[G.R. No. 117472.

February 7, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO

ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the
filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian
R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion raises the following
grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by
the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a
bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant
from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the
father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of death
against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
 [6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III,
Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal
before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila
Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[1]
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first
time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge xxx, the defense attempted
to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the
alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the
alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the
accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not
have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
 c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-
appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of
conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to
the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in
the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately
defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance
that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty
Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial
court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the
only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which
touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the
prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal.[2]
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in
open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly
pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the
latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women." [3] Thus, this is one occasion
where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim,
in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against
the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also
cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration
that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when
coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." [5]

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance,
which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no
bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way
that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in
court to defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to
whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the required
ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to
his client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from
the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings
thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the
Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in
support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could
have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his
client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the
prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the
accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors
committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have
overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for
violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that
our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal
law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization
throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of
state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual
person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen
with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against
threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts
criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own
subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes
of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have
been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised
Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death
penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated,
provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As
early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
of Harden v. Director of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v.
Puda[11] and People v. Marcos,[12] In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.'"[13]

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself
provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the
1951 case of Limacothat:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However,
as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal
law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
[14]

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.[15]

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon
or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded
to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added
espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more
capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to
the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by
the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated
people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working
committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As
Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of
rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as
follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed
shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus
among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on
how the abolition was to be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution or by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should
be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by the
legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is
inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting,
even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty
deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope
that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another
man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as
an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended
precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons
which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty". [16]

The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the
debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its
zenith during the last decade".[17] Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness
to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless
in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As
Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death
penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future
legislation,"[18] and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of
Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following
exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right
even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of
view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is
needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or
not under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular
stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever
under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine,
under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of
the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not
believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days
or even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would
prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous
crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." [19]

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered

provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from
Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo,
however, expressed reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the
Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and
con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the
discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in
effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this
piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that
the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty
to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature,
but let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the
Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or
repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same
time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think we
should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we
are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it
to the legislature 100 percent."[20]

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it,
followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty
provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of
the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be
capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may
be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua"[22] thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to
only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then,
in People v. Masangkay,[23] People v. Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into three
new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as
the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal
Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and
after extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not
reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article III,
Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the
aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one where the death
penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said
constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be
negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished
the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining
periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided
into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the
legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it
toreclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties.
These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough". [27]

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step
process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the
death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
 On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and
against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of
death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the
Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death
penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on
this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a
vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties
as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote
against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide
the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter,
a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in
accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the
death penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on
which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one
crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed
would be left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator
would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy
issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of
 penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted
down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to
the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus,
is going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the
mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will
be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal
Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the
Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death
penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2)
And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death
penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous." [28]

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no
abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a
penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person
committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said
vote. The mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main
debate in the committee would be the determination of the crimes to be considered
heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee
on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an
explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by
amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes
provisions that do not define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the
reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty
on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of
drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future
deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death
penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death
penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty
on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was
affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided
in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed -- all
provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed
by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose
 such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but
many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the
Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision
that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in
making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed
draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended
or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were
totally repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be
retained. And some of them had to be amended because the Committee
thought that amendments were proper." [29]

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it

would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined
and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that
the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised
Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the
death penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be
considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble
is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill the
case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the death
penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the
case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do
the same -- merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the
simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and merely
adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in
these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code." [30]

From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion
until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the
sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for which
the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble
of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge
of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case
of each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher
incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than
before such ratification.[31]Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the
abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of
heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty,
Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the
alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution
was that "the State has done everything in its command so that it can be justified to use
an inhuman punishment called death penalty".[32] The problem, Senator Lina
emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous
reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly,
the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last
resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As an initial
reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement
in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not
to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase
in incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death penalty
is enough compelling reason.[33]
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines were
clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as
provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons
for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed
his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are
crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are
crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are
proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not
supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important
element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the
relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature
of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves
connected with the effect upon society and the government have made them fall under
the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death
penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so
serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for
the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the
Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the
reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated
for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes
heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the
Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling
reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is
why in the preamble, general statements were made to show these compelling
reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be
sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in
providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with
the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the
sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense
described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and
every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations
upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on
the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be
so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts
and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is
sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or less be a matter
of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect
to due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the
definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the
reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the
distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as
well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I
believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state
why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is
raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be
controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling
reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The
accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go
into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of Congress to
enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be entirely separate
from the matter of due process." [34]

Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated
our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital
punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified,
however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary session. He stressed
that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect
on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably
bound by said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have reached
only the committee level.[35]
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No.
891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and
one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16,
1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993
was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight
Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the
death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the
Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the
House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of
House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of
Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill
Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632
authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably
essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this
constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter
provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian
Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death
penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely
suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the
propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo
Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future
time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and
referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely
possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of
the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are
now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law
and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes
the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more, and they
are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes,
their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a
few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a
patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is
an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
 Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the epitome
of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business
executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high
school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands of
a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians
and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the
lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in
the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body
in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the
people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I
quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of
anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law
upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our
constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness
under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be
kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for
justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future
animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that of
society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we
hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty." [36]

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the

House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of
oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the
form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception
of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their
occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the
following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the
importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous
crimes such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the
Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as
defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as
defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed;
hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any
occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of
heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government,
committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the
'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to
the government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection
which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own
will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is
enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even
scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being
punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the
crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of
self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits
are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal
property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over
the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and
degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and permanently destroyed her
reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of
police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal
hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement
of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to
be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr.
Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in
making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation or nations,
coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism." [37]

The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11,
1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration
on third reading. [38] The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2
abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of
Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee
convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose
the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took
effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present
time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein
accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of
death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated
to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death
sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his
death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A.
7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for
having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the
death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's
view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin
requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as
unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the
following analysis.
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it
is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set
in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be
singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, [40] traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning,
hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts
so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to
be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of
crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to
afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing
the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty
of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada
grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of
capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They
were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill:
first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there
were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain
specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following
four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was
committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a
building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a
building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in
an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two
or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed
with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c) the
rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited
drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of
regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs
confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another
to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them
being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In
other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in
each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with
death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in
these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to
impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has,
in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the
accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to
the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which
circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed
in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting
or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the
penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be
imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article,
death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum
penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim
is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited
drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in
such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of
regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
[of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim
is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a
regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the
same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in
such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on
the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers
including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9,
11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article
III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or
any of the same offenses are government officials, employees or officers including
members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory
death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the
latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death]
regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by
any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness
must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an
animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality
life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual
personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value
he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences
and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence
of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in
this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of
law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial
court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be
additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished
with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No.
7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to
be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No.
7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1)
aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the
provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty;
and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably
characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the
imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted
in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime
as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the
commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is
capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and
every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the
test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of
the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing
danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death
sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one
criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and
substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A.
No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that
the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we
note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent
demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political
and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated,
curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and
we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and
thrashing it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort
to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason
required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in
the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987
such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however,
interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The imposition of the requirement that
there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death
penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is
a requirement that the death penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in
criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the
time that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death
penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say
that the constitution in the first place did not require that the death penalty be first
proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death
penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as
a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
"alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be
the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest
of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative
of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically
ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by
the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the
nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In
fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case
of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against
racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were
sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort
to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system
of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the
determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 'caste'
aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in
imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised x x x.
 xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are
pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and
unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention
of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and
sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their
death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by the
U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty
statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia,[42] Jurek v. Texas,[43] and Profitt v. Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder,
does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant
largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia. [45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric
or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always
disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that
imposing capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures
provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmities which led
the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v.
Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for
deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a
punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question
of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing
the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death
penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16
States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and
Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found
guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana
and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital
punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none
of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their
death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to
Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to
1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the
crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death
penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and the rapist an
adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was
mandatory. x x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is
an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the
victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly
unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side
of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our
own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime
of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both
in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with
whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the
'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force,
or the threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the
victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and
can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the
community's sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life
may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the
public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in
their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape,
while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling
of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We
have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture
of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty
in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is
imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest
citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both
their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the
safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate
heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can
mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at
the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death
question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over
death". But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for
struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is,
in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are
of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially
repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting
zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that
seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to
preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and
will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may rule
comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if
limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on
this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false
delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival."
[47]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED[48] for LACK OF MERIT.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf

of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS
IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI],

represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S.
Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M.
Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando
M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F
emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco &
Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R.
Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and
on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA
Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali,
THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B.
Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON,
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL
ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II,
DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its

National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A.
Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J.
Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE
H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T.

DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known
as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA,
CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO,
and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F.

PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as

Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT
Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA

BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO,

JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI

SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND
SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a
developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a
problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government
continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the
general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole.
The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to
enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial
solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes
on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when
called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash
between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M.
Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat
Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution
(Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and
several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas,
Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task
Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro
City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen

(Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the
Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a
citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
 (9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines

Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar
(MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and
several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity

as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an

accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the
RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes
cancer and other health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that
the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
 authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary
to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such
as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses,
or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for
indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a
medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services
since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public
would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that
the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.45
 • The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated
as "violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a
full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only
his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they
are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their
children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to
the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to
determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative

authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1
), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units

(LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is
contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to
LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of
Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the
Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;
2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the
parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the
sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9
and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the
Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on
some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June
18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under
Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable
of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by
a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population,

which recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male
vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a
National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to
space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued
Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others,
made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning
services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods
of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or
preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the
country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be
adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International
Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country
enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on
galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million
Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000
and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the
measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to
the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more
effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on
the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective
the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays
that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se.
As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly
licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the
RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the
cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country -
is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the
widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge
 4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it
should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the
compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's
ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners,
and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of
judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis
of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the
three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation
of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the
Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation
- but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may
be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be
subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason
is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is
not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line
with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,

"judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual
case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that
the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since
no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its
operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate

or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the

Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that
the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights.
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to
render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners
or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through
an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is,
after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in
Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but
also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all.
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life
and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait
for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life
of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing
its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and
the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin
E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero,
it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph
of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be
"so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible

parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a)
of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives
that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has
life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient"
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research
shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized
ovum which already has life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners
assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an
affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no
way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law
does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and
supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that

contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was
enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the
Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only
when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right
to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins
from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not
prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom,
or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An
Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to
achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and
health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No.
4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding
this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been
grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are
quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as
an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation
of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of
survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental

Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S.
Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases
in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court,
said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in
the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect
the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized
by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of

human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that
needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says
yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients
which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes
in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in
the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the
moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens
23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a
total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only
in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the
fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human
life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from
the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but
rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us
here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the
Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life
begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that
would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins
from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give
any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually,
that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it
has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg
meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether
certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact
that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel
towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that
they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this
provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether
or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the
provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would
allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized
that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question
of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the

point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the
millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be
assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this
afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like
to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives
which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the
committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive.
There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has
already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even
admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal
ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am
discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s

Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of
pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a
viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from
which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical

schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the
moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation
of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental
stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development
begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process
known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with
the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with
the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling
of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a
large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under
ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic
genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on
the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA
maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along
the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can
be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment
of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception
are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete
with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any
drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It
would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting
the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal
proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed
by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection
be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH
Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. 170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
 xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities,
services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide
freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing
of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and
to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided,
however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law,
presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients.
To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any
drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because
the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which,
as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the
destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does
not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman
suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is
a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection
from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized
ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device
that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that
"any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification
from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is
not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its
expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient,
since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as
worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as
abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second
paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such
purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely
abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law
defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern
family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that
prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken.
As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-
IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole
known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the
fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion,
the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the
EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do
not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the
principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained,
the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and
prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive
would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in
the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of
developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk
is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended
that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased
risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an
indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law,
the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-
executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if
it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the
health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.

Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce

a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
(Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not
question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status
quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a
good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees
with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be

dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell,

dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive
drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is

used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum:
and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent

introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of
preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall
be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not
less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,

pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded,
dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public
except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other
relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law
which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the
whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies
to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and
budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections
of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit
their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The
public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De
Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or
loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this
ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured
up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The
first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has
the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine
device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the
EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in
the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are
in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered
by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious
education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient
or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their
beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that
"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love
and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing

that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious
freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional
guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services
to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For
the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with
the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized,
the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and
(2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the
right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public
health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation
of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in
Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered
a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling
them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality.
Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion
of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon
the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's
freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's
belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive
acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that
endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality,
non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are
not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be
couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate
in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As
the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of
non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a
specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only
seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's
duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that
what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their
right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his
religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be
allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious
freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In
other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced
compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is
allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access
to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front
of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State
under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to
refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents

claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to
have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account
of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information
given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family
planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing
various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made
up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History
has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different
sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in
a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes
with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would
not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of
Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual

respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
1âwphi 1

less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down
the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly

or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee,
the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's
belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of
one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting,
within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards
for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended
to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and
the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination
and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without
bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and
can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the
Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the
theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral
law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that
free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning

with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this
test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive
means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule.
Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all
the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate
danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used
in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases
set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society
and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test .
Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and
Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects.
The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent
with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar
to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut
of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is
therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which
shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be
the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty
while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This
was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays.
In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of
the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the
use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with
"faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it
does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious
beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands
of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State
shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have
been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR
and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State
shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have
the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs,
taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments.
[Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's

organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women,
the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the
needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns
consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality,
their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it
will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands
that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government

legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal
of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a
more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense
tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean
conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the
predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of
the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a
false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to
free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn
includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom
follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights
guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice
through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public
or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in
the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that
the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's
Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on
their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if
'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the
same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or
refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court
deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The
same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in
the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to
ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is
bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the
Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by
virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious
objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health
officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt
from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong
to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even
if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the
hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the
secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through
the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the
RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR
and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you
mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you
have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in
the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered
conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional
right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in
defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state
interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain.

