I.

Introduction 7/17/18 10:02 AM

I. Introduction
A. Legal Method and Legal Reasoning
• Legal reasoning - mastery of an array of talents in argument and decision-making.
• Thinking like a lawyer- most important mission of law school
• Legal rules - will change over time.
• Lawyering skills – best learned in practice.
• There is legal reasoning ought not to be dismissed out of hand.
• Law schools and the lawyers and judges they train suppose that lawyers are characterized
by more than knowing things that nonlawyers do not.
• It is difficult to say what lawyers have other than their technical skills and knowledge,
easier to say what thinking like a lawyer is not. This casts doubt on the idea.
• Skeptics think that legal reasoning maybe less distinctive and less important than many
thought it is.
• The claim of legal reasoning’s existence is a hypothesis that lawyers have ways of
approaching problems and making decision that others do not.
o Heightened ability to see the other side of the argument
o Putting oneself in the shoes of another which is common to good thinkers and
people.
• Law is not a closed system.
• Various forms of odd (in a special way) reasoning exist throughout our decision-making
lives.
• Common forms of reasoning/ decision-making often dictate outcomes other than those
the cession-maker would otherwise have chosen.
• Law’s goal is to make sure that the outcome for all or atleast most of the particulars in a
given category is the right one.
o Coke: “It is better saith the Law to suffer a mischiefe (that is particular to one)
than an inconvenience that may prejudice the many,
• Ability to describe legal reasoning and example of its use says less than is commonly
supposed about how often such reasoning is an important component of what lawyers
actually do.
• The goal is to identify, describe, analyze and evaluate the characteristic modes of legal
reasoning.
From Dangat book:
• Legal method-process of arriving at the answers to legal questions.
 o Legal writing, lawyering skills or legal process
o More than statutory construction.
• Statutory Construction – art or process of discovering and expounding meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where
the intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
• Interpreting the law.
• Legal Bibliography - course on development of skills in the use of legal materials and the
law library.
• Legal History – evolution of laws and legal systems.
• Analytical reasoning
o Deduction: rule - starting point
§ Syllogism – dominant style of legal reasoning; established structure,
consisting of a major premise (rule), minor premise (particular situation),
and conclusion (whether rule applies to situation).
§ Ex. An ordinance prohibits mode of transportation in the city. Bike is a
mode of transportation. Bike is prohibited in the city.
o Analogy – use of precedent, rule of previous case governs the case to be decided
o Deduction uses specific law while analogy uses specific case.
o Analogy is advantageous because:
§ Produces a wealth of data for decision making
§ Represent collaborative effort of judges over time
§ Corrects biases that might lead judges to discount the force prior to
decisions
§ Exerts a conservative force in law, holding development of law to a
gradual pace

B. Rules and Authorities

• Rules
o Every rule has background rationale and justification
o Debates happen in the fringes, not in the core.
o What rules says really matter
o Rules are general. Ex. Speed limit of 50kph, still applies in light traffic and a
skillful driver decides to slightly beyond speed limit.
 o Rules are formal – dictates outcome
• Understanding when, why, and how rules are important in law will take us a long way
toward understanding law itself.
• Common law
o Absence of codes
o Judges make decision based on sense of fairness, reasonableness, customs, and
good policy.
o Law is made by judges.
o Tentative – open to defeat
o Flexible to adapt to changing social conditions
o Systematically improving and redefining rather than systematically worsening
and degenerating, or simply random, of course an optimistic view, but it is an
optimism that has pervaded the common law since its inception.
o When rule is not yet pure, it needs redefining.
o Equity – developed to soften inflexible Roman Laws
o Law - like when it is resistant to modification
• Civil law
o Law made by legislature not by judges
o Judges interpret the code
o Precedent is less important
o Use of detailed statues
• Authorities
o Legal sources (e.g constitution, statutes, reported cases)
o Primary and Secondary Authority (Sources)
§ Primary Authority:
• Law that court can rely on in decision making
• Issued by a branch of government in lawmaking capacity
§ Secondary Authority:
• Non-law sources which court can rely on in reaching conclusions
(e.g legal/non-legal literatures, legal encyclopedias, legal
dictionaries)
• Created by lawyers, scholar, nongovernmental bodies or officials
not acting in their lawmaking capacity.
o Mandatory and Persuasive Authority
§ Mandatory Authority:
• Court rely on to reach decision
• Enacted law
• Court opinion
§ Persuasive Authority:
• Court may or may follow
• Eg. Law review, legal encyclopedia
• A prior court opinion the court is not required to follow
• Or secondary authority that is persuasive.
• Non-authority:
o Primary/secondary authority that is not “on point”, does not
cover client’s case;
o Invalid primary authority
o Finding aid
o Enacted Law as mandatory law
§ Within jurisdiction
§ Covers facts of situation
§ Does not violate laws of superior authority
o Opinion as mandatory authority
§ Opinion is analogous to facts of the current case
§ Written by a court of superior authority
o Opinion as persuasive authority
§ Opinion was written by inferior court is now being considered by a court
within the same judicial system that is superior to the court that wrote the
opinion
§ Written by a court from another judicial system
o Foreign decisions
§ Have persuasive effect upon Phil. Courts.
o Indigenous and Islamic Law
§ Phil legal system applies application of tribal or customary law and
Islamic Law.
§ Application of these laws does not preclude the operation of national
judicial system over ancestral domains or ARMM.
 o Canon Law
§ Decisions of church tribunals may be given persuasive effect.
o Secondary Authority as Persuasive Authority
§ Secondary Sources may be used to bolster one’s interpretation of primary
authority because secondary authority frequently paraphrases or
summarizes primary authority.

C. Reason by Analogy
• Precedent v. Analogy
o In analogy, the target (current case) has the same feature as the source (earlier
case) and must be decided in the same way. Same is true in Precedent.
o There is a choice of source analogs that best assist in making decision and help
persuade others in the correctness of the decision.
o Use of analogy supports an argument.
o Mandatory precedents, current decisions, are binding.
o Use of precedent imposes itself to preclude an otherwise preferred outcome.
• Skeptic challenge questions whether analogical reasoning is distinct from precedential
constraint and whether analogies are truly distinctive or merely something else in
disguise.

• Operation and Effects of Laws

o Takes effect 15 days after completion of their publication in O.G and newspapers
in gen. circulation, unless otherwise provided.
§ Basic req’t of procedural due process
§ Online publication – does not satisfy this req’t

o Have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided

§ Retroactive application will impair vested rights.
§ Internal regulation/specific applicability – no need for publication
§ Curative, procedural, and penal laws - given retroactive application
o In interpretation of law and admin. issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, English text shall control unless other texts may be consulted.
o No implied revival of repealed law unless expressly so provided.
o Ignorance of the law excuses no one.
 o Rules of Court
§ Has retroactive application because no vested rights impaired in
procedural laws.
§ Applies to pending cases

Stare Decisis
-Doctrinal, doctrines will hold in other similar cases (same facts, same issues, it is expected that
ruling would be the same)
Villena v. Sps. Chavez

Doctrine: When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same; Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different

Facts:
According to the facts of the CA the respondents owned four parcels of land subdivided
into several blocks. By mere permission/tolerance of the respondents the petitioners have
occupied and erected their homes, the respondent allowed it but they should, in consideration,
pay in certain amount as equity. The petitioners failed to pay the equity from the respondent so
the respondent in return wrote them a letter that they need to vacate the premises in a span of 30
days, but in regards to that the petitioners refused to vacate and remove their houses. The
petitioners said that the respondent does not have power to institute such orders from
the conflicted properties because the equities that they must pay is in accordance of National
Home Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC). They also claim that they paid already the said
equity however they were not given any receipts and copy of their contract. The petitioners also
claim that they are qualified beneficiaries under the RA no. 7279 known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act and adding that they were builder of good faith. CA ruled that the
petitioners entered with an agreement of equity with the respondent, so in return they must
pay amortization or they will face eviction.

Issue:
Whether or not, the decision of the CA needed to be redefined by the SC. (NO)
Ruling:
It is ruled that in the findings they the petitioners were in binding contract with the respondent.
Respondent’s occupation in the said land is not due to petitioner’s tolerance but an agreement
where petitioner allows them to stay in exchange of certain amount and eventually became
owners.
As correctly pleaded by petitioners, a similar case had been decided by CA in which it rule that
the proper action raise by the plaintiff should have been for rescission of contract or specific
performance, not unlawful detainer. Same applies to this case.

The CA ruling in this case is informative and straight to the point. The petition to review was
granted, the decision of the CA was overturned and the decision of the RTC and MTC was
reinstated

De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola

Doctrine:
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

Facts:
Pepsi Cola launched a promotional program. code problems, they erroneously announced “349”
as winning number instead of the numbers submitted to the DTI, and deposited in the safety
deposit box in a bank. Pepsi Cola revoked and dishonored the claim of the frustrated winners,
which moved the petitioners to file breach of contract. Meanwhile, similar cases, Mendoza and
Rodrigo, are pending with the Court of Appeals. The petitioners then filed a motion for leave in
December 2000 to adopt the testimonial and documentary evidence in Mendoza and Rodrigo
cases or archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases. RTC granted the motion in
Jan. 2001.Unfortunately, Mendoza and Rodrigo cases were both dismissed. Consequently, De
Mesa et al. case was dismissed by the RTC under the principle of stare decisis which is
contemplated as well in Art. 8 of the New Civil Code.

Issue: The applicability of stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Ruling:
The evidence presented in Mendoza and Rodrigo cases is as the current case. Whatever may be
the judgment of the Court on the case, it shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,
and more specially, it shall apply to similar cases as the current case. The petition for review is
denied, and the judgment of RTC is affirmed.

Lank Bank v. Pagayatan

Doctine:
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment; Elements of Res Judicata. The elements of res judicata are: (a) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in
the two (2) particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Facts:
October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286­hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of was subjected to the
operation of Presidential Decree No. 27, under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with
farmer­beneficiaries declared as owners of the property. However, a 300­hectare portion of the
land was subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instead of the OLT.

Lubrica (in behalf of Suntay) filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation
with the PARAD. PARAD fixed a just compensation of P71,634,027.30 which must be paid by
LBP immediately.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration but PARAD
denied the motion.

It filed a petition with RTC appealing PARAD decision. RTC ruled in favor of Lubrica and
ordered LBP to deposit preliminary compensation as determined by PARAD.

LBP filed an Omnibus Motion which was denied because RTC found no error in its previous
order.

LBP appealed to CA which also denied the petition, it moved for reconsideration which was also
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether the RTC/CA acted properly in ordering the deposit or payment to the landowner of the
preliminary valuation of the land made by the PARAD.

Ruling:

Lubrica (in behalf of Suntay) argues that under res juricata and stare decisis, case must be
dismissed, citing Lubrica v. LBP. In Lubrica v. LBP, SC affirmed that on March 31, 2003 Order
of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent LBP to deposit the just compensation
determined by PARAD.

However, it was held that res judicata and stare decisis are not applicable. Res judicata is a
doctrine that provides a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of a competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and heir privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The
elements are:

a. ) identities of the parties or same interest in both actions,

b. ) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and
c. ) identity in 2 particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under the consideration.

The second element of res judicata is not present. The relief prayed for in Lubrica is that the
amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of
payment and not of the time of taking. But here, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of
the valuation of the LBP and DAR and not that of the PARAD. These are two distinct and
separate issues. Thus res judicata cannot apply.

Stare decisis cannot also be applied because of different issues in both cases. Stare decisis is
the adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the SC in its final decision, for
economy and stability.

Petition DENIED.
Res Judicata
-not the doctrine, if the court already made a ruling on the issue raised which is final and
executory, cannot be relitigated.
-Otherwise, there will be endless litigation.
-Quite similar to stare decisis but the established doctrine applies only to that same party or case.
PCGG v. Dumayas
Doctrine:
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.

The doctrine of res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first, known as “bar by prior judgment,” or
“estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of
judgment,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.

