Rule 111 Sections

2-3
Republic of the Philippines
 The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a
SUPREME COURT
 certification against forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss
Manila the case;9 and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the
criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
FIRST DIVISION
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court requires a
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the
ECCI), petitioner, 

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on
vs.

February 8, 199411 by extending the requirement to all initiatory pleadings
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis
filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court
Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
and the Court of Appeals.
PARDO, J.:
Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in
The Case her complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing,
the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit
the Court of Appeals.12 Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is
Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the order1 of the
inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for
three days before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the circular.13
reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of
injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is
The Facts
sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa2 against injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.
Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta 14

Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."15 This
amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for
is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission
deposit with the teller of petitioner.
of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.16
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint3 against
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
certification against forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular
"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
No. 28-91.4
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order5 dismissing Civil Case deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
No. CV-94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
reconsideration6 of the order. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." [Emphasis
supplied]
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order7 granting respondent's
motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that —
Hence, this petition.8
The Issues

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Rule 111 Sections
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"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil Davide, Jr., C. J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago., JJ., concur.
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.17
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."18
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.19
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33
of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no
reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
order dated February 21, 1997.20
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Rule 111
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Republic of the Philippines
 ‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum
SUPREME COURT
 of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, 
 ‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum
vs.
 of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted
out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability
of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang]
was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum
of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income
for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further
sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
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Sections
of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of
income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the
further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of P170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00
as moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income,
and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as
medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her
loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctor’s
fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for
medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as
actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for
hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner
of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;
Rule 111
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to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
actual damages;’
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is
worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998,
the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s]
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from
filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The
motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999.
On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant
motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also
of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
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"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158
SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant
case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on
the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.
10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment
with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the
same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
Rule 111
2-3
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded
resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his
counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision
of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x
x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15
days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot
seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7
of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned
his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
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Sections
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken
by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein,
or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according
to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x xxx x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
Rule 111 Sections
2-3
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved
and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here
of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA and from
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s finding of
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31
deemed included therein.
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
to bring such action. render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power
than once for the same act or omission.24
to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
remaining civil interest therein.25
his consent.
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently,
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion -- including the appeal. Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a
the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived
employee.
his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even
be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did
by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them.
not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or
circumstances is not possible.
by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an x x x."37
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

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Rule 111
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hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal
case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his
right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers
in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,
petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latter’s insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in
the cases to which they are applicable.45Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability
of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot
be separated from that of the employee.49
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Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not
been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action.
But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party
and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be
done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal
and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature;
its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for
its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to
be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is
highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate
that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to
and dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
Rule 111 Sections
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It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements
must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be
followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that
the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a
passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner’s
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt
against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines
 In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
SUPREME COURT
 affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the
Manila death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil
liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
EN BANC
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
statute. It reads, in part:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
vs.

extinguished. — Criminal liability is
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
totally extinguished:
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the
ROMERO, J.: offender occurs before final judgment;
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
1992 at 

is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment."
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
executory?
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
which the civil liability is based.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of penas personales siempre, y respecto a
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil fallecimiento no hubiere
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the recaido sentencia firme.
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil
xxx xxx xxx
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
rendered. "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

9 | Page
Rule 111 Sections
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XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
the ready answer: It says: criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People
vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964.
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que
See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
no haberse utilizado por las partes
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella
action is based solely on the felony committed and of
dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
concedidos al efecto.
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought
confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then,
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una
if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory,
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. 