The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest
that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an
action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State
interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State
interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free
speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated
when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according
to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an

individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate
"the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not
presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the
act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in
utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that
the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A .
No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The
pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for
women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State
shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-
responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and
which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That
in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to
women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the
right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address

pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family

planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to
educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including

sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast

and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related

complications;
 (8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health
services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction

pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems

of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged
and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the
prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women
in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education
on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to
be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including
fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling
state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of
unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this
point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the
Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although
there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist
that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs,
an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be
given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced
referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in
the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm
on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good"
effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of
one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided
that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the
loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable.
Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the

life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the
medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he
would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power
by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in
the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues
that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the
basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and

implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth,
contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding
their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any
person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement,
the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the
founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall
defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family.
The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them
" is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband
and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family,
all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the
policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which

belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect
their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their
own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they
chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710,

otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have
equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint
decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood,
as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute
authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital
privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of

contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone
of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who
will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7
of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to
tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice,
and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and
father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In
this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It
imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control
over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and
family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining
close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the
family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of
their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section
23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access
to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on
the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under
the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper
care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they
are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the
spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down.
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating

the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education
under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to
be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and
statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown
of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law
is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate
the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the
1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is,
that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and
teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights
and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t)
of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds
that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than
supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their
children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health

education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of
the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the
due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a
"private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not
define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern
family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt
from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing
of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care
service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines
a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which
is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation
of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is
a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily
renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for
the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough
to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health
care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference,
the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or

intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of
legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or
model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements
of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand,
the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is
acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health
and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under
the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary
target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the
various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in
the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on
the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in
a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted

as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature
as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.
It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health
care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the
needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have
and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the
petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its
provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in
the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere
fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational
institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers
to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform
acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege
and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be
an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious
beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs
List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under
the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be
called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health

products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the

implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health
products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety,
efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as

basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance
with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of
health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and
quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,

wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
 "(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for
health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for
registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days
and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been
observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health
product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are
specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress
to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines
that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law,
it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17
of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

 (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions
and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the
local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under
the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be
implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the
training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide
for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to
provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said
reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH
Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the
regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted
the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject
the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by
the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from
what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written
law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the
very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life.
It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court
that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled,
poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago ,
are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel
their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are
still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas
Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing
population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement
level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not
use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious
objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to
say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying
what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is
not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to
remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is
for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must
carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and
existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is,
as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with
coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional,
there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No.
4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No.
9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning
method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. L-43098 March 30, 1981

MARIANO R. BASA, Petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Department of Justice), Respondents. chanrobles v irt ual law li bra ry

MAKASIAR, J.:

Mariano R. Basa, retired municipal judge of Calapan, Oriental

Mindoro, seeks the review of the December 12, 1975 decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission in WC Case No. C-958,
which affirmed the October 14, 1975 order of the acting chief of
Unit, Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor, at San Pablo City,
denying his second claim for reimbursement of medical expenses
incurred in relation with his heart ailment. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

On July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered a heart attack that

incapacitated him from further performing his function as municipal
judge, and which forced him on October 16, 1969 to retire from the
service. Consequently, he filed a claim for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was awarded on
October 26, 1970 permanent and total disability benefits and
reimbursement of medical expenses incurred, chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

On January 26, 1975 or after a period of almost six (6) years his
initial heart attack on July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered his second
heart attack which proved more severe, causing loss of his power of
speech and the weakening of his body. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On June 26, 1975, he filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit

of the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 5, at San Pablo
City, a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in
connection with his aforesaid second heart attack; but the same
was denied on October 14, 1975 by the acting chief of unit for lack
of merit, reasoning that petitioner had been awarded benefits under
Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, for
permanent and total disability, plus reimbursement of medical
expenses. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Petitioner duly filed his motion for reconsideration, invoking Section

13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On December 27, 1976, respondent Commission rendered a

decision affirming the decision of its acting chief of unit, thus: chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

It appears that claimant of this case has previously been awarded

compensation under Section 15 of the Act and the instant case was
subsequently filed in relation thereto only for the sole purpose of
seeking reimbursement under Section 13. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

We cannot sustain claimant's view. The claimant has already been

declared totally disabled in the previous award. That being so, no
claim for reimbursement of subsequent and Mother medical
expenses may be entertained or awarded, in accordance with the
policy of this Commission.

Hence, this recourse. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
The parties are agreed that the sole issue in this case is whether or
not petitioner is entitled to recover subsequent and further medical
expenses for the same permanent and total disability which had
already been the subject of a maximum compensation benefits
under Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended,
and for reimbursement of medical expenses already then incurred
under Section 13 thereof. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

I
chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

The issue as framed admits the causal relationship of petitioner's

1969 heart attack to his 1975 heart attack. As a matter of fact,
respondent employer did not allege and there was no evidence
presented that petitioner had fully recovered from his first heart
attack in 1969 when his second heart attack occurred in 1975.
Moreover, petitioner's attending physician testified that once the
patient has been subjected to this kind of disease, and there is
already exclusion in the blood because of the previous thrombosis,
the patient will be in serious condition because the area in the brain
will be involved (TSN, September 26, 1975, pp. 17-18, rec.). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The members of this Tribunal are aware of death induced by a

second heart attack even after the lapse of many years from the
first attack. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Consequently, petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with

his first heart attack which was already declared compensable by
the Workmen's Compensation, may be the source of a claim for
further compensation benefits. In the recent case of Enriquez versus
Workmen's Compensation Commission (93 SCRA 366 [1979]), WE
stated that ... the right to compensation extends to disability due to
disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting
from a compensable injury (82 Am Jur 132). Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or
misconduct (Larson Workmen's Compensation law 3-279 [1972]).
Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow
from the primary injury are compensable (ibid.). chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual l aw libra ry
II
cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Petitioner's case therefore comes within the ambit of the 1980

precedents-setting decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (G.R.
No. L- 43425, January 22, 1980), where it sustained the right of an
ailing employee under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended, to continuous medical treatment and therefore
reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses incurred even
after he is declared permanently disabled. The Court En Banc,
passing upon the same issue and arguments raised in this present
case, compassionately ruled: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The Law applicable is Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation

Act, as amended on June 20, 1964, which provides, in part:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. - Immediately after an

employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during
the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance
carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances
and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his
recovery may require; and that which will promote his early
restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical, surgical,

dental, hospital and nursing attendance and treatment as well as
the proper fitting and training in the use of appliances and the
necessary training for purposes of rehabilitation; "appliances" shall
include crutches, artificial members and other devices of the same
kind, and the replacements or repairs of such artificial members or
such devices unless the replacement or repair is made necessary by
the lack of proper care by the employee; and "supplies" shall
include medicines, as well as medical, surgical and dental supplies.'
(Underlined portions are amendments introduced by Section 7 of
Republic Act 4119 of June 20, 1964).

As will be seen from this law, it imposes upon the employer the
obligation 'to provide the employee with such services, appliances
and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his
recovery may require; and that which will promote his early
restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity. 'This law
does not provide a maximum either as to the amount to be paid or
the time within which such rights may be availed of. To sustain,
therefore, the proposition that petitioner's disability being total and
permanent, respondent's liability to furnish him with further medical
and hospital expenses is terminated, would, in effect, qualify
Section 13, supra, by adding what is not provided in the law or
subtracting what is therein embodied which is legally impermissible.
This would constitute 'judicial fiat'. This Court, therefore, shall itself
to the clear intendment of the law. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Before the 1964 amendment. but as amended by Republic Act 772

on June 20, 1952, Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13. Medical attendance. - Immediately after an employee has

suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during the subsequent
period of disability, the employer shall provide the employee with
such medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies as the
nature of the injury or sickness may require. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The pecuniary liability of the employer for the necessary, medical,

surgical, and hospital services and supplies shall be limited to the
amount ordinarily paid in the community for such treatment of an
injured person of the same standard of living if the treatment had to
be paid for by the injured person himself.'

Under the above-quoted 1952 amendment - prior to the 1964

amendment - WE already ruled that the employer's liability for
medical services subsists during the period if disability or 'lasts as
long as the employee is sick.' chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

Thus, on October 19, 1961, WE ruled in La Maflorca Pambusco vs.

Isip, et al. (L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961 3 SCRA 242, 244):

We are inclined to uphold this contention of respondent. In the first

place, in the order of the Commission dated November 20, 1955
acting favorably on the claim of respondent it was expressly stated
that petitioner should provide him "further medical, surgical and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of his sickness may
require until it is cured or arrested " Said order became final for lack
of protest or appeal on the part of petitioner. Then we have the
document signed by respondent entitled "satisfaction of Award or
Decision", dated February 7, 1956, which embodies the so-called
compromise agreement entered into between them, and from this
document we find that while respondent received the sum of
P5,302.05 in fun satisfaction of the award, the same is qualified by
the following condition: "except with respect to further hospital or
medical treatment, whenever necessary." Finally, we have the
provisions of Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended (Workmen's
Compensation Act), which postulate, among others, that "during
the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall provide the
employee with such medical, surgical and hospital services and
supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require." These
provisions justify the subsequent award made by the
Commission. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

It is true that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the amount

of compensation to which an injured employee is entitled in case of
disability shall not in any case exceed the total sum of P4,000.00
but this limitation only applies to the compensation for disability,
and not to medical attendance (Sections 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No.
3428, as amended). In fact, this subject is governed by a different
section of law (Section 13, Idem 3 SCRA 242, 244; emphasis
supplied].

Then on September 31, 1963, WE reiterated the aforesaid ruling

inItogon-Suyoc, Inc. vs. Fruto Dulay, et al. (L-18974, Sept. 31,
1963, 9 SCRA 199, 202-203):

The decision orders petitioner "to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with
continuous medical and hospital service and supplies until his illness
is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13 of the Act." Petitioner
assails this portion of the decision on the ground that Dulay is no
longer in its employ and that its liability for medical care can not
extend beyond 208 weeks. There is no merit in the contention.
Section 13 does not require employer-employee relationship as a
condition for the employer's liability. As long as the illness was
contracted during the employee's employment, the employer's
obligation subsists. This obligation lasts for as tong as the employee
is sick. The limit of 208 weeks, like the limit of P4,000.00, refers to
the liability of the employer for compensation (Secs. 12, 14, 16, 18,
Act No. 3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the
employer's liability for medical care (Sec. 13) which lasts during the
"period of disability" (See La Mallorea Pambusco vs. Isip, et al., G.R.
No. L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961) [emphasis supplied].

And again, on February 29, 1964, in the case of Cebu Portland

Cement Co. vs. WCC, et al., (L-19164, Feb. 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 420,
423-425) WE ruled:

It may be observed that the law, in imposing on the employer the

obligation to provide medical attendance to an injured or sick
employee, unlike those provisions relating to compensation for
disability (Secs. 14, 16, 17 and 18 of Act No. 3428, as amended)
does not provide maximum either in the amount to be paid or the
time period within which such right may be availed of by the
employee. On the contrary the law imposes on the employer the
obligation to "provide the employee with such medical, surgical, and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness
may require . The implication is that such medical expenses as may
be necessary until the work-connected injury or sickness ceases,
may be charged against the employer. In the United States, from
where our labor compensation law is derived, the two kinds of
benefits for physical injury or sickness are, like in our law, treated
differently. The wage-loss payments based on the concept of
disability are invariably limited in both amount and duration while
payments of medical benefits, that is, hospital and medical
expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury, regardless of
wage-loss or disability, vary in the different states of the Union In
twelve states such benefits are unlimited as to duration and
amount; in nineteen, the preliminary limits are subject to extension
by the administrative agency for indefinite periods as the case
warrants; in eight, there are fixed limits subject to extension for
limited additional periods; and in nine, there are fixed limits with no
provision for extension (Arthur Larson on "The Law of Workmen's
Compensation", Vol. 2 [1952], p. 82). In construing the
compensation act's provision requiring the employer to furnish
medical, surgical and hospital services '.reasonably required to care
or relieve e the employee from the facts of the injury ", it was there
held that "in the absence of express statuory authority this court is
powerless to place a definite limitation upon the time such medical,
surgical and hospital service shall be rendered in any particular
case" (W.J. Newman v. Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353
111. 190, 88 A.L.R., 1188). This was based on the theory that
workmen's acts are a humane law of a remedial nature, and
wherever construction is permissible, their language should be
liberally construed in favor of the employee. And, this is supported
by the prevailing rule in compensation cases.

Acts not containing any limitation as to the period during which the
employer may furnish or pay for medical surgical or hospital
services have been construed as imposing liability on the employer
as long as such services are required to cure or relieve the injured
employee from the effects of' his injury(Florczak v. Industrial
Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 111. 190, 88 A.L.R. 1188).

Thus an employee who contracted tuberculosis while employed at a

state tuberculosis hospital and where the infection was never
arrested from the time it was contracted until his death, was
declared entitled to continued treatment the governing statute not
having limited the time of treatment (Carrol v. State, 64 N.Y. 2d
166, 242 Minn. 70) [emphasis supplied].

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

The office of the Solicitor General, however, contends that since the
petitioner had been declared to be totally and permanently disabled,
the liability of the employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital
services ceases, citing 10 Workmen's Compensation Text,
Schneider, page 109, that:

Where the evidence discloses that further medical, surgical, and

hospital services would not definitely improve the condition of an
injured employee, the liability of an employer to furnish reasonable
medical and hospital services, as and when needed, ceases Patilsen
vs. Glenn L. Martin - Nebraska Co. 26 N.W. 2d. II, Jan. 31, 1947,
citing Wilson vs. Brown-McDonald Co. 278 N.W. 264, 256, March 4,
1938).
But the foregoing 1947 Nebraska decision was based on the old
Nebraska law providing for limited liability. Thereafter, said law was
amended allowing unlimited liability as to time and amount, thus
making Nebraska one of the 12 states providing for such unlimited
liability as to time and amount even for total and permanent
disability, together with California, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Puerto
Rico and Wisconsin (see Samuel B. Horovitz "Injury and Death
under Workmen's Compensation law", 1948 ed., p. 294; see also
Larson, supra).chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry c hanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

From 1948 to 1975, the number of states in the American Union

providing for medical benefits which are unlimited as to duration
and amount, has increased from 12 to 43:

61.11 Statutory summary

An integral and important part of the benefit scheme of all

compensation acts is the provision of hospital and medical benefits.
These benefits account for about one-third of the total benefits paid
to injured workmen.

In forty-three states such benefits are essentially unlimited as to

duration and amount; in one there is a fixed limit subject to
extension for a limited additional amount; in three there are fixed
limits with no provision for extension; and in three, there are limits
only as to silicosis and related diseases.

It is interesting to observe that in the space of about thirty years

the number of states providing full medical coverage has risen from
about a dozen to almost four times that number. This appears to
evince agreement with the finding of an authoritative study that "it
is impossible fully to relieve pain and to assure restoration of
seriously disabled persons when medical care is arbitrarily limited
Equally important is the convincing evidence that unlimited medical
benefits are economically the soundest benefit; that over the long
term, they become the least expensive (Sec. 61.11, Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis supplied).
Larson continues to state that 'medical benefits ordinarily include
not only medical and hospital services, but necessary incidentals
such as transportation, apparatus, and nursing care, which may be
compensable even when supplied at home by a member of
claimant's family. Palliative measures are included under the
decisions of most jurisdictions, to relieve pain even after all hope of
cure is gone. Rehabilitation is becoming an increasingly important
part of the compensation program under such provisions supplying
additional maintenance and compensation during the rehabilitation
period as well as curative and retraining centers to restore earning
power to handicapped workers' (Sec. 61, Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis supplied). c hanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

To repeat, the prevailing interpretation of Section 13 is consistent

with the law and jurisprudence of the States of Hawaii, Minnesota
and New York (See Table 14, 4, Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, 574-10-574.11 [1979]), upon whose compensation
statutes our own compensation act was patterned. It was originally
adopted by our Philippine Legislature in Spanish from the Statutes
of the Territory of Hawaii (Nava v. Ynchausti Steamship Co. 57 Phil.
751 [19321; Fernando and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare
Legislation, 401 [1964]; Pucan and Besinga, Comments and
Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, 5-6
[1971]).chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Section 13 of our compensation law mandates the employer to

provide the employee medical benefits immediately after he has
suffered an injury and during the subsequent period of disability 'as
the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may
require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the
maximum level of his physical capacity', regardless of whether the
disability is permanent or temporary. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

In Hawaii; the obligation of the employer to provide the employee

medical benefits subsists 'during resulting period of disability'; in
Minnesota, 'during disability as long as necessary to cure and
relieve'; and in New York, 'as long as necessary'. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtua l law lib rary

The present jurisprudence in these states sanctions unlimited

medical benefits, both in time and in amount. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
In Florida, the pertinent compensation statutes require the
employer 'to furnish remedial treatment - for such period as the
nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require' but 'all
rights for remedial attention - shall be barred unless a claim
therefor is filed or the commission acts on its own initiative within
two years after the date of the last remedial treatment or payment
of compensation.' Applying said provisions in the case of Platzer v.
Burger, 144 So. 2d 507 Fla. 1962), where the evidence indicated
that the claimant would need periodic medical treatment consisting
of dilation of the urethra, medical prescriptions, and treatment for
prostatitis for the rest of his life, the court ordered medical benefits
for the lifetime of the claimant. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual la w libra ry

It is true that' throughout the Workmen's Compensation Act, the

intention of the legislator to limit payable compensation to
P6,000.00 is redolent But this refers only to compensation for loss
of income proper or income benefit which is fixed or computed on
the basis of the average weekly wages of the claimant; never to
medical benefits. For it is likewise pervasive in the law that the
legislature has intended a separate and different treatment for
medical benefits as shown by the fact that it provided for separate
provisions for medical benefits. If the intention of the lawmakers
were to put a limit to medical benefits then they would have merged
or lumped the two benefits in all the applicable provisions of the
law. That they did not, simply means that they intended a different
treatment thereof. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation

Act, benefits for disability are of two general types: (1) Indemnity
benefits in the form of cash payments which is designed to
compensate the worker for the loss of wages due to disability
sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the form of
medical services, hospitalization, medicine and other matters
related to the treatment of the compensable injury or disease
(Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation,
597-598 1964). The first, indemnity or compensation benefits for
loss of wages, is limited both as to time and as to amount; while the
second, medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to
amount. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry
xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

The suggestion that the 'period of disability' used in Section 13 of

the Act refers to the number of weeks fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16
and 18, was already rejected in the aforecited cases. Thus, in the
Itogon-Suyoc case, this Court rules:

The decision orders petitioner: "to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with
continuous medical and hospital services and supplies until his
illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13 of the Act."
Petitioner assails this portion of the decision oil the ground that
Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its liability for medical care
cannot extend beyond 208 weeks 'There is no merit in the
contention. Section 13 does not require employer- employee
relationship as a condition for the employer's liability. As long as the
illness was contractes during the employee's employment, the
employers obligation lasts for as long as the employee is sick. The
limit of 208 weeks, like the limit of P4,000.00 , refers to the liability
of the employer for compensation (Sees. 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No.
3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the employer's
liability, for medical care (Sec. 13) which lasts during the "period of
disability.