Law of the Case

-Does not have the finality of res judicata, maybe subject to change

Sps. Sy v. Young

Doctrine: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It
means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court.

Facts:

Lilia (Geraldyn’s mom) obtained a loan from the spouses Sy with the parcel of land inherited
from deceased husband. Lilia defaulted in payment which resulted to the foreclosure and sale of
the property to the Sps. Sy.
Geraldyn argued that the Sps. entered into contract of mortgage with the knowledge that Lilia
was unauthorized to mortgage property. Lilia acted in behalf of daughter in the partition
proceeding.

Geraldyn filed with RTC a motion to admit a supplemental complaint with the attached
supplemental complaint. –DENIED by RTC.

She filed petition for certiorari and mandamus with CA – DENIED petition because cause of
action in the supplemental complain is entirely different from her original complaint.

Case was elevated to SC (157955).

RTC continued and ruled despite of motion to suspend proceeding until CA decided. RTC
denied motion. Geraldyn filed motion to cancel hearing which led RTC to issue an order
dismissing the complaint on ground of non-suit. She filed an appeal with CA to annul RTC order
but was DENIED. She appealed to SC (157745)

SC denied 157745 but granted 157955 where it held that the right of legal redemption as a co-
owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. In effect,
Geraldyn’s cause of action for legal redemption stems from her rights as co-owner. Thus, its
ordered RTC to admit the supplemental complaint.

Issue: WON CA erred in setting aside the RTC order which dismissed the case for non-suit.

Ruling:

The present action is barred by the law of the case. SC ruling in Young which constitutes as the
controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case. Law of the case has been defined
as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

The case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to the same case
whereas res judicata forecloses parties in one case by what has been done in another case. The
rationale of the case of the law is to enable appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC

Facts:

In the May 1995 elections for governor, Marquez questioned Rodriguez’s candidacy via a
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based on the allegation that Rodriguez is
a"fugitive from justice" for leaving the US where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was pending. Marquez claims
that Rodriguez should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code.

COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto
case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No. 95-089 (present disqualification case),
where it found Rodriguez a fugitive from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decision’s
(1995) definition of "fugitive from justice.” With Rodriguez’s walk-out during the hearing of
the case, COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of
Marquez' documentary evidence.

Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for
the position of governor. However, COMELEC also made a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF
THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after
calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as
defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180
degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution.

COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision
definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established
that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was
instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

Issue: WON fugitive from justice needs to be redefined by SC.

Ruling:

The “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re­definition of “fugitive
from justice.” Fugitive from justice was already defined in Marquez Decision. What was
irrevocably established as controlling legal rule in the Marquez decision and the instant petition.
However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge the Court to redefine “fugitive from
justice.” They espouse the broader concept of the term as culled from foreign authorities (mainly
of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a “fugitive from
justice” by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him,
regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. Suffice it
to say that the “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded redefinition of
“fugitive from justice” (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed
therefrom in resolving the instant petition.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The
MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal from the quo warranto petition although the
COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with the Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of
Rodriguez. Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the
MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept
of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which
highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with
their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, to redefine “fugitive from
justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZ Decision.

Veloso v. CA
Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Veloso owns a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila covered by a TCT issued
by the Registry of Deeds-Manila. He acquired the subject property before he got married from
Philippine Building Corporation. Hence, the property did not belong to the
conjugal partnership.

•The said title was subsequently canceled and a new one was issued in the name of Aglaloma
B. Escario.

•Subsequently, petitioner filed an action for annulment of documents, reconveyance of

property with damages and preliminary injunction alleging that he was the absolute owner of
the subject property and he never authorized anybody to sell it. He alleged that when his wife
left for abroad, he found out that his copy was missing.

•The transfer of property was supported by a General Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by IrmaVeloso, wife of the petitioner.

•Petitioner denied executing the power of attorney and alleged that his signature was falsified.
He also denied having known the supposed witnesses in the execution of the power of attorney.
Thus, he contended that the sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer were null and
void.

•Defendant Aglaloma Escario alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and denied any
knowledge of the alleged irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general power of attorney
which was sufficient in form and substance and was duly notarized.

•Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig denied any participation in the execution of the
general power of attorney, and attested that he did not sign.

•RTC ruled in favor of Escario as the lawful owner of the property as she was deemed an
innocent purchaser for value. The trial court ruled that there was no need for a special power of
attorney when the special power was already mentioned in the general one.

•CA affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court

Issue: WON the CA is correct in affirming RTC that Escario is the lawful owner. (YES)

Ruling:

Yes, the SC denied the petition and affirmed CA decision. The court cannot allow a petition
for annulment of judgment which in effect seeks a second cycle of review regarding a subject
matter which in effect has already been fully and fairly adjudicated.

Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision

continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the same case whether correct
on general principles or not so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

D. Case law and Precedent

Schauer, Chapter 3 The Practice and Problems of Precedent
• Precedent in Two Directions
o Law is committed to the view that it is more important for a decision to follow
a precedent than to be right for a particular case.
o It is better for a law to follow a precedent than to be right, to be consistent
than to have the best consequences.
o Vertical precedent – lower courts are expected to observe decisions of higher
court.
§ -“chain of command”
o Horizontal precedent – a court follows previous decisions
§ “Stare decisis”
o Both following decisions of others, vertical – superior court, horizontal –
previous decisions
• Precedent – the basic concept
o Core principle of decision-making according to precedent is that courts should
follow previous decisions.
o To give same answer to same question
o Precedent court, precedent decision
o Example is boiling egg, boil for 6 minutes, you boil next for 6 min b/c you did
the same before, then boil again for 6 min b/c you learned that it is the right
time.
o Must be followed even when incorrect
o Following the past (reasoning by precedent) versus learning from the past.-
Reasoning by precedent means following a decision of a higher court or an
earlier decision.- Reasoning by precedent enjoins courts to follow a precedent,
even if they think it was incorrectly decided, because they need to follow it by
virtue of its status as an earlier decision.
• Strange Idea
o Just like children obeying their parents when they disagree, lower court follow
instruction of higher court
o Holmes: “It is revolting that courts would be bound by precedents which
persist for no better reason than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV”
 o Acting without reason, forced to follow previous decisions even when they
think is wrong.
o It is important to have things settled to others can rely on those decisions and
be guided accordingly.
o This confidence/ reliance would be lost if legal rules continually change.
o Stare decisis bring the advantage of cognitive and decisional efficiency.
o Stability, consistency, settlement and respect for the past.
• On Identifying a Precedent
o It is problematic b/c no 2 events are exactly alike.
o 2 problems arise:
§ Initial identification of the relevant precedent. “Is some previous
decision to be treated as a precedent at all.”
§ Determination of what the precedent case will now be taken to stand
for.
o Ex. MacPherson v. Buick case resembles Donoghue v. Stevenson were a
customer was served with drinks with a dead snail.
§ Lack of privity of contract
o 1. Similar case -> similar facts (material facts)
o 2. Ration decidendi, how the court decided. Now only what was the decision
but why such decision is such. (holding)
• Of Holdings and Dicta
o Holding – legal rule that determines the outcome of the case.
o Obiter dictum – “something said in passing”, court’s observation about issues
not actually before it, or conclusions about matters unnecessary to the
outcome the court actually reached, or wide-ranging explanations of an entire
body of law, or simply largely irrelevant asides.
§ -makes it possible for us to recognize very specific ruling and thus to
use it as precedent in the future.
• On the Force of Precedent – Overruling, Distinguishing, and Other Types of
Avoidance
o Vertical precedent – binding
o Overrule previous - decision should be more that the belief that previous
decision is in error, otherwise stare decisis would be meaningless .
§ - must be extreme error that has grave consequence
 § -requires special justification – special and manifestly
§ -when error is within normal range, no need to override previous
decision
Schauer, Chapter 6 The Idea of the Common Law
• Some History and a Comparison
o Originated in England
o Absence of code of laws
o Judges make decision based on sense of fairness, reasonableness, customs,
and good policy.
o Law is made by judges.
o Rule that is extracted from a collection of judicial opinions.
o Holmes: “It is the merit of common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards.
o Defeasible and tentative - open to defeat as new situations arise
o Flexible to adapt to changing social conditions
o Systematically improving and redefining rather than systematically
worsening and degenerating, or simply random, of course an optimistic view,
but it is an optimism that has pervaded the common law since its inception.
o When rule is not yet pure, it needs redefining.
o In contrast to Civil law
§ Law made by legislature not by judges
§ Judges interpret the code that are made by legislature
§ Precedent is less important
§ Use of detailed statues
• On the Nature of the Common Law
o Common law is self-correcting, continuously and progressively substituting
smaller mistakes for larger ones as it approaches perfection, works itself pure
• How does the Common law Change?
o Ex. In Macpherson v Buick, no liability due to absence of privity between MP
and Buick, but it ruled that it is liable
o Rules are sometimes changed as they are applied.
o When the court sees that a large/small-scale modification, change is applied in
present and future cases.
o Problem: retroactivity
• Is the Common Law Law?
o “dog law” – when you wait for the dog to do a thing that you want to break of
him, then beat him for it.
o Still law
• A Short Tour of the Real of Equity
o Equity – developed to soften inflexible Roman Laws
o Law - like when it is resistant to modification
o Court of Chancery

The Decision
Schauer, Chapter 9 The Judicial Opinion
o The Causes and Consequences of Judicial Opinions
§ Common law has major role in telling lawyers and their clients what
the law is.
o Giving reasons
§ When a court gives reason for its decision, it created a commitment for
that court and an expectation on the part of those who seek to be
guided by judicial opinions.
§ Induces reasonable reliance and creates prima facie commitment on
the part of the court to decide subsequent cases in accordance with the
reason that it has explicitly given on a previous occasion.
§ The practice of reason giving in judicial opinion is one in which the
benefits of full explanation are not without cost.
o Holding and Dicta revisited
§ Holding- consist of what is necessary to support the case, binding if
from superior court
§ Obiter dicta – everything else, could be disregarded
§ Knowing the difference allows one to know how much weight to put
on the statement.
o The Declining Frequency of Opinion
§ Clogged dockets
§ Reasons are abbreviated
§ Okay as long as not an indication of laziness
Dangat, The Decision
o Decision – adjudication or settlement of a controversy by a court of law.
o Judgment – determination by the court that the accused is guilty or not
o Consitutional mandate
§ To be valid, should comply with form, procedure, and substantive
requirements laid by the Constitution, rules of Court and circulars and
orders of the Supreme Court.
§ Art. VIII sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and laws on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
§ Rule 36, sec 1. Rules of Court. Rendition of judgments and final
orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.
§ Rule 120, sec 2, Rules of Court. Form and contents of judgment. The
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
§ Adm. Circular no. 1 1988 “to make complete findings of facts in their
decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the
light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to
generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which the conclusions are deducted.
§ Parts of a judgment:
ú Body – court clearly and distinctly states its finding of facts
and of law
ú Decretal portion
§ Due process – given info of how the case was decided
o Repositories of Decisions
§ Adheres to binding precedent
 § Requires publication of decisions
§ Philippine Reports
§ Unofficial source – SCRA
o Personal Opinions of Judges
§ Contain only relevant opinion, interpretation and application of law
o Form of Decisions
§ No prescribed form
§ Brevity is desirable
§ Lucidly crafted, complete in all its vital details
§ With due care, make sure that it accurately reflects their conclusion
§ Essential parts:
ú Statement of the case,
ú Statement of facts – narration of events that gave rise to issue
ú Issues
ú Court ruling
ú Dispositive
§ Outline:
ú 1. facts – narration of events that gave rise to issue
ú 2. Procedural History – events that occurred in the trial from
filing of complaint
ú 3. Question presented – issue for the court to decide on
ú 4. Rule of law – principles that must be applied to facts
ú 5. Application of law to the facts – determines whether each
element of each rule apply to the facts
ú 6. Holding – decision of court with respect to question
ú 7. Disposition – procedural directive that gives effect to court’s
decision
o Disposition or Dispositive Portion
§ Fallo – embodies court’s decisive action
§ Controlling factor in resolving issue, unless when body decision is so
clear which shows that there is error in the dispositive
§ Exception (when fallo is not controlling):
ú There is when there is uncertainty, check the body b/c
dispositive should find support from ratio decidendi.
 ú Extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of issue is
found in the body.
ú Where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
o The Syllabus
§ Now court’s work but of the reporter
§ Rule 10.02, Canon 10 , Code of Prof. Responsibility, “lawyers should
not misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision for authority.
§ Decision should be cited accurately
o The Certification
§ Art VIII, sec. 13
§ to ensure implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of SC and lower courts are reached after consultation with
members of court en banc or in a division.
§ Absence of certification does not necessarily mean no consultation
occurred but may be a basis for holding the official liable for the
omission.
ú Does not invalidate the decision
§ Per curiam – no ponente, does not require formal certification
§ Minute resolution – no certification
o Memorandum Decision – decisions which adopt by reference of findings of
fact and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals.
o Per curiam Decisions – opinion of courts which the judges are all of one mind
and the question involved is so clear that it is not necessary to elaborate on it
by an extended discussion.
o Minute Resolutions – not bound to render signed decisions, has discretion to
formulate decisions or minute resolutions provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case.
§ - alleviates heavy dockets

