II.

Hours of Worka

 Coverage and Exclusions

Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.
Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics
with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a
week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days
or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case, they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%)
of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, "health personnel" shall include resident
physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians,
psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.

SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW et. al., petitioners, 
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al., respondents
FACTS:
Then Labor Secretary Franklin M. Drilon issued Policy Instruction No. 4 in line with R.A. 5901 which “requires that the
covered hospital workers who used to work 7 days a week should be paid for such number of days for working only 5 days
or 40 hours a week”.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the expeditious implementation and payment by respondent” Juan De Dios Hospital “. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC both dismissed their complaints and MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.
In said Policy Instruction, it was provided that: “The Labor Code in its Article 83 adopts and incorporates the basic provisions
of RA 5901 and retains its spirit and intent which is to shorten the workweek of covered hospital personnel and at the same
time assure them of a full weekly wage.”
ISSUE:
WON the intent of Art. 83, LCP, is that persons in subject hospitals and clinics who have completed the 40-hour/5-day
workweek in any given workweek are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven days.
HELD:
No.
What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five days per week for health personnel,
and (2) where the exigencies of service require that health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours then such health
personnel shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent of their regular wage for work on the sixth
day.
There is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labor’s assertion that “personnel in subject hospitals and clinics
are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given
workweek”.
Also, if petitioners are entitled to two days off with pay, then there appears to be no sense at all why Section 15 of the
implementing rules grants additional compensation equivalent to the regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for
work performed on Sunday to health personnel, or an “additional straight-time pay which must be equivalent at least to the
regular rate” ” for work performed in excess of forty hours a week.

Interphil Laboratories Ee Union vs Interphil Laboratories

Facts:
Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Respondent. They had a CBA.
Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner, through its officers. The Union
inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar
told the union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal negotiations which would start soon.
All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. The employees stopped
working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.

1
To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the
union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their
normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar
again told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the
union was apparently unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they
were working, thus substantially delaying the production of the company.
Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner union’s “overtime boycott” and
“work slowdown” which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of
Labor a petition for assumption of jurisdiction. Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labor
dispute. Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then
Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order, finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.
Issue: WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike.
Held:
On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike
committed by petitioner union, it cannot be denied that the issues of “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” amounting to
illegal strike before Labor Arbiter
Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary.
The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s jurisdiction over labor-
related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor
Union (ALU) where the Court declared:
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and
decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the opening
proviso therein reading ‘(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code x x x.’ Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was
meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain
conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold
the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may
have diametricallyopposed rulings. As we have said, ‘it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would
breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.
In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the
jurisdiction vested in the
Secretary.
Petition denied.
 Compressed work week-The normal work week is reduced to less than six (6) days but the total number of work hours
of 48 hours per week shall remain. The normal work day is increased to more than eight (8) hours but not to exceed
twelve (12) hours, without corresponding overtime premium. The concept can be adjusted accordingly depending on
the mormal work week of the company pursuant to the provisions of Department Advisory No. 02, series of 2004, dated
2 December 2004 of the Department of Labor and Employment;

 Changing of working hours:

UNION CARBIDE LABOR UNION (NLU), PETITIONER, VS. UNION CARBIDE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND THE
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR,
This refers to a petition for review of the decision of the then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople handed down on February 7, 1975
which set aside the decision of the Arbitrator ordering reinstatement with backwages, and instead adjudged the payment of
separation pay; and the resolution dated July 24, 1975 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The undisputed facts as found by the Secretary of Labor are as follows:

2
". . . Complainants Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar, were dismissed from their employment after an
application for clearance to terminate them was approved by the Secretary of Labor on December 19, 1972. Respondent's
application for clearance was premised on "willful violation of Company regulations, gross insubordination and refusal to
submit to a Company investigation x x x."
Prior events leading to the dismissal of complainants are recited in the Arbitrator's decision, which we quote:
'It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely: morning, afternoon and night shifts. The workers in the
third shift normally work from Monday to Saturday, the last working day being Friday or forty (40) hours a week or from
Monday to Friday.
'Sometime in July 1972, there seems to be a change in the working schedule from Monday to Friday as contained in the
collective bargaining agreement aforecited to Sunday thru Thursday. The change became effective July 5, 1972. The third shift
employees were required to start the new work schedule from Sunday thru Thursday.

'On November 6, 1972, the night shift employees filed a demand to maintain the old working schedule from Monday thru
Friday. (Letter of November 6, 1972 addressed to the Committee on Labor Relation, UCLU). The demand was referred to
the Labor Management Relation Committee and discussed from November 15, up to November 24, 1972. In the discussions
had, it was arrived at that all night shift operating personnel were allowed to start their work Monday and on Saturday. This
excepted the employees in the maintenance and preparation crews whose work schedule is presumed to be maintained from
Sunday to Thursday. The work schedule between management representatives and the alleged officers of the Union (Varias
group) was approved and disseminated to take effect November 26, 1972. (Exh. "2" Respondent).
'In manifestation of their dissention to the new work schedule, the three respondents Duro, Torio, and Javillonar did not report
for work on November 26, 1972 which was a Sunday since it was not a working day according to the provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. (Exh. "A"-Complainant). Their absence caused their suspension for fourteen (14) days."
(pp. 29-30, Rollo)
On May 4, 1973, the Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of the complainants. On June
8, 1973, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed respondent company's appeal for having been filed out of time.
A motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal was then filed by respondent company before the Secretary of
Labor, resulting in the modification of the Arbitrator's decision by awarding complainants separation pay. A motion for
reconsideration subsequently filed by the petitioner was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the complainants could be validly dismissed from their employment on the
ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the new work schedule.
Petitioner alleges that the change in the company's working schedule violated the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
of the parties. Hence, complainants cannot be dismissed since their refusal to comply with the re-scheduled working hours
was based on a provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioner further contends that the dismissal of the
complainants violated Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which provides "the right of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work."
The petition has no merit.
Although Article XIX of the CBA provides for the duration of the agreement, which We quote:
"This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in full force and effect without change until
August 31, 1974. Unless the parties hereto agree otherwise, negotiation for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a new
agreement may not be initiated before July 1, 1974."
this does not necessarily mean that the company can no longer change its working schedule, for Section 2, Article II of the
same CBA expressly provides that:
"SECTION 2. In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY shall have the sole and exclusive right and
power, among other things, to direct the operations and the working force of its business in all respects; to be the sole judge in
determining the capacity or fitness of an employee for the position or job to which he has been assigned; to schedule the hours
of work, shifts and work schedules; to require work to be done in excess of eight hours or on Sundays or holidays as the
exigencies of the service may require; to plan, schedule, direct, curtail and control factory operations and schedules of
production; to introduce and install new or improved production methods or facilities; to designate the work and the
employees to perform it; to select and hire new employees; to train new employees and improve the skill and ability of
employees; to make rules and regulations governing conduct and safety; to transfer employees from one job to another or from
one shift to another; to classify or reclassify employees; and to make such changes in the duties of its employees as the
COMPANY may see fit or convenient for the proper conduct of its business."

3
Verily and wisely, management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the working
hours of its employees. And as long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise (San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) vs. Ople, 170 SCRA 25
[1989]).
Thus, in the case of Abbott Laboratories (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC (154 SCRA 713 [1987]), We ruled:

". . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what
are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose
cannot be denied." (p. 717)
Further, the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation of the 1973 Constitution to speak of
because the guarantee of security of tenure embodied under Section 9, Article II may not be given a retroactive effect. It is the
basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for
its retroactive application is so provided.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

"Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a prospective application unless
the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution." (p. 10,
Constitutional Law, Isagani Cruz, 1991 Edition)
We agree with the findings arrived at by both Arbitrator and the Secretary of Labor that there is no unfair labor practice in
this case. Neither was there gross and habitual neglect of complainants' duties. Nor did the act of complainants in refusing to
follow the new working hours amount to serious misconduct or willful disobedience to the orders of respondent company.
Although no serious objections may be offered to the Arbitrator's conclusion to order reinstatement with backwages of the
complainants, We now refrain from doing so considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the fact that the
controversy started more than 20 years ago aside from the obviously strained relations between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

A. SORIANO AVIATION vs. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANOAVIATION

Petitioner,which is engaged in providing transportationof guests to and from Amanpulo and El Nido resorts inPalawan, and
respondent, which is the duly certifiedbargaining agent of the rank and file employees of thepetitioner, entered into a CBA
which included a “NoStrike-No Lock-out Clause.” On several dates,which were legal holidays and peak season, some of the
members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal as a concerted action which is a
violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause. Thus, it meted the workers 30- day suspension and filed an illegal strike
againstthem. The attempted settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Despite the conciliation no
amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on strike. The company filed a motion to re- open the case
which was granted by LA. In its decision, LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed it in per
curiam decision.56 In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike on the ground
of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declared the second strike illegal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the
LA’s decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position.
ISSUEWhether or not the strike staged by the respondent is illegal.
HELD
YES. The Union members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm directed against company officers
and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements
imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of
illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence. Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners and placards, coupled
with the name-calling and harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted to coerce the resolution of the dispute – the very
evil which Art. 264 seeks to prevent. While the strike is the most preeminent economic weapon of workers to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not
only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic
well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly and within the bounds of law in the
interest of industrial peace and public welfare.