Sections 22 and 29 refer to disability compensation or indemnity

benefits; not to medical benefits. Section 22 speaks of
compensation fixed by law, referring to the amounts fixed in
Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18; not to Section 13 on medical benefits
which have no fixed or definite amount. Likewise, Section 29 speaks
of 'the same amount of compensation as that prescribed by this
Act', referring to Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

It must likewise be noted that the initial text of Section 13 before its
amendment by Republic Act 4119 in 1964 imposed a limitation as to
the amount of medical benefits, thus: 'The pecuniary liability of the
employer for the necessary medical, surgical, and hospital services
and supplies shall be limited to the amount ordinarily, paid in the
(community for such treatment of an injured person of the same
standard of living if the treatment of an injured person had to be
paid for by the injured himself . That such discriminatory and
degrading limitation was amended out of the Act is clearly indicative
of the intention of tile lawmakers to provide unlimited medical
benefits.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

The findings of the 'workmen's Compensation Commission, Chat

petitioner is 'totally and permanently disabled for labor', is no proof
that further medical surgical and hospital services would not
definitely improve petitioner's condition, at the very least, relieve
him of his pain or other injurious effect of his ailment. Thus, even
assuming that further medical treatment would not return the
employee to work or cure him, further treatment may still relieve
him of his pain or its injurious effects. This is the doctrine laid down
in W.J. Newman Co. vs. Industrial Commission (187 N.E.137, June
22, 1933), thus:

[1-37] This is a novel and exceptional case. Index such

circumstances caution is required in the construction of the
particular statute so as not to extend it or affect its general
application to the thousands of other cases not presenting such
unusual features. In construing paragraph (a) of Section 8, since
the curing of Nee is admittedly impossible, two principal questions
confront us, viz: First, whether the services rendered or to be
rendered are reasonably necessary to relieve the employee from the
effects of his injury; and, secondly, if such services are necessary,
whether power is conferred upon this court to say when such
services shall be terminated. Reference to the record clearly shows
that Nee is beyond hope of cure from medical skill. It further shows
that the medical, surgical, and hospital services he had been and is
now receiving are not only necessary but also adequate to relieve
him, as far as possible, from the effects of his injury. The findings of
the Industrial Commission on this phase of the question are
unquestionably in accord with the manifest weight of the evidence.
We are therefore left solely with the question whether, by a
construction of paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, this court can say, not only in this case but in
other cases of exceptional nature hereafter presented, that the
medical, surgical and hospital services rendered by an employer
where no cure is possible, may with justice both to the employer
and the injured employee, be terminated after a reasonable length
of time, to be determined according to the varying circumstances of
each particular case. In other words, can it be said that the last
phrase of paragraph (a) should be interpreted to mean that when
an employer has done that which is reasonably required to cure an
injured employee from the effects of his injury and medical advice
indicates that a cure is hopeless, the employer is thereafter relieved
from any further liability, under the act, to furnish medical, surgical,
and hospital services. We cannot adopt any such literal or strained
construction of paragraph (a) as plaintiff in error urges in this case,
to the effect that the words "cure" and "relieve" mean virtually the
same thing. A workman who is cured is, of course, relieved from the
effects of his injury, but one who is incurable, as in the present
case, may still need skillful attention to relieve him of pain or other
injurious effects caused by his injury. This is only the natural and
usual meaning of the words used. It is a construction in accordance
with the general spirit and humane purpose of the act. The
Workmen's Compensation Act is a humane law of a remedial nature,
and whenever construction is permissible its language should be
liberally construed. City of Chicago vs. Industrial Commission, 291
111 23, 125 N.E. 705; Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Industrial Board,
283 111. 177, 118 N.E. 989. A strained construction not fairly
within the provisions of the act cannot be supported. Berry Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 318 111. 312, 149 N.E. 278. There was no
denial by the employer of liability, and it has been repeatedly held
by this court that the furnishing of medical, surgical, and hospital
services must be regarded as the payment of compensation under
the act. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 316 111. 394,
147 N.E. 394, and cases cited.

xxx xxx xxx

[47] By these successive amendments it may be seen that the

legislature deemed inadequate the original limitation of eight weeks'
time and $200 in amount as to medicine and hospital services, as
the amendment of 1919 enlarged the hospital services from two
weeks to extend "during the period for which compensation may be
payable," and also removed any financial limit, except as to medical
or surgical services. The amendment in 1925 went further by
removing all time or money limitation upon medical and surgical
services, and limited medical, surgical, and hospital services to such
as might be "reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects
of the injury." In the absence of express statutory authority this
court is therefore powerless to place a definite limitation upon the
time such medical, surgical and hospital services shall be rendered
in any particular case. As we have said before, the proof here shows
that medical and hospital services are necessary to relieve Nee from
the effects of bis injury and that such services cannot be rendered
in his home. There is no proof indicating any malingering or feigned
sickness in this case, or any other circumstance which would enable
us to say that fur there services are not reasonably necessary to
relieve Nee from the effects of his injury. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

As the Legislature has seen fit to amend paragraph (a) of section 8

and to successively omit the former limitations therein imposed
upon the furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services, it
would be nothing short of judicial legislation for this court now, in
an exceptional case, to impose such a limitation The limitations of
the section in question cannot be definitely fixed except by the
Legislature, and the only reasonable interpretation which we are
able to place upon it, as said above, is that the employer's liability
continues so long as medical, surgical, and hospital services are
required in order to relieve the injured employee from the effects of
his injury.

Indeed, to follow the modern trend of medical care, the direction is

for increased medical liability to be the "third phase of medicine",
from "preventive medicine" and "definitive or curative medicine or
surgery", to the dynamic concept of "medical rehabilitation", one
principal objective of which is to reduce or alleviate the disability to
the greatest possible degree (Injury and Death under Workmen's
Compensation Law, Samuel B. Horovitz, p. 297; Medical Handbook
on Workmen's Compensation and Principles of Disability Evaluation,
by Guilatco 1967 ed., pp. 264-265). chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

In much the same way that euthanasia is not even prescribed as

the extreme remedy for what appears to be a terminal case, WE
should not be oblivious to the possibility that medical science may
devise somehow, sometime during the lifetime of the disabled
employee, a remedy to banish his pain and to completely
rehabilitate him physically, mentally and socially. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law lib rary

After devoting the best years of their lives to the service of the
State, it is only fair and just that the State should take care of its
civil servants until they are relieved completely from the effects of
an ailment incurred by reason of their employment. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Denial of medical benefits to an employee who is disabled

permanently, is to accord more rights to an employee who is
suffering only temporary disability or incapacity; because the latter
is entitled to continuous medical, surgical and hospital services and
appliances as the nature of his injury or ailment may require
(Section 13, Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended); ... chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

It certainly would be anomalous and would do violence to natural

reason and logic as well as it would be an act of inhumanity to favor
the temporarily disabled more than the one deemed permanently
incapacitated by illness or injury contracted or sustained during his
employment. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is

entitled (1) to continuous hospital, medical and/or surgical services
to relieve the painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from or
alleviation of the humiliating effects of his injury, like plastic surgery
after the first operation that may leave an ugly scar or deformity;
(3) to be provided with such facilities, supplies or equipment that
will restore the normal use of his senses, faculties, or limbs, such as
improved models of wheelchairs, crutches, artificial limbs or hearing
or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation of his morale and spirit by
eliminating the psychological effects of the trauma caused by the
ailment or injury so that he can join, and be accepted by, the
mainstream of society and lead a normal life. c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee
may remain to be the main support of his family. Denial to him of
further hospital, medical or surgical services would be aggravating
the economic distress his family is suffering. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Because society does not seem to accept him (like a cured leper his
feeling of depression may drive him to commit suicide or may infect
the other members of the family who may, in desperation, commit
anti-social acts, which would engender a more serious tragedy for
the family. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Then again, to abandon one who is permanently disabled after the

first medical treatment, is virtually to consign him to the scrap heap
or to the garbage dump of human derelicts no longer entitled to the
concern and solicitude of the State. Nothing would be more
inhuman, repugnant to the central core of our democratic welfare
state as envisioned by our Constitution and shocking to a
compassionate society. As heretofore emphasized, the Government
should be the last to give up hope on the recovery and rehabilitation
of those who are now considered permanently disabled.
Laboratories all over the world are continuously testing and
searching for the panacea for all ailments that plague humanity.
There is greater possibility that such a cure may be discovered in
our time. The right to life rank second to none in the hierarchy of
human rights. The entire world is witness to the amazing survival of
Karen Quinlan for the last two years (over 4 years now) after the
life-giving apparatus was disconnected from her body. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It is likewise possible that from our own flora and fauna may be
discovered the remedy for many an ailment or injury. Many of our
plants, fruits and vegetables have been found to cure, prevent or
minimize serious cardiac ailments, hypertension, arthritis, afflictions
of the kidney and bladder, as well as deep wounds. Some of our
vegetables are likewise natural disinfectants. Lately, the
lowly chichitica and dioscorea have been found to be a cure for
cancer (BT or DE May 13,1978). chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob le s virt ual law li bra ry

God in his infinite wisdom has provided the remedies for human
diseases, injuries and afflictions. The genius of resourceful man will
discover these cures somehow, sometime - sooner than
expected. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
As the Florida Supreme Court pragmatically opined in the 1950 case
of Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. vs. Pittman 'Medicine is not an exact
science ... Moreover, in this modern era of extensive scientific
research, it is not possible to say with certainty today that any
disease is incurable for no one knows but that tomorrow will herald
a new miracle drug'(49 So. 2d 600, 603). chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

A Filipino eye specialist gave the information that blindness due to

glaucoma may in time be a tiling of the past. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Specialists have provided relief to those afflicted with cardiac and

kidney diseases through transplanting heartily hearts and kidneys
for diseased or impaired ones. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Social legislations which constrict the rights of labor, should yield to

the social justice guarantee of the new Constitution which stresses
that:

Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits' (Art. 11, 1973 Constitution, emphasis
supplied).

To underscore this obligation of the State, Section 9 of Article I I

likewise directs that:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full

employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and 'employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration' (1973 Constitution,
emphasis supplied).

The conservative view limiting the right of the injured or ailing

employee to only one surgical or medical service prevailing in some
States of the American Union should not find adherence in our
jurisdiction: because such States seem to be still dominated by the
capitalistic philosophy as they do not provide in their respective
constitutions any guarantee of social justice in favor of their
citizens. If, on the other hand, the humanitarian view which
sustains the right of the ailing or injured employee to continuous
medical and surgical services until he has been fully rehabilitated, is
espoused by the pro-aggressive states of the United States of
America despite the absence of any social justice guarantee in their
respective constitutions; a fortiori such compassionate approach
should be followed in our jurisdiction, where our Constitution
expressly guarantees social Justice 'to ensure the dignity, welfare
and security of all the people' (Sec. 6, Art. 11, 1973 Constitution),
while commanding the State to' afford protection to labor' and
'assure the right of workers to ... just and humane conditions of
work'(Section 6, Art. 11, 1973 Constitution). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp
the Government with claims for continuing medical, hospital and
surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National
Treasury, is no argument against it; because the Republic of the
Philippines as a welfare State, in providing for the social justice
guarantee in our Constitution, assumes such risk. This assumption
of such a noble responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just and
equitable since the employees to be benefitted thereby precisely
became permanently injured or sick while invariably devoting the
greater portion of their lives to the service of our country and
people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural
resources of the nation and therefore should merit the highest
solicitude and the greatest protection from the State to relieve them
from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the hope
that during the few remaining years of their life some dedicated
institution or gifted individual may produce a remedy or cure to
relieve them from the painful or crippling or debilitating or
humiliating effects of their injury or ailment, to funy and completely
rehabilitate them and develop their 'mental, vocational and social
potentials', so that they will remain useful and productive
citizens.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Finally, the New Labor Code itself commands that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor' (Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended). This
echoes Article 1702 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides that:

in case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of safety and decent living for the laborer.'

The school of thought that resists the expansion of the social rights
of employees and workers is essentially capitalistic, conservative,
reactionary and selfish. The invocation of the due process clause to
challenge the validity of social and labor legislation as violative of
the freedom of contract and an undue deprivation of property had
long been discarded in America since the 1937 case of West Coast
Hotel vs. Parrish (300 U.S. 379) affirming the validity of minimum
wage laws. In our country, such a view was repudiated after the
1924 case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440). Thereafter, other
social legislations followed and survived the constitutional test such
as our own minimum wage law, the 8-hour labor law, and various
amendments to the workmen's compensation law, and employer's
liability act, law on maternity leave with pay, and laws for the
protection of women and minors employed in dangerous industries
and occupations. Such statutes were held not to trench upon the
Constitution, even in the states of the American Union whose
constitutions do not expressly guarantee social justice specifically in
favor of the working class, as heretofore stated. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Then again, the fear that continued hospitalization and medical

treatment of employees who are permanently disabled would
constitute an intolerable burden on the employer, whether
government or private, is more fancied than real. Firstly, no
statistics have been cited to show that there are many permanently
disabled and needing continued medical treatment or hospitalization
for a long period. Secondly, the employer can always secure or
purchase insurance against such possible liability. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In the instance case, the government is the employer against whom

such liability for continued hospitalization, medical services and
medical supplies, is being raised. The government can always
appropriate the necessary funds for the purpose. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles vi rt u al law lib rary

The government has been losing revenues, either through graft and
corruption or failure to honestly and fully collect such revenues.
These amounts of which the government has been promoted by
dishonest public officers, private contractors or suppliers or which
the government failed to collect by reason of the criminal neglect or
dishonesty of its collecting agencies, may aggregate hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of pesos yearly. The financial exposure of the
government to provide medical and hospital services for its
unfortunate employees rendered permanently disabled but still
suffering pain or humiliation or degradation by reason of such
permanent disability is practically minimal, or not substantial,
compared to the millions of pesos that the country is losing all these
years through graft and corruption. The government has failed not
only to prosecute many big-time tax dodgers, grafters and
corruptors but also to recover even a portion of the unpaid revenues
or the amounts embezzled or stolen from its coffers. Until the guilty
parties are brought before the courts, the tribunals cannot do
anything.