Velarde v. Social Justice Society

• Doctrine: In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:
(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4)
 court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and,
finally, (5) dispositive portion.
Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information
on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court
• Facts:
• Respondent Social Justice Society filed for a Petition for Declaratory Relief before
the RTC-Manila against petitioners Mike Velarde, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Minister
Erano Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo Soriano. This petition
sought to resolve the question ofwhether petitioners’ actions violate the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution by “endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective
office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock
to vote for a specified candidate.
• In its decision, the RTC-Manila decided in favor of petitioners. However, the decision
of the RTC-Manila only contained the following:
o · Statement of the nature of the Petition and the issue presented
o · A brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved and what the
Petition sought to achieve
o · Procedural incidents
o · Full-length opinion on the nature and extent of separation of church and
State
o · Ended the decision with “SO ORDERED”
• In short, the RTC-Manila decision did not contain (1) a statement of facts and (2) a
dispositive portion stating the relief granted or denied
• Petitioner Mike Velarde then brought an action before the Supreme Court to question
the validityof the RTC-Manila decision, arguing that the RTC-Manila decision did
not conform with the form and substance of a decision required by the Constitution,
the law and the Rules of Court
• On the other hand, the RTC-Manila argued that its decision is not defective because:
(1) it only clarified a constitutional provision and declare whether acts are violative
thereof; and (2) a dispositive portion is only required for coercive reliefs (redress
from a wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wrong should get)
Issue: RTC- Manila’s decision is valid and constitution (NO)
Ruling:
• The SC cited the following provisions as basis:
o · Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution
o · Section 1, Rule 36 of Rules of Civil Procedure; and
o · Section 2, Rule 120 of Rules of Court
• The SC then provided an explanation as to why the specific form and content under
the Constitution, the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule of Court is required:
• Citing Yao vs. CA:
o The purpose of Section 14, Art. VII is to ensure “due process and fair play”
because it enables parties to litigation to “be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court.”
• Without facts and law where the decision is based, there is no opportunity for the
losing party to check for errors on the decision for purposes of appealing the same to
a higher court.
• The said form and content ensures that judges arrived at their decision through the
process of “legal reasoning” and not just arbitrarily
• Applying the foregoing, the Supreme Court explained why the RTC-Manila decision
is not compliant with the form and content required:
• ·According to the SC:
“What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly
were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS?
More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court
based its legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the
RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the
constitutional directive.”
• The SC explained the value of both the factual findings and the dispositive portion of
a decision:
o Factual findings – value of decision as precedent (Otherwise stated, how will
the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?)
o Dispositive portion – this portion is controlling in how rights of parties are
determined/settled

The Dissent
 Dangat, Chapter 8 The Dissenting Opinion
o Value and Functions of Dissent
§ Parties deserve to know all the views of the collegiate court
§ So that parties won’t have difficulty understanding the dissertation in
the ponencia that addressed the points raised and reason presented
§ Freedom of expression of minority
§ cannot be cited as precedent
§ calling out of majority’s shortcomings
§ can lead the ponente to refine and clarify her initial opinion
§ designed to appeal to the people
o Adopting the Dissent
§ SC is sometimes influenced by dissents when reviewing decisions of
lower courts or admin. bodies.
o Concurring Opinions
§ Intended to define with greater precision the scope of an opinion
§ May agree with the disposition but disagree with one or more aspects
of the case

Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome
Facts:
• The prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that “no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area” is not found in the 1935 Constitution.
• 1 Dec 1976 - The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino
citizens, filed an application for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of
165m 2 located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.
• The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that:
• The applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands;
and
• The applicant and its predecessors-in- interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
• Lower Court: Dismissed the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not
qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person.
The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
• Meralco appealed to SC: It contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years
before selling it to the Meralco, had become private land, and, therefore, the
constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public
land, is not applicable to the said land.
• Solicitor General: The said land is not private land because the Meralco and its
predecessors-in- interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor
possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as
grants or patents.
• Issue:
WON the land in dispute is a private land. NO.
WON Meralco is qualified to own the land. NO.
Ruling:
1. NO. As between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It
would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). In Uy Un vs. Perez, it was held that
until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is
sought to be confirmed, remains public land.
2. NO. Because the land is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco’s application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

àDissents made by Justice Teehankee and Justice Fernardo regarding “doctrine that
open, exclusive and undisputed land possession of alienable public land for the
prescribed period by law creates the legal fiction that after completion, it ceases to
become public land and becomes private property without the need of judicial or any
other sanction” in the Meralco case was adopted in the case of Director of Lands v.
IAC to become its controlling rule.
 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court
• Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., (Acme) on October 29,1962, instituted the Land
Registration proceeding of five parcels of land measuring 481,390 sqm, more or less,
which was ancestrally acquired from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of
the Dumagat tribe.
The possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as
the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel.
Their possession of the subject land is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 and
now considered from time immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private
land pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain.
• The CFI of Isabela found during its ocular investigation on September 18,1982 of the
subject land that Acme has introduced more than P45,000,000 worth of
improvements. The ownership and possession of the subject land was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme.
• The CFI ruled in favor of Acme and ordered the registration in their name the subject
land. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the CFI’s decision upon appeal.
• The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since Sec. 11 of its Art. XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question)
it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.
• Issues:
• WON the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114SRC 799) should be
overturned in light of jurisprudence – YES
• WON the land is already a private land – YES
• WON the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing
public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively – NO
• Ruling:
• 1. YES. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Gov’t, to Susi v.
Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the
operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the
necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively
ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at
the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the
bona fide right to ownership from Meralco’s predecessors-interest. There being no
law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus
overturned the decision.
• The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is
that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors­in­interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation’s holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco.
• 2. YES. The land was already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient. It had already ceased to be of the public domain
 and had become private property, at least by presumption. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law.
3. NO. If it is accepted, as it must be, that the land was already private land to which
the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when
Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
• While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re­established,
as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching
examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference
to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited
to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
• WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum

Schauer, Chapter 10 Making Law with Rules and Standards
o Standard – ex. Prudent and reasonable man
§ - hold things open for future and allows for a flexible approach to
problems tomorrow
§ - vague directives, will hold open the ability of some future decision-
maker to make just the right decision, but at the cost of providing very
little certainty, predictability, and decision-maker constraint.
 o When a directive is vague, it gives judges discretion
o Rule- gives more information about likely consequences of action than a less
determinate standard
§ - make a decision now for the future
§ highly specific directives, will maximize certainty, constraint, and
predictability, but they will do so at the cost of retaining the ability to
achieve exactly the correct result in some unanticipated circumstances.
o Rules and Standards in Judicial Opinion
o Broad categories can be extremely precise, and narrow categories can be
vague.

Dangat, Chapter 9
o Ratio Decidendi – ultimate issue expressly decided in the course of the
consideration of the case
§ -constitutes binding to the case
o Obiter Dictum – matter that was not raised expressly, it is not a prerequisite in
the disposition of the case
§ -lacks force of an adjudication
§ -opinions unnecessary for the decision of the case, not binding.
o Rulings Pro Hac Vice
§ SC can limit the extent to which its decisions can constitute precedent
§ Latin for “for this one occasion”
§ Applies to extremely peculiar cases
§ Made to bypass procedural lapses by litigants in order to address the
merits of impt. Cases
§ Not to be applied in future cases
Villanueva v. CA
Facts:
• The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which denied
Villadores’ motion for disqualifaction of Rico and Associates as private prosecutor
for petitioner Villanueva Jr.
• Villadores is one of the accused in a criminal case “People v Bernardo” for
falsification of public documents, before RTC Manila
• Villanuenva, Jr. filed before RTC a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva,
IBC 13 appealed to the NLRC. As an appeal bond, IBC 13 filed a Surety Bond,
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. However, both documents were found
to be falsified.
• Thus, the 2 complaints for falsification of public document were filed before against
Villadores and Diaz. The Manila City Prosecutor’s office, which was dismissed. On a
petitioner for review before the DOJ, it affirmed the dismissal of Diaz, but ordered
the inclusion of Villadores in the 2 criminal cases. The RTC granted the motion to
admit amended informations.
• Thus, Villadores filed a petition for certiorari at the CA, which dismissed the petition.
• Subsequently, respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates in
line with the pronouncement of the appellate court: “Incidentally, We are one with the
petitioner when it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in
these cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified
surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of
the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter
prevailed. We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result
of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result
of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.”
• Rico and Associates opposed the opposed the motion on the ground that the above-
quoted is a mere obiter dictum.
• RTC denied the motion for disqualification agreeing with Rico and Associates
• CA reversed, hence the following petition.
Issues: WON the CA erred in failing to consider that the pronouncement was a mere
obiter dictum and in effect not appreciating that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was in fact
an aggrieved party. (NO)
Ruling:
• First, the Court defined an Obiter Dictum as “an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is
a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, “by
the way,” that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
 him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent.”
• Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA­G.R. SP No.
46103 is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent
Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the Amended Informations.
Among the issues upon which the petition for certiorari in CA­G.R. SP No. 46103
was anchored, was “whether Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party.” It
has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the
case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent
questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in
the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion,
and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
• So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient
to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case
as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can
be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.