4
Manila Jockey Club Employees Union vs. Manila Jockey Club
[G.R. No. 167760. March 7, 2007]
Facts:
In their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the parties agreed to a 7-hour work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on a work week of Monday to Saturday. The CBA likewise reserved in the employer certain
management prerogatives, including the determination of the work schedule.MJC later on issued an inter-office memorandum
declaring a change in the hours of work of regularmonthly-paid employees to 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when horse races are
held, that is, every Tuesday and Thursday. But it maintained the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule for non-race days. Employees
questioned it as violative of the prohibition against non-diminution of wages and benefits. They claimed that the employees
are precluded from rendering their usual overtime work from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
Issue:
1) Was the change in schedule a valid?
2) Was there diminution of benefits?
Held:

Valid Exercise of management prerogativeWhen the races were moved to 2:00 p.m., there was no other choice for
management but to changethe employees' work schedule as there was no work to be done in the morning. Evidently,
theadjustment in the work schedule of the employees is justified.
While the CBA provided for a schedule, it also reserved expressly to management the right to changeexisting methods or
facilities to change the schedules of work. The CBA also grants respondent theprerogative to relieve employees from duty
because of lack of work.No diminution of benefits
The CBA does not guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work performed in excess of
seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the workweek shall be considered overtime and paid as
such."Respondent was not obliged to allow all its employees to render overtime work everyday for the whole year, but only
those employees whose services were needed after their regular working hours and only upon the instructions of management.
The overtime pay was not given to each employee consistently, deliberately and unconditionally, but as a compensation for
additional services rendered. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor
Code on prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits.

Art. 84. Hours worked. Hours worked shall include (a) all time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be
at a prescribed workplace; and (b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work.
Rest periods of short duration during working hours shall be counted as hours worked.

 Principles in determining hours worked

Durabuilt vs. NLRC

FACTS: -In July 1983, Reynaldo Bodegas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Durabuilt, a tire capping company. -
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision reinstating Bodegas to his former position with full backwages (including benefits) from the
time of his termination up to the time he was actually reinstated. - A computation of backwages, ECOLA, 13th month pay,
sick and vacation leave benefits in favor or Bodegas was then submitted which amounted to Php 24, 316.38. - Durabuilt filed
an opposition to the computation.
Durabuilt’s contention: Bodegas should only be entitled to a total of P3,834.05 and not 24, 316.38. The submitted computation
contemplated a straight computation of twenty six (26) working days in one month
when the period covered by the computation was intermittently interrupted due to frequent brownouts and machine trouble
. Hence, the days during which they were not in operation due to the brownouts should be excluded in the number of days
worked for the purpose of computing Bodegas’ backwages.
ISSUE: WON Bodegas is entitled to backwages. YES, (for 3,834.05 and not 24, 316.38) SC: The illegal dismissal of Bodegas
is conceded by the Durabuilt and is willing to pay backwages.
However, it argues that for days where no work was required and could be done by its employees, no wages could have been
earned and, thereafter, lost by said employees to justify an award of backwages.

5
Here, it appears that Durabuilt’s business was not in actual operation due to brownouts or power interruption and the
retrenchment of workers they had during the period of private respondent's dismissal, thus it is justified to exclude certain days
for purposes of computing backwages. It cannot be denied that during the past years particularly in 1983, there was chronic
electrical power interruption resulting to disruption of business operations. To alleviate the situation, the government thru the
Ministry of Trade and Industry called on the industrial sector to resort to the so-called Voluntary Loan Curtailment Plan (or
VLCP), whereby brownouts or electrical power interruption was scheduled by area. The program while it may have been
called “voluntary" was not so as electrical power consumers had no choice then due to the prevailing energy crisis.
As early as 1978, Ministry of Labor thru Policy Instruction No. 36 provides that:
2. Brownouts running for more than twenty minutes may not be treated as hours worked provided that any of the following
conditions are present; a) The employees can leave their work place or go elsewhere whether within or without the work
premises; or b) The employees can use the time effectively for their own interest.It is of record that during the electrical power
interruptions, Durabuilt’s business was not in operation. Hence, it would neither be fair nor just to allow Bodegas to recover
something he has not earned and could not have earned and to further penalize Durabuilt over and above the losses it had
suffered due to lack of raw materials and the energy-saving programs of the government. Bodegas cannot be allowed to enrich
himself at the expense of Durabuilt. The computation of backwages should be based on daily rather than on monthly pay
schedules where, as in the case at bar, such basis is more realistic and accurate.

 Working time and working on time call:

Opulencia Ice Plant & Storage v. NLRC

Facts:
MANUEL P. ESITA was for twenty (20) years a compressor operator of Tiongson Ice Plant in San Pablo City. In 1980 he
was hired as compressor operator-mechanic for the ice plants of petitioner Dr. Melchor Opulencia located in Tanauan,
Batangas, and Calamba, Laguna. Initially assigned at the ice plant in Tanauan, Esita would work from seven o'clock in the
morning to five o'clock in the afternoon receiving a daily wage of P35.00.
In 1986, Esita was transferred to the ice plant in Calamba, which was then undergoing overhauling, taking the place of
compressor operator Lorenzo Eseta, who was relieved because he was already old and weak. For less than a month, Esita
helped in the construction-remodeling of Dr. Opulencia's house.
In February 1989, for demanding the correct amount of wages due him, Esita was dismissed from service. Consequently, he
filed with Sub-Regional Arbitration in San Pablo City, a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment, non-payment for
overtime, legal holiday, premium for holiday and rest day, 13th month, separation/retirement pay and allowances against
petitioners.
Petitioners deny that Esita is an employee. They claim that Esita could not have been employed in 1980 because the Tanauan
ice plant was not in operation due to low voltage of electricity and that Esita was merely a helper/peon of one of the contractors
they had engaged to do major repairs and renovation of the Tanauan ice plant in 1986. Petitioners further allege that when
they had the Calamba ice plant repaired and expanded, Esita likewise rendered services in a similar capacity, and thus
admitting that he worked as a helper/peon in the repair or remodeling of Dr. Opulencia's residence in Tanauan.
In December 1989, Labor Arbiter Villena rendered a decision 1 finding the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between petitioners and Esita and accordingly directed them to pay him separation pay, underpayment of wages, allowances,
13th month, holiday, premium for holiday, and rest day pays. Almost a year after, NLRC affirmed the decision of Labor
Arbiter Villena but reduced the monetary award as it was not proven that Esita worked every day including rest days and on
the days before the legal holidays. In March 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
W/N there was an employee-employer relationship between Opulencia and Esita.
Ruling:
Yes.
Ratio:
No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. For, if only documentary evidence would be required to show

6
that relationship, no scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice, as no employer would wish to come
out with any trace of the illegality he has authored considering that it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written
instrument.
On the claim that Esita's construction work could not ripen into a regular employment in the ice plant because the construction
work was only temporary and unrelated to the ice-making business, needless to say, the one month spent by Esita in
construction is insignificant compared to his nine-year service as compressor operator in determining the status of his
employment as such, and considering further that it was Dr. Opulencia who requested Esita to work in the construction of his
house.
In allowing Esita to stay in the premises of the ice plant and permitting him to cultivate crops to augment his income, there is
no doubt that petitioners should be commended; however, in view of the existence of an employer-employee relationship as
found by public respondents, we cannot treat humanitarian reasons as justification for emasculating or taking away the rights
and privileges of employees granted by law. Benevolence, it is said, does not operate as a license to circumvent labor laws. If
petitioners were genuinely altruistic in extending to their employees privileges that are not even required by law, then there is
no reason why they should not be required to give their employees what they are entitled to receive.
Moreover, as found by public respondents, Esita was enjoying the same privileges granted to the other employees of petitioners,
so that in thus treating Esita, he cannot be considered any less than a legitimate employee of petitioners.

Teofilo Arica vs National Labor Relations Commission

Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for allegedly not paying the
workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from 5:30am to 6am. The assembly time consists of the roll
call of the workers; their getting of assignments from the foreman; their filling out of the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment
Report; their getting of tools and equipments from the stockroom; and their going to the field to work. The workers alleged
that this is necessarily and primarily for STANFILCO’s benefit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the worker’s assembly time should be paid.

HELD: No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under
Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of
Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . . .
Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings
attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. In
short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.

Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees Association
FACTS:
Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence
showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that
period. The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand
by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that
as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform
work during this period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time.
HELD:
Yes. The Industrial Court’s order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a
consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration,
the laborers had to be on ready call.

 Travel Time
a. Travel from home to work -not compensable working time
b. Travel that is all in the day’s work - compensable hours worked.
c. Travel away from home - compensable hours worked.

7
Hilario Rada vs National Labor Relations Commission
In 1977, Hilario Rada was contracted by Philnor Consultants and Planners, Inc as a driver. He was assigned to a specific
project in Manila. The contract he signed was for 2.3 years. His task was to drive employees to the project from 7am to 4pm.
He was allowed to bring home the company vehicle in order to provide a timely transportation service to the other project
workers. The project he was assigned to was not completed as scheduled hence, since he has a satisfactory record, he was re-
contracted for an additional 10 months. After 10 months the project was not yet completed. Several contracts thereafter were
made until the project was finished in 1985.
At the completion of the project, Rada was terminated as his employment was co-terminous with the project. He later sued
Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He said he is entitled to be paid OT pay because he uses extra
time to get to the project site from his home and from the project site to his home everyday – in total, he spends an average of
3 hours OT every day.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rada is entitled to separation pay and OT pay.
HELD: Separation pay – NO. Overtime pay – Yes.
Separation Pay
The SC ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was coterminous with the project for which he was hired. Project
employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project employees, are mentioned in Section 281 of the Labor Code as those
‘where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.
‘Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any
phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a
particular construction company. Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
connection with such termination.’
OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along EDSA in going to
the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro
Manila is not merely incidental to Rada’s job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted,
not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnor’s
memorandum, they allowed their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to provide a timely transport
service and to avoid delay – not really so that the drivers could enjoy the benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save
on fair.

