Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 6

P7 Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR No.

203335, 2014

DOCTRINE: The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Clearly, what the section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use,
misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

FACTS: Consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. But, petitioners claim that
the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Among the issues raised by petitioners is Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law which provides for (b) Computer-related Offenses:
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the constitutional right to due process

RULING: No. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his
contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those
who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how
government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
process of law. Clearly, what the section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying
data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.

P7 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015

DOCTRINE: JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being
repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Compostela Valley Province, Region XI. He later
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Tagum City; Davao City; and,
Agusan Del Sur. In a letter, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included
in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion
in the list of considered applicants.

The petitioner was informed through a latter that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was
excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to the Court. In his petition, he argued that the Constitution already
prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; that the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal
protection and due process clause. He also contended that the policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-
submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).

ISSUE: Whether the requirement imposed by the JBC constitutionally violates the right to due process

RULING: No. The assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined
to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants
to second-level courts should have been published. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation. Rule 9 is the special guidelines for nomination to a
vacancy in the court of appeals and sandiganbayan. The express declaration of the guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly
published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere
internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published.

P7 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146 (2014)


DOCTINE: A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. In determining whether the words used in a statute are
vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It
is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment

FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as
it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. Particularly, petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers
from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider."
They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

ISSUE: Whether he RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

RULING: NO. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to “private health care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
P7.1 Bureau of Customs v. Teves, GR 181704, December 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 or Attrition Act of 200 that was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the
fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents. BOCEA argued,
among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required
quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective
families prejudice.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to equal protection

RULING: No. Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada: The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,
that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the
law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection

P7.1 Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (supra)

DOCTRINE: In administrative proceedings, the line of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity
to explain one’s side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements
of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard

FACTS: In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA). Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on led before the IAD-ODESLA,
a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. In defense,
Pichay led a Motion to Dismiss manifesting that a case involving the same transaction is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichay’s right to due process and the equal protection of the laws

RULING: Pichay’s right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him. In administrative proceedings, the line of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain one’s side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of
due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Also, Pichay
is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government from non-
presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government.

P7.1 Alvez v. People 677 SCRA 673

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
P7.2 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236

DOCTRINE: The statute served a secular purpose and did not violate the establishment clause. the primary purpose of the statute
was the improvement of education for all children. The books in question were not religious, and the law itself did not promote any
religion.

FACTS: The New York law in question, through a 1965 Amendment, ordered public school officials to lend textbooks, without
charge, to all students in grades 7 through 12, including those in parochial schools. The Board of Education of Central School District
No. 1 and other school boards subsequently filed suit; James Allen, the state commissioner of education, was named as a respondent.
The school boards sought to have the law declared unconstitutional, to bar the commissioner from firing those who refused to comply
with the law, and to stop state funds from being used to purchase textbooks that would be lent to students in religious schools.
A trial court found the statute unconstitutional, but an appellate court held that the school boards had no standing to question the
validity of the statute and thus reversed the lower court’s decision. The case then moved to the New York Court of Appeals. That
court ruled that the school boards did have standing, but it found that the statute was constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the non-establishment clause.

RULING: No. The Court held that the primary purpose of the statute was the improvement of education for all children. The books
in question were not religious, and the law itself did not promote any religion. Moreover, the court held that because the books were
given to the children, the private schools did not receive any financial benefits. The Supreme Court thus found that the statute served
a secular purpose and did not violate the establishment clause. It further ruled that the school boards had presented no evidence that
the law “coerces them in any way in the practice of religion,” and thereby it dismissed the free-exercise claims. The decision of the
New York Court of Appeals was upheld.

P7.2 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602

DOCTRINE: The intrusion of the government into the running of non-public schools through grants and other funding creates the
entanglement that the Establishment Clause prohibits

FACTS: Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-
public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school
teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided
state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.

The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the
separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school.
The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax
payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First
Amendment.

ISSUE: Whether the statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment?

RULING: YES. Yes. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.
The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits
religion, and it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that both the state statutes in
question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education
requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but
it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount
of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would
require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the
Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial
involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state.

P7.2 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US 672


DOCTRINE: Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would
have the effect of advancing religion.

FACTS: The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provides federal construction grants for college and university facilities,
excluding "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . . primarily in connection
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity." The United States retains a 20-year interest in any facility
constructed with funds under the Act, and if, during this period, the recipient violates the statutory conditions, the Government is
entitled to recovery of funds. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut received federal construction grants for
five facilities. Appellants attempted to show, in a three-judge court, that the recipient institutions were "sectarian" by introducing
evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the curricula content, and other indicia of religious character. Appellee colleges
introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliations did not interfere
with their secular educational functions.

ISSUE: Whether the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?

RULING: No. The Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular
purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used
their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university
facility." The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were
less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require
constant state surveillance.