Ledesma v. CA
Doctrine: An obiter dictum, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is
susceptible to varying interpretations—it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of
the Supreme Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
Facts:
• Atty. Ronaldo Ledesma, the petitioner, was the Chairman of the First Division of the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration (BID).
• The complaint filed by the FIIB against the petitioner alleged the following illegal
acts: (a) irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using
“recycled” or photocopied applications for a TRV extension without the applicants
affixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein. The petitioner allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
 forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were
questionable.
• The FIIB filed the formal complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint was treated as both a
criminal (violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of
public documents) and an administrative charge (Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty).
• The criminal charges were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
• For the administrative case, the Graft Investigation Officer suspended the petitioner
for 1 year. After a motion for reconsideration, the suspension was reduced to 9
months without pay.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the suspension but reduced the suspension to 6
months without pay.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
• Issues: WON the Ombudsman’s findings are merely advisory on the Bureau of
Immigration and the findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an
indirect interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over
immigration matters.
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties: . . .
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that
the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any
binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman: ... Besides, assuming
arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no
authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more
particularly from his position in the BID.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee
 found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The word recommend must be
taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper
interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee
at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural
aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.
• Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported
by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is
before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination.
II. Statutory Construction 7/17/18 10:02 AM

A. Definition, Nature and Concept

Schauer, Chapter 8 The Interpretation of Statuses
• Statutory Interpretation in the Regulatory State
o Broad phrases in constitutional text initiated the development of common law.
o Statutory interpretation is used for common law development.
o In comprehensive and precise statutes, interpretation is hardly warranted
except in highly unusual scenarios.
o Statutory Interpretation is needed in cases -- the statute is poorly drafted, the
legislators allocated difficult decisions to the judiciary, the statue cannot come
close to anticipating the complexities of modern life.
• The role of the text-
o Interpretation begins with the enacted law.
o If the meaning of the words in a statute is unclear, we should look for the
underlying intent of the statute. If the underlying intent is still unclear, that is
the time the judge exercises his discretion to determine the meaning of the
law.
o Using discretion in adjudication cases, some say, is quasi-legislative.-
Language could not ever be sufficient to produce a core or a clear case
because in some instances, application of the literal meaning of the law
produces absurd results.
o Three types of cases:
§ 1. Those in which the language provides a plausible answer;
§ 2. Those in which the language does not provide an answer;
§ 3. Those in which the language provides a bad answer.
• When the text provides no answer-
o In cases when the statute is vague, the judge uses discretion to determine the
meaning of the statute.
o Legislative history can also be looked at to determine the underlying aim of
the law.
o Opponents of legislative history say that it is undemocratic to use it because it
is not the text that was voted upon by the legislature.
o Meaning of the statute can also be found in statutes itself.
• When the text provides a bad answer
 o Taking the text as be-all and end-all should be avoided because it is grossly
inconsistent with the fundamental nature of law as the reasonable guide for
human conduct.
o The challenge to this approach is whether the judge can decide whether the
application of a statute is absurd or not -- which some argue is not a function
of the judiciary.
o The general rule is to apply the law based on text except in case of absurd
results.- The textual approach respects what the legislature’s democratic
provenance.
o On the other side of the argument, it is not the judge’s duty to just slavishly
follow the text but to make sense of the language of statutes to ensure the
consistency of its application and the reasonability of the results.
• Canons of statutory construction
o Expression unius est exclusion alterius -- the expression of one is the
expression of the other: Omission should be understood as exclusions.-
Ejusdem generis: open-ended terms in a list be interpreted to included only
items similar to those in the list.
o In pari material -- statutes dealing with same subject matters should be
interpreted together.

Dangat, Chapter 12
• Statutory Construction
o Statutes, rules, and regulations can be vague; in these cases, courts can
construe these laws.
o Process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
o Verba legis, index maximo sermo est (speech is the index of intention): Clear
and precise statutes need not be interpreted.
o Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat: law should be
interpreted with a view of upholding it rather than destroying it.
o Looking beyond the law is warranted when the law seems to be of doubtful
import.
 o The following are the means for determining the legislative intent:
§ 1. Circumstances under which the action was taken;
§ 2. What evil is sought to be redressed;
§ 3. Contemporaneous construction.
• Power to construe laws and its limitations
o Act of defining and interpreting law is a judicial function which arises out of
the principle of separation of powers.
o Legislature cannot pass a law that violates the constitution.
o The Court’s exercise of judicial review is not an assertion of superiority to the
other departments.

Agpalo, Chapter 2 Construction and Interpretation

A. Nature and Purpose
• Construction defined.
o Art/ process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law when there is ambiguity.
o Drawing of warranted conclusions that lie beyond direct expression of the
text.
o Exercise of choice by judiciary.
• Construction and interpretation distinguished.
o Interpretation – art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of
words
o Construction – process of drawing warranted conclusions beyond what is
written
• Rules of construction, generally.
o Tools to ascertain legislative content
o The legislators are presumed to know these rules, and that when they create a
law and in case of doubt, it will be construed in accordance with principles of
interpretation.
o Bad law – ambiguous, deficient, makes case hard
o Rules of StatCon can resolve bad laws
o Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction as part of the
provisions of a statute. Ex. Art. 10 of CC “It is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.”
 o Not binding nor controlling, but may be used to clarify, not to defeat,
legislative intent.
o Gen. rule: if law is clear, it should be applied. If ambiguous, must be
interpreted.
• Purpose or object of construction.
o To ascertain, give effect to, the intent of the law/legislature
• Legislative intent, generally.
o Essence of the law, controlling factor in StatCon
o Must be enforced when ascertained
o Includes 2 concept: (1)purpose and (2)meaning
o “spirit”
• Legislative purpose.
o Reason why a particular statute was enacted
o What legislature intends to accomplish
• Legislative meaning.
o What the law means
o What it comprehends, covers, what its limits and confines are.
• Matters inquired into in construing a statute.
o It is also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning has been
expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity
o Legal act – made up of 2 elements: (1)internal and (2)external
• Where legislative intent is ascertained.
o Statute itself, as a whole and not an isolated part or particular provision
o If ambiguous, look beyond the statute, e.g legislative history

Caltex v. Ledesma
• Construction is the process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
o Case re: Caltex’s hooded pump contest does not fall within the ban of the
Postal Law and that the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution
of its rules by the mails. Judgment affirmed. Absent the element of
 consideration, the scheme is a gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
which the law does not condemn.

General v. Barrameda
• Ordinary meaning of word may imply different meaning from the intent of the law
(similar doctrine for Matibag v Benepayo in Consti 1)
• Interpretation of Sec. 31, CA 459: Is the redemption period counted from the date of
the auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds? -
Yes
• In Salazar v. Meneses, it was held that the period of redemption started only when the
sale was registered, since the registration of the deed of conveyance for properties
brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the property,
and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the
same has taken place.
• This interpretation serves the ends of justice and equity. General and Gontang would
lose nothing because the P7,271.22 paid to DBM would simply be returned to them.
• But if the Court ruled the other way around, Barrameda would lose his land to DBP,
which acquired the land for only P7,271.22.

People v. Mapa

B. Power to Construe; Limitations

Schauer, Chapter 7 The Challenge of Legal Realism
• Do rules and precedents decide cases?
o Before, legal actors saw the development of law is a process of discovery than
creation; it does not only involve locating the law but also a largely logical
and deductive march from case to the next.
o Holmes posited that change in law is a consequence of experience-based and
empirical determination of the judges who were making policy choices. Legal
doctrines are principal determinants of legal outcomes. The most important
standpoint from which to view law is that of a bad man. Legal analysis is
focused on what courts are likely to do in specific cases.
o Some view that judges have a hunch which based less on cases, statutes, and
legal principles than on other non-judicial factors; that outcomes precede law;
 that the litigation focuses greatly on the irrelevant characteristics of the judge
and the litigants.- Realists -- judicial decisions are predictable; predicting legal
outcomes lies in discovering the factors that lead a judge to a certain legal
outcome (non-legal factors and norms).
• Does doctrine constrain even if it does not direct?
o There are cases, statutes, maxims, canons, authorities, or statements in learned
legal treatises available to justify decisions in favor or both parties.
o Rule of lenity -- vague criminal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the
accused.- For a canon, there is a dueling canon that can lead to an opposite
interpretation of a statute.
• An empirical claim- Realists
o (1) judge have a preferred outcome that precedes consultation of the formal
law;
o (2) looking for legal justification of an outcome selected on other grounds,
judges In complex, messy common-law will rarely be disappointed.
§ Non-legal bases -- judicial attitudes to certain issues.
• Realism and the role of the lawyer
o A good lawyer frames an argument to appeal to the actual for judicial
decision-making and presents a legal doctrine on which to hang a decision.
Endencia v. David
• Joint appeal from decision of CFI-Manila declaring sec. 13 of RA 590 –
unconstitutional and ordering refund to Endecia and Jugo
• J. Pastor Edencia is an Associate Justice of CA
• J. Fernando Jugo is a presiding justice of CA, later on became associate justice of SC
• The two cases were jointly submitted to lower because of the similarity of cases,
same question of law, which was whether the income tax collected from their salary
constitutes a decrease in salary.
• Lower court adhered to doctrine laid by the SC in Perfecto v. Meer, income taxes
from salaries was a diminution of their compensation and was in violation of:
• 'Art. VIII, Sec. 9 The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may he fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the
 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos."
• The SC refused to discuss again what was already settled
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 13 of RA 590 can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of
judicial officers.
HELD:
• After the promulgation of Perfecto v. Meer, which congress did not like, Congress
enacted RA 590 which authorizes and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers.
• Sec. 13 says that no salary received by any public officer shall be exempt from
income tax and that tax is not considered as diminution of salary, which is contrary to
SC’s interpretation of sec. 9 art. VIII that judicial officers are exempt.
• Under constitution, legislative enact laws while the judiciary interpret and apply
them. When legislative said that tax is not a diminution, they have interpreted or
ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during
continuance in office” which is not within the power of the the legislative.
o Cannot pass any declaratory act saying what the law was before it passage.
o "Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legis lative
branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution
• When legislature declare what the law means after the courts have ascertained it
would cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
CFI decision affirmed.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

• In the 1935 election for National Assemble for the 1st District, Tayabas, Angara
won against Ynsua.
• When the National assembly in session assembled, it passed Resolution No. 8
Confirming the election of members against whom no protest had been filed at the
time of passage, Angara was one of the confirmed members
• However, after the passage of the said resolution, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against Angara.
 • The following day, Resolution No. 9 was passed affixing the deadline of filing of
protest to be on Dec. 9, 1935.
• On Dec. 20, Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest before the Electoral
Commission contending that Res. 8, a legit exercise of its constitutional prerogative
to prescribe the period during which protests against election of its members be
presented. And that Ynsua’s protest was file out of the prescribed period.
• Ynsua’s answer: No constitutional provision barring him from filing protest after
confirmation
• EC denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss protest.
• Hence this petition.
Angara’s argument:
• Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the EC solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly
• Consti excludes the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests,
which power has been reserved to the legislature or the National Assembly
• EC can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its
primary power to regulate such proceedings
• Reso No. 8 of the National Assembly is VALID and SHOULD BE RESPECTED
AND OBEYED
• Para. 13, Sec. 1 of Ordinance Appended to 1935 Consti; Art. 7, Tydings-McDuffie
Law; Art. 8, Sec. 1 & 3, 1935 Consti: SC has no jurisdiction to pass upon
fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the PH
Consti
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IN DEFENSE OF THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION:
• EC has been created by the Consti as a tool of the legislature invested with the
jurisdiction to decide all election-related contests (elections, returns, qualifications
of National Assembly members)
• In adopting Reso of Dec. 9, 1935 fixing the date as the last day for the presentation
of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, EC acted
within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted
by the Consti (to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers
and functions conferred upon EC by the Consti)
 • In adopting the Reso of Jan. 23, 1936 dismissing Angara’s motion to dismiss, EC
acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of
the legislative department of the Commonwealth Gov’t; hence, said act is beyond the
judicial control of the SC
• National Assembly Reso No. 8 confirming the election of Nat’l Assembly members
against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the
EC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time
that might be set by its own rules
• EC Is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions created by the Consti as an
instrumentality of the legislative department
• EC not inferior tribunal per Secs. 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure against
which prohibition should lie
YNSUA’S COUNTER-ARGUMENTS (MARCH 2, 1936):
• At the time of the approval of EC rules on Dec. 9, 1935, there was no existing law
fixing the period within w/c protests vs election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed
• In fixing Dec. 9, 1935 as last day of filing of protests, EC was acting on its power
impliedly conferred by the Constitution, quasi-judicial attributes
• Ynsua presented his protest before the EC on Dec. 9, 1935, the last day fixed by EC
• EC acquired jurisdiction over Ynsua’s protest and over the parties
• EC Reso on Jan. 23, 1936 denying Angara’s motion to dismiss was WITHIN EC’s
jurisdiction, NOT REVIEWABLE by means of a writ of prohibition
• Neither law nor Consti requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members
• Such confirmation DOES NOT OPERATE TO LIMIT PERIOD w/in such protests
should be filed as to deprive EC of jurisdiction over election protests
• EC is an INDEPENDENT ENTITY created by the Consti, with quasi-judicial
functions, whose decisions are final and unappealable
• EC, as a Consti creation, NOT AN INFERIOR TRIBUNAL within the terms of
Secs. 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure against which prohibition should lie
• Neither under provisions of the Consti (Secs. 1&2, Art. 8) nor para. 13, Sec. 1, of the
Ordinance appended could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the SC
• Para.6, Art.7, Tydings-McDuffie Law not applicable to present case
ISSUES:
• WON SC has jurisdiction over the EC and subject matter of controversy re:
determining the character, scope and extent of the Constitution grant to EC mission as
sole judge of all electoral protests re NA members (YES)
• WON the EC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against Angara’s election notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly (NO)
HELD:
1.
• YES. This court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."
• There is an actual controversy involving a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on
the other.
• The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments
• Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions.
• The government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
• In cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries
• Judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
2.
• NO. The present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
• Based on the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention, it is evident that the
purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal.
• The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial
of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
• The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed.
• There are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the
appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy
• The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which
date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article
XV thereof, went into effect.
• The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the
resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by
that body on December 3, 1935.
• The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year.
• The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized
but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest.
• When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized.
• According to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the
petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National
 Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only
on December 4 and 6, 1935.
• If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for
the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution.
• Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, cannot be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests.
• Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