"there cannot be any determination by final judgment
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
proceeding."
p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco,
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860) This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the
Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison,
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
accused pending appeal of said cases.
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
his right to appeal."
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this
against him.
court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final

10 | P a g e
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judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication,
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility,
the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes
the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in
instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
11 | P a g e
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accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws
of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the
accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his
death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court
relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant
whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money
may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of
the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the
rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether
the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with
the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed
from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
Rule 111
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ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the
civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals,
L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence
to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
12 | P a g e
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criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire
appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of
our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of
the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed
irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section
21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex
delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the
civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the
question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction.
This is because whether asserted in 

the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso
Rule 111
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facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims
from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be
determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the
civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and
is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life
from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed
the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30.
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as
that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article
30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the
main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis
of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis
of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently,
although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
13 | P a g e
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Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action
already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil
actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As
correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
Rule 111
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justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before
the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in
light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
"What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil
liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from
delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate
of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction
of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending
finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
14 | P a g e
Sections
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in
recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action
based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against
the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim
to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or
tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same
act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Rule 111 Sections
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4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal
is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
 "WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt,
SUPREME COURT
 the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Manila RECLUSION PERPETUA and such penalties accessory thereto as may be
provided for by law.
THIRD DIVISION
The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
G.R. No. 136843 September 28, 2000
Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 
 and to pay the costs."6
vs.

Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14,
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO
1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison
RAGONTON Jr., accused,

(NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant.
Brief7 before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other
RESOLUTION hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief8 on February 4, 2000. The case was
deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received
PANGANIBAN, J.:
the Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief.
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of
In a letter dated August 7, 2000,9 however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant
conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict
director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant
or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be
Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the
dismissed.
letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.
The Case and the Facts
Issue
Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision1 of the
The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the
Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,2 in Criminal Case
case and on the appeal.
No. V-0447, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the This Court's Ruling
deceased.
The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal
In an Information3 dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict
charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (civil liability ex delicto).
(both at large), with murder committed as follows:
Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal
"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan,
The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of
Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, "Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, totally extinguished:
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death, to
the offender occurs before final judgment;
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
xxx xxx x x x"
"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."4
Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas10 made the following
With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty
pronouncements:
upon his arraignment on April 30, 1993.5After trial on the merits, the trial
court rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion "1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
of which reads as follows: criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final

16 | P a g e
Rule 111 Sections
2-3
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan)
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
delicto in senso strictiore.'" Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of SO ORDERED.
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription."
In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition
in Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability.
Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the
crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be
added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action
against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him.11 Necessarily, the lower court's
Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetuaand to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual.