In this case of petitioner who served the government as municipal

judge from 1947 to 1969, risking his health and life, and who prays
for a second reimbursement of his medical expenses, ... this Court
has the singular opportunity to afford him relief from his misery and
not let him deteriorate until his body is finally and totally
decomposed and dissolved into dust. Any gratuity that he might
have received, aside from the first compensation for wage loss and
the first refund for hospitalization and medical treatment, would not
even be sufficient to maintain his family for the remaining few years
of his life. With his retirement gratuity and disability compensation
already exhausted by now (after eleven years from 1969), he and
his family are exposed to complete misery. The government or the
court that does not lift a hand to rescue the ailing employee and his
family from such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an agency
of social justice, much less pretend to be compassionate. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
2. And the Court En Banc by way of emphasizing ITS role as a
potent social justice arm of the State concluded optimistically in the
aforesaid Biscarra case that - chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

WE may yet escape the judgment of history that the Supreme

Tribunal was once found wanting in 'moral vision and abdicated ITS
role as an active 'implementing instrument of reform.'

3. It appears that petitioner's claim for medical reimbursement as

stated in his letter to the Workmen's Compensation Unit was for the
amount of P20,588.85 (p. 242, WCC rec.). However, the receipts
submit by his counsel totalled only P19,880.00, as follows: chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

1. Exhs.D, D-1 to D-12

(pp- 243-256, WCC rec.)
Payments to St. Luke's chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Hospital P11,750.00
(This includes the amounts
in Exhs. B, B-1 to B-152
and Exhs. C, C-1 to C-1 52,
pp. 258-551, WCC rec.). chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

2. Exh. O (p. 598, WCC rec.) 330.00 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

3. Exh. P (p. 597, WCC rec.) 6,500.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Gatchalian) chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

4. Exh. Q (p. 596, WCC rec.) 300.00

(Professional fee of Dr. Quizon) chanroble s virtual law lib rary

5. Exh. R (p. 595, WCC rec.) 1,000.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Damian) chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

_________
TOTAL P19,880.00
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION
IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT (NOW MINISTRY) OF JUSTICE IS HEREBY ORDERED
TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTY (P9,880.00) PESOS AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual l aw libra ry

chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

I maintain my dissent and contrary view in Biscarra vs. Republic

and WCC (95 SCRA 248, 282) that "an employee who has been
declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has
received the maximum P6,000. - disability compensation therefor
and has been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to the
injury or illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled
under the Act and more particularly under section 13 to any further
payment or reimbursement tor subsequent medical expenses. The
Act has never burdened the employer, be it the government itself,
(and this has always been the official construction and
implementation of the Act as heretofore stated with the obligation of
making unlimited payments for subsequent, medical services and
expenses for as long as the permanently and totally disabled
employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has
such a limitless burden been imposed, for the cost, thereof would be
staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that no
provision for such an open-ended and endless obligation has ever
been provided in the budget for the half-century that the
Workmen's Compensation Act has been in force. The employer's
obligation ceases upon payment of the maximum and fixed P6,000.
- disability compensation for total and permanent disability and the
medical expenses attendant thereto (which generally have
amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum
compensation);" and that "the remedy for the plight of the
permanently disabled who were not taken care of by the old
Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the
lawmakers. This they can give by simple remedial legislation
providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical and
rehabilitation services contemplated and provided for under the
above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made
applicable and shall be available to the employees and workers who
incurred permanent and total disability under tile Workmen's
Compensation Act. " chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

I reiterate that in our deliberations, the majority decision

in Biscarra "was expressly limited to the government as the
employer and that the question of whether the same ruling of now
holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong
medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently
disabled employees would also apply to the private employers,
many of which could possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this
ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs
of such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved "
(Emphasis supplied) chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Confronted, however, with the majority ruling in Biscarra holding

that the government as employer (as in the case at bar) continues
to liable for the indefinite, lifelong medical, surgical and hospital
expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees
(notwithstanding their having been paid the corresponding disability
compensation and reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to
their disailing injury or illness), we have to apply the prevailing rule,
for as long as the same has not been overturned and set aside. (Cf.
Yap vs. Republic, 45 SCRA 36, 40 [1972]). Accordingly I am
constrained to concur in the result.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge ill 194-1. He

suffered his first heart attack in July, 1969. Here tired from the
service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in October 1970, by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, permanent and total
disability benefits and reimbursement, of medical expenses
incurred.chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry
After approximately six years from The date of his retirement, or in
1975, petitioner suffered a second heart attack. He incurred further
medical expenses consisting of hospitalization and physician's fees
in the amount of P19,880. Respondent Commission denied his claim
for further reimbursement. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The question is. should petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for

the subsequent medical and hospitalization expenses that he had
incurred? chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Although under the ruling of the Court En Banc in Biscarra vs.

Workmen's Compensation Commission (95 SCRA 248 [19801),
petitioner is so entitled, I am constrained, as a matter of principle,
to reiterate my dissent in that case to the effect that under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a totally and permanently disabled
claimant is not entitled, up to his death, to continued hospital,
medical and surgical services, nor to further reimbursement of his
medical expenses. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Briefly, the reasons I stated were: 1) under section 13 of the said

Act, an employee is entitled to such services and expenses
"immediately ...during the subsequent period of disability or, to
immediate medical expenses. 2) Under sections 22 and 29 of the
Act, "the employer shall be exempt from all liability under this Act
as soon as the compensation has been paid under this section,
saving the provisions of section six of this Act." 3) Throughout the
said Act, the legislative intent to limit payable compensation to
P6,000.00 is evident (see secs. 12, 14, 16, 18). 4) The
administrative interpretation given by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission to Section 13 of the Act, although never conclusive, is
usually given great weight by the Courts as it is the department
charged with the implementation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Madrigal & Paterno vs. Rafferty & Concepcion, 38 Phil. 415
[1918]; Asturias Sugar Central vs. Commissioner of Customs, 1
SCRA 617 [1961]). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Relative to the assertion that the Philippines is a "welfare state" (p.

26, majority Decision) to which I also took exception in my previous
dissent in Biscarra and which I reiterate herein, I need mention only
the statement of President Marcos, quoted in the local Times Journal
of April 27, 1980, reading as follows:chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

Speaking during a breakfast hosted by the Hawaii Chamber of

Commerce and Industry at the Oahu Country Club in Honolulu, the
President further pledged not to adopt the welfare state policy. This
could render industry bankrupt, he said, stressing that his policy is
for a proportionate sharing of wealth between capital and labor.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Workmen's

Compensation Commission.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I maintain my dissent and contrary view in Biscarra vs. Republic

and WCC (95 SCRA 248, 282) that "an employee who has been
declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has
received the maximum P6,000. - disability compensation therefor
and has been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to the
injury or illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled
under the Act and more particularly under section 13 to any further
payment or reimbursement tor subsequent medical expenses. The
Act has never burdened the employer, be it the government itself,
(and this has always been the official construction and
implementation of the Act as heretofore stated with the obligation of
making unlimited payments for subsequent, medical services and
expenses for as long as the permanently and totally disabled
employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has
such a limitless burden been imposed, for the cost, thereof would be
staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that no
provision for such an open-ended and endless obligation has ever
been provided in the budget for the half-century that the
Workmen's Compensation Act has been in force. The employer's
obligation ceases upon payment of the maximum and fixed P6,000.
- disability compensation for total and permanent disability and the
medical expenses attendant thereto (which generally have
amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum
compensation);" and that "the remedy for the plight of the
permanently disabled who were not taken care of by the old
Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the
lawmakers. This they can give by simple remedial legislation
providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical and
rehabilitation services contemplated and provided for under the
above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made
applicable and shall be available to the employees and workers who
incurred permanent and total disability under tile Workmen's
Compensation Act. "

I reiterate that in our deliberations, the majority decision

in Biscarra "was expressly limited to the government as the
employer and that the question of whether the same ruling of now
holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong
medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently
disabled employees would also apply to the private employers,
many of which could possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this
ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs
of such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved "
(Emphasis supplied)

Confronted, however, with the majority ruling in Biscarra holding

that the government as employer (as in the case at bar) continues
to liable for the indefinite, lifelong medical, surgical and hospital
expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees
(notwithstanding their having been paid the corresponding disability
compensation and reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to
their disailing injury or illness), we have to apply the prevailing rule,
for as long as the same has not been overturned and set aside. (Cf.
Yap vs. Republic, 45 SCRA 36, 40 [1972]). Accordingly I am
constrained to concur in the result.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge ill 194-1. He

suffered his first heart attack in July, 1969. Here tired from the
service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in October 1970, by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, permanent and total
disability benefits and reimbursement, of medical expenses
incurred.chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
After approximately six years from The date of his retirement, or in
1975, petitioner suffered a second heart attack. He incurred further
medical expenses consisting of hospitalization and physician's fees
in the amount of P19,880. Respondent Commission denied his claim
for further reimbursement. chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

The question is. should petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for

the subsequent medical and hospitalization expenses that he had
incurred?

Although under the ruling of the Court En Banc in Biscarra vs.

Workmen's Compensation Commission (95 SCRA 248 [19801),
petitioner is so entitled, I am constrained, as a matter of principle,
to reiterate my dissent in that case to the effect that under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a totally and permanently disabled
claimant is not entitled, up to his death, to continued hospital,
medical and surgical services, nor to further reimbursement of his
medical expenses. chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Briefly, the reasons I stated were: 1) under section 13 of the said

Act, an employee is entitled to such services and expenses
"immediately ...during the subsequent period of disability or, to
immediate medical expenses. 2) Under sections 22 and 29 of the
Act, "the employer shall be exempt from all liability under this Act
as soon as the compensation has been paid under this section,
saving the provisions of section six of this Act." 3) Throughout the
said Act, the legislative intent to limit payable compensation to
P6,000.00 is evident (see secs. 12, 14, 16, 18). 4) The
administrative interpretation given by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission to Section 13 of the Act, although never conclusive, is
usually given great weight by the Courts as it is the department
charged with the implementation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Madrigal & Paterno vs. Rafferty & Concepcion, 38 Phil. 415
[1918]; Asturias Sugar Central vs. Commissioner of Customs, 1
SCRA 617 [1961]). chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Relative to the assertion that the Philippines is a "welfare state" (p.

26, majority Decision) to which I also took exception in my previous
dissent in Biscarra and which I reiterate herein, I need mention only
the statement of President Marcos, quoted in the local Times Journal
of April 27, 1980, reading as follows:

Speaking during a breakfast hosted by the Hawaii Chamber of

Commerce and Industry at the Oahu Country Club in Honolulu, the
President further pledged not to adopt the welfare state policy. This
could render industry bankrupt, he said, stressing that his policy is
for a proportionate sharing of wealth between capital and labor.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Workmen's

Compensation Commission.

G.R. No. L-43098 March 30, 1981

MARIANO R. BASA, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Department of Justice), respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Mariano R. Basa, retired municipal judge of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, seeks the
review of the December 12, 1975 decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission in WC Case No. C-958, which affirmed the October 14, 1975 order of the
acting chief of Unit, Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor, at San Pablo City,
denying his second claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in relation
with his heart ailment.

On July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered a heart attack that incapacitated him from further
performing his function as municipal judge, and which forced him on October 16, 1969
to retire from the service. Consequently, he filed a claim for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was awarded on October 26, 1970
permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses
incurred,

On January 26, 1975 or after a period of almost six (6) years his initial heart attack on
July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered his second heart attack which proved more severe,
causing loss of his power of speech and the weakening of his body.

On June 26, 1975, he filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of
Labor, Regional Office No. 5, at San Pablo City, a claim for reimbursement of medical
expenses incurred in connection with his aforesaid second heart attack; but the same
was denied on October 14, 1975 by the acting chief of unit for lack of merit, reasoning
that petitioner had been awarded benefits under Section 15 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, for permanent and total disability, plus reimbursement
of medical expenses.

Petitioner duly filed his motion for reconsideration, invoking Section 13 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.

On December 27, 1976, respondent Commission rendered a decision affirming the

decision of its acting chief of unit, thus:

It appears that claimant of this case has previously been awarded

compensation under Section 15 of the Act and the instant case was
subsequently filed in relation thereto only for the sole purpose of seeking
reimbursement under Section 13.

We cannot sustain claimant's view. The claimant has already been

declared totally disabled in the previous award. That being so, no claim for
reimbursement of subsequent and Mother medical expenses may be
entertained or awarded, in accordance with the policy of this Commission.

Hence, this recourse.

The parties are agreed that the sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover subsequent and further medical expenses for the same permanent
and total disability which had already been the subject of a maximum compensation
benefits under Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and for
reimbursement of medical expenses already then incurred under Section 13 thereof.

The issue as framed admits the causal relationship of petitioner's 1969 heart attack to
his 1975 heart attack. As a matter of fact, respondent employer did not allege and there
was no evidence presented that petitioner had fully recovered from his first heart attack
in 1969 when his second heart attack occurred in 1975. Moreover, petitioner's attending
physician testified that once the patient has been subjected to this kind of disease, and
there is already exclusion in the blood because of the previous thrombosis, the patient
will be in serious condition because the area in the brain will be involved (TSN,
September 26, 1975, pp. 17-18, rec.).

The members of this Tribunal are aware of death induced by a second heart attack
even after the lapse of many years from the first attack.

Consequently, petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with his first heart attack
which was already declared compensable by the Workmen's Compensation, may be the
source of a claim for further compensation benefits. In the recent case of Enriquez
versus Workmen's Compensation Commission (93 SCRA 366 [1979]), WE stated that
... the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am Jur 132). Where
the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it
is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own
negligence or misconduct (Larson Workmen's Compensation law 3-279 [1972]). Simply
stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the primary injury are
compensable (ibid.).

II

Petitioner's case therefore comes within the ambit of the 1980 precedents-setting
decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission (G.R. No. L- 43425, January 22, 1980), where it sustained the right of an
ailing employee under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, to
continuous medical treatment and therefore reimbursement for subsequent medical
expenses incurred even after he is declared permanently disabled. The Court En Banc,
passing upon the same issue and arguments raised in this present case,
compassionately ruled:

The Law applicable is Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as

amended on June 20, 1964, which provides, in part:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. — Immediately

after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the
employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee
with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of
his disability and the process of his recovery may require;
and that which will promote his early restoration to the
maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical,

surgical, dental, hospital and nursing attendance and
treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use
of appliances and the necessary training for purposes of
rehabilitation; "appliances" shall include crutches, artificial
members and other devices of the same kind, and the
replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such
devices unless the replacement or repair is made necessary
by the lack of proper care by the employee; and "supplies"
shall include medicines, as well as medical, surgical and
dental supplies.' (Underlined portions are amendments
introduced by Section 7 of Republic Act 4119 of June 20,
1964).
As will be seen from this law, it imposes upon the employer the obligation
'to provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as
the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require;
and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of
his physical capacity. 'This law does not provide a maximum either as to
the amount to be paid or the time within which such rights may be availed
of. To sustain, therefore, the proposition that petitioner's disability being
total and permanent, respondent's liability to furnish him with further
medical and hospital expenses is terminated, would, in effect, qualify
Section 13, supra, by adding what is not provided in the law or subtracting
what is therein embodied which is legally impermissible. This would
constitute 'judicial fiat'. This Court, therefore, shall itself to the clear
intendment of the law.

Before the 1964 amendment. but as amended by Republic Act 772 on

June 20, 1952, Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13. Medical attendance. — Immediately after an

employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and
during the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall
provide the employee with such medical, surgical, and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or
sickness may require.

The pecuniary liability of the employer for the necessary,

medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies shall be
limited to the amount ordinarily paid in the community for
such treatment of an injured person of the same standard of
living if the treatment had to be paid for by the injured person
himself.'

