G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
01-094 and entitled
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria
Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed
out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed
as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the
April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another
Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot
staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to
Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R.
No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1)
dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain
orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years
old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to
Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca
gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the
First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil
Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations
pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14,
1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only
of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the
issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and
secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American
citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.
as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot,
the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In
it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for
her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay
a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the
amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on, inter
alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for
support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition,
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid
divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another
marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand,
charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 18 denying Vicente's
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's
application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in
Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken
up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the
trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca
does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the
above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. 22 On April
30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final
resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent
court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001,
and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No.
01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount
of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ 25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the
CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2,
2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for
certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision
dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-
094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to
the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No.
01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to
dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining
whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements
of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against
Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have
her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having
previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being
a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was
rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father,
at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of
Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous
events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she
applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually
secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little
over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn
petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on
March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a
purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about
being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce
precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the
validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of
errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which
converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled
her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed
CA decision submitting as follows:
I For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS
CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER
PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED
FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE
ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First,
a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine
national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And
third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to
another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. 32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of
the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into
the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino
citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the
Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the
Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she
applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship:
(1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus
soli is followed in this American territory granting American
citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and
may still be, a holder of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the
marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment 34 in
which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000
upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by
Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA
Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female
Civil Status: married
Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown
Distinguishing marks on face: none
 was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as
per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8,
2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October,
1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition
on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years
from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate
No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995after
the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR
No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate
could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995
when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the
issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of
Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is,
thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in
question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of
Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which
is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and
the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the
DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by
the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section
shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from
its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an
Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1 st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events
which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or
confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino
citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate
No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau
Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or
confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen
through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual
issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13,
2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca,
She Was not a Filipino Citizen and
Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least
was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured
the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that
Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration
of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC)
obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged
Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows
that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed
with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after
Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce
decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about
said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents
appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-
Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of
Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the
Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical
to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of
the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her
case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first
petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following
material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce
Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as
Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their
respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause
of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96
and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca
was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in
fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself
in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least,
she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her
American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second,
she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is
evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of
the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The
parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing
at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x
x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing
him to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country which
allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree
No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997.
Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca
was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not
been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did
they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge
the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the
decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court
explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally
secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented
by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid
and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as
a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the
outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
the same shall be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As
an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife
to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat
the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no
longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code.
He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for
the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor
further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during
the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No.
406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind
both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations.
The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property
consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by
TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x
x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was
affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered
that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference
but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and
directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in
the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation
before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala
Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition
for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the
Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the
concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of
action exists if the following elements are present, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
 constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition
before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather
than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured
by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente.
There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix.
The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty,
albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been
insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born
on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November
27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition
for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence,
the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action
for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of
Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions
until the child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to
delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her
entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA
veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4,
2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157044 October 5, 2005
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, (represented by his heirs, Rodolfo,
Jr., Romeo Allan, Lillian Rhodora, Roy Victor, Roger Lyle
and Alexander Nicolai, all surnamed Rosales) and LILY
ROSQUETA-ROSALES, Petitioners
vs.
MIGUEL CASTELLTORT, JUDITH CASTELLTORT, and LINA
LOPEZ-VILLEGAS, assisted by her Attorney-in-Fact, Rene
Villegas, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari assails the October 2,
2002 Decision1 and February 6, 2003 Resolution2of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 64046 and seeks to reinstate
the April 21, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2229-95-C.
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-
Rosales (petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856 4 and designated
as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in
Los Baños, Laguna.
On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was
being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). 5
It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had
purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from
respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-
in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by
geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17
as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with
Villegas offering a larger lot near petitioners’ lot in the same
subdivision as a replacement thereof.6 In the alternative, Villegas
proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners’ lot with legal
interest.7 Both proposals were, however, rejected by
petitioners8 whose counsel, by letter9of August 24, 1995, directed
Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and
any other structure he may have built thereon, and desist from
entering the lot.
Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a
complaint10 for recovery of possession and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction
against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort
before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.
2229-95-C.
To the complaint, the Castelltorts claimed in their Answer with
Counterclaim11 that they were builders in good faith.
Lina, represented by her son-attorney-in-fact Villegas, soon filed
a Motion for Intervention12 before the RTC which was granted by
Order13 of December 19, 1995.