17 | P a g e
Rule 111
2-3
Republic of the Philippines
 2. LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National Defense to "take over or
SUPREME COURT
 control, or cause the taking over and control of all x x x newspapers,
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133347 October 15, 2008
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR.,
AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, petitioners, 
 to re-open, ABS-CBN on October 31, 1972, terminated the services of all its
vs.
 employees, giving each employee his/her retirement benefits. Corollary
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL
B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY)
TAN,* respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
challenging the Joint Resolution1 dated May 2, 1997 of then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto in OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners against private respondents, and the Order2 denying their motion
for reconsideration.
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, i.e., the
declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos and the
simultaneous sequestration of not a few private corporations, including one
of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN).
On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto
Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN,
executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private respondents
Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V. Gonzalez, and Salvador
(Buddy) Tan with the following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by Means of Violence or
Intimidation; (b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308
- Theft; (d) Article 302 - Robbery; (e) Article 312 - Occupation of Real
Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other
Deceits.
Individual petitioners' complaint-affidavits3 uniformly narrated the following
facts:
1. The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972,
just before midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast
Center in Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers and
personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of the premises by virtue of
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the
closure of all radio and television stations in the country.
18 | P a g e
Sections
magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of
communications" throughout the country. Consequently, a total of seven (7)
television stations owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down by
the government.4
3. When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit
thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of
ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,5 of
their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the government. In that same month,
however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at
Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape therefrom on
September 30, 1977.
4. Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos
government did not materialize, ABS-CBN started negotiations with then
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, who expressed his desire
and intention to acquire the former. However, the negotiations with Kokoy
Romualdez in 1973 likewise did not result in the sale and re-opening of ABS-
CBN.
5. On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations of Kanlaon
Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City were
consumed by fire. KBS was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group
of broadcasting companies, including Radio Philippines Network (RPN),
6 which operated TV Channel 9, the only television station allowed to
continue operating during the early years of the martial law regime.
Respondent Benedicto, then Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed,
controlled, and was one of the principal stockholders of RPN.
6. On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, who at that time
was Chairperson of the Board of Directors (BOD) of ABS-CBN, were in
Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his emissary to the Lopezes,
relaying his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in Quezon
City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time as may be
necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.
7. On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other officers and executives of
ABS-CBN, including herein petitioners Oscar and Augusto Lopez, informing
them of Benedicto's request. Oscar and Augusto, and the rest of the ABS-
CBN management team, strongly opposed the request. Eventually, however,
when Montelibano mentioned that Malacañang and Romualdez had cleared
said request, the possibility of a government-ordered confiscation of ABS-
CBN, and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio Lopez, Jr.,
petitioners Oscar and Augusto, as with the rest of ABS-CBN's executives,
acquiesced to Benedicto's request.
Rule 111
2-3
8. Thus, at noontime on the same day, representatives of KBS headed by
Jose Montalvo arrived at the Meralco Building to finalize the proposed
arrangement with ABS-CBN. The transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is
evidenced by a letter-agreement dated June 8, 1973, which reads in relevant
part:
This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between RPN and ABS-
CBN to the following effect:
1. Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby conveys to
RPN by way of lease its TV and radio equipment (excluding TV
channels and radio frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN
Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City (collectively called
the "leased facilities") listed in the schedule attached hereto and
marked as Annex "A".
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable
compensation for the use of the leased facilities. The amount of the
rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador
Roberto Benedicto.
3. The term of this lease shall commence on the date hereof and
continue for such reasonable time as may be normally necessary
for the rehabilitation of RPN's facilities unless an earlier period may
be fixed by RPN and ABS-CBN after discussion with Ambassador
Benedicto.
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the
leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and
damages to such facilities.
xxxx
6. Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return the possession
of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN and vacate the same without
the need of notice or demand.
7. ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, shall
have the right to select and designate the personnel (not to exceed
20 at any one time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and
radio equipment.
xxxx
10. ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the Broadcast Center at
any reasonable time during the term of this lease for the purpose of
determining compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.
xxxx
12. RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of ABS-CBN,
sub-lease the leased facilities or any part thereof nor shall any part
19 | P a g e
Sections
be removed from the premises except the equipment, which are
intended for operation the Broadcast Center in due course of
operations.
9. Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard pressed to negotiate and
fix the monthly rental rate. Several attempts by Oscar to set up a meeting
with Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved unsuccessful.
10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting between Oscar and
Benedicto finally materialized on October 31, 1973. At that meeting, the
discussion not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the lease of the
ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included the possibility of an outright sale.
11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations stopped as none of the
petitioners were able to meet anew with Benedicto who had supposedly