 Preliminary and postliminary activities

 Attendance in Lectures,meetings,and training program
SECTION 6. Lectures, meetings, training programs. — Attendance at lectures, meetings, training programs, and other similar
activities shall not be counted as working time if all of the following conditions are met:
(a) Attendance is outside of the employee's regular working hours;
(b) Attendance is in fact voluntary; and
(c) The employee does not perform any productive work during such attendance.
Attendance in CBA negotiations or grievance meeting - compensable hours worked.
Attendance in hearings in cases filed by employee - not compensable hours worked.
Participation in strikes - not compensable working time.
Working time of sea based and seaman Philippines
Semestral Breaks-SECTION 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. — (a) Private school teachers, including faculty members
of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral vacations. They shall, however, be paid
for the regular holidays during Christmas vacation;

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN And NLRC DIGEST

8
FACTS:
Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent University of Pangasinan, an educational institution
duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
Th petitioner filed a complaint against the private respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC- Dagupan City seeking:
(a) the payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLA) for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break;
(b) salary increases from the 60% of the incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for
suspended extra loads.
The petitioner’s members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers of respondent University. The teachers in the
college level teach for a normal duration of 10 months a school year, divided into 2 semesters of 5 months each, excluding the
2 months summer vacation. These teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly basis.
During the semestral break (Nov. 7- Dec. 5, 1981), they were not paid their ECOLA. The private respondent claims that the
teachers are not entitled thereto because the semestral break is not an integral part of the school year and there being no actual
services rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle of “No work, no pay” applies.
During the same school year (1981-1982), the private respondent was authorized by the Ministry of Education and Culture to
collect, from its students a 15% increase of tuition fees. Petitioner’s members demanded a salary increase effective the first
semester of said schoolyear to be taken from the 60% percent incremental proceeds of the said increased tuition fees as
mandated by the PD 451. Private respondent refused.
ISSUES:
WON PETITIONER’S MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO ECOLA DURING THE SEMESTRAL BREAK FROM NOV.
7 – DEC. 5, 1981 OF THE 1981-82 SCHOOL YEAR.
WON 60% OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS OF INCREASED TUITION FEES SHALL BE DEVOTED
EXCLUSIVELY TO SALARY INCREASE,
RULING:
Yes. According to various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs “Allowances of Fulltime Employees . . .” that “Employees
shall be paid in full the required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular working days if they incur no
absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the amounts corresponding to the absences may be deducted
from the monthly allowance . . .”; and on “Leave of Absence Without Pay”, that “All covered employees shall be entitled to
the allowance provided herein when they are on leave of absence with pay.”
The petitioner’s members are full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of the number of working days
or teaching hours in a month. However, they find themselves in a situation where they are forced to go on leave during
semestral breaks. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work interruptions beyond the employees’ control. As such, these
breaks cannot be considered as absences within the meaning of the law for which deductions may be made from monthly
allowances. The “No work, no pay” principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioner’s members received their
regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the provision of law that it contemplates a “no work” situation where the
employees voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, do not voluntarily absent themselves during semestral
breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they cannot be faulted nor can they be
begrudged that which is due them under the law.
The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the principle of “No pay, no
ECOLA” the converse of which finds application in the case at bar. Petitioners cannot be considered to be on leave without
pay so as not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, the petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of
November and December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral break.
Although said to be on forced leave, professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened with the task of working during a
period of time supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are papers to correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to
meet, and periods within which to submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by the respondent to be on leave,
the semestal break could not be used effectively for the teacher’s own purposes for the nature of a teacher’s job imposes upon
him further duties which must be done during the said period of time. Arduous preparation is necessary for the delicate task
of educating our children. Teaching involves not only an application of skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a
responsibility which entails self dedication and sacrifice. It would be unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers
as employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue availing of their services as they
prepare for the next semester or complete all of the last semester’s requirements.
Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as “hours worked.” For this, the teachers are paid regular salaries and, for
this, they should be entitled to ECOLA. The purpose of the law is to augment the income of employees to enable them to cope
with the harsh living conditions brought about by inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against the ravages
brought by these conditions
9
With regard to the second issue, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree 451, “no increase in tuition or other school fees or
charges shall be approved 60% of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and
all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension
services, and return to investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per centum
of the incremental proceeds; . . .”
Such allowances must be taken in resources of the school not derived from tuition fees.
If the school happen to have no other resources to grant allowances and benefits, either mandated by law or secured by
collective bargaining, such allowances and benefits should be charged against the return to investments referred.
The law is clear. The 60% incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be devoted entirely to wage or salary increases
which means increases in basic salary. The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above
the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase
in basic salary provided by law.
Law provides that 60% of tuition fee increase should go to wage increases and 40% to institutional developments, student
assistance, extension services, and return on investments. Framers of the law intended this portion (return on investments) of
the increases in tuition fees to be a general fund to cover up for the university’s miscellaneous expenses.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

Sibal vs. Notre Dame of Greater Manila

Facts:
Delia Sibal, a school nurse at the Notre Dame of Greater Manila, was ordered to work during thesummer, though her contract
does not require her to do so, and was also assigned to teach health during SY1981-1982.For filing an LOA and not reporting
to work that summer, she was not paid her vacation pay;
neither was she compensated for the extra teaching job. The school director claimed that the summer was thebest time to
update the students’ clinical records, and that she was not entitled to extra compensation forteaching, which was part of her
regular working program as a school nurse. He threatened to take drasticmeasures against her if she kept refusing to report for
work the next summer. Sibal filed a complaint for nonpayment of compensation and vacation pay, after which the school
served Sibal with a letter of terminationeffective immediately.
Issue:
Whether or not unfair labor practice existed which would entitle petitioner to moral damages?
Held:
In arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral damages, the Solicitor General has aptly summed up
her plight. The Solicitor General has submitted this valid justification for the award of moral damages under Art. 1701 of the
Labor Code:Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before she was ultimately dismissed.
When she justifiably refused to obey the order to report for work for two summers, she was not given hervacation pay for both
occasions. Unlike her, the doctor and dentist who worked in the same clinic, were notrequired to report during summer and
were given their respective vacation pay. Again, petitioner, unlike theteachers who accepted extra load, was not given extra
compensation when she taught health subjects to 900 students for one year. By withholding such compensation, respondent
school stood to gain at the expense of petitioner, the amount of the salary which it could have paid to two (2) health teachers.
Petitioner's 13th month pay was likewise underpaid because the basis for computation was only ten months, and not one year
as in the case of other regular office personnel. Finally, petitioner's travails culminated in her unceremonious termination
without due process at the beginning of the school year on June 14, 1982, by the service of her termination paper antedated
June 11, 1982. Termination without due process is specifically prohibited by Rule XIV Section 1 under Section 8 of the Rules
Implementing BP Blg. 130: Security of tenure and due process. — No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law and after due process.
The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against petitioner invariably makes respondent liable for
moral damages under Art. 1701, which prohibits acts of capital or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human relations in
relation to Art. 2219 No. 10 and Art. 2220, all of the Civil Code

 Power interruptions or brown-outs, basic rules:

- Brown-outs of short duration not exceeding twenty (20) minutes - compensable
hours worked.

10
- Brown-outs running for more than twenty (20) minutes may not be treated as
hours worked provided any
of the following conditions are present:
a. The employees can leave their workplace or go elsewhere whether
within or without the work premises; or
b. The employees can use the time effectively for their own interest.

Durabuilt vs. NLRC

FACTS: -In July 1983, Reynaldo Bodegas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Durabuilt, a tire capping company. -
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision reinstating Bodegas to his former position with full backwages (including benefits) from the
time of his termination up to the time he was actually reinstated. - A computation of backwages, ECOLA, 13th month pay,
sick and vacation leave benefits in favor or Bodegas was then submitted which amounted to Php 24, 316.38. - Durabuilt filed
an opposition to the computation.
Durabuilt’s contention: Bodegas should only be entitled to a total of P3,834.05 and not 24, 316.38. The submitted computation
contemplated a straight computation of twenty six (26) working days in one month
when the period covered by the computation was intermittently interrupted due to frequent brownouts and machine trouble
. Hence, the days during which they were not in operation due to the brownouts should be excluded in the number of days
worked for the purpose of computing Bodegas’ backwages.
ISSUE: WON Bodegas is entitled to backwages. YES, (for 3,834.05 and not 24, 316.38) SC: The illegal dismissal of Bodegas
is conceded by the Durabuilt and is willing to pay backwages.
However, it argues that for days where no work was required and could be done by its employees, no wages could have been
earned and, thereafter, lost by said employees to justify an award of backwages.
Here, it appears that Durabuilt’s business was not in actual operation due to brownouts or power interruption and the
retrenchment of workers they had during the period of private respondent's dismissal, thus it is justified to exclude certain days
for purposes of computing backwages. It cannot be denied that during the past years particularly in 1983, there was chronic
electrical power interruption resulting to disruption of business operations. To alleviate the situation, the government thru the
Ministry of Trade and Industry called on the industrial sector to resort to the so-called Voluntary Loan Curtailment Plan (or
VLCP), whereby brownouts or electrical power interruption was scheduled by area. The program while it may have been
called “voluntary" was not so as electrical power consumers had no choice then due to the prevailing energy crisis.
As early as 1978, Ministry of Labor thru Policy Instruction No. 36 provides that:
2.Brownouts running for more than twenty minutes may not be treated as hours worked provided that any of the following
conditions are present; a) The employees can leave their work place or go elsewhere whether within or without the work
premises; or b) The employees can use the time effectively for their own interest.It is of record that during the electrical power
interruptions, Durabuilt’s business was not in operation. Hence, it would neither be fair nor just to allow Bodegas to recover
something he has not earned and could not have earned and to further penalize Durabuilt over and above the losses it had
suffered due to lack of raw materials and the energy-saving programs of the government. Bodegas cannot be allowed to enrich
himself at the expense of Durabuilt. The computation of backwages should be based on daily rather than on monthly pay
schedules where, as in the case at bar, such basis is more realistic and accurate.
o Burden of proving hours worked.
o Seaman
 Cagampan vs. NLRC, March 22, 1994