Under the above-quoted 1952 amendment — prior to the 1964

amendment — WE already ruled that the employer's liability for medical
services subsists during the period if disability or 'lasts as long as the
employee is sick.'

Thus, on October 19, 1961, WE ruled in La Maflorca Pambusco vs. Isip, et

al. (L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961 3 SCRA 242, 244):

We are inclined to uphold this contention of respondent. In

the first place, in the order of the Commission dated
November 20, 1955 acting favorably on the claim of
respondent it was expressly stated that petitioner should
provide him "further medical, surgical and hospital services
and supplies as the nature of his sickness may require until it
is cured or arrested " Said order became final for lack of
 protest or appeal on the part of petitioner. Then we have the
document signed by respondent entitled "satisfaction of
Award or Decision", dated February 7, 1956, which
embodies the so-called compromise agreement entered into
between them, and from this document we find that while
respondent received the sum of P5,302.05 in fun satisfaction
of the award, the same is qualified by the following condition:
"except with respect to further hospital or medical treatment,
whenever necessary." Finally, we have the provisions of
Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended (Workmen's
Compensation Act), which postulate, among others, that
"during the subsequent period of disability, the employer
shall provide the employee with such medical, surgical and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or
sickness may require." These provisions justify the
subsequent award made by the Commission.

It is true that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the

amount of compensation to which an injured employee is
entitled in case of disability shall not in any case exceed the
total sum of P4,000.00 but this limitation only applies to the
compensation for disability, and not to medical attendance
(Sections 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended). In fact,
this subject is governed by a different section of law (Section
13, Idem 3 SCRA 242, 244; emphasis supplied].

Then on September 31, 1963, WE reiterated the aforesaid ruling in Itogon-

Suyoc, Inc. vs. Fruto Dulay, et al. (L-18974, Sept. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 199,
202-203):

The decision orders petitioner "to provide him (Fruto Dulay)

with continuous medical and hospital service and supplies
until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13
of the Act." Petitioner assails this portion of the decision on
the ground that Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its
liability for medical care can not extend beyond 208 weeks.
There is no merit in the contention. Section 13 does not
require employer-employee relationship as a condition for
the employer's liability. As long as the illness was contracted
during the employee's employment, the employer's
obligation subsists. This obligation lasts for as tong as the
employee is sick. The limit of 208 weeks, like the limit of
P4,000.00, refers to the liability of the employer for
compensation (Secs. 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as
amended) and has no reference at all to the employer's
liability for medical care (Sec. 13) which lasts during the
 "period of disability" (See La Mallorea Pambusco vs. Isip, et
al., G.R. No. L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961) [emphasis supplied].

And again, on February 29, 1964, in the case of Cebu Portland Cement
Co. vs. WCC, et al., (L-19164, Feb. 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 420, 423-425) WE
ruled:

It may be observed that the law, in imposing on the employer

the obligation to provide medical attendance to an injured or
sick employee, unlike those provisions relating to
compensation for disability (Secs. 14, 16, 17 and 18 of Act
No. 3428, as amended) does not provide maximum either in
the amount to be paid or the time period within which such
right may be availed of by the employee. On the contrary the
law imposes on the employer the obligation to "provide the
employee with such medical, surgical, and hospital services
and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may
require . The implication is that such medical expenses as
may be necessary until the work-connected injury or
sickness ceases, may be charged against the employer. In
the United States, from where our labor compensation law is
derived, the two kinds of benefits for physical injury or
sickness are, like in our law, treated differently. The wage-
loss payments based on the concept of disability are
invariably limited in both amount and duration while
payments of medical benefits, that is, hospital and medical
expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury,
regardless of wage-loss or disability, vary in the different
states of the Union In twelve states such benefits are
unlimited as to duration and amount; in nineteen, the
preliminary limits are subject to extension by the
administrative agency for indefinite periods as the case
warrants; in eight, there are fixed limits subject to extension
for limited additional periods; and in nine, there are fixed
limits with no provision for extension (Arthur Larson on "The
Law of Workmen's Compensation", Vol. 2 [1952], p. 82). In
construing the compensation act's provision requiring the
employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services
'.reasonably required to care or relieve e the employee from
the facts of the injury ", it was there held that "in the absence
of express statuory authority this court is powerless to place
a definite limitation upon the time such medical, surgical and
hospital service shall be rendered in any particular case"
(W.J. Newman v. Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353
111. 190, 88 A.L.R., 1188). This was based on the theory
that workmen's acts are a humane law of a remedial nature,
 and wherever construction is permissible, their language
should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. And,
this is supported by the prevailing rule in compensation
cases.

Acts not containing any limitation as to the

period during which the employer may furnish
or pay for medical surgical or hospital services
have been construed as imposing liability on
the employer as long as such services are
required to cure or relieve the injured employee
from the effects of' his injury(Florczak v.
Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 111.
190, 88 A.L.R. 1188).

Thus an employee who contracted tuberculosis while

employed at a state tuberculosis hospital and where the
infection was never arrested from the time it was contracted
until his death, was declared entitled to continued treatment
the governing statute not having limited the time of treatment
(Carrol v. State, 64 N.Y. 2d 166, 242 Minn. 70) [emphasis
supplied].

xxx xxx xxx

The office of the Solicitor General, however, contends that since the
petitioner had been declared to be totally and permanently disabled, the
liability of the employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services
ceases, citing 10 Workmen's Compensation Text, Schneider, page 109,
that:

Where the evidence discloses that further medical, surgical,

and hospital services would not definitely improve the
condition of an injured employee, the liability of an employer
to furnish reasonable medical and hospital services, as and
when needed, ceases Patilsen vs. Glenn L. Martin -
Nebraska Co. 26 N.W. 2d. II, Jan. 31, 1947, citing Wilson vs.
Brown-McDonald Co. 278 N.W. 264, 256, March 4, 1938).

But the foregoing 1947 Nebraska decision was based on the old Nebraska
law providing for limited liability. Thereafter, said law was amended
allowing unlimited liability as to time and amount, thus making Nebraska
one of the 12 states providing for such unlimited liability as to time and
amount even for total and permanent disability, together with California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois Minnesota, New
York, North Dakota, Puerto Rico and Wisconsin (see Samuel B. Horovitz
"Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation law", 1948 ed., p. 294;
see also Larson, supra).

From 1948 to 1975, the number of states in the American Union providing
for medical benefits which are unlimited as to duration and amount, has
increased from 12 to 43:

61.11 Statutory summary

An integral and important part of the benefit scheme of all

compensation acts is the provision of hospital and medical
benefits. These benefits account for about one-third of the
total benefits paid to injured workmen.

In forty-three states such benefits are essentially unlimited

as to duration and amount; in one there is a fixed limit
subject to extension for a limited additional amount; in three
there are fixed limits with no provision for extension; and in
three, there are limits only as to silicosis and related
diseases.

It is interesting to observe that in the space of about thirty

years the number of states providing full medical coverage
has risen from about a dozen to almost four times that
number. This appears to evince agreement with the finding
of an authoritative study that "it is impossible fully to relieve
pain and to assure restoration of seriously disabled persons
when medical care is arbitrarily limited Equally important is
the convincing evidence that unlimited medical benefits are
economically the soundest benefit; that over the long term,
they become the least expensive (Sec. 61.11, Larson, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis
supplied).

Larson continues to state that 'medical benefits ordinarily include not only
medical and hospital services, but necessary incidentals such as
transportation, apparatus, and nursing care, which may be compensable
even when supplied at home by a member of claimant's family. Palliative
measures are included under the decisions of most jurisdictions, to relieve
pain even after all hope of cure is gone. Rehabilitation is becoming an
increasingly important part of the compensation program under such
provisions supplying additional maintenance and compensation during the
rehabilitation period as well as curative and retraining centers to restore
earning power to handicapped workers' (Sec. 61, Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis supplied).
To repeat, the prevailing interpretation of Section 13 is consistent with the
law and jurisprudence of the States of Hawaii, Minnesota and New York
(See Table 14, 4, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 574-10-
574.11 [1979]), upon whose compensation statutes our own
compensation act was patterned. It was originally adopted by our
Philippine Legislature in Spanish from the Statutes of the Territory of
Hawaii (Nava v. Ynchausti Steamship Co. 57 Phil. 751 [19321; Fernando
and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 401 [1964];
Pucan and Besinga, Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, 5-6 [1971]).

Section 13 of our compensation law mandates the employer to provide the

employee medical benefits immediately after he has suffered an injury and
during the subsequent period of disability 'as the nature of his disability
and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote
his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity',
regardless of whether the disability is permanent or temporary.

In Hawaii; the obligation of the employer to provide the employee medical

benefits subsists 'during resulting period of disability'; in Minnesota, 'during
disability as long as necessary to cure and relieve'; and in New York, 'as
long as necessary'.

The present jurisprudence in these states sanctions unlimited medical

benefits, both in time and in amount.

In Florida, the pertinent compensation statutes require the employer 'to

furnish remedial treatment —for such period as the nature of the injury or
the process of recovery may require' but 'all rights for remedial attention —
shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed or the commission acts on
its own initiative within two years after the date of the last remedial
treatment or payment of compensation.' Applying said provisions in the
case of Platzer v. Burger, 144 So. 2d 507 Fla. 1962), where the evidence
indicated that the claimant would need periodic medical treatment
consisting of dilation of the urethra, medical prescriptions, and treatment
for prostatitis for the rest of his life, the court ordered medical benefits for
the lifetime of the claimant.

It is true that' throughout the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention

of the legislator to limit payable compensation to P6,000.00 is redolent But
this refers only to compensation for loss of income proper or income
benefit which is fixed or computed on the basis of the average weekly
wages of the claimant; never to medical benefits. For it is likewise
pervasive in the law that the legislature has intended a separate and
different treatment for medical benefits as shown by the fact that it
provided for separate provisions for medical benefits. If the intention of the
lawmakers were to put a limit to medical benefits then they would have
merged or lumped the two benefits in all the applicable provisions of the
law. That they did not, simply means that they intended a different
treatment thereof.

It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

benefits for disability are of two general types: (1) Indemnity benefits in the
form of cash payments which is designed to compensate the worker for
the loss of wages due to disability sustained or for his death; and (2)
medical benefits in the form of medical services, hospitalization, medicine
and other matters related to the treatment of the compensable injury or
disease (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare
Legislation, 597-598 1964). The first, indemnity or compensation benefits
for loss of wages, is limited both as to time and as to amount; while the
second, medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to amount.

xxx xxx xxx

The suggestion that the 'period of disability' used in Section 13 of the Act
refers to the number of weeks fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18, was
already rejected in the aforecited cases. Thus, in the Itogon-Suyoc case,
this Court rules:

The decision orders petitioner: "to provide him (Fruto Dulay)

with continuous medical and hospital services and supplies
until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13
of the Act." Petitioner assails this portion of the decision oil
the ground that Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its
liability for medical care cannot extend beyond 208 weeks
'There is no merit in the contention. Section 13 does not
require employer- employee relationship as a condition for
the employer's liability. As long as the illness was contractes
during the employee's employment, the employers obligation
lasts for as long as the employee is sick. The limit of 208
weeks, like the limit of P4,000.00 , refers to the liability of the
employer for compensation (Sees. 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No.
3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the
employer's liability, for medical care (Sec. 13) which lasts
during the "period of disability.

Sections 22 and 29 refer to disability compensation or indemnity benefits;

not to medical benefits. Section 22 speaks of compensation fixed by law,
referring to the amounts fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18; not to Section
13 on medical benefits which have no fixed or definite amount. Likewise,
Section 29 speaks of 'the same amount of compensation as that
prescribed by this Act', referring to Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18.
It must likewise be noted that the initial text of Section 13 before its
amendment by Republic Act 4119 in 1964 imposed a limitation as to the
amount of medical benefits, thus: 'The pecuniary liability of the employer
for the necessary medical, surgical, and hospital services and
supplies shall be limited to the amount ordinarily, paid in the (community
for such treatment of an injured person of the same standard of living if the
treatment of an injured person had to be paid for by the injured himself
. That such discriminatory and degrading limitation was amended out of
the Act is clearly indicative of the intention of tile lawmakers to provide
unlimited medical benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

The findings of the 'workmen's Compensation Commission, Chat

petitioner is 'totally and permanently disabled for labor', is no proof that
further medical surgical and hospital services would not definitely improve
petitioner's condition, at the very least, relieve him of his pain or other
injurious effect of his ailment. Thus, even assuming that further medical
treatment would not return the employee to work or cure him, further
treatment may still relieve him of his pain or its injurious effects. This is the
doctrine laid down in W.J. Newman Co. vs. Industrial Commission (187
N.E.137, June 22, 1933), thus:

[1-37] This is a novel and exceptional case. Index such

circumstances caution is required in the construction of the
particular statute so as not to extend it or affect its general
application to the thousands of other cases not presenting
such unusual features. In construing paragraph (a) of
Section 8, since the curing of Nee is admittedly impossible,
two principal questions confront us, viz: First, whether the
services rendered or to be rendered are reasonably
necessary to relieve the employee from the effects of his
injury; and, secondly, if such services are necessary,
whether power is conferred upon this court to say when such
services shall be terminated. Reference to the record clearly
shows that Nee is beyond hope of cure from medical skill. It
further shows that the medical, surgical, and hospital
services he had been and is now receiving are not only
necessary but also adequate to relieve him, as far as
possible, from the effects of his injury. The findings of the
Industrial Commission on this phase of the question are
unquestionably in accord with the manifest weight of the
evidence. We are therefore left solely with the question
whether, by a construction of paragraph (a) of Section 8 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, this court can say, not
only in this case but in other cases of exceptional nature
 hereafter presented, that the medical, surgical and hospital
services rendered by an employer where no cure is possible,
may with justice both to the employer and the injured
employee, be terminated after a reasonable length of time,
to be determined according to the varying circumstances of
each particular case. In other words, can it be said that the
last phrase of paragraph (a) should be interpreted to mean
that when an employer has done that which is reasonably
required to cure an injured employee from the effects of his
injury and medical advice indicates that a cure is hopeless,
the employer is thereafter relieved from any further liability,
under the act, to furnish medical, surgical, and hospital
services. We cannot adopt any such literal or strained
construction of paragraph (a) as plaintiff in error urges in this
case, to the effect that the words "cure" and "relieve" mean
virtually the same thing. A workman who is cured is, of
course, relieved from the effects of his injury, but one who is
incurable, as in the present case, may still need skillful
attention to relieve him of pain or other injurious effects
caused by his injury. This is only the natural and usual
meaning of the words used. It is a construction in
accordance with the general spirit and humane purpose of
the act. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a humane law
of a remedial nature, and whenever construction is
permissible its language should be liberally construed. City
of Chicago vs. Industrial Commission, 291 111 23, 125 N.E.
705; Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Industrial Board, 283 111.
177, 118 N.E. 989. A strained construction not fairly within
the provisions of the act cannot be supported. Berry Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 318 111. 312, 149 N.E. 278. There
was no denial by the employer of liability, and it has been
repeatedly held by this court that the furnishing of medical,
surgical, and hospital services must be regarded as the
payment of compensation under the act. Goodman Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 316 111. 394, 147 N.E. 394, and
cases cited.

xxx xxx xxx

[47] By these successive amendments it may

be seen that the legislature deemed
inadequate the original limitation of eight
weeks' time and $200 in amount as to
medicine and hospital services, as the
amendment of 1919 enlarged the hospital
services from two weeks to extend "during the
 period for which compensation may be
payable," and also removed any financial limit,
except as to medical or surgical services. The
amendment in 1925 went further by removing
all time or money limitation upon medical and
surgical services, and limited medical, surgical,
and hospital services to such as might be
"reasonably required to cure or relieve from the
effects of the injury." In the absence of express
statutory authority this court is therefore
powerless to place a definite limitation upon
the time such medical, surgical and hospital
services shall be rendered in any particular
case. As we have said before, the proof here
shows that medical and hospital services are
necessary to relieve Nee from the effects of bis
injury and that such services cannot be
rendered in his home. There is no proof
indicating any malingering or feigned sickness
in this case, or any other circumstance which
would enable us to say that fur there services
are not reasonably necessary to relieve Nee
from the effects of his injury.