referred the matter to "people above" and the "man on top."
12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Tañada, as counsel for ABS-CBN, in
May 1976, wrote Benedicto demanding vacation of the ABS-CBN Broadcast
Center and payment of back rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN studios and
facilities.
13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on behalf of Benedicto, met
with Senator Tañada in June 1976. Another meeting took place between the
parties' respective counsels which included respondent Gonzales, another
counsel for Benedicto. Despite these meetings, no agreement was reached
between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from June 8, 1973, the
time KBS occupied the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City, no rental was paid
by the former to the latter.
14. In the years following until the Marcos government was toppled in 1986,
the ABS-CBN stations were transferred to the National Media Production
Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio Cendaña of the Ministry of Information.
Starting in January 1980, KBS, on a staggered basis, transferred
possession, control and management of ABS-CBN's provincial television
stations to NMPC. Some of the radio stations of ABS-CBN were turned over
to the government's Bureau of Broadcast, while some were retained by KBS
thru the Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Philippines
Network (RPN).
15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in 1979-1980, and a visit by
ABS-CBN executives at ABS-CBN's radio transmitting stations in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto, on August 13, 1984,
ABS-CBN properties and massive equipment were found to be missing. In
addition, the musical records and radio dramas accumulated by ABS-CBN in
a span of twenty-five (25) years and stored in its library were now gone.
16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-
CBN through Senator Tañada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV
stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.
Rule 111
2-3
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed
their respective counter-affidavits,7 with Benedicto adopting that of
Gonzales', denying petitioners' charges, and averring that:
1. The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement was a free and
voluntary act of ABS-CBN which agreed thereto fully expecting remuneration
in the form of rentals, thus:
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable
compensation for the use of the lease facilities. The amount of the
rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador
Roberto Benedicto.
2. In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for KBS, RPN and
Benedicto, participated in the negotiations and was present at three (3)
meetings for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were former Senator
Estanislao Fernandez, specially engaged to represent RPN and Benedicto,
and Senator Tañada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.
3. Initially, the discussions centered on the possible formulas for the fixing of
rentals. Later on, however, before an agreement on the rental rate could be
reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of an outright sale. The
discussions on the sale were expanded as various creditors of ABS-CBN
had made and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then Comptroller
of KBS-RPN.
4. However, the discussions were discontinued when then Secretary of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reminded KBS of the sequestered
status of ABS-CBN facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the use
and lease thereof should be taken up with the government.8
5. Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile authorized KBS, acting
on behalf of BBC, to make use of the ABS-CBN provincial stations which
were not covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The authorization
was granted in connection with the increased undertakings assigned by the
Department of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for the
government's mass-media developmental peace and order nationwide
campaign.
7. Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABS-CBN studios and
turned over the properties to George Viduya, the general manager of the
government station GTV-4. Viduya continued operations of GTV-4 at the
ABS-CBN properties, after which, the properties were all delivered in 1979 to
the NMPC headed by Cendaña. The provincial stations were delivered and
turned over on a staggered basis, with the DZRI station in Dagupan handed
over in 1979. The successive transfer of all ABS-CBN studios and stations,
in Quezon City and the provinces, were covered by receipts which were
collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales retained by KBS for that
purpose.
20 | P a g e
Sections
8. The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only three (3) juridical entities,
RPN, ABS-CBN and the government. The charges leveled by petitioners in
their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability as specified in the letter-
agreement itself:
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the
leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and
damages to such facilities.
On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not support the elements of
the crimes charged.
9. Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute immunity to Benedicto as
part of the Compromise Agreement in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
which states:
The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized
under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and
employees of the corporations above mentioned, who are included
in past, present and future cases and investigations of the
Philippine Government, such that there shall be no criminal
investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts,
omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be
alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset
treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.
Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint reply-affidavit refuted respondents'
counter-affidavits. Contrary to respondents' allegations, petitioners reiterated
Benedicto's over-all ploy, in conspiracy with the other respondents who were
officers of KBS and/or RPN, to use and occupy ABS-CBN properties without
paying compensation therefor. Petitioners maintain that respondents' grand
scheme was to take-over ABS-CBN, albeit ostensibly covered by the letter-
lease agreement, giving the take over a semblance of legality.
Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the
herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the
Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable
cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged:
1. The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any illegal take-over
of the ABS-CBN complex.
While the Lopezes are now complaining that the letter-agreement
was virtually forced unto them thru intimidation, hence, the vitiated
consent of Mr. Montelibano, there is nothing however which the
complainants adduced to prove this allegation except their
threadbare allegations of threats. On the contrary, it appears that
the Lopezes blessed the letter-agreement hoping that their financial
Rule 111
2-3
difficulties with respect to the affairs of the ABS-CBN and their
problem concerning the continued detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr.
by the military, would at least be mitigated. x x x
It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely leased by
Montelibano upon consultation with the Lopezes who entertained
some ulterior motives of their own which they expect would result
from the agreement, either directly or indirectly. Of course, the
Lopezes may not have realized some of these expectations (i.e.,
the rentals, the release of Eugenio, Jr. from detention) but this does
not change the fact that the parties' consent to the contract appears