C. Determining Legislative Intent

Agpalo, Chapter 4 Adherence to, or Departure from, language of Statute
Literal Interpretation
• Literal meaning or plain meaning
o Verba legis - If statute is clear, plan and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
o Index animi sermo - speech is the index of intention
o Verbal egis non est recendum – there should be no departure from the words
of the statue.
o Judicial interpretation – it is an encroachment on the legislative prerogative to
define the wisdom of law; courts must administer the law, not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.
• Dura lex sed lex
o “The law may be harsh, but it is still the law”
o hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est – it is exceedingly hard
but so the law is written
o Law should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, harsh, or hard
o If there is a need to change, amend or repeal, that may be done through
legislative process, not by judicial decree/
o Equity is available only in the absence of law and not its replacement
o Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis - Equity never acts in contravention of
the law.

Departure from Literal Interpretation

• Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative.
o The court must use authorize means to ascertain the intent of the statute and
give it intelligible meaning.
o The court may depart from the language of the statue if it will enable the court
to effectuate legislative intent and purpose.
o If no judicial certainty as to its meaning, court cannot supply or make one.
o When a statue fails to express a meaning, juridical modesty forbids the court
from assuming or supplying.
o In that case, the statute is inoperative.
• What is within the spirit is within the law.
 o Sometimes intent is not accurately reflected in the language of the statute as
its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, absurd or unjust.
o In this case, the intent or spirit of the law controls the letters.
o Ratio Legis – reason of the law is the soul of the law
o interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law
o There is a presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended bu
a legislative measure, and construction of the statute should avoid injurious
consequences.
• Literal import must yield to intent
o Verba intentionani, non e contra, debent insevire – words ought to be more
subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.
o It is the duty of the court to choose between conflicting theories that which
best accords with the spirit or intent of the law.
o Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of a
statute.
• The intent of the statute is the law
• Limitation of rule
o What is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute itself although it is
not within its letter applies only when there is ambiguity in the language
employed in the law.
• Construction to accomplish a purpose
o All statutes must be construed in the light of their purpose to be achieved and
evil to be remedied.
o Literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.
• When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases.
o Reason for enacting the law is the heart of the law which plays a decisive role
in its construction.
o Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex – when the reason of the law ceases,
law itself ceases.
o Ratio legis et anima – reason of the law is its soul
• Supplying legislative omission
 o When it is clear that words have been omitted and it is ascertainable from the
context, the court may supply the omission to make the statute conform to the
obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd.
o Court cannot supply based on what it think.
• Correcting clerical error Part IV C of syllabus
o The court may correct errors if uncorrected, would render the statute
meaningless, or would defeat or impair the intended operation, so long as the
meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no
specific provision is abrogated.
o Not a judicial legislation but only rectifying the legislative intent
• Qualification of rule
o The court may not correct what they think is due to oversight where the statue
is clear and to correct it would change the meaning of the law, or specific
provision will be abrogated.
• Construction to avoid absurdity
o Court’s duty to construe to avoid absurdity because congress could not have
intended absurd interpretation of the law.
o Interpretation talis in ambiguis semper fuenda est ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum – when there is ambiguity, such interpretation as willa void
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
• Construction to avoid injustice
o Ea est accipinda interpretation quae vitio caret – interpretation to be adopted
should be free from evil or injustice.
o It is presumed that the legislature did not intend to work a hardship or
oppressive result when enacting the law.
• Construction to avoid danger to public interest
o Where great inconvenience will result, or great public interest will be
endangered or sacrificed, such construction should be avoided.
o Drafters of the law could not have intended to create such deplorable
situation.
• Construction in favor of right and justice
o In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of law, it is presumed that
the lawmakers intended right and justice to prevails.
• Surplusage and superfluity disregarded
 o Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to
the context of the statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the
statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be rejected
as surplusage or entirely ignored.
o Surplusagium non noceat –surplusage does not vitiate a statute
o Utile per inutile non vitiatur – nor is the useful vitiated by the non-useful
• Redundant words may be rejected
o Frequent
o Gen. rule: give meaning to every part of statue.
o If interpretation of redundant words or phrase tend to defeat whole purpose of
statute, redundant words or phrase should be rejected.
• Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude construction
o Courts cannot always be bound to literal meaning of a statue.
o Neither does false description preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of
the statute which is otherwise clear – Falsa demonstratia non nocet, cum de
corpore constat.
• Exemption from rigid application of law
o If rigid application would work injustice, an exemption to prevent such result
and equitable grounds is warranted
• Law does not require the impossible.
o The law obliges no oneto perform an impossibility – nemo tenetur ad
imposible
o Impossibilium nulla obligation est – no obligation to do an impossible thing
o Statute cannot be constryed as to require compliance with what it prescribes
cannot be legally accomplished.
• Number and gender of words
o Words in plural include the singular and vv.
o Masculine – includes all genders
• Tense
o Present tense includes the future and past
• May and Shall
o May – permissive; connotes possibility and not certainty
o Shall - mandatory
Implications
• Doctrine of necessary implication
o No statute can be enacted that can provide all details involved in the
application
o One of the rules of statutory construction is to fill in the gap
• Remedy is implied from a right
o Where there is a right, there is a remedy for its violation
o Even when statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from
vindicating is right.
• Grant of jurisdiction
o Jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is conferred only by constitution or by
stature, not by rules of court
• What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction
o Every regularly constituted court has power to do all things which are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction
o It can grant reliefs incidental thereto
• Grant of power includes incidental powers
• Grant of power excludes greater power
• What is implied should not be against the law
• Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied
• Illegality of act implied from prohibition
o Statute prohibits and act, the act done in violation is by implication null and
void.
• Exception to the rule
o Pari delicto – it will not apply when its enforcement or application will
violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest
• What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
o Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur te per obliquun
o What the law prohibits cannot be legally accomplished the other way.
• There should be no penalty for compliance with law.

• Mens Legislatoris/Mischief rule – interpret by bearing in mind the evil sought to be

avoided by the enactment of law
III. Aids to Interpretation and Construction 7/17/18 10:02 AM

Gatmaytan, Chapter 13 Aids to Construction

To ascertain LEGISLATIVE INTENT, the sole purpose of statutory construction
Intrinsic Aids
• Parts of a statute
o ex. EO applies to administrative complaints not criminal complaints
o title
o explanatory note that accompanies the bill – present issues the bill seeks to
address, shed light on what is intends to accomplish
o whole statute
o analysis of several provisions which should be harmonized
o punctuation marks
o spirit of law – when true intent of law is clear, such must prevail over letter
Statutory directives
• Short, single line guides for courts to follow in the event that interpretation is required
ex. Art 10 of Civil Code
Extrinsic aids OUTSIDE four corners of the statute.
• History of enactment – events that transpired during process of enacting law
o E.g. records of constitutional convention
• Purpose of the legislature
• Another statutes
• Debates and proceedings – shows views of individual members, indicative of reason
for their votes
Legislative history
• Changes in statutory language, legislative policy
• Change in phraseology by amendments
o The change indicates a legislative intent to change meaning of the provision
from that it originally had.
• Amendment by deletion
o Deletion indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the
statute.
• Exceptions to the rule
 o Rule that an amendment indicates a change in meaning from the original only
applies when deleted words or phrases are nor surplusage or when the
intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the old law.
o Rule does not apply where intent is clear and amendment is to plainly express
the construction of the act.
•
Contemporary Construction
• interpretation by admin. agency
• executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the
considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law
• officials have competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment
• court may also strike down admin. decisions
• not necessarily binding
Dictionaries
• Determine ordinary meaning
• Not binding to courts