As the Legislature has seen fit to amend

paragraph (a) of section 8 and to successively
omit the former limitations therein imposed
upon the furnishing of medical, surgical and
hospital services, it would be nothing short of
judicial legislation for this court now, in an
exceptional case, to impose such a limitation
The limitations of the section in question
cannot be definitely fixed except by the
Legislature, and the only reasonable
interpretation which we are able to place upon
it, as said above, is that the employer's liability
continues so long as medical, surgical, and
hospital services are required in order to
relieve the injured employee from the effects of
his injury.

Indeed, to follow the modern trend of medical care, the direction is for
increased medical liability to be the "third phase of medicine", from
"preventive medicine" and "definitive or curative medicine or surgery", to
the dynamic concept of "medical rehabilitation", one principal objective of
which is to reduce or alleviate the disability to the greatest possible degree
(Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Law, Samuel B.
Horovitz, p. 297; Medical Handbook on Workmen's Compensation and
Principles of Disability Evaluation, by Guilatco 1967 ed., pp. 264-265).

xxx xxx xxx

In much the same way that euthanasia is not even prescribed as the
extreme remedy for what appears to be a terminal case, WE should not be
oblivious to the possibility that medical science may devise somehow,
sometime during the lifetime of the disabled employee, a remedy to banish
his pain and to completely rehabilitate him physically, mentally and
socially.

After devoting the best years of their lives to the service of the State, it is
only fair and just that the State should take care of its civil servants until
they are relieved completely from the effects of an ailment incurred by
reason of their employment.

Denial of medical benefits to an employee who is disabled permanently, is

to accord more rights to an employee who is suffering only temporary
disability or incapacity; because the latter is entitled to continuous medical,
surgical and hospital services and appliances as the nature of his injury or
ailment may require (Section 13, Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended); ...

xxx xxx xxx

It certainly would be anomalous and would do violence to natural reason

and logic as well as it would be an act of inhumanity to favor the
temporarily disabled more than the one deemed permanently
incapacitated by illness or injury contracted or sustained during his
employment.

An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is entitled (1)

to continuous hospital, medical and/or surgical services to relieve the
painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from or alleviation of the
humiliating effects of his injury, like plastic surgery after the first operation
that may leave an ugly scar or deformity; (3) to be provided with such
facilities, supplies or equipment that will restore the normal use of his
senses, faculties, or limbs, such as improved models of wheelchairs,
crutches, artificial limbs or hearing or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation
of his morale and spirit by eliminating the psychological effects of the
trauma caused by the ailment or injury so that he can join, and be
accepted by, the mainstream of society and lead a normal life.
After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee may
remain to be the main support of his family. Denial to him of further
hospital, medical or surgical services would be aggravating the economic
distress his family is suffering.

Because society does not seem to accept him (like a cured leper his
feeling of depression may drive him to commit suicide or may infect the
other members of the family who may, in desperation, commit anti-social
acts, which would engender a more serious tragedy for the family.

Then again, to abandon one who is permanently disabled after the first
medical treatment, is virtually to consign him to the scrap heap or to the
garbage dump of human derelicts no longer entitled to the concern and
solicitude of the State. Nothing would be more inhuman, repugnant to the
central core of our democratic welfare state as envisioned by our
Constitution and shocking to a compassionate society. As heretofore
emphasized, the Government should be the last to give up hope on the
recovery and rehabilitation of those who are now considered permanently
disabled. Laboratories all over the world are continuously testing and
searching for the panacea for all ailments that plague humanity. There is
greater possibility that such a cure may be discovered in our time. The
right to life rank second to none in the hierarchy of human rights. The
entire world is witness to the amazing survival of Karen Quinlan for the
last two years (over 4 years now) after the life-giving apparatus was
disconnected from her body.

It is likewise possible that from our own flora and fauna may be discovered
the remedy for many an ailment or injury. Many of our plants, fruits and
vegetables have been found to cure, prevent or minimize serious cardiac
ailments, hypertension, arthritis, afflictions of the kidney and bladder, as
well as deep wounds. Some of our vegetables are likewise natural
disinfectants. Lately, the lowly chichitica and dioscorea have been found
to be a cure for cancer (BT or DE May 13,1978).

God in his infinite wisdom has provided the remedies for human diseases,
injuries and afflictions. The genius of resourceful man will discover these
cures somehow, sometime — sooner than expected.

As the Florida Supreme Court pragmatically opined in the 1950 case of Di

Giorgio Fruit Corp. vs. Pittman 'Medicine is not an exact science ...
Moreover, in this modern era of extensive scientific research, it is not
possible to say with certainty today that any disease is incurable for no
one knows but that tomorrow will herald a new miracle drug'(49 So. 2d
600, 603).
A Filipino eye specialist gave the information that blindness due to
glaucoma may in time be a tiling of the past.

Specialists have provided relief to those afflicted with cardiac and kidney
diseases through transplanting heartily hearts and kidneys for diseased or
impaired ones.

Social legislations which constrict the rights of labor, should yield to the
social justice guarantee of the new Constitution which stresses that:

Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the

dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this
end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits' (Art. 11, 1973
Constitution, emphasis supplied).

To underscore this obligation of the State, Section 9 of Article I I likewise

directs that:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full

employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and 'employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration' (1973 Constitution, emphasis
supplied).

The conservative view limiting the right of the injured or ailing employee to
only one surgical or medical service prevailing in some States of the
American Union should not find adherence in our jurisdiction: because
such States seem to be still dominated by the capitalistic philosophy as
they do not provide in their respective constitutions any guarantee of
social justice in favor of their citizens. If, on the other hand, the
humanitarian view which sustains the right of the ailing or injured
employee to continuous medical and surgical services until he has been
fully rehabilitated, is espoused by the pro-aggressive states of the United
States of America despite the absence of any social justice guarantee in
their respective constitutions; a fortiori such compassionate approach
should be followed in our jurisdiction, where our Constitution expressly
guarantees social Justice 'to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all
the people' (Sec. 6, Art. 11, 1973 Constitution), while commanding the
State to' afford protection to labor' and 'assure the right of workers to ...
just and humane conditions of work'(Section 6, Art. 11, 1973 Constitution).
The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the
Government with claims for continuing medical, hospital and surgical
services and as a consequence unduly drain the National Treasury, is no
argument against it; because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare
State, in providing for the social justice guarantee in our Constitution,
assumes such risk. This assumption of such a noble responsibility is, as
heretofore stated, only just and equitable since the employees to be
benefitted thereby precisely became permanently injured or sick while
invariably devoting the greater portion of their lives to the service of our
country and people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural
resources of the nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude
and the greatest protection from the State to relieve them from unbearable
agony. They have a right to entertain the hope that during the few
remaining years of their life some dedicated institution or gifted individual
may produce a remedy or cure to relieve them from the painful or crippling
or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or ailment, to funy and
completely rehabilitate them and develop their 'mental, vocational and
social potentials', so that they will remain useful and productive citizens.

Finally, the New Labor Code itself commands that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor' (Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended). This echoes Article 1702 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that:

in case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts

shall be construed in favor of safety and decent living for the
laborer.'

The school of thought that resists the expansion of the social rights of
employees and workers is essentially capitalistic, conservative,
reactionary and selfish. The invocation of the due process clause to
challenge the validity of social and labor legislation as violative of the
freedom of contract and an undue deprivation of property had long been
discarded in America since the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel vs.
Parrish (300 U.S. 379) affirming the validity of minimum wage laws. In our
country, such a view was repudiated after the 1924 case of People vs.
Pomar (46 Phil. 440). Thereafter, other social legislations followed and
survived the constitutional test such as our own minimum wage law, the 8-
hour labor law, and various amendments to the workmen's compensation
law, and employer's liability act, law on maternity leave with pay, and laws
for the protection of women and minors employed in dangerous industries
and occupations. Such statutes were held not to trench upon the
Constitution, even in the states of the American Union whose constitutions
do not expressly guarantee social justice specifically in favor of the
working class, as heretofore stated.
 Then again, the fear that continued hospitalization and medical treatment
of employees who are permanently disabled would constitute an
intolerable burden on the employer, whether government or private, is
more fancied than real. Firstly, no statistics have been cited to show that
there are many permanently disabled and needing continued medical
treatment or hospitalization for a long period. Secondly, the employer can
always secure or purchase insurance against such possible liability.

In the instance case, the government is the employer against whom such
liability for continued hospitalization, medical services and medical
supplies, is being raised. The government can always appropriate the
necessary funds for the purpose.

The government has been losing revenues, either through graft and
corruption or failure to honestly and fully collect such revenues. These
amounts of which the government has been promoted by dishonest public
officers, private contractors or suppliers or which the government failed to
collect by reason of the criminal neglect or dishonesty of its collecting
agencies, may aggregate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of pesos
yearly. The financial exposure of the government to provide medical and
hospital services for its unfortunate employees rendered permanently
disabled but still suffering pain or humiliation or degradation by reason of
such permanent disability is practically minimal, or not substantial,
compared to the millions of pesos that the country is losing all these years
through graft and corruption. The government has failed not only to
prosecute many big-time tax dodgers, grafters and corruptors but also to
recover even a portion of the unpaid revenues or the amounts embezzled
or stolen from its coffers. Until the guilty parties are brought before the
courts, the tribunals cannot do anything.

In this case of petitioner who served the government as municipal judge from 1947 to
1969, risking his health and life, and who prays for a second reimbursement of his
medical expenses, ... this Court has the singular opportunity to afford him relief from his
misery and not let him deteriorate until his body is finally and totally decomposed and
dissolved into dust. Any gratuity that he might have received, aside from the first
compensation for wage loss and the first refund for hospitalization and medical
treatment, would not even be sufficient to maintain his family for the remaining few
years of his life. With his retirement gratuity and disability compensation already
exhausted by now (after eleven years from 1969), he and his family are exposed to
complete misery. The government or the court that does not lift a hand to rescue the
ailing employee and his family from such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an
agency of social justice, much less pretend to be compassionate.

2. And the Court En Banc by way of emphasizing ITS role as a potent social justice arm
of the State concluded optimistically in the aforesaid Biscarra case that —
 WE may yet escape the judgment of history that the Supreme Tribunal
was once found wanting in 'moral vision and abdicated ITS role as an
active 'implementing instrument of reform.'

3. It appears that petitioner's claim for medical reimbursement as stated in his letter to
the Workmen's Compensation Unit was for the amount of P20,588.85 (p. 242, WCC
rec.). However, the receipts submit by his counsel totalled only P19,880.00, as follows:

1. Exhs.D, D-1 to D-12

(pp- 243-256, WCC rec.)
Payments to St. Luke's

Hospital P11,750.00
(This includes the amounts
in Exhs. B, B-1 to B-152
and Exhs. C, C-1 to C-1 52,
pp. 258-551, WCC rec.).

2. Exh. O (p. 598, WCC rec.) 330.00

3. Exh. P (p. 597, WCC rec.) 6,500.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Gatchalian)

4. Exh. Q (p. 596, WCC rec.) 300.00

(Professional fee of Dr. Quizon)

5. Exh. R (p. 595, WCC rec.) 1,000.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Damian)

_________
TOTAL P19,880.00

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT (NOW
MINISTRY) OF JUSTICE IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF
NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY (P9,880.00) PESOS AS
REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I maintain my dissent and contrary view in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (95 SCRA
248, 282) that "an employee who has been declared to be totally and permanently
disabled and who has received the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation
therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to the injury or
illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more
particularly under section 13 to any further payment or reimbursement tor subsequent
medical expenses. The Act has never burdened the employer, be it the government
itself, (and this has always been the official construction and implementation of the Act
as heretofore stated with the obligation of making unlimited payments for subsequent,
medical services and expenses for as long as the permanently and totally disabled
employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such a limitless
burden been imposed, for the cost, thereof would be staggering, if not altogether
prohibitive, not to mention that no provision for such an open-ended and endless
obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century that the Workmen's
Compensation Act has been in force. The employer's obligation ceases upon payment
of the maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability compensation for total and permanent
disability and the medical expenses attendant thereto (which generally have amounted
to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation);" and that "the remedy for the
plight of the permanently disabled who were not taken care of by the old Workmen's
Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the lawmakers. This they can give by
simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical
and rehabilitation services contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles
185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made applicable and shall be available to the
employees and workers who incurred permanent and total disability under tile
Workmen's Compensation Act. "

I reiterate that in our deliberations, the majority decision in Biscarra "was

expressly limited to the government as the employer and that the question of whether
the same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong
medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees
would also apply to the private employers, many of which could possibly be thrown into
bankruptcy should this ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high
costs of such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved " (Emphasis supplied)

Confronted, however, with the majority ruling in Biscarra holding that the government as
employer (as in the case at bar) continues to liable for the indefinite, lifelong medical,
surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees
(notwithstanding their having been paid the corresponding disability compensation and
reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to their disailing injury or illness), we have
to apply the prevailing rule, for as long as the same has not been overturned and set
aside. (Cf. Yap vs. Republic, 45 SCRA 36, 40 [1972]). Accordingly I am constrained to
concur in the result.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge ill 194-1. He suffered his first heart
attack in July, 1969. Here tired from the service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in
October 1970, by the Workmen's Compensation Commission, permanent and total
disability benefits and reimbursement, of medical expenses incurred.

After approximately six years from The date of his retirement, or in 1975, petitioner
suffered a second heart attack. He incurred further medical expenses consisting of
hospitalization and physician's fees in the amount of P19,880. Respondent Commission
denied his claim for further reimbursement.

The question is. should petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for the subsequent
medical and hospitalization expenses that he had incurred?

Although under the ruling of the Court En Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission (95 SCRA 248 [19801), petitioner is so entitled, I am
constrained, as a matter of principle, to reiterate my dissent in that case to the effect
that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, a totally and permanently disabled
claimant is not entitled, up to his death, to continued hospital, medical and surgical
services, nor to further reimbursement of his medical expenses.

Briefly, the reasons I stated were: 1) under section 13 of the said Act, an employee is
entitled to such services and expenses "immediately ...during the subsequent period of
disability or, to immediate medical expenses. 2) Under sections 22 and 29 of the Act,
"the employer shall be exempt from all liability under this Act as soon as the
compensation has been paid under this section, saving the provisions of section six of
this Act." 3) Throughout the said Act, the legislative intent to limit payable compensation
to P6,000.00 is evident (see secs. 12, 14, 16, 18). 4) The administrative interpretation
given by the Workmen's Compensation Commission to Section 13 of the Act, although
never conclusive, is usually given great weight by the Courts as it is the department
charged with the implementation of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Madrigal &
Paterno vs. Rafferty & Concepcion, 38 Phil. 415 [1918]; Asturias Sugar Central vs.
Commissioner of Customs, 1 SCRA 617 [1961]).

Relative to the assertion that the Philippines is a "welfare state" (p. 26, majority
Decision) to which I also took exception in my previous dissent in Biscarra and which I
reiterate herein, I need mention only the statement of President Marcos, quoted in the
local Times Journal of April 27, 1980, reading as follows:

Speaking during a breakfast hosted by the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce

and Industry at the Oahu Country Club in Honolulu, the President further
pledged not to adopt the welfare state policy. This could render industry
 bankrupt, he said, stressing that his policy is for a proportionate sharing of
wealth between capital and labor.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission.

