Q3 Part a

How would you characterize NASA`s response to the foam strike, in comparison with its response
to the Apollo 13 incident?

It was January 6th, 2003, Thursday, NASA launched Columbia from Kennedy Space Center, Columbia
aka “The Hanger Queen” as referred by most of the people because of the number of repairs it had
undergone before launch. They found it difficult to launch and related a mantra to it ”tough to
launch, easy to fly. After 81.7 seconds of its launch, a big chunk of Foam fell off from the external
fuel tank and struck the Orbiter’s left wing.

Foam, as mentioned above, is responsible for many issues faced earlier. Also, the issue being known
to NASA had become a concern to all but eventually was accepted. Later in 1992, it was named as an
in-flight anomaly and was classified as “accepted flight risk”.

However many times in the history of NASA, problems like this arose and was rectified and
responded to in many ways.

During Apollo 13 mission, primary oxygen tank burst while astronomers were travelling to the moon,
it took astronomers one day to realize that there is a problem and they immediately counter acted
on it. They were prepared for situations like this, and also they informed the NASA immediately
about this. Considering the exigency of the problem, a Tiger team was introduced which consisted of
individuals with relevant experience. They practised for emergencies multiple times. So NASA asked
the team to come up with some solution and creative ideas. The team worked intensively for three
days while oxygen level inside the craft was depleting. Then they come up with a very simplified
solution that resulted in the safe return of the Space Craft.

On the other hand, NASA knew about Columbia’s Foam strike issue, but they were not responding as
they were in Apollo Mission due to below-mentioned factors

Lack of Budget: - they were not interested in entertaining the Foam issue and rather shifting
responsibilities from one hand to other. The issue was so common that it repeated six times in
various missions before Columbia and bipod ramp had not been changed since 1992.
Foam failure in Columbia. Source: Google.

Secondly due to budgeting issue, NASA had compromised with the quality of security cameras and
their maintenance due to which cameras tracking the strike provided neither the good quality views
not the clear angles. So the error which could had been identified within next 1 hour was identified
9:30 Am the next morning.

2. Lack of contingency plan:- during Apollo 13, they immediately come up with rapid task force
“Tiger team” which was dedicatedly working for resolution of issue. It did not happened in case of
Columbia. Instead, Boeing engineers and NASA engineers formed and ad-hoc group called as Debris
Assessment Team, which was very vague. The team does not had a reporting agency and they were
not sure who and where to ask for further data. There was never a direct conversation b/w DAT and
Mission Management Team.

3. Seriousness of Problem:- During the Apollo 13 mission, it was sure that if something was not done,
all the crew members will be killed. Therefore, the action was taken at utmost priority but foam
strike was a repetitive issue and its expected outcome was unknown. So assuming the frequency of
its occurrence and unavailability of research and solution to this, they approved it for launch.
Accordingly, it was not a major issue.

4. Lack of Coordination among departments: - During Apollo 13, Task Force was supported by NASA
and was given freedom to give immediate solutions but there were several problems in Columbia:-

a) Task force designed for Columbia spacecraft Foam Strike issue lacked structuring.

b) People were not providing information to each other and blaming others.

c) The lack of organization and structure was so much that they doubted their own set parameters
and tests.

Q3 Part b: - How does the Columbia mission compare the Challenger accident in 1986?

The critical issue during both the launches was same. In 19833 foam shedding from left bipod of the
shuttle leaving the oil tank exposed occur for the first time in Challenger STS-7 and the same was
repeated though Columbia. The similarity in both the cases is that they knew the issue well before
the launch of the mission.

In both the cases, they ignored the issue, they did not come up with a solution and they were not
able to find out the root cause behind the anomaly. In Challenger, the anomaly was termed as
“accepted flight risk” and in Columbia, NASA termed spacecraft as “tough to launch” but the
problem remained.

Another Similarity in both the mission was the inability of engineers to convey the probability of
damages Foam Strike can cause in both Columbia and Challenger. After Challenger, they showed a
PPT in 2002 before the launch of Columbia where the probability of damage caused due to Foam
Strike was almost similar to the past events. In addition, in Columbia, They were incompetent in
discovering the extent of damage it caused, Engineers calculating on software had armature
experience on the software and he did not consult with the experienced professionals.