In her Answer to the complaint,14 Lina alleged that the
Castelltorts acted in good faith in constructing the house on
petitioners’ lot as they in fact consulted her before commencing
any construction thereon, they having relied on the technical
description of the lot sold to them, Lot 16, which was verified by
her officially designated geodetic engineer.
Nevertheless, Lina proposed to give petitioners a lot containing
an area of 536 square meters together with the house and duplex
structure built thereon or, if petitioners choose, to encumber the
536 square meter lot as collateral "to get immediate cash"
through a financing scheme in order to compensate them for the
lot in question.15
Ruling out good faith, the RTC, by Decision of April 21, 1999,
found for petitioners in this wise:
In the instant case, there is no well-founded belief of ownership
by the defendants of the land upon which they built their house.
The title or mode of acquisition upon which they based
their belief of such ownership stemmed from a Contract to Sell
(Exhibit "P") of which they were not even parties, the designated
buyer being Elizabeth Yson Cruz and the sale even subjected to
the judicial reconstitution of the title. And by their own actions,
particularly defendant Miguel Castelltort, defendants betrayed
this very belief in their ownership when realizing the inutility of
anchoring their ownership on the basis of the Contract of Sale,
defendant Miguel Castelltort in his testimony declared Elizabeth
Yson Cruz as his wife (tsn, pp. 7-8, March 24, 1998) despite an
admission in their answer that they are the spouses named as
defendants (tsn, p. 8, January 12, 1998) and which declaration is
an utter falsehood as the Contract to Sell itself indicates the civil
status of said Elizabeth Yson Cruz to be single.
Even if we are to concede that defendants built their house in
good faith on account of the representation of attorney-in-fact
Rene Villegas, their failure to comply with the requirements of the
National Building Code, particularly the procurement of a building
permit, stained such good faith and belief.
xxx
From any and all indications, this deliberate breach is an
unmitigated manifestation of bad faith. And from the evidence
thus adduced, we hold that defendants and the intervenor were
equally guilty of negligence which led to the construction of the
defendants’ house on plaintiffs’ property and therefore jointly and
severally liable for all the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads,
quoted verbatim:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to surrender the possession of the property
covered by TCT No. 36856 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna
including any and all improvements built thereon to the plaintiffs.
Defendants and intervenors are likewise jointly and severally
directed to pay to plaintiffs the following damages:
a) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS per month from
February 1995 by way of reasonable compensation for the use of
plaintiffs’ property until the surrender of the same;
b) FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS by way of moral
damages;
c) THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as exemplary
damages;
d) TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as attorney’s
fees and cost of suit.
The counterclaim interposed by the defendants in their
responsive pleading is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Respondents thereupon filed their respective appeals with the
CA.
Petitioner Rodolfo Rosales, in the meantime, died on December
7, 2001. His heirs Rodolfo, Jr., Romeo Allan, Lillian Rhodora,
Roy Victor, Roger Lyle and Alexander Nicolai, all surnamed
Rosales, filed their Appearance18 as his substitute.
By Decision of October 2, 2002, the CA granted the appeal and
set aside the April 21, 1999 RTC Decision. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the court a
quo REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In accordance with the cases
of Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals and Depra vs. Dumlao, applying Article 448 of the Civil
Code, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, for further proceedings, as follows:
1. to determine the present fair price of appellees’ 315 square
meter area of land and the amount of the expenses actually
spent by the appellants for building the house as of 21 August
1995, which is the time they were notified of appellees’ rightful
claim over Lot 17.
2. to order the appellees to exercise their option under the law
(Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the house as
their own by paying to the appellants the amount of the expenses
spent for the house as determined by the court a quo in
accordance with the limitations as aforestated or to oblige the
appellants to pay the price of the land.
In case the appellees exercise the option to oblige the appellants
to pay the price of the land but the latter reject such purchase
because, as found by the court, the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the house, the court shall order
the parties to agree upon the terms of a forced lease, and give
the court a quo a formal written notice of such agreement and its
provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the court a
quo shall then fix the terms of the forced lease, provided that the
monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less that Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, payable within the first
five (5) days of each calendar month and the period thereof shall
not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the
judgment.
Upon the expiration of the forced lease, or upon default by the
appellants in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, the appellees shall be entitled to terminate the forced
lease, to recover their land, and to have the improvement
removed by the appellants at the latter’s expense. The rentals
herein provided shall be tendered by the appellants to the court
for payment to the appellees, and such tender shall constitute
evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the
period fixed by the court.
