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that
We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the
prosecutions motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon
authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE
the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases
by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL
S. ROCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also
what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from
any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to
his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in
PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al."1

Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators,
or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of
the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e.,
stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a
blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as
their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 as party-defendant.3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco
as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.4

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,

Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G.
Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of
UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately
1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their

codefendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to

clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became
holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their
respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint
as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do
not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976
of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business
purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint.
However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore
denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the expanded
Amended Complaint are his assets.6

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.7

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion
for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings.9

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private

respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33;
(b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21,
1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33. 10

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor
had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client
for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until
they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun
to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the
client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that
Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of
cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both
under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings
(par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have
preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.
 The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as
party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded
the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA
lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the
PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners

ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-
stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not

considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and,
therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or

had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to

reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute
a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable
under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue

preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection
clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding

that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege

includes the identity of the client(s).
 2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the
identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to
other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring

that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable
and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18,
1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of
his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA
law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by
private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their
sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information
obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 13

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding
him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right
to dismiss Civil Case No.0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger
fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal
with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client
for whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until
they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun
to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the
client.
 This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
"Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription
payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA
lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons;
some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA
lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of
these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers
executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank.
Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are
actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank
assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr.
Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are
really just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed
sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to
1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the
municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of
Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the
principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves. 16

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently
to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid
cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services
may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend
on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by
the contract to the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that
of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what
may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and
exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from
any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies
centuries of established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford,26 the U. S.
Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence
than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and
faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the
sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer
them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights
of the party bestowing it. 27

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28Passed on into various provisions of the
Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any

communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain
him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed
within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the
most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose
between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either
opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is
too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct
individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon
the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation
which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that
in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of
option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name
of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know
his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be
obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge
the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related
to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the
unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a
bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the
attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she
could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt
for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt
orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the
exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino
Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law
partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by
Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names.
The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts
and circumstances of the case, held:

A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged
where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that
disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity
for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird
Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal
law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the
attorney-client privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors
must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's
consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the
 client's identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases,
protected as confidential communications. 36

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know
the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to
the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state
supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The
court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had
hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is
clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report
an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against
him. 38

xxx xxx xxx

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional
advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or
contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever
the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as
attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by
the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .

It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to
the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to
use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present
action pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected.
The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the
court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the
question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his
clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he
represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made
progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already
suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that
he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to
 him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were
interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case
has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. 41

3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable
position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered
to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85
to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients.
The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird
refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found
guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to
reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily
in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or
investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a
client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered
that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by
government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general
rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby
admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one
purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties
are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may
well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the
reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done. 43

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions
to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been
held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences. 46

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should
they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their
clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure,
framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties
as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in
the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client)
of a . . . crime." 47

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal,
his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a
shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against
the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case
against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a
lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in
the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-
client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related,
when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications
made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and
which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to
each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications."50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege,
would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open
up other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the
client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection.
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has
likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these
cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a
fishing expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend
on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances
such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the
transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously
protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a
duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of
transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other.
In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer
cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which
forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its
fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit
only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client.
The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special
breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and
found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to
pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical
stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle
for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to
clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty
alone, but the punctilioof an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US
Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during
the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57

Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled
by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to
realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so
deep in the stream of life — so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs,
both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we
are united — this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see
reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think
on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress,
we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and
lonely passion — only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened
to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the
use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to
the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit
to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."

III

In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private
respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted
merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and
circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the
principal."59

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in
the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that
their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in
this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision
to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to
disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show — and
absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at bar — that private respondent actually
revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the
leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which
is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed
comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents
were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and
one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves
willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent
rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients
which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco
was treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such
substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal
protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates
against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those
who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but
also as to the liabilities imposed.

. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of

legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was
noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the
rest.63

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for
their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 64 It is grossly
unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same
exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question
of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions,
not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the
expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client

confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until
they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence
before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-
principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position
clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled
to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental
legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course
in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation
when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client
relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To
allow the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the
 bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not
here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will
not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-
incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent

Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

Romero and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Mendoza, J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998]

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD
and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as
annulling petitioners extra-judicial partition of the decedents estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa
Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the
real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the
decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother,
Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly
executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife
of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and
Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition
in Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had
been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from
1943 to 1971, and that during these period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores
Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of
collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of
Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in
lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed
administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents motion to
remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to
establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos.
13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers
estate. Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-
judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the
Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate
mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad,
and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M.
 Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to
the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said
estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the
period they lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M.
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from
participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties,
monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment
as administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked.[1]
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latters
motion for annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following
judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for Annulment, dated October 4,
1973 to be meritorious and accordingly

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all
registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of
Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT
No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house
situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the
late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa,
executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the
notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to
be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance
in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad;
TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title
in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as
Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina
de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of
1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C.
Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation
thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
 6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to
surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and
108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the
trial court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed
out of time.Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings
with the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974,
the appellate court granted petitioners petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to
the latters appeal. The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that
their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19,
1974 ruling of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground
that it had been filed out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and
mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-
04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to
appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due
course to petitioners appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents
heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain
documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On
October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie,
all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land
described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the
extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972
is inexistent and void from the beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is
null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding
Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With
costs against petitioner-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
 I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS
OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE
MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the
startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when
Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was
married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria
Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose
Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that
he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and
Marian are not Ricardo Abads children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at
Mapua Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: engineer (mining)

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[5]

as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology,
which states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: none

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[6]

 Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications
were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being
the case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro
Ramos[7] stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow,
Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, [8] Ricardo Abads physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with
gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the
illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial courts
finding of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court,
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.[9] Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.[10]
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to
say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is
deceased is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as
to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latters
death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate
has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos death. More telling,
while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed
buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first husband,
the latters name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista
Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria
Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [11] The rule on
confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which
the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal
representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was
acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was
necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information
would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]
 Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert,
however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the
deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter
contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that
society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of
contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any
patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible
in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed
out that: The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as
stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law
would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated,
if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which
a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are
not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish
their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence
presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo Abad. We quote with approval the trial courts decision, thus:

In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and
1970, and in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967,
1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria
Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh.
12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).

xxxxxxxxx

In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11)
years old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan
with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and
34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).

In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00
with the Peoples Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971,
payable to either of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5,
1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable
to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister
Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9%
income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account
reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo
Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for
Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo
Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the
name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account
17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad,
petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions
are:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate

children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Italics supplied)

As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to
their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence
presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As
stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be
disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. [13] In fact, petitioners seem to
accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether
the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa
Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This
affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same
was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are
binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal
of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is
SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 91114