G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE :PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"Chicks mo dong?"1

With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate
of many desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in
the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice. Hopefully, there will be more
rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the
minor knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003."3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated May 5,
2008, states:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by
acting as their procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other
consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. 9208
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a nongovernmental organization,

coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in
Cebu City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert
Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives. 7 PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides
looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money, which
was recorded in the police blotter.9

The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were
adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was
for the rest of the police team.10

PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay

Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called their
attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused
went as follows:

Accused: Chicks mo dong?(Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel.
(Are they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)

Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.)12

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a
prospective subject.13

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this
case.14 Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)

PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in
sex?)15 Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo
inquired how much their serviceswould cost. Accused replied, "Tag kinientos"
(₱500.00).16

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland
Motel. Upon proceeding toRoom 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to
accused.17

As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was
their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested
accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the
marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were brought to Room 25
and placed in the custody of the representatives from the IJM and the DSWD." 19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was
supported by a copy of her certificate of live birth.20

AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March
2008 she stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed
with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there where
she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When
Gee Ann found out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed
because she needed the money in order to helpher father. AAA recalled that she had
sex with her first customer. She was paid ₱200.00 and given an additional ₱500.00 as
tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann
brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in that
area.21

AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her
pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May
2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that she
was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to
Queensland Motel.24

AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was
in Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and toldAAA and
BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not arrested. 25

AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with
other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received ₱400.00 for every customer who
selected her.26

The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1
Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call
to PSI Ylanan, they "rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused."27 SPO1 Altubar
retrieved the marked money worth ₱1,000.00 from accused’s right hand "and upon
instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the ‘police blotter prior
operation’. . . ."28

The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM "in conducting the
operation against the accused."29

Version of the accused

In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the evening of

May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men
on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing.
She replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that
they were actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper witha number written
on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home,
she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would
be given money by the two males.30 Ruling of the trial court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and held31 that:

Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under

paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in
prostitution asdefined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of "sexual
intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. the
‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of Php1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.

....

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified
under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).

Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED[.]32

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and
awarded moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the
private complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted
and gavedue course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case records of CA-
G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17, 2014.37

In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also
required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to confirm the
confinement of accused.39

Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective
manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering
that all issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s brief filed
before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV
Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for
Women since October 27, 2010.

The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may be
dissected into the following:

(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid,
considering that there was no prior surveillance and the police did not know the
subject of the operation;43

(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence presented to show that
accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking;44 and

(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering

that AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.45

Arguments of accused

Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into
committing the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not
evenknow who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know the identities of the
alleged victims.

Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because
the prosecution did notpresent evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging
in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and asserted that
she was a laundry woman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute.
Thus, it was her decision to display herself to solicit customers.49

Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused because
witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited customers and received
money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized
by courts.51Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was
correct in stating that accused had "fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. .
."53

We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.

I.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC)
was "adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession" 54 on November 15,
2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition.55

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations "Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children"
(Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30,
2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on December 25, 2003. 58

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:

Article 3 Use of terms For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,

harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation

set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the
means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for

the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this
does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the "Anti-Trafficking Act
will serve as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the] protocol." 59

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described
trafficking in persons as follows:

Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is

tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most
flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this
insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape,
physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured
servitude.

....

As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the
Child; the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their
Families; and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among
others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention
Against Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

At first glance, it appears thatwe are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.

Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall
squarely address human trafficking.60

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No.
2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking
law when other laws exist that cover trafficking.61

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:

At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised
Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act,
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment,
prostitution, falsification of public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These
laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons
resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only
address to one or some elements of trafficking independent of their results or
consequence.62(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human
trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May
26, 2003.

II.

Elements of trafficking in persons

The elements of trafficking inpersons can be derived from its definition under Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:

(1) The actof "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of

persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders."

(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." 63

On January 28, 2013,Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,

offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does
not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:

(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,

transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person"

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of

others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals found thatAAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their
services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time
that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a
prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability
as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68

III.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008.
She concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with "customers" for
money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still becommitted even if the
victim gives consent.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes ata
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
 exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.

The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given outof his or her
own free will.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in
persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states:

SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons.— It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
judicial, to commit any of the following acts.

a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any

means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;72

Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in
persons is qualified.

SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified

trafficking: a. When the trafficked person is a child;

b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is

deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group;

d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who

exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by
a public officer or employee;
 e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any
member of the military or law enforcement agencies;

f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;

and

g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the

offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73

Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

....

b. Child- refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over
eighteen (18) but isunable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition.74

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of

trafficking in persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the
offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was also qualified
because the trafficked persons were minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting
at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused
peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that she
was born on January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed
the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a
child. As held by the trial court:

[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere
"transaction" i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of
Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75

IV.

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to
determine whether there was a valid entrapment operation:

. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin
of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit
the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to
government agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits,
his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." If the accused was found to have been
ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defense will fail even if a police agent usedan unduly persuasive inducement.

Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court considers
the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry
is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on
the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.For the goal of the defense is to
deter unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law
enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one
who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed
that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is
presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)77

Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in
determining the whether there was an entrapment operation or an
instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from also
applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:

Applying the "subjective"test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures income

from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing
accused-appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is
not even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers for
quite some time.79 (Citations omitted)

Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance
before the entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and
instigation. In Chang v. People,80this court explained that:

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
reaoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. 81

Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police
to commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living
as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals:

[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and
PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and
when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while
she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82

This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated
the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their
attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" If accused had no predisposition to commit the
offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they
wanted girls.

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely
proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked
them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police
for the accused to commit the crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights. 83 The
marked money retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the
entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence. 84

On accused’s alibi thatshe was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of
Appeals noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was
unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence.85

With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an
entrapment operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value
of flexibility in police operations:

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust

operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as
the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass
on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The
urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action on
the part of the law enforcers.

V.

Imposition of fine and award of damages

The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of 2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of
Republic Act No. 9208 provides that:

SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions.— The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

....

c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but
not more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00);

However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from ₱150,000.00 89 to

₱500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00. These
amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:

The payment of ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

 (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

....

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be
trafficked as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that
Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she
was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its
accompanying desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the
weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such
hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world, where our choices
of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort taken just to survive.
Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a foundation
for two human beings to face life’s joys and challenges while continually growing
together with many shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines
the world that we create also for others.

Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the
text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their
character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human
beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this
case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope
that our people and our government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to
a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.

There are more AAA's and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too,
need to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in
our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000,000.00,
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(2) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTOLIN

CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias STEPHEN P0 y
UY or TOMMY SY and PAUL LEE y WONG alias PAUL
LEUNG, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAWFUL ARRESTS
WITHOUT WARRANT; REQUIREMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. - Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court
cannot agree with and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the search
without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the
baselessness of its findings and conclusion: x x x the search conducted on
their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for being
incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee
without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have
committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting
officers from the time they received the bags containing the regulated drug
in the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their
arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under the situation where an
offense had in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the
ones who committed it. x x x Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, we note that
par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being
escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other
hand requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
 while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These requirements
are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest,
appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room, and
appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child
inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being
actually committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the
presence of the lawmen.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE 113, SECTION 5; PARAGRAPH (b) THEREOF; NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - Par. (b) of Rule 113, Section 5 is
likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not
been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-
appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act
of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be
considered to have committed the offense of carrying and transporting
prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was no
sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the
accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of
handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true,
cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act
performed under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in
broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of
the public. Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport
setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over
and delivering pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat
obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending along
(pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover,
one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that
they contained shabu hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom.
The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color
and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were
concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received
that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that
same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another decision of like
import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller),
and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT
BAR. - We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the
 prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable
ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a
crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were
made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in
par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY; CONSPIRACY; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. -
Because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient
proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on
the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the
four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the
very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the
Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely
and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very
same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say
that they looked like the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming
them to be the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the
actual ownership of the said bags at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time
they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the
finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and
Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved
independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; DEEMED WAIVED BY
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ITS VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. - What has
been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the
search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not
being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that
appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as
well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise
the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly,
any possible challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed
waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional
rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, in cases such as People vs. Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936])
and De Garcia vs. Locsin (65 Phil. 689 [1938]).
6. ID.; ID.; THE JUDICIARY WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO EXPECT
ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BE LAW ABIDING IF WE DO NOT INSIST ON
THE FULL PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS. - It is evident and clear to
 us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in
the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests
and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal
drugs that the government officers claimed to have recovered, this Court
agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply the law with an
even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would
have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not
insist on the full protection of their rights.
7. ID.; ID.; LAW ENFORCERS MUST ACT WITH DELIBERATE CARE AND
WITHIN THE PARAMETERS SET BY CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAW. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over
an illegal search and seizures as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of
law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our
system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court
appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set
by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office and The Law Firm of Ross B. Bautista for Antolin
Cuizon.
Marcial P. Pe Benito for Steve Pua and Paul Lee.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal

searches and seizures, and the requirements for a valid warrantless search
incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and
encourages pro-active law enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the
sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar maxim, the end
never justifies the means.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 5, 1993 Criminal Case
No. 92-0230) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding
appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous rugs Act of 1972.
 On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants
charging them as follows:

That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without lawful
authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de

parte, pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and
Steve Pua, the latter translated the Information into Chinese-Cantonese for
the understanding of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand
English, Pilipino or any other Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by
their counsel, also pleaded not guilty.4 Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993,
the court a quo found appellants guilty as charged and rendered the following
disposition:5

WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen
Po y Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted Information;
and they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu involved in this case is declared

forfeited in favor of the government and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug
Board for proper disposal.

The Facts
According to the Prosecution

The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor
General, who added the page references to the transcript of stenographic
notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows:6

In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
gathered an information regarding the drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y
Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them. The
residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18,
21).

In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its
informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on
the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of shabu. A
team was organized to intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with
Ernesto Dio, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members.
Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of the
NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).

Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Dio positioned
himself at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of the team posted
themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the
same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong, after
passing through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the
Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding a car. While there, accused
Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) travelling bags to accused Steve Pua y
Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area.
Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded in leaving the
airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4-
5, 8-9).

At this juncture, Dio, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the
group of Yap at the parking area, describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and
Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the two. However, the message
of Dio was not completely received by his teammates as the radio he was using ran
short of battery power (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 25-26).

Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Dio proceeded to the
place where his companions were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to
them, believing that they were already in the process of apprehending accused Pua
and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not apprehended, Dio told the
group of Yap to follow him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee
which, according to an earlier tip he learned, was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula
Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila (tsn, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992 pp.
6, 15).

Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee
entered, Dio and the other members of the team coordinated with Cot. Regino
Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two
accused. A verification made by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua
and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel. The two accused allowed Dio and Yap,
together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4)
travelling bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused
Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having introduced themselves as
NBI agents, Dio and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee to search their bags
in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing.(Exh. I). Three
(3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a considerable
quantity of white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Each package was sandwiched between two (2) pieces of
board which appear to be lawanit placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags.
The suspected shabu contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other
had a weight of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected shabu retrieved from the third bag
weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Dio and his companions
(tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. F-2, p. 75, Records).

Immediately thereafter, Dio and the other members of the team proceeded to the
house of accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and
the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs. They reached the place at
about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from
accused Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline
substance weighing 2.695 kilos, likewise believed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from accused Cuizon
(tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).

Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI
headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were
subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice for
inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May 19,
1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).

In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito
Soriano, roomboy of the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed
that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he discovered in the
ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected shabu of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. X,
p. 110). Informed of the discovery while they were already in their office in the
NBI, Yap and some companions returned to the hotel. The suspected shabu was
turned over to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline
substance taken from the three (3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua
and Lee in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the white crystalline substance retrieved from
the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the white
crystalline substance hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. (Board Regulation
No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992,
p. 12).

The Defenses Version(s)

Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct

examination, he testified that at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila
Peninsula Hotel.7 His version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can be
summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to
check-in at the Manila Peninsula Hotel for and in behalf of the latters personal
friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to arrive
that evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged by
appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee does not know how to speak English
and the local language.8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from
the lobby informing them of the arrival of Paul Leungs luggage. At Puas
instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy.
Thereafter, two persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a tomboy and
a thin man with curly hair. The two men identified themselves as NBI agents
and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did not know
who they were. However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security Officer of the
hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee relented and
permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the agents to
sign a piece of paper. Made to understand that they were merely giving their
consent for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed the same.
Whereupon, the agents told them that they will open Paul Leungs bags. Again
appellant Pua refused, saying that the bags did not belong to them. Just the
same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lees consent, opened the bags
and found the shabu. Pua and Lee were then apprehended and brought to the
NBI headquarters.9
 Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecutions
version of the incident. While admitting that on February 21, 1992, he and his
wife Susan did arrive from Hong Kong with several pieces of luggage, he
denied that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less
passed to them the four pieces of luggage. According to him, only his two-
year old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside
the airport. Ong fetched them from the airport and brought them to their home
in Caloocan City. They arrived at their house around 3:00 in the afternoon.10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son
on his bed, two NBI agents suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They
manhandled him in front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a
necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI agents
ransacked the place without any warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin
Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters
in Manila and there the NBI agents continued mauling him.11
Appellant Cuizons wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his
nephew Nestor Dalde, testified in his favor basically reiterating or confirming
his testimony.12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a
word of English or Pilipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able
to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his
testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date
allotted to the defense for the reception of Lees testimony, his counsel,
although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court
deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present additional
evidence,13 and the case was considered submitted for decision after the filing
of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the
reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only
accused Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his
memorandum.

The Issues

In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of
errors:14

I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.

II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and Ernesto Dio despite contradictions made on
material points.

III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his
evidence in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.

Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two

assignments of errors above-quoted, and in addition challenges the legality
and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental
thereto.15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal
question of the legality of the arrest and search of herein appellants effected
by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of
the court a quo will stand or fall. Consequently, there is a need to resolve first
this issue before endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by
appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and
arrests to have been illegal, whether failure by appellants Pua and Lee to
explicitly assign the same as errors before this Court amounted to a waiver of
their constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.

The Courts Ruling

General Rule on Warrantless

Arrests, Searches, & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the
land16 ordains it:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17

However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is
not absolute. Thus, under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court, an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or
a private person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate

arrest without warrant, the person arrested may be subjected to a search of
his body and of his personal effects or belongings, for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
likewise without need of a search warrant.18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under
circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed
above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal
activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been
committed by him, then the search made of such person as well as his arrest
are deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been
obtained during such search, even if tending to confirm or actually confirming
such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose and in any
proceeding,20 the same being the fruit of the poisonous tree.21 Emphasis is to
be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot
agree with and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the search without a warrant.
The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its
findings and conclusion:

x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as
valid for being incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee
without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have committed
the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from the time
they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time
they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as
falling under the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused
were the ones who committed it. x x x22

Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on

lawful arrests without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously
inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the
time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested
(i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s).
These requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of
their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room,
and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child
inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually
committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the
lawmen.23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally
exacting requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to
establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon
could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other
two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of carrying and
transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was
no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the
accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of handing
over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true, cannot in
any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under
suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically
at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public.24 Furthermore, it
can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or
their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of
baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our
fellow countrymen for sending along (pakikipadala) things and gifts through
friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot determine from the external
appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden beneath some
secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with
luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far
as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents
purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be
arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another
decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the
telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed.25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear
guidelines, as follows:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed,
is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that
fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
(Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful
under Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the information
given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground (for belief)
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok s verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery
of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife
cannot make the arrest lawful. x x x

The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where
this Court ruled that x x x under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay
information (tips), but they were completely uncertain that anything was really
going down that day. That much is undisputed, from a reading of the
testimony of Agent Dio:
Q - Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the spouses
Cuizon were going to bring in or transport into the country shabu on February 21,
1992?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would bring in
shabu, is it not? That was only the information relayed to your group?
A - Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q - But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they were
bringing in shabu?
A - Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)

In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Dio
during the operation, likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their
uncertainty regarding the commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992,
pp. 29 & 34).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution
failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI
agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the
search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest
do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and
therefore should be deemed illegal. We might add that the search conducted
on Pua and Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having
preceded the same and produced the justification therefor. On the other hand,
the search on Cuizon s residence, without the benefit of a search warrant,
was clearly illegal and the shabu seized thereat cannot but be considered
inadmissible in evidence. More on these points later.