In any event, the appellants shall pay the appellees the amount
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as reasonable
compensation for their occupancy of the encroached property
from the time said appellants’ good faith cease (sic) to exist until
such time the possession of the property is delivered to the
appellees subject to the reimbursement of the aforesaid
expenses in favor of the appellants or until such time the
payment of the purchase price of the said lot be made by the
appellants in favor of the appellees in case the latter opt for the
compulsory sale of the same.
SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis in the original)
In reversing the trial court, the CA held:
xxx
x x x A perusal of the records readily reveals that said court
instead relied on flimsy, if not immaterial, allegations of the
appellees, which have no direct bearing in the determination of
whether the appellants are builders in bad faith.
For one, the pivotal issue to be resolved in this case, i.e. whether
appellant Miguel is a builder in good faith, was ignored by the
court a quo. The instant case does not in any way concern the
personal and property relations of spouses-appellants and
Elizabeth Yson Cruz which is an altogether different matter that
can be ventilated by the concerned parties through the institution
of a proper action. xxx The court a quo should have focused on
the issue of whether appellant Miguel built, in good faith, the
subject house without notice of the adverse claim of the
appellees and under the honest belief that the lot which he used
in the construction belongs to him. Xxx
xxx As it is, appellant Miguel relied on the title which the
intervenor showed to him which, significantly, has no annotation
that would otherwise show a prior adverse claim. Thus, as far as
appellant Miguel is concerned, his title over the subject lot, as
well as the title of the intervenor thereto, is clean and untainted
by an adverse claim or other irregularities.
For another, the appellants’ failure to secure a building permit
from the Municipal Engineer’s Office on their construction on Lot
17 does not impinge on the good faith of the appellants. In fact, it
can be told that a building permit was actually filed by appellant
Miguel with respect to Lot 16 and it was only due to the confusion
and misapprehension by the intervenor of the exact parameters
of the property which caused appellant’s belief that Lot 17 [the
questioned lot], is his. This fact bolsters appellant Miguel’s good
faith in building his house on appellees’ lot under the mistaken
belief that the same is his property. Otherwise, he should have
secured a building permit on Lot 17 instead or should not have
bothered to take the necessary measures to obtain a building
permit on Lot 16 in the first place.
By and large, the records show that, as testified to by Engr.
Rebecca T. Lanuang, appellant Miguel had already applied for a
building permit as early as February 1994 and was in fact issued
a temporary building permit pending the completion of the
requirements for said permit. Although the building permit was
belatedly issued in January 1996, this does not in any way
detract from appellant Miguel’s good faith.
xxx
In holding the appellants as builders in bad faith, the court a quo
defied law and settled jurisprudence considering that the factual
basis of its findings and the incontrovertible evidence in support
thereof prove that the appellant Miguel, in good faith, built the
house on appellees’ land without knowledge of an adverse claim
or any other irregularities that might cast a doubt as to the
veracity of the assurance given to him by the intervenor. Having
been assured by the intervenor that the stone monuments were
purposely placed, albeit wrongfully, by the land surveyor in said
land to specifically identify the lot and its inclusive boundaries,
the appellants cannot be faulted for having relied on the expertise
of the land surveyor who is more equipped and experienced in
the field of land surveying. Although under the Torrens system of
land registration, the appellant is presumed to have knowledge of
the metes and bounds of the property with which he is dealing,
appellant however, considering that he is a layman not versed in
the technical description of his property, cannot be faulted in his
reliance on the survey plan that was delivered to him by the
intervenor and the stone monuments that were placed in the
encroached property.
xxx
Peremptorily, contrary to the flawed pronouncements made by
the court a quo that appellant Miguel is deemed as a builder in
bad faith on the basis of a mere assertion that he built his house
without initially satisfying himself that he owns the said property,
this Court finds reason to maintain good faith on the part of the
appellant. Admittedly, the appellants’ house erroneously
encroached on the property of the appellees due to a mistake in
the placement of stone monuments as indicated in the survey
plan, which error is directly attributable to the fault of the geodetic
engineer who conducted the same. This fact alone negates bad
faith on the part of appellant Miguel.