Agpalo, Chapter 3 Aids to Construction

A. In General
• Generally
o When ambiguous, court can make use of aids to construction to ascertain
intent of statute.
• Title
o May guide in ascertaining intent because of the requirement that “every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title.
o Indicates extent and scope of law
• When resort to title is not authorized
o When text is clear and free from ambiguity
• Preamble
o It states or sets out the intention, purpose, reason or justification for enactment
of law
o Generally omitted in statutes passed by Philippine Commission, The
Philippine legislature, National Assembly, Congress of the Philippines and
Batasang Pmabansa
 o Also in presidential decrees
o Where meaning of statute is clear and unambiguous, preamble cannot expand
or restrict its operation
• Context of whole text
o Statute itself- best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent
o Statute taken as a whole in relation to one another
• Punctuation marks or grammatical marks
o Aids of low degree
o Not part of statute
o But ambiguity may be solved partially or wholly by a punctuation mark
o Missing punctuation mark, incorrect punctuation, or superfluous punctuation
• Capitalization of letters
o Low degree
o Words that start with a capital letter such as Islands may refer to something
specific.
• Headnote or epigraphs
o Prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute for ready reference or
classification
o Maybe consulted in aid of interpretation but not of much weight
• Lingual text
o The language in which it is written prevails
• Intent or spirit of law
o Intent or spirit of law is the law itself
o Legislative intent is a controlling factor
o Courts cannot speculate or assume intent
• Policy of law
o Once ascertained should be given effect by judiciary
o A construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law
should adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it.
o A decent respect for policy of law must save the court from imputing to it a
self-defeating purpose.
• Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
o Impt. factors
o Look at object to be accomplished and evils to remedied
 • Dictionaries
o Legal, scientific, or general dictionaries to determine meaning of words or
phrases
o Dictionaries define words in their natural. Plain and ordinary acceptance and
significance
• Consequences of various constructions
o Will the statute bi given literal, strict, or liberal interpretation?
o Restrictive or expansive meaning?
o Retroactively or not?
o Objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable and sensible
interpretation in accord with legislative intent
• Presumptions
o Based on logic, experience and common sense
o Include presumptions in favor of constitutionality of statutes, its
completeness, prospective operation, right and justice, and of its effective,
sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation
o Against inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law,
impossibility, absurdity injustice, hardship
B. Legislative Intent
• Generally
o When ambiguous, history of statute is the best means of ascertaining the
legislative intent
• What constitutes legislative history
o All antecedents from inception to enactment
o Explanatory note accompanying it, committee reports, legislative
investigation, public hearings, debates, deliberations, presidents message
• President’s message to legislature
o Consti provides “the president shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.”
o Contains proposed legislative measures
o May contain legislative intent of laws enacted in response to such message
• Explanatory Note
o Short exposition or explanation accompanying a proposed legislation by its
proponent
 o Contains statements of reason or purpose of bill
• Legislative debates, views and deliberations
o Actual proceedings or discussions
• Reports of commissions
o Commissions compile and collate all laws on particular subject and to prepare
a draft of the proposed code.
o May refer to the commission reports that drafted the code to clarify
ambiguities
• Prior laws from which the statute is based
o Applicable to prior laws which have been codified, revised or complied
statutes, as these will show their history
• Change in phraseology by amendments
o The change indicates a legislative intent to change meaning of the provision
from that it originally had.
• Amendment by deletion
o Deletion indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the
statute.
• Exceptions to the rule
o Rule that an amendment indicates a change in meaning from the original only
applies when deleted words or phrases are nor surplusage or when the
intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the old law.
o Rule does not apply where intent is clear and amendment is to plainly express
the construction of the act.
• Adopted statutes
o Where local statutes are patterned after those of another country, court
decisions of those country must be given great weight.
• Limitations of rule
o Where local law and foreign law (on which local law is based on) differ in
some material aspects
o Where foreign construction is clearly erroneous or not settled
o Where the adopting state has given its own interpretation
• Principles of common law
o Common law is not in force in the country
 o But many principles have been imported into this jurisdiction so may be use
as aid
o When there is conflict between common law principle and statutory
provisions, the latter prevails
• Conditions at the time of enactment
o Statutes do not operate in vacuum
o Legislature is presumed to have taken into account existing conditions of
things at the time of its enactment
• History of the times
o Examine state of things existing when the statute was enacted
o History at the time must bear direct relationship with law, evils intended to be
remedied and the good to be accomplished
C. Contemporary Construction
• Generally
o Or practical constructions are constructions placed upon statutes at the time
or, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities
as well as by those who are knowledgeable of intent and purpose of law
o Contemporanea exposition est optima et foreissima in lege – the
contemporary construction is strongest in law.
• Executive construction, generally; kind of
o Executive and administrative officers are first to interpret laws in form of
rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinion and ruling.
o 3 types:
§ construction by an executive or administrative officer – embodied in
circular, etc.
§ construction by secretary of justice as chief legal adviser – in form of
opinions issued upon request; generally controlling in
administrative/executive officials
§ contemporaneous construction – interpretation handed down in an
adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by and executive officer
exercising quasi-judicial power.
• Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction
o Probably true expression of legislative purpose, especially if construction is
followed for a considerable period of time.
 o Great weight unless shown to be erroneous
• Weight accorded to usage and practice
o Frequently of great value
o Esp. when usage has been acquiesced in by all the parties concerned and has
extended over a period of time.
• Construction of rules and regulations
o Issued by executive/admn. Officers
o Have force and effect of law
o Admin. agency has power to interpret own rules
o Great weight
• Reasons why contemporaneous construction is given much weight
o b/c it comes from the particular branch of govt. called upon to implement the
law construed.
o When a statute is enacted, regulation is issued to implement it.
o Relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities
by admn. Agency in charged with implementing particular statute.
• When contemporaneous construction is disregarded
o When no ambiguity
o Construction is erroneous
o Strong reason to the contrary exists
o Where court gave a different interpretation
• Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction nor create
rights; exception
o Creates no vested rights
o Must be corrected because duty of admn. agency is to administer and enforce
law
• Legislative interpretation
o Judicial function
o Legislature may indicate its constructions through declaratory act or
resolution
• Legislative approval
o Legislature may approve or ratify contemporaneous interpretation
• Reenactment
o most common act of legislative approval of a contemporaneous constructions
 o persuasive indication of the adoption by legislature of prior construction
• Stare decisis
o Applying or interpreting a statute imbedded in SC decisions
o Controlling
o Greater weight than admin or executive officers
o Et non quieta movere – one should follow past precedents and should not
disturb what has been settles.

Illustrative cases:
1. Title
Ebarle v. Sucaldito
-EO is applicable to administrative cases and not to criminal cases. Based on the title speaks of
“COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES”, there is no mention, or by implication, of criminal
offenses. More specific term had it intended to make itself applicable there to.

City of Baguio v. Marcos

- Title is the index/clue/guide to legislative intent. It may be resorted to ascertain legislative
intent because according to the constitution, no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

2. Preamble
People v. Purisima
One of the aids available to determine intent is looking at the preamble which usually starts with
“Whereas”. The preamble includes events/reasons/facts that precipitated the enactment of the
statute. In this case, it was inferred from the preamble that PD 9 that only act of carrying
blunt/bladed weapon with motivation connected with desired results of Proclamation No. 1081
(Martial law declaration) is within the intent of PD 9 (3).

3. Punctuation Marks
People v. Subido
-In this case, scrutiny of the punctuation mark (effect of comma) was resorted to determine
whether subsidiary imprisonment apply to all antecedent or only to the last antecedent. In this
case, the use/position of the comma in the part of the of the sentence is to make the the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but also to non-payment of the fine.
Florentino v. PNB
- To determine which among the antecedents in the provision does the clause “who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement,” the court looked into the position of comma
which appeared before the words “or to any citizen, etc.” Thus it was inferred that the qualifying
clause refers only to the last antecedent.

DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT – “this clause will only refer to the antecedent closest to
the clause.”

4. Definition and Interpretation Clause

People v. Buenviaje
-Buenviaje who practice chiropractic argued that chiropractic is not included in the definition of
medicine therefore should not be charged with violation of the Medical Act. The Court held that
the statue defines “practice of medicine” to include the manipulations employed in chiropractic.
It further held that statutory definitions prevail over the ordinary one. Therefore, Buenviaje who
practices chiropractic is guilty of a violation of the Medical Act.

5. Capitalization of Letters
Unabia v. City Mayor.
-Whether or not the Capital C and S in the word Civil Service in sections 1 & 4 of Art. XII of the
CONSTI, and the use of small letters in in section 670 of RAC applies only to classified service,
and are protected in the sections of CONSTI. The Court held that there is no difference in the use
of capital or small letters. There is no reason for exluding persons in unclassified service for both
expressly belong to the Civil Service should be given the same rights and privileges. The persons
in the unclassified service are so designated because of the nature of their work and
qualifications, are not subject to classification.

6. Headnotes or Epigraphs
People v. Yabut
-In this case, the issue arises from the interpretation of the statue from Spanish to English. In the
English translation, it seemed that a person previously convicted who commits another crime
should not be meted out additional penalty (?) The SC court that in the Spanish provision, no
such confusion exist. It held that epigraphs are mere catchwords or convenient index to content,
but it should not have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words. Secondary
aids may be consulted to remove and NOT TO CREATE doubt.

7. Statutory Directives
Vergara v. Coca-Cola
Constitution protect the rights of workers, to promote their welfare, and to accord them full
protection. In turn, said mandate is the basis of Art. 4 of the Labor Code states that “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be rendered in favor of the labor. In this case, Vergara could have claimed the
Sales Incentive if he has proven that he had not failed to meet the collection qualifiers of the
Sales Incentive.
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

Extrinsic Aids
Illustrative of Cases
1. Origin of the Statute
Carolina Industries v. CMS Stock Brokerage
If you wish to defend client using AmJur, use this case!!!
The Securities Act was promulgated for the benefit of stockbroker’s customers and public, who,
unike the brokerage firms are highly incapable of protecting themselves. The Court generally
follow American interpretations of laws adopted from the US like the Securities Act. Not only
provisions are adopted but also the interpretations of these statutes.

US v. De Guzman
For the proper construction and application of the terms and provisions of legislative enactments
which have been borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-American precedents, it is proper and
oftentimes essential to review the legislative history of such enactments and to find an
authorative guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of American and
English courts of last resort construing and applying similar legislation in those countries.
After doing so, it was ascertained that since the agreement was not complied with in good faith,
he shall prosecuted again despite of the previous dismissal (on the ground that he did not what
has been promised).

Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.
If you wish to defend client that AmJur should not be used, use this case!!!
When Ortigas cited American jurisprudence, the court held that American decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be
construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmaers and such intent may be deduced
from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation. Also it held that the
jurisprudence cited actually support the lower court’s Resolution no. 27 which is the subject of
the case (not favorable for Ortigas). Hence it was held that the Resolution is an exercise of police
power and should prevail over contractual obligations.

2. Legislative History
Buenaseda v. Flavier

Francisco v. Bosier
3.
IV. …in Relation to the Language of the Statute7/17/18 10:02 AM
IV. Interpretation and Construction in Relation to the Language of the Statute
Gatmaytan, Chapter 14 Interpretation of Words and Phrases
Canons of Construction *BE SURE TO DISTINGUISH CHAPTER 3, 4, 5 of SYLLABUS
• - set of background norms and conventions widely used when interpreting statutes.
• -rule of thumb/presumptions that help extract substantive meaning
• -duty of the court: NOT to give it a construction which would be repugnant to to an
Act of Congress
• -NO unanimity in using them
3 Leading Theories
1. Intentionalist theory – work under the premise that the aim of statcon is the
realization of legislative intent
-view extrinsic legislative sources as legit sources of authority
-consider legislature’s general purpose
2. New textualist – rely on statutory language itself as last best evidence of legislative
intent
-discards legislative history
-strict vision of textualism where absurd results are discarded
-statutory text is examined in context, examine other provisions of same statute,
how borrowed statutes are interpreted, and consult contemporary dictionaries.
3. Pragmatism – relies on multiple supporting arguments than single argument.
-eclectic and there is no single authoritative source
Substantive and Linguistic Canons
• Canons of interpretation – classified as linguistic or substantive
• Linguistic canons – apply rules of syntax to statutes (e.g “inclusion of the one is
exclusion of the other” / “inclusion unius est exclusion alterius”)
o To decipher legislative intent
• Substantive canons – purpose is to promote policies external to a statute
o Reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of
how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional
priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or specific statutorily based
policies.
o Inspired by values drawn from common law, statutes, and the Consti
o Represent value choices by the Court
Canons and Indeterminacy
 • Canons can contradict each other and be abused. (e.g de Castro v. JBC)
• To address this,
o Court should give doctrines of statutory construction (stare decisis)
o Substantive canon should be expanded/revitalized, develop set of canons for
each doctrinal area which will serve as concrete guide on how judges should
interpret statues, source of extrinsic legal principles to resolve ambiguity
Latin Maxims
• Handy interpretative maxims
• Refers to a specific principle of statutory construction that can help courts interpret
legislation
• Guide judges in construing statutes and legal instruments
o Ex. Leges posteriors abrogant – subsequent laws repeal former ones
• Maxims form a code for statutory grammar that helps in understanding patterns of
language in legislative texts
General and Particular Uses of Words
• Legislators does not have to define every word used in the statute
• Words used – be given ordinary meaning as they are commonly used
• If literal meaning leads to absurdity, be interpreted according to the spirit and reason
of the law
Associated Words
• Noscitur A Sociis –Doctrine of Associated words
o When a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
o Word or phrase meaning – be ascertained with other words or phrases it goes
with
o Doesn’t always entail an enumeration.
• Ejusdem Generis
o General words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned
 o Statute describes things a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic word is usually limited to things of a similar
nature with those particular enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statute that would repel such inference
o A long enumeration followed by a general term
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
o The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others.
o A statute expressly limited to certain matters by its own terms may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others
o Does not apply to statute where enumeration is only a sample of the scope
o Closely related to exception firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis – which
means that, that which is not excepted must fall within the general rule. In
other words if it is not excluded, then it must be deemed included/covered
• Dissimilum Dissimili Est Ratio
o The court may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing
that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification
o ex. Members of Katipunan ng Kabataan – twenty one years old only
§ while officials of Sangguniang Kabataan - 21 y.o on the day of
election
• Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est
o Corollary to Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
o a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally
o applies only when omission has been clearly established
• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos
o When law does not distinguish, court should not distinguish
• Reddendo Singula Singulis
o "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object," or
o "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively."
o words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate
connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if
 possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise
o "Men and women may become members of fraternities and sororities." This
passage can be construed in several ways. On the one hand, perhaps it means
that men may join both fraternities and sororities and that women may join
fraternities and sororities as well.
o Reddendo suggests that men should be matched with "fraternities" and women
should be matched with "sororities," not because of the meaning of those
words, but merely because of their placement within the relevant passage.
• Doctrine of Necessary Implication Expansive in nature as it fills in the gap
o Statute enacted will always have gaps which makes this doctrine necessary.
o What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed
o Contrary to Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius – what is not included is
deemed excluded, and
o Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est – what is omitted is intentionally
ommitted
o Contrary to Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos – when
the law does not distinguish, the court should distinguish (?)
• Proviso, Exceptions and Saving Clauses Doctrine of Last Antecedent
o Generally, Proviso - to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows.
§ Exception - clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only
the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier
provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole
o Saving clause – limit the effect of law
§ Ex. Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve
the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of
e repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or
under investigation. ß saving clause
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