Comparison Between The Present Case

and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For claritys sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with
previous decisions by this Court in various drug cases, in which apparently
different conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from the
instant case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing
holding as well as the constitutional and legal principles on which it is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound
for Baguio City, was arrested by a policeman on the same bus because of the
distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying.
The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful,
the search justified and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.
2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus
terminal, was noticed by lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also
positively fingered by an informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was
accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission; the
lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a package of
marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and
search incident thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand
sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search warrant had
there been time, but as the case presented urgency, and there was actually
no time to obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and
inasmuch as an informer had given information on the spot that the accused
was carrying marijuana, the search of his person and effects was thus
considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting
suspiciously, and when accosted by two members of the Davao INP who
identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued
and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed
revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his
conviction for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the
circumstances sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search.
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,31 agents of the Narcotics
Command set up a checkpoint on a highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen
vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio Citydue to confidential reports from
informers that Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large
quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two suspects,
riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop. The
officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks and tin cans,
which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court
upheld the search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al.,32 the Court ruled that the search of the
appellants moving vehicles and the seizure of shabu therefrom was legal, in
view of the intelligence information, including notably, clandestine reports by a
planted deep penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate, to the effect that appellants were
bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it is not
practicable to secure a search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a
moving vehicle to transport contraband, because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp
Dangwa, Mountain Province, set up a temporary checkpoint to check vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent reports that vehicles from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of
particular information to the effect that a Caucasian would be travelling from
Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding
was stopped at the checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the
NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only foreigner on board, had a bulge
at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought accuseds
passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to comply, the
lawman directed him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his waist.
It was a pouch bag which, when opened by the accused, was found to contain
packages of hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited for questioning, the
accused disembarked from the bus and brought along with him two pieces of
luggage; found inside were two teddy bears stuffed with more hashish. The
Court held that there was sufficient probable cause in the premises for the
lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime
and/or trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Said probable
cause arose not only from the persistent reports of the transport of prohibited
drugs from Sagada, and the tip received by the NARCOM that same day that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but
also from the failure of the accused to present his passport or other
identification papers when confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered
suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused was trying to hide his
identity, it being the normal thing expected of an innocent man with nothing to
hide, that he readily present identification papers when asked to do so. The
warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found
by the Court to provide probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and
searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or
positive identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee,
failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Too, urgency attended the
arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved
the use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get
away long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be overlooked, unlike
in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned
cases acted immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and
probable causes established, and effected the arrests and searches without
any delay.

Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case

In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly
decided against arresting the accused-appellants inside the airport as they
allegedly wanted to discover the identities of the airport immigration, security
or customs personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise
involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in order to avoid the
possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might result in
injuries to innocent bystanders. These excuses are simply unacceptable. They
are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure to effect the
arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain how
come they did not apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon handed
over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative safety. Such
arrest would have been consistent with the settled constitutional, legal and
jurisprudential precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security
checks allegedly with their contraband cargo undetected in their luggage.
Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed they did not testify that they
saw) anyone from the airport immigration, security or customs who could have
escorted the spouses Cuizon, and therefore, there was no danger of any live
ammo encounter with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had already
made their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the
accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very act of handing over the luggage to
the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them at that very
instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the agents, Dio,
merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off
for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to think that at the
most critical and climactic moment, when agent Dio radioed his companions
for help to close in on the suspects, the most amazing and stupendous thing
actually happened: Murphys Law kicked in - whatever could go wrong, did,
and at the worst possible time - the batteries in Agent Dios hand-held radio
supposedly went dead and his message was not transmitted. Thus the
departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily and unimpeded to the Peninsula
Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their residence
in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and scampering madly to
catch up. Such absolutely astounding and incredible happenstance might find
a place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the courts to swallow it-
hook, line and sinker - is infinite naivete, if not downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the
agents were not thereby rendered helpless or without recourse. The NBI
agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-called informant, claimed to
have piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua
and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car distance behind (TSN, May 20,
1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did
not intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way, pull
them over, arrest them and search the luggage. And since the agents were in
three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one
vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went
after Pua and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary,
common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men
who testified claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug busts
or similar operations and therefore must have been familiar with contingency
planning, or at least should have known what to do in this situation where their
alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what the lawmen opted to do,
i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, allegedly bringing the drug
cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his
residence with one of the luggage, increased significantly the risk of the
suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping through the lawmens fingers, and puts
into question the regularity of performance of their official functions. The
agents alleged actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright and
decisive steps taken by lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court
held the arrests and seizures to be valid.
 Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents
intercepted and collared the suspects on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or
better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over, then there would not have
been any question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as they
would presumably have been caught red-handed with the evidence, and
consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of
commission of the offense charged, there would have been no doubt also as
to the existence of conspiracy among the appellant to transport the drugs.
However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no
sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and
Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence
that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were
the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the
Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely
and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same
ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that they
looked like the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be
the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual
ownership of the said bags as at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they
were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding
of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the
other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently
and beyond reasonable doubt.34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely
difficult to subscribe to the trial courts finding as to the existence and
sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major component of which
would have been the alleged information or tip purportedly received by the
agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon that fateful day with a
large cache of shabu. The question that defies resolution in our minds is why,
if indeed the information or tip was genuine and from a highly reliable source
as claimed by the government agents, did they not act on it? Throw in the
alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the NBI
people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with the
so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the government officers were still
seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and
search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went
after Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and
searching them, as they were supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and
meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search
their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how confident
the agents were about their hot tips, reliable informers and undercover
surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate the
existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest and
search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score,
but we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of
the accused-appellants individually.

Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon

The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted

without any warrant, and not on the occasion or as an incident of a valid
warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could
not be admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make
an effort to hold him liable under such seizure. He lamely argued: (A)t any
rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in connection
with the bag containing shabu confiscated from his residence. His
responsibility is based on the bags containing shabu which he handed to Pua
and Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of shabu
taken from his house were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of
the prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him.
However, contrary to the trial judges conclusion, we hold that insofar as
Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the
poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be
acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search conducted
on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid
warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not
illegal, conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua
and Lee on the other had not been established by sufficient proof beyond
reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this
Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure
conducted at his residence, and questioned the admission of the seized
shabu in evidence.

Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ Tommy Sy

What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua.
While the search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal
for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that
appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search as well
as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue
or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible
challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This
Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including,
particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases
such as People vs. Malasugui35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by
virtue of the handwritten consent (Exhibit I) secured by the arresting officers
from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to the search
of their baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the consented
search is admissible in evidence. The said written permission is in English,
and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search of their
luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee are
carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua understands both English and
Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, and
gave his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was asked to
sign the written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992,
pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct and cross-
examinations to the effect that he did not really read the consent but signed it
right away, and that by signing it he only meant to give permission for the NBI
agents to enter the room (and not to search) is hardly worthy of belief,
considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been extra careful
about who to let into the hotel room.
Thus, the full weight of the prosecutions testimonial evidence plus the
large amount of prohibited drugs found, must be given full force vis-a-vis Puas
claim of innocent presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not worthy of
credence.

Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ Paul Leung

Appellant Lees situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the
Solicitor General when he noted that the trial judge did not exert sufficient
effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused
appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was
effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one,
he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense
such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf;
further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee the
availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf,
including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to
present his testimony.37 In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason,
we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin
for a re-trial.

Epilogue

It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the
drug bust operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees
against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the
large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have
recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply
the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of
justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we
do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors
and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the
methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-
breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more
rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society,
we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the
parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies
the means.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant
Antolin Cuizon y Ortega is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His
immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid causes.
Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of
Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is
hereby affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant Lee is
hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may
be given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with
respect to the disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR

PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere,
as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for
the protection of the people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer,
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights
(ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the
IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing
to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not
killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual
petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to
bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be
infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of
the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light
therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other

areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But,
at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police
and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional
Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,

Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without
proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is
that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the
suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark
street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different.
Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out
suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might
impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region."
It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial
law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I
am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein,
unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and
effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be
left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the
majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even
irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain
command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first
saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF
CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67
(AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66
DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for
liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance,
is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court
because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is
the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo
Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges.
(Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a
roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And
so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is
(are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one
simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing)
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a
light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step
we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the
majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have
here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa
Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because
they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can
not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's
right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go
on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around.
Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once
again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper
democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a
living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without
proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is
that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the
suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark
street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different.
Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out
suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might
impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region."
It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial
law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I
am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein,
unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and
effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be
left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the
majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even
irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain
command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first
saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF
CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67
(AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66
DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures,
the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for
liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance,
is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court
because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is
the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo
Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges.
(Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a
roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And
so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is
(are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one
simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing)
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a
light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step
we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the
majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have
here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa
Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because
they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can
not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's
right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go
on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around.
Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once
again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper
democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a
living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

G.R. No. 101808 July 3, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON BOLANOS, accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case No. 1831-M-90, for
"Murder", wherein the accused-appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder and
the Court hereby imposed upon the accused Ramon Bolanos the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment)
and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 With Costs.

SO ORDERED. (Judgment, p. 6)

The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow:

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Patrolmen Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated
National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and
documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence were after the fact narration of events based on the report regarding the death of the victim,
Oscar Pagdalian which was communicated to the Police Station where the two (2) policemen who responded to the incident are assigned
and subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2)

Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime of the Marble Supply, Balagtas,
Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then
inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were informed that the deceased was with two (2) companions, on the previous night,
one of whom was the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of
the following morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid., p. 3)

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further indicated that when they apprehend the accused-appellant, they found
the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated; that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay
on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly
admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)

During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it
was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as
follows:

. . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the
police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he was asked by
the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim because the victim was abusive; this statement of the accused
was considered admissible in evidence against him by the Court because it was given freely and before the
investigation.

The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused Ramon Bolanos is guilty
of having killed the victim Oscar Pagdalian. (Judgment, p. 6)
A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's Office, dated April 2, 1992, with the position that the lower
court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on board the police patrol jeep. Said office even
postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was given, it was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to
have a counsel of his choice, while already under police custody." (Manifestation, p. 4)

Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation
may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families. (Emphasis supplied).

Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and
the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides
appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under
review.

WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused-appellant have been violated, the appellant is ACQUITTED, with costs de
oficio.

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio N. Salamera for defendant-appellant.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
finding the accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in Criminal Case No. 61029 guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i),
Article I of the Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended
by P.D. No. 1675, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

There is no dispute about the facts of this case. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along
Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting
suspiciously near the corner of Estrada Street. 1 The police officers, after Identifying
themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his possession dried
marijuana leaves. 2 The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under arrest.
Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana
leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias "Balanchoy". 3

The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with suspect
Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos y
Gaerlan in 2366 Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him. The police operatives
immediately brought appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police
Department Headquarters for investigation.

During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn
statement implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the
marijuana leaves. 4 The accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional
rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the
offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana
leaves for P10.00. 5

On May 22, 1981, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of
not guilty to the information filed by assistant fiscal Antonio J. Ballena which states:

That on or about May 4, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another
or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
sell or offer for sale and deliver dried marijuana leaves, which is a
prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 6

At the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses to wit: Patrolman Jaime Cruz, a
police investigator, Patrolman Agapito Linga, a police agent, and Felisa Vequilla, an NBI
forensic chemist.

Patrolman Cruz testified that on May 5, 1981, he investigated and took down the sworn
statement of one Malcon Olevere who disclosed that the accused-appellant Ramos was
the source of the marijuana leaves. Patrolman Cruz also testified that he prepared the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the appellant Ramos and the corresponding Crime
Report. 7 Patrolman Agapito Linga declared on the witness stand that Lt. Mediavilla
arrested appellant Ramos because Malcon Olevere declared that the appellant sold to
him the confiscated marijuana leaves. 8 The third witness, Felisa Vequilla, a forensic
chemist, affirmed that after conducting a dangerous drug test, the leaves confiscated
from Malcon Olevere are positive for marijuana. 9

The prosecution offered the following as documentary evidence: 10

 Exhibit "A" The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Rogelio
Ramos prepared by witness Patrolman Cruz which was offered as part of
his testimony;

Exhibit "B" Crime Report dated May 6, 1981 also prepared by the witness
Patrolman Cruz;

Exhibit "B-1" second page of Exhibit "B'

Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa;

Exhibit "C-1" The bracketed portions of Exhibit "C" stating among others
that it was Rogelio Ramos herein accused who furnished Malcon Olevere
the marijuana leaves;

Exhibit "D-1" marijuana leaves examined;

Exhibit "E" the envelope containing the marijuana leaves

which was confiscated from Malcon Olevere.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found
the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
view of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered
and admitted in court. The dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, accused ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN is hereby found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4, Article II in
relation to Section 2(i), Article I Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by PD
44 and further amended by PD 1675 as charged in the present
information, for selling subject prohibited drugs (marijuana leaves) without
any lawful authority and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment); to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs. Let the accused be given full credit of the
entire period of his preventive imprisonment.

Subject marijuana leaves (Exhibit E) are confiscated, to be destroyed by

the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED. 11

The case is now before Us for automatic review. Accused-appellant submits before this
Honorable Court the following errors: 12

I
 That the court erred in finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 4
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Selling-Pushing).

II

That the court erred in its findings both in question of law and fact in
convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to
adduce the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt by failing to present Malcon Olevere y
Napa, the person who claimed that it was the therein accused who
allegedly sold the marijuana leaves.

III

That the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to
meet the witness against him face to face and to cross-examination e him
has been violated.

IV

That the court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
denial of due process of law.

The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or admissible
evidence in the record to justify the conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos.

We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the
written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that
Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos
sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of
paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for cross-examination. An
affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. 13 Such kind of
evidence is considered hearsay. 14 The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to
face 15 in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties without due process
of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence. Thus, in People vs. Toledo, 16 We
elucidated:

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-
court declaration, even when the witness has in fact been confronted
already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate
judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any
other proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the
conduct and demeanor of the witness as well as the respective efforts of
the counsels of the parties.
For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the
adverse party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of
evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-
examine the affiant, 17 but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit
is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them.18

The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa Vequilla which
were presented as evidence by the prosecution, established nothing to support the
conviction of the appellant herein. For the same reason, that Malcon Olevere was not
presented as a witness and insofar as they impute to appellant the commission of the
crime charged, the adduced evidence are nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot
be regarded as competent evidence as to the veracity of the contents therein.

It is not disputed that the marijuana leaves recovered and tested by witness Vequilla
came from Malcon Olevere and not from appellant. It would be absurd and manifestly
unjust to conclude that appellant had been selling marijuana stuff just because what
were recovered from Olevere were real marijuana. Proof of one does not necessarily
prove another. Nowhere can it be found on the record that appellant was caught in
possession or in the act of selling the prohibited marijuana leaves.

The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material
and culpable against the accused. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not
anyone of the three witnesses presented testified on the basis of their personal
knowledge that the appellant sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule
130, Sec. 30 of the Revised Rules of Court, "a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception. ...

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others, either
because he was told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Since
Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the
witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to the
appellant the commission of the offense charged.

The lower court in convicting appellant of the crime charged, Partly relief on the verbal
admission made by appellant himself before Lt. Mediavillo and Sgt. Linga during the
custodial investigation. Although the records prove that the appellant has been duly
apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, 19 We are not fully
convinced that this apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood and
accepted by the appellant. This is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's verbal
admission. We have repeatedly emphasized that care should be taken in accepting
extrajudicial admissions, especially when taken during custodial investigation. In People
vs. Caquioa, 20We ruled:

As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully

effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right to
silence and assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of those rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the prosecution that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to
be questioned.

Again, the constitutional rights of the accused to silence and to counsel is fortified in the
very recent case of Morales and Moncupa vs. Enrile 21 where this Court said:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shag not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, 22 which means that he is not
adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police
investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and
then taking his statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in
explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these requirements have
been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been
represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of
the Bill of Rights which states that "any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant
during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.

We hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Manila is REVERSED, and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged in the information. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., A bad Santos, De Castro and Escolin JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.