 128 SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 85122-24 March 22, 1991 CAGAMPAN, et. al., petitioners, vs. NLRC & ACE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., respondents.
 BRIEF: Presented before the SC for review is the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission handed down on March 16, 1988 reversing the decision of the Philippine Oversees Employment
Administration and correspondingly dismissing the cases for lack of merit. The POEA decision granted overtime pay
to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay

11
  FACTS: On April 17 and 18,1985, petitioners, all seamen, entered into separate contracts of employment with the
Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., through its local agency, private respondent ACE MARITIME AGENCIES,
INC. with their respective ratings and monthly salary rates. Petitioners were deployed on May 7, 1985, and discharged
on July 12, 1986.

Thereafter, petitioners collectively and/or individually filed complaints for non-payment of overtime pay, vacation pay and
terminal pay against private respondent. In addition, they claimed that they were made to sign their contracts in blank; that
although they agreed to render services on board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd.,
the vessel they actually boarded was MV "SOIC I" managed by Columbus Navigation; and more so, petitioners de Castro and
de Jesus charged that although they were employed as ordinary seamen, they actually performed the work and duties of Able
Seamen. Private respondent was furnished with copies of petitioners' complaints and summons, but it failed to file its answer
within the reglementary period.

Thus, on January 12, 1987, an Order was issued declaring that private respondent has waived its right to present evidence in
its behalf and that the cases are submitted for decision. On August 5, 1987, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) rendered a Decision DISMISSING petitioners' claim for terminal pay but GRANTED their prayer
for leave pay and overtime pay.

Private respondent appealed from the POEA's Decision to the NLRC on August 24, 1987. On March 16, 1988, the NLRC
promulgated a Decision, REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE and another one entered dismissing the cases for lack of merit.
On May 8, 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision but the same was denied by
the NLRC for lack of merit in its Resolution dated September 12, 1988.

Hence, this appeal from the decision and resolution of the respondent NLRC. Petitioners allege that respondent Commission,
NLRC, gravely abused its discretion or erred in reversing and setting aside the POEA decision and correspondingly dismissing
the appeal of petitioners, allegedly in contravention of law and jurisprudence. Private respondent maritime company disclaims
the aforesaid allegations of petitioners. The Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent NLRC, contends that: The NLRC
did not abuse its discretion in the rendition of subject decision because the evidence presented by petitioners in support of their
complaint is by itself sufficient to back up the decision. The issue of the disallowance of overtime pay stems from an
interpretation of particular provisions of the employment contract.

ISSUE: WON respondent Commission NLRC gravely abused its discretion or erred in REVERSING the decision of POEA
(in granting overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay). Page 1 of 2

 HELD: No. RATIO DECIDENDI: The NLRC cannot be faulted for disallowing the payment of overtime pay
because it merely straightened out the distorted interpretation asserted by petitioners and defined the correct
interpretation of the provision on overtime pay embodied in the contract conformably with settled doctrines on the
matter. Notably, the NLRC ruling on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that petitioners
never produced any proof of actual performance of overtime work. Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view
that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of 30% of the basic salary per month" embodied in their employment
contract should be awarded to them as part of a "package benefit." They have theorized that even without sufficient
evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime pay. Their theory is
erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking even runs counter to the intention behind the provision.
The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay
if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled
to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract
provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically
speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work
schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to
his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable. Reiterated in the
case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. CIR (3 SCRA 890), the SC ruled: We cannot agree with the
Court below that respondent Malondras should be paid overtime compensation for every hour in excess of the regular
working hours that he was on board his vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he actually put in
work during those hours. Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it
is for this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and subsistence
allowances when required to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to
pay them overtime even when they are not actually working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would be
entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each day, even if he spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after
his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not,
therefore, whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but
whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. Page 2 of 2

12
  Art. 85 Meal Periods.

Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his
employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals.

 Philippine Airlines vs. NLRC 302 SCRA 582 (1999)

FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was assigned at the PAL
Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.

On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou
t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its
employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of
the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital.
When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient to the hospital.
The patient died the following day.

Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his
explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon
being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked
and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.

Finding private respondent’s explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with abandonment of
post while on duty. He denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the clinic to have
his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.

After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months effective
December 16, 1994.

Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.

On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also ordered
petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of
suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on
record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.

2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.

HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed decision awarding moral damages to private
respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED

13
1. The legality of private respondent’s suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house,
which was only a few minutes’ drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could
be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acosta’s condition, private respondent immediately left
his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioner’s claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a full-
time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may
not leave the company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor
Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work. — The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a
day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and
clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5)
days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six
(6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent
(30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, “health personnel” shall include: resident
physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians,
psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel. (emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. —
Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees
not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. — Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex,
not less than one (1) hour time-off for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less than twenty
(20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked
of the employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where
the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there
is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would
otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks
running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work
period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within
the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on
time. Private respondent’s act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment. 2. The award of
moral damages: Not every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral damages
are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy In the case at bar, there is
no showing that the management of petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private respondent. It
suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private respondent’s act of leaving the company
premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of suspension. Under the
circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.

 Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119205, April 15, 1998
Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break constitutive
of unfair labor practice?
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber
products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly
salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all company factory workers in
Marikina including members of private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30 minute paid on call
lunch break.
On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its monthly salaried
employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a
change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus

TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES

RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE

Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule factory office will be as follows:

7:45 A.M. 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)

7:45 A.M. 11:45 P.M. (Saturday).

Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:

9:30 A.M. 10:30 A.M. and

14
2:30 P.M. 3:30 P.M.

Lunch break will be between:

12:00 NN 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).

Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA employees who are on shifting. Their work and break
time schedules will be maintained as it is now.[1]
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute
paid on call lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby International Tire Co., Inc. v.
NLRC.[2]However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the
elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative
and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the effect of diminishing the benefits
granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight (8) hours.
The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be justly enriched if they continued to be paid during their
lunch break even if they were no longer on call or required to work during the break. He also ruled that the decision in the
earlier Sime Darby case[3] was not applicable to the instant case because the former involved discrimination of certain
employees who were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court
ordered that the discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch break.
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed the appeal.[4] However, upon motion for reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time
with two (2) new commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its arlier decision of 20 April 1994 as well as the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.[5] The NLRC considered the decision of this Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of
the case wherein petitioner was ordered to pay the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch and/or working
time breaks. The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of time-
honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of
company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a) in ruling that petitioner committed unfair
labor practice in the implementation of the change in the work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. 3:45 p.m. to 7:45 a.m.
4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in holding that there was diminution of benefits when
the 30-minute paid lunch break was eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby case affirming the
decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to discontinue the practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it
decide to do so; and (d) in ignoring petitioners inherent management prerogative of determining and fixing the work schedule
of its employees which is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and private
respondent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the petition
be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory
of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.
We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their
employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business
operations and its improved production.[6] It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch
break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they were on call. Even if denominated as lunch
break, this period could very well be considered as working time because the factory employees were required to work if
necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch
break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely
and effectively use this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and
better performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there
is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully
complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. [7] Besides, the new schedule applies
to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not.[8]
Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the earlier Sime Darby case[9] with the facts
obtaining in this case. That ruling in the former case is not applicable here. The issue in that case involved the matter of
granting lunch breaks to certain employees while depriving the other employees of such breaks. This Court affirmed in that
case the NLRCs finding that such act of management was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.
The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue of
whether the change of work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor
practice. As shown by the records, the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all

15
factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it
cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to self-organization.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may devise means to attain that goal. Even
as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives.[10] Thus, management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects
of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.[11] Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service
so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise.[12]
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not
be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has right which, as such, are
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Although this Court has inclined more often than not
toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such as favoritism has not blinded the Court
to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable
law and doctrine.[13]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 29
November 1994 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 26 November 1993 dismissing the complaint
against petitioner for unfair labor practice is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

 Art. 86 Night Shift Differential

Every employee shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than ten percent (10%) of his regular wage for each hour of
work performed between ten o’clock in the evening and six o’clock in the morning.

 Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs. Dayao, G.R. No. L-30452, September 30, 1982
Facts:

The respondents filed a petition against the petitioner praying: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done on
Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c additional compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2)
payment of extra compensation on work done at night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their
former positions with back salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its disestablishment and the refund of all monies
it had collected from petitioners.

The respondent court rendered its decision that:

1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages correspoding to the first four hours work rendered on every other
Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays should be denied for lack of merit;

2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty- nine (69) petitioners: (a) An additional sum
equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the
period from March 20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and (b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their
respective basic or regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and

3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Not satisfied
with the decision, the respondents filed a motion for its reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration, was however, denied
by the Court en banc.