C. Construction of Words and Phrases

• Correcting clerical error Part IV C of syllabus
o The court may correct errors if uncorrected, would render the statute
meaningless, or would defeat or impair the intended operation, so long as the
meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no
specific provision is abrogated.
o Not a judicial legislation but only rectifying the legislative intent
• Number and gender of words
o Words in plural include the singular and vv.
o Masculine – includes all genders
• Tense
o Present tense includes the future and past
• May and Shall
o May – permissive; connotes possibility and not certainty
o Shall – mandatory
• And and Or
o And - conjunctive, all must be satisfied
o Or – disjunctive, only one of the listed needs to be satisfied
o And/or – same as or, written in such manner to not exclude a combination of
the alternatives given
• Principally and Exclusively
o Principally – prioritize what is principal but does not exclude the others
o Exclusive - excludes the others
• Including
o Take in or comprise as a part of a whole.
o Not limited to what has been enumerated
o Expressio unius est exlusio alterius (what is not included is deemed excluded)
is not applicable
o SIMILAR to Ejusdem generis
•
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

V. Other Tools in Interpretation and Construction of Statutes

A. Construction of the Statute as a Whole pari materia
Chapter 15, Gatmaytan
• Taking the thought conveyed as whole
• Construe constituent parts together, ascertain legislative intent from the whole act
• Cardinal rule in statutory construction: legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision.
• Careful review of the whole law is necessary.
o Ex. RA 9165, drug test is required for all unlawful act, but if construed as
whole, it would be ascertained that unlawful act referred to in the provision
includes only unlawful acts prohibited in the statute (drug-related acts).

B. Construction of the Statute in Relation to Other Statutes

Harmonizing All Laws Chapter 16, Gatmaytan
• New statutes should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation
to the same subject matter
• Harmonize if can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation,
• Why harmonize?
o If older statute relates to a similar subject matter of the new statute does not
result in an implied repeal.
o Also both are work of our lawmakers, thus deserve equal respect.
o Uniform system of jurisprudence
• Instead of pitting one against the other, court must reconcile them.
• If two statutes are conflicting and impossible to reconcile, one must be annulled.
• EXCEPTION:
o When to statutes apply to a particular case, that which is specially intended for
the said case must prevail.
o Ex. In Calingin v. CA about the implementation of Calingin’s suspension, 2
statutes apply, Local Gov’t Code and Revised Administrative Code. It was
held that RAC is only of general application. LGC which is the specific code
that governs the matter must be referred to.

C. General and Special Provisions/Statutes

 Special and General Laws
• When there is inconsistency between the special law and general law, the court
should not assume that the Congress intended the repeal of the older law.
• The special law must be intended to constitute an exception to the general act or
provision.
• Ex. The case of jurisdiction of Sharia Courts
• Well settled rule: repeal by implication are not to be favored.
• Special laws prevail over a general law regardless of the dates of enactment of both
laws.

D. Strict and Liberal Construction

• LIBERAL construction - A form of construction which allows a judge to consider
other factors when deciding the meaning of a phrase or document.
• STRICT construction - Interpreting a legal provision (usually a constitutional
protection) narrowly. Strictissimi juris

Chapter 17, Gatmaytan

• Avowed state policy: construe social legislation liberally in favor of the beneficiaries
and to resolve all doubts in their favor.
o Purpose: achieve humanitarian purpose & to give full force and effect to their
clear intent
o Intent: promote the economic and social stability of its beneficiaries.
o Ex. Labor laws, retirement laws, agrarian laws.
§ Agrarian laws = social welfare legislation; be liberally construed in
favor of intended beneficiaries; to ensure constitutional mandate on the
promotion of social justice in promoting the well-being and economic
security of the people
• ELECTION LAWS
o Liberal construction is applied to express the will of the people.
o May be divided into three parts for purposes of applying the rules of statcon
§ 1st – provisions for the conduct of elections that election officials are
required to follow – merely directory provisions (when construed after
election, mandatory if before elections)
 § 2nd – provisions that candidates for office are required to comply with
and are necessarily mandatory.
§ 3rd – procedural rules designed to ascertain the actual winner in the
elections; requires liberal construction
o COMELEC rules of procedure are subject to liberal construction.
o Laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are
construed in favor of eligibility (ex. When a candidate has received popular
mandate, all doubts be resolved in favor of the candidate to not defeat the will
of the people)
• TAX LAWS
o Statute will not be construed as imposing tax unless it does so clearly,
expressly, and unambiguously.
o Interpretation that raises revenue (for the government) must yield to the
provisions of the law; such provisions must leave no room for interpretation
o Taxes are burdens; should not be presumed beyond what the law expressly
and clearly declares; be construed strictly against the state.
o Cases with multiple tax assessments beyond 5 year period – law on
prescription be liberally construed, exceptions should be strictly construed
o Laws granting tax exceptions – strictly construed against grantee; such
exemption must be shown to exist clearly and categorically in the provision
o Claim of tax refund – strictissimi juris against taxpayer; in the nature of claim
for exemption.
• LABOR LAWS
o Liberal application
o Collective bargaining agreement (CBA) – it terms are clear, literal meaning of
stipulations shall prevail; be construed liberally rather than narrowly and
technically; any doubts should be resolved in favor of labor.
• PENAL STATUTES
o Liberally construed in favor of the accused
• RULES of COURT
o Courts may relax procedural rules even the most mandatory character
o To reconcile the need to put an end to litigation and the parties’ rights to due
process
 o Be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
E. Mandatory and Directory Statutes
Chapter 18, Gatmaytan
• May and shall – guides in ascertaining whether provision has mandatory or directory
character
• May- discretionary; auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and
possibility; DIRECTORY in nature and generally permissive; cannot be construed as
having mandatory effect.
• Prohibitive words – rarely directory because only one way to obey or comply with
prohibition, mandatory
• Directory can only be given operation if it does not conflict with mandatory
provisions.
• Shall - mandatory
• Must and shall – not always imperative;
• Rules of Court have both mandatory and directory provisions.

F. Prospective and Retroactive Statutes

• Retroactive effect- Take affect from the past
• Prospective – from time of effectivity, applying to the future
• General rule: prospective application
o Exception:
§ Remedial/procedural laws
Chapter 19, Gatmaytan
• 1987 Consti, Art. III, sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
o Ex post fact law A law that makes illegal an act that was legal when
committed, increases the penalties for an infraction after it has been
committed, or changes the rules of evidence to make conviction easier.
o Bill of attainder –a legislative act finding a person guilty without trial of
treason or felony and declaring him attainted
• Civil Code, Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided
 o Reason: tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on
account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of
prior transactions
• Administrative Code of 1987, sec 19. Prospectivity – Laws shall have prospective
effects unless the contrary is expressly provided.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
• PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS
o Statutes are prospective; formulation of rules for the future and not for the
past
o Laws existing at the time of execution are applicable thereto
o Contracts have prospective application
• RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS
o usually divests rights that have become vested
o matter of civil and not consti, although it can be related to consti hen it affects
vested rights such as right to due process, liberty, etc.
o law enacted in the exercise of police power may be given retroactive affect
o curative statutes – be given retroactive effect if it does not impair vested
rights, same is true with procedural laws
o penal laws – operate retroactively be legislative command; if clearly favorable
to the accused
o social legislation – sometimes applies retroactively
o code of Muslim Personal Laws – cannot retroactively override the Civil Code.
• APPLICATION of RULE to SC DECISIONS
o SC decisions-subject to Art. 4 of NCC
o Given prospective application
o Retroactivity is permissible if decision does not
§ 1. Overrule a previous doctrine
§ 2. Adopt a different view
§ 3. Reverse an old construction
• APPLICATION of RULE to ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
 o Have prospective application; cannot be given retroactive effect
• RULES OF COURT
o May be given retroactive application
o Apply to actions already pending at the time of their promulgation
o No vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
o No retroactive application if would result to injustice

G. Amendment, Revisions, Codification and Repeals

• Amendment – alteration, deletion, insertion of words and phrases without altering the
underlying principle
• Revision - changes beyond amendment, underlying principle is changes, major
changes.
• Codification – related laws are combined together
• Repeal – one law is substituted by another law

Chapter 20, Gatmaytan

• REPEAL
o 1987 Administrative Code,
§ Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law - When a law which
expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall
not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
§ Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed - When a law which
§ impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall
thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.
o Civil Code, Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
§ Only law can repeal another law
o Repeal by implication – not favored because laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing pertaining to the
subject.
o 2 kinds: Express and Implied
o Express – repealing clause, identify law/s intended to be repealed
o To effect
 o Express – all other repeals
§ a.) there must be absolute incompatibility and clear repugnancy that
latter law cannot exist without nullifying the other
§ b.) OR the later law includes the whole subject matter of the older law
and is clearly intended as substitute
o Intention to revoke must be clear and manifest
• REVISION of CODIFICATION, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are
omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed unless the statute provides
otherwise.
• REPEALING CLAUSES
o Usually straight forward
o General repealing clause- implied repeal
o Repeals of existing laws are not always evident in the title of the law
 7/17/18 10:02 AM

VI. Constitutional Construction

Chapter 3, Gatmaytan
• What is the Constitution?
o System of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation
o Supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
o Fundamental and paramount law of the nation
o Supreme law to which all other laws must conform
o Constitutional Supremacy – if the law violates any norm of the constitution is
null and void (struck down for being unconstitutional)
o Since Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
o It is the expression of the sovereign will and governs the resolution of
constitutional issues
• Constitutional Construction
o Faithful to the document’s language, structure, and history
o Begin with consti’s text and history then on to examine additional sources to
explicate the consti’s substance
o Approaches in Constitutional Construction
§ Textualism – an approach that consists of narrowly parsing the text of
the document, examining of words alone as text is the most obvious
embodiment of the constitutional truth.
ú Freeze the consti then eventually become obsolete.
§ Structural analysis – reading across words, looking at arrangement of
the constitution’s text.
ú Diction, word repetitions and documentary organizing forms
give a sense of what consti is about.
ú Used when text is ambiguous or silent on particular issue.
§ Originalism – looking at lawmaker’s intent, supplements the text and
structure
ú Subordinates ratified and enacted constitutional text to purely
subjective and unenacted intentions
ú Focuses on abstract intentions rather than on concrete
expectations
 ú Drafters did not always share a single purpose the tha language
choses.
ú Historical record of intentions and aims is inconclusive and at
times downright contradictory
§ Normative/oragmatic approach – elucidation of meaning through
attempts to discern which interpretation accords with ethos or moral
and political character
ú Inappropriately subjectivity makes it difficult
ú Appeals to values and commitments
§ Stare decisis – juridical elaboration of decisional doctrine to derive
ansers constitutional questions
ú Flexibility and stability, ability to adapt changes and judges are
required to follow
ú Improve one’s reading of its terms over time.
§ Search for meaning drough a deliberately eclectic combination of
above approaches
§ RULES in Consti Con
§ Fundamental principle:
ú verba legis - Intent is ascertained from the language of the
provision itself
ú Ratio legis est anima – words be interpreted according to the
intent of the framers, the evil sought to be prevented/remedied
ú Ut magis valeat quam pereat – interpret consti as a whole, no
provision be separated from the others, harmonize
§ When plain meaning is not evident, consult other aids such as debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention
§ Fundamental principle: give effect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and the people adopting it.
§
§ Consitutiona Interpreted as a Whole
ú One mandate should not bi given importance over the other
except when supremacy is clear
§ Words Understood as They are Commonly Used
ú Be understood in its common use, give ordinary meaning
 § Prospective application
ú While penal laws are given retroactive effect when favorable to
the accused, provision of consti are applied prospectively,
unless provided otherwise.
§ Language Requires No Construction – construction must be faithful to
the language of the Constitution.
§ when clear, plain and free from ambiguity, give literal meaning and
apply without interpretation, no departure from the words of the
statute.
§ When Construction is required – when application of law is impossible
or inadequate without such interpretation
§ Aids in Interpretation
ú debates on constitutional convention
§ Statutes and Executive Regulations not Binding on Courts – statutes
and implementing rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional
construction however not binding or conclusive on courts
§ Self-Executing Provisions – immediately operative as they are ready
for enforcement, no room for any implementing legislation with
respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness.
§
• Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr.
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the
same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within
which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz,
Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a
memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his
decision, his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation
of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the
court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month
period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already
lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date
of last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-
month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the
case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of
rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge
Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28,
1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could
not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of
this constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court,
12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the
Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory,
its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless,
the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and
not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.