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the
physician-patient relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as
being violative thereof the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul the
order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental
Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of
petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such
marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was
terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three
(3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own
behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent's counsel announced that
he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who
specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify
on 25 January 1989. Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground
that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since
the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition,
the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.
On 24 January 1989, petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to
quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the
motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court
heard this urgent motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined
the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from
testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient
relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr.
Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify
on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a
professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the
motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the
witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert
witness and was asked by hypothetical questions related to her field of
expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the
petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she had prescribed.
Since petitioner's counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion
be reduced to writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the
same date:
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24,
1989, petitioner seeks to prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying
because she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic)
communication rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert
witness and that she will not testify on any information she acquired in (sic)
attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court
denied the respondent's motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to
testify. However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose his
objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited
is covered by the privileged communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to
qualify her as an in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to
what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to
render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain
behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly
Lim but she never revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic);
nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim; nor (sic) the medicines
she prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby
DENIED."[1]
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of
Appeals a petition[2] for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as
C.A.-G.R. SP N. 16991, to annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on
the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with
the reception of Dr. Acampado's testimony.
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
resolution[3] denying due course to the petition on the ground that "the
petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25,
1969." Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the
conditions which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence
between a physician and his patient under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the following findings:
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage, and the person
whose testimony is sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a
physician, who was summoned by the patient in her professional capacity
for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the
information given by the physician in her testimony in open court on
January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication. We are of the opinion
that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication
because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while
attending her in her professional capacity; and neither were (sic) the
information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give
treatment to the patient, Nelly Lim. And neither does the information
obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or
bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical
Specialist II and incharge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center
for Mental Health, a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to
testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado's testimony, We
find no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information which
she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she
attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that
she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything
she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of
her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr.
Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the
fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to
(sic) whatever information or findings the doctor obtained from attending
the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert
concerning a patient's ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired
in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic)
the hypothetical question. (Butler vs. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of
Arizona, Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on
hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has
attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony
tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his
professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago vs. City of Cedar
Rapids, 98 NW 354; see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and
patient proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the
communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin.
Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of
physician and patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of
each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the
occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of
establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege,
including the confidential nature of the information given."[4]
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner
took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the
respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred":
"I.
x x x in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-
patient privileged communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the
case at bar.
II.
x x x in believing that Dr. Acampado 'was summoned as an expert witness
and not as an attending physician of petitioner.'
III.
x x x in concluding that Dr. Acampado made 'no declaration that touched
(sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient,
Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a professional
capacity.'
IV.
x x x in declaring that 'the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential
nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.'"[5]
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda[6] after the private respondent filed his
Comment[7] and the petitioner submitted her reply[8] thereto. The parties
subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in its challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rues on
Evidence which reads:
"SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. -- The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient."
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the
inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b)
substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21
in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940
Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase
"which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken."[9] Verily,
these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules
of Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the
character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement
was imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such
character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on July 1989,
the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the
word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between
these two concepts. "'Character' is what a man is, and 'reputation' is what
he is supposed to be in what people say he is. 'Character' depends
on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on attributes which others believe
one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what s
accepted to be reality at present."[10]
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of
all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness
stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be
enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient.[11] It rests in public
policy and is for the general interest of the community.[12]
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if
no timely objection is made to the physician's testimony.[13]
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient."[14]
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions
necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
certain communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation."[15]
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity
when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege.[16] It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only
of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making
a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated."[17]
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites.[18]
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other
course of action but to agree with the respondent Court's observation that
the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner;
moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the
doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing
that Dr. Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her relating
to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained
from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between
them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then
be excluded. The rule on this point is summarized as follows:
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the
statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated
by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a
strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his
opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning
such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege
where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion
solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from
consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the
physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient's
condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." [19]
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the
petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always
conducted in the presence of a third party, thus:
"Q - I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?
A - I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the
history, I interviewed the patient, Nelly.
Q - How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?
A - Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before,
once in the month of April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June
1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim,
who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q - Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?
A - Yes, I understand.
Q - Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a
clinic?
A - I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about
Nelly, I could not get anything from Dr. Lim.
Q - Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any
doctor who was also present during that interview?
A - No, sir, I don't remember any."[20]
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation
with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such information
from the mantle of the privilege:
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys
the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient
and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the
doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result."[21]
Thirdly, except for the petitioner's sweeping claim -- that "(T)he
information given by Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic)
reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial
court and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance
called schizophrenia -- which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable
injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," [22] -- which
is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to
show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr.
Acampado would blacken the former's "character" (or "reputation"). Dr.
Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner
regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment recommended therefor.
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral
request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado
and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before
the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the
witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the
privilege, despite the trial court's advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony once it becomes apparent that the testimony,
sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The
particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr.
Acampado quoted in the petitioner's Petition[23] and Memorandum,[24] and
in the private respondent's Memorandum,[25] do not at all show that any
objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of
Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably
object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Bidin, (Acting Chairman), Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on
the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared
the report.

The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the
contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now
before us on a petition for review on certiorari.

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de
Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple
developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in
fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared
and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the
report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br.
II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the
trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz
merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the
rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a
Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that
would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a
Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever
for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being
completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has
since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose
the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.

On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the
Record. 8

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report in evidence and ruling that —

. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the
respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the
respondent had been suffering from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when
the said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not
object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between
patient and physician. What was raised by the respondent was that the said
psychiatric report was irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and
for the purpose of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition was
suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material
and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part
of the respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner
and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be presented. 9

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991,
and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.

Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5
February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review.

Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric
report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the
case. She argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters
which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE
REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from
submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has
acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that the
reason behind the prohibition is —
 . . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension
of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. 13

She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's
intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his
patient." 14 Her thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done
indirectly.

Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she asserted
in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was
filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it
has never been intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal
basis whatsoever to expunge it from the records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is
the husband and not the physician of the petitioner." 16In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction
his testimony considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one
against the other.

Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person
entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use
of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their
marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied
consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where
she merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to
interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged
matters may be construed as an implied waiver.

With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this in
reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between
physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making
communications between physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the
patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and
condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that will result
in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with
the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and guards against the
possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their subsequent
disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the
humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of
information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health
records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging
those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.

Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly lays
down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is
claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on
a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he
invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It
was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.