Issues:

a.Whether or not private respondent is entitled to claims for 25% additional compensation performing work during Sunday
and legal holidays.

b.Whether or not the 25% compensation had already been included in the private respondents monthly salaries.

c.Whether or not the contracts of employment were null and void was not put in issue, hence, the respondent court pursuant
to the Rules of Court should have refrained from ruling that such contracts of employment were null and void.

16
Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the first issue, based on Sec. 4 CA No. 444, No person, firm or corporation,
business establishment or place of center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas,
electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.

In this case, the petitioner does not fall on exemptions. On the second issue, their 25% additional compensation for work done
on Sundays and Legal Holidays were not included in their respective monthly salaries. The petitioner contention was not
supported by substantial evidence.

The last issue, the Mercury Drug Co., Inc., maintains a chain of drugstores that are open every day of the week and, for some
stores, up to very late at night because of the nature of the pharmaceutical retail business. The respondents knew that they had
to work Sundays and holidays and at night, not as exceptions to the rule but as part of the regular course of employment.
Presented with contracts setting their compensation on an annual basis with an express waiver of extra compensation for work
on Sundays and holidays, the workers did not have much choice. T

he private respondents were at a disadvantage insofar as the contractual relationship was concerned. Workers in our country
do not have the luxury or freedom of declining job openings or filing resignations even when some terms and conditions of
employment are not only onerous and inequitous but illegal.

It is precisely because of this situation that the framers of the Constitution embodied the provisions on social justice (Section
6, Article 11) and protection to labor (Section 9, Article I I) in the Declaration of Principles And State Policies.

 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Lepanto Local Staff Union 562 SCRA 495 (August 2008)

G.R. No. 161713. August 20, 2008 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LEPANTO
LOCAL STAFF UNION, respondent. CARPIO, J.:
Facts: *Note: this case involves interpretation of CBA. ARTICLE VIII—NIGHT SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL “Section 3. Night
Differential pay.—The Company shall continue to pay nightshift differential for work during the first and third shifts to all
covered employees within the bargaining unit as follows:
For the First Shift (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), the differential pay will be 20% of the basic rate. For the Third Shift (3:00 p.m.
to 11:00 p.m.), the differential pay will be 15% of the basic rate.
However, for overtime work, which extends beyond the regular day shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.), there [will] be no night
differential pay added before the overtime pay is calculated.” ARTICLE XII—RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND OTHER
BENEFITS “Section 9. Longevity pay.—
The company shall grant longevity pay of P30.00 per month effective July 1, 1998 and every year thereafter.” During the
effectivity of the first three CBAs, petitioner paid night shift differentials to other workers who were members of respondent
for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m.
Petitioner also paid night shift differential for work beyond 3:00 p.m. during the effectivity of the 4th CBA. However, petitioner
alleges that the payment of night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. during the 4th CBA was a mistake on
the part of its accounting department. Respondent Union filed a complaint with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board, alleging that petitioner failed to pay the night shift differential and longevity pay of respondent’s members as provided
in the 4th CBA. Petitioner and respondent failed to amicably settle the dispute so they agreed to submit the issue to a voluntary
arbitrator (VA).
VA ruled in favor of respondent (Union) that the inclusion of paragraph 3, Section 3, Article VIII of the 4th CBA disclosed
the intent of the parties to grant night shift differential benefits to employees who rendered work beyond the regular day shift.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that if the intention were otherwise, paragraph 3 would have been deleted. CA affirmed VA
and held that petitioner’s act disclosed the parties’ intent to include employees in the second shift in the payment of night shift
differential.
Issue: The issue is whether workers are entitled to night shift differential for work performed beyond the regular day shift, from
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m
Held. YES. SC affirmed CA. The first paragraph of Section 3 provides that petitioner shall continue to pay night shift
differential to workers of the first and third shifts. It does not provide that workers who performed work beyond the second
shift shall not be entitled to night shift differential. The inclusion of the third paragraph is not intended to exclude the regular
day shift workers from receiving night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It only provides that the night

17
shift differential pay shall be excluded in the computation of the overtime pay. The CA correctly ruled that petitioner failed to
present any convincing evidence to prove that the payment was erroneous. In fact, the Court of Appeals found that even after
the promulgation of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision and while the case was pending appeal, petitioner still paid night shift
differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It affirms the intention of the parties to the CBA to grant night shift
differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. Doctrines: The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract
constitute the law between the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. In order to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, the
Voluntary Arbitrator shall principally consider their contemporaneous and subsequent acts as well as their negotiating and
contractual history and evidence of past practices.
o Exceptions
o Rate

 Art. 87 Overtime Work

Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime work, an additional
compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Work performed beyond eight
hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours on a
holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%) thereof.
o Computation of Overtime Work
o Premium Pay vs. Overtime Pay
o Stipulation on overtime rate
o Built-in overtime pay

 Engineering Equipment, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. L-64967, September 23, 1985

This is a claim for overtime pay. Miguel Aspera, a mechanical engineer, worked for Engineering Equipment, Inc. in Saudi
Arabia for nearly a year from April 26, 1977 to April 16, 1978 at a monthly salary of P750 (P860) with a six-day work week
consisting of ten working hours. His written contract of employment provides:
1. Work Schedule/Assignment. … Your workdays shall be on a six-day work week basis, with a working day consisting of ten
(10) working hours. You may be required to work overtime in excess of ten (10) hours each work day and to work on your
restdays and on Saudi Arabian legal holidays.
2. A monthly salary of P750.00 plus overtime pay for work rendered during restdays/holidays and/or in excess of ten (10)
hours during regular working days.
Aspera worked ten hours daily for 335 working days. He claims that his monthly salary should correspond to eight hours of
daily work and that for the additional two hours daily, he was entitled to overtime pay at $1.2162 per hour or to $814.85 for
670 hours during 335 working days.
The Director of Employment Services and the National Labor Relations Commission sustained his claim and awarded him
that amount as overtime pay. They declared void the stipulation for a ten-hour working day because it was contrary to Section
83 of the Labor Code, formerly Eight-Hour Labor Law, which expressly provides that “the normal hours of work of any
employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day” and to section 87 of the same Code which provides that work performed
“beyond eight (8) hours a day” is treated as overtime work,
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner. It contends that Aspera was a managerial employee exercising supervision and control
over its rank-and-file employees with power to recommend disciplinary action or their dismissal. Section 82 of the Labor Code
provides that managerial employees are not entitled to overtime pay.
It also asserts that Aspera was one of several employees who signed written contracts with a “built-in” overtime pay in the
ten-hour working day and that their basic monthly pay was adjusted to reflect the higher amount covering the guaranteed two-
hour extra time whether worked or unworked.
Moreover, it argues that the contracts were submitted to BES Director Jonathan M.R.A. de la Cruz, the same director who
rendered the questioned decision He approved the same. Without his approval, the petitioner would not have stipulated the ten-hour
work schedule and would have provided for a lower basic salary for an eight-hour working day.
In addition to his salary Aspera was given free board and lodging while in Saudi Arabia and free transportation in going to
and returning from that country.
We hold that under the particular circumstances of this case the Acting Minister of Labor and Director De la Cruz committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in awarding overtime pay and in disregarding a contract that De
la Cruz himself, who is supposed to know the Eight-Hour Labor Law, had previously sealed with his imprimatur. Because of
that approval, the petitioner acted in good faith in enforcing the contract.

18
Furthermore, Aspera had not denied that he was a managerial employee within the meaning of section 82. As such, he was
not entitled to overtime pay.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Acting Minister of Labor dated November 16, 1981 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Aspera’s complaint is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

 PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association vs. NLRC August 22, 1996.

Facts:
The respondent used to be a security guard underthe employ of the petitioner company. He works for 12hours a day and is
receiving a monthly salary. He wasthen dismissed by the petitioner company. Because ofthis, the respondent filed a complaint
with the
Labor Arbiter for the payment of his overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the respondent is entitled to anovertime pay.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of theLabor Arbiter. Hence, the current petition.The petitioner contends that the fact that
the monthlysalary of the petitioner is higher than the minimum wageprovided by law is already compensatory of the excess
of4 hours of work rendered by the said employee. It arguesthat the salary of the petitioner already includes thepayment for the
excess of 4 hours of work rendered bythe respondent. It also contends that since there is ameeting of the minds between the
respondent and thepetitioner, there is already a perfected contract whichmeans that the parties are bound by their agreements.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to anovertime pay.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent isentitled to an overtime pay. The contention of the petitioner that since the
respondent’s monthly salary is higher than the minimum wage, it is alreadycommensurate of the 4 hours excess of work
rendered bythe respondent. The Supreme Court held that the fact that one’s salar y is higher than the minimum wage doesnot
in any way offset the other benefits that are due tothe employees, in the absence of an agreement to thecontrary. To consider
the overtime pay of the respondentincluded in his monthly salary would be in contraventionof the rule against non-diminution
of benefits and a violation of the Labor Code since it prescribes a certainmanner on how overtime pay is included. Moreover,
theSupreme Court found that contrary to what thepetitioner aver, as shown in the computation of thepetitioner itself, the
monthly salary of the respondent isonly a basic salary which is exclusive of all the other benefits that the respondent is to
receive. With regard to the petitioner’s second contention that there is already a perfected contract, hence the termsand
conditions imposed therein binds the parties to thecontract, the Supreme Court held that while suchcontention has the weight
and force of law, it is stillsubject to certain exception. The general right to contractis subject to a limitation that such terms and
conditionsmust not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,morals and good customs. Employment contracts
areimbued with public interest and are therefore subject tothe police power of the state. The subject contract in thecase at bar
is contrary to labor laws. Therefore, not binding to the parties of the case

 Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco vs. NLRC October 15, 2008

Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule
to be implemented in the company effective May20, 1996. The MOA was entered into pursuant to Department of Labor and
Employment Department Order (D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek.
As provided in the MOA, 8:00a.m. to 6:12p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours,
and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those hours. The MOA specificall y
stated that the employee waives the right to overtime pay for work rendered after 5p.m. until 6:12p.m. from
Monday to Friday considering that the compressed workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek
schedule which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12p.m.,
such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay.Tryco informed the Bureau of Working Conditions of the
Department of Labor and Employment of the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company. In January
1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new
agreement.
Issue:WON the MOA providing for compressed workweek is unenforceable as it is contrary to law.
Held:The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioner.Where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.Notably, the MOA complied with the
19
following conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O.No. 21, to protect the interest of the employees in the implementation of a
compressed work week scheme:1.The employees voluntarily agree to work more than eight (8) hours a day the total in a week
of which shall not exceed their normal weekly hours of work prior to adoption of the compressed workweek
arrangement.2.There will not be any diminution whatsoever in the weekly or monthly take-home pay and fringe benefits of
the employees.3.If an employee is permitted or required to work in excess of his normal weekly hours of work prior to the
adoption of the compressed workweek scheme, all such excess hours shall be considered overtime work and shall
be compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code or applicable CBA.4.Appropriate waivers with respect
to overtime premium pay for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours a day may be devised by the parties to the
agreement.5.The effectivity and implementation of the new working time arrangement shall be by agreement of the parties.
o Overtime Work of Seamen

 Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services vs. NLRC, 1996

FACTS
1.Respondent Meynardo J. Hernandez was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services(Phils.) Inc. as radio officer
on board M/T Stolt Condor for a period of ten months. He boarded the vessel on January 20, 1990.

2.On April 26, 1990, the ship captain ordered privateres pondent to carry the baggage of crew member Lito
Loveria who was being repatriated. He refused to obey the order out of fear in view of the utterance of said crew member
"makakasaksak ako"and also because he did not perceive such task as one of his duties as radio officer.

3.As a result of such refusal, private respondent was ordered to disembark on April 30, 1990 and was himself
repatriated on May 15, 1990. He was paid his salaries and wages only up to May 16, 1990.

4.Private respondent filed before public respondent POEA a complaint for illegal dismissal and breach of
contract paying for, among other things, payment of salaries,wages, overtime and other benefits due him for the unexpired
portion of the contract which was six (6) months and three (3) days.

5.Petitioner in its answer alleged that private respondent refused to follow the "request" of the master of the
vessel to explain to Lolito Loveria, the reason for the latter's repatriation and to assist him in carrying his baggage, all in
violation of Article XXIV,Section I of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the POEA Standard Contract. Hence,
private respondent, after being afforded the opportunity to explain his side, was dismissed for gross insubordination and
serious misconduct.

6.Respondent denied that the master of the vessel requested him to explain to Loveria the reason for the latter's
repatriation.

7.Thereafter, POEA Administrator rendered an award in favor of private respondent.

8.Aggrieved, petitioner Stolt-Nielsen appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).The NLRC
concurred with the POEA Administrator in ruling that private respondent, having been illegally dismissed, was, therefore,
entitled to the monetary award.

9.It further stated that private respondent's duty as a radio officer or radio operator does not include the carrying
of the luggage of any seaman or explaining to said seaman the reason for his repatriation. Thus, concluded the NLRC, his
termination on this ground was not proper and, therefore, he had every right to the monetary award. The NLRC likewise
granted private respondent's claim for fixed overtime pay and attorney's fees.

ISSUES
1.Whether or not private respondent was legally dismissed on the ground of gross insubordination and serious
misconduct.2.Whether or not private respondent was entitled to the award of over-time pay.

HELD

1.YES. Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee,
envisages the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites.
The employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and
perverse attitude", and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain
to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
The Court agrees that by virtue of the aforementioned CBA and POEA Standard Contract provisions cited by petitioner,
private respondent is indeed bound to obey the lawful commands of the captain of the ship, but only as long as these pertain
to his duties. The order to carry the luggage of a crew member, while being lawful, is not part of the duties of a radio officer.
20
Assuming arguendo that lawful commands of a ship captain are supposed to be obeyed by the complement of a ship, private
respondent's so-called

-
"act of disobedience" does not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal.In instant case, the POEA found that private
respondent's actuation which led to his dismissal was the first and only act of disobedience during his service with the
petitioner,Furthermore, examination of the circumstances surrounding private respondent's disobedience shows that the
repatriated seaman's utterance of "makakasaksak ako"so instilled fear in private respondent that he was deterred from carrying
out the order of the captain. Hence, his act could not be rightfully characterized as one motivated by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude." Besides, said incident posed no serious or substantial danger to the well-being of his other co-employees or of the
general public doing business with petitioner employer, neither did such behavior threaten substantial prejudice to the business
of his employer.

2.NO. The Court reiterated that the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said
work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be
computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime
pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job,
stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for
the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be
extremely unfair and unreasonable

 PCL Shipping, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006.

Facts

In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming
Marine. Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex for 12 months with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance
of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special
allowance of US$175.00.

On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a consequence thereof, he suffered a
broken/sprained ankle on his left foot. A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On
August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore.

He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the
hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the Philippines. On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted
his employment by jumping off the vessel.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the complainant. NLRC affirmed the finding of the
Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was guilty of desertion to justify his dismissal.

Held: No

For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or
vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to
the ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when
private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where
he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance forthe injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners
to conclude that he had the intention of deserting his post.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply to
Filipino employees working abroad.

Held: Yes, it does.

21
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and that they failed to
conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements
of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply
to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the
law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract
of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its
implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Accordingly, as to the requirement of
notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and
that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a representative. Hence, the
employer should strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of
employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.

Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 18,

2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are affirmed with modification to the effect that the award of US$1620.00
representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private
respondent's living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof,
an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living allowance, special allowance and vacation leave
with pay for the same period.
o Waiver of Overtime Pay

 Mercader vs. Manila Polo Club Inc. G.R. No. L-8373, September 28, 1956

The undisputed facts which gave rise to the present case are as follows:
On May 11, 1946, the Appellant was employed by the Defendant Manila Polo Club through the intervention of its treasurer, the
other Defendant Alex D. Stewart, as bookkeeper and accountant with a salary of P375 per month. On August 19, 1949, this
salary was increased to P400 allocated as follows:c
P375 for regular pay, and P25.00 premium over regular pay for work on Sundays and legal holidays, overtime and other
special duty. He was also granted two weeks leave with pay each year and 12 days sick leave with pay in any one year for
proven illness (Exhibit 3).
On March 26, 1951, Plaintiff requested for leave with pay for a period from April 1 to August 1, which was granted, and on
April 17, 1951, while still on vacation, Plaintiff received a letter (Exhibit 7) from Mr. H. J. MacLean, manager of the Club,
notifying him that the Club would allow only two weeks sick leave for the year 1951 and would give one month’s severance
pay, for which a check for P405.00 was enclosed. Not being agreeable with his separation from the Club, on June 16,
1951, Plaintiff brought the matter to the Department of Labor where he filed the corresponding claim — which was docketed
as Case No. 1224 — for the amount of P10,000 for overtime work and other privileges granted to him by the Defendant Club
in its communication to the Plaintiff, dated August 19, 1951, whereby Plaintiff’s salary was increased to P400.00 allocated as
above indicated.
The Department of Labor took cognizance of the matter and, after the corresponding proceedings, on September 24, 1951,
the Secretary of Labor ordered the Defendant Manila Polo Club to pay to the herein Plaintiff the sum of P10,623,24.
The record does not show what transpired during the intervening period from September 24, 1951 up to November 9, 1951
when Plaintiff and his Attorney Constancio Leuterio entered into an amicable settlement and subscribed to the following
receipt:
‘RECEIVED from Gibbs, Chuidian & Quasha, as attorneys for the MANILA POLO CLUB, Chartered Bank of India,
Australia & China Check No. 192045 in the sum of P7,000 and payable to Constancio Leuterio, as attorney for Alejandro
Mercader, in full settlement of any and all claims, including overtime work, vacation and sick leave privileges, which said
Alejandro Mercader has or many have against the Manila Polo Club.
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MERCADER.
(Sgd.) CONSTANCIO LEUTERIO.”
Accordingly, the aforesaid case No. 1224 was completely closed.