to have been freely given. Perforce, the complaint under Article 298
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines must fail.
2. Other TV and radio stations were taken over pursuant to LOI 1-A,
hence no violations of Art. 312, 302 and 308 of RPC.
To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the
respondents contended that their use of ABS-CBN's facilities other
than those included in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the
authority of the then Department of National Defense (DND). There
is no denying that all of the ABS-CBN properties including the
provincial ones are under sequestration pursuant to Presidential
Letter of Instruction No. 1-A, issued on September 28, 1972. It was
under the strength of this Presidential Letter of Instruction that KBS-
RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate the facilities of
ABS-CBN. This was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile in his letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976. Unmistakably, KBS-
RPN's possession of the ABS-CBN's property other than those in
the ABS-CBN complex is primarily anchored on the authority
pursuant to LOI 1-A. With this apparent authority, this investigation
can not see in any which way how the respondents could have
illegally taken over the properties of the [petitioners], particularly
those in the province; there is therefore no convincing proof to
support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. It
may come to mind that "occupation of real property or usurpation of
real rights in property" under Article 312 requires as one of its
elements the presence of violence against or intimidation of
persons as a means in securing real property or rights belonging to
another. Plainly, this element is not shown. The complainants may
have felt intimidated by the sequestration order, but it is in the
nature of such Order to be coercive. It was an act flowing from the
martial law powers of then President Marcos.
3. No unlawful taking as to justify charges for Robbery or Theft.
Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the Revised Penal
Code were also attributed by the [petitioners] against the
respondents. From the records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has
21 | P a g e
Sections
juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject of this
complaint; a right which can be validly set-up even against ABS-
CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBS-RPN was authorized to
enter, occupy and operate ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the
authority granted by the President, pursuant to LOI No. 1-A. Aside,
the Broadcast Center itself was covered by the lease-agreement.
Under these situations, there is obviously no basis to charge the
respondents for robbery and theft; for these penal offense require
as an element the act of unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation
is simply poles apart from the juridical possession which KBS-RPN
enjoyed over the properties.
4. No deceit was employed to gain possession of the Broadcast
Center and the provincial TV and radio stations.
In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315, paragraphs 2(a),
3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that
the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement of fraudulent
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or, at least
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainants, it
being essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the complainants to part with the thing. If there be no such
prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent representation,
any subsequent act of the respondent, however fraudulent or
suspicious it may appear, can not serve as basis for the
prosecution of these crimes.
[From petitioners' complaint-affidavits], it is very clear that the late
Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with Roberto
Benedicto, preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As
the complainants did not identify exactly which constitute the
deceitful act (or the intimidation) which could have induced the
Lopezes into accepting the lease agreement, in most probability,
the occurrences which vitiated their consent happened during this
preliminary discussion. Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo
Montelibano, the one who supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is
testifying on the alleged "veiled threat" or deceits, if there are.
Precisely, because he is already dead.
x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on
something which are not derived from their own personal
perception. The bottomline is that what they are now trying to
adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits [or intimidation] attending
the negotiation of the lease agreement are purely hearsay. This is a
matter which only Alfredo Montelibano could testify competently.9
The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the defenses of prescription and
immunity from suit raised by the respondents given his dismissal of the
Rule 111
2-3
complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a subsequent Order denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution, the
Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel's ratiocination for
dismissing the complaint-affidavits, thus:
Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the corporation in
which respondent Benedicto has substantial interests. In fact, it was
one of the subject matters of the Compromise Agreement reached
by the government and respondent Benedicto in Sandiganbayan
Civil Case no. 34.
In that Compromise Agreement, for and in consideration of
respondent Benedicto's cession of equities, and assignment of his
rights and interest in corporations therein listed, among them RPN,
the government extended "absolute immunity" to Benedicto,
including officers of his corporations as therein mentioned, "such
that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against
said persons for acts or omissions committed prior to February 25,
1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including
but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the
acquisition of any asset treated or included in this Agreement."
In effect, the People of the Philippines as the offended party in
criminal cases has waived its right to proceed criminally against
Benedicto, et. al., for whatever crime they may have committed
relative to, among others, the alleged plunder of ABS-CBN
properties. Again, whatever liability that remains thereabout on
respondents' part is perforce only civil in nature.10
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in
the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and Order.
Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the
respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in compliance with
Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the
Court of their clients' demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death
(With Prayer for Dismissal)12 moving that Benedicto be dropped as
respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal
cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of
the party accused."
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent,
citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the
accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the
extinguishment of civil obligations."
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil
liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his criminal
liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
14
Sections
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
[de]privation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench
survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of
merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The
Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute respondents for
various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed
instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives

22 | P a g e
Rule 111
2-3
the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action,16 is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death of the accused
necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him,
regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which
survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation
provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil
action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be
prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based
solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action
cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,18 taking cognizance
of respondent Benedicto's death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that the
latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well
as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to
92-101969 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in
People v. Bayotas19 by filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim against
the estate of respondent Benedicto.20 The claim against the estate of
Benedicto is based on contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in
consonance with Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the
dropping of respondents Benedicto and Tan as parties herein is in order.
We now come to the core issue of whether the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint against the
respondents. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional
officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."22 The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment of broad
investigative authority is to insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom
that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in
the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.23
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto,24 we
dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested
primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis that
the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free
23 | P a g e
Sections
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the
Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the
complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance.
Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint
should it be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court
will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman's
powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo
v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by private complainants.25
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers vested
by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman's exercise of
discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except when the exercise
thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.26 In this regard,
Rule 111 Sections
2-3
petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection with this
grave abuse, of discretion. ubiquitous letter-agreement.30
Apart from a blanket and general charge that remaining respondents herein, In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the
Gonzales and Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter egos of allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of
Benedicto, petitioners' complaint-affidavits are bereft of sufficient ground to criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners'
engender a well-founded belief that crimes have been committed and the complaint-affidavits.
respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably guilty thereof and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
should be held for trial.27 Certainly, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private respondents
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint-affidavits.
without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective
From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil that petitioners seek to estates. The assailed Joint Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in
attach criminal liability to an unequivocally civil undertaking gone awry. As OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.
pointed out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners may not have
SO ORDERED.
realized their expectations in entering into the June 8, 1973 letter-
agreement, such does not render their consent thereto defective.
The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is connected with
respondents' culpability for the felonies charged as these include the
element of whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN
properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not freely give their consent
to the letter-agreement. However, on more than one occasion, petitioners
have invoked the letter-agreement's provisions, and made claims
thereunder.
First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fixing of the rental
rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City as provided in paragraph 2 of
the letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners' counsel wrote a demand letter
to respondents for the payment of rentals for the latter's occupation and use
of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. Last and most
importantly, petitioners have made a claim against the estate of Benedicto
based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.
This action of petitioners clearly evinces their ratification of the letter-
agreement. As previously discussed, the civil liability of respondents
Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was
extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities founded on other
sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be
prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased if based on contract,
28 or against the executors and administrators of the deceased's estate if