The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The
allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's
declarations which may be denied or disproved during the trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already lapsed
and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony
thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with deliberate
speed in resolving the main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this
case. If all lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial
and include in their appeals depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of
appellate courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise
prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the
resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition
and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the
right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO

INVENCION y SORIANO, appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us for automatic review is the Decision dated 22 September 1997

[1] [2]

of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No.
9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old
daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay Cynthia the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000
as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with
thirteen counts of rape in separate complaints docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were consolidated
and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in
each case.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were
Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty.
Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and
Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog
Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of
Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime
before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room
with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was
awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on
top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father
put on his short pants.
[3]

Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a
drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her
suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his
stepfather, Celestino Navarro.[4]
 Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay
Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March
1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of
Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He
then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of
the sawaliwall of Artemios house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and
crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie
observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to
the field to catch fish. He reported what he had witnessed to Artemios
[5]

stepfather, Celestino, later that morning. [6]

Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of

Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started living together in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they
had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio
parted ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac.
When Artemios mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a
small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located in Barangay Sapang
Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac. On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that
[7]

Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked
Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually
abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their
daughter Cynthia.[8]

Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined
Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months
pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock
positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign
body inserted in her private part. [9]

Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996,

Cynthia, accompanied by her mother, complained before him and NBI
Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father
Artemio. She then executed a written statement, which she subscribed and
[10]

sworn to before Atty. Canlas. [11]

The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de
parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the
defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified
before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to
the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made
of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut. When he went
around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front
and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room
where Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about
noontime, it was dark inside. Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution
[12]

witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen
what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in
the sawali wall of the house in the early morning sometime on the second
week of March 1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to
live was a small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When
she went there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a
hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people
passed by to fish in a nearby brook. When she went to the place again
[13]

sometime in September 1996 after she was informed of Cynthias pregnancy,

she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not yet
repaired.[14]

The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio,

testified that he is the owner of the small house where Artemio and his
children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children, including
Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts old sawali walls had some small
holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was
arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint before the NBI, Celestino made
some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets
to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a
person named Alvin occupied the house. [15]

In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in

Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve
cases for lack of evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I

... BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;

II

NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO

PROVE [HIS] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He

argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness
against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, [16]

Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him
to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover,
Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, Artemio points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies:
(1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen
Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat
testified having seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m.in
the second week of March 1996; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996,
Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba from November
1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in
Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr.,
Gloria stated that he was living with the appellant, but later she declared that
he was living with her in Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark
even at daytime, it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly
doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges
us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and
Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio)
because he had been badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the
hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased mother. On the other
hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting
with another man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for
the affirmation of Artemios conviction and sentence, but recommends that a
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in addition to the awards
of moral and exemplary damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the
culpability of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer,
the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or
full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien. This [17]
rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued
by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of
the facts. We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at bar.
[18]

As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected

by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule
[19]

on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a

descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked
[20]

or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven
was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he
was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell
the truth. [21]

Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding

leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of
[22]

tender years like Elven.

The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also
deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and
flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not
have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been
compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters
virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-
motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly
pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his
father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for
the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence. [23]

We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time

that the rape was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or
between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or
date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is
decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused
has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor
matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds
for acquittal. In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed,
[24]

committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

 The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do
not impair the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that
they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not
destroy the witnesses credibility. On the contrary, they may even be
[25]

considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material

points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on
essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent
whole. [26]

Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to
have seen and witnessed the crime because the room was dark even at
daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and
Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was
without electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his identification of
Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven
was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without
sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud
cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father. [27]

The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not
sufficiently proved. Nothing in the records suggests any reason that would
motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the father of her other
children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her
child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for
rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the person
responsible for her childs defilement incarcerated. As for Celestino, he
[28]

testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda,
and not by Artemios mother. At any rate, even without Celestinos testimony,
[29]

Artemios conviction would stand.

The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of
death imposed by the trial court. The death penalty was imposed because of
the trial courts appreciation of the special qualifying circumstances that
Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at
the time the crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
which is the governing law in this case, pertinently reads:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

 ...

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a

father on a daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the
complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by
the quantum of proof required for conviction. The accusatory portion of the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as follows:

That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of his daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [30]

Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the
complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the
complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna, we set the guidelines in
[31]

appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying

circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents

such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been

lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity
 or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought

to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document

was presented and offered in evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement
in the medical certificate showing Cynthias age is not proof thereof, since a
medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the
victim. Moreover, pursuant to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias
age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged to be 16 years old already at
the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18
years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on
Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence. Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of
[32]

Cynthias minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and

sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of simple
rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are
insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape, should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the
[33]

victim shall not be less than P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim
Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., on leave.