22
Nevertheless and despite the settlement recited in the aforequoted receipt, on January 9, 1953, Plaintiff filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila his present complaint, stating therein that while he was in the service of the Defendant Manila Polo
Club with a monthly compensation at the rate of P375, assurance of the permanence of his position as long as he did not
commit any criminal act such as embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, with 15 days vacation and 15 days sick leave with
pay for every year’s service, the Defendant Club, arbitrarily and capriciously, terminated Plaintiff’s services in violation of the
contract of service and thus he was maliciously and arbitrarily deprived of his monthly income of P405 from the time of his
separation up to the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff also alleged that as a result of the malicious and arbitrary act of
the Defendant, he suffered untold mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shame, social humiliation and
besmirched reputation, and prayed that the Defendant be ordered to pay him, by way of actual and compensatory damages,
the sum of P5,000 per annum from the date of his separation from the service on May 15, 1951 up to the final termination of
the case; the sum of P50,000, by way of moral damages; the sum of P2,000, by way of attorney’s fees; cand P200 by way of
litigation expenses.
The Defendant Manila Polo Club, in its answer to the complaint practically did not deny the principal allegations of the
complaint regarding the employment of the Plaintiff by the Defendant, the vacation leave granted to Plaintiff and his separation
from the service, although it was claimed that said separation was due to the fact that the Plaintiff was very much behind in his
work. Defendants also pleaded that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount from the Defendants, for on November 9,
1951 the Plaintiff, in consideration of the sum of P7,000, released the Defendant Manila Polo Club from all claims arising from
his employment and his separation from the Defendant Club. And, by way of counterclaim, Defendant prayed for the sum of
P5,000 as attorney’s fees on the allegation that, owing to the filing of the complaint by the Plaintiff, the Defendant had been
compelled to retain the services of counsel for the protection of his rights.
After the parties had joined issues, the case was tried and the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case on the
ground that the preponderance of evidence militated in favor of the contention of the Defendants and that Plaintiff’s claim was
already settled for P7,000 by virtue of the execution of the receipt, Exhibit 1, quoted above, whereby the Plaintiff renounced
any and all claims he may have against the Defendant Club. Not satisfied with this decision, Plaintiff appealed claiming that the
court a quo erred:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. In holding that the overtime pay of the herein Plaintiff- Appellant had been impliedly waived.
II. In holding that the position of the Plaintiff-Appellant was not permanent.
III. In awarding excessive damages to the Defendants-Appellees.
We have carefully scrutinized the record of the case, the pleadings of the parties and the evidence supporting them and find
no reason for disturbing the decision appealed from. The settlement recited in Exhibit 1, signed by the Plaintiff together with
his counsel Constancio Leuterio, does constitute an absolute waiver of any and all claims including overtime work, vacation
and sick leave privileges which the Plaintiff had against the Manila Polo Club; consequently, by virtue of said
settlement, Plaintiff lost any action against the Defendant Manila Polo Club in connection with his employment and separation
from said Club.
Plaintiff has lengthily discussed in his brief about the nature of his employment and laboriously argued on the permanency of
his position as an employee of the Defendant Manila Polo Club; but, in our opinion, all these questions are completely
immaterial for, whatever be the nature of his employment, whether permanent or temporary, the facts of the case show that
he has no longer any action against the Defendants because he entered with the latter in an amicable settlement whereby he
renounced and waived any and all claims against them.

As to Defendant Alex D. Stewart, the evidence shows that he only acted as agent of the Defendant Manila Polo Club in securing
the services of the Plaintiff and therefore he cannot be made responsible for the separation of the Plaintiff from his employment.
In his third assignment of error, Plaintiff assails the award of P600 attorney’s fees in favor of the Defendants contending that in
filing the present action he tried to protect his rights. We notice that in the decision no reason was given by the lower court for
awarding the fees in question; neither is there in the record any indication that the present action was malicious and intended
only to cause prejudice to the Defendants; hence, we believe that there is no sufficient ground for ordering the Plaintiff to pay
the fees in question.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from in so far as it dismisses the complaint is hereby affirmed, and reversed as it orders the
payment of P600 in favor of the Defendant for litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. No pronouncement with regard to cost.

 PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association vs. NLRC August 22, 1996.
(the same built-in over time play)

 Damasco vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 115755, December 4, 200

23
That she [Damasco] was employed by respondents [Manila Glass Supply and Bonifacio K. Sia] as Sales Clerk on January 30,
1992, receiving lately a daily wage of P140.00; that as sales clerk, she was ordered to do almost all the works related to the
glass business of respondents including the cutting, sales and delivery of glass as well as balancing, accounting and checking
of capital and profits every end of the month; that she was made to work from 8:30 in the morning up to 9:30 in the evening
continuously from Monday to Sunday without having been paid overtime pay, rest day pay and holiday pay; that during the
period of her employment, she was not paid any 13th month pay as well as five (5) days service incentive leave pay; that on
August 28, 1992 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, while she was working, respondent Bonifacio Sia called her up and told
her to finish all her works that night, but she told respondent that she would not be able to finish them all because it was
already late; that she then left respondents room but respondent called her again and asked her why she could not finish what
she was told to do, to which complainant [Damasco] answered that it was already late and there were still a lot of things to
do; that respondent asked her what she was doing since he (respondent) left for Manila, to which complainant told him that
she was attending to the sales, to the field and to other things relative to the business of respondent, to which respondent got
mad at her; that respondent asked complainant why she was not teaching her two (2) other co-workers on what to do, and she
answered she would not do it anymore because if the other co-workers should commit mistakes in accounting, she was the
first one to be lambasted by respondent and even required to share in paying the shortages; that when respondent heard this,
he picked up and swiped an ashtray in front of complainant and it broke, after which, he threw some notebooks at complainant
who began to tremble in fear and her whole body shook; respondent ordered her to go out of the room, lambasted her again
and told her that he (respondent)does not want to see her face anymore (ayaw ko nang makita ang pagmumukha mo rito);
that after respondent had left, complainant again trembled and she could not prevent herself from crying, her co-workers
applied alcohol on her because her body was cold, given water to drink and after about an hour, complainant decided not to
finish her work anymore because she felt weak; that one of his co-workers, Alma, brought her home and since then, she did
not report for work anymore because she developed a phobia of respondent

Disputing the claim of complainant, respondents maintain as follows: That sometime in the late part of August 1992,
complainant was instructed by respondent to report for work in their store in Metro Manila as there is a necessity for her detail
thereat for reasons that the employees there are new and do not have the experience and know-how in running the store
specifically with regards (sic) to the sale of glass; that complainant manifested her objection to such detail for reasons that her
husband is working in Olongapo City and she does not want to work in Manila; that thereafter, complainant did not report
for work in the respondents store in Olongapo City, so respondent sent some of his employees to the house of complainant
but were told that she is sick and cannot report for work; that sometime in the first week of January 1993, respondent received
a copy of the instant complaint filed by complainant; that immediately, respondent thru counsel sent a letter to complainant
directing her to report for work on January 13, 1993 at its store in Olongapo City; that complainant ignored the letter despite
receipt thereof, hence, on January 15, 1993, respondent again sent complainant another letter directing her to report for work
on January 22, 1993 but just the same, complainant failed and refused to report for work; that it is not true as claimed by
complainant that respondent shouted at her and swiped an ashtray from the table and threw at her some notebooks. [1]

On December 7, 1992, Damasco filed before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga, a
complaint against Bonifacio Sia and Manila Glass Supply (jointly referred hereafter as Sia for easy reference). In the one-page
complaint form of the NLRC, Damasco indicated that she is suing her employer for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
overtime pay.[2] However, in her complaint affidavit and position paper filed later before the labor arbiter, Damasco
additionally charged her employer with non-payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and night
shift differential.[3]
On September 2, 1993, the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Damasco. The labor official declared that Sia
has not shown any just or authorized cause in terminating the services of Damasco, except for wild, generalized and self-
serving statements that Damasco committed serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders in connection
with her work. The labor arbiter also ruled that Damasco is entitled to 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, holiday
pay, overtime pay, and disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the complainant and against respondents,
ordering the latter, as follows:

1.To pay the total sum of P112,570.32 representing unpaid 13th month pay, holiday pay, overtime and premiums pay, five (5)
days service incentive leave pay, backwages and separation pay of complainant;

2.To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P11,257.00 which is ten (10%) percent of the award; and

3.All other claims or issues, for want of substantial evidence, are hereby DISMISSED.

SO DECIDED.[4]

24
 On appeal, the NLRC upheld the labor arbiters finding that Damasco was illegally dismissed but modified the labor
officials judgment, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of September 2, 1993, is hereby MODIFIED. Respondents are directed to pay
complainant the following:

I. Backwages .. P43,680.00

II. Separation Pay 36,400.00

III. 13th month pay . 10,920.00

IV. Service Incentive Leave Pay 2,100.00

V. Holiday Pay .. 4,200.00

VI. Attorneys fees .. 1,722.00

--------------

T O T A L ----- P99,022.00

SO ORDERED.[5]

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied.