xxx
Moreover, it is quite illogical for appellant Miguel to knowingly
build his house on a property which he knew belongs to another
person. x x x
xxx
In view of the good faith of both parties in this case, their
rights and obligations are to be governed by Article 448,
which has been applied to improvements or portions of
improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to
the adjoining owner. x x x
x x x20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration 21 dated October 22, 2002
having been denied by the CA by Resolution of March 13, 2002,
the present petition was filed raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING
A FINDING THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS BY
THE PARTIES
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT, IN DECIDING THE
CASE, RELIED ON FLIMSY, IF NOT IMMATERIAL,
ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITIONERS, WHICH HAVE NO
DIRECT BEARING IN THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER
THE RESPONDENTS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
RENDERING A DECISION THAT IS UNENFORCEABLE
AGAINST BOTH RESPONDENT JUDITH CASTELLTORT AND
THIRD-PARTY ELIZABETH CRUZ22
Petitioners initially hammer against respondents’ proving that
Castelltort and a certain Elizabeth Cruz are the builders of the
house on the subject property, they faulting them with estoppel
for alleging in their Answer before the trial court that "they
(respondents Castelltort and Judith) caused the construction of
their house which they bought from a certain Lina Lopez-
Villegas."
Petitioners rely on the following doctrine established in Elayda v.
Court of Appeals:23
"an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not x x x"
Petitioners’ contention is hardly relevant to the case at bar.
Whether it was Castelltort and Judith or Castelltort and Elizabeth
Cruz who purchased the property from Lina is not material to the
outcome of the instant controversy. As found by the CA:
The fact remains that appellant [Castelltort] is the builder of the
house on Lot 17 xxx The court a quo should have focused on the
issue of whether appellant Miguel built, in good faith, the subject
house without notice of the adverse claim of the appellees and
under the honest belief that the lot which he used in the
construction belongs to him. xxx it cannot be gainsaid that
appellant Miguel has a title over the land that was purchased
from the intervenor x x x24
At all events, as this Court held in the case of Gardner v. Court of
Appeals:25
In its Resolution reversing the original Decision, respondent
Court discredited the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS for being at
variance with the allegations in his Answer. The fact, however,
that the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings
and in his declarations in open Court differed will not militate
against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by
respondent Court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s
pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon
it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a
mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove,
but it is not evidence. As Ariosto SANTOS himself, in open Court,
had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and
against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and
credence.26 (Underscoring supplied)
The issue determinative of the controversy in the case at bar
hinges on whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the
land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right
to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. 27
Article 527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.28
In the case at bar, Lot 16 was sold by Lina, through her attorney-
in-fact Villegas, to Castelltort and a certain Elizabeth Cruz 29 for a
consideration of ₱500,000.00. While prior to the sale, what
Villegas showed Castelltort as evidence of his mother Lina’s
ownership of the property was only a photocopy of her title TCT
No. (T-42171) T-1855030 he explaining that the owner’s duplicate
of the title was lost and that judicial reconstitution thereof was
ongoing, Castelltort acted in the manner of a prudent man and
went to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a certified
true copy of the TCT.31 The certified true copy bore no annotation
indicating any prior adverse claim on Lot 16.
The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began
constructing his house on petitioners’ lot, he believed that it
was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
In his cross-examination, Villegas testified:
Q: You said the surveyor placed a mujon along boundary of the
property?
A: Yes.
Q: When were the mujons placed in the boundary of the
property?
A: These mujons were the basis for my locating the property in
pointing to Mr. Castelltort.
xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that before Miguel Castelltort started
constructing that house he sought your advice or permission to
construct the same over that particular lot?
A: Yes.
Q: And you gave your consent?
A: Yes, because based on my knowledge also that that was the
lot as pointed by Engr. Rivera.
xxx
Q: Was there any remarkable difference between lot 16 and 17 at
the time that this particular lot was sold to Miguel Castelltort and
Elizabeth Cruz?
xxx
A: Both lots 16 and 17 are practically the same. The (sic) have
the same frontage. There is only a difference of 4 square meters,
one is 311 square meters and the other 315 square meters. Both
sides were fenced, as drawn they were facing the same road.
They are practically the same.
Q: But at the time or immediately before Mr. Castelltort started
the construction of the house, was there any remarkable
distinction between these two properties?
A: None.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was eventually traced
to the error committed by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera’s
employees in placing stone monuments on petitioners’ property,
instead of on Lot 16, the lot sold to Castelltort, based on the
survey made by the engineer in 1992.
The engineer so testified:
Q: Now, aside from inspecting personally the site, what else did
your men or assistants do?