• In Marcelinov. Cruz, Jr., the Court ruled on the directory nature of constitutional
provisions on procedure when Bernardino Marcelino, charged with the crime of rape,
moved for postponement of the promulgation of his conviction. Eighty-five days after
the case was submitted for decision, Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. filed his decision on
the case with the Deputy Clerk of Court. On the date of promulgation, however, the
accused moved for the postponement of the promulgation on the ground of loss of
jurisdiction for failure to resolve the case within the 90-day period provided for in the
Constitution.

• The Court pronounced that the trial court was able to render the decision within the
90-day period, when on the eighty-fifth day, it filed the decision. First, the reckoning
date of the period was not that of the promulgation but that of the rendition of
 judgment and filing with the Clerk of Court. And in any case, the 90-day period in the
Constitution is directory.
o Section 11(1), Article X of the Constitution provides that:
Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission,
shall be eighteen months for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three
months for all other inferior courts.
• While the Court recognized that constitutional provisions are generally mandatory, it
held that there are exceptions. One such exception is the period of deciding a case
which is held widely by authoritiess' to be merely directory. Evidencing this is the
phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," which shows that such period may
be modified according to the Court's sound discretion. Characterizing such provision
as merely procedural, the Court relied upon the pronouncement in Albermarle Oil &
Gas Co. v. Morris that constitutional provisions on procedure are directory.
o If not complied with will not invalidate decision or result to loss of jurisdiction.
• Finally, the Court explained that the liberal construction of the provision would result
in less injury to the public and would avoid "absurd, impossible or mischievous"
outcomes.

Sarmiento v. Mison
• In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to
enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioners argued that
such appointment contradicted Article VII Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution which
required the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and must, therefore, be
voided.
• The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
•
• ISSUE: W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the
Commission on Appointments to be valid?

• In interpreting the constitutional provision, the Supreme Court traced legislative

history through the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, ascertained the intent of the
framers in their deliberations, clarified the construction of certain words in the
provision, considered the nature of the power to appoint, and harmonized the
provision with other existing laws.
• In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The 1973 Constitution placed
absolute power in the President in the matter of appointments. The Constitutional
Convention struck the "middle ground" when, in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, it made classifications of appointees to the government. As detailed by
the Court, these classifications are:
• First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
• Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
• Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
• Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone."
• While the first set of officers must clearly be confirmed by the Commission of
Appointments, the Court had to refer to the debates of the Constitutional
Commission to ascertain whether or not the same confirmation is required for the
other groups. The records of the Constitutional Commission revealed that the
framers intended the appointments of the second and third groups of officers to be
effected without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
contention that the word "also" in the second sentence (of the Constitutional
Commission's discussion) meant that the second group required confirmation was
rejected by the Court.
• Instead, it ruled that "also" simply meant "in addition to, as well, or besides." By this
interpretation, the provision simply read that in addition to the power to appoint
 officers of the first group with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
the President can also appoint officers of the second group.
• The use of the word "alone" in the third sentence was also put into issue. Petitioners
submitted that absent legislation, the appointment of lower-ranked officers (fourth
group) must be made by the President, with the consent of the Commission on
• Appointments; and if this were so, it must follow that the same procedure should be
observed as for the appointment of higher-ranked officers. In contrast, the
respondents posited that it simply referred to the option of Congress to vest the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the President Ruling in favor of either party,
the Court held that the word "alone" was a mere slip in draftsmanship. Its use in the
1935 Constitution to denote an exception to the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments could not be extended to the 1987 Constitution
wherein the clear intent of the framers was to vest the power to appoint such group
of officers in the President without further need of confirmation. Taken literally, such
word appeared to be a redundancy in light of the second sentence; a redundancy
which could not prevail over the intent of the framers.
• The Court gave import to the power of appointment as fundamentally executive in
character; hence, limitations to it must be strictly construed. Strict construction
requires the clear statement of the limitations.

o Aids in Interpretation
§ debates on constitutional convention
o Statutes and Executive Regulations not Binding on Courts – statutes and
implementing rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional construction
however not binding or conclusive on courts

• Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance (1982)

• In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the
interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840
“granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other
purposes” unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the
fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a
Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only
‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no
 concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already
lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi
averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is
invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
•
• ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence
of the Batasan Pambansa.
•
• Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the
Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that –
• ‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.’
•
•
• HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid.
• The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising
his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to
his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when
the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the
concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the
Constitution.”

o In Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, the Supreme Court looked at the purpose

of the law in ruling on the constitutionality of Amendment No. 6 of President
Marcos. Pursuant to the grant of legislative powers to the President in
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 1840, essentially granting tax amnesty to delinquent
taxpayers. Valentino Legaspi, a member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,
questioned the constitutionality of the decree before the Supreme Court,
alleging that the President's power to legislate under Amendment No. 6 had
not been carried over by more recent constitutional amendments. In finding
for the validity of the law, the Court concluded that
 o Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the
Charter. The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that has
consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the
meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of any of
its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and
developments but likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted
in the historical background and environment at the time of its adoption and
thereby caused their being written as part and parcel thereof. As long as this
Court adheres closest to this perspective in viewing any attack against any
part of the Constitution, to the end of determining what it actually
encompasses and how it should be understood, no one can say We have
misguided Ourselves. None can reasonably contend We are treading the
wrong way.
o It then traced the four constitutional measures to be implemented whenever
national security is threatened (delegation of emergency powers by the
Batasan, calling out power, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
martial law) through the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The external legislative
power of the President was construed by the Court as an addition to these
measures. In defense of Amendment No. 6, the Court discussed that its
raison d'etre is "that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law
unless manifest extreme situations should ever demand it."
• In construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous, courts may consider the
debates in the constitutional convention to shed light on the intent of the framers of
the Constitution. The intent of the convention is not controlling by itself but "the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the
constitutional provision that was the subject of the deliberation, helps in explaining
the understanding of the people when they ratified it"

• Montejo vs. COMELEC

Facts:
• Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of
 representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province.
• For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the
population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

• • Census 1990 • Census 1994

• First District • 303, 349 • 178, 688

• Second District • 272, 167 • 156, 462

• Third District • 214, 499 • 125, 763

• Fourth District • 269, 347 • 155, 995

• Fifth District • 309, 148 • 181, 242

• ISSUES:
• Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736
• HELD/RULING:
• The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution, which states:
• Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
• The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission
wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another
district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor adjustments
does not allow the change in allocations per district.
• It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is
then annulled and set aside. The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is
denied.
• Montejo v. COMELEC resorted to the records of the Constitutional Commission
when the Court invalidated the Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 2736,
redistricting certain municipalities in the province of Leyte. The Resolution
transferred municipalities from one legislative district to another. The Court reviewed
the records of the Constitutional Commission which empowered to make minor
adjustments to the reapportionments in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
 The Court ruled that the power to make legislative apportionments was wielded by
the Constitutional Commission itself, and thereby struck down the resolution.

• De Castro v. JBC (2010)

• Facts:
• The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. This dilemma is
rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except
when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII
of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the
next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates
should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to
compel the submission of JBC’s nominees to the president? This issue at hand truly is
impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot of petitions were
received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We limit our discussion with
GR191002 for brevity.

• WON prohibition applies to SC. (NO)

•
• In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council where both the Court and dissenter Justice
Carpio-Morales relied, among others, based on the deliberations of the Commission
in respectively finding that the sitting President is permitted or not permitted to
appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court even within two months immediately
preceding the next presidential elections. While Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution mandates the President to appoint a new Chief Justice within ninety days
from the vacancy of such position, Section 15, Article VII prohibits the President
from making appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections until the end of term. The import of whether the presidential mandate to
appoint under the former provision or the prohibition on appointments in the latter
 provision should apply was brought forth by the compulsory retirement of former
Chief Justice Reynato Puno a few days after the May 2010 presidential elections.
• The Court concluded that the prohibition does not extend to the
Judiciary, citing seven reasons for its stand. First, the Court said
that reference to the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission showed that the framers did not intend to include judicial appointments
in the prohibition. It took notice of the separation of appointments under the article on
the Executive Department and those under the article on the Judiciary, and
pronounced that the 90-day limitation for filling the vacancy in the Supreme Court
was a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power. It reversed its earlier ruling In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
• 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela) which upheld the prohibition even as against members of
the Judiciary. Second, it held that prohibition does not apply to all other appointments
in the Judiciary. The establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council proved that there
was an intent to avoid midnight appointments since the Judicial and Bar Council is
expected to undertake an unhurried and deliberate process of appointment even
before the vacancy occurs. Third, the constitutionality of appointments to the
Judiciary within the prohibition period was confirmed by Justice Regalado in 1998,
and this confirmation was accepted by the Judicial and Bar Council. Fourth, Section
15 of Article VII must be taken in the context of Section 14 and 16, both of which
pertain to appointments in the executive department Fifth, appointment by the
succeeding President would not ensure judicial independence. Also, such a holding
would tie the Judiciary to the fortunes and misfortunes of the presidential candidates.
Sixth, the argument that there would still be time for compliance with the 90-day
limitation after the election was flawed because it does not take into consideration
that this period applies to every vacancy, and not just the one by Former Chief Justice
Puno. Seventh, there is doubt, said the Court, as to whether the appointment may be
made among the sitting justices without need for a Judicial and Bar Council list, as
can be inferred from a reading of Section 4(1).
 o Self-Executing Provisions – immediately operative as they are ready for
enforcement, no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness.

• Oposa v. Factoran
• Facts:
• The principal petitioners are 44 minors duly represented by their respective parents,
as well as the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI). Minors further aver that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." They are praying
that the DENR cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. The demand was made on the ground that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued deforestation caused by logging violate the
“constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
• DENR Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
petitioners have no cause of action against him and the issue raised is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government.
• In their Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents
a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
• RTC Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and further ruled that the
cancellation of Timber License Agreements would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
• Petitioners filed special civil action for certiorari of said order.
• Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution1, the concept of generational genocide in


 Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
• Respondents argue that they see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
• ISSUE: WON the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology entitles
petitioners to a valid cause of action.
• HOLDING: Yes. Provisions that state general principles are usually
not self-executing but merely “suggestions” or principles from
which Congress may derive statutes. However, if a provision supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants rights may be enjoyed or
protected, then it is considered self-executing.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation – the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. These basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second.
Then President Corazon C. Aquino also promulgated on E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare
of the present and future generations of Filipinos." E.O. NO. 1922 and the Administrative Code
of 19873 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners and all those they represent to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as the DENR's duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions – to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted, challenged Order is set aside.

in Oposav. Factoran, the Court held that Sections 15 and 16 may be the bases of a suit:
• While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation- aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners -the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is




 because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS (1997)

Citing Manila PrinceHotel v. GSIS, the Court explained that a provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-
executing. The Court held:
o But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
o