On July 4, 1994, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment stating that the aforesaid judgment of the labor tribunal has
become final and executory.
On July 7, 1994, the labor arbiter, upon motion of Damasco, issued a writ of execution. In compliance therewith, public
respondent deputy sheriff issued the next day a notice of garnishment addressed to Far East Bank and Trust Company,
Olongapo City, against all credits and deposits of Bonifacio Sia and/or Manila Glass Supply maintained in said bank,
sufficient to cover the monetary award in favor of Damasco.[6]
In her petition, Damasco alleged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion:

IN DELETING THE AWARD FOR OVERTIME PAY AND REDUCING THE ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER.[7]

In his memorandum, Sia raised the following issues for resolution, thus:
A

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER SALUDARES DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF

THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND THUS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISRCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN AFFIRMING, ALBEIT WITH
MODIFICATIONS, THE LABOR ARBITERS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION. [8]

In our view, the crucial issue for resolution is whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the decision of the labor arbiter which held that Damasco was illegally dismissed from her job.
On August 1, 1994, we decided to consolidate the two petitions inasmuch as they involve the same parties and intertwined
issues. Likewise, we issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, enjoining the parties concerned from implementing the subject writ of execution and notice of garnishment dated July
7 and 8, 1994, which were respectively issued by the labor arbiter and deputy sheriff of NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
III, San Fernando, Pampanga.[9]

25
 We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in
their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct.[10] The certification of non-forum shopping must
be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have
warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.[11]
But, the Court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving
labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving herein
the rights and obligations of these parties.[12] Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not
to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.[13]
Sia contends that he was deprived of his right to due process as the labor arbiter failed to conduct a hearing for the
reception of evidence. He also claims that the labor arbiters finding that Damasco was illegally dismissed is not supported by
substantial evidence. On the contrary, Sia insists, Damasco abandoned her work as she refused to be detailed at her employers
store in Metro Manila.
Sias contentions are bereft of merit. His words cannot hide the oppressive acts obviously directed to deprive Ms. Damasco
of her employment and erode her dignity as a worker.
It is now axiomatic that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[14] A formal or trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.[15]
As noted by the Solicitor General and petitioner Damasco, the labor arbiter set the case several times for preliminary
conference but the parties failed to reached an amicable settlement.[16] The labor arbiter then ordered the parties to submit their
position papers. In compliance therewith, the parties submitted position papers where they set out and argued the factual as
well as the legal bases of their position. Damasco filed her position paper, computation of money claims and affidavit. For his
part, Sia filed his position paper and affidavit. Damasco, in turn, filed her affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Sia. After both
parties had filed their replies, the case was deemed submitted for resolution as the labor arbiter did not find it necessary to
conduct a trial-type hearing. Note that the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfills the requirements of due
process.[17] Further, it is within the discretion of the labor arbiter to determine if there is a need for a hearing. [18] Thus, we
cannot subscribe to Sias posturing that the labor arbiter gravely abused its discretion when he dispensed with the hearing to
receive further evidence.[19]
Moreover, Sia was given additional opportunity to argue his case on appeal before the NLRC in a memorandum and
motion for reconsideration which pleadings were likewise considered by that labor agency in the course of resolving the case.
Sia cannot thereafter interpose lack of due process since he was given sufficient time and ample chances to be heard in the
present case. Consequently, the alleged defect in the proceedings in the labor arbiter, if there be any, should be deemed
cured.[20] All told, Sias due process argument must fail.
On Sias assertion that the labor arbiters finding is not supported by ample evidence, suffice it to state that judicial review
of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and NLRC based their
determinations.[21] Moreover, this Court does not review supposed errors in the decision of the NLRC which raise factual
issues because findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality aside
from the consideration that this Court is not a trier of facts.[22] In any case, in our view, the labor arbiter used every reasonable
means to ascertain the facts by giving the parties ample opportunity to present evidence. It is worth stressing that in
controversies between a worker and her employer doubts reasonably arising from evidence or in the interpretation of
agreements should be resolved in the formers favor.[23] Thus, the labor arbiter had reasonable ground to sustain the version of
Ms. Damasco on how she was unceremoniously dismissed from her job. Furthermore, Sia did not quite succeed to convince
theNLRC to rule otherwise. Finally, the mere fact that the worker seeks reinstatement and backpay directly rebuts the
employers bare claim of abandonment by the worker of his employment.
Thus, going now to the specific issue of abandonment, we find no merit in Sias allegation that Ms. Damasco abandoned
her job. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor when manifested by some overt acts.[24] Abandoning ones job means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of
the employee to resume his employment and the burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on
the part of the employee to discontinue employment.
In this case, there are no overt acts established by Sia from which we can infer the clear intention of Damasco to desist
from employment. Sias letters dated January 7 and 15, 1993, for Damasco to report for work deserve scant consideration.
Note that those orders were made four months after Damasco was told not to show herself again in the store, and after Sia
had received a copy of Damascos complaint for illegal dismissal. It is indeed highly incredible for an employer to require his
employee without an approved leave to report to work only after four months of absence. If at all, the charge of abandonment
is disingenuous to say the least. Moreover, as noted by the NLRC, it was unlikely that Damasco had abandoned her job for
no reason at all considering the hardship of the times. In addition, if Damasco had truly forsaken her job, she would not have

26
bothered to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against her employer and prayed for reinstatement. An employee who
forthwith took steps to protect her layoff could not by any logic be said to have abandoned her work. [25]
As to Sias allegation that Ms. Damasco committed serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful order in
connection with her work, we find no tenable support. Even if Sia directed her to be assigned at his store in Metro Manila, her
act of refusing to be detailed in Metro Manila could hardly be characterized a willful or intentional disobedience of her
employers order. It was Sias order that appears to us whimsical if not vindictive. Reassignment to Metro Manila is prejudicial
to Ms. Damasco, as she and her family are residing in Olongapo City. This would entail separation from her family and
additional expenses on her part for transportation and food. Damascos reassignment order was unreasonable, considering the
attendant circumstances.[26]
In sum, we conclude there is no valid and just cause to terminate the employment of Ms. Damasco. The NLRC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in upholding the finding of the labor arbiter that Ms. Damascos dismissal was not for cause.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges as well as to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. [27]
However, in our view, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of Ms. Damasco.
Antagonism caused a severe strain in the relationship between her and her employer. A more equitable disposition would be
an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) months pay for every year of service with the employer. [28]
Now, as regards Ms. Damascos contention that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in deleting the award for
overtime pay for lack of factual basis, we find the same impressed with merit. We note that Sia has admitted in his pleadings
that Damascos work starts at 8:30 in the morning and ends up at 6:30 in the evening daily, except holidays and Sundays.
However, Sia claims that Damascos basic salary of P140.00 a day is more than enough to cover the one hour excess work
which is the compensation they allegedly agreed upon.[29]
Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case
are conclusive, no further evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to
have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[30] In view of Sias formal admission that Ms.
Damasco worked beyond eight hours daily, the latter is entitled to overtime compensation. No further proof is required. Sia
already admitted she worked an extra hour daily. Thus, public respondent gravely erred in deleting the award of overtime pay
to Ms. Damasco on the pretext that the claim has no factual basis.
Still, even assuming that Damasco received a wage which is higher than the minimum provided by law, it does not follow
that any additional compensation due her can be offset by her pay in excess of the minimum, in the absence of an express
agreement to that effect. Moreover, such arrangement, if there be any, must appear in the manner required by law on how
overtime compensation must be determined. For it is necessary to have a clear and definite delineation between an employees
regular and overtime compensation to thwart violation of the labor standards provision of the Labor Code.[31]
With regard to the award of attorneys fees the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees is provided for in Article 111 of the Labor
Code. Considering the circumstances of this case, said award is in order.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 115755, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in favor of
petitioner Imelda B. Damasco dated September 2, 1993 is REINSTATED in full. In G.R. No. 116101, the petition of Bonifacio
K. Sia and Manila Glass Supply is DISSMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners Bonifacio K. Sia and Manila
Glass Supply.
SO ORDERED.

o Compressed Workweek (CWW) Dole Advisory No. 02-04

 Undertime Not Offset by Overtime

o Rationale:
 NWSA vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766

FACTS: Petitioner National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
under Republic Act No. 1383, while respondent NWSA Consolidated Unions are various labor organizations composed of
laborers and employees of the NAWASA. The other respondents are intervenors Jesus Centeno, et al., hereinafter referred to
as intervenors.

The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC) conducted a hearing on the controversy then existing between petitioner and
respondent unions specifically the implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law (Republic Act No. 1880)
Respondent intervenors filed a petition in intervention on the issue of additional compensation for night work.

27
The court ruled that “The NAWASA is an agency not performing governmental functions and, therefore, is liable to pay
additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays conformably to Commonwealth Act No. 444, known as the
Eight-Hour Labor Law, even if said days should be within the staggered five-work days authorized by the President; the
intervenors do not fall within the category of “managerial employees” as contemplated in Republic Act 2377 and so are not
exempt from the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law”

ISSUE: Whether the intervenors are “managerial employees” within the meaning of Republic Act 2377 and, therefore, not
entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended;

HELD: NO.
Section 2 of Republic Act 2377 provides.
“Sec. 2.This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the
exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, managerial employees outside sales personnel,
domestic servants — persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him.
“The term ‘managerial employee’ in this Act shall mean either (a) any person whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, or (b) any
officer or member of the managerial staff.”

One of the distinguishing characteristics by which a managerial employee may be known as expressed in the explanatory note
of Republic Act No. 2377 is that he is not subject to the rigid observance of regular office hours. The true worth of his service
does not depend so much on the time he spends in office but more on the results he accomplishes. In fact, he is free to go out
of office anytime.

NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES COVERED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 444. — Employees who have little
freedom of action and whose main function is merely to carry out the company’s orders, plans and policies, are not managerial
employees and hence are covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444.
The philosophy behind the exemption of managerial employees from the 8-Hour Labor Law is that such workers are not
usually employed for every hour of work but their compensation is determined considering their special training, experience
or knowledge which requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, or perform work related to management
policies or general business operations along specialized or technical lines. For these workers it is not feasible to provide a
fixed hourly rate of pay or maximum hours of labor.

The intervenors herein are holding position of responsibility. One of them is the Secretary of the Board of Directors. Another
is the private secretary of the general manager. Another is a public relations officer, and many chiefs of divisions or sections
and others are supervisors and overseers. Respondent court, however, after examining carefully their respective functions,
duties and responsibilities found that their primary duties do not bear any direct relation with the management of the
NAWASA, nor do they participate in the formulation of its policies nor in the hiring and firing of its employees. The chiefs
of divisions and sections are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their execution. Hence, it
concludes, they have little freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the company’s orders, plans and
policies.

 Emergency Overtime Work

 Computation of Additional Compensation

28