A: After computing the subdivision lots, they went back to the
field to plant those subdivision corners with concrete monuments.
Q: Which is (sic) also called as "mohons"?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, can you point to this Honorable Court where exactly did
your men place these additional mohons and how many?
A: Later on we discovered that they placed the mohons in the
adjoining lot, lot 17.
xxx
Q: x x x when again did you meet Mr. Rene Villegas or after how
many months or year?
A: Maybe after a year, sir.
Q: And you met him again because he had a problem regarding
the property of one Engr. Rosales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he confided to you this matter, did you go to the site
of Lot 16 or 17?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you see there?
A: A house being constructed then I rechecked the location of the
house and it turned out to be in Lot 17.
xxx
Q: Considering that you found out that a mistake was actually
made by your assistants Dennis Orencio, Mario Carpio and
Sovejano when you allowed them to proceed on their own to
make this computation, did you confront these men of yours
afterwards?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what manner?
A: I actually reprimanded them verbally and also I dismissed
Mario Carpio from my office.
xxx
Q: And did you investigate how your men committed this mistake
of planting these monuments on another lot when corners 4 & 1
were clearly planted on the ground?
A: I myself rechecked it and found out that they committed an
error.
xxx
Q: And now, you are saying that your men committed a mistake
by placing thereon monuments by planting these monuments not
on Lot 16 but on Lot 17?
A: When I investigated how did they commit (sic) a mistake it
came to be like this. Before when we surveyed first this in 1992,
at that time Dante Villegas contracted my services there was a
fence here then when we went back, the road was already
removed so they committed an error that this point is Lot 19, they
thought that it was Lot 19, the back portion.
xxx
Q: In this particular case, did you find out how your men checked
the succeeding lots, how they determine (sic) the exact location
of lot 16?
A: They just relied on one side of the subdivision.
Q: By just counting the number of lots?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Without making any actual measurement?
A: They made an actual measurement but the reference point is
not the one, the correct one because they also checked it with
the other corner of the road going back.
xxx
Q: And how did they commit a mistake when you said they
checked the lot at the back of Lot 16?
A: Because they were quite confident since we had already
relocated the property two years ago so they thought that they
get (sic) the right lot without checking the other side of the
subdivision.
xxx
Q: Now, you said that when you went to the place because you
heard from Rene Villegas that there was a mistake you no longer
could find the monuments on lines 1 and 4 and according to you
the reason is that a fence was already constructed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For clarification, is this line 1 & 4 on Lot 16 a common line 1
&4 on Lot 17?
A: Yes, sir a common line.
Q: In other words, this line 1 &4 devides (sic) Lot 16 & 17?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that when these monuments were placed on lines 1 & 4
somebody could mistake it for Lot 17 also because there were
monuments now 1 &4 for lot 16 since these are common lines for
Lot 17 also with Lot 16, it could also be construed that these are
monuments for Lot 17?
A: Yes, sir possible.33 (Underscoring supplied)
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good
faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this
case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose
between appropriating the building by paying the proper
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures,
in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable
rent.34 If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of
the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords
with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies
with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive.35 The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it
from the land.36
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law
has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land
and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to
exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by
the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.37
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully.38 The good faith ceases or is legally
interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known
to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery
of the property by the true owner.39
In the case at bar, Castelltort’s good faith ceased on August 21,
1995 when petitioners personally apprised him of their title over
the questioned lot. As held by the CA, should petitioners then opt
to appropriate the house, they should only be made to pay for
that part of
the improvement built by Castelltort on the questioned property at
the time good faith still existed on his part or until August 21,
1995.
The CA, however, failed to qualify that said part of the
improvement should be pegged at its current fair market value
consistent with this Court’s pronouncement in Pecson v. Court of
Appeals.40
And, as correctly found by the CA, the commencement of
Castelltort’s payment of reasonable rent should start on August
21, 1995 as well, to be paid until such time that the possession of
the property is delivered to petitioners, subject to the
reimbursement of expenses, that is, if such option is for
petitioners to appropriate the house.
This Court quotes the CA’s ratiocination with approval:
x x x Generally, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the
payment of reasonable rent should be made only up to the date
appellees serve notice of their option as provided by law upon
the appellants and the court a quo; that is, if such option is for
appellees to appropriate the encroaching structure. In such
event, appellants would have a right to retain the land on which
they have built in good faith until they are reimbursed the
expenses incurred by them. This is so because the right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid
implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is
built, planted or sown.