based on quasi-delict.29
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of
martial law and the toppling of the Marcos government, and advanced the
validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto,
they cannot, in the same breath, aver that respondents' actuations in the
execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-
agreement was more ostensible than real and to insist on the prosecution of

24 | P a g e
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2-3
Republic of the Philippines
 sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death; P200,000.00 as moral
SUPREME COURT
 damages; P378,956.50 as actual damages in connection with his
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175784 August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.4
vs.

JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is an appeal filed by Jaime Ayochok y Tauli (Ayochok) assailing
the Decision1 dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00949, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jaime Ayochok y Tauli,"
which affirmed with modifications the Decision dated August 13, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No.
18658-R.2 The RTC found Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder.
In an Amended Information3 dated September 21, 2001, Prosecutor
Benedicto T. Carantes charged Ayochok with Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and by means of treachery and with cruelty by
deliberately and inhumanly outraging at the victim, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot SPO1 CLAUDIO
CALIGTAN y NGODO in the following manner, to wit: that while the victim
was relieving himself with his back turned to the accused, the latter coming
from the blind side of the victim, shoot him several times hitting him on the
different parts of his body and there was no opportunity or means to defend
himself from the treacherous act of the assailant, thereby inflicting upon the
latter: hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage; multiple gunshot
wounds on the head, neck, and upper extremities which directly caused his
death.
When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty.
After trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 18658-R, the RTC rendered a
Decision on August 13, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, qualified by treachery
as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased SPO1 Claudio Caligtan the
25 | P a g e
Sections
death; P2,573,096.40 as unearned income, all indemnifications being
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The accused Jaime Ayochok being a detention prisoner is entitled to be
credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in
Ayochok was committed at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on
October 31, 2003.
The case was directly elevated to us for automatic review and was docketed
as G.R. No. 161469. However, pursuant to our decision in People v.
Mateo5 – which modified the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment – G.R. No. 161469 was transferred to the Court of Appeals,
6 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00949.
In its Decision dated June 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the RTC judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision subject of
this review is hereby AFFIRMED, save for several modifications in the civil
aspect. Accordingly, the civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00; moral
damages reduced to P50,000.00; actual damages reduced to P144,375.75
and unearned income reduced to P2,571,696.10.7
Initially, Ayochok filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 of the foregoing
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, however, Ayochok filed a
Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal9 since
he believed there was no chance that the appellate court would reverse
itself, and prayed that the case already be forwarded to us instead. In a
Resolution dated June 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied Ayochok’s
Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal. In
another Resolution dated August 11, 2006, the appellate court denied
Ayochok’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated June 28, 2005.
Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals
conveying his intention to appeal to us the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of
said court. On December 29, 2006, the Judicial Records Division of the
Court of Appeals elevated to us the original records of CA-G.R. CR No.
00949,10 and Ayochok’s appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 175784.
On February 12, 2007, we required the parties in G.R. No. 175784 to file
their supplemental briefs. 11
Ayochok filed his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief12 on May 31, 2007, while
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation13 on March 29, 2007,
stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief given that its
Rule 111
2-3
Appellee’s Brief, originally filed in G.R. No. 161469, is adequate to ventilate
the People’s cause. On August 6, 2007, we submitted G.R. No. 175784 for
resolution.14
However, in a letter dated February 16, 2010, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant
Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us
that Ayochok had died on January 15, 2010 at the Philippine General
Hospital, Manila. A copy of the death report signed by a medical officer of the
New Bilibid Prison Hospital was attached to said letter.
In a Resolution dated April 28, 2010, we noted the letter and required the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to submit a certified true copy of
Ayochok’s death certificate from the local civil registrar within five days from
notice of the said resolution.
On June 22, 2010, Melind M. Alipe, Head of the Medical and Dental Division
of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, submitted a certified true copy of
the death certificate of Ayochok.
Given Ayochok’s death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of
such death on the present appeal.
Ayochok’s death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal,
extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of murder committed
against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N. Caligtan, but also his civil liability
solely arising from or based on said crime.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment.
Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in
People v. Bayotas15:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
26 | P a g e
Sections
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.16
Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule
on Ayochok’s appeal.1âwphi1 Whether or not he was guilty of the crime
charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Ayochok had
incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death.
Moreover, because Ayochok’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment
of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liability
arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise
extinguished by his death.
Consequently, the appealed Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00949 – finding Ayochok guilty of Murder,
sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victim –
had become ineffectual.17
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-appellant Jaime Ayochok y
Tauli, the Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00949 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 18658-R before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.