However, considering that appellants had ceased as builders in
good faith at the time that appellant Miguel was notified of
appellees’ lawful title over the disputed property, the payment of
reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that time since
he can no longer avail of the rights provided under the law for
builders in good faith.41
If the option chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale, however,
the payment of rent should continue up to the actual transfer of
ownership.42
Respecting petitioners’ argument that the appellate court erred in
rendering a decision that is "unenforceable against Judith who is
not the owner of the house and Elizabeth Cruz who was found to
be a part owner of the house built on their lot but is not a party to
the case," the same does not lie.
While one who is not a party to a proceeding shall not be affected
or bound43 by a judgment rendered therein,44 like Elizabeth Cruz,
this does not detract from the validity and enforceability of the
judgment on petitioners and respondents Castelltorts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 2, 2002 and Resolution dated February 6, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that
the trial court shall include for determination the increase in value
("plus value") which petitioners’ 315 square meter lot may have
acquired by reason of the existence of that portion of the house
built before respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort were
notified of petitioners’ rightful claim on said lot, and the current
fair market value of said portion.
SO ORDERED.
 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00,
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price
vs. of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect
DECISION ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving
PEREZ, J.: an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686,
which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT.
Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San
Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the
Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. ₱1,693,125.00
m. located at 1085 Norma Street,
Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 ₱400,000.00
sq. m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao,
Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 ₱490,000.00
hectares located at Maria Aurora,
Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 175 ₱175,000.00
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed
a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June
2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her
two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation
of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied
on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the
power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2)
David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties
be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the
purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00
litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of
their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the
conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed
acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result
intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the
petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
3

sq.m. located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be
included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3-has. coconut plantation in San ₱750,000.00
Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora 3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by
petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A.
USA Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s
property rights over their conjugal properties.
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE 4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to
reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street,
Daly City, California proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half
of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty.
$550,000.00 Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
(unpaid debt of
$285,000.00) 5. How the absolute community properties should be
distributed.
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000 of the parties were chargeable against their conjugal
properties.
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are
Bank of America Cash Deposit entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.10
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00 On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00 1. The absolute community of property of the parties is
annuities hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be
The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the
the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the properties in the United States of America remaining in the
couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same. sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the
Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as
Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the
lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in 3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David
the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to
 Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America
awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as
their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income from these properties,
if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year, starting January
2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and
Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them
US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income
from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education
and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA.
The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be
increased in the future as the needs of the children require
and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase
price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are
hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A.
Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of
the respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of
the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by
their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of
Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe
period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this
Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be
submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court
within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn
from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-
in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the
parties shall be shouldered by them individually. 11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens,
the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are those of the
USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June
2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been
dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support
and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first
classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement
before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75
of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the
US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national
law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall
under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation
of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial
court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and
infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the
reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of
the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his
property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate court
ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8,
2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case
No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of
the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally
between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
(sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor
children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering
the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if
any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within
the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount
of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as
their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc
property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall
be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint
account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be
made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy
of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted
to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same
period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-
fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of
₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler,
Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times
Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals
should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded
the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part
of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial
court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine
properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US properties
by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are
US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to
their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial
separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce
decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of
a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed
the requirement on certification where we held that "[petitioner
therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree
is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there
is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the
lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements
must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception
to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially
approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to
a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner
has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the
latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the
family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in
the marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of
not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months from such
abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there
after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been
going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the
relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner
discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the said petition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia
and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name
of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form.20Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime,
as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code,
thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community
shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
 balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall
be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed
to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand
the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial
court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited
to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolutecommunity
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both claimed
to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the
same is presumed to have come from the community property.
Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale
of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on
Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case
of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-
half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse
in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as
to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in
the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their
presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor
child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of
the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled
to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or
less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his
son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued
a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16 Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under
Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons
in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of
those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution.
Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to
givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein,
hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance
of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly
lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which
lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be
brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties
from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by
writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or
of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition
highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to
family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of
the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this
Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the
same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources
of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of
efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which
provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent
is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his
minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well
as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent
also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot
rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved
the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved
in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation
that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the
ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law
would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a
sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent
is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with
the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged SO ORDERED.
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to
wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by
force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children
of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x
x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over
the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections
5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under
Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995
but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in
the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has
